Bywater (OCT, 1894) · Ostwald (1962)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 9,Chapter 1 (1163b32–1164b21)
1163b
Ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον
ἰσάζει καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ
ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ
35 γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς.
Wherever friendships are dissimilar in kind, it is proportion which, as we have stated,427 establishes equality between the partners and preserves the friendship. In a friendship between fellow citizens, for example, a shoemaker receives 35 an equivalent recompense in exchange for his shoes, and the same is true of a weaver and of the other craftsmen.
1164a
1 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ
πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν
δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν
οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
5 πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος
πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν
ὃ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ. διὰ
ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν
10 μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.
ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται.
διαφέρονται δ' ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ
μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν
15 οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος,
καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς
ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι
ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς
ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὃ μὲν τέρψιν ὃ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὃ μὲν ἔχει
20 ὃ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν
γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου
γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί,
τοῦ προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ'
ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν·
25 ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἁδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν
ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν
τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." οἱ δὲ
προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν
διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι
30 γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο
δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν
δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν
μισθόν, μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς
δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς
35 προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ'
1 Now, in these cases money has been devised as a common measure, and, consequently, money is the standard to which everything is related and by which everything is measured. In the friendship between lovers, on the other hand, the lover sometimes complains that his most passionate affection is not returned, though it may quite well be that there is nothing lovable about him, 5 while frequently the complaint of the beloved is that the lover, who first promised everything, now fulfills none of his promises. Such situations arise when one partner's affection for the beloved is motivated by pleasure, while the other's affection for the lover is motivated by usefulness, and neither of them has the requisite quality ⟨which the other expects to find⟩. If this is the basis on which the friendship rests, the break comes as soon as 10 they do not attain the objective of their affection. For each loved the other not for what he was but for what he had to offer, and that was not something lasting, and, accordingly, such friendships do not last, either. But when friendship is based on character, it does last, as we have stated,428 because it is friendship for its own sake, ⟨in which each partner loves his friend for what he is⟩.
Differences arise when each partner gets something other ⟨than what he had expected⟩ and not what he desires. 15 Not to attain what we aim at is like getting nothing at all. It is as in the story of the man who made a promise to the harper: the better he would sing the more he would pay him. When the next morning the singer demanded fulfillment of the promise, the man replied that he had already repaid the pleasure ⟨he got from the singing⟩ with the pleasure ⟨he gave the singer in making him anticipate a reward⟩.429 Now all would be well, if this were what each partner wanted; but if one partner wants enjoyment and the other profit, and if one has what the other wants 20 but the other does not, then the terms of their association will not be properly met. For a man concentrates his efforts on whatever he happens to need, and he will give what he has in order to get it.
Which person should have the right of assessing the value of the benefit, the first giver or the first recipient? ⟨The latter,⟩ since the giver seems to be leaving it up to him. We are told that this is what Protagoras used to do: 25 after every course he taught he would tell the student to estimate how much the knowledge gained was worth to him, and that was the amount he would take as his fee.430 But in cases of this sort, some people like the principle: "Let the hire ⟨that has been promised⟩ to a friend ⟨be made good⟩."431 When people take the money first > When you deal with your brother, be pleasant, > but get a witness; for too much > trustfulness, and too much suspicion, > have proved men's undoing.
and then do not do any of the things they said they would because their promises were excessive, they of course get involved in 30 complaints, since they do not fulfill what they had agreed to. The Sophists no doubt are compelled to demand payment first, because ⟨otherwise⟩ no one would give money for their kind of knowledge. So when people are paid in advance, they are naturally involved in complaints if they took their pay without doing what they were paid to do.
When no agreement has been made regarding the service to be rendered, there is, as we said,432 no complaint against a person who 35 gives freely for his partner's sake, since a friendship based on excellence is free from complaints:
Differences arise when each partner gets something other ⟨than what he had expected⟩ and not what he desires. 15 Not to attain what we aim at is like getting nothing at all. It is as in the story of the man who made a promise to the harper: the better he would sing the more he would pay him. When the next morning the singer demanded fulfillment of the promise, the man replied that he had already repaid the pleasure ⟨he got from the singing⟩ with the pleasure ⟨he gave the singer in making him anticipate a reward⟩.429 Now all would be well, if this were what each partner wanted; but if one partner wants enjoyment and the other profit, and if one has what the other wants 20 but the other does not, then the terms of their association will not be properly met. For a man concentrates his efforts on whatever he happens to need, and he will give what he has in order to get it.
Which person should have the right of assessing the value of the benefit, the first giver or the first recipient? ⟨The latter,⟩ since the giver seems to be leaving it up to him. We are told that this is what Protagoras used to do: 25 after every course he taught he would tell the student to estimate how much the knowledge gained was worth to him, and that was the amount he would take as his fee.430 But in cases of this sort, some people like the principle: "Let the hire ⟨that has been promised⟩ to a friend ⟨be made good⟩."431 When people take the money first > When you deal with your brother, be pleasant, > but get a witness; for too much > trustfulness, and too much suspicion, > have proved men's undoing.
and then do not do any of the things they said they would because their promises were excessive, they of course get involved in 30 complaints, since they do not fulfill what they had agreed to. The Sophists no doubt are compelled to demand payment first, because ⟨otherwise⟩ no one would give money for their kind of knowledge. So when people are paid in advance, they are naturally involved in complaints if they took their pay without doing what they were paid to do.
When no agreement has been made regarding the service to be rendered, there is, as we said,432 no complaint against a person who 35 gives freely for his partner's sake, since a friendship based on excellence is free from complaints:
1164b
1 ἀρετὴν φιλία), τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν
(αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς)· οὕτω δ' ἔοικε
καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ'
ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμή τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ'
5 ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ
ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπί
τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν
ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι,
οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν,
10 ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου
τὴν ἡδονὴν εἵλετ' ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει τὴν παρὰ
τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον,
ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας
μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον
15 καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον
εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ
γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια·
ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν
20 οἱ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου
ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.
1 recompense must be made in terms of the giver's purpose or choice, for in a friend and in virtue it is the purpose that matters. This, it seems, is also the way it should be when ⟨teacher and student⟩ have studied philosophy together. For money is not the standard by which the worth ⟨of a teacher⟩ can be measured, and no honor could match what he has given. 5 Still, it is perhaps sufficient to make what return we can, just as we do in the case of the gods and our parents.
If the gift is not given for the sake of the recipient but on the understanding that there will be some recompense, the best thing would of course be that both partners regard the return as fair. But if they should not reach agreement, it would seem not only necessary 10 but just that the first recipient of a benefit assess its value. For if the giver receives in exchange an amount equal to the advantage which has come to the recipient or the amount the recipient would have given for the pleasure, he will have an equivalent return from the recipient.
We see the same thing happening when something is offered for sale,433 and in some places there are laws which provide that no legal action can be taken to enforce voluntary contracts, on the ground that when one has had common dealings with a man in good faith one ought to 15 settle with him in good faith. ⟨The law⟩ holds that it is more just that the value be assessed by the man who has been trusted than by the person who trusted him. For most things do not have the same value in the eyes of those who have them and of those who want to get them: what is a person's own and what he has to offer seems to him to have great value. And yet the recompense given depends on the value assigned by the recipient 20. But surely the recipient should not assess the object at the value it has in his eyes 20 now that he possesses it, but at the value he attached to it before it came into his possession.
If the gift is not given for the sake of the recipient but on the understanding that there will be some recompense, the best thing would of course be that both partners regard the return as fair. But if they should not reach agreement, it would seem not only necessary 10 but just that the first recipient of a benefit assess its value. For if the giver receives in exchange an amount equal to the advantage which has come to the recipient or the amount the recipient would have given for the pleasure, he will have an equivalent return from the recipient.
We see the same thing happening when something is offered for sale,433 and in some places there are laws which provide that no legal action can be taken to enforce voluntary contracts, on the ground that when one has had common dealings with a man in good faith one ought to 15 settle with him in good faith. ⟨The law⟩ holds that it is more just that the value be assessed by the man who has been trusted than by the person who trusted him. For most things do not have the same value in the eyes of those who have them and of those who want to get them: what is a person's own and what he has to offer seems to him to have great value. And yet the recompense given depends on the value assigned by the recipient 20. But surely the recipient should not assess the object at the value it has in his eyes 20 now that he possesses it, but at the value he attached to it before it came into his possession.
Book 9,Chapter 2 (1164b22–1165a35)
Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ
πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα
μὲν ἰατρῷ πιστεύειν, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν·
25 ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον,
καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ προετέον,
ἐὰν ἄμφω μὴ ἐνδέχηται. ἆρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς
μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας
ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ
30 ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον·
καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφείλει
ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ'
ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσάμενον
35 ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ, ἢ μὴ ἑαλωκότι
There is also the following problem: should a person assign all prerogatives to his father and obey him in everything, or should he put his faith in a doctor when he is ill, and vote for a military expert when he must elect a general? Similarly, 25 should he accommodate a friend rather than a good man, and should he render the thanks he owes to his benefactor rather than freely give presents to his bosom companion, if he is not in a position to do both?
Surely, to draw an exact line of demarcation in all these cases is not an easy matter. Many and various considerations make one case different from the next in importance and unimportance as well as in point of what is noble and what is necessary. 30 But it is quite clear that we should not make all our returns to the same person. Moreover, we must, as a general rule, repay good deeds rather than do favors for our bosom companions, just as a loan must be paid back to a creditor before presents can be given to a bosom companion. Perhaps even this does not always hold true: when, for example, a man has been ransomed from robbers, 35 should he ransom his ransomer in return regardless of who he is, ⟨if the ransomer falls into robbers' hands⟩ ⟨or repay ⟨the amount of the ransom⟩,
Surely, to draw an exact line of demarcation in all these cases is not an easy matter. Many and various considerations make one case different from the next in importance and unimportance as well as in point of what is noble and what is necessary. 30 But it is quite clear that we should not make all our returns to the same person. Moreover, we must, as a general rule, repay good deeds rather than do favors for our bosom companions, just as a loan must be paid back to a creditor before presents can be given to a bosom companion. Perhaps even this does not always hold true: when, for example, a man has been ransomed from robbers, 35 should he ransom his ransomer in return regardless of who he is, ⟨if the ransomer falls into robbers' hands⟩ ⟨or repay ⟨the amount of the ransom⟩,
1165a
1 ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε
γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται,
καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ
δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον.
5 ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι,
ἐπειδὰν ὃ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις
γίνηται ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ
δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι
ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι
10 παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον
τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν
ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ
πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρισμένον
τοῖς περὶ ἅ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον,
15 οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ
ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις
καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα
ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους
μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος
20 καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ'
οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό. δόξειε δ'
ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας,
καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς
ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ
25 πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ
τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μητρικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν
καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις·
πρὸς ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ
30 ἁπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ
πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον
ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ'
οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων
ἡ σύγκρισις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διά
35 γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον.
1 if the ransomer has not been captured but demands repayment⟩? Or should he ransom his father? It would seem that he should ransom his father in preference even to himself. Therefore, as we just said, as a general principle we must repay a debt, but in a situation in which giving is nobler or more necessary ⟨than repayment would be⟩, we must abandon principle and make the gift. 5 For there are times when it would not even be fair and equitable to make recompense for the original benefit, for instance, when *A* has done a good deed for *B*, whom he knows to be a good man, and *B* makes a return to *A*, despite his belief that *A* is wicked. There are also occasions when one ought not to make a loan to a man who has previously made us a loan, for example, if *A* has made the loan in the belief he will get it back, because *B* is an honest man, while *B* has no hope of recovering it from *A* because *A* is a bad man. 10 Therefore, if this is the true situation, the demand ⟨for a loan in return for a loan previously given⟩ is not fair; but if it is not the true situation, though the second party thinks it is, there would seem to be nothing peculiar in his refusing. So, as we have often stated,434 discussions about emotions and actions are no more definite than the matter with which they deal.
It is now quite clear that we must not make the same return to everyone and 15 that we should not make all our returns to our father, just as we do not offer every sacrifice to Zeus. Since the returns we owe to parents, brothers, bosom companions, and benefactors are different, we must render what is appropriate and fitting to each. This is what people in fact seem to do: when there is a wedding they invite their relatives, since they have common family ties, and thus also a common interest in family affairs. 20 For the same reason, they think that relatives have a special obligation to get together at funerals. When it comes to providing food it would seem to be our first objective to satisfy the needs of our parents, since we owe it to them and since it is nobler to give this assistance to the authors of our being rather than to ourselves. Honor, too, we owe to our parents, as we owe it to the gods, 25 but not every kind of honor. We do not owe the same honor to our father as we do to our mother, nor again do we owe them the honor due to a wise man or the honor due to a general; we owe them the honor due to a father and a mother, respectively. We also owe to every older person the honor due his age by getting up for him, by offering him a seat, and so forth. But on the other hand, in our relations with our bosom companions and brothers we can say anything we please and can share everything with them. 30 We must also try to render what is appropriate to kinsmen, fellow tribesmen, fellow citizens, and every other person, and compare what each is entitled to in terms of the closeness of his relation to us and in terms of his excellence or usefulness. This comparison is fairly easy when the persons involved belong to the same group, but it is more troublesome when they belong to different groups. None the less, 35 this is hardly a sufficient reason to give up the task, and we must differentiate ⟨between the various obligations⟩ as best we possibly can.
It is now quite clear that we must not make the same return to everyone and 15 that we should not make all our returns to our father, just as we do not offer every sacrifice to Zeus. Since the returns we owe to parents, brothers, bosom companions, and benefactors are different, we must render what is appropriate and fitting to each. This is what people in fact seem to do: when there is a wedding they invite their relatives, since they have common family ties, and thus also a common interest in family affairs. 20 For the same reason, they think that relatives have a special obligation to get together at funerals. When it comes to providing food it would seem to be our first objective to satisfy the needs of our parents, since we owe it to them and since it is nobler to give this assistance to the authors of our being rather than to ourselves. Honor, too, we owe to our parents, as we owe it to the gods, 25 but not every kind of honor. We do not owe the same honor to our father as we do to our mother, nor again do we owe them the honor due to a wise man or the honor due to a general; we owe them the honor due to a father and a mother, respectively. We also owe to every older person the honor due his age by getting up for him, by offering him a seat, and so forth. But on the other hand, in our relations with our bosom companions and brothers we can say anything we please and can share everything with them. 30 We must also try to render what is appropriate to kinsmen, fellow tribesmen, fellow citizens, and every other person, and compare what each is entitled to in terms of the closeness of his relation to us and in terms of his excellence or usefulness. This comparison is fairly easy when the persons involved belong to the same group, but it is more troublesome when they belong to different groups. None the less, 35 this is hardly a sufficient reason to give up the task, and we must differentiate ⟨between the various obligations⟩ as best we possibly can.
Book 9,Chapter 3 (1165a36–1165b36)
Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας
36 A further problem is
1165b
1 ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ
χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν,
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν
ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἄν τις,
5 εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ
τὸ ἦθος. ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ
γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι
φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι
διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν
10 αἰτιῷτ' ἄν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ,
δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ
νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία.
ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ
δοκῇ, ἆρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν
15 ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν <τὸ> πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ·
φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται
δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἆρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον;
ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;
ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν
20 οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ'
ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ
φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται.
εἰ δ' ὃ μὲν διαμένοι ὃ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ
διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται;
25 ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν
ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὃ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν
παῖς ὃ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι
μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι;
οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ
30 δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν
τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἆρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς
αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ
μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις
μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς
35 γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν,
ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται.
1 whether or not a friendship should be broken off when the friend does not remain what he was. Surely, there is nothing strange about breaking friendships based on what is useful or pleasant when the partners no longer have the qualities of being useful or pleasant. For they were friends of these qualities ⟨rather than of the persons of their partners⟩, and it is only reasonable that the affection should pass with the passing of the qualities. But there is reason for complaint, 5 if a person loves another for being useful or pleasant but pretended to love him for his character. For as we said at the beginning,435 differences between friends arise most frequently when they are not friends in the sense they think they are. So when a person has erroneously assumed that the affection he got was for his character, though nothing in his friend's conduct suggested anything of the sort, 10 he has only himself to blame. But when he has been deceived by his friend's pretense, he has every right to complain against the deceiver. In fact, his complaint is more justified than complaints against those who counterfeit money, inasmuch as he offends against something more valuable.
If we accept a person as a friend assuming that he is good, but he becomes, and we think he has become, wicked, do we still owe him affection? Surely, that is impossible, since 15 only the good—not just anything—is the object of affection. What is evil neither is nor should be an object of affection, for a man must not be a lover of evil, nor must he become like what is base. As we have said,436 like is the friend of like. Should the friendship, then, be broken off at once? Probably not in every case, but only when a friend's wickedness has become incurable. But if there is a chance of reforming him, we must come to the aid of his character more than to the aid of his 20 property, inasmuch as character is the better thing and a more integral part of friendship. But no one would regard a person who breaks off such a friendship as acting strangely, because the man who was his friend was not the kind of man ⟨he turned out to be⟩: his friend has changed, and since he is unable to save him, he severs his connections with him.
But if one partner were to remain as he was, while the other became better and far outdistanced him in excellence, ought the latter to treat the former as a friend? Surely, that is impossible, and 25 that it is becomes most obvious when the distance between them becomes great, as, for example, in childhood friendships. For if one partner were to remain mentally a child, while the other has grown to be a man in the best sense of the word, how could they still be friends, when they neither like nor feel joy and pain at the same things? They will not even have the same tastes in regard to one another, and 30 without that, as we saw,437 it is impossible to be friends, since they cannot live together. But we have already discussed these matters.438
Should, then, a former friend be treated just as if he had never been a friend at all? No; we should remember our past familiarity with him, and just as we feel more obliged to do favors for friends than for strangers, 35 we must show some consideration to him for old friendship's sake, provided that it was not excessive wickedness on his part that broke the friendship.
If we accept a person as a friend assuming that he is good, but he becomes, and we think he has become, wicked, do we still owe him affection? Surely, that is impossible, since 15 only the good—not just anything—is the object of affection. What is evil neither is nor should be an object of affection, for a man must not be a lover of evil, nor must he become like what is base. As we have said,436 like is the friend of like. Should the friendship, then, be broken off at once? Probably not in every case, but only when a friend's wickedness has become incurable. But if there is a chance of reforming him, we must come to the aid of his character more than to the aid of his 20 property, inasmuch as character is the better thing and a more integral part of friendship. But no one would regard a person who breaks off such a friendship as acting strangely, because the man who was his friend was not the kind of man ⟨he turned out to be⟩: his friend has changed, and since he is unable to save him, he severs his connections with him.
But if one partner were to remain as he was, while the other became better and far outdistanced him in excellence, ought the latter to treat the former as a friend? Surely, that is impossible, and 25 that it is becomes most obvious when the distance between them becomes great, as, for example, in childhood friendships. For if one partner were to remain mentally a child, while the other has grown to be a man in the best sense of the word, how could they still be friends, when they neither like nor feel joy and pain at the same things? They will not even have the same tastes in regard to one another, and 30 without that, as we saw,437 it is impossible to be friends, since they cannot live together. But we have already discussed these matters.438
Should, then, a former friend be treated just as if he had never been a friend at all? No; we should remember our past familiarity with him, and just as we feel more obliged to do favors for friends than for strangers, 35 we must show some consideration to him for old friendship's sake, provided that it was not excessive wickedness on his part that broke the friendship.
Book 9,Chapter 4 (1166a1–1166b29)
1166a
1 Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι
ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι
γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ
ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ
5 ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα
πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἳ δὲ
τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα
καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ
τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν
10 ὁρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει
(τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι·
ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ
ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται
15 δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ
γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ
γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν
δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ
φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δ'
20 ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς
πάντ' ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον] (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ
θεὸς τἀγαθόν) ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν
ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ
βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων
25 ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ
τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ·
πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ
ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς
30 αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ
τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος
ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ
φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ
οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν
35 ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων,
1 The friendly relations which we have with our neighbours and which serve to define the various kinds of friendship seem to be derived from our relations to ourselves. We count as a friend (1) a person who wishes for and does what is good or what appears to him to be good for his friend's sake; or (2) a person who wishes for 5 the existence and life of his friend for the friend's sake. This is also the feeling which mothers have for their children and which friends who have had a quarrel, ⟨but are still friends, have for one another⟩. We regard as a friend also (3) a person who spends his time in our company and (4) whose desires are the same as ours, or (5) a person who shares sorrow and joy with his friend. This quality, too, is most frequently found in mothers. By one or another of these sentiments people also define friendship.
A 10 good man has all these feelings in relation to himself. All others have them to the extent to which they regard themselves as good; and the measure ⟨of excellence⟩ in particular instances seems to be virtue and a man of high moral standards, as we have said.439 For (4) a good man remains consistent in his judgment, and he desires the same objects with every part of his soul. He, therefore, (1) 15 wishes for and does what is good for himself and what appears good to him—for the mark of a good man is to work hard to achieve the good—and he does so for his own sake, for he does it for the sake of the intellectual part of himself, which of course is thought to constitute what each person really is. Further, (2) he wishes for his own life and preservation, and he wishes it especially for that part of him with which he thinks. For to a man of high moral standards existence is good. Everyone ⟨—not a morally good man alone—⟩ 20 wishes good things for himself; ⟨but he wishes only for what is good for himself as a man:⟩ no one would choose to become another kind of being and to have that other being440 possess everything good. ⟨In other words, no one would choose to become a god,⟩ for the divinity already possesses the good, anyway, ⟨and does not have to wish for it⟩. A person ⟨wishes good for himself⟩ as long as he remains whatever kind of being he actually is, and it is the thinking part of each individual that constitutes what he really is or constitutes it in a greater degree than anything else. A man like that also (3) wishes to spend his time with himself, for he does so with pleasure. The memory of his achievements 25 gives him delight, and his hopes for the future are good; and such memories and hopes are pleasant. Moreover, his mind has an ample supply of subjects for study. (5) No one shares with himself his own sorrows and pleasures more than he does. The same thing is at all times painful and the same thing is at all times pleasant to him, and not different at different times. He is, one might say, a person who knows no regrets.
Since 30 a good man has every one of these sentiments toward himself, and since he has the same attitude toward his friend as he does toward himself, for his friend really is another self, therefore friendship, too, is regarded as being one or other of these sentiments, and those who harbor them are regarded as friends. We may dismiss for the moment the question whether or not friendship with oneself is possible.441 On the basis of what we have said, 35 friendship would seem to be possible to the extent that a man is composed of two or more elements,
A 10 good man has all these feelings in relation to himself. All others have them to the extent to which they regard themselves as good; and the measure ⟨of excellence⟩ in particular instances seems to be virtue and a man of high moral standards, as we have said.439 For (4) a good man remains consistent in his judgment, and he desires the same objects with every part of his soul. He, therefore, (1) 15 wishes for and does what is good for himself and what appears good to him—for the mark of a good man is to work hard to achieve the good—and he does so for his own sake, for he does it for the sake of the intellectual part of himself, which of course is thought to constitute what each person really is. Further, (2) he wishes for his own life and preservation, and he wishes it especially for that part of him with which he thinks. For to a man of high moral standards existence is good. Everyone ⟨—not a morally good man alone—⟩ 20 wishes good things for himself; ⟨but he wishes only for what is good for himself as a man:⟩ no one would choose to become another kind of being and to have that other being440 possess everything good. ⟨In other words, no one would choose to become a god,⟩ for the divinity already possesses the good, anyway, ⟨and does not have to wish for it⟩. A person ⟨wishes good for himself⟩ as long as he remains whatever kind of being he actually is, and it is the thinking part of each individual that constitutes what he really is or constitutes it in a greater degree than anything else. A man like that also (3) wishes to spend his time with himself, for he does so with pleasure. The memory of his achievements 25 gives him delight, and his hopes for the future are good; and such memories and hopes are pleasant. Moreover, his mind has an ample supply of subjects for study. (5) No one shares with himself his own sorrows and pleasures more than he does. The same thing is at all times painful and the same thing is at all times pleasant to him, and not different at different times. He is, one might say, a person who knows no regrets.
Since 30 a good man has every one of these sentiments toward himself, and since he has the same attitude toward his friend as he does toward himself, for his friend really is another self, therefore friendship, too, is regarded as being one or other of these sentiments, and those who harbor them are regarded as friends. We may dismiss for the moment the question whether or not friendship with oneself is possible.441 On the basis of what we have said, 35 friendship would seem to be possible to the extent that a man is composed of two or more elements,
1166b
1 καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται.
φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν,
καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις. ἆρ' οὖν ᾗ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ
ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν;
5 ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ'
ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις·
διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν
ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ
ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ
10 ὄντα· οἳ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται
τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. οἷς δὲ πολλὰ
καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ
φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ
μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν·
15 ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ'
ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες
ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν
πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν
οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή,
20 καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ
δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα.
εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὑτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ
25 οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς
ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ
δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν
διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ
καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.
1 and because the extreme degree of friendship can be likened to self-love.
Most people, however ordinary they may be, appear to have the attributes just discussed. Now, do men share in these sentiments to the extent that they are satisfied with themselves and assume themselves good? ⟨That seems to be the case,⟩ 5 since no one who is thoroughly base and reprobate harbors them, or even gives the appearance of harboring them. One might almost say that base people do not even share them, for (4) they are at variance with themselves and have appetite for one thing and wish for another, as morally weak people do: instead of what seems to be good to them they choose what is pleasant and actually harmful, 10 and others again, from cowardice and laziness, refrain from doing what they think is best for them. Those who have committed many shocking crimes and are hated for their wickedness (2) run away from life and do away with themselves. Wicked men seek the company of others with whom to spend their days, but (3) they avoid their own company. For when they are by themselves 15 they remember many events that make them uneasy, and they anticipate similar events for the future, but when they are with others, they can forget. Further, since there is nothing lovable about them, (1) their relations with themselves are not friendly. Therefore, such people (5) do not share their joys and sorrows with themselves, for their soul is divided against itself, and 20 while one part, because of its wickedness, feels sorrow when it abstains from certain things, another part feels pleasure: one part pulls in one direction and the other in another as if to tear the individual to pieces. If a man cannot feel pain and pleasure at the same time, he can at least after a little while feel pain for having felt pleasure at a certain object, and he can wish that it had not been pleasant to him. 25 Bad people are full of regrets.
We see, therefore, that a bad man's disposition is not friendly even toward himself, because there is nothing lovable about him. Accordingly, if to be such a person means utter misery, we must strain all our efforts to avoid wickedness and must try to be good. For in this way, a person can have a friendly attitude toward himself and can become the friend of another.
Most people, however ordinary they may be, appear to have the attributes just discussed. Now, do men share in these sentiments to the extent that they are satisfied with themselves and assume themselves good? ⟨That seems to be the case,⟩ 5 since no one who is thoroughly base and reprobate harbors them, or even gives the appearance of harboring them. One might almost say that base people do not even share them, for (4) they are at variance with themselves and have appetite for one thing and wish for another, as morally weak people do: instead of what seems to be good to them they choose what is pleasant and actually harmful, 10 and others again, from cowardice and laziness, refrain from doing what they think is best for them. Those who have committed many shocking crimes and are hated for their wickedness (2) run away from life and do away with themselves. Wicked men seek the company of others with whom to spend their days, but (3) they avoid their own company. For when they are by themselves 15 they remember many events that make them uneasy, and they anticipate similar events for the future, but when they are with others, they can forget. Further, since there is nothing lovable about them, (1) their relations with themselves are not friendly. Therefore, such people (5) do not share their joys and sorrows with themselves, for their soul is divided against itself, and 20 while one part, because of its wickedness, feels sorrow when it abstains from certain things, another part feels pleasure: one part pulls in one direction and the other in another as if to tear the individual to pieces. If a man cannot feel pain and pleasure at the same time, he can at least after a little while feel pain for having felt pleasure at a certain object, and he can wish that it had not been pleasant to him. 25 Bad people are full of regrets.
We see, therefore, that a bad man's disposition is not friendly even toward himself, because there is nothing lovable about him. Accordingly, if to be such a person means utter misery, we must strain all our efforts to avoid wickedness and must try to be good. For in this way, a person can have a friendly attitude toward himself and can become the friend of another.
Book 9,Chapter 5 (1166b30–1167a21)
30 Ἡ δ' εὔνοια φιλικῷ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία·
γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία
δ' οὔ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησίς
ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει
δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ
35 δ' εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς
30 Good will looks like a friendly relationship, but friendship it is not. For we can have good will toward people we do not know and the fact that we have it may remain unnoticed, but there can be no friendship in such circumstances. That has already been stated.442 But good will is not even affection: it lacks intensity and desire, the qualities which ⟨always⟩ accompany affection. Further, affection involves familiarity, whereas good will can arise on the spur of the moment, as it does, for example 35, toward competitors in a contest:35
1167a
1 συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν
δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι
γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας
εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ
5 προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν
μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας
ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ
εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται
γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ'
10 ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη
τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς
συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ
χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις
γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν
15 ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός
τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ'
εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ
φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν. ὅλως δ' εὔνοια
δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ
20 καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.
1 a spectator may come to have good will for a competitor and side with him without giving him any active assistance. For, as we said, the good will comes on the spur of the moment and the love is superficial.
So it seems that good will is the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure we get from seeing a person is the beginning of falling in love. 5 For no one falls in love who has not first derived pleasure from the looks of the beloved. But if someone finds joy in the looks of another, he is not in love with him for all that: ⟨he is in love only⟩ if he longs for the beloved when he is away and craves his presence. Thus, it is likewise impossible to be friends without first feeling good will toward one another, but people who have good will for one another do not therefore feel mutual affection. For they only wish for the good of those toward whom they have good 10 will, without giving them active assistance in attaining the good and without letting themselves be troubled in their behalf 10. Hence one might call good will "friendship" in an extended sense, but it is inactive friendship. But if it goes on for a long time and reaches the point of familiarity, it becomes friendship—not a friendship which is motivated by what is useful or by what is pleasant, for these factors are not the basis of good will. When a person has been the recipient of a good deed, he gives his good will in return for what he has received, and in doing so 15 he does what is just. But if someone wishes to do good to another in the hope of gaining advancement through him, he does not seem to have good will for that person, but rather for himself, just as a man is not another's friend if he caters to him for the use he can get out of him.
In general, some sort of excellence and moral goodness are the basis on which good will arises when a person strikes us as 20 beautiful, brave, or something similar, as we said when mentioning the competitors in a contest.
So it seems that good will is the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure we get from seeing a person is the beginning of falling in love. 5 For no one falls in love who has not first derived pleasure from the looks of the beloved. But if someone finds joy in the looks of another, he is not in love with him for all that: ⟨he is in love only⟩ if he longs for the beloved when he is away and craves his presence. Thus, it is likewise impossible to be friends without first feeling good will toward one another, but people who have good will for one another do not therefore feel mutual affection. For they only wish for the good of those toward whom they have good 10 will, without giving them active assistance in attaining the good and without letting themselves be troubled in their behalf 10. Hence one might call good will "friendship" in an extended sense, but it is inactive friendship. But if it goes on for a long time and reaches the point of familiarity, it becomes friendship—not a friendship which is motivated by what is useful or by what is pleasant, for these factors are not the basis of good will. When a person has been the recipient of a good deed, he gives his good will in return for what he has received, and in doing so 15 he does what is just. But if someone wishes to do good to another in the hope of gaining advancement through him, he does not seem to have good will for that person, but rather for himself, just as a man is not another's friend if he caters to him for the use he can get out of him.
In general, some sort of excellence and moral goodness are the basis on which good will arises when a person strikes us as 20 beautiful, brave, or something similar, as we said when mentioning the competitors in a contest.
Book 9,Chapter 6 (1167a22–1167b16)
Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν
ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν
ἄν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν,
25 οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ
τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν
περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται
καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ
δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα
30 ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν
πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις,
ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν
δ' ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις,
στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν
35 ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος
Concord,443 too, appears to be a friendly relation. That is why it is not simply an identity of opinion, for even people who do not know one another might hold the same opinions. Nor is concord attributed to people who have the same judgment on any subject whatever it may be. ⟨We do not attribute it,⟩ 25 for example, to those who have the same judgment about the heavenly bodies, since to be of the same mind in these matters does not constitute a friendly relation. But we do attribute concord to states, when the citizens have the same judgment about their common interest, when they choose the same things, and when they execute what they have decided in common. In other words, concord is found in the realm of action, and in the realm of action in matters of importance and in those matters in which 30 it is possible for both partners or all partners to attain their goals. For example, there is concord in a state when all citizens decide that the offices should be elective, or that an alliance should be concluded with the Spartans, or that Pittacus should govern them at the time when Pittacus himself was willing to do so.444 But when each of two persons wishes himself to be the ruler, as, e.g., ⟨Eteocles and Polyneices in Euripides'⟩ *Phoenician Women*, there is faction. For concord does not consist in two persons having identical thoughts 35 of any kind at all, but in having them in relation to the same person, e.g., when both the common people and the better classes445
1167b
1 καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται
οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια,
καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι
καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια
5 ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ
ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων
γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὔριπος),
βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ
καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν
10 πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας
ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς
λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα
τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν
ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους
15 μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια
ποιεῖν.
1 wish that the best men should rule. For in this way only does everyone attain his goal. We see, consequently, that concord is friendship among fellow citizens, and that is indeed the common use of the term. For its sphere is what is in the common interest and what is important for life.
Now, 5 this kind of concord exists among good men. They are of the same mind each with himself and all with one another, since—to use the expression—they never shift their position:446 the wishes of people like this remain constant and do not flow this way and that, as the Euripus does.447 They wish for what is just and what is in the common interest, and these are their common goals. Bad men, on the other hand, cannot live in concord, 10 except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends. They aim at more than their share when material advantages are to be gotten, but fall short when it comes to exertion and to the performance of public services.448 Each of them has these wishes only for himself; on his neighbor he keeps a jealous eye and prevents him ⟨from getting what he wants⟩. For unless they are on guard ⟨against one another⟩, the common good goes to ruin. So faction comes to be rife among them, when they force 15 one another to do what is just, though they are themselves unwilling to do it.
Now, 5 this kind of concord exists among good men. They are of the same mind each with himself and all with one another, since—to use the expression—they never shift their position:446 the wishes of people like this remain constant and do not flow this way and that, as the Euripus does.447 They wish for what is just and what is in the common interest, and these are their common goals. Bad men, on the other hand, cannot live in concord, 10 except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends. They aim at more than their share when material advantages are to be gotten, but fall short when it comes to exertion and to the performance of public services.448 Each of them has these wishes only for himself; on his neighbor he keeps a jealous eye and prevents him ⟨from getting what he wants⟩. For unless they are on guard ⟨against one another⟩, the common good goes to ruin. So faction comes to be rife among them, when they force 15 one another to do what is just, though they are themselves unwilling to do it.
Book 9,Chapter 7 (1167b17–1168a27)
Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον
φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ
λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται
20 ὅτι οἳ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν
ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς
ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν
ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι
εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας,
25 τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος
μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ
θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῷ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί,
καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν
φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐδ' ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς
30 δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
σῴζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες
φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας κἂν μηδὲν ὦσι
χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἄν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ
35 μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου·
It is thought that benefactors have a greater affection for those they benefit than recipients do for those who have done some good to them, and since this seems to be unreasonable, people look for an explanation. In the view of the majority, 20 the explanation is that one partner is a debtor and the other a creditor. In case of a loan the debtor wishes that his creditor did not exist, while the giver of the loan is actually concerned for the debtor's safety, so similarly men who have done a good deed wish for the existence of its recipients in order to receive their gratitude in return, 25 whereas the recipients have no interest in making a return. Epicharmus would probably say that those who give this explanation "look at a thing only from the bad side,"449 but ⟨actually⟩ it seems to be ⟨no more than⟩ human: most people's memories are short, and they want to have good done to themselves rather than do it to another.
But, it would seem, the true cause lies more deeply in the nature of things, and the case of the lender is not even analogous 30. There is no affection between creditor and 30 debtor, but only the wish for the preservation of the other, in order that something may be got out of him. But benefactors have affection and love for those they have benefited, even if they are not useful to them at the moment and are unlikely to be useful at a later time. The same is also true of craftsmen: every craftsman loves the work of his own hands 35 more than he would be loved by it, if it were to come to life.
But, it would seem, the true cause lies more deeply in the nature of things, and the case of the lender is not even analogous 30. There is no affection between creditor and 30 debtor, but only the wish for the preservation of the other, in order that something may be got out of him. But benefactors have affection and love for those they have benefited, even if they are not useful to them at the moment and are unlikely to be useful at a later time. The same is also true of craftsmen: every craftsman loves the work of his own hands 35 more than he would be loved by it, if it were to come to life.
1168a
1 μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι
γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ
τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ
πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ
5 τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν
αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ (τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ
πράττειν), ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως· στέργει
δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὃ γάρ
ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ
10 τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν
ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι,
ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν.
ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος
ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ
15 τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι
μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι
τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἥ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα,
τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἧττον· ἡ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν
ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι
20 δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν
ἕπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως
γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα
οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν
εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα
25 δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις,
καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὑτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ
τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.
1 Perhaps poets have this attitude more intensely than anyone. For they exaggerate their attachment to their own poems, and love them as if they were their children. It is with this kind of attitude that the sentiment of benefactors is comparable: the recipient of their benefaction is the work of their own hands, and, accordingly, they love their handiwork 5 more than it loves its maker. The reason for this is that existence is for all men desirable and worthy of affection; but we exist in activity, i.e., by living and acting, and in his activity the maker is, in a sense, the work produced. He therefore loves his work, because he loves existence. And this lies in the nature of things: what a thing is potentially is revealed in actuality by what it produces.450
At the same time, 10 to the benefactor, that which depends on his action is noble, with the result that the object of his action gives him joy. But the recipient finds nothing noble in the giver; at most, he finds some advantage in him, but advantage is less pleasant and less lovable. Pleasant is only the activity of the present, the hope of the future, and the memory of the past; and 15 what activity gives us is the pleasantest and the most lovable, too. Now, the work has permanence for him who achieved it, since what is noble lasts for a long time; but the use the recipient gets from it is transitory. And while the memory of noble acts is pleasant, the memory of useful things is unlikely to be pleasant, or is so to a less degree, though the reverse seems to be true of anticipation.
Also, affection is something active, 20 while getting affection is passive; and affection and friendly feelings are the attributes of the more active of the two partners. Moreover, we all love a thing more if we got it through effort. For example, those who have earned their own money love it more than those who have inherited it. To receive a good deed seems to take no effort, but to do a good deed involves labor. That is, by the way, the reason 25 why mothers love their children more ⟨than fathers do⟩: birth involves a greater effort on the mother's part, and she knows more clearly that the child is hers. The same would also seem to apply to benefactors.
At the same time, 10 to the benefactor, that which depends on his action is noble, with the result that the object of his action gives him joy. But the recipient finds nothing noble in the giver; at most, he finds some advantage in him, but advantage is less pleasant and less lovable. Pleasant is only the activity of the present, the hope of the future, and the memory of the past; and 15 what activity gives us is the pleasantest and the most lovable, too. Now, the work has permanence for him who achieved it, since what is noble lasts for a long time; but the use the recipient gets from it is transitory. And while the memory of noble acts is pleasant, the memory of useful things is unlikely to be pleasant, or is so to a less degree, though the reverse seems to be true of anticipation.
Also, affection is something active, 20 while getting affection is passive; and affection and friendly feelings are the attributes of the more active of the two partners. Moreover, we all love a thing more if we got it through effort. For example, those who have earned their own money love it more than those who have inherited it. To receive a good deed seems to take no effort, but to do a good deed involves labor. That is, by the way, the reason 25 why mothers love their children more ⟨than fathers do⟩: birth involves a greater effort on the mother's part, and she knows more clearly that the child is hers. The same would also seem to apply to benefactors.
Book 9,Chapter 8 (1168a28–1169b2)
Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα
ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι,
30 καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε
ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον—ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει—ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ
ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα,
35 τὸ δ' αὑτοῦ παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ,
A further problem is whether a person should love himself or someone else most of all. People decry those who love themselves most, 30 and use the term "egoist" in a pejorative sense. Only a base man, it is thought, does everything for his own sake, and the more wicked he is the more selfishly he acts. He is, therefore, criticized, for example, for never doing anything unless he is made to do it. A good man, on the other hand, is regarded as acting on noble motives, and the better he is the nobler his motives are: he acts for his friend's sake 35 and neglects his own affairs.
However, the facts are not in harmony with these arguments,
However, the facts are not in harmony with these arguments,
1168b
1 οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν
μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται
τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δ'
ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ'
5 οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ
φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ
πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ "μία ψυχή" καὶ "κοινὰ
τὰ φίλων" καὶ "ἰσότης φιλότης" καὶ "γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον·"
πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστ' ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα
10 γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται
δὴ εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν
τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν
καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ
λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο
15 δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι
τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς
καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται,
καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ
περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται
20 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς
ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία
γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὴ τοῖς
οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὑτοῖς
ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον·
25 εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς
μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ
τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς
ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος
μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα
30 καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ,
καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον
μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ
ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ
τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται
35 τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγέναι
1 and that is not surprising. It is said that we should love our best friend best, and the best friend is he who, when he wishes for someone's good, does so for that person's sake even if no one will ever know it. Now, a man has this sentiment primarily toward himself, and the same is true of all the other sentiments 5 by which a friend is defined. For, as we have stated,451 all friendly feelings toward others are an extension of the friendly feelings a person has for himself. Furthermore, all proverbs express a similar opinion, e.g., "⟨friends have⟩ one soul," "friends hold in common what they have," "friendship is equality," and "charity begins at home."452 All these sentiments will be found chiefly in a man's relation to himself, 10 since a man is his own best friend and therefore should have the greatest affection for himself. Accordingly, it is understandable that there should be a problem which of these two views we ought to follow, since both are plausible.
When there is a difference of opinion of this sort, we should perhaps differentiate the arguments from one another and define the extent and the sense in which each contains truth. Consequently, if we were to take the sense in which each side uses the word "egoist," we should probably clarify the matter. 15 Now those who use "egoist" as a term of opprobrium apply it to people who assign to themselves the larger share of material goods, honors, and bodily pleasures. For these are the objects which most people desire, and which they zealously pursue as being supremely good, and for this reason, too, they fight to get them. Those, therefore, who try to get more than their share of these things, 20 gratify their appetites, their emotions in general, and the irrational part of their souls, and most people are of this kind. Hence, the ⟨pejorative⟩ use of the term is derived from the fact that the most common form of self-love is base, and those who are egoists in this sense are justly criticized. That most people usually apply the word "egoist" to persons who assign to themselves the large share of things of this sort, is quite clear. 25 If a man were always to devote his attention above all else to acting justly himself, to acting with self-control, or to fulfilling whatever other demands virtue makes upon him, and if, in general, he were always to try to secure for himself what is noble, no one would call him an egoist and no one would find fault with him.
However, it would seem that such a person is actually a truer egoist or self-lover. At any rate, he assigns what is supremely noble and good to himself, 30 he gratifies the most sovereign part of himself, and he obeys it in everything. Just as a state and every other organized system seems to be in the truest sense identical with the most sovereign element in it, so it is with man. Consequently, he is an egoist or self-lover in the truest sense who loves and gratifies the most sovereign element in him. Moreover, when we call a person "morally strong" or "morally weak," 35 depending on whether or not his intelligence is the ruling element ⟨within him⟩, we imply that intelligence is the individual. And also,
When there is a difference of opinion of this sort, we should perhaps differentiate the arguments from one another and define the extent and the sense in which each contains truth. Consequently, if we were to take the sense in which each side uses the word "egoist," we should probably clarify the matter. 15 Now those who use "egoist" as a term of opprobrium apply it to people who assign to themselves the larger share of material goods, honors, and bodily pleasures. For these are the objects which most people desire, and which they zealously pursue as being supremely good, and for this reason, too, they fight to get them. Those, therefore, who try to get more than their share of these things, 20 gratify their appetites, their emotions in general, and the irrational part of their souls, and most people are of this kind. Hence, the ⟨pejorative⟩ use of the term is derived from the fact that the most common form of self-love is base, and those who are egoists in this sense are justly criticized. That most people usually apply the word "egoist" to persons who assign to themselves the large share of things of this sort, is quite clear. 25 If a man were always to devote his attention above all else to acting justly himself, to acting with self-control, or to fulfilling whatever other demands virtue makes upon him, and if, in general, he were always to try to secure for himself what is noble, no one would call him an egoist and no one would find fault with him.
However, it would seem that such a person is actually a truer egoist or self-lover. At any rate, he assigns what is supremely noble and good to himself, 30 he gratifies the most sovereign part of himself, and he obeys it in everything. Just as a state and every other organized system seems to be in the truest sense identical with the most sovereign element in it, so it is with man. Consequently, he is an egoist or self-lover in the truest sense who loves and gratifies the most sovereign element in him. Moreover, when we call a person "morally strong" or "morally weak," 35 depending on whether or not his intelligence is the ruling element ⟨within him⟩, we imply that intelligence is the individual. And also,
1169a
1 δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ
ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ'
ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων
5 τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι
ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν
περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες
ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς
τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ'
10 ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν
ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν
δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ·
βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν
15 ἑπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν
καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει·
πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς
πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν
φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ
20 ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς
καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ
καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἕλοιτ'
ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη
τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς
25 καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει·
αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ'
ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ
μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον
ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ
30 αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν
γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος
εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται
δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ
αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς
35 ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον
1 we regard a man as being an independent and voluntary agent in the truest sense when he has acted rationally. Thus it is clear that a man is—or is in the truest sense—the ruling element within him, and that a good man loves this more than anything else. Hence, it is he who is in the truest sense an egoist or self-lover. His self-love is different in kind from that of the egoist with whom people find fault: 5 as different, in fact, as living by the guidance of reason is from living by the dictates of emotion, and as different as desiring what is noble is from desiring what seems to be advantageous. Those, then, whose active devotion to noble actions is outstanding win the recognition and praise of all; and if all men were to compete for what is noble and put all their efforts into the performance of the noblest actions, 10 all the needs of the community will have been met, and each individual will have the greatest of goods, since that is what virtue is.
Therefore, a good man should be a self-lover, for he will himself profit by performing noble actions and will benefit his fellow men. But a wicked man should not love himself, since he will harm both himself and his neighbors in following his base emotions. 15 What a wicked man does is not in harmony with what he ought to do, whereas a good man does what he ought to do. For intelligence always chooses what is best for itself, and a good man obeys his intelligence.
It is also true that many actions of a man of high moral standards are performed in the interest of his friends and of his country, and if there be need, 20 he will give his life for them. He will freely give his money, honors, and, in short, all good things that men compete for, while he gains nobility for himself. He would rather choose to experience intense pleasure for a short time than mild pleasure for a long time; he would rather live nobly for one full year than lead an indifferent existence for many; and he would rather perform one great and noble act than many insignificant ones. 25 People who die for a cause achieve this perhaps, and they clearly choose great nobility for themselves. A good man would freely give away his money if it means that his friends would get more, for ⟨in this way⟩ the friend's gain is wealth, while his own is nobility, so that he assigns the greater good to himself. 30 He acts in the same way when it comes to honor and public office: he will give these freely to his friend, since that will bring him nobility and praise. No wonder, then, that he is regarded as a man of high moral standards, since he chooses nobility at the cost of everything else. It is even possible that he lets his friend perform actions ⟨which he intended to perform himself⟩, and that he actually finds it nobler to be the cause of his friend's action than to act himself. 35 So we see that in everything praiseworthy a man of high moral standards assigns himself the larger share of what is noble.
Therefore, a good man should be a self-lover, for he will himself profit by performing noble actions and will benefit his fellow men. But a wicked man should not love himself, since he will harm both himself and his neighbors in following his base emotions. 15 What a wicked man does is not in harmony with what he ought to do, whereas a good man does what he ought to do. For intelligence always chooses what is best for itself, and a good man obeys his intelligence.
It is also true that many actions of a man of high moral standards are performed in the interest of his friends and of his country, and if there be need, 20 he will give his life for them. He will freely give his money, honors, and, in short, all good things that men compete for, while he gains nobility for himself. He would rather choose to experience intense pleasure for a short time than mild pleasure for a long time; he would rather live nobly for one full year than lead an indifferent existence for many; and he would rather perform one great and noble act than many insignificant ones. 25 People who die for a cause achieve this perhaps, and they clearly choose great nobility for themselves. A good man would freely give away his money if it means that his friends would get more, for ⟨in this way⟩ the friend's gain is wealth, while his own is nobility, so that he assigns the greater good to himself. 30 He acts in the same way when it comes to honor and public office: he will give these freely to his friend, since that will bring him nobility and praise. No wonder, then, that he is regarded as a man of high moral standards, since he chooses nobility at the cost of everything else. It is even possible that he lets his friend perform actions ⟨which he intended to perform himself⟩, and that he actually finds it nobler to be the cause of his friend's action than to act himself. 35 So we see that in everything praiseworthy a man of high moral standards assigns himself the larger share of what is noble.
1169b
1 νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται·
ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.
1 It is in this sense, then, as we said, that he ought to be an egoist or self-lover, but he must not be an egoist in the sense in which most people are.
Book 9,Chapter 9 (1169b3–1170b19)
Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται
φίλων ἢ μή. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις
5 καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά· αὐτάρκεις
οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον
αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν "ὅταν ὁ
δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;" ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ'
ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ
10 δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν
ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς
ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων,
τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται
πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις,
15 ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν
εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην
ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὑτὸν
τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν
πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ
20 τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν
κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν.
δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ
πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους
εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος,
25 ἐπειδὴ τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ,
ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὢν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου
ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι
φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται
ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι
30 γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν
ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια
σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ
εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον
τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ
35 τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων
A further problem is whether or not a happy man will need friends. It is said that supremely happy and self-sufficient people do not need friends, 5 since they already have the good things of life. Therefore, ⟨it is argued,⟩ since they are self-sufficient, they have no need of anything further; ⟨we need⟩ a friend, who is another self, only to provide what we are unable to provide by ourselves; hence the verse: "When fortune smiles, what need is there of friends?"453 However, it seems strange that we should assign all good things to a happy man without attributing friends to him, 10 who are thought to be the greatest of external goods. Also, if the function of a friend is to do good rather than to be treated well, if the performance of good deeds is the mark of a good man and of excellence, and if it is nobler to do good to a friend than to a stranger, then a man of high moral standards will need people to whom he can do good. This raises the further question whether we need friends more in good or in bad fortune, and by raising it we imply 15 that in misfortune a man needs someone who will do good to him, and in good fortune he will need someone to whom he may do good.
It is perhaps also strange to make a supremely happy man live his life in isolation. No one would choose to have all good things all by himself, for man is a social and political being and his natural condition is to live with others. Consequently, even a happy man needs society. 20 Since he possesses what is by nature good, it is obviously better for him to spend his days with friends and good men than with any stranger who comes along. It follows that a happy man needs friends.
What, then, do the proponents of the first view mean and to what extent is their view true? ⟨The reason why they hold this view is probably⟩ that most people understand by friends those who are useful. Now, a supremely happy man will have no need of this kind of friend, 25 since he already has the good things of life. Nor will he need a friend for the pleasantness ⟨of his company⟩, or, if so, only to a small extent, for his own life is so pleasant that he needs no extraneous pleasure. And since he does not need useful or pleasant friends, people think that he needs no friends at all.
But that is certainly not true. We stated at the beginning454 that happiness is some kind of activity, and an activity clearly 30 is something that comes into being and not something we can take for granted like a piece of property. ⟨From the propositions: (1)⟩ being happy consists in living and in being active, and, as we stated at the beginning,455 the activity of a good man is in itself good and pleasant; (2) what is our own is a pleasant thing to us; (3) we are better able to observe our neighbors than ourselves, and their actions better than our own; 35 and (4) the actions of persons who have a high moral standard
It is perhaps also strange to make a supremely happy man live his life in isolation. No one would choose to have all good things all by himself, for man is a social and political being and his natural condition is to live with others. Consequently, even a happy man needs society. 20 Since he possesses what is by nature good, it is obviously better for him to spend his days with friends and good men than with any stranger who comes along. It follows that a happy man needs friends.
What, then, do the proponents of the first view mean and to what extent is their view true? ⟨The reason why they hold this view is probably⟩ that most people understand by friends those who are useful. Now, a supremely happy man will have no need of this kind of friend, 25 since he already has the good things of life. Nor will he need a friend for the pleasantness ⟨of his company⟩, or, if so, only to a small extent, for his own life is so pleasant that he needs no extraneous pleasure. And since he does not need useful or pleasant friends, people think that he needs no friends at all.
But that is certainly not true. We stated at the beginning454 that happiness is some kind of activity, and an activity clearly 30 is something that comes into being and not something we can take for granted like a piece of property. ⟨From the propositions: (1)⟩ being happy consists in living and in being active, and, as we stated at the beginning,455 the activity of a good man is in itself good and pleasant; (2) what is our own is a pleasant thing to us; (3) we are better able to observe our neighbors than ourselves, and their actions better than our own; 35 and (4) the actions of persons who have a high moral standard
1170a
1 ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα)·
ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται
πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα.
5 μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ' αὑτὸν
ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον. ἔσται
οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὑτήν, ὃ δεῖ
περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ᾗ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς
κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει,
10 καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἥδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ
τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς
ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς
φησιν. φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος
τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἱρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει
15 ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ'
αὑτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,
ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν
ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὴ
τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν
20 καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον
τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ
τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν
μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις·
ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν
25 τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ'
αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας
ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους·
τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη
ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει
30 καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι
τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ', ὅτι
αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα
ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ
1 are pleasant to those good men who are their friends, in that they possess both qualities which are pleasant by nature, ⟨i.e., they are good and they are their own⟩; it follows that a supremely happy man will need friends of this kind. His moral purpose or choice is to observe actions which are good and which are his own, and such are the actions of a good man who is his friend.
Also, it is thought that the life of a happy man ought to be pleasant. Now, ⟨if a happy man lived⟩ 5 in isolation, his life would be hard. For it is not easy to be continuously active all by oneself; it is easier in the company of and in relation to others. Accordingly, when an activity is in itself pleasant, as it must be in the case of a supremely happy person, it will be more continuous ⟨if we engage in it together with friends⟩. For a morally good man, inasmuch as he is a morally good man, finds joy in actions that conform to virtue and is displeased by actions which display vice, 10 just as an expert in music feels pleasure when he hears beautiful tunes, and pain when he hears bad tunes. We may also get some sort of training in virtue or excellence from living together with good men, as Theognis says.456
If we examine the matter ⟨more profoundly⟩ along the lines of natural science, a morally good man seems to be by nature desirable as a friend for a morally good man. For we have stated457 that 15 what is by nature good is good and pleasant in itself to a morally good man. Now, in the case of animals, life is defined by their capacity for sense perception, and in the case of man by the capacity for sense perception or for thought. But a capacity is traced back to its corresponding activity, and it is the activity that counts.458 Consequently, life in the true sense is perceiving or thinking. Life is one of the things which 20 are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate and what is determinate belongs to the nature of the good. But what is by nature good is also good to the good man, and that is why life seems to be a pleasant thing in the eyes of all men. Still, we must not take "life" to be a wicked and corrupt existence, nor a life spent in pain; for such an existence is as indeterminate as its foundations, ⟨vice and pain,⟩ are. 25 The point about pain will be clarified in the sequel.459
Life is in itself good and pleasant. We can see that from the very fact that everyone desires it, especially good and supremely happy men: for them life is the most desirable of all things, and their existence is the most blessed. Moreover, when a person sees, he perceives that he sees; when he hears, he perceives that he hears; 30 when he walks, he perceives that he walks; and similarly in all other activities there is something which perceives that we are active. This means that, in perception, we perceive that we perceive, and in thinking we perceive that we think. But to perceive that we are perceiving or thinking means that we exist, since, as we saw, existence is perceiving or thinking. Now,
Also, it is thought that the life of a happy man ought to be pleasant. Now, ⟨if a happy man lived⟩ 5 in isolation, his life would be hard. For it is not easy to be continuously active all by oneself; it is easier in the company of and in relation to others. Accordingly, when an activity is in itself pleasant, as it must be in the case of a supremely happy person, it will be more continuous ⟨if we engage in it together with friends⟩. For a morally good man, inasmuch as he is a morally good man, finds joy in actions that conform to virtue and is displeased by actions which display vice, 10 just as an expert in music feels pleasure when he hears beautiful tunes, and pain when he hears bad tunes. We may also get some sort of training in virtue or excellence from living together with good men, as Theognis says.456
If we examine the matter ⟨more profoundly⟩ along the lines of natural science, a morally good man seems to be by nature desirable as a friend for a morally good man. For we have stated457 that 15 what is by nature good is good and pleasant in itself to a morally good man. Now, in the case of animals, life is defined by their capacity for sense perception, and in the case of man by the capacity for sense perception or for thought. But a capacity is traced back to its corresponding activity, and it is the activity that counts.458 Consequently, life in the true sense is perceiving or thinking. Life is one of the things which 20 are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate and what is determinate belongs to the nature of the good. But what is by nature good is also good to the good man, and that is why life seems to be a pleasant thing in the eyes of all men. Still, we must not take "life" to be a wicked and corrupt existence, nor a life spent in pain; for such an existence is as indeterminate as its foundations, ⟨vice and pain,⟩ are. 25 The point about pain will be clarified in the sequel.459
Life is in itself good and pleasant. We can see that from the very fact that everyone desires it, especially good and supremely happy men: for them life is the most desirable of all things, and their existence is the most blessed. Moreover, when a person sees, he perceives that he sees; when he hears, he perceives that he hears; 30 when he walks, he perceives that he walks; and similarly in all other activities there is something which perceives that we are active. This means that, in perception, we perceive that we perceive, and in thinking we perceive that we think. But to perceive that we are perceiving or thinking means that we exist, since, as we saw, existence is perceiving or thinking. Now,
1170b
1 νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὑτό (φύσει
γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ), αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς,
ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ (συναισθανόμενοι
5 γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται), ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ
φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ,
οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν
αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη
10 αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ
φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν
λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων
τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν
15 ἐστι καθ' αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον
δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν
εἴη. ὃ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ
ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων
σπουδαίων.
1 to perceive that we are living is something pleasant in itself, for existence is by nature good, and to perceive that that good thing is inherent in us is pleasant. Further, life is desirable especially for good men, because existence is good and pleasant to them: 5 they are pleased when they are conscious of the presence in them of what is in itself good. Also, the attitude of a morally good man is the same toward himself as it is toward his friend, since a friend is another self. From all this it follows that just as one's own existence is desirable for each man, so, or nearly so, is his friend's existence also desirable for him. Now as we saw, his existence is desirable because he perceives his own goodness, and 10 this kind of perception is in itself pleasant. Consequently, he must also include his friend's existence in his consciousness, and that may be accomplished by living together with him and by sharing each other's words and thoughts. For this would seem to be the meaning of living together when said of human beings: it does not mean feeding in the same place as it does in the case of cattle.
If, therefore, existence is in itself desirable to a supremely happy man, 15 since it is by nature good and pleasant, and if his friend's existence is almost as desirable to him, we may conclude that a friend is something desirable. But what is desirable for a happy man he must have, or else he will be deficient in that respect ⟨and, consequently, not supremely happy⟩. It follows that, in order to be happy, a man needs morally good friends.
If, therefore, existence is in itself desirable to a supremely happy man, 15 since it is by nature good and pleasant, and if his friend's existence is almost as desirable to him, we may conclude that a friend is something desirable. But what is desirable for a happy man he must have, or else he will be deficient in that respect ⟨and, consequently, not supremely happy⟩. It follows that, in order to be happy, a man needs morally good friends.
Book 9,Chapter 10 (1170b20–1171a20)
20 Ἆρ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ
τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ "μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ'
ἄξεινος," καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι
μήτ' αὖ πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν
κἂν πάνυ δόξειεν ἁρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ
25 ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ [τοῦτο]
πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν
περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ
αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν
τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους
30 κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ
πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ'
ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως
ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων. καὶ φίλων
20 Ought we to make as many friends as possible? Or will the *mot juste* about hospitality, "not too many guests, nor yet none,"460 also fit friendship in the sense that a person should neither be friendless nor have an excessive number of friends? The saying would seem to fit exactly those who become friends with a view to their ⟨mutual⟩ usefulness. To accommodate many people in return for what they have done to us is troublesome, and life is not long enough to do that. 25 Accordingly 25, more friends than are sufficient for one's own life are superfluous and are an obstacle to the good life, so that there is no need of them. To give us pleasure a few friends are sufficient, just as it takes little to give food the right amount of sweetness.
But, as regards morally good men, should we have 30 as many in number as possible as our friends? Or is there some limit to the number of friendly relations a person can have, just as there is a limit to the size of a city-state? Ten persons do not make a city-state, and when there are a hundred thousand it is no longer a city-state.461 The right number is perhaps not some specific number, but anything that lies between certain fixed limits. The number of our friends, is, accordingly, also limited.
But, as regards morally good men, should we have 30 as many in number as possible as our friends? Or is there some limit to the number of friendly relations a person can have, just as there is a limit to the size of a city-state? Ten persons do not make a city-state, and when there are a hundred thousand it is no longer a city-state.461 The right number is perhaps not some specific number, but anything that lies between certain fixed limits. The number of our friends, is, accordingly, also limited.
1171a
1 δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν
δύναιτό τις συζῆν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι)· ὅτι
δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
ἔτι δὲ κἀκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι
5 πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν
πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν
καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα
τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ
ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ
10 συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι
φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ
τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα
δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων·
οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν
15 φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι
καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι,
πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν
οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς
ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῆ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς
20 πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους.
1 Perhaps it is the largest number with whom a man might be able to live together, for, as we noticed,462 living together is the surest indication of friendship; and it is quite obvious that it is impossible to live together with many people and divide oneself up among them. Furthermore, one's friends should also be the friends of one another, 5 if they are all going to spend their days in each other's company; but it is an arduous task to have this be the case among a large number of people. It is also difficult to share the joys and sorrows of many people as intensely as if they were one's own, for it might well happen that one would have to share the joy of one friend and the grief of another all at the same time.
So the right course is perhaps not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are sufficient for living together 10. In fact, it would even seem to be impossible to be an intimate friend of many. For that very 10 reason it is also impossible to be in love with many people: being in love means to have something like an excess of friendship, and that is only possible toward one person. Accordingly, intimate friendship is only possible with a few people.
This seems to be corroborated by the way things are. In friendships of bosom companions not many people are included, 15 and the friendships celebrated in stories are ⟨always⟩ between two people.463 Those who have many friends and are on familiar terms with any chance acquaintance are thought to be friends to none, except in the sense in which there is friendship among fellow citizens. They are also called "obsequious." Now, in the kind of friendship that exists among fellow citizens, it is actually possible to be friends with many people without being obsequious and while remaining a truly good man. But to be a friend of many people is impossible, if the friendship is to be based on virtue or excellence and on the character of our friends. 20 We must be content if we find even a few friends of this kind.
So the right course is perhaps not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are sufficient for living together 10. In fact, it would even seem to be impossible to be an intimate friend of many. For that very 10 reason it is also impossible to be in love with many people: being in love means to have something like an excess of friendship, and that is only possible toward one person. Accordingly, intimate friendship is only possible with a few people.
This seems to be corroborated by the way things are. In friendships of bosom companions not many people are included, 15 and the friendships celebrated in stories are ⟨always⟩ between two people.463 Those who have many friends and are on familiar terms with any chance acquaintance are thought to be friends to none, except in the sense in which there is friendship among fellow citizens. They are also called "obsequious." Now, in the kind of friendship that exists among fellow citizens, it is actually possible to be friends with many people without being obsequious and while remaining a truly good man. But to be a friend of many people is impossible, if the friendship is to be based on virtue or excellence and on the character of our friends. 20 We must be content if we find even a few friends of this kind.
Book 9,Chapter 11 (1171a21–1171b28)
Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις;
ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἵ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες
δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἵ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ
ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ
25 ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον
δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους
γὰρ αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι
γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτὴ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις
καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι
30 συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον
ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, ἡ παρουσία
δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν
λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται,
ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε δ'
35 ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν
Is the need of friends greater in good fortune or in bad? Men seek them in both: in bad fortune they need their assistance, and in good fortune they need people with whom to live together and to whom they will be able to do good, since men wish to be beneficent. 25 Accordingly, friends are more indispensable in bad fortune; and that is why the useful kind of friend is needed in such situations. But it is nobler to have friends in good fortune, and for that reason people look for good men ⟨as their friends when they are well off⟩, because it is more desirable to do good to them and to spend one's time with them.
The very presence of friends is pleasant in both good and bad fortune. Pain is alleviated 30 when friends share the sorrow. In this connection, the question might be raised whether friends share a burden, as it were, or whether the truth is rather that the pain is reduced by the pleasantness which their presence brings, and by the thought that they are sharing the sorrow. Let us dismiss the question whether the alleviation is brought about by these or by some other factors. At any rate, it is evident that ⟨friendship⟩ brings about what we have said it does.
It 35 seems that the presence of friends consists in a mixture of several factors.
The very presence of friends is pleasant in both good and bad fortune. Pain is alleviated 30 when friends share the sorrow. In this connection, the question might be raised whether friends share a burden, as it were, or whether the truth is rather that the pain is reduced by the pleasantness which their presence brings, and by the thought that they are sharing the sorrow. Let us dismiss the question whether the alleviation is brought about by these or by some other factors. At any rate, it is evident that ⟨friendship⟩ brings about what we have said it does.
It 35 seems that the presence of friends consists in a mixture of several factors.
1171b
1 τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεταί τις
ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι (παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος
καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἥδεται καὶ λυπεῖται)· τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι
5 ἐπὶ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει
λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν
φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὑτοῖς, κἂν μὴ
ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει,
ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς
10 εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι
χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας.
μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν
ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τήν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν
ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἥδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς ..
15 διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους
προθύμως (εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν), εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας
ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν,
ὅθεν τὸ "ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν." μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον
ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν.
20 ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας
ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα
τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ [τὸ] μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον
καὶ ἥδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως
(καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως·
25 οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν
δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ
συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ
φαίνεται.
1 The very sight of friends is pleasant, especially at a time of misfortune, and it provides some relief from pain. For, if a friend is tactful, seeing him and talking to him are a source of comfort, since he knows our character and the things which give us pleasure or pain. But on the other hand, 5 it is painful to see him pained by our misfortunes, for everyone tries to avoid being the cause of a friend's pain. For that reason, manly natures take scrupulous care not to let their friends share their pain, and, unless a man is extremely insensitive to pain,464 he cannot bear the pain which ⟨sympathy for him⟩ gives his friends. In general, such a person does not let others join in his lamentations, because he himself is not given to lamenting. 10 But womenfolk and womanish men enjoy it when others join their mourning, and they feel affection for them as being their friends and sharers of their sorrow. Still, it is the better type of man whom we must obviously imitate in all matters.
In good fortune, the presence of friends brings with it a pleasant way of passing one's time and the pleasant thought that they are pleased by the good we are enjoying. 15 This is a reason for thinking that we ought to be eager to invite our friends to share our good fortunes, since it is noble to do good, and to be reluctant to ask our friend to share our misfortunes, since one should let others participate as little as possible in what is evil. Hence the saying: "That I'm unfortunate is enough."465 We should invite our friends to come to our side chiefly when a little trouble on their part will mean a great benefit to 20 us.
Conversely, it is perhaps fitting for a man to go unasked and eagerly to a friend in misfortune: doing good is the mark of a friend, and especially to do good to those in need without being asked, since that is nobler and more pleasant for both partners. It is also fitting to join eagerly in the activities of a friend who is enjoying good fortune, for here, too, friends are needed; but we should take our time in going to enjoy the fruits of their good fortune, 25 for to be eager to receive a benefit is not noble. Still, we should perhaps scrupulously avoid the reputation of being disagreeable in rejecting their kindnesses, for that happens occasionally. So we see that the presence of friends is desirable in all circumstances.
In good fortune, the presence of friends brings with it a pleasant way of passing one's time and the pleasant thought that they are pleased by the good we are enjoying. 15 This is a reason for thinking that we ought to be eager to invite our friends to share our good fortunes, since it is noble to do good, and to be reluctant to ask our friend to share our misfortunes, since one should let others participate as little as possible in what is evil. Hence the saying: "That I'm unfortunate is enough."465 We should invite our friends to come to our side chiefly when a little trouble on their part will mean a great benefit to 20 us.
Conversely, it is perhaps fitting for a man to go unasked and eagerly to a friend in misfortune: doing good is the mark of a friend, and especially to do good to those in need without being asked, since that is nobler and more pleasant for both partners. It is also fitting to join eagerly in the activities of a friend who is enjoying good fortune, for here, too, friends are needed; but we should take our time in going to enjoy the fruits of their good fortune, 25 for to be eager to receive a benefit is not noble. Still, we should perhaps scrupulously avoid the reputation of being disagreeable in rejecting their kindnesses, for that happens occasionally. So we see that the presence of friends is desirable in all circumstances.
Book 9,Chapter 12 (1171b29–1172a15)
Ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι
30 καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς
ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου,
οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία
γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν
φίλον· περὶ αὑτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή, καὶ περὶ
35 τὸν φίλον δή· ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν,
What lovers love most is to see one another, and 30 they prefer sight to all the other senses, because love exists and is generated by sight more than by any other sense. Is it, similarly, true of friends that the most desirable thing for them is to live together? ⟨Apparently, yes;⟩ for friendship is an association or community, and a person has the same attitude toward his friend as he has toward himself. Now, since a man's perception that he exists is desirable, his perception of his friend's existence is desirable, too. 35 But only by living together can the perception of a friend's existence be activated,
1172a
1 ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὅ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τὸ
εἶναι ἢ οὗ χάριν αἱροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων
βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἳ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ
συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν
5 ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ τι
περ μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι
μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν
οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία
μοχθηρά (κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ
10 δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους
γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται
γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν "ἐσθλῶν
μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά." περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
15 εἰρήσθω· ἑπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.
1 so that it stands to reason that friends aim at living together. And whatever his existence means to each partner individually or whatever is the purpose that makes his life desirable, he wishes to pursue it together with his friends. That is why some friends drink together or play dice together, while others go in for sports together and hunt together, 5 or join in the study of philosophy: whatever each group of people loves most in life, in that activity they spend their days together. For since they wish to live together with their friends, they follow and share in those pursuits which, they think, constitute their life together.
Thus, the friendship of base people becomes wicked, because, unsteady as they are, they share in base pursuits, 10 and by becoming like one another they become wicked. But the friendship of good men is good, and it increases with ⟨the frequency of⟩ their meetings. Also, it seems, they become better as they are active together and correct one another: from the mould of the other each takes the imprint of the traits he likes, whence the saying: "Noble things from noble people."466 15 Let this be enough of our treatment of friendship. Our next task is a discussion of pleasure.
Thus, the friendship of base people becomes wicked, because, unsteady as they are, they share in base pursuits, 10 and by becoming like one another they become wicked. But the friendship of good men is good, and it increases with ⟨the frequency of⟩ their meetings. Also, it seems, they become better as they are active together and correct one another: from the mould of the other each takes the imprint of the traits he likes, whence the saying: "Noble things from noble people."466 15 Let this be enough of our treatment of friendship. Our next task is a discussion of pleasure.