Name: Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI
Author: Aristotle

Bywater (OCT, 1894) · Ostwald (1962)

Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).

Book 6,Chapter 1 (1138b18–34)

1138b

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον

αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ

20 δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν.

ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον

ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων,

ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως,

25 οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως

ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις,

περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν,

ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ

τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν

30 τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς

τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς

ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ

μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον

τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.

We stated earlier²³⁷ that we must choose the median, and not excess or deficiency, 20 and that the median is what right reason dictates. Let us now analyze this second point.
In all the characteristics we have discussed, as in all others, there is some target on which a rational man keeps his eye as he bends and relaxes his efforts to attain it. There is also a standard that determines the several means which, as we claim, lie between excess and deficiency, 25 and which are fixed by right reason. But this statement, true though it is, lacks clarity. In all other fields of endeavor in which scientific knowledge is possible, it is indeed true to say that we must exert ourselves or relax neither too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as right reason demands. But if this is the only thing a person knows, 30 he will be none the wiser: he will, for example, not know what kind of medicines to apply to his body, if he is merely told to apply whatever medical science prescribes and in a manner in which a medical expert applies them. Accordingly, in discussing the characteristics of the soul, too, it is not enough that the statement we have made be true. We must also have a definition of what right reason is and what standard determines it.
In analyzing the virtues of the soul we said that some are virtues of character and others excellence of thought or understanding.²³⁸ We have now discussed the moral virtues, ⟨i.e., the virtues of character⟩. In what follows, we will deal with the others, ⟨i.e., the intellectual virtues,⟩ beginning with some prefatory remarks about the soul. We said in our earlier discussion that the soul consists of two parts, one rational and one irrational.²³⁹ We must now make a similar distinction in regard to the rational part. Let it be assumed that there are two rational elements: with one of these we apprehend the realities whose fundamental principles do not admit of being other than they are, and with the other we apprehend things which do admit of being other. For if we grant that knowledge presupposes a certain likeness and kinship of subject and object,²⁴⁰ there will be a generically different part of the soul naturally corresponding to each of two different kinds of object. Let us call one the scientific and the other the calculative element. Deliberating and calculating are the same thing, and no one deliberates about objects that cannot be other than they are. This means that the calculative constitutes one element of the rational part of the soul. Accordingly, we must now take up the question which is the best characteristic of each element, since that constitutes the excellence or virtue of each. But the virtue of a thing is relative to its proper function.

Book 6,Chapter 2 (1138b35–1139b13)

35 Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι

35 Now, there are three elements in the soul which control action and truth: sense perception, intelligence,²⁴¹ and desire.

1139a

1 τοῦ ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν

ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς

πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη

δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον·

5 νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον.

καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ

θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται

ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ

τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ

10 γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα

καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων

τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι

καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ

τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν

15 ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων

τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ'

ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον. Τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ

τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τούτων

δ' ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ

20 τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν.

ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν

ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις

προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ

ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν,

25 εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι

τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια

πρακτική· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς

μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος

(τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον)· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ

30 καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ

ὀρθῇ. πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις

ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ

ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ' ἄνευ

ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ

35 ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια

δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική·

1 Of these sense perception does not initiate any action. We can see this from the fact that 20 animals have sense perception but have no share in action.²⁴² What affirmation and 5 negation are in the realm of thought, pursuit and avoidance are in the realm of desire. Therefore, since moral virtue is a characteristic involving choice, and since choice is a deliberate desire,²⁴³ it follows that, 25 if 10 the choice is to be good, the reasoning must be true and the desire correct; that is, reasoning must affirm what desire pursues. This then is the kind of thought and the kind of truth that is practical and concerned with 15 action. On the other hand, in the kind of thought involved in theoretical knowledge and not in action or production, the good and the bad state are, respectively, truth and falsehood; in fact, the attainment of truth is the function of the intellectual faculty as a whole. 30 But in intellectual activity concerned with action, the good state is truth in harmony with correct desire.
Choice is the starting point of action: it is the source of motion but not the end for the sake of which we act, ⟨i.e., the final cause⟩.²⁴⁴ The starting point of choice, however, is desire and reasoning directed toward some end. That is why there cannot be choice either without intelligence and thought or without some moral characteristic; for good and bad action²⁴⁵ 35 in human conduct are not possible without thought and character. Now thought alone moves nothing; only thought which is directed to some end and concerned with action can do so.

1139b

1 αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ

πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ

τινός) τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος,

ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις

5 ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. οὐκ

ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται

Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος

ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς

οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων

10 μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,

ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ' ἃς

οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

1 And it is this kind of thought also which initiates production. For whoever produces something produces it for an end. The product he makes is not an end in an unqualified sense, but an end only in a particular relation and of a particular operation. Only the goal of action is an end in the unqualified sense: for the good life is an end, and desire is directed toward this. Therefore, choice is either intelligence motivated by desire 5 or desire operating through thought, and it is as a combination of these two that man is a starting point of action.
(No object of choice belongs to the past: no one chooses to have sacked Troy. For deliberation does not refer to the past but only to the future and to what is possible; and it is not possible that what is past should not have happened. Therefore, Agathon is right when he says:
> 10 One thing alone is denied even to god:
> to make undone the deeds which have been done.²⁴⁶)
As we have seen, truth is the function of both intellectual parts ⟨of the soul⟩. Therefore, those characteristics which permit each part to be as truthful as possible will be the virtues of the two parts.

Book 6,Chapter 3 (1139b14–36)

Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.

15 ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι,

πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις

σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.

ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ

δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάντες

20 γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι

ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ

θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα

ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀίδιον ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα

ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ δ' ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα.

25 ἔτι διδακτὴ ἅπασα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν

μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥςπερ

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἣ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς,

ἣ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι

καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν

30 ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός·

ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική,

καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς·

ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ

ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος,

35 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης

διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

So let us make a fresh beginning and discuss these characteristics once again. 15 Let us take for granted that the faculties by which the soul expresses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number: art, science, practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, and intelligence.²⁴⁷ Conviction and opinion do not belong here, for they may be false.
What pure science or scientific knowledge is—in the precise sense of the word and not in any of its wider uses based on mere similarity—will become clear in the following. We are all convinced that 20 what we *know* scientifically cannot be otherwise than it is; but of facts which can possibly be other than they are we do not know whether or not they continue to be true when removed from our observation. Therefore, an object of scientific knowledge exists of necessity, and is, consequently, eternal. For everything that exists of necessity in an unqualified sense is eternal, and what is eternal is ungenerated and imperishable ⟨and hence cannot be otherwise⟩.
Moreover, 25 all scientific knowledge is held to be teachable, and what is scientifically knowable is capable of being learned. All teaching is based on what is already known, as we have stated in the *Analytics*;²⁴⁸ some teaching proceeds by induction and some by syllogism. Now, induction is the starting point ⟨for knowledge⟩, of the universal as well ⟨as the particular⟩, while syllogism proceeds *from* universals.²⁴⁹ Consequently, 30 there are starting points or principles from which a syllogism proceeds and which are themselves not arrived at by a syllogism. It is, therefore, induction that attains them. Accordingly, scientific knowledge is a capacity²⁵⁰ for demonstration and has, in addition, all the other qualities which we have specified in the *Analytics*.²⁵¹ When a man believes something in the way there specified, and when the starting points or principles on which his beliefs rest are known to him, then he has scientific knowledge; unless he knows the starting points or principles better than the conclusion, 35 he will have scientific knowledge only incidentally. So much for our definition of scientific knowledge or pure science.

Book 6,Chapter 4 (1140a1–23)

1140a

1 Τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν

καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις (πιστεύομεν

δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)· ὥστε καὶ ἡ

μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς

5 ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ

ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ

οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου

ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου

ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν

10 ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. ἔστι

δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν

ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ

μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ

ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ

15 τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι

ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον,

ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ

τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ

καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ "τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη

20 τέχνην." ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ

λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον

μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον

ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Things which admit of being other than they are 1 include both things made and things done. Production is different from action—for that point we can rely even on our less technical discussions.²⁵² Hence, the characteristic of acting rationally is different from the characteristic of producing rationally. 5 It also follows that one does not include the other, for action is not production nor production action. Now, building is an art or applied science, and it is essentially a characteristic or trained ability of rationally producing. In fact, there is no art that is not a characteristic or trained ability of rationally producing, nor is there a characteristic of rationally producing that is not an art. 10 It follows that art is identical with the characteristic of producing under the guidance of true reason. All art is concerned with the realm of coming-to-be, i.e., with contriving and studying how something which is capable both of being and of not being may come into existence, a thing whose starting point or source is in the producer and not in the thing produced. For art is concerned neither with things which exist or come into being by necessity, 15 nor with things produced by nature: these have their source of motion within themselves.
Since production and action are different, it follows that art deals with production and not with action. In a certain sense, fortune and art are concerned with the same things, as Agathon says: "Fortune loves art and 20 art fortune." So, as we have said, art is a characteristic of producing under the guidance of true reason, and lack of art, on the contrary, is a characteristic of producing under the guidance of false reason; and both of them deal with what admits of being other than it is.

Book 6,Chapter 5 (1140a24–1140b30)

Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες

25 τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ

δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ

συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς

ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ

τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον

30 εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν

εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν

ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ

πρᾶξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ'

αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις

35 (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν), καὶ οὐκ

We may approach the subject of practical wisdom by studying the persons 25 to whom we attribute it. Now, the capacity of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself is regarded as typical of a man of practical wisdom—not deliberating well about what is good and advantageous in a partial sense, for example, what contributes to health or strength, but what sort of thing contributes to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact that we speak of men as having practical wisdom in a particular respect, ⟨i.e., not in an unqualified sense,⟩ when they calculate well with respect to some worthwhile end, 30 one that cannot be attained by an applied science or art. It follows that, in general, a man of practical wisdom is he who has the ability to deliberate.
Now no one deliberates about things that cannot be other than they are or about actions that he cannot possibly perform. Since, as we saw, pure science involves demonstration, while things whose starting points or first causes can be other than they are do not admit of demonstration—for 35 such things too ⟨and not merely their first causes⟩ can all be other than they are—

1140b

1 ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη

ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται

τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ

γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι

5 ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ

καὶ κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ

πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ

τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι,

ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν·

10 εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς

πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν

τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σῴζει δὲ τὴν

τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει

οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον

15 δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ

πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα

τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς

οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ'

αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ

20 ἀρχῆς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου

ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν

τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν

τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν

ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή

25 τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς

τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ·

ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ

φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον

δ' ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ'

30 οὐκ ἔστιν.

1 and since it is impossible to deliberate about what exists by necessity, we may conclude that practical wisdom is neither a pure science nor an art. It is not a pure science, because matters of action admit of being other than they are, and it is not an applied science or art, because action and production are generically different.
What remains, then, is that 5 it is a truthful characteristic of acting rationally in matters good and bad for man. For production has an end other than itself, but action does not: good action²⁵³ is itself an end. That is why we think that Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom.²⁵⁴ They have the capacity of seeing what is good for themselves and for mankind, and 10 these are, we believe, the qualities of men capable of managing households and states.
This also explains why we call "self-control" *sōphrosynē*: it "preserves" our "practical wisdom."²⁵⁵ What it preserves is the kind of conviction we have described. For the pleasant and the painful do not destroy and pervert every conviction we hold—not, for example, our conviction that a triangle has or does not have the sum of its angles 15 equal to two right angles—but only the convictions we hold concerning how we should act. In matters of action, the principles or initiating motives are the ends at which our actions are aimed. But as soon as a man becomes corrupted by pleasure or pain, the goal no longer appears to him as a motivating principle: he no longer sees that he should choose and act in every case for the sake of and because of this end. For vice tends to destroy the principle or initiating motive of 20 action.
Necessarily, then, practical wisdom is a truthful rational characteristic of acting in matters involving what is good for man. Furthermore, whereas there exists such a thing as excellence in art, it does not exist in practical wisdom.²⁵⁶ Also, in art a man who makes a mistake voluntarily is preferable to one who makes it involuntarily; but in practical wisdom, as in every virtue or excellence, such a man is less desirable. Thus it is clear that practical wisdom is an excellence or virtue 25 and not an art. Since there are two parts of the soul that contain a rational element, it must be the virtue of one of them, namely of the part that forms opinions.²⁵⁷ For opinion as well as practical wisdom deals with things that can be other than they are. However, it is not merely a rational characteristic or trained ability. An indication ⟨that it is something more may be seen⟩ in the fact that a trained ability of that kind can be forgotten, 30 whereas practical wisdom cannot.

Book 6,Chapter 6 (1140b31–1141a8)

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις

καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν

καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς

ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε

35 φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἳ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν

Since pure science or scientific knowledge is a basic conviction concerning universal and necessary truths, and since everything demonstrable and all pure science begins from fundamental principles (for science proceeds rationally), the fundamental principle or starting point for scientific knowledge cannot itself be the object either of science, of art, or of practical wisdom. 35 For what is known scientifically is demonstrable, whereas art and practical wisdom are

1141a

1 οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ

σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν

ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα

περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως

5 ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων

δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία

φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν

ἀρχῶν.

1 concerned with things that can be other than they are. Nor are these fundamental principles the objects of theoretical wisdom: for it is the task of a man of theoretical wisdom to have a demonstration for certain truths.²⁵⁸ Now, if 5 scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, and intelligence are the faculties by which we attain truth and by which we are never deceived both in matters which can and in those matters which cannot be other than they are; and if three of these—I am referring to practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, and theoretical wisdom—cannot be the faculty in question, we are left with the conclusion that it is intelligence that apprehends fundamental principles.²⁵⁹

Book 6,Chapter 7 (1141a9–1141b22)

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις

10 τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ

Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο

σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ

τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι

σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

15 τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἂρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία.

δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι,

ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ

σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη

20 τῶν τιμιωτάτων. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν

φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν

ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν

ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ

ταὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸ πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον

25 δὲ ἕτερον· τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν

φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά. διὸ καὶ

τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν

βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ

ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ

30 τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὑτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ

ἔσονται σοφίαι· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν

ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ

πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων

ζῴων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ

We attribute "wisdom" in the arts to the most precise and perfect masters of their skills: 10 we attribute it to Phidias as a sculptor in marble and to Polycletus as a sculptor in bronze.
In this sense we signify by "wisdom" nothing but excellence of art or craftsmanship. However, we regard some men as being wise in general, not in any partial sense or in some other particular respect, as Homer says in the *Margites*:
> The gods let him not be a digger or a ploughman > nor wise at anything.²⁶¹
It is, therefore, 15 clear, that wisdom must be the most precise and perfect form of knowledge. Consequently, a wise man must not only know what follows from fundamental principles, but he must also have true knowledge of the fundamental principles themselves. Accordingly, theoretical wisdom must comprise both intelligence and scientific knowledge. It is science in its consummation, as it were, 20 the science of the things that are valued most highly.
For it would be strange to regard politics or practical wisdom as the highest kind of knowledge, when in fact man is not the best thing in the universe. Surely, if "healthy" and "good" mean one thing for men and another for fishes, whereas "white" and "straight" always mean the same, "wise" must mean the same for everyone, but "practically wise" 25 will be different. For each particular being ascribes practical wisdom in matters relating to itself to that thing which observes its interests well, and it will entrust itself to that thing. That is the reason why people attribute practical wisdom even to some animals—to all those which display a capacity of forethought in matters relating to their own life.
It is also evident that theoretical wisdom is not the same as politics. 30 If we are to call "theoretical wisdom" the knowledge of what is helpful to us, there will be many kinds of wisdom. There is no single science that deals with what is good for all living things any more than there is a single art of medicine dealing with everything that is, but a different science deals with each particular good. The argument that man is the best of living things makes no difference.

1141b

1 θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος

συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ

καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν

καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους

5 δ' οὔ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα

ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ

καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι

οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ

ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου

10 μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται

δ' οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ'

ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ'

ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς

κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν

15 καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν·

πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ

ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς

ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα

κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν,

20 ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια [κοῦφα καὶ] ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει

μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω

ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.

1 There are other things whose nature is much more divine than man's: to take the most visible example only, the constituent parts of the universe.²⁶²
Our discussion has shown that theoretical wisdom comprises both scientific knowledge and ⟨apprehension by the⟩ intelligence of things which by their nature are valued most highly. That is why it is said that men like Anaxagoras and Thales have theoretical but not practical wisdom: 5 when we see that they do not know what is advantageous to them, we admit that they know extraordinary, wonderful, difficult, and superhuman things, but call their knowledge useless because the good they are seeking is not human.
Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is concerned with human affairs and with matters about which deliberation is possible. As we have said, 10 the most characteristic function of a man of practical wisdom is to deliberate well: no one deliberates about things that cannot be other than they are, nor about things that are not directed to some end, an end that is a good attainable by action. In an unqualified sense, that man is good at deliberating who, by reasoning, can aim at and hit the best thing attainable to man by action.
Nor 15 does practical wisdom deal only with universals. It must also be familiar with particulars, since it is concerned with action and action has to do with particulars. This explains why some men who have no scientific knowledge are more adept in practical matters, especially if they have experience, than those who do have scientific knowledge. For if a person were to know that light meat is easily digested, and hence wholesome, but did not know what sort of meat is light, he will not produce health, 20 whereas someone who knows that poultry is light and²⁶³ wholesome is more likely to produce health.²⁶⁴
Now, practical wisdom is concerned with action. That means that a person should have both ⟨knowledge of universals and knowledge of particulars⟩, or knowledge of particulars rather ⟨than knowledge of universals⟩. But here, too, it seems, there is a supreme and comprehensive science involved, ⟨i.e., politics⟩.

Book 6,Chapter 8 (1141b23–1142a30)

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ

μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ

25 πόλιν ἣ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἣ δὲ

ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική· αὕτη

δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν

ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον λέγουσιν·

μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ

30 δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ

ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἣ μὲν

οἰκονομία ἣ δὲ νομοθεσία ἣ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἣ

μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἣ δὲ δικαστική. Εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη

γνώσεως τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν·

Political wisdom²⁶⁶ and practical wisdom are both the same characteristic, but their essential aspect is not the same. There are two kinds of wisdom concerning the state: 25 the one, which acts as practical wisdom supreme and comprehensive, is the art of legislation; the other, which is practical wisdom as dealing with particular facts, bears the name which, ⟨in everyday speech,⟩ is common to both kinds, politics, and it is concerned with action and deliberation. For a decree, ⟨unlike a law, which lays down general principles,⟩ is a matter for action, inasmuch as it is the last step ⟨in the deliberative process⟩.²⁶⁷
That is why only those who make decrees are said to engage in politics, for they alone, like workmen, "do" things.²⁶⁸
It is also commonly held that 30 practical wisdom is primarily concerned with one's own person, i.e., with the individual, and it is this kind that bears the name "practical wisdom," which properly belongs to others as well. The other kinds are called household management, legislation, and politics, the last of which is subdivided into deliberative and judicial.²⁶⁹
Now, knowing what is good for oneself is, to be sure, one kind of knowledge; but it is very different from the other kinds.

1142a

1 καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος

εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως

ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ

5 ἴσον μετασχεῖν;

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον ...

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν.

ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρονίμους

εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας

10 οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν,

ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου

καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται

καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι.

αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται

15 γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος

γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο,

διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς

δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν,

τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν

20 οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; ἔτι

ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ

τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα

φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ

ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται·

25 τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν

γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου,

οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων,

ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς]

ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον

30 αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

1 A man who knows and concerns himself with his own interests is regarded as a man of practical wisdom, while men whose concern is politics are looked upon as busybodies. Euripides' words are in this vein:
> How can I be called "wise," who might have filled > a common soldier's place, free from all care, > 5 sharing an equal lot . . . ?
> For those who reach too high and are too active. . . .²⁷⁰
For people seek their own good and think that this is what they should do. This opinion has given rise to the view that it is such men who have practical wisdom. And yet, surely one's own good cannot exist without household management 10 nor without a political system. Moreover, the problem of how to manage one's own affairs properly needs clarification and remains to be examined.
An indication that what we have said is correct is the following common observation. While young men do indeed become good geometricians and mathematicians and attain theoretical wisdom in such matters, they apparently do not attain practical wisdom. The reason is that practical wisdom is concerned with particulars as well ⟨as with universals⟩, and 15 knowledge of particulars comes from experience. But a young man has no experience, for experience is the product of a long time. In fact, one might also raise the question why it is that a boy may become a mathematician but not a philosopher or a natural scientist. The answer may be that the objects of mathematics are the result of abstraction, whereas the fundamental principles of philosophy and natural science come from experience. Young men can assert philosophical and scientific principles 20 but can have no genuine convictions about them, whereas there is no obscurity about the essential definitions in mathematics.
Moreover, in our deliberations error is possible as regards either the universal principle or the particular fact: we may be unaware either that all heavy water is bad, or that the particular water we are faced with is heavy.
That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is ⟨therefore⟩ evident. As we stated,²⁷¹ it is concerned with ultimate particulars, 25 since the actions to be performed are ultimate particulars. This means that it is at the opposite pole from intelligence. For the intelligence grasps limiting terms and definitions that cannot be attained by reasoning, while practical wisdom has as its object the ultimate particular fact, of which there is perception but no scientific knowledge. This perception is not the kind with which ⟨each of our five senses apprehends⟩ its proper object,²⁷² but the kind with which we perceive that in mathematics the triangle is the ultimate figure.²⁷³ For in this direction, too, we shall have to reach a stop.²⁷⁴ But this ⟨type of mathematical cognition⟩ is more truly 30 perception than practical wisdom, and it is different in kind from the other ⟨type of perception which deals with the objects proper to the various senses⟩.

Book 6,Chapter 9 (1142a31–1142b33)

Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ

βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας

τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ

ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι

There is a difference between investigating and deliberating: to deliberate is to investigate a particular kind of object. We must also try to grasp what excellence in deliberation is: whether it is some sort of scientific knowledge, opinion, shrewd guessing, or something generically different from any of these.
Now, scientific knowledge it is certainly not:²⁷⁵ people do not investigate

1142b

1 περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος

ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ

τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν

χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα,

5 βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον

καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ

δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος

ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης

τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης·

10 ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία),

δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ

δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας

ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα

οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν

15 τε εὖ ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.

ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα

πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς,

δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται

†ἰδεῖν† ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται

20 βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν

τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς

εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ

συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι'

οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ'

25 αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι

δι' οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν,

τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης

ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὣς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι

ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος. ἣ μὲν

30 δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ

ἡ πρός τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι,

ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς

τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.

1 matters they already know. But good deliberation is a kind of deliberation, and when a person deliberates he is engaged in investigating and calculating ⟨things not yet decided⟩. Nor yet is it shrewd guessing. For shrewd guessing involves no reasoning and proceeds quickly, whereas deliberation takes a long time. As the saying goes, the action which follows deliberation should be quick, 5 but deliberation itself should be slow. Furthermore, quickness of mind is not the same as excellence in deliberation: quickness of mind is a kind of shrewd guessing. Nor again is excellence in deliberation any form of opinion at all. But since a person who deliberates badly makes mistakes, while he who deliberates well deliberates correctly, it clearly follows that excellence in deliberation is some kind of correctness. But it is correctness neither of scientific knowledge nor of opinion. 10 There cannot be correctness of scientific knowledge any more than there can be error of scientific knowledge; and correctness of opinion is truth. Moreover, anything that is an object of opinion is already fixed and determined, ⟨while deliberation deals with objects which remain to be determined⟩. Still, excellence in deliberation does involve reasoning, and we are, consequently, left with the alternative that it is correctness of ⟨a process of⟩ thought; for thinking is not yet an affirmation. For while opinion is no longer a process of investigation but has reached the point of affirmation, a person who deliberates, 15 whether he does so well or badly, is still engaged in investigating and calculating something ⟨not yet determined⟩.
Good deliberation is a kind of correctness of deliberation. We must, therefore, first investigate what deliberation is and with what objects it is concerned.²⁷⁶ Since the term "correctness" is used in several different senses, it is clear that not every kind of correctness in deliberation ⟨is excellence in deliberation⟩. For (1) a morally weak or a bad man will, as a result of calculation, attain the goal which he has proposed to himself as the right goal²⁷⁷ to attain. He will, therefore, have deliberated 20 correctly, but what he will get out of it will be a very bad thing. But the result of good deliberation is generally regarded as a good thing. It is this kind of correctness of deliberation which is good deliberation, a correctness that attains what is good.
But (2) it is also possible to attain something good by a false syllogism, i.e., to arrive at the right action, but to arrive at it by the wrong means when the middle term is false.²⁷⁸
Accordingly, 25 this process, which makes us attain the right goal but not by the right means, is still not good deliberation.
Moreover, (3) it is possible that one man attains his goal by deliberating for a long time, while another does so quickly.
Now, long deliberation, too, is not as such good deliberation:
excellence in deliberation is correctness in assessing what is beneficial, i.e., correctness in assessing the goal, the manner, and the time.
Again, (4) it is possible for a person to have deliberated well either in general, in an unqualified sense, or in relation to some particular end. 30 Good deliberation in the unqualified sense of course brings success in relation to what is, in an unqualified sense, the end, ⟨i.e., in relation to the good life⟩.
Excellence in deliberation as directed toward some particular end, however, brings success in the attainment of some particular end.
Thus we may conclude that, since it is a mark of men of practical wisdom to have deliberated well,²⁷⁹ excellence in deliberation will be correctness in assessing what is conducive to the end, concerning which practical wisdom gives a true conviction.
with Burnet, Rackham, and Dirlmeier δεῖν, which is preserved in two fifteenth-century manuscripts and which seems to underlie the medieval Latin translation of the *Nic. Eth.* by Robert Grosseteste.

Book 6,Chapter 10 (1142b34–1143a18)

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἃς λέγομεν

34 Understanding, i.e., excellence in understanding,

1143a

1 συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὔθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμῃ

ἢ δόξῃ (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία τῶν

κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἡ γεωμετρία

περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ

5 ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν,

ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ

τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις

καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν· τί γὰρ

δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις

10 κριτικὴ μόνον. ταὐτὸ γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ

καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν

οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν

λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ

χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ

15 φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ

εὖ τῷ καλῶς τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ

σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν

γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

1 the quality which makes us call certain people "men of understanding"
and "men of good understanding," is in general not identical with scientific knowledge or with opinion. For (if it were opinion,) everyone would be a man of understanding, (since everyone forms opinions). Nor is it one of the particular branches of science, in the sense in which medicine, for example, is the science of matters pertaining to health, or geometry the science which deals with magnitudes. For understanding is concerned neither with eternal 5 and unchangeable truth nor with anything and everything that comes into being (and passes away again). It deals with matters concerning which doubt and deliberation are possible. Accordingly, though its sphere is the same as that of practical wisdom, understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. Practical wisdom issues commands: its end is to tell us what we ought to do and what we ought not to do. Understanding, on the other hand, 10 only passes judgment.²⁸¹ (There is no difference between understanding and excellence in understanding:) for excellence in understanding is the same as understanding, and men of understanding are men of good understanding.
Thus understanding is neither possession nor acquisition of practical wisdom. Just as learning is called "understanding"
when a man makes use of his faculty of knowledge,²⁸² so (we speak of "understanding") when it implies the use of one's faculty of opinion in judging statements made by another person about 15 matters which belong to the realm of practical wisdom—and in judging such statements rightly, for *good* understanding means that the judgment is right. It is from this act of learning or understanding ⟨what someone else says⟩ that the term "understanding" as predicated of "men of good understanding" is derived. For we frequently use the words "learning" and "understanding" synonymously.

Book 6,Chapter 11 (1143a19–1143b17)

Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ

20 ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή.

σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν,

καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην.

ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή·

ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

25 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι·

λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν

ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη

καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται

τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ

30 κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων

ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων

ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ

τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον

δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ

35 πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ'

ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων

As for what is called "good sense,"²⁸³ the quality which makes us say of a person that he has the sense to forgive others, ⟨i.e., sympathetic understanding,⟩ and that he has good sense, this is a correct judgment of what is fair or equitable.
This 20 is indicated by the fact that we attribute to an equitable man especially sympathetic understanding and that we say that it is fair, in certain cases, to have the sense to forgive.
Sympathetic understanding is a correct critical sense or judgment of what is fair; and a correct judgment is a true one.
All these characteristics, as one would expect, tend toward 25 the same goal. We attribute good sense, understanding, practical wisdom, and intelligence to the same persons, and in saying that they have good sense, ⟨we imply⟩ at the same time that they have a mature intelligence and that they are men of practical wisdom and understanding. For what these capacities ⟨have in common is that they are⟩ all concerned with ultimate particular facts. To say that a person has good judgment in matters 30 of practical wisdom implies that he is understanding and has good sense or that he has sympathetic understanding; for equitable acts are common to all good men in their relation with someone else. Now, all matters of action are in the sphere of the particulars and ultimates. Not only must a man of practical wisdom take cognizance of particulars, but understanding and good sense, too, deal with matters of action, and 35 matters of action are ultimates. As for intelligence, it deals with ultimates at both ends of the scale.

1143b

1 νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις

τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς

τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως·

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ

5 τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.

διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν

οὐδείς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ'

ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία

νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. [διὸ

10 καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις

καὶ περὶ τούτων.] ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ

πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ

δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ

τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ

15 φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει

οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα,

εἴρηται.

1 It is intelligence, not reasoning, that has as its objects primary terms and definitions 1143b²⁸⁴ as well as ultimate particulars. Intelligence grasps, on the one hand, the unchangeable, primary terms and concepts for demonstrations; on the other hand, in questions of action, it grasps the ultimate, contingent fact and the minor premise.²⁸⁵ For it is particular facts that form 5 the starting points or principles for ⟨our knowledge of⟩ the goal of action: universals arise out of particulars. Hence one must have perception of particular facts, and this perception is intelligence.²⁸⁶
That is why these characteristics are regarded as natural endowments and, although no one is provided with theoretical wisdom by nature, we do think that men have good sense, understanding, and intelligence by nature. An indication of this is that we think of these 10 characteristics as depending on different stages of life, and that at a given stage of life a person acquires intelligence and good sense: the implication is that ⟨human⟩ nature is the cause.²⁸⁷ Therefore, we ought to pay as much attention to the sayings and opinions, undemonstrated though they are, of wise and experienced older men as we do to demonstrated truths. For experience has given such men an eye with which they can see correctly.²⁸⁸
We have now completed our 15 discussion of what practical and theoretical wisdom are; we have described the sphere in which each operates, and we have shown that each is the excellence of a different part of the soul.²⁸⁹

Book 6,Chapter 12 (1143b18–1144a36)

Διαπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων

20 ἄνθρωπος (οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο

μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς; εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησίς

ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ,

ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν,

οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις

25 αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά,

ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται·

οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν

ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον ῥητέον ἀλλὰ

τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος·

30 ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν

ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ

καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ

μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν,

εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται·

35 ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ

τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.

One might raise some questions about the usefulness of these two virtues. Theoretical wisdom, ⟨as we have described it,⟩ will study none of the things that make a man happy, for it is not at all concerned with 20 the sphere of coming-to-be ⟨but only with unchanging realities⟩. Practical wisdom, on the other hand, *is* concerned with this sphere, but for what purpose do we need it? (1) It is true that practical wisdom deals with what is just, noble, and good for man; and it is doing such things that characterizes a man as good. But our ability to perform such actions is in no way enhanced by knowing them, since the virtues are characteristics, ⟨that is to say, fixed capacities for action, acquired by habit⟩. The same also applies, after 25 all, to matters of health and well-being (not in the sense of "producing health and well-being" but in the sense of "being healthy and well" as the manifestation of a physical condition or a characteristic): our ability to perform actions ⟨which show that we are healthy and well⟩ is in no way enhanced by a mastery of the science of medicine or of physical training.
(2) But if we are to say that the purpose of practical wisdom is not to *know* what is just, noble, and good, but to *become* just, noble, and good, it would be 30 of no use at all to a man who is already good. Moreover, it is of no use to those who do not have virtue, for it makes no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or listen to others who have it.
It is quite sufficient to take the same attitude as we take toward health: we want to be healthy, yet we do not study medicine.
(3) In addition, it would seem strange if practical wisdom, though ⟨intrinsically⟩ inferior to theoretical wisdom, should surpass it in authority, because that which produces a thing rules 35 and directs it.
These, then, are the questions we must discuss: so far we have only stated them as problems.

1144a

1 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς

αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ

εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι

μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως

5 ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς

τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ †τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα.† ἔτι τὸ ἔργον

ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ

μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ

πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν

10 ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν

ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους

διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν

ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ

δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον

15 τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας

ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί

γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς

ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν,

λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν

20 πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή,

τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς

ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον

περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα·

αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα

25 σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν

αὐτοῦ. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν,

ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς

καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις,

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ

30 ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς

εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν

ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ

ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)·

τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ

35 μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς.

ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα

1 First of all, then, we should insist that both theoretical and practical wisdom are necessarily desirable in themselves, even if neither of them produces anything. For each one of them is the virtue of a different part of the soul.²⁹⁰
Secondly, they do in fact produce something: theoretical wisdom produces happiness, not as medicine produces health, but as health itself makes a person healthy.²⁹¹ 5 For since theoretical wisdom is one portion of virtue in its entirety, possessing and actualizing it makes a man happy. ⟨For happiness, as we have seen (I. 7) consists in the activity of virtue.⟩ In the third place, a man fulfills his proper function only by way of practical wisdom and moral excellence or virtue:
virtue makes us aim at the right target, and practical wisdom makes us use the right means. The fourth part of the soul, 10 the nutritive,²⁹² does not have a virtue ⟨which makes man fulfill his proper function⟩, since it does not play any role in the decision to act or not to act.
Finally, the argument has to be met that our ability to perform noble and just acts is in no way enhanced by practical wisdom. We have to begin a little further back and take the following as our starting point. It is our contention²⁹³ that people may perform just acts without actually being just men, as in the case of people 15 who do what has been laid down by the laws but do so either involuntarily or through ignorance or for an ulterior motive, and not for the sake of performing just acts. ⟨Such persons are not just men⟩ despite the fact that they act the way they should, and perform all the actions which a morally good man ought to perform. On the other hand, it seems that it is possible for a man to be of such a character that he performs each particular act in such a way as to make him a good man—I mean that his acts are due to choice and are performed for the sake of the acts themselves.
Now, 20 it is virtue which makes our choice right. It is not virtue, however, but a different capacity, which determines the steps which, in the nature of the case, must be taken to implement this choice.
We must stop for a moment to make this point clearer.
There exists a capacity²⁹⁴ called "cleverness," which is the power to perform those steps 25 which are conducive to a goal we have set for ourselves and to attain that goal. If the goal is noble, cleverness deserves praise; if the goal is base, cleverness is knavery. That is why men of practical wisdom are often described as "clever" and "knavish." But in fact this capacity ⟨alone⟩ is not practical wisdom, although practical wisdom does not exist without it. Without virtue or excellence, 30 this eye of the soul, ⟨intelligence,⟩ does not acquire the characteristic ⟨of practical wisdom⟩: that is what we have just stated and it is obvious. For the syllogisms which express the principles initiating action²⁹⁵ run: "Since the end, or the highest good, is such-and-such . . . "—whatever it may be; what it really is does not matter for our present argument. But whatever the true end may be, only a good man can judge it correctly.
For wickedness 35 distorts and causes us to be completely mistaken about the fundamental principles of action. Hence it is clear that a man cannot have practical wisdom unless he is good.

1144b

1 ἀγαθόν.

1 Accordingly, we must also re-examine virtue or excellence.
Virtue offers a close analogy to the relation that exists between practical wisdom and cleverness. Just as these two qualities are not identical but similar, so we find the same relation between natural virtue and virtue in the full sense.
It seems that the various kinds of character inhere in all of us, somehow or other, by nature. 5 We tend to be just, capable of self-control, and to show all our other character traits from the time of our birth. Yet we still seek something more, the good in a fuller sense, and the possession of these traits in another way. For it is true that children and beasts are endowed with natural qualities or characteristics, but it is evident that without intelligence these are harmful. 10 This much, to be sure, we do seem to notice: as in the case of a mighty body which, when it moves without vision, comes down with a mighty fall because it cannot see, so it is in the matter under discussion.
⟨If a man acts blindly, i.e., using his natural virtue alone, he will fail;⟩ but once he acquires intelligence, it makes a great difference in his action. At that point, the natural characteristic will become that virtue in the full sense which it previously resembled.
Consequently, just as there exist two kinds of quality, 15 cleverness and practical wisdom, in that part of us which forms opinions, ⟨i.e., in the calculative element,⟩ so also there are two kinds of quality in the moral part of us, natural virtue and virtue in the full sense. Now virtue in the full sense cannot be attained without practical wisdom. That is why some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and why Socrates' approach to the subject was partly right and partly wrong. 20 He was wrong in believing that all the virtues are forms of wisdom, but right in saying that there is no virtue without wisdom.²⁹⁶ This is indicated by the fact that all the current definitions of virtue,²⁹⁷ after naming the characteristic and its objects, add that it is a characteristic "guided by right reason." Now right reason is that which is determined by practical wisdom. So we see that these thinkers all have some inkling 25 that virtue is a characteristic of this kind, namely, a characteristic guided by practical wisdom.
But we must go a little beyond that. Virtue or excellence is not only a characteristic which is guided by right reason, but also a characteristic which is united with right reason; and right reason in moral matters is practical wisdom.²⁹⁸ In other words, while Socrates believed that the virtues *are* rational principles—he said that all of them are forms of knowledge— 30 we, on the other hand, think that they are *united with* a rational principle.
Our discussion, then, has made it clear that it is impossible to be good in the full sense of the word without practical wisdom or to be a man of practical wisdom without moral excellence or virtue. Moreover, in this way we can also refute the dialectical argument which might be used to prove that the virtues exist independently of one another. The same individual, it might be argued, is not equally well-endowed by nature for all the virtues, 35 with the result that at a given point he will have acquired one virtue but not yet another.
In the case of the natural virtues this may be true, but it cannot happen in the case of those virtues which entitle

Book 6,Chapter 13 (1144b1–1145a11)

Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ

ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα

—οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν, ὅμοιον δέ—οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς

τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν

5 φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι

καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν

ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον

ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν

ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι.

10 πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ

ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ

τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν,

ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ' ἔσται

κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν

15 εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο

ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ

κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας

τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν

ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο

20 εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως,

καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες,

ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες

καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ

κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες

25 ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ

δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν

λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς

δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης

μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι

30 πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων

ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ

φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος

ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων

αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας,

35 ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο

γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς

1145a

1 δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ

φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν

εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου

ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ

5 φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἣ δὲ

τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία

γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ

τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ

ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ.

10 ἔτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν,

ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

1 a man to be called good in an unqualified sense. For in the latter case, as soon as he possesses this single virtue of practical wisdom, he will also possess all the rest.
It is now clear²⁹⁹ that we should still need practical wisdom, even if it had no bearing on action, because it is the virtue of a part of our soul. But it is also clear that ⟨it does have an important bearing on action, since⟩ no choice will be right without 5 practical wisdom and virtue. For virtue determines the end, and practical wisdom makes us do what is conducive to the end.
Still, practical wisdom has no authority over theoretical wisdom or the better part of our soul³⁰⁰ any more than the art of medicine has authority over health. ⟨Just as medicine does not use health but makes the provisions to secure it, so⟩ practical wisdom does not use theoretical wisdom but makes the provisions to secure it. It issues commands to attain it, but it does not issue them to wisdom itself. To say the contrary would be 10 like asserting that politics governs the gods, because it issues commands about everything in the state, ⟨including public worship⟩.