Bywater (OCT, 1894) · Ostwald (1962)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 10,Chapter 1 (1172a19–1172b8)
1172a
Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἕπεται διελθεῖν. μάλιστα
20 γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι
τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς
τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ
μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν
ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα
25 βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν·
ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι,
ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἳ μὲν γὰρ
τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἳ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον,
οἳ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἳ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον
30 εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν
φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς
αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοὐναντίον
ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ
καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ
35 ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἧττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν
διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ
After this, a discussion of pleasure is no doubt our next task.467 Pleasure is 20 considered to be deeply ingrained in the human race, and that is why in educating the young we use pleasure and pain as rudders with which to steer them straight. Moreover, to like and to dislike what one should is thought to be of greatest importance in developing excellence of character. 25 For in view of the fact that people choose the pleasant and avoid the painful, pleasure and pain pervade the whole of life and have the capacity of exerting a decisive influence for a life of excellence or virtue and happiness. Surely, a subject as important as this ought not to be omitted, especially since it is very controversial.
One school asserts that pleasure is the good,468 and another the opposite view that it is utterly base.469 While some of the latter school are no doubt convinced that pleasure is actually bad, others think that it is conducive 30 to living a better life to create an impression that pleasure is a base thing even if it is not: most people, they argue, gravitate toward pleasure and become slaves to it, so that they ought to be driven in the opposite direction, in order thus to reach the median.
But surely this view cannot be correct. When it comes to emotions 35 and actions, what is said is less reliable than what is done; and, consequently,
One school asserts that pleasure is the good,468 and another the opposite view that it is utterly base.469 While some of the latter school are no doubt convinced that pleasure is actually bad, others think that it is conducive 30 to living a better life to create an impression that pleasure is a base thing even if it is not: most people, they argue, gravitate toward pleasure and become slaves to it, so that they ought to be driven in the opposite direction, in order thus to reach the median.
But surely this view cannot be correct. When it comes to emotions 35 and actions, what is said is less reliable than what is done; and, consequently,
1172b
1 τἀληθὲς προσαναιροῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθείς
ποτ' ἐφιέμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην
οὖσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. ἐοίκασιν
οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι
5 χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῳδοὶ γὰρ
ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας
ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλις· τὰ δ' εἰρημένα
περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.
1 when words clash with perceived facts, they are scorned and bring the truth into discredit besides. For if a man who ⟨constantly⟩ disparages pleasure is once seen pursuing it, people will take his lapse to mean that he really considers all pleasure desirable; for drawing fine distinctions is not the strong point of most people. So it seems that true assertions are not only most useful for knowledge, 5 but also for life. For since they are in harmony with the facts, they gain credence, and so induce those who have understanding to guide their lives by them. But enough of this, and on to the various views on pleasure.
Book 10,Chapter 2 (1172b9–1173a12)
Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν ᾤετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ
10 πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι
δ' εἶναι τὸ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον·
τὸ δὴ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον
ὄν (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ
τροφήν), τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τἀγαθὸν
15 εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν
μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὑτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι·
οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως
ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἧττον δ' ᾤετ' εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ
ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὑτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι,
20 ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετόν· μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἱρετὸν ὃ μὴ
δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἱρούμεθα· τοιοῦτο δ' ὁμολογουμένως
εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα
ἥδεται, ὡς καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. προστιθεμένην
τε ὁτῳοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ
25 δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὔξεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ.
ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν,
καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ
αἱρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων
ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι
30 τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν
κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος
αὐτῷ τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ'
ἄλλο οὐδὲν τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ
ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ
35 ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι
ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγουσιν. ἃ
Eudoxus470 believed that pleasure is the good ⟨for the following reasons⟩. 10 He saw that all things, rational and irrational, strive for pleasure, and that in all situations what is good is desirable, and that which is most desirable is best. The fact that everything strives for the same goal indicated to him that this goal is the best for all. He believed that each individual finds what is good for himself just as he finds his proper food; but what is good for all and for which all strive, that is the supreme good. 15 Eudoxus' arguments gained credence more because of his excellent character than on their own merit. As he had the reputation of being a man of unusual self-control, people thought that he was propounding his theories not because he was addicted to pleasure, but because what he said was actually true.
Eudoxus thought that the same conclusion followed just as plainly from an examination of the opposite of pleasure. Since pain, he argued, is as such avoided by all, pleasure, its opposite 20, is conversely desirable. Again, he held that a thing is most desirable when we choose 20 it not on account of or for the sake of something else, and that it is pleasure which is generally acknowledged to have this quality: no one ever asks the question for what purpose a man is feeling pleasure, because we assume that pleasure is in itself desirable. Further, ⟨he argued,⟩ the addition of pleasure to any good thing at all, for example, to 25 just action or to self-control, makes that good thing more desirable; but what is good can be increased only by another good thing, ⟨and, therefore, pleasure is good⟩.
As for this last argument, it does indeed seem to prove that pleasure is a good thing, but not that it is more of a good thing than any other. For every good thing becomes more desirable when combined with another good than when taken by itself alone. As a matter of fact, Plato uses a similar argument in his refutation of the view that pleasure is the good:471 a pleasant life, he says, is more desirable when combined 30 with practical wisdom than without it; but if pleasure is better in combination with something else ⟨than alone⟩, it is not the good, since the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of something to it. Obviously, the same would apply to things other ⟨than pleasure⟩: nothing can be the good, if it becomes more desirable by the addition of some other thing which is intrinsically good. What good is there, then, which does have this quality, and which is, furthermore, a good in which we can 35 share? It is something of that sort that we are looking for.
Those who object that the aim of all things is not ⟨necessarily⟩ good are talking nonsense.472
Eudoxus thought that the same conclusion followed just as plainly from an examination of the opposite of pleasure. Since pain, he argued, is as such avoided by all, pleasure, its opposite 20, is conversely desirable. Again, he held that a thing is most desirable when we choose 20 it not on account of or for the sake of something else, and that it is pleasure which is generally acknowledged to have this quality: no one ever asks the question for what purpose a man is feeling pleasure, because we assume that pleasure is in itself desirable. Further, ⟨he argued,⟩ the addition of pleasure to any good thing at all, for example, to 25 just action or to self-control, makes that good thing more desirable; but what is good can be increased only by another good thing, ⟨and, therefore, pleasure is good⟩.
As for this last argument, it does indeed seem to prove that pleasure is a good thing, but not that it is more of a good thing than any other. For every good thing becomes more desirable when combined with another good than when taken by itself alone. As a matter of fact, Plato uses a similar argument in his refutation of the view that pleasure is the good:471 a pleasant life, he says, is more desirable when combined 30 with practical wisdom than without it; but if pleasure is better in combination with something else ⟨than alone⟩, it is not the good, since the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of something to it. Obviously, the same would apply to things other ⟨than pleasure⟩: nothing can be the good, if it becomes more desirable by the addition of some other thing which is intrinsically good. What good is there, then, which does have this quality, and which is, furthermore, a good in which we can 35 share? It is something of that sort that we are looking for.
Those who object that the aim of all things is not ⟨necessarily⟩ good are talking nonsense.472
1173a
1 γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν
πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται
αὐτῶν, ἦν ἄν τι λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν
ἄν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν
5 κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔοικε
δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ
ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι
γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ—λέγοντες
ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες.
10 ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν <τῶν> κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι,
τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται
τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἱρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν·
οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.
1 For what all believe to be true is actually true; and anyone who challenges that basic belief will hardly gain more credence by propounding his view. If the desire for ⟨pleasure⟩ were confined to creatures that have no intelligence, the objection would make sense, but how can it make sense when intelligent beings share the same desire? But there is perhaps even in inferior beings some natural good 5 stronger than they are themselves which aims at the good which is properly theirs.
The objections advanced against ⟨Eudoxus' argument about⟩ the opposite of pleasure do not seem to be sound, either. The point is made that if pain is evil, it does not follow that pleasure is good: one evil can also be opposed to another and both evils can be opposed to something that is neither good nor evil. The argument is not bad, yet as applied to the problem under discussion it is not true. 10 For if both pleasure and pain were evil, both ought to be avoided: if they were both neither good nor evil, neither of them ought to be avoided or one ought to be avoided just as much as the other. But in actual fact, we see that people avoid pain as an evil and choose pleasure as a good; it is, accordingly, as a good and an evil that they are opposed to one another.
The objections advanced against ⟨Eudoxus' argument about⟩ the opposite of pleasure do not seem to be sound, either. The point is made that if pain is evil, it does not follow that pleasure is good: one evil can also be opposed to another and both evils can be opposed to something that is neither good nor evil. The argument is not bad, yet as applied to the problem under discussion it is not true. 10 For if both pleasure and pain were evil, both ought to be avoided: if they were both neither good nor evil, neither of them ought to be avoided or one ought to be avoided just as much as the other. But in actual fact, we see that people avoid pain as an evil and choose pleasure as a good; it is, accordingly, as a good and an evil that they are opposed to one another.
Book 10,Chapter 3 (1173a13–1174a12)
Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων
ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς
15 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι
δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι
δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ [τὸ] ἧττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι
τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς,
καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν
20 καὶ <πράττειν> κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται ταὐτά· δίκαιοι
γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ
σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ
λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὦσιν αἳ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἳ δὲ μικταί. καὶ
τί κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὡρισμένη οὖσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον
25 καὶ [τὸ] ἧττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ
συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ'
ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ
ἧττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
τέλειόν τε τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις
30 ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν
πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἐοίκασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν.
πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ
καθ' αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων
οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ
Moreover, if pleasure is not a quality, that does not mean that it is not a good. For the activities which manifest virtue 15 are not qualities either, nor is happiness; ⟨yet both virtuous activities and happiness are good⟩.
The assertion is made that, while the good is something determinate, pleasure is indeterminate because it admits of degrees.473 If this judgment is based on the view that we feel pleasure with greater or lesser intensity, ⟨it will have to be admitted that⟩ the same also holds true of justice and the other virtues. For when we say of people that they have these virtues, we clearly speak of them as having certain qualities to a greater or lesser degree 20 and as acting more or less virtuously. Some men are more just and more courageous ⟨than others⟩, and there are also degrees in acting justly and with self-control. However, if their judgment is based on the various forms pleasure takes, they allege the wrong cause ⟨of the indeterminateness of pleasure⟩, for ⟨the distinction that ought to be made is that⟩ some pleasures are unmixed and others mixed. Furthermore, is there any reason why pleasure should not be analogous to health which, though determinate, 25 admits of degrees? For the proportion ⟨of the various elements, which constitutes health,⟩ is not the same for all persons, nor is it always the same in the same individual; rather, it can remain the same up to a point even when it is disintegrating and it can vary in degree. It is possible, therefore, that the same may also be true of pleasure.
Again, the assumption is made that the good is something final and complete, whereas motion and coming-to-be 30 are incomplete, and on that basis they try to prove that pleasure is a motion and a coming-to-be.474 But to assert that pleasure is a motion does not seem to be right, either. We think of speed and slowness as the terms appropriate to all motion; and if a motion does not in itself ⟨have degrees of velocity⟩—the motion of the universe does not—all motion has it in relation to something else. But pleasure has neither speed nor slowness. It is of course possible to become pleased quickly,
The assertion is made that, while the good is something determinate, pleasure is indeterminate because it admits of degrees.473 If this judgment is based on the view that we feel pleasure with greater or lesser intensity, ⟨it will have to be admitted that⟩ the same also holds true of justice and the other virtues. For when we say of people that they have these virtues, we clearly speak of them as having certain qualities to a greater or lesser degree 20 and as acting more or less virtuously. Some men are more just and more courageous ⟨than others⟩, and there are also degrees in acting justly and with self-control. However, if their judgment is based on the various forms pleasure takes, they allege the wrong cause ⟨of the indeterminateness of pleasure⟩, for ⟨the distinction that ought to be made is that⟩ some pleasures are unmixed and others mixed. Furthermore, is there any reason why pleasure should not be analogous to health which, though determinate, 25 admits of degrees? For the proportion ⟨of the various elements, which constitutes health,⟩ is not the same for all persons, nor is it always the same in the same individual; rather, it can remain the same up to a point even when it is disintegrating and it can vary in degree. It is possible, therefore, that the same may also be true of pleasure.
Again, the assumption is made that the good is something final and complete, whereas motion and coming-to-be 30 are incomplete, and on that basis they try to prove that pleasure is a motion and a coming-to-be.474 But to assert that pleasure is a motion does not seem to be right, either. We think of speed and slowness as the terms appropriate to all motion; and if a motion does not in itself ⟨have degrees of velocity⟩—the motion of the universe does not—all motion has it in relation to something else. But pleasure has neither speed nor slowness. It is of course possible to become pleased quickly,
1173b
1 ὀργισθῆναι, ἥδεσθαι δ' οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ
αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς
τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν
οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἥδεσθαι. γένεσίς τε πῶς ἂν εἴη;
5 δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ
οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου
ἡ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν
τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ
σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις
10 ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο· τὸ
σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή,
ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτ' ἄν τις, καὶ †τεμνόμενος†
λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ
τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενομένους
15 καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ'
οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ
τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς
ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆμαι
καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς
20 γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς δὲ
τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν
ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα (οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις
ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ
οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ
25 λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν)· ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις ἄν,
ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε τούτων, ὥσπερ
καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὁτιοῦν
φαγόντι· ἢ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ
ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι
30 τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ
ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ
δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὸν
τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἴδει· ὃ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τἀγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν
δοκεῖ, ὃ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ'
1 just as we can fly into a temper quickly; however, the experience itself of pleasure is not quick, not even in relation to ⟨the pleasure experienced by⟩ some other person, while all such motions as walking and growing ⟨can be quicker in one case than they are in another⟩. In short, although it is possible to pass into a state of pleasure quickly or slowly, speed and slowness are not involved in the active exercise of pleasure, that means, in being pleased. Also, in what sense can pleasure be considered as a coming-to-be? 5 It seems that a thing cannot come to be out of just any chance thing, but it is resolved again into that from which it comes to be. This means that what comes to be through pleasure passes away through pain.
A further argument of theirs475 is that pain is a deficiency of our natural condition, while pleasure is its replenishment. But deficiency and replenishment are bodily affects. Thus, if pleasure is the replenishment of our natural condition, 10 we will feel pleasure in that part of us in which the replenishment takes place, and that is the body. However, that is not what is generally held to be true. Consequently, pleasure is not a replenishment, although of course we do feel pleased while the replenishment is going on, just as an operation performed on us gives us, ⟨but is not,⟩ pain. The opinion that pleasure is replenishment seems to have been suggested by the pleasures and pains connected with food. For when hunger has made us deficient 15 and we have suffered its pain, we later find pleasure in replenishment. But that does not apply to all pleasures: the pleasures of gaining knowledge involve no pain, nor do, among the pleasures of our senses, those that come through smell, through many sounds and sights, memories and hopes. What is there, then, that these pleasures cause to be? 20 There has been no deficiency of which they could be the replenishment.
When culpable pleasures are cited ⟨to support the contention that pleasure is bad⟩, one might reply (1) that these are not actually pleasant. If something is pleasant to a person whose disposition is bad, we must not think that it is actually pleasant to anyone other than him, just as we would deny that that is actually healthy, sweet, or bitter which is so to the invalid, or that 25 that is white which appears white to a man with an ailment of the eyes. (2) Another answer might be that, even though pleasures are desirable, they are not desirable when they come from sources such as these, just as wealth is desirable, but not wealth won by treason, and health is desirable, but not if it means eating anything and everything. (3) Or one might retort that pleasures are different in kind. There is a difference between pleasures that come from noble sources and pleasures that come from base sources, and 30 the pleasure of a just man cannot possibly be felt by someone who is not just, nor the pleasure of music by someone who is not musical, and so forth.
That pleasure is not a good or that pleasures differ in kind seems also to be evinced by the difference between a friend and a flatterer. We think of a friend's company as having the good as its aim, but of the company of a flatterer only as giving us pleasure; and, while flattery brings reproach,
A further argument of theirs475 is that pain is a deficiency of our natural condition, while pleasure is its replenishment. But deficiency and replenishment are bodily affects. Thus, if pleasure is the replenishment of our natural condition, 10 we will feel pleasure in that part of us in which the replenishment takes place, and that is the body. However, that is not what is generally held to be true. Consequently, pleasure is not a replenishment, although of course we do feel pleased while the replenishment is going on, just as an operation performed on us gives us, ⟨but is not,⟩ pain. The opinion that pleasure is replenishment seems to have been suggested by the pleasures and pains connected with food. For when hunger has made us deficient 15 and we have suffered its pain, we later find pleasure in replenishment. But that does not apply to all pleasures: the pleasures of gaining knowledge involve no pain, nor do, among the pleasures of our senses, those that come through smell, through many sounds and sights, memories and hopes. What is there, then, that these pleasures cause to be? 20 There has been no deficiency of which they could be the replenishment.
When culpable pleasures are cited ⟨to support the contention that pleasure is bad⟩, one might reply (1) that these are not actually pleasant. If something is pleasant to a person whose disposition is bad, we must not think that it is actually pleasant to anyone other than him, just as we would deny that that is actually healthy, sweet, or bitter which is so to the invalid, or that 25 that is white which appears white to a man with an ailment of the eyes. (2) Another answer might be that, even though pleasures are desirable, they are not desirable when they come from sources such as these, just as wealth is desirable, but not wealth won by treason, and health is desirable, but not if it means eating anything and everything. (3) Or one might retort that pleasures are different in kind. There is a difference between pleasures that come from noble sources and pleasures that come from base sources, and 30 the pleasure of a just man cannot possibly be felt by someone who is not just, nor the pleasure of music by someone who is not musical, and so forth.
That pleasure is not a good or that pleasures differ in kind seems also to be evinced by the difference between a friend and a flatterer. We think of a friend's company as having the good as its aim, but of the company of a flatterer only as giving us pleasure; and, while flattery brings reproach,
1174a
1 ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν
παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία
ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων,
μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ'
5 ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν,
μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἕπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἑλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν
ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε
τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἱρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ
10 ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἢ ἀφ'
ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς
εἰρήσθω.
1 a friend is praised for associating with us for different purposes. No one would choose to live his entire life with the mentality of a child, even if he were to enjoy to the fullest possible extent what children enjoy; nor would he choose to find his joy in doing something very base, even though he were to escape any painful consequences. Also, there are many things for which we would exert our efforts 5 even if they would not entail any pleasure, for example, sight, memory, knowledge, and the possession of the virtues. It makes no difference whether pleasures necessarily accompany these things, for we would choose them even if we were to get no pleasure from them.
The obvious conclusion, then, seems to be that pleasure is not the good, and that not all pleasures are desirable, 10 and further that some pleasures, which differ one from the other in kind or in their source, are desirable in themselves. So much for the current views on pleasure and pain.
The obvious conclusion, then, seems to be that pleasure is not the good, and that not all pleasures are desirable, 10 and further that some pleasures, which differ one from the other in kind or in their source, are desirable in themselves. So much for the current views on pleasure and pain.
Book 10,Chapter 4 (1174a13–1175a20)
Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ'
ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ' ὁντινοῦν
15 χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον
γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ
ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις
ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ
εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις
20 καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ
οὗ ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς
μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς
ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς
τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ
25 ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον),
ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπῖδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους
γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν
ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν
τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ
30 γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ
κατ' εἴδη, πτῆσις βάδισις ἅλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον
δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ
οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει
καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κἀκείνην·
What pleasure is or what sort of thing it is will emerge more clearly if we take up the problem from the beginning.
We regard an act of vision as complete476 15 at any given moment: it lacks nothing which has to develop later in order to make complete the specific form that constitutes seeing.477 Something similar seems to be true of pleasure also: it is a whole, and one cannot at a given moment find a pleasure whose specific form will be brought to completion only if the pleasure lasts longer. That is precisely why pleasure is not motion. For all motion—take building, for example—takes place in time 20 and is directed at an end; it is complete only when it has accomplished that at which it aims. In other words, it is complete either in the whole time it takes or at the moment ⟨when the end is reached⟩. The parts and individual moments of any motion are incomplete and each is different in its specific form from the whole and from the others. Fitting the stones together is not the same as fluting the columns, and both differ from the construction of the temple. 25 The construction of the temple is the complete motion, since, in terms of the whole project, it lacks nothing; but the motions of laying the foundation and of making the triglyph are incomplete, since each constitutes a part. Accordingly, these motions are different in form, and it is impossible to find a motion which is complete in its form at any given moment, but, if at all, only in the whole time it takes.
The same is true of walking and every other motion. 30 For if locomotion is motion from one point to another, it, too, takes different forms, such as flying, walking, jumping, and so forth. More than that, there are even differences in walking: for the point from which the motion starts and the point to which it proceeds are not the same for an entire racecourse and for a part of it, and the terminal points of one part are different from those of another; nor is passing along one line the same as passing along another,
We regard an act of vision as complete476 15 at any given moment: it lacks nothing which has to develop later in order to make complete the specific form that constitutes seeing.477 Something similar seems to be true of pleasure also: it is a whole, and one cannot at a given moment find a pleasure whose specific form will be brought to completion only if the pleasure lasts longer. That is precisely why pleasure is not motion. For all motion—take building, for example—takes place in time 20 and is directed at an end; it is complete only when it has accomplished that at which it aims. In other words, it is complete either in the whole time it takes or at the moment ⟨when the end is reached⟩. The parts and individual moments of any motion are incomplete and each is different in its specific form from the whole and from the others. Fitting the stones together is not the same as fluting the columns, and both differ from the construction of the temple. 25 The construction of the temple is the complete motion, since, in terms of the whole project, it lacks nothing; but the motions of laying the foundation and of making the triglyph are incomplete, since each constitutes a part. Accordingly, these motions are different in form, and it is impossible to find a motion which is complete in its form at any given moment, but, if at all, only in the whole time it takes.
The same is true of walking and every other motion. 30 For if locomotion is motion from one point to another, it, too, takes different forms, such as flying, walking, jumping, and so forth. More than that, there are even differences in walking: for the point from which the motion starts and the point to which it proceeds are not the same for an entire racecourse and for a part of it, and the terminal points of one part are different from those of another; nor is passing along one line the same as passing along another,
1174b
1 οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ
οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ
κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ
τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ
5 εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁτῳοῦν
χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων,
καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν
τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι
δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ
10 ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ
γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ
ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος,
οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς·
ὅλον γάρ τι. Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης,
15 τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ
τὴν αἴσθησιν (τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια·
αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω),
καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα
διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. αὕτη δ' ἂν
20 τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν
ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη,
τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον
τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε
25 καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ
ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴςθησιν
ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον (φαμὲν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ
ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα)· δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν ἥ
τε αἴσθησις ᾖ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ'
30 ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ
ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ τε ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. τελειοῖ
δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ'
ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. ἕως
ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ
1 for you do not just pass along *a* line, but a line that is in a ⟨definite⟩ place, and one line is in a different place from another. We have dealt with the subject of motion in greater detail in another work;478 however, it seems that motion is not complete at any given moment, but that the many motions ⟨which make up the whole⟩ are incomplete and 5 different in form, since the terminal points determine the form. Yet the specific form which constitutes pleasure is complete at any given moment. So pleasure and motion are obviously different things, and pleasure is something whole and complete.
This is also shown by the fact that while motion is possible only in time, pleasure is not in time. For what takes place in a moment is a whole. This further shows that 10 those people are wrong who assert that pleasure is motion or coming-to-be. For these terms cannot be applied to everything, but only to what has parts and is not a whole. There is no coming-to-be of an act of vision nor of a point nor of a unit: none of these is motion or coming-to-be, and the same is, accordingly, true of pleasure, since it is a whole.
All sense perception is actively exercised in relation to its object, 15 and is completely exercised when it is in good condition and its object is the best of those that can be perceived by the senses. For something like that seems to come very close to being complete activity, assuming that it makes no difference whether we say that the sense perception or the organ in which it resides is actively exercised. From all this it follows that in any sense perception that activity is best whose organ is in the best condition and whose object is the best of all the objects that fall within its range, and 20 this activity will be the most complete and the most pleasant. For each sense, and similarly all thought and study, has its own pleasure and is pleasantest when it is most complete; but it is most complete when the organ is in good condition and the object the worthiest of all that fall within its range; pleasure completes the activity. Still, pleasure does not complete the activity in the same way in which 25 the perceived object and sense perception do, when both are good, just as health and a physician are not in the same sense the cause of a man's healthy state.
That there is a pleasure for each sense is obvious, for we speak of sights and sounds as being pleasant. It is also obvious that the pleasure is greatest when the sense perception is keenest and is exercised upon the best object. As long as 30 this is the condition of the perceived object and the perceiving subject the pleasure will last on, since there is something to act and something to be acted upon.
Pleasure completes the activity not as a characteristic completes an activity by being already inherent in it, but as a completeness that superimposes itself upon it, like the bloom of youth in those who are in their prime. So long, then, as the object of thought or of sense perception and
This is also shown by the fact that while motion is possible only in time, pleasure is not in time. For what takes place in a moment is a whole. This further shows that 10 those people are wrong who assert that pleasure is motion or coming-to-be. For these terms cannot be applied to everything, but only to what has parts and is not a whole. There is no coming-to-be of an act of vision nor of a point nor of a unit: none of these is motion or coming-to-be, and the same is, accordingly, true of pleasure, since it is a whole.
All sense perception is actively exercised in relation to its object, 15 and is completely exercised when it is in good condition and its object is the best of those that can be perceived by the senses. For something like that seems to come very close to being complete activity, assuming that it makes no difference whether we say that the sense perception or the organ in which it resides is actively exercised. From all this it follows that in any sense perception that activity is best whose organ is in the best condition and whose object is the best of all the objects that fall within its range, and 20 this activity will be the most complete and the most pleasant. For each sense, and similarly all thought and study, has its own pleasure and is pleasantest when it is most complete; but it is most complete when the organ is in good condition and the object the worthiest of all that fall within its range; pleasure completes the activity. Still, pleasure does not complete the activity in the same way in which 25 the perceived object and sense perception do, when both are good, just as health and a physician are not in the same sense the cause of a man's healthy state.
That there is a pleasure for each sense is obvious, for we speak of sights and sounds as being pleasant. It is also obvious that the pleasure is greatest when the sense perception is keenest and is exercised upon the best object. As long as 30 this is the condition of the perceived object and the perceiving subject the pleasure will last on, since there is something to act and something to be acted upon.
Pleasure completes the activity not as a characteristic completes an activity by being already inherent in it, but as a completeness that superimposes itself upon it, like the bloom of youth in those who are in their prime. So long, then, as the object of thought or of sense perception and
1175a
1 θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ
πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ
καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς
συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ
5 συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ
τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως
διὰ ταὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ
διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ
ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ
10 παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ
τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες
ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα
καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς
τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ
15 θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ
τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή, οὗ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ
τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἱρετὸν ὄν.
Πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἱρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν
ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα
20 φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ
γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.
1 the discriminating or studying subject are in their proper condition, there will be pleasure in the activity. For as long as that which is acted upon and that which acts remain unchanged in themselves and in their relation to one another, the same result must naturally follow.
How is it, then, that no one feels pleasure continuously? Do we get tired? ⟨That 5 seems to be the correct answer;⟩ for whatever is human is incapable of continuous activity. Consequently 5, pleasure is not continuous, either, since it accompanies activity. And for the same reason, some things which delight us when they are new, give us less delight later on: at first our thinking is stimulated and concentrates its activity upon them. To take sight as an example, people are engrossed in what they see, but afterwards the activity is not the same 10 but is relaxed, and as a result the pleasure loses its edge.
One is led to believe that all men have a desire for pleasure, because all strive to live. Life is an activity, and each man actively exercises his favorite faculties upon the objects he loves most. A man who is musical, for example, exercises his hearing upon tunes, an intellectual 15 his thinking upon the subjects of his study, and so forth. But pleasure completes the activities, and consequently life, which they desire. No wonder, then, that men also aim at pleasure: each man finds that it completes his life, and his life is desirable.
We need not discuss for the present the question whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life. For the two are obviously interdependent 20 and cannot be separated: there is no pleasure without activity, and every activity is completed by pleasure.
How is it, then, that no one feels pleasure continuously? Do we get tired? ⟨That 5 seems to be the correct answer;⟩ for whatever is human is incapable of continuous activity. Consequently 5, pleasure is not continuous, either, since it accompanies activity. And for the same reason, some things which delight us when they are new, give us less delight later on: at first our thinking is stimulated and concentrates its activity upon them. To take sight as an example, people are engrossed in what they see, but afterwards the activity is not the same 10 but is relaxed, and as a result the pleasure loses its edge.
One is led to believe that all men have a desire for pleasure, because all strive to live. Life is an activity, and each man actively exercises his favorite faculties upon the objects he loves most. A man who is musical, for example, exercises his hearing upon tunes, an intellectual 15 his thinking upon the subjects of his study, and so forth. But pleasure completes the activities, and consequently life, which they desire. No wonder, then, that men also aim at pleasure: each man finds that it completes his life, and his life is desirable.
We need not discuss for the present the question whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life. For the two are obviously interdependent 20 and cannot be separated: there is no pleasure without activity, and every activity is completed by pleasure.
Book 10,Chapter 5 (1175a21–1176a29)
Ὅθεν
δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ὑφ' ἑτέρων
οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι (οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ
τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῷα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἄγαλμα
25 καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος)· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας
τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι
δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ
αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.
φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην
30 τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ
οἰκεία ἡδονή. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν
οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες
τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
35 ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ·
συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· τοῖς
This also suggests that pleasures differ in kind. For when things differ in kind we believe that their completion is brought about by something correspondingly different. We see that this is so in the case of the products of nature as well as those of art, for example, in the case of animals and trees, a painting and a statue, 25 a house and a piece of furniture. We likewise think of activities which differ in kind as attaining their completion through the agency of things which differ in kind. Now, the activities of thought differ in kind from the activities of the senses and from one another, so that the pleasures which complete them are correspondingly different.
This is corroborated by the fact that each pleasure is intimately connected 30 with the activity which it completes. For an activity is increased by the pleasure proper to it. People who engage in an activity with pleasure are more perceptive in the judgment and accurate execution of particulars; those who enjoy doing geometry become geometers and understand the particular facts of geometry more readily, 35 and similarly those who are fond of music, building, and so forth, become proficient each in his own proper line of work through the joy he derives from it. Pleasures increase activities, and what increases a thing is proper to it.
This is corroborated by the fact that each pleasure is intimately connected 30 with the activity which it completes. For an activity is increased by the pleasure proper to it. People who engage in an activity with pleasure are more perceptive in the judgment and accurate execution of particulars; those who enjoy doing geometry become geometers and understand the particular facts of geometry more readily, 35 and similarly those who are fond of music, building, and so forth, become proficient each in his own proper line of work through the joy he derives from it. Pleasures increase activities, and what increases a thing is proper to it.
1175b
1 ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. ἔτι δὲ
μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίους
ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς
λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες
5 αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν
οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως
δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο
ἐνεργῇ· ἡ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ
κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μηδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ
10 τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁτῳοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν
ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἠρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον
καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ
ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὦσι, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν
οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ
15 βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον ὡς πολὺ
διεστᾶσιν. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ
οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι,
οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι·
ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὃ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς
20 ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ
τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ
ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὑτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται
ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ,
πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικείᾳ
25 καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν
τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἑκάστην
γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἔστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ
οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι
τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί.
30 οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων·
αἳ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ
φύσει, αἳ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως
ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις (ἄτοπον
35 γάρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν.
ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ
1 But when things differ in kind there must be a corresponding difference in kind in what is proper to them.
This seems to emerge even more clearly from the fact that the pleasures arising from one activity obstruct those caused by other activities. Devotees of flute music, for example, are incapable of paying attention to a discussion if they suddenly hear someone playing the flute, because they derive greater joy from flute-playing 5 than from the activity in which they are engaged. Accordingly, the pleasure which flute-playing brings destroys the activity concerned with discussion. The same thing also happens in other cases when a person is engaged in two activities at the same time: the pleasanter activity crowds out 10 the other; and if the pleasure it gives is much greater, it crowds out the other all the more to the point where one engages in it no longer. Therefore, when we enjoy something very much, we hardly do anything else at all; and when something we do gives us only slight satisfaction, we turn to something else, for example, people who eat candy in the theater do so especially when the actors are bad. So, since an activity is made more precise, more enduring, 15 and better by the pleasure proper to it, but spoiled by pleasures not proper to it, it is clear that there is a great difference between them. One might almost say that alien pleasures have the same effect as a pain that comes with a given activity. For a pain that comes with an activity destroys it; if, for example, writing or doing sums is unpleasant and irritating for a person, he does not write or do sums, because the activity is painful 20. It 20 is, therefore, true that an activity is affected in opposite ways by the pleasures and by the pains proper to it; and the pleasures and pains proper to it are those which accompany the activity itself. Alien pleasures, as we have said, are very close to pain in their effect: they destroy activity, but not in the same way.
Now, activities differ from one another in goodness 25 and badness. Some are desirable, others should be avoided, and others again are indifferent. The same is also true of pleasures, since each activity determines its own proper pleasure. The pleasure proper to a morally good activity is good, the pleasure proper to a bad activity evil. For appetites deserve praise when their objects are noble, but blame when they are base. 30 But the pleasures inherent in the activities are more truly proper to these activities than are the desires. The desires are distinct from the activities in time as well as in their nature, whereas pleasure is so closely linked to activity and so little distinguished from it that one may dispute whether ⟨or not⟩ activity is identical with pleasure. At any rate, pleasure seems to be neither thought nor again sense perception—that would be absurd; 35 but because they are never found apart, some people get the impression that they are identical.
So we see that differences in activities make for corresponding differences in pleasures.
This seems to emerge even more clearly from the fact that the pleasures arising from one activity obstruct those caused by other activities. Devotees of flute music, for example, are incapable of paying attention to a discussion if they suddenly hear someone playing the flute, because they derive greater joy from flute-playing 5 than from the activity in which they are engaged. Accordingly, the pleasure which flute-playing brings destroys the activity concerned with discussion. The same thing also happens in other cases when a person is engaged in two activities at the same time: the pleasanter activity crowds out 10 the other; and if the pleasure it gives is much greater, it crowds out the other all the more to the point where one engages in it no longer. Therefore, when we enjoy something very much, we hardly do anything else at all; and when something we do gives us only slight satisfaction, we turn to something else, for example, people who eat candy in the theater do so especially when the actors are bad. So, since an activity is made more precise, more enduring, 15 and better by the pleasure proper to it, but spoiled by pleasures not proper to it, it is clear that there is a great difference between them. One might almost say that alien pleasures have the same effect as a pain that comes with a given activity. For a pain that comes with an activity destroys it; if, for example, writing or doing sums is unpleasant and irritating for a person, he does not write or do sums, because the activity is painful 20. It 20 is, therefore, true that an activity is affected in opposite ways by the pleasures and by the pains proper to it; and the pleasures and pains proper to it are those which accompany the activity itself. Alien pleasures, as we have said, are very close to pain in their effect: they destroy activity, but not in the same way.
Now, activities differ from one another in goodness 25 and badness. Some are desirable, others should be avoided, and others again are indifferent. The same is also true of pleasures, since each activity determines its own proper pleasure. The pleasure proper to a morally good activity is good, the pleasure proper to a bad activity evil. For appetites deserve praise when their objects are noble, but blame when they are base. 30 But the pleasures inherent in the activities are more truly proper to these activities than are the desires. The desires are distinct from the activities in time as well as in their nature, whereas pleasure is so closely linked to activity and so little distinguished from it that one may dispute whether ⟨or not⟩ activity is identical with pleasure. At any rate, pleasure seems to be neither thought nor again sense perception—that would be absurd; 35 but because they are never found apart, some people get the impression that they are identical.
So we see that differences in activities make for corresponding differences in pleasures.
1176a
1 ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαρειότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις γεύσεως·
ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν
διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ
καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
5 καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα
γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός
φησιν ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον
γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει
διαφέρουσιν εἴδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὔλογον εἶναι.
10 διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ
αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ
καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων
δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι
καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ
15 εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ
δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου
μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἁγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν
ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ
20 τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλαὶ
γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ
ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως
αἰσχρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν
τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ
25 τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον;
ταύταις γὰρ ἕπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους
αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ
κυρίως λέγοιντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ
δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.
1 Now, sight is superior in purity to touch, and hearing and smell are superior to taste, and, accordingly, their respective pleasures also differ from one another. The pleasures of thought, in turn, are superior to the pleasures of the senses, and there are further differences within each class.
Each animal is thought to have its own proper pleasure, just as each has its own function, for the activity determines the pleasure. 5 This is shown if we study particular animals: the pleasure of a horse differs from that of a dog and of a man. As Heraclitus says, an ass would prefer chaff to gold,479 for food gives asses more pleasure than gold. Accordingly, as animals differ in kind, so do their pleasures differ in kind, and it makes sense that there should be no difference in the pleasures when animals do not so differ. 10 But as regards men, there is considerable variation. The same things give delight to some and pain to others, are painful and hateful to some and pleasant and agreeable to others. We find this also true of sweetness: the same things do not seem sweet to a man in fever and to a healthy person. 15 Nor is the same thing hot to an invalid and to a man in good condition. The same is true also of other cases.
But in all matters of this sort we consider that to be real and true which appears so to a good man. If this is right, as it seems to be, and if virtue or excellence and the good man, insofar as he is good, are the measure of each thing, then what seem to him to be pleasures are pleasures and what he enjoys is pleasant. 20 It is not surprising that some things which are disagreeable to him are pleasant to someone else; for there are many ways in which men can become corrupted and perverted. Still, such things are not actually pleasant, but are so only to persons of this kind, that is, to persons who have this kind of disposition.
It is, accordingly, clear that we cannot call pleasures those which are admittedly base; they are pleasures only to corrupt people. But of the pleasures which are regarded as decent, 25 what sort or which particular pleasure are we to claim as being truly proper to man? Surely, this is shown by the activities in which he engages, since it is these that the pleasures accompany. Those pleasures, therefore, which complete the activities of a perfect or complete and supremely happy man, regardless of whether these activities are one or several, can be called in the true sense the pleasures proper to man. All the rest are human pleasures only in a secondary and even less than secondary sense, as are the activities ⟨which they accompany⟩.
Each animal is thought to have its own proper pleasure, just as each has its own function, for the activity determines the pleasure. 5 This is shown if we study particular animals: the pleasure of a horse differs from that of a dog and of a man. As Heraclitus says, an ass would prefer chaff to gold,479 for food gives asses more pleasure than gold. Accordingly, as animals differ in kind, so do their pleasures differ in kind, and it makes sense that there should be no difference in the pleasures when animals do not so differ. 10 But as regards men, there is considerable variation. The same things give delight to some and pain to others, are painful and hateful to some and pleasant and agreeable to others. We find this also true of sweetness: the same things do not seem sweet to a man in fever and to a healthy person. 15 Nor is the same thing hot to an invalid and to a man in good condition. The same is true also of other cases.
But in all matters of this sort we consider that to be real and true which appears so to a good man. If this is right, as it seems to be, and if virtue or excellence and the good man, insofar as he is good, are the measure of each thing, then what seem to him to be pleasures are pleasures and what he enjoys is pleasant. 20 It is not surprising that some things which are disagreeable to him are pleasant to someone else; for there are many ways in which men can become corrupted and perverted. Still, such things are not actually pleasant, but are so only to persons of this kind, that is, to persons who have this kind of disposition.
It is, accordingly, clear that we cannot call pleasures those which are admittedly base; they are pleasures only to corrupt people. But of the pleasures which are regarded as decent, 25 what sort or which particular pleasure are we to claim as being truly proper to man? Surely, this is shown by the activities in which he engages, since it is these that the pleasures accompany. Those pleasures, therefore, which complete the activities of a perfect or complete and supremely happy man, regardless of whether these activities are one or several, can be called in the true sense the pleasures proper to man. All the rest are human pleasures only in a secondary and even less than secondary sense, as are the activities ⟨which they accompany⟩.
Book 10,Chapter 6 (1176a30–1177a11)
30 Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ
ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος
αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προειρημένα
συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ
ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν
35 ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα
30 Now that we have completed our discussion of the virtues, and of the different kinds of friendship and pleasure, it remains to sketch an outline of happiness, since, as we assert, it is the end or goal of human ⟨aspirations⟩. Our account will be more concise if we recapitulate what we have said so far.
We stated, then, that happiness is not a characteristic;480 ⟨if it were,⟩ a person who passes his whole life in sleep, vegetating like a plant, 35 or someone who experiences the greatest misfortunes could possess it.
We stated, then, that happiness is not a characteristic;480 ⟨if it were,⟩ a person who passes his whole life in sleep, vegetating like a plant, 35 or someone who experiences the greatest misfortunes could possess it.
1176b
1 μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ
ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἳ μέν εἰσιν
ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ αἳ δὲ καθ' αὑτάς, δῆλον
ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ
5 οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης.
καθ' αὑτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται
παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν
πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι'
αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι'
10 ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον
ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως.
καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων
οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν
οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται,
15 ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς, δέονται δὲ τοιούτων.
δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν
δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δ' ἴσως σημεῖον
οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς,
ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες
20 ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν,
διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ
γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὑτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται
εἶναι. εὔλογον δή, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται
τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν
25 πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ
τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη
ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. οὐκ
ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
30 ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου
ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ
λίαν παιδικόν. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν,
ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες
35 δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος
1 If, then, such a conclusion is unacceptable, we must, in accordance with our earlier discussion,481 classify happiness as some sort of activity. Now, some activities are necessary and desirable only for the sake of something else, while others are desirable in themselves. Obviously, happiness must be classed as an activity desirable in itself 5 and not for the sake of something else. For happiness lacks nothing and is self-sufficient. Activities desirable in themselves are those from which we seek to derive nothing beyond the actual exercise of the activity. Actions in conformity with virtue evidently constitute such activities; for to perform noble and good deeds is something desirable for its own sake.
Pleasant amusements, too, ⟨are desirable for their own sake⟩. 10 We do not choose them for the sake of something else, since they lead to harm rather than good when we become neglectful of our bodies and our property. But most of those who are considered happy find an escape in pastimes of this sort, and this is why people who are well versed in such pastimes find favor at the courts of tyrants; 15 they make themselves pleasant by providing what the tyrants are after, and what they want is amusement. Accordingly, such amusements are regarded as being conducive to happiness, because men who are in positions of power devote their leisure to them. But perhaps such persons cannot be ⟨regarded as⟩ evidence. For virtue and intelligence, which are the sources of morally good activities, do not consist in wielding power. Also, if these men, 20 who have never tasted pure and generous pleasure, find an escape in the pleasures of the body, this is no sufficient reason for thinking that such pleasures are in fact more desirable. For children, too, think that what they value is actually the best. It is, therefore, not surprising that as children apparently do not attach value to the same things as do adults, so bad men do not attach value to the same things as do good men. Accordingly, 25 as we have stated repeatedly,482 what is valuable and pleasant to a morally good man actually is valuable and pleasant. Each individual considers that activity most desirable which corresponds to his own proper characteristic condition, and a morally good man, of course, so considers activity in conformity with virtue.
Consequently, happiness does not consist in amusement. In fact, it would be strange if our end were amusement, and if we were to labor and suffer hardships all our life long merely to amuse ourselves. 30 For, one might say, we choose everything for the sake of something else—except happiness; for happiness is an end. Obviously, it is foolish and all too childish to exert serious efforts and toil for purposes of amusement. Anacharsis483 seems to be right when he advises to play in order to be serious; for amusement is a form of rest, and 35 since we cannot work continuously we need rest. Thus rest is not an end,
Pleasant amusements, too, ⟨are desirable for their own sake⟩. 10 We do not choose them for the sake of something else, since they lead to harm rather than good when we become neglectful of our bodies and our property. But most of those who are considered happy find an escape in pastimes of this sort, and this is why people who are well versed in such pastimes find favor at the courts of tyrants; 15 they make themselves pleasant by providing what the tyrants are after, and what they want is amusement. Accordingly, such amusements are regarded as being conducive to happiness, because men who are in positions of power devote their leisure to them. But perhaps such persons cannot be ⟨regarded as⟩ evidence. For virtue and intelligence, which are the sources of morally good activities, do not consist in wielding power. Also, if these men, 20 who have never tasted pure and generous pleasure, find an escape in the pleasures of the body, this is no sufficient reason for thinking that such pleasures are in fact more desirable. For children, too, think that what they value is actually the best. It is, therefore, not surprising that as children apparently do not attach value to the same things as do adults, so bad men do not attach value to the same things as do good men. Accordingly, 25 as we have stated repeatedly,482 what is valuable and pleasant to a morally good man actually is valuable and pleasant. Each individual considers that activity most desirable which corresponds to his own proper characteristic condition, and a morally good man, of course, so considers activity in conformity with virtue.
Consequently, happiness does not consist in amusement. In fact, it would be strange if our end were amusement, and if we were to labor and suffer hardships all our life long merely to amuse ourselves. 30 For, one might say, we choose everything for the sake of something else—except happiness; for happiness is an end. Obviously, it is foolish and all too childish to exert serious efforts and toil for purposes of amusement. Anacharsis483 seems to be right when he advises to play in order to be serious; for amusement is a form of rest, and 35 since we cannot work continuously we need rest. Thus rest is not an end,
1177a
1 ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ
εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν
γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ
5 μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ
βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη. ἀπολαύσειέ
τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ
ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν,
εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ
10 εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ
πρότερον εἴρηται.
1 for we take it for the sake of ⟨further⟩ activity. The happy life is regarded as a life in conformity with virtue. It is a life which involves effort and is not spent in amusement.
Moreover, we say that what is morally good is better than what is ridiculous and brings amusement, and the better the organ or man—whichever may be involved in a particular case —the greater the moral value of the activity. 5 But the activity of the better organ or the better man is in itself superior and more conducive to happiness.
Furthermore, any person at all, even a slave, can enjoy bodily pleasures no less than the best of men. But no one would grant that a slave has a share in happiness any more than that he lives a life of his own.484 For happiness does not consist in pastimes of this sort, 10 but in activities that conform with virtue, as we have stated earlier.485
Moreover, we say that what is morally good is better than what is ridiculous and brings amusement, and the better the organ or man—whichever may be involved in a particular case —the greater the moral value of the activity. 5 But the activity of the better organ or the better man is in itself superior and more conducive to happiness.
Furthermore, any person at all, even a slave, can enjoy bodily pleasures no less than the best of men. But no one would grant that a slave has a share in happiness any more than that he lives a life of his own.484 For happiness does not consist in pastimes of this sort, 10 but in activities that conform with virtue, as we have stated earlier.485
Book 10,Chapter 7 (1177a12–1178a8)
Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον
κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς
τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι
15 καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν
καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια
κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι
δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν
εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε γὰρ
20 αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια (καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν
γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς)· ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν [τε]
γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. οἰόμεθά
τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν
κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως
25 ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν
καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων
ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια
περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ
ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται,
30 τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται
πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων
καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς
καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος
ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως
Now, if happiness is activity in conformity with virtue, it is to be expected that it should conform with the highest virtue, and that is the virtue of the best part of us. Whether this is intelligence or something else which, it is thought, by its very nature rules and guides us 15 and which gives us our notions of what is noble and divine; whether it is itself divine or the most divine thing in us; it is the activity of this part ⟨when operating⟩ in conformity with the excellence or virtue proper to it that will be complete happiness. That it is an activity concerned with theoretical knowledge or contemplation486 has already been stated.487
This would seem to be consistent with our earlier statements as well as the truth. For this 20 activity is not only the highest— for intelligence is the highest possession we have in us, and the objects which are the concern of intelligence are the highest objects of knowledge—but also the most continuous: we are able to study continuously more easily than to perform any kind of action. Furthermore, we think of pleasure as a necessary ingredient in happiness. Now everyone agrees that of all the activities that conform with virtue activity in conformity with theoretical wisdom is the most pleasant. 25 At any rate, it seems that ⟨the pursuit of wisdom or⟩ philosophy holds pleasures marvellous in purity and certainty, and it is not surprising that time spent in knowledge is more pleasant than time spent in research. Moreover, what is usually called "self-sufficiency" will be found in the highest degree in the activity which is concerned with theoretical knowledge. Like a just man and any other virtuous man, a wise man requires the necessities of life; 30 once these have been adequately provided, a just man still needs people toward whom and in company with whom to act justly, and the same is true of a self-controlled man, a courageous man, and all the rest. But a wise man is able to study even by himself, and the wiser he is the more is he able to do it. Perhaps he could do it better if he had colleagues to work with him, but
This would seem to be consistent with our earlier statements as well as the truth. For this 20 activity is not only the highest— for intelligence is the highest possession we have in us, and the objects which are the concern of intelligence are the highest objects of knowledge—but also the most continuous: we are able to study continuously more easily than to perform any kind of action. Furthermore, we think of pleasure as a necessary ingredient in happiness. Now everyone agrees that of all the activities that conform with virtue activity in conformity with theoretical wisdom is the most pleasant. 25 At any rate, it seems that ⟨the pursuit of wisdom or⟩ philosophy holds pleasures marvellous in purity and certainty, and it is not surprising that time spent in knowledge is more pleasant than time spent in research. Moreover, what is usually called "self-sufficiency" will be found in the highest degree in the activity which is concerned with theoretical knowledge. Like a just man and any other virtuous man, a wise man requires the necessities of life; 30 once these have been adequately provided, a just man still needs people toward whom and in company with whom to act justly, and the same is true of a self-controlled man, a courageous man, and all the rest. But a wise man is able to study even by himself, and the wiser he is the more is he able to do it. Perhaps he could do it better if he had colleagues to work with him, but
1177b
1 αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι·
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ
δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν
πρᾶξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα
5 γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην
ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς
ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς
(οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ
10 παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος
τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ
φόνοι γίνοιντο)· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ
παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς
ἢ τήν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν
15 οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν.
εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ
πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἄσχολοι
καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν,
ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ
20 οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὑτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, καὶ ἔχειν τὴν
ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες
δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν
φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου,
25 λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι
τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ
κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ'
ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου,
τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.
30 εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος
θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας
ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν
θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ
1 he still is the most self-sufficient of all. Again, study seems to be the only activity which is loved for its own sake. For while we derive a greater or a smaller advantage from practical pursuits beyond the action itself, from study we derive nothing beyond the activity of studying. Also, we regard happiness as depending on leisure; 5 for our purpose in being busy is to have leisure, and we wage war in order to have peace. Now, the practical virtues are activated in political and military pursuits, but the actions involved in these pursuits seem to be unleisurely. This is completely true of military pursuits, since no one chooses to wage war or foments war for the sake of war; 10 he would have to be utterly bloodthirsty if he were to make enemies of his friends simply in order to have battle and slaughter. But the activity of the statesman, too, has no leisure. It attempts to gain advantages beyond political action, advantages such as political power, prestige, or at least happiness for the statesman himself and his fellow citizens, 15 and that is something other than political activity: after all, the very fact that we investigate politics shows that it is not the same ⟨as happiness⟩. Therefore, if we take as established (1) that political and military actions surpass all other actions that conform with virtue in nobility and grandeur; (2) that they are unleisurely, aim at an end, and are not chosen for their own sake; (3) that the activity of our intelligence, inasmuch as it is an activity concerned with theoretical knowledge, is thought to be of greater value than the others, 20 aims at no end beyond itself, and has a pleasure proper to itself—and pleasure increases activity; and (4) that the qualities of this activity evidently are self-sufficiency, leisure, as much freedom from fatigue as a human being can have, and whatever else falls to the lot of a supremely happy man; it follows that the activity of our intelligence constitutes the complete happiness of man, 25 provided that it encompasses a complete span of life; for nothing connected with happiness must be incomplete.
However, such a life would be more than human. A man who would live it would do so not insofar as he is human, but because there is a divine element within him. This divine element is as far above our composite nature488 as its activity is above the active exercise of the other, ⟨i.e., practical,⟩ kind of virtue. 30 So if it is true that intelligence is divine in comparison with man, then a life guided by intelligence is divine in comparison with human life. We must not follow those who advise us to have human thoughts, since we are ⟨only⟩ men, and mortal thoughts, as mortals should; on the contrary, we should try to become immortal as far as that is possible and do our utmost to live in accordance with what is highest in us. For though
However, such a life would be more than human. A man who would live it would do so not insofar as he is human, but because there is a divine element within him. This divine element is as far above our composite nature488 as its activity is above the active exercise of the other, ⟨i.e., practical,⟩ kind of virtue. 30 So if it is true that intelligence is divine in comparison with man, then a life guided by intelligence is divine in comparison with human life. We must not follow those who advise us to have human thoughts, since we are ⟨only⟩ men, and mortal thoughts, as mortals should; on the contrary, we should try to become immortal as far as that is possible and do our utmost to live in accordance with what is highest in us. For though
1178a
1 τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον
πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ
τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν
αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον
5 ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον
καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ
τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ
εὐδαιμονέστατος.
1 this is a small portion ⟨of our nature⟩,489 it far surpasses everything else in power and value. One might even regard it as each man's true self, since it is the controlling and better part. It would, therefore, be strange if a man chose not to live his own life but someone else's.
Moreover, 5 what we stated before490 will apply here, too: what is by nature proper to each thing will be at once the best and the most pleasant for it. In other words, a life guided by intelligence is the best and most pleasant for man, inasmuch as intelligence, above all else, is man. Consequently, this kind of life is the happiest.
Moreover, 5 what we stated before490 will apply here, too: what is by nature proper to each thing will be at once the best and the most pleasant for it. In other words, a life guided by intelligence is the best and most pleasant for man, inasmuch as intelligence, above all else, is man. Consequently, this kind of life is the happiest.
Book 10,Chapter 8 (1178a9–1179a32)
Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ
10 ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ
ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν
συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἔν τε
τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι
φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ
15 τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν
ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ
ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως
ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν
τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ
20 τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ
ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς
εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. δόξειε
δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι
25 τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία
καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ
πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι·
πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ
δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ
30 δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι,
προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν),
τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν
ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ
οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτερον
35 τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν
A life guided by the other kind of virtue, ⟨the practical,⟩ is happy in a secondary sense, since its active exercise is confined to man. It is in our dealings with one another that 10 we perform just, courageous, and other virtuous acts, when we observe the proper kind of behavior toward each man in private transactions, in meeting his needs, in all manner of actions, and in our emotions, and all of these are, as we see, peculiarly human. Moreover, some moral acts seem to be determined 15 by our bodily condition, and virtue or excellence of character seems in many ways closely related to the emotions. There is also a close mutual connection between practical wisdom and excellence of character, since the fundamental principles of practical wisdom are determined by the virtues of character, while practical wisdom determines the right standard for the moral virtues. The fact that these virtues are also bound up 20 with the emotions indicates that they belong to our composite nature, and the virtues of our composite nature are human virtues; consequently, a life guided by these virtues and the happiness ⟨that goes with it are likewise human⟩. The happiness of the intelligence, however, is quite separate ⟨from that kind of happiness⟩. That is all we shall say about it here, for a more detailed treatment lies beyond the scope of our present task.
It also seems that such happiness has little need of external trimmings, or less need 25 than moral virtue has. Even if we grant that both stand in equal need of the necessities of life, and even if the labors of a statesman are more concerned with the needs of our body and things of that sort—in that respect the difference between them may be small—yet, in what they need for the exercise of their activities, their difference will be great. A generous man will need money to perform generous acts, 30 and a just man will need it to meet his obligations. For the mere wish to perform such acts is inscrutable, and even an unjust man can pretend that he wishes to act justly. And a courageous man will need strength if he is to accomplish an act that conforms with his virtue, and a man of self-control the possibility of indulgence. How else can he or any other virtuous man make manifest his excellence? Also, it is debatable whether 35 the moral purpose or the action is the more decisive element in virtue, since virtue depends on both.
It also seems that such happiness has little need of external trimmings, or less need 25 than moral virtue has. Even if we grant that both stand in equal need of the necessities of life, and even if the labors of a statesman are more concerned with the needs of our body and things of that sort—in that respect the difference between them may be small—yet, in what they need for the exercise of their activities, their difference will be great. A generous man will need money to perform generous acts, 30 and a just man will need it to meet his obligations. For the mere wish to perform such acts is inscrutable, and even an unjust man can pretend that he wishes to act justly. And a courageous man will need strength if he is to accomplish an act that conforms with his virtue, and a man of self-control the possibility of indulgence. How else can he or any other virtuous man make manifest his excellence? Also, it is debatable whether 35 the moral purpose or the action is the more decisive element in virtue, since virtue depends on both.
1178b
1 οὔσης· τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ
τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ
καλλίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων
πρός γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι
5 πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ,
αἱρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων
πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική
τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς
γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι·
10 πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας;
ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας
ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους * *
ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν; ἢ
τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται
15 αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν;
ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας;
διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ
καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν
αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν
20 Ἐνδυμίωνα. τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ
μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ
ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη· καὶ
τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη.
σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας,
25 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον
ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων
ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ'
ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον
30 ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὑτὴν τιμία.
ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.
Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ
αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα
35 ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν.
1 It is clear of course that completeness depends on both. But many things are needed for the performance of actions, and the greater and nobler the actions the more is needed. But a man engaged in study has no need of any of these things, at least not for the active exercise of studying; in fact one might even go so far as to say that they are a hindrance to study. 5 But insofar as he is human and lives in the society of his fellow men, he chooses to act as virtue demands, and accordingly, he will need externals for living as a human being.
A further indication that complete happiness consists in some kind of contemplative activity is this. We assume that the gods are in the highest degree blessed and happy. 10 But what kind of actions are we to attribute to them? Acts of justice? Will they not look ridiculous making contracts with one another, returning deposits, and so forth? Perhaps acts of courage—withstanding terror and taking risks, because it is noble to do so? Or generous actions? But to whom will they give? It would be strange to think that they actually have 15 currency or something of the sort. Acts of self-control? What would they be? Surely, it would be in poor taste to praise them for not having bad appetites. If we went through the whole list we would see that a concern with actions is petty and unworthy of the gods. Nevertheless, we all assume that the gods exist and, consequently, that they are active; for surely we do not assume them to be always asleep like Endymion.491 20 Now, if we take away action from a living being, to say nothing of production, what is left except contemplation? Therefore, the activity of the divinity which surpasses all others in bliss must be a contemplative activity, and the human activity which is most closely akin to it is, therefore, most conducive to happiness.
This is further shown by the fact that no other living being has a share in happiness, since they all are 25 completely denied this kind of activity. The gods enjoy a life blessed in its entirety; men enjoy it to the extent that they attain something resembling the divine activity; but none of the other living beings can be happy, because they have no share at all in contemplation or study. So happiness is coextensive with study, and 30 the greater the opportunity for studying, the greater the happiness, not as an incidental effect but as inherent in study; for study is in itself worthy of honor. Consequently, happiness is some kind of study or contemplation.
But we shall also need external well-being, since we are only human. Our nature is not self-sufficient for engaging in study: our body must 35 be healthy and we must have food and generally be cared for. Nevertheless, if it is not possible for a man to be supremely happy without external goods,
A further indication that complete happiness consists in some kind of contemplative activity is this. We assume that the gods are in the highest degree blessed and happy. 10 But what kind of actions are we to attribute to them? Acts of justice? Will they not look ridiculous making contracts with one another, returning deposits, and so forth? Perhaps acts of courage—withstanding terror and taking risks, because it is noble to do so? Or generous actions? But to whom will they give? It would be strange to think that they actually have 15 currency or something of the sort. Acts of self-control? What would they be? Surely, it would be in poor taste to praise them for not having bad appetites. If we went through the whole list we would see that a concern with actions is petty and unworthy of the gods. Nevertheless, we all assume that the gods exist and, consequently, that they are active; for surely we do not assume them to be always asleep like Endymion.491 20 Now, if we take away action from a living being, to say nothing of production, what is left except contemplation? Therefore, the activity of the divinity which surpasses all others in bliss must be a contemplative activity, and the human activity which is most closely akin to it is, therefore, most conducive to happiness.
This is further shown by the fact that no other living being has a share in happiness, since they all are 25 completely denied this kind of activity. The gods enjoy a life blessed in its entirety; men enjoy it to the extent that they attain something resembling the divine activity; but none of the other living beings can be happy, because they have no share at all in contemplation or study. So happiness is coextensive with study, and 30 the greater the opportunity for studying, the greater the happiness, not as an incidental effect but as inherent in study; for study is in itself worthy of honor. Consequently, happiness is some kind of study or contemplation.
But we shall also need external well-being, since we are only human. Our nature is not self-sufficient for engaging in study: our body must 35 be healthy and we must have food and generally be cared for. Nevertheless, if it is not possible for a man to be supremely happy without external goods,
1179a
1 οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα,
εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὔταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις,
δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν
5 τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν
κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν (τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται
τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον)· ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ
βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων
10 δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως
τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς
ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια
κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ
πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι
15 οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι
γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν
δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν
μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς
πρακτικοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις
20 γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα
καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις
ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ
νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ
θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
25 ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον
χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο
δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας
ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους
καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα
30 τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα.
τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη
ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.
1 we must not think that his needs will be great and many in order to be happy; for self-sufficiency and moral action do not consist in an excess ⟨of possessions⟩. It is possible to perform 5 noble actions even without being ruler of land and sea; a man's actions can be guided by virtue also if his means are moderate. That this is so can be clearly seen in the fact that private individuals evidently do not act less honorably but even more honorably than powerful rulers. It is enough to have moderate means at one's disposal, for the life of a man whose activity is guided by virtue will be happy.
Solon certainly 10 gave a good description of a happy man, when he said that he is a man moderately supplied with external goods, who had performed what he, Solon, thought were the noblest actions, and who had lived with self-control.492 For it is possible to do what one should even with moderate possessions. Also Anaxagoras, it seems, did not assume that a happy man had to be rich and powerful.493 He said that 15 he would not be surprised if a happy man would strike the common run of people as strange, since they judge by externals and perceive nothing but externals. So it seems that our account is in harmony with the opinion of the wise.
Now, though such considerations carry some conviction, in the field of moral action truth is judged by the actual facts of life, for it is in them that 20 the decisive element lies. So we must examine the conclusions we have reached so far by applying them to the actual facts of life: if they are in harmony with the facts we must accept them, and if they clash we must assume that they are mere words.
A man whose activity is guided by intelligence, who cultivates his intelligence and keeps it in the best condition, seems to be most beloved by the gods. For if the gods have any concern for human affairs—and 25 they seem to have—it is to be expected that they rejoice in what is best and most akin to them, and that is our intelligence; it is also to be expected that they requite with good those who most love and honor intelligence, as being men who care for what is dear to the gods and who act rightly and nobly. 30 That a wise man, more than any other, has all these qualities is perfectly clear. Consequently, he is the most beloved by the gods, and as such he is, presumably, also the happiest. Therefore, we have here a further indication that a wise man attains a higher degree of happiness than anyone.
Solon certainly 10 gave a good description of a happy man, when he said that he is a man moderately supplied with external goods, who had performed what he, Solon, thought were the noblest actions, and who had lived with self-control.492 For it is possible to do what one should even with moderate possessions. Also Anaxagoras, it seems, did not assume that a happy man had to be rich and powerful.493 He said that 15 he would not be surprised if a happy man would strike the common run of people as strange, since they judge by externals and perceive nothing but externals. So it seems that our account is in harmony with the opinion of the wise.
Now, though such considerations carry some conviction, in the field of moral action truth is judged by the actual facts of life, for it is in them that 20 the decisive element lies. So we must examine the conclusions we have reached so far by applying them to the actual facts of life: if they are in harmony with the facts we must accept them, and if they clash we must assume that they are mere words.
A man whose activity is guided by intelligence, who cultivates his intelligence and keeps it in the best condition, seems to be most beloved by the gods. For if the gods have any concern for human affairs—and 25 they seem to have—it is to be expected that they rejoice in what is best and most akin to them, and that is our intelligence; it is also to be expected that they requite with good those who most love and honor intelligence, as being men who care for what is dear to the gods and who act rightly and nobly. 30 That a wise man, more than any other, has all these qualities is perfectly clear. Consequently, he is the most beloved by the gods, and as such he is, presumably, also the happiest. Therefore, we have here a further indication that a wise man attains a higher degree of happiness than anyone.
Book 10,Chapter 9 (1179a33–1181b23)
Ἆρ' οὖν εἰ περί τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας
καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν
35 οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς
Now that we have given an adequate outline of these matters, of the virtues, and also of friendship and pleasure, 35 can we regard our project as having reached its completion? Must we not rather abide by the maxim that
1179b
1 πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ
εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως
ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς
5 τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως
ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι·
νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι
τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἦθός τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς
ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς,
10 τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι·
οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι
τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας·
πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ
δι' ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας,
15 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι
ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; οὐ
γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημμένα
λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι· ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων
ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοιμεν
20 τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἳ μὲν φύσει
οἳ δ' ἔθει οἳ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς
οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς
ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή
ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς
25 ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ
μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος
ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τ'
οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος
30 προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ
δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν
πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ
γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς,
ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν
35 καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα.
1 in matters of action the end is not to study and attain knowledge of the particular things to be done, but rather to do them? Surely, knowing about excellence or virtue is not enough: we must try to possess it and use it, or find some other way in which we may become good.
Now, if words alone would suffice 5 to make us good, they would rightly "harvest many rewards and great," as Theognis says,494 and we would have to provide them. But as it is, while words evidently do have the power to encourage and stimulate young men of generous mind, and while they can cause a character well-born and truly enamored of what is noble to be possessed by virtue, 10 they do not have the capacity to turn the common run of people to goodness and nobility. For the natural tendency of most people is to be swayed not by a sense of shame but by fear, and to refrain from acting basely not because it is disgraceful, but because of the punishment it brings. Living under the sway of emotion, they pursue their own proper pleasures and the means by which they can obtain them, and they avoid the pains that are opposed to them. 15 But they do not even have a notion of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it. What argument indeed can transform people like that? To change by argument what has long been ingrained in a character is impossible or, at least, not easy. Perhaps we must be satisfied if we have whatever we think it takes to become good 20 and attain a modicum of excellence.
Some people believe that it is nature that makes men good, others that it is habit, and others again that it is teaching. Now, whatever goodness comes from nature is obviously not in our power, but is present in truly fortunate men as the result of some divine cause. Argument and teaching, I am afraid, are not effective in all cases: 25 the soul of the listener must first have been conditioned by habits to the right kind of likes and dislikes, just as land ⟨must be cultivated before it is able⟩ to foster the seed. For a man whose life is guided by emotion will not listen to an argument that dissuades him, nor will he understand it. How can we possibly persuade a man like that to change his ways? And in general it seems that emotion does not yield to argument but only to force. Therefore, 30 there must first be a character that somehow has an affinity for excellence or virtue, a character that loves what is noble and feels disgust at what is base.
To obtain the right training for virtue from youth up is difficult, unless one has been brought up under the right laws. To live a life of self-control and tenacity is not pleasant for most people, especially for the young. Therefore, 35 their upbringing and pursuits must be regulated by laws; for once they have become familiar, they will no longer be painful.
Now, if words alone would suffice 5 to make us good, they would rightly "harvest many rewards and great," as Theognis says,494 and we would have to provide them. But as it is, while words evidently do have the power to encourage and stimulate young men of generous mind, and while they can cause a character well-born and truly enamored of what is noble to be possessed by virtue, 10 they do not have the capacity to turn the common run of people to goodness and nobility. For the natural tendency of most people is to be swayed not by a sense of shame but by fear, and to refrain from acting basely not because it is disgraceful, but because of the punishment it brings. Living under the sway of emotion, they pursue their own proper pleasures and the means by which they can obtain them, and they avoid the pains that are opposed to them. 15 But they do not even have a notion of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it. What argument indeed can transform people like that? To change by argument what has long been ingrained in a character is impossible or, at least, not easy. Perhaps we must be satisfied if we have whatever we think it takes to become good 20 and attain a modicum of excellence.
Some people believe that it is nature that makes men good, others that it is habit, and others again that it is teaching. Now, whatever goodness comes from nature is obviously not in our power, but is present in truly fortunate men as the result of some divine cause. Argument and teaching, I am afraid, are not effective in all cases: 25 the soul of the listener must first have been conditioned by habits to the right kind of likes and dislikes, just as land ⟨must be cultivated before it is able⟩ to foster the seed. For a man whose life is guided by emotion will not listen to an argument that dissuades him, nor will he understand it. How can we possibly persuade a man like that to change his ways? And in general it seems that emotion does not yield to argument but only to force. Therefore, 30 there must first be a character that somehow has an affinity for excellence or virtue, a character that loves what is noble and feels disgust at what is base.
To obtain the right training for virtue from youth up is difficult, unless one has been brought up under the right laws. To live a life of self-control and tenacity is not pleasant for most people, especially for the young. Therefore, 35 their upbringing and pursuits must be regulated by laws; for once they have become familiar, they will no longer be painful.
1180a
1 οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας
τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπιεδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν
αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων,
καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ
5 μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ
οἴονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν
ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων
τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυεστέροις
οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους
10 ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον
λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καί φασι
δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἳ μάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται
ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν
15 ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἶθ'
οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ'
ἑκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις
κατά τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν· ἡ μὲν
οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ [δὴ] τὸ ἀναγκαῖον,
20 οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἤ τινος
τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό
τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι
τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ
νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ
25 Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει <ἢ> μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν
δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς
πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ
ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἠδ'
ἀλόχου. κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ
30 ὀρθὴν [καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι]· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων
ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις
εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, * * ἢ προαιρεῖσθαί γε. μᾶλλον
δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς
γενόμενος. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων
35 γίνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων· γεγραμμένων
1 But it is perhaps not enough that they receive the right upbringing and attention only in their youth. Since they must carry on these pursuits and cultivate them by habit when they have grown up, we probably need laws for this, too, and for the whole of life in general. 5 For most people are swayed rather by compulsion than argument, and by punishments rather than by ⟨a sense of⟩ what is noble. This is why some believe that lawgivers ought to exhort and try to influence people toward ⟨a life of⟩ virtue because of its inherent nobility, in the hope that those who have made good progress through their habits will listen to them.495 Chastisement and penalties, they think, should be imposed upon those who do not obey and are of an inferior nature, 10 while the incorrigible ought to be banished abroad.496 15 A good man, they think, who orients his life by what is noble will accept the guidance of reason, while a bad man, whose desire is for pleasure, is corrected by pain like a beast of burden. For the same reason, they say that the pains inflicted must be those that are most directly opposed to the pleasures he loves.
Accordingly, if, as we have said, a man must receive a good upbringing and discipline in order to be good, and must subsequently lead the same kind of life, pursuing what is good and never involuntarily or voluntarily doing anything base, this can be effected by living under the guidance of a kind of intelligence and right order which can be enforced. Now, a father's command does not have the power to enforce or to compel, 20 nor does, in general, the command of a single man, unless he is a king or someone in a similar position. But law does have the power or capacity to compel, being the rule of reason derived from some sort of practical wisdom and intelligence. While people hate any men who oppose, however rightly, their impulses, the law is not invidious when it enjoins what is right.
But, with a few exceptions, 25 Sparta is the only state in which the lawgiver seems to have paid attention to upbringing and pursuits. In most states such matters are utterly neglected, and each man lives as he pleases, "dealing out law to his children and his wife" as the Cyclopes do.497 Now, the best thing would be to make the correct care of these matters a common concern. 30 But if the community neglects them, it would seem to be incumbent upon every man to help his children and friends attain virtue. This he will be capable of doing, or at least intend to do.498
It follows from our discussion that he will be better capable of doing it if he knows something about legislation. For clearly matters of common concern are regulated by laws, 35 and good concerns by laws which set high moral standards.
Accordingly, if, as we have said, a man must receive a good upbringing and discipline in order to be good, and must subsequently lead the same kind of life, pursuing what is good and never involuntarily or voluntarily doing anything base, this can be effected by living under the guidance of a kind of intelligence and right order which can be enforced. Now, a father's command does not have the power to enforce or to compel, 20 nor does, in general, the command of a single man, unless he is a king or someone in a similar position. But law does have the power or capacity to compel, being the rule of reason derived from some sort of practical wisdom and intelligence. While people hate any men who oppose, however rightly, their impulses, the law is not invidious when it enjoins what is right.
But, with a few exceptions, 25 Sparta is the only state in which the lawgiver seems to have paid attention to upbringing and pursuits. In most states such matters are utterly neglected, and each man lives as he pleases, "dealing out law to his children and his wife" as the Cyclopes do.497 Now, the best thing would be to make the correct care of these matters a common concern. 30 But if the community neglects them, it would seem to be incumbent upon every man to help his children and friends attain virtue. This he will be capable of doing, or at least intend to do.498
It follows from our discussion that he will be better capable of doing it if he knows something about legislation. For clearly matters of common concern are regulated by laws, 35 and good concerns by laws which set high moral standards.
1180b
1 δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν
εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ
γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἤθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν
5 οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ
τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες
καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ
καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς· καθόλου
μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία,
10 τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὔ, ὅ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην
περιτίθησιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον
ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου
τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθείη μὲν <ἂν> ἄριστα καθ'
ἓν καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ καθόλου εἰδώς, τί
15 πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοισδί (τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε
καὶ εἰσίν)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἑνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς
ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς
τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ
ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἑτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι
20 ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἧττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γενέσθαι
καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν
ἄν, κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ'
αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας
βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον
25 γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἄν. ὅντινα γὰρ
οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος,
ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον
πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις; ἢ καθάπερ
30 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει
τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς
καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν
γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες
καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ γραφεῖς·
35 τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί,
1 Whether the laws are written or unwritten would seem to make no difference, nor whether they give education to one person or many, just as it makes no difference in the case of mental or physical training or any other pursuit. For just as legal traditions and ⟨national⟩ character prevail in states, 5 so paternal words and ⟨ancestral⟩ habits prevail in households—and the latter have an even greater authority because of the tie of kinship and of benefits rendered, ⟨for members of a household⟩ have the requisite natural affection and obedience ⟨toward the father⟩ to start with. Furthermore, individual treatment is superior to group treatment in education as it is in medicine. As a general rule, rest and abstaining from food are good for a man with a fever, but perhaps 10 they are not good in a particular case. And an expert boxer perhaps does not make all his pupils adopt the same style of fighting. It seems that each particular is worked out with greater precision if private attention is given, since each person has more of an opportunity to get what he needs.
But a physician, a physical trainer, or any other such person can take the best care in a particular case when he knows the general rules, that is, when he knows 15 what is good for everyone or what is good for a particular kind of person; for the sciences are said to be, and actually are, concerned with what is common to particular cases. Of course, there is probably nothing to prevent even a person with no scientific knowledge from taking good care of a particular case, if he has accurately observed by experience what happens in a particular case, just as there are some who seem to be their own best physicians, even though they are incapable of giving aid to another. 20 Nevertheless, if a man wants to master a skill or art or some theoretical knowledge, he ought, one would think, probably to go on to a universal principle, and to gain knowledge of it as best as possible. For, as we have stated, it is with this that the sciences are concerned.
Moreover, a man who wants to make others better by devoting his care to them—regardless of whether they are many or 25 few—should try to learn something about legislation, if indeed laws can make us good. To inculcate a good disposition in any person, that is, any person who presents himself, is not a job for just anyone; if anyone can do it, it is the man who knows, just as it is in medicine and in all other matters that involve some sort of care and practical wisdom.
Is it not, then, our next task to examine from whom and how we can learn to become legislators? 30 Is it not, as always, from the experts, in this case the masters of politics? For, as we saw,499 legislation is a part of politics. Or does politics not appear to be like the rest of the sciences and capacities?500 In the other sciences and faculties we find that the people who transmit the capacity are at the same time actively engaged in practicing what they know, as, for example, physicians and painters. 35 The Sophists, on the other hand, profess to teach social and political matters, but none of them practices them.
But a physician, a physical trainer, or any other such person can take the best care in a particular case when he knows the general rules, that is, when he knows 15 what is good for everyone or what is good for a particular kind of person; for the sciences are said to be, and actually are, concerned with what is common to particular cases. Of course, there is probably nothing to prevent even a person with no scientific knowledge from taking good care of a particular case, if he has accurately observed by experience what happens in a particular case, just as there are some who seem to be their own best physicians, even though they are incapable of giving aid to another. 20 Nevertheless, if a man wants to master a skill or art or some theoretical knowledge, he ought, one would think, probably to go on to a universal principle, and to gain knowledge of it as best as possible. For, as we have stated, it is with this that the sciences are concerned.
Moreover, a man who wants to make others better by devoting his care to them—regardless of whether they are many or 25 few—should try to learn something about legislation, if indeed laws can make us good. To inculcate a good disposition in any person, that is, any person who presents himself, is not a job for just anyone; if anyone can do it, it is the man who knows, just as it is in medicine and in all other matters that involve some sort of care and practical wisdom.
Is it not, then, our next task to examine from whom and how we can learn to become legislators? 30 Is it not, as always, from the experts, in this case the masters of politics? For, as we saw,499 legislation is a part of politics. Or does politics not appear to be like the rest of the sciences and capacities?500 In the other sciences and faculties we find that the people who transmit the capacity are at the same time actively engaged in practicing what they know, as, for example, physicians and painters. 35 The Sophists, on the other hand, profess to teach social and political matters, but none of them practices them.
1181a
1 πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἳ δόξαιεν
ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ·
οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε
5 καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους
υἱεῖς ἤ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὔλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ
ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον
ἄν, οὔθ' αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης
δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν
10 ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς
πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς
εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν
οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι.
ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
15 τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο
ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας
τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον,
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικήν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα
20 κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν,
καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνᾴδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν
τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον, ὥςπερ
ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν·
1 That is done by the politicians, whose practice, it would seem, owes more to some sort of native capacity and to experience than to thought. We find that they neither discuss nor write about these matters—though that would certainly be nobler than making speeches for the law courts and the assemblies—nor 5 again that they have succeeded in making masters of politics of their own sons or any of their friends. But one would expect that they would have done so, had they been able; for they could not have left a better bequest to their cities, nor is there anything they would rather choose to have for themselves, and thus also for those dearest to them, than a capacity of this kind. Nonetheless, experience does seem to make no mean contribution; 10 for they would not have become masters of politics simply through their familiarity with political matters. This is why those who aim at a knowledge of politics also seem to need experience.
But, as we can see, those Sophists who profess to teach politics are very far from teaching it.501 By and large, they do not even know what sort of thing it is or with what kind of subjects it deals. For ⟨if they did,⟩ 15 they would not have classified it as identical with or even inferior to rhetoric; nor would they have believed that it is easy to legislate by collecting the most highly regarded laws.502 They think that it is possible to > Now I think that all would agree that our laws are responsible for ⟨having contributed⟩ a very large number of the greatest goods to the life of mankind. But the use of these laws is naturally confined to the interest of the affairs of our city and the dealings we have with one another. If, however, you were to be persuaded by my arguments, you might administer the whole of Greece well, justly, and in a manner advantageous to our state. Sensible people ought to devote their efforts to both ⟨our city and to Greece⟩, but should attach greater value to the greater and more worthy of these two. Moreover, they ought to recognize that, although tens of thousands of Greeks as well as non-Greeks are endowed with what talents are needed to enact laws, there are not many people who are capable of discussing matters of public interest in a manner worthy of our city and of Greece.
> > That is why men who make it their business to invent discussions of this sort must be held in higher esteem than those who enact and write laws, inasmuch as they are rarer, harder ⟨to find⟩, and require greater intellectual qualities. This is particularly true of the present. For when the human race first came to be and began to settle in cities, all searched for much the same thing as a matter of course. But since we have reached the point where the arguments advanced and the laws enacted are innumerable, and where we praise the oldest laws and the newest arguments, this is no longer a task of a single intelligence: those who have made it their purpose to enact laws have at their disposal select the best laws, as if the very selection were not an act of understanding and as if correct judgment were not the most important thing here, as it is in matters of music. In every field, it is those who are experienced that judge its products correctly, 20 and are privy to the means and the manner in which they were accomplished and understand what combinations are harmonious. The inexperienced, on the other hand, must be satisfied if they do not fail to recognize whether the work has been produced well or badly. That is the case, for example, in painting. Laws are, as it were, the products of politics. Accordingly,
But, as we can see, those Sophists who profess to teach politics are very far from teaching it.501 By and large, they do not even know what sort of thing it is or with what kind of subjects it deals. For ⟨if they did,⟩ 15 they would not have classified it as identical with or even inferior to rhetoric; nor would they have believed that it is easy to legislate by collecting the most highly regarded laws.502 They think that it is possible to > Now I think that all would agree that our laws are responsible for ⟨having contributed⟩ a very large number of the greatest goods to the life of mankind. But the use of these laws is naturally confined to the interest of the affairs of our city and the dealings we have with one another. If, however, you were to be persuaded by my arguments, you might administer the whole of Greece well, justly, and in a manner advantageous to our state. Sensible people ought to devote their efforts to both ⟨our city and to Greece⟩, but should attach greater value to the greater and more worthy of these two. Moreover, they ought to recognize that, although tens of thousands of Greeks as well as non-Greeks are endowed with what talents are needed to enact laws, there are not many people who are capable of discussing matters of public interest in a manner worthy of our city and of Greece.
> > That is why men who make it their business to invent discussions of this sort must be held in higher esteem than those who enact and write laws, inasmuch as they are rarer, harder ⟨to find⟩, and require greater intellectual qualities. This is particularly true of the present. For when the human race first came to be and began to settle in cities, all searched for much the same thing as a matter of course. But since we have reached the point where the arguments advanced and the laws enacted are innumerable, and where we praise the oldest laws and the newest arguments, this is no longer a task of a single intelligence: those who have made it their purpose to enact laws have at their disposal select the best laws, as if the very selection were not an act of understanding and as if correct judgment were not the most important thing here, as it is in matters of music. In every field, it is those who are experienced that judge its products correctly, 20 and are privy to the means and the manner in which they were accomplished and understand what combinations are harmonious. The inexperienced, on the other hand, must be satisfied if they do not fail to recognize whether the work has been produced well or badly. That is the case, for example, in painting. Laws are, as it were, the products of politics. Accordingly,
1181b
1 πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους
κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων
γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνταί γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν
5 ἑκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις
ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως
οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς
μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρῖναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον
καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἁρμόττει εὔχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ
10 ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιοῦσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν
ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα
τάχ' ἂν γένοιντο. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον
τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον
βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν
15 ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν
οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων
πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν
θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σῴζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ
ποῖα ἑκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἳ μὲν
20 καλῶς αἳ δὲ τοὐναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων
τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη,
καὶ πῶς ἑκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη.
λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.
1 how can a man learn from them to become a legislator or to judge which are the best? We do not even find men becoming medical experts by reading textbooks. Yet medical writers try at least not only to describe the treatments, but also how particular patients, 5 whom they distinguish by their various characteristics, can be cured and how the treatments are to be applied. Though their books seem useful for experienced people, they are useless for those who do not have the requisite knowledge. So also collections of laws and constitutions503 may perhaps be of good use to those who have the capacity to study them and judge what enactments are good and which are not, and what kind of measures are appropriate to what circumstances. But those who go through such collections 10 without the trained ability504 ⟨to do so⟩ do not have the requisite good judgment, unless they have it spontaneously, though they may perhaps gain a deeper understanding of these matters.
Accordingly, since previous writers have left the subject of legislation unexamined, it is perhaps best if we ourselves investigate it and the general problem of the constitution of a state, 15 in order to complete as best we can our philosophy of human affairs.505 First of all, then, let us try to review any discussion of merit contributed by our predecessors on some particular aspect; and then, on the basis of our collection of constitutions, let us study what sort of thing preserves and what destroys states, what preserves and destroys each particular kind of constitution, and what the causes are that 20 make some states well administered and others not. Once we have studied this, we shall perhaps also gain a more comprehensive view of the best form of constitution, of the way in which each is organized, and what laws and customs are current in each. So let us begin our discussion.
Accordingly, since previous writers have left the subject of legislation unexamined, it is perhaps best if we ourselves investigate it and the general problem of the constitution of a state, 15 in order to complete as best we can our philosophy of human affairs.505 First of all, then, let us try to review any discussion of merit contributed by our predecessors on some particular aspect; and then, on the basis of our collection of constitutions, let us study what sort of thing preserves and what destroys states, what preserves and destroys each particular kind of constitution, and what the causes are that 20 make some states well administered and others not. Once we have studied this, we shall perhaps also gain a more comprehensive view of the best form of constitution, of the way in which each is organized, and what laws and customs are current in each. So let us begin our discussion.