Bywater (OCT, 1894) · Ostwald (1962)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 4,Chapter 1 (1119b22–1122a17)
1119b
Λέγωμεν δ' ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ
περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν
τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν,
25 ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δ'
ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι
μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία
περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν
προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα
30 σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες·
τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς
ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·
πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται·
βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἓν κακὸν ἔχων,
Next in order let us discuss generosity.115 It seems to be the mean in the sphere of material goods. A man is praised as generous neither for what he does on the battlefield, nor in situations in which a person is praised as self-controlled, nor again in the making of judicial decisions. 25 He is praised in matters involving the giving and taking of material goods, more particularly the giving. By "material goods" we understand everything whose value is measured in money.
There also exists in matters involving material goods extravagance and stinginess as excesses and deficiencies. We attach the label of stinginess always to those who are more intent on material goods than they should be; 30 the term "extravagance," on the other hand, is sometimes used with wider implications, when we call moral weaklings and people who spend their money in indulging themselves "extravagant." They have so many vices all at once that they are regarded as the most worthless of all. But that is not proper usage; for "extravagant" denotes a person who has only one bad quality,
There also exists in matters involving material goods extravagance and stinginess as excesses and deficiencies. We attach the label of stinginess always to those who are more intent on material goods than they should be; 30 the term "extravagance," on the other hand, is sometimes used with wider implications, when we call moral weaklings and people who spend their money in indulging themselves "extravagant." They have so many vices all at once that they are regarded as the most worthless of all. But that is not proper usage; for "extravagant" denotes a person who has only one bad quality,
1120a
1 τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος,
δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα.
ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς·
5 ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται
ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ χρήσεται
ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν
ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ
δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλόν
10 ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν
δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον
τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον
ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν
δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει
15 τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ
διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον.
καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον
προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευθέριοι
δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ
20 εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην·
οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν
μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ,
τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. Αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ
τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα
25 καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα
ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ
κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς
οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν' ἄλλην
αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς·
30 μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς
πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ
δεῖ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη
λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος
εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ
1 namely, that of wasting his property. A man ruined by his own doing is a hopeless case116 indeed; wasting one's property seems to be a kind of self-destruction, since property provides the means for living. This is, therefore, the sense in which we understand 'extravagance."
Things meant for use can be used well and badly, 5 and wealth is a useful thing. Now, any particular object is put to the best use by a man who possesses the virtue proper to that object. Accordingly, wealth will be put to best use by him who possesses the excellence proper to material goods, and that is the generous man. Use, we think, consists in spending and giving material goods, while taking and keeping them is more properly called "possession." 10 Therefore, a generous man is characterized rather by giving to the right people than by taking from the right and not taking from the wrong sources. For excellence consists in doing good rather than in having good done to one, and in performing noble actions rather than in not performing base ones. It is fairly obvious that giving implies doing good and acting nobly, and that taking implies having good done to one and not acting basely. 15 Furthermore, we show gratitude to him who gives, not to him who does not take, and, what is more, we praise him. Also, it is easier not to take than to give, for people are less liable to give away what belongs to them than not to take what is another's. Moreover, givers are called "generous," whereas 20 those who do not take are rather praised for their honesty and justice,117 not their generosity, and takers are not likely to be praised. Generous men are perhaps loved more than any other people who are loved for their excellence, for they are helpful, and their helpfulness consists in giving.
Virtuous actions are noble and are performed because they are noble. Accordingly, a generous man, too, will give—and give in the correct manner—because that is noble. 25 He will give to the right people, the right amount, at the right time, and do everything else that is implied in correct giving. Moreover, it will give him pleasure to do so, or ⟨at least⟩ no pain; for to act in conformity with virtue is pleasant or painless, but certainly not painful. If he gives to the wrong people or for the wrong motive, and not because it is noble to give, he will not be called generous but something else. ⟨The same applies to a man who finds giving⟩ painful. 30 He would prefer material goods to noble action, and that is not what marks a man as generous. Nor will a generous man take from the wrong source; that kind of taking is not characteristic of a man who holds material goods in low esteem. He is not likely to make requests, either: a person who does good is not one to accept good turns lightly. But he will take from the right source,
Things meant for use can be used well and badly, 5 and wealth is a useful thing. Now, any particular object is put to the best use by a man who possesses the virtue proper to that object. Accordingly, wealth will be put to best use by him who possesses the excellence proper to material goods, and that is the generous man. Use, we think, consists in spending and giving material goods, while taking and keeping them is more properly called "possession." 10 Therefore, a generous man is characterized rather by giving to the right people than by taking from the right and not taking from the wrong sources. For excellence consists in doing good rather than in having good done to one, and in performing noble actions rather than in not performing base ones. It is fairly obvious that giving implies doing good and acting nobly, and that taking implies having good done to one and not acting basely. 15 Furthermore, we show gratitude to him who gives, not to him who does not take, and, what is more, we praise him. Also, it is easier not to take than to give, for people are less liable to give away what belongs to them than not to take what is another's. Moreover, givers are called "generous," whereas 20 those who do not take are rather praised for their honesty and justice,117 not their generosity, and takers are not likely to be praised. Generous men are perhaps loved more than any other people who are loved for their excellence, for they are helpful, and their helpfulness consists in giving.
Virtuous actions are noble and are performed because they are noble. Accordingly, a generous man, too, will give—and give in the correct manner—because that is noble. 25 He will give to the right people, the right amount, at the right time, and do everything else that is implied in correct giving. Moreover, it will give him pleasure to do so, or ⟨at least⟩ no pain; for to act in conformity with virtue is pleasant or painless, but certainly not painful. If he gives to the wrong people or for the wrong motive, and not because it is noble to give, he will not be called generous but something else. ⟨The same applies to a man who finds giving⟩ painful. 30 He would prefer material goods to noble action, and that is not what marks a man as generous. Nor will a generous man take from the wrong source; that kind of taking is not characteristic of a man who holds material goods in low esteem. He is not likely to make requests, either: a person who does good is not one to accept good turns lightly. But he will take from the right source,
1120b
1 τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον,
ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε
διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ
διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ
5 σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν
ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου.
κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος
ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει
10 ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων
διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι
ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς
ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα,
ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν
15 ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν
δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς
δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι
ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ
γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ
20 οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ
δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ
τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς
ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ
κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
25 ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος
τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς
δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος
οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ
δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς
30 καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν
δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος,
ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει
ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις, ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν
οὖν ἑπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον
1 from his own possessions, for example, not because it is noble to do so, but because it is necessary in order to have ⟨something⟩ to give. He will not, however, be careless of his personal possessions, since he wishes to use them as a means of helping others. He will not give to anybody and everybody, so that he may have ⟨something⟩ to give to the right people at the right time and where it is noble to do so. Still, 5 a generous man has a strong tendency to go to such excess in giving that he leaves too little for himself; for not to look out for himself is typical of a generous person.
We speak of generosity relative to a person's property. For a generous act does not depend on the amount given, but on the characteristic of the giver, and this makes him give relative to his property. In other words, 10 it is quite possible that a man who gives less is more generous, if his gift comes from smaller resources. Those who have not accumulated their own property but have inherited it are thought to be more generous, not only because they have never experienced want, but also because everyone has a greater love for what he has produced himself, as do parents and poets.118 A generous man does not easily get rich, 15 inasmuch as he is not a taker or a keeper, but an openhanded spender who values material goods not for their own sake but for the sake of giving. That is also why fortune is blamed when the most worthy individuals are the least wealthy. And not without reason: 20 one cannot have material goods or anything else without devoting care to getting them.
Still, ⟨a generous man⟩ will not give to the wrong people, at the wrong time, and so forth; for if he did, his actions would no longer be dictated by generosity, and if he spent his money on the wrong things, he would have none to spend on the right ones. For as we have said, a man is generous who spends relative to his property and on the right objects; he who ⟨spends⟩ to excess is extravagant. 25 Therefore, we do not call tyrants or absolute monarchs extravagant, for, it seems, the amounts they give and spend cannot very well be in excess of the amounts they possess.
Now, since generosity is the mean in giving and taking material goods, a generous person will give and spend the right amounts on the right objects, 30 in small and great matters alike, and he will derive pleasure from doing so. Also, he will take the right amounts from the right sources. For since the virtue is a mean both in giving and in taking, he will do both in the proper manner: honest taking goes with honest giving, and any other kind of taking is contrary to it. Now,
We speak of generosity relative to a person's property. For a generous act does not depend on the amount given, but on the characteristic of the giver, and this makes him give relative to his property. In other words, 10 it is quite possible that a man who gives less is more generous, if his gift comes from smaller resources. Those who have not accumulated their own property but have inherited it are thought to be more generous, not only because they have never experienced want, but also because everyone has a greater love for what he has produced himself, as do parents and poets.118 A generous man does not easily get rich, 15 inasmuch as he is not a taker or a keeper, but an openhanded spender who values material goods not for their own sake but for the sake of giving. That is also why fortune is blamed when the most worthy individuals are the least wealthy. And not without reason: 20 one cannot have material goods or anything else without devoting care to getting them.
Still, ⟨a generous man⟩ will not give to the wrong people, at the wrong time, and so forth; for if he did, his actions would no longer be dictated by generosity, and if he spent his money on the wrong things, he would have none to spend on the right ones. For as we have said, a man is generous who spends relative to his property and on the right objects; he who ⟨spends⟩ to excess is extravagant. 25 Therefore, we do not call tyrants or absolute monarchs extravagant, for, it seems, the amounts they give and spend cannot very well be in excess of the amounts they possess.
Now, since generosity is the mean in giving and taking material goods, a generous person will give and spend the right amounts on the right objects, 30 in small and great matters alike, and he will derive pleasure from doing so. Also, he will take the right amounts from the right sources. For since the virtue is a mean both in giving and in taking, he will do both in the proper manner: honest taking goes with honest giving, and any other kind of taking is contrary to it. Now,
1121a
1 ὡς οὔ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνῃ
αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ·
τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ
ὡς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
5 δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ
μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ
μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.
Ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται ἐφ'
οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι φανερώτερον.
10 εἴρηται δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ
ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει·
καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ
λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει,
15 τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς.
τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον
μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει
ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι
εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι
20 τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας
καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν.
ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει,
οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἤ πως
ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ,
25 καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος
τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν
διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διά
τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὃ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὃ δὲ οὐθένα,
30 ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὑτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ
εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο
ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν,
εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ
ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἑτέρωθεν
1 the practices that belong together are found in the same individual, while contrary practices obviously are not. If he should happen to spend his money in a manner other than proper and noble, he will feel pain, but moderately and in the right way; for it is a mark of virtue or excellence to feel pleasure and pain at the right objects and in the right way. Moreover, a generous man is easy to get along with in business matters, 5 for he can be taken advantage of, since he sets no store by material goods and since he feels more vexation at not having made a proper expenditure, than pain at having made a wrong one; he is not a man to Simonides' liking.119
Here, too, an extravagant man goes completely wrong: he feels neither pleasure nor pain at the right objects and in the right manner. This will become more apparent as we go on. 10 We have stated120 that extravagance and stinginess are excesses and deficiencies in two respects, i.e., in giving and in taking, for we classify spending with giving. Extravagance is an excess in giving without taking, but it falls short in taking. Stinginess, on the other hand, is a deficiency in giving and 15 an excess in taking, but only in small matters.
Now, these two aspects of extravagance do not usually go together. For it is not easy for a person to give to all and take from none. Private individuals soon exhaust their property by giving, and it is of private individuals that we think ⟨when we say that a person⟩ is extravagant.121 Still, a man who is extravagant in both senses is thought to be considerably 20 superior to a stingy man: age and poverty easily cure him, and he can attain the median state. He has the qualities requisite for a generous man: he gives and does not take, though he does neither rightly and well. If he were to acquire this practice by habit or by changing in some other way, he would be generous: he will then give to the right people 25 and will not take from the wrong source. That is why he is not regarded as bad in character, for excess in giving and in not taking marks a man as foolish, but not as wicked or ignoble. A man who is extravagant in this fashion seems to be far superior to a stingy person for the reasons mentioned, and also because he is helpful to many people, while a stingy man helps nobody, not even himself.
However, most extravagant people, as we have pointed out, 30 also take from the wrong sources and are, in this respect, stingy. They tend to take because they want to spend, but they are unable to do so with an open hand, since their own resources are soon exhausted. As a result, they are compelled to provide means from elsewhere.
Here, too, an extravagant man goes completely wrong: he feels neither pleasure nor pain at the right objects and in the right manner. This will become more apparent as we go on. 10 We have stated120 that extravagance and stinginess are excesses and deficiencies in two respects, i.e., in giving and in taking, for we classify spending with giving. Extravagance is an excess in giving without taking, but it falls short in taking. Stinginess, on the other hand, is a deficiency in giving and 15 an excess in taking, but only in small matters.
Now, these two aspects of extravagance do not usually go together. For it is not easy for a person to give to all and take from none. Private individuals soon exhaust their property by giving, and it is of private individuals that we think ⟨when we say that a person⟩ is extravagant.121 Still, a man who is extravagant in both senses is thought to be considerably 20 superior to a stingy man: age and poverty easily cure him, and he can attain the median state. He has the qualities requisite for a generous man: he gives and does not take, though he does neither rightly and well. If he were to acquire this practice by habit or by changing in some other way, he would be generous: he will then give to the right people 25 and will not take from the wrong source. That is why he is not regarded as bad in character, for excess in giving and in not taking marks a man as foolish, but not as wicked or ignoble. A man who is extravagant in this fashion seems to be far superior to a stingy person for the reasons mentioned, and also because he is helpful to many people, while a stingy man helps nobody, not even himself.
However, most extravagant people, as we have pointed out, 30 also take from the wrong sources and are, in this respect, stingy. They tend to take because they want to spend, but they are unable to do so with an open hand, since their own resources are soon exhausted. As a result, they are compelled to provide means from elsewhere.
1121b
1 πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως
καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι,
τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι
αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου
5 ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους
ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν,
τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ
ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες
καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς
10 τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος
ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. ἡ δ'
ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός τ' ἐστίν (δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα
ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν), καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
15 τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον
ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν·
πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ
γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς
λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται,
20 καὶ οἳ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἳ δὲ τῇ δόσει
ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις
οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι,
τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν,
οἳ μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν
25 (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μή
ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ
κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς
ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι)· οἳ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται
τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων
30 λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους μή· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ
μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι. οἳ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν
ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ
τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ
πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ.
1 At the same time, their indifference to what is noble makes them take indiscriminately from any and every source. They have an appetite for giving, no matter how or from what source. For that reason, their gifts are not even generous. Their gifts are not noble, they are not given because it is noble to give, 5 and they are not given in the right way. On the contrary, persons of this sort sometimes make wealthy those who ought to be poor; they would give nothing to people of respectable character but much to those who flatter them or provide them with other kinds of pleasure. Hence, most of them are also self-indulgent: 10 they are easy spenders and squander their money to indulge themselves. They incline toward pleasure, since their lives are not oriented toward what is noble.
This is what an extravagant man will develop into if left unschooled, but if he receives proper care he may attain the median, the right state. But stinginess is incurable and more deeply ingrained in men 15 than extravagance, for we can see that old age and any kind of disability can make men stingy. Most people love to hang on to material goods rather than to give them away. Moreover, stinginess reaches far and takes many forms, for there seem to be many kinds of it.
There are two aspects to stinginess: deficiency in giving and excess in taking. This means that it is not found in its entirety in all men, but is sometimes divided, 20 so that some exceed in taking while others fall short in giving. Names such as "miser," "niggard," "penny-pincher," are all used of people who fall short in giving but do not covet or wish to take what belongs to another. Some are motivated by a sense of honesty and have scruples against acting basely—for 25 there are those who seem (or, at any rate, profess) to keep what they have in order to avoid being compelled to do something base. Here belongs the skinflint and everyone like him who gets his name from his excessive reluctance to give anything. Some do not touch another man's property through fear, in the belief that it is not easy to take what belongs to another 30 while at the same time preventing others from taking what belongs to oneself. Accordingly, they are satisfied neither to take nor to give.
Still others exceed in taking in that they take anything from any source; such, for example, are those who follow occupations not fit for free men, such as pimps and all their ilk, and usurers who lend small sums at high interest.
This is what an extravagant man will develop into if left unschooled, but if he receives proper care he may attain the median, the right state. But stinginess is incurable and more deeply ingrained in men 15 than extravagance, for we can see that old age and any kind of disability can make men stingy. Most people love to hang on to material goods rather than to give them away. Moreover, stinginess reaches far and takes many forms, for there seem to be many kinds of it.
There are two aspects to stinginess: deficiency in giving and excess in taking. This means that it is not found in its entirety in all men, but is sometimes divided, 20 so that some exceed in taking while others fall short in giving. Names such as "miser," "niggard," "penny-pincher," are all used of people who fall short in giving but do not covet or wish to take what belongs to another. Some are motivated by a sense of honesty and have scruples against acting basely—for 25 there are those who seem (or, at any rate, profess) to keep what they have in order to avoid being compelled to do something base. Here belongs the skinflint and everyone like him who gets his name from his excessive reluctance to give anything. Some do not touch another man's property through fear, in the belief that it is not easy to take what belongs to another 30 while at the same time preventing others from taking what belongs to oneself. Accordingly, they are satisfied neither to take nor to give.
Still others exceed in taking in that they take anything from any source; such, for example, are those who follow occupations not fit for free men, such as pimps and all their ilk, and usurers who lend small sums at high interest.
1122a
1 πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ.
κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ
ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς
γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἃ δεῖ, οὐ
5 λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας
καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ
ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ λῃστὴς
τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα
ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ
10 οἳ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἳ δ' ἀπὸ
τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν
οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ
τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι
ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς
15 ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν
ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.
1 All these people take from the wrong sources and more than they should. What they have in common is clearly the motive of profiteering, for they all endure notoriety for the sake of profit, and small profit at that. 5 But those who take the wrong things from the wrong source on a large scale, such as tyrants who sack cities and plunder temples, are not called "stingy" or "mean" but "wicked," "impious," and "unjust." However, gamblers and highwaymen122 are classified as stingy and mean, for they are profiteers in that both ply their trade and endure notoriety for the sake of profit, 10 the one taking the greatest risks to get booty, and the other to make a profit at the expense of his friends to whom he ought to give. Now, since both wish to gain profit from the wrong sources, they are profiteers, and all such ways of taking are stingy and mean.
It is with good reason that stinginess is said to be the opposite of generosity. For not only is it a greater evil than extravagance, 15 but people are more prone to go wrong in following it than in following extravagance as we have described it.123 So much for generosity and the vices opposed to it.
It is with good reason that stinginess is said to be the opposite of generosity. For not only is it a greater evil than extravagance, 15 but people are more prone to go wrong in following it than in following extravagance as we have described it.123 So much for generosity and the vices opposed to it.
Book 4,Chapter 2 (1122a18–1123a33)
Δόξαι δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας
διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι·
20 οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν
χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν
τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ
τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν.
τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ
25 καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ
περὶ ὅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν
οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ "πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ,"
ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος,
ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς
30 τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται,
ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται,
οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς
οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν
ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ
35 δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ
It seems logical to discuss magnificence124 next, for it, too, is evidently a virtue concerned with material goods. 20 However, unlike generosity, which covers all actions involving material goods, magnificence is confined to those that involve spending, but in these it surpasses generosity in scale. For, as the very name suggests, it is a "suitable" expenditure on a "grand" scale. Now, a scale is relative: the expense of equipping a trireme is not the same 25 as that of heading a sacred embassy.125 What is suitable is, then, relative to the person, the circumstances, and the object. A man who, like the proverbial "to many a wanderer did I give,"126 spends appropriate amounts on insignificant or only moderately important occasions is not called magnificent. But he is if he does so on important occasions. A magnificent man is generous, but that does not mean that a generous man is magnificent. 30 The deficiency of this characteristic is called niggardliness and its excess vulgarity, gaudiness, and the like; it is an excess that does not consist in too great an amount spent on a proper object, but in putting on a showy display on the wrong occasions and in the wrong manner. We shall discuss them later.
A magnificent man is like a skilled artist: he has the capacity to observe what is suitable 35 and to spend large sums with good taste. For
A magnificent man is like a skilled artist: he has the capacity to observe what is suitable 35 and to spend large sums with good taste. For
1122b
1 γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ
ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ
πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα
δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης
5 ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.
δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ
ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ
προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον
καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ
10 πῶς ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ
εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς
δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης
τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ
15 ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον
τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ
γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν)·
καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή, μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει.
Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ
20 περὶ θεούς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν
εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς
ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ἅπασι δ'
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς
25 ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ
μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ
πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν
πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ
τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει
30 δὲ [καὶ] οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν
προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς
ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει
καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ
ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ
35 εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότατα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα
1 as we said at the outset,127 a characteristic is defined by its activities and by its objects. Therefore, the expenses of a magnificent man are great and suitable, and so are, consequently, the results which he produces. For ⟨only⟩ in this way will the expenditure be great and suited to the result. 5 Accordingly, a result must be worth the expense and the expense worth the result or even exceed the result. A magnificent man will spend amounts of this kind because it is noble to do so; for this motive is common to all the virtues. Moreover, he will spend with pleasure and with a free hand, for exact bookkeeping is niggardly. He will try to find out how to achieve the most noble and suitable result rather than how much it will cost him 10 and how it can be done most cheaply. Therefore, a magnificent man will necessarily also be generous. A generous man, too, will spend the right amount in the right manner, but in spending the right amount in the right manner—the sphere of generosity—the "grand" of a *magnificent man*,128 his greatness, will come to the fore: at the same expense he will achieve a more magnificent result. For the excellence of a possession is not the same 15 as the excellence of a result achieved. The most valued possession is the most costly, such as gold, but the most valued achievement or result is one that is great and noble: to look at it will be to admire it, and what is magnificent is admirable. In other words, the excellence or virtue of a result achieved, i.e., its magnificence, consists in greatness.
Magnificence involves expenditures which we call honorable, e.g., 20 expenditures on the worship of the gods—votive offerings, buildings, and sacrifices—and similarly on the various forms of worshiping the lesser divinities, and on public enterprises which people ambitiously vie with one another to undertake, as, for example, when they think they should equip a chorus or a trireme or give a feast for the city in a brilliant fashion. But in all these cases, as we have said,129 we must also take account of who the agent 25 is and what his resources are, for the expenditure must be in keeping with that and must be suited not only to the result achieved but also to the spender. That is why a poor man is unlikely to be magnificent; for he does not have the means for a suitable expenditure of large sums. If he tries ⟨to spend large sums⟩, he is a fool; for he spends more than he can afford or ought to spend, whereas virtuous spending is right spending. 30 But such expenditure is suited to persons who have the requisite means either by dint of their own effort or from their ancestors or their connections. It is suited to persons of high birth and reputation, and so forth, since all these qualities carry greatness and prestige. Such a man, above all, is magnificent, and, as we have said, 35 magnificence consists in expenditures of this kind; for they are the greatest and most honorable. In private affairs, magnificence is shown in those expenditures
Magnificence involves expenditures which we call honorable, e.g., 20 expenditures on the worship of the gods—votive offerings, buildings, and sacrifices—and similarly on the various forms of worshiping the lesser divinities, and on public enterprises which people ambitiously vie with one another to undertake, as, for example, when they think they should equip a chorus or a trireme or give a feast for the city in a brilliant fashion. But in all these cases, as we have said,129 we must also take account of who the agent 25 is and what his resources are, for the expenditure must be in keeping with that and must be suited not only to the result achieved but also to the spender. That is why a poor man is unlikely to be magnificent; for he does not have the means for a suitable expenditure of large sums. If he tries ⟨to spend large sums⟩, he is a fool; for he spends more than he can afford or ought to spend, whereas virtuous spending is right spending. 30 But such expenditure is suited to persons who have the requisite means either by dint of their own effort or from their ancestors or their connections. It is suited to persons of high birth and reputation, and so forth, since all these qualities carry greatness and prestige. Such a man, above all, is magnificent, and, as we have said, 35 magnificence consists in expenditures of this kind; for they are the greatest and most honorable. In private affairs, magnificence is shown in those expenditures
1123a
1 εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί
τι ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ
ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς·
οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ'
5 εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον.
μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως
τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα
γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει
10 θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ
τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον
<ἁπλῶς> μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ
ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ
δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλοπρέπειαν
15 ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ
ἀνελεύθερον· διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ
γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐπέρβλητον)
καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν
ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ
20 παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν
γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ
λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν,
καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων,
ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ
25 καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ
ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι,
ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς
περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν
μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ
30 σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος,
καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις
αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ
τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.
1 which are made only once—e.g., a wedding and the like, and anything of interest to the whole city or to eminent people—and also in receiving and taking leave of foreign guests and in exchanging gifts. For a man is magnificent not when he spends on himself, 5 but when he spends for the common good. There is a similarity between gifts and votive offerings. It is also typical of a magnificent man to furnish his house commensurate with his wealth—for it, too, is a kind of ornament—and to prefer spending his money on works that endure, since they are the noblest; in each particular case he will spend an amount suited to the occasion. For the same thing is not fit for 10 both gods and men, and what suits a temple does not suit a tomb. Now, the greatness of expenditure depends on its kind. The most magnificent absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, the most magnificent in a particular case is great expenditure for that particular object; moreover, greatness in the result achieved is different from greatness in expenditure. The most beautiful ball or oil flask is magnificent 15 as a gift for a child, though its price is small and far from generous. From all this it follows that a magnificent man is characterized by achieving his results, of whatever kind they may be, magnificently—for such results cannot easily be surpassed—and in a manner worth the expenditure.
Such, then, is the magnificent man. His opposite on the side of excess is the vulgar man who, as we said,130 20 exceeds in spending more money than he should. He spends much where small expenditures are called for and makes an improper show of himself. He gives a dinner to his club on the scale of a wedding banquet, and when he defrays the expenses of a comic chorus, he makes them enter the theater in purple, as they do at Megara.131 He will do all kinds of similar things, 25 not for a noble motive, but to show off his wealth, and in the belief that he will be admired for doing so. Where he ought to spend much money he spends little, and where little he spends much.
A niggardly person, on the other hand, will fall short in every respect. After spending tremendous sums, he will for a trifle spoil the beauty of his achievement. In everything he does he will hestitate 30 and try to find ways of economizing. He will grumble about spending the little that he does, thinking that he is doing everything on a greater scale than he ought. Accordingly, these characteristics are vices, yet they do not bring reproach upon a person because they are neither harmful to one's neighbor nor excessively unseemly.
Such, then, is the magnificent man. His opposite on the side of excess is the vulgar man who, as we said,130 20 exceeds in spending more money than he should. He spends much where small expenditures are called for and makes an improper show of himself. He gives a dinner to his club on the scale of a wedding banquet, and when he defrays the expenses of a comic chorus, he makes them enter the theater in purple, as they do at Megara.131 He will do all kinds of similar things, 25 not for a noble motive, but to show off his wealth, and in the belief that he will be admired for doing so. Where he ought to spend much money he spends little, and where little he spends much.
A niggardly person, on the other hand, will fall short in every respect. After spending tremendous sums, he will for a trifle spoil the beauty of his achievement. In everything he does he will hestitate 30 and try to find ways of economizing. He will grumble about spending the little that he does, thinking that he is doing everything on a greater scale than he ought. Accordingly, these characteristics are vices, yet they do not bring reproach upon a person because they are neither harmful to one's neighbor nor excessively unseemly.
Book 4,Chapter 3 (1123a34–1125a35)
Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος
35 ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν· διαφέρει
High-mindedness, as its very name suggests,132 seems to be concerned with great and lofty matters. 35 Let us take the nature of these matters as the first point of our discussion.
1123b
1 δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ
δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· ὁ
γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος.
5 ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος
δ' οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ
τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι,
καλοὶ δ' οὔ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν
χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων
10 ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν
τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ
μάλιστ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ
μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει
ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὑτὸν
15 ἀξιοῖ· οἳ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὴ μεγάλων
ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ
ἓν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη. ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά·
μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ
μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
20 ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς
ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ
τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,
κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
25 καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς
ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ
δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.
τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ
30 δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα.
οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι,
οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα;
καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ
μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος
35 φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται
1 It makes no difference whether we investigate the characteristic or the man who is characterized by it. A man is regarded as high-minded when he thinks he deserves great things and actually deserves them; one who thinks he deserves them but does not is a fool, and no man, insofar as he is virtuous, is either foolish or senseless. This then is the description of a high-minded man. 5 A person who deserves little and thinks he deserves little is not high-minded, but is a man who knows his limitations.133 For high-mindedness implies greatness, just as beauty implies stature in body: small people may have charm and proportion but not beauty.134 A man who thinks he deserves great things but does not deserve them is vain, though not everybody who overestimates himself is vain. 10 One who underestimates himself is small-minded135 regardless of whether his actual worth is great or moderate, or whether it is small and he thinks that it is smaller still. A man of great deserts, it would seem, is most ⟨liable to be small-minded⟩, for what would he do if his deserts were not as great as they are? Thus, measured by the standard of greatness, the high-minded man is an extreme, but by the standard of what is right he occupies the median; for his claims correspond to his deserts, 15 whereas the others exceed or fall short.
Accordingly, if a high-minded man thinks he deserves and actually does deserve great things, especially the greatest, there is one matter that will be his major concern. "Deserts" is a relative term that refers to external goods; and as the greatest external good, we may posit that which we pay as a tribute to the gods, for which eminent people strive most, and which is the prize for the noblest achievements. 20 Honor fits that description, for it is the greatest of external goods. Consequently, it is in matters of honor and dishonor that a high-minded man has the right attitude. It is an obvious fact, and need not be argued, that the high-minded are concerned with honor. For they regard themselves as worthy of honor above all else, but of an honor that they deserve. A small-minded man falls short both in view of his own deserts and in relation to the claims of a high-minded person, 25 while a vain man exceeds his own deserts but does not exceed the high-minded.
This means that the high-minded man, inasmuch as he deserves what is greatest, is the best. For the deserts of the better man are always greater, and those of the best man the greatest. It follows that a truly high-minded man must be good. 30 And what is great in each virtue would seem to be the mark of a high-minded person. It would be quite out of character for him to run away in battle with arms swinging or to do wrong to anyone. For what motive does he have to act basely, he to whom nothing is great? If we were to examine ⟨his qualities⟩ one by one, we should see the utter absurdity of thinking of a high-minded man as being anything but good. 35 If he were base, he would not even deserve honor, for honor is the prize of excellence and virtue,
Accordingly, if a high-minded man thinks he deserves and actually does deserve great things, especially the greatest, there is one matter that will be his major concern. "Deserts" is a relative term that refers to external goods; and as the greatest external good, we may posit that which we pay as a tribute to the gods, for which eminent people strive most, and which is the prize for the noblest achievements. 20 Honor fits that description, for it is the greatest of external goods. Consequently, it is in matters of honor and dishonor that a high-minded man has the right attitude. It is an obvious fact, and need not be argued, that the high-minded are concerned with honor. For they regard themselves as worthy of honor above all else, but of an honor that they deserve. A small-minded man falls short both in view of his own deserts and in relation to the claims of a high-minded person, 25 while a vain man exceeds his own deserts but does not exceed the high-minded.
This means that the high-minded man, inasmuch as he deserves what is greatest, is the best. For the deserts of the better man are always greater, and those of the best man the greatest. It follows that a truly high-minded man must be good. 30 And what is great in each virtue would seem to be the mark of a high-minded person. It would be quite out of character for him to run away in battle with arms swinging or to do wrong to anyone. For what motive does he have to act basely, he to whom nothing is great? If we were to examine ⟨his qualities⟩ one by one, we should see the utter absurdity of thinking of a high-minded man as being anything but good. 35 If he were base, he would not even deserve honor, for honor is the prize of excellence and virtue,
1124a
1 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος
τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται
ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. μάλιστα
5 μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι· καὶ
ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως
ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς
γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν·
10 τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει·
οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ
γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ
πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν
15 μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς
ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει
ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν
τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν
βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα.
20 διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα
συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται
τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ
γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν·
25 κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ δ' ἄμφω
ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν
οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς
παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ
30 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ
ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ
1 and it is reserved as a tribute to the good. High-mindedness thus is the crown, as it were, of the virtues: it magnifies them and it cannot exist without them. Therefore, it is hard to be truly high-minded and, in fact, impossible without goodness and nobility.136
A 5 high-minded man is, then, primarily concerned with honor and dishonor. From great honors and those that good men confer upon him he will derive a moderate amount of pleasure, convinced that he is only getting what is properly his or even less. For no honor can be worthy of perfect virtue. Yet he will accept it, because they have no greater tribute to pay to him. 10 But he will utterly despise honors conferred by ordinary people and on trivial grounds, for that is not what he deserves. Similarly, he will despise dishonor, for no dishonor can be justified in his case. A high-minded man, as we have stated, is concerned primarily with honors. But he will of course also have a moderate attitude toward wealth, power, and every manner of good or bad luck that may befall him. 15 He will not be overjoyed when his luck is good, nor will bad luck be very painful to him. For even toward honor, his attitude is that it is not of the greatest moment. Power and wealth are desirable for the honor they bring; at any rate, those who have them wish to gain honor through them. But a person who attaches little importance even to honor will also attach little importance to power and wealth. 20 As a result, he is regarded as haughty.
Gifts of fortune, it is believed, also contribute to high-mindedness. Men of noble birth, of power, or of wealth are regarded as worthy of honor, since they occupy a superior position, and whatever is superior in goodness is held in greater honor. That is why the gifts of fortune make men more high-minded, for they are honored by some people ⟨for having them⟩. 25 But in truth it is the good man alone that ought to be honored, though a man who has both excellence and good fortune is regarded as still more worthy of honor. Whoever possesses the goods of fortune without possessing excellence or virtue is not justified in claiming great deserts for himself, nor is it correct to call him high-minded, for neither is possible without perfect virtue. Their good fortune notwithstanding, 30 such people become haughty and arrogant, for without virtue it is not easy to bear the gifts of fortune gracefully.
A 5 high-minded man is, then, primarily concerned with honor and dishonor. From great honors and those that good men confer upon him he will derive a moderate amount of pleasure, convinced that he is only getting what is properly his or even less. For no honor can be worthy of perfect virtue. Yet he will accept it, because they have no greater tribute to pay to him. 10 But he will utterly despise honors conferred by ordinary people and on trivial grounds, for that is not what he deserves. Similarly, he will despise dishonor, for no dishonor can be justified in his case. A high-minded man, as we have stated, is concerned primarily with honors. But he will of course also have a moderate attitude toward wealth, power, and every manner of good or bad luck that may befall him. 15 He will not be overjoyed when his luck is good, nor will bad luck be very painful to him. For even toward honor, his attitude is that it is not of the greatest moment. Power and wealth are desirable for the honor they bring; at any rate, those who have them wish to gain honor through them. But a person who attaches little importance even to honor will also attach little importance to power and wealth. 20 As a result, he is regarded as haughty.
Gifts of fortune, it is believed, also contribute to high-mindedness. Men of noble birth, of power, or of wealth are regarded as worthy of honor, since they occupy a superior position, and whatever is superior in goodness is held in greater honor. That is why the gifts of fortune make men more high-minded, for they are honored by some people ⟨for having them⟩. 25 But in truth it is the good man alone that ought to be honored, though a man who has both excellence and good fortune is regarded as still more worthy of honor. Whoever possesses the goods of fortune without possessing excellence or virtue is not justified in claiming great deserts for himself, nor is it correct to call him high-minded, for neither is possible without perfect virtue. Their good fortune notwithstanding, 30 such people become haughty and arrogant, for without virtue it is not easy to bear the gifts of fortune gracefully.
1124b
1 φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν,
αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται
γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν
οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι
5 δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ
(δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ
ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν,
μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίου ὡς
οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος
10 δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου.
καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει
ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν
οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ (ἐλάττων
γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν), καὶ
15 τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ
λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ
μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς
μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ
20 τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ
σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ
ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς
ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν
ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου
25 τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων
δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῆ εἶναι καὶ
φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου, καὶ ἀμελεῖν
τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν
φανερῶς (παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι,
30 καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν [εἰρωνεία δὲ]
πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν
1 Unable to bear them and considering themselves superior, they look down upon others, while they themselves do whatever they please. They imitate the high-minded man wherever they can, but they are not really like him. Thus, they look down upon others, but they do not act in conformity with excellence. 5 A high-minded person is justified in looking down upon others for he has the right opinion of them, but the common run of people do so without rhyme or reason.
A high-minded man does not take small risks and, since there are only a few things which he honors, he is not even fond of risks. But he will face great risks, and in the midst of them he will not spare his life, aware that life at any cost is not worth having. He is the kind of man who will do good, 10 but who is ashamed to accept a good turn, because the former marks a man as superior, the latter as inferior. Moreover, he will requite good with a greater good, for in this way he will not only repay the original benefactor but put him in his debt at the same time by making him the recipient of an added benefit. The high-minded also seem to remember the good turns they have done, but not those they have received. For the recipient is inferior to the benefactor, whereas a high-minded man wishes to be superior. 15 They listen with pleasure to what good they have done, but with displeasure to what good they have received. That is apparently why Thetis does not mention the good turns she had done to Zeus,137 and why the Spartans did not mention theirs to the Athenians,138 but only the good they had received. It is, further, typical of a high-minded man not to ask for any favors, or only reluctantly, but to offer aid readily. He will show his stature in his relations with men of eminence and fortune, 20 but will be unassuming toward those of moderate means. For to be superior to the former is difficult and dignified, but superiority over the latter is easy. Furthermore, there is nothing ignoble in asserting one's dignity among the great, but to do so among the lower classes is just as crude as to assert one's strength against an invalid. He will not go in for pursuits that the common people value, nor for those in which the first place belongs to others. He is slow to act and procrastinates, 25 except when some great honor or achievement is at stake. His actions are few, but they are great and distinguished. He must be open in hate and open in love, for to hide one's feelings and to care more for the opinion of others than for truth is a sign of timidity. He speaks and acts openly: 30 since he looks down upon others his speech is free and truthful, except when he deliberately depreciates himself in addressing the common run of people. He cannot adjust his life to another,
A high-minded man does not take small risks and, since there are only a few things which he honors, he is not even fond of risks. But he will face great risks, and in the midst of them he will not spare his life, aware that life at any cost is not worth having. He is the kind of man who will do good, 10 but who is ashamed to accept a good turn, because the former marks a man as superior, the latter as inferior. Moreover, he will requite good with a greater good, for in this way he will not only repay the original benefactor but put him in his debt at the same time by making him the recipient of an added benefit. The high-minded also seem to remember the good turns they have done, but not those they have received. For the recipient is inferior to the benefactor, whereas a high-minded man wishes to be superior. 15 They listen with pleasure to what good they have done, but with displeasure to what good they have received. That is apparently why Thetis does not mention the good turns she had done to Zeus,137 and why the Spartans did not mention theirs to the Athenians,138 but only the good they had received. It is, further, typical of a high-minded man not to ask for any favors, or only reluctantly, but to offer aid readily. He will show his stature in his relations with men of eminence and fortune, 20 but will be unassuming toward those of moderate means. For to be superior to the former is difficult and dignified, but superiority over the latter is easy. Furthermore, there is nothing ignoble in asserting one's dignity among the great, but to do so among the lower classes is just as crude as to assert one's strength against an invalid. He will not go in for pursuits that the common people value, nor for those in which the first place belongs to others. He is slow to act and procrastinates, 25 except when some great honor or achievement is at stake. His actions are few, but they are great and distinguished. He must be open in hate and open in love, for to hide one's feelings and to care more for the opinion of others than for truth is a sign of timidity. He speaks and acts openly: 30 since he looks down upon others his speech is free and truthful, except when he deliberately depreciates himself in addressing the common run of people. He cannot adjust his life to another,
1125a
1 ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες
θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός·
οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ
μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ
5 μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὑτοῦ
ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει
αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός
ἐστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι'
ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς
10 καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα.
καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν
καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κίνησις
δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ
βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα
15 σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία
καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος·
ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ
κακοποιοί εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος
20 ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε
κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν
γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν·
25 ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ
τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι
ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι
ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ
ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται·
30 καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ
βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα καὶ φανερὰ εἶναι αὑτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι
περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ
μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ
γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία
35 περὶ τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
1 except a friend, for to do so is slavish. That is, ⟨by the way,⟩ why all flatterers are servile and people from the lower classes are flatterers. He is not given to admiration, for nothing is great to him. He bears no grudges, for it is not typical of a high-minded man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, 5 but rather to overlook them. He is not a gossip, for he will talk neither about himself nor about others, since he is not interested in hearing himself praised or others run down. Nor again is he given to praise; and for the same reason he does not speak evil of others, not even of his enemies, except to scorn them. When he encounters misfortunes that are unavoidable or insignificant, he will not lament and ask for help. 10 That kind of attitude belongs to someone who takes such matters seriously. He is a person who will rather possess beautiful and profitless objects than objects which are profitable and useful, for they mark him more as self-sufficient.
Further, we think of a slow gait as characteristic of a high-minded man, a deep voice, and a deliberate way of speaking. For a man who takes few things seriously is unlikely to be in a hurry, 15 and a person who regards nothing as great is not one to be excitable. But a shrill voice and a swift gait are due to hurry and excitement.
Such, then, is the high-minded man. A man who falls short is small-minded, and one who exceeds is vain. Now here, too,139 these people are not considered to be bad—for they are not evildoers—but only mistaken. 20 For a small-minded man deprives himself of the good he deserves. What seems to be bad about him is due to the fact that he does not think he deserves good things and that he does not know himself; if he did, he would desire what he deserves, especially since it is good. It is not that such people are regarded as foolish, but rather ⟨that they are looked upon⟩ as retiring. However, a reputation of this sort seems to make them even worse. 25 For while any given kind of man strives to get what he deserves, these people keep aloof even from noble actions and pursuits and from external goods as well, because they consider themselves undeserving.
Vain people, on the other hand, are fools and do not know themselves, and they show it openly. They take in hand honorable enterprises of which they are not worthy, and then they are found out. 30 They deck themselves out with clothes and showy gear and that sort of thing, and wish to publicize what fortune has given them. They talk about their good fortune in the belief that that will bring them honor.
Small-mindedness is more opposed to high-mindedness than vanity is, for it occurs more frequently and is worse. Thus, as we have said,140 35 high-mindedness is concerned with high honors.
Further, we think of a slow gait as characteristic of a high-minded man, a deep voice, and a deliberate way of speaking. For a man who takes few things seriously is unlikely to be in a hurry, 15 and a person who regards nothing as great is not one to be excitable. But a shrill voice and a swift gait are due to hurry and excitement.
Such, then, is the high-minded man. A man who falls short is small-minded, and one who exceeds is vain. Now here, too,139 these people are not considered to be bad—for they are not evildoers—but only mistaken. 20 For a small-minded man deprives himself of the good he deserves. What seems to be bad about him is due to the fact that he does not think he deserves good things and that he does not know himself; if he did, he would desire what he deserves, especially since it is good. It is not that such people are regarded as foolish, but rather ⟨that they are looked upon⟩ as retiring. However, a reputation of this sort seems to make them even worse. 25 For while any given kind of man strives to get what he deserves, these people keep aloof even from noble actions and pursuits and from external goods as well, because they consider themselves undeserving.
Vain people, on the other hand, are fools and do not know themselves, and they show it openly. They take in hand honorable enterprises of which they are not worthy, and then they are found out. 30 They deck themselves out with clothes and showy gear and that sort of thing, and wish to publicize what fortune has given them. They talk about their good fortune in the belief that that will bring them honor.
Small-mindedness is more opposed to high-mindedness than vanity is, for it occurs more frequently and is worse. Thus, as we have said,140 35 high-mindedness is concerned with high honors.
Book 4,Chapter 4 (1125b1–25)
1125b
1 Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν
τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς
τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν.
ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι,
5 περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ·
ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἔστι καὶ
ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ
μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τόν τε
γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ
10 τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς
καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον
ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον
ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν.
δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ
15 ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες
μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον
ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν
ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
20 δεῖ καὶ ἧττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις
αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς
μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν
φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ'
εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ'
25 οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.
1 There seems to be a virtue, also in the sphere of honor, which, as we stated when we first broached the subject,141 is believed to be as closely related to high-mindedness as generosity is to magnificence. Neither this virtue nor generosity operates on a grand scale, 5 and both give us the proper disposition in matters of moderate or small importance. Just as there is a mean, an excess, and a deficiency in taking and in giving material goods, so too can we desire honor more than we should and less than we should, and from the right source and in the right manner. We blame an ambitious man for striving for honor more than he should and for trying to get it from the wrong sources; 10 and we blame an unambitious man for deliberately desiring not to be honored even for noble achievements. However, occasionally we praise the ambitious as manly and as fond of what is noble and the unambitious as moderate and self-controlled, as we said when we first discussed the subject.142 But since "fond" of something is clearly used in more senses than one, 15 we do not always apply the term "fond of honor" or "ambitious" to the same thing. As a term of praise it means "fonder of honor than most people," and as a term of blame "fonder of honor than one ought to be." As there is no name for the mean, the extremes dispute for its possession as for an unclaimed inheritance, as it were. But where there is excess and deficiency there is also a median. Men desire honor both more than they should and less; 20 therefore, it must also be possible to desire it to the right degree. It is this characteristic which is praised, a nameless characteristic that constitutes the mean in the sphere of honor. In comparison with ambition it appears like lack of ambition, in comparison with lack of ambition like ambition, and in comparison with both it somehow looks like both at once. The same seems to be true also of the other virtues. But in this case the men at the extremes are seen only in their opposition to one another, 25 because the man who occupies the median position does not have a name.
Book 4,Chapter 5 (1125b26–1126b10)
Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος
τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν
πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον
οὖσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἄν.
30 τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ
διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος,
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος
δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται
γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους,
35 ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ
Gentleness is the mean in feelings of anger. Although there is no name for the *person* occupying the median position and hardly even for the extremes, we apply the term "gentleness" to the median, despite the fact that it inclines toward the deficiency, which has no name, either. The excess may be called something like "short temper." 30 For the emotion is a feeling of anger,143 which is brought about by many different factors.
Now, a man is praised for being angry under the right circumstances and with the right people, and also in the right manner, at the right time, and for the right length of time. He may be ⟨termed⟩ gentle, since gentleness is used as a term of praise. For being gentle means to be unruffled and not to be driven by emotion, 35 but to be angry only under such circumstances and for as long a time as reason may bid.
Now, a man is praised for being angry under the right circumstances and with the right people, and also in the right manner, at the right time, and for the right length of time. He may be ⟨termed⟩ gentle, since gentleness is used as a term of praise. For being gentle means to be unruffled and not to be driven by emotion, 35 but to be angry only under such circumstances and for as long a time as reason may bid.
1126a
1 τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν· ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον
ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν
εἴθ' ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς
5 δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ'
οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός
τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον
ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἡ δ'
ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται (καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ,
10 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω
χρόνον), οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον
ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν
ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
15 δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει
δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ'
ἀνταποδιδόασιν ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ' ἀποπαύονται.
ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς
πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ
20 δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ
τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ
τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.
τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς
εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι
25 τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι
καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς
τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω
χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.
τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ
30 γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι·
καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον
χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει.
35 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ
τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας
1 But he seems to be more prone to going wrong in the direction of deficiency: a gentle person is forgiving rather than vindictive.
The deficiency, whether it is a kind of apathy or whatever else it may be, receives blame. For those who do not show anger at things that ought to arouse anger 5 are regarded as fools; so, too, if they do not show anger in the right way, at the right time, or at the right person. Such people seem to have no feelings, not even for pain; they do not seem to rise to their own defense, since they do not show anger; but to let one's own character be smeared and to put up with insults to those near and dear to him is slavish.
In all these points, excess is also possible. Anger can be shown against the wrong persons, 10 under the wrong circumstances, to an improper degree, too quickly, and for an unduly long time. Yet these factors are not all found in the same person. That would be impossible, for evil destroys even itself, and when it is present in its entirety it becomes unbearable. Short-tempered people are quick to be angered at the wrong people, under the wrong circumstances, and more than is right, 15 but they get over it quickly, and that is their best quality. What happens to them is that they do not restrain their feeling of anger, but quick as they are they retaliate in an open way and then have done with it. Choleric people are excessively quick and short-tempered about everything and on every occasion, hence their name.144 20 Sullen people are hard to appease and their anger lasts for a long time, since they repress their passion. But once they retaliate, they are relieved; for revenge puts an end to their anger and engenders pleasure in place of the pain. If that does not happen, they go on carrying their burden. Since it does not appear on the surface, no one reasons them out of it, and 25 to digest one's anger in oneself takes time. Such men are very troublesome to themselves and to their closest friends. "Bad-tempered" we call those who show anger under the wrong circumstances, to an improper degree, and for too long a time, and those who cannot be reconciled without exacting their revenge or punishment.
We regard the excess as more opposed to gentleness than the deficiency. In the first place, 30 it is much more common, for it is more human to seek revenge. Secondly, bad-tempered people are worse to live with.
Our present discussion corroborates the point we made earlier:145 it is not easy to determine in what manner, with what person, on what occasion, and for how long a time one ought to be angry, and at what point right action ends and wrong action begins. 35 We do not blame a man for straying a little either toward the more or toward the less. Sometimes we praise those who are deficient in anger
The deficiency, whether it is a kind of apathy or whatever else it may be, receives blame. For those who do not show anger at things that ought to arouse anger 5 are regarded as fools; so, too, if they do not show anger in the right way, at the right time, or at the right person. Such people seem to have no feelings, not even for pain; they do not seem to rise to their own defense, since they do not show anger; but to let one's own character be smeared and to put up with insults to those near and dear to him is slavish.
In all these points, excess is also possible. Anger can be shown against the wrong persons, 10 under the wrong circumstances, to an improper degree, too quickly, and for an unduly long time. Yet these factors are not all found in the same person. That would be impossible, for evil destroys even itself, and when it is present in its entirety it becomes unbearable. Short-tempered people are quick to be angered at the wrong people, under the wrong circumstances, and more than is right, 15 but they get over it quickly, and that is their best quality. What happens to them is that they do not restrain their feeling of anger, but quick as they are they retaliate in an open way and then have done with it. Choleric people are excessively quick and short-tempered about everything and on every occasion, hence their name.144 20 Sullen people are hard to appease and their anger lasts for a long time, since they repress their passion. But once they retaliate, they are relieved; for revenge puts an end to their anger and engenders pleasure in place of the pain. If that does not happen, they go on carrying their burden. Since it does not appear on the surface, no one reasons them out of it, and 25 to digest one's anger in oneself takes time. Such men are very troublesome to themselves and to their closest friends. "Bad-tempered" we call those who show anger under the wrong circumstances, to an improper degree, and for too long a time, and those who cannot be reconciled without exacting their revenge or punishment.
We regard the excess as more opposed to gentleness than the deficiency. In the first place, 30 it is much more common, for it is more human to seek revenge. Secondly, bad-tempered people are worse to live with.
Our present discussion corroborates the point we made earlier:145 it is not easy to determine in what manner, with what person, on what occasion, and for how long a time one ought to be angry, and at what point right action ends and wrong action begins. 35 We do not blame a man for straying a little either toward the more or toward the less. Sometimes we praise those who are deficient in anger
1126b
1 ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις
ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων
ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
καθ' ἕκαστα κἀν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον
5 δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,
αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν
γινόμεναι ἠρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν
10 περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.
1 and call them gentle, and sometimes we praise the angry as manly and regard them as capable of ruling. Therefore, it is not easy to give a formula how far and in what manner a man may stray before he deserves blame, for the decision depends on the particular circumstances and on our ⟨moral⟩ sense. 5 But this much is clear: what deserves praise is the median characteristic that makes us show anger at the right people, on the right occasions, in the right manner, and so forth, while the extremes and deficiencies deserve blame: slight blame for small deviations, more blame for greater deviations, and very severe blame for very great deviations. Thus, it is clear that we must hold fast to the median characteristic. 10 So much for the characteristics concerned with feelings of anger.
Book 4,Chapter 6 (1126b11–1127a12)
Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ
πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἳ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα
πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι
δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις
15 πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φροντίζοντες
δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ
εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση
τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέξεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ
20 τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ. τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν
μέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ
στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ
πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ
ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος
25 εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις
καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει·
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν,
οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει,
ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάσεται
30 τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας· τούτων δ' ὅσας
μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ,
καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· κἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην
φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἡ δ' ἐναντίωσις
35 μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ.
διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι,
In social relations, in living together, and in associating with our fellow men in conversation and business, there are people whom we regard as obsequious. They praise you just to give you pleasure, never object to anything, and think that they must avoid giving pain to those they meet. Their opposites, 15 who object to everything without caring in the least whether they give pain, are called grouchy and quarrelsome.
That the characteristics just described deserve blame is clear enough, and so is the fact that the middle position between them deserves praise, i.e., the position of a man who will put up with—and likewise refuse to put up with—the right things in the right manner. No name has been given to this characteristic, 20 but it bears the greatest resemblance to friendship.146
For a man who conforms to the intermediate characteristic is the kind of person we mean when we speak of a "good friend,"
though "friend" also involves affection.
This characteristic differs from friendship in that it involves no emotion or affection for those with whom one associates. It is not because of his feelings of friendship or hatred that such a man takes everything the right way, but because he is the kind of man he is. 25 His behavior will be the same toward those he knows and those he does not, toward people with whom he is familiar and people with whom he is not, except that in each particular case his behavior will be appropriate to the person. For it is not proper to show the same consideration to familiar people and to strangers, nor again to be equally concerned to avoid giving them pain. We have stated in general terms that his behavior in society will be as it ought to be. But further, 30 in aiming to avoid giving pain or to contribute to pleasure, he will act by the standard of what is noble and beneficial. For his concern seems to be with the pleasures and pains that are found in social relations.
Wherever it is not noble or harmful for him to contribute to the pleasure of others, he will refuse and will prefer to give pain (by his refusal); and when an action will bring considerable discredit or harm upon the agent, he will not acquiesce in it but refuse, 35 if his own opposition to it will cause only a small amount of pain. He will behave differently toward eminent men and toward ordinary people,
That the characteristics just described deserve blame is clear enough, and so is the fact that the middle position between them deserves praise, i.e., the position of a man who will put up with—and likewise refuse to put up with—the right things in the right manner. No name has been given to this characteristic, 20 but it bears the greatest resemblance to friendship.146
For a man who conforms to the intermediate characteristic is the kind of person we mean when we speak of a "good friend,"
though "friend" also involves affection.
This characteristic differs from friendship in that it involves no emotion or affection for those with whom one associates. It is not because of his feelings of friendship or hatred that such a man takes everything the right way, but because he is the kind of man he is. 25 His behavior will be the same toward those he knows and those he does not, toward people with whom he is familiar and people with whom he is not, except that in each particular case his behavior will be appropriate to the person. For it is not proper to show the same consideration to familiar people and to strangers, nor again to be equally concerned to avoid giving them pain. We have stated in general terms that his behavior in society will be as it ought to be. But further, 30 in aiming to avoid giving pain or to contribute to pleasure, he will act by the standard of what is noble and beneficial. For his concern seems to be with the pleasures and pains that are found in social relations.
Wherever it is not noble or harmful for him to contribute to the pleasure of others, he will refuse and will prefer to give pain (by his refusal); and when an action will bring considerable discredit or harm upon the agent, he will not acquiesce in it but refuse, 35 if his own opposition to it will cause only a small amount of pain. He will behave differently toward eminent men and toward ordinary people,
1127a
1 καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς
ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ'
αὑτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος,
τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ
5 τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς
εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός
ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς
εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ διά τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά
τις αὑτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων,
10 κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος
καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ
τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.
1 toward those he knows well and those he knows less well, and he will observe other similar distinctions in his behavior, paying the proper tribute to each. Everything else being equal, he will choose to contribute to the pleasure of others and scrupulously avoid giving pain. But he will guide his behavior by considering whether the consequences are of greater moment, i.e., by considering 5 what is noble and beneficial. Moreover, he will inflict small pain in order to gain great pleasure in the future.
Such is the man in the median position, but there is no name for him. A man who contributes to the pleasures of others is obsequious if he has no ulterior motive and simply aims at being pleasant. But if his purpose is to gain some material advantage for himself in the form of money or of what money can buy, 10 he is a flatterer. A man who refuses to put up with anything is, as we said, grouchy and quarrelsome.
The extremes appear to be only opposed to one another, because there is no name for the middle.
Such is the man in the median position, but there is no name for him. A man who contributes to the pleasures of others is obsequious if he has no ulterior motive and simply aims at being pleasant. But if his purpose is to gain some material advantage for himself in the form of money or of what money can buy, 10 he is a flatterer. A man who refuses to put up with anything is, as we said, grouchy and quarrelsome.
The extremes appear to be only opposed to one another, because there is no name for the middle.
Book 4,Chapter 7 (1127a13–1127b32)
Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας <καὶ
εἰρωνείας> μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ
15 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ
ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς
πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν
δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται,
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν
20 ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ
δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ
ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν
ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός
τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ
25 ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε
ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ
μηδενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει
καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ
μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ
30 ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν ἐπαινετός,
οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ
ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ.
οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος
λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης
In almost the same sphere, we find the mean—also nameless—of which boastfulness is an extreme. But it is not a bad idea to discuss nameless virtues, too, for if we go through them one by one 15 we shall gain a greater knowledge of the factors involved in character and confirm our belief that the virtues are means, if our survey shows that this is true in every instance.147 Now, we have already discussed148 those people who in social life give pleasure and pain to their fellow men. Let us now speak about those who are truthful and those who are false 20 in speech and action as well as in pretense.
A man who is regarded as boastful pretends to qualities that carry high prestige, though he does not possess them, or to greater qualities than he possesses. A self-depreciator,149 on the contrary, disclaims or belittles the qualities he possesses, while the man in the median position is the kind that calls everything by its proper name. He is truthful in his life and in his speech; 25 he admits to the qualities he possesses and neither exaggerates nor understates them. Now, each of these lines of behavior may be pursued with or without an ulterior motive. When an individual has no ulterior motive, he speaks, acts, and lives his real character. Falsehood is base in its own right and deserves blame, but truthfulness is noble and deserves praise. 30 In the same way, a truthful man, occupying the median position, deserves praise, while untruthful persons of either type, but especially the boastful, deserve blame.
Let us discuss them both, starting with the truthful man.
We are not speaking of a man who is truthful in the contracts he makes or in matters relevant to injustice and justice—for that would properly belong to another virtue.
A man who is regarded as boastful pretends to qualities that carry high prestige, though he does not possess them, or to greater qualities than he possesses. A self-depreciator,149 on the contrary, disclaims or belittles the qualities he possesses, while the man in the median position is the kind that calls everything by its proper name. He is truthful in his life and in his speech; 25 he admits to the qualities he possesses and neither exaggerates nor understates them. Now, each of these lines of behavior may be pursued with or without an ulterior motive. When an individual has no ulterior motive, he speaks, acts, and lives his real character. Falsehood is base in its own right and deserves blame, but truthfulness is noble and deserves praise. 30 In the same way, a truthful man, occupying the median position, deserves praise, while untruthful persons of either type, but especially the boastful, deserve blame.
Let us discuss them both, starting with the truthful man.
We are not speaking of a man who is truthful in the contracts he makes or in matters relevant to injustice and justice—for that would properly belong to another virtue.
1127b
1 γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος
καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν
τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ
φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει
5 καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος
εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος
ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
ἀποκλίνει· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς
ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος
10 μηδενὸς ἕνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε
τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ δ'
ἕνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, †ὡς ὁ
ἀλαζών,† ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος
(οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει·
15 κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν)· ὥσπερ
καὶ ψεύστης ὃ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὃ δὲ δόξης
ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι
τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός,
οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν
20 ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο
οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται·
ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον
λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ
κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν·
25 μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης
ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι]
βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ
ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ
γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ
30 μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν
καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικεῖσθαι
δ' ὁ ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.
1 But we are speaking of a man who, when no question of this kind is involved, is truthful in his speech and in his life simply because it is part of his character to be that kind of man. Such a man would seem to be honest.150 For a man who loves truth and who is truthful when nothing is at stake 5 will be even more truthful when something is at stake. He will scrupulously avoid falsehood as being base, especially since he has always been scrupulous to avoid it when no other considerations were involved: such a man deserves praise. He is more inclined to understating the truth. That is clearly in better taste, since exaggeration is obnoxious.
A man who pretends to greater qualities than he possesses 10 with no ulterior motive is a vile sort of person, else he would not take delight in falsehood; but he is evidently inept rather than wicked. But if his pretensions have reputation and honor as an ulterior motive, he does not deserve too much blame (considering that he is a boaster). But if his motive is money or something that will get him money, he shows a greater lack of propriety. It is not the capacity that makes a boaster, but the moral choice. 15 His characteristic and the kind of person he is mark him as boastful. Similarly, one man is a liar because he enjoys lying as such, and another because he desires reputation or profit. Accordingly, people who boast in order to gain reputation pretend to qualities for which a man is praised or regarded as happy; while those who boast for profit pretend to qualities which benefit their neighbors or to accomplishments which they do not have but can claim to have without (fear of) being detected, e.g., (proficiency as) 20 a soothsayer, a scholar, or a physician. That is why most people indulge in this kind of pretense and boast, for they do not have the qualifications just mentioned.151
Those who depreciate themselves by understatement are evidently more subtle in character. For, it seems, their speech is not motivated by profit but by (the concern) to avoid bombast. 25 They disclaim especially those qualities which are highly valued by others, as Socrates used to do. When they disclaim insignificant and obvious qualities, they are called "humbugs"
and are more contemptible. Sometimes this is obvious boastfulness, as for example Spartan dress.152 In fact, both excess and exaggerated deficiency tend to be boastful. 30 But people who make moderate use of self-depreciation and understate such of their own qualities as are not too noticeable and obvious strike one as cultivated. It is the boastful man who is evidently the opposite of the truthful man, because he is inferior (to the self-depreciator).
A man who pretends to greater qualities than he possesses 10 with no ulterior motive is a vile sort of person, else he would not take delight in falsehood; but he is evidently inept rather than wicked. But if his pretensions have reputation and honor as an ulterior motive, he does not deserve too much blame (considering that he is a boaster). But if his motive is money or something that will get him money, he shows a greater lack of propriety. It is not the capacity that makes a boaster, but the moral choice. 15 His characteristic and the kind of person he is mark him as boastful. Similarly, one man is a liar because he enjoys lying as such, and another because he desires reputation or profit. Accordingly, people who boast in order to gain reputation pretend to qualities for which a man is praised or regarded as happy; while those who boast for profit pretend to qualities which benefit their neighbors or to accomplishments which they do not have but can claim to have without (fear of) being detected, e.g., (proficiency as) 20 a soothsayer, a scholar, or a physician. That is why most people indulge in this kind of pretense and boast, for they do not have the qualifications just mentioned.151
Those who depreciate themselves by understatement are evidently more subtle in character. For, it seems, their speech is not motivated by profit but by (the concern) to avoid bombast. 25 They disclaim especially those qualities which are highly valued by others, as Socrates used to do. When they disclaim insignificant and obvious qualities, they are called "humbugs"
and are more contemptible. Sometimes this is obvious boastfulness, as for example Spartan dress.152 In fact, both excess and exaggerated deficiency tend to be boastful. 30 But people who make moderate use of self-depreciation and understate such of their own qualities as are not too noticeable and obvious strike one as cultivated. It is the boastful man who is evidently the opposite of the truthful man, because he is inferior (to the self-depreciator).
Book 4,Chapter 8 (1127b33–1128b9)
Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ
διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία
Since relaxation is also an essential part of life, and since it includes spending one's time in amusement,
1128a
1 τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν.
διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.
δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις
τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι
5 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου,
καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν
εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ'
αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες
ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς
10 παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι· τοῦ
γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ
σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη. ἐπιπολάζοντος
δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ
παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι
15 εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι,
καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. τῇ μέσῃ δ'
ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ
τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ
ἁρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν
20 παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει
τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου.
ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν
καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία,
τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα
25 πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον
τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῆ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα
ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ
ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ
ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει·
30 τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια
λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὴ χαρίεις
καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν
οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. ὁ
δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε
35 τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων
1 it seems possible here, too, to display good taste in our social relations and propriety in what we say and how we say it. The same is also true of listening. It will make a difference in what kind of company we speak and to what kind of company we listen. Clearly, in this field, too, it is possible to exceed and fall short of the median.
People who exceed in being funny are regarded as buffoons 5 and as crude. They try to be funny at any cost, and their aim is more to raise a laugh than to speak with decorum and without giving pain to the butt of their jokes. Those who cannot say anything funny themselves and take offense when others do are considered to be boorish and dour. Those whose fun remains in good taste 10 are called "witty," implying quick versatility in their wits.153 For such sallies are believed to be movements of the character, and, like bodies, characters too are judged by the way they move. But since one need not go far afield to find something to laugh about, and since most people enjoy fun and joking more than they should, 15 even buffoons often pass as cultivated and are called witty. But that there is a difference, and a considerable difference at that, is clear from our discussion.
Tact is also a quality that belongs to the median characteristic, and a man is tactful who says and listens to the sort of thing that befits an honest and a free man. 20 For there are some things that are proper for such a man to say and to hear by way of jest. There is a difference between the jesting of a free and that of a slavish man, and between that of an educated and of an uneducated person. This difference can also be seen in old and in modern comedy: for the writers of old comedy the ridiculous element was obscenity, while the moderns tend toward innuendo.154 25 The difference in propriety between the two is quite considerable. Can we then define a good jester as a man who says nothing that is improper for a free man, or as a man who will not give pain, or even as one who will give joy, to his listener? Surely that sort of thing is undefinable, for different things are hateful and pleasant to different people. (The kind of jokes he will tell will also be) the kind of jokes he will hear: for what jokes a person can endure to listen to also seem to be the jokes he makes. But he will draw a line somewhere, 30 for a jest at the expense of a person is a kind of slander, and for some things, lawgivers forbid us to slander people. Perhaps they should also forbid us to make fun (of some things).
A cultivated and free man, then, will have this kind of attitude, being, as it were, a law unto himself. Thus he occupies the median position, whether we call him tactful or witty. A buffoon, however, cannot resist any temptation to be funny, 35 and spares neither himself nor others for a laugh.
People who exceed in being funny are regarded as buffoons 5 and as crude. They try to be funny at any cost, and their aim is more to raise a laugh than to speak with decorum and without giving pain to the butt of their jokes. Those who cannot say anything funny themselves and take offense when others do are considered to be boorish and dour. Those whose fun remains in good taste 10 are called "witty," implying quick versatility in their wits.153 For such sallies are believed to be movements of the character, and, like bodies, characters too are judged by the way they move. But since one need not go far afield to find something to laugh about, and since most people enjoy fun and joking more than they should, 15 even buffoons often pass as cultivated and are called witty. But that there is a difference, and a considerable difference at that, is clear from our discussion.
Tact is also a quality that belongs to the median characteristic, and a man is tactful who says and listens to the sort of thing that befits an honest and a free man. 20 For there are some things that are proper for such a man to say and to hear by way of jest. There is a difference between the jesting of a free and that of a slavish man, and between that of an educated and of an uneducated person. This difference can also be seen in old and in modern comedy: for the writers of old comedy the ridiculous element was obscenity, while the moderns tend toward innuendo.154 25 The difference in propriety between the two is quite considerable. Can we then define a good jester as a man who says nothing that is improper for a free man, or as a man who will not give pain, or even as one who will give joy, to his listener? Surely that sort of thing is undefinable, for different things are hateful and pleasant to different people. (The kind of jokes he will tell will also be) the kind of jokes he will hear: for what jokes a person can endure to listen to also seem to be the jokes he makes. But he will draw a line somewhere, 30 for a jest at the expense of a person is a kind of slander, and for some things, lawgivers forbid us to slander people. Perhaps they should also forbid us to make fun (of some things).
A cultivated and free man, then, will have this kind of attitude, being, as it were, a law unto himself. Thus he occupies the median position, whether we call him tactful or witty. A buffoon, however, cannot resist any temptation to be funny, 35 and spares neither himself nor others for a laugh.
1128b
1 ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ'
ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος
πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ
παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι
5 ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν
καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἣ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν
ἐστιν, αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἣ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἣ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον
ὁμιλίαις.
1 He says things that no cultivated man would say, and some that he would not even listen to. A boor, on the other hand, is useless in social relations of this kind. He contributes nothing and takes offense at everything, despite the fact that relaxation and amusement are a necessary part of life.
As we have seen, the 5 means we have described are three in number, and all are concerned with human relations in speech and in action. The difference between them is that one mean concerns truthfulness and the other two pleasantness.155 Of the latter, one is found in amusement and the other in social relations in life in general.
As we have seen, the 5 means we have described are three in number, and all are concerned with human relations in speech and in action. The difference between them is that one mean concerns truthfulness and the other two pleasantness.155 Of the latter, one is found in amusement and the other in social relations in life in general.
Book 4,Chapter 9 (1128b10–35)
10 Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν·
πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις
ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον·
ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον
φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι
15 ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι. οὐ
πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα
γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας
πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ
ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ'
20 οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν
αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς
ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ
πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ
τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα,
25 ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)· φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον
πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι
τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ
εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δ' ὁ
ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ
30 ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι
δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ
τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν
τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ'
ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ
35 αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.
10 It is incorrect to speak of a sense of shame as being a virtue or excellence, for it resembles an emotion more than a characteristic. At any rate, it is defined as a kind of fear of disrepute, and the effect it produces is very much like that produced by fear of danger: people blush when they feel ashamed and turn pale when they fear death. Both these phenomena are of course in a sense physical, and 15 that is held to be more typical of emotions than of characteristics.
The emotion of shame does not befit every stage of life but only youth. For we think that young people ought to be bashful because, living by their emotions as they do, they often go wrong and then shame inhibits them. We praise young people who have a sense of shame, but 20 no one would praise an elderly man for being bashful, for we think he ought not to do anything that will bring him shame. In fact, shame is not the mark of a decent man at all, since it is a consequence of base actions. Now, base actions should not be performed, regardless of whether they really are disgraceful or whether people merely think they are. In either case they ought not to be performed, and as a result, 25 a man ought not to be ashamed. But a base man is even characterized by the fact that he is the kind of person who would perform any disgraceful action. It is absurd for a man to believe himself actually to be decent because he is the kind of person who would be ashamed if he performed some such act. For shame is felt for voluntary actions, and no decent man will ever voluntarily do what is base. So it would appear that shame is conditionally good: 30 a decent man will feel ashamed if he were to act this way; but there is nothing conditional about the virtues. But if shamelessness, i.e., to act basely and not be ashamed of it, is base, it does not follow that it is decent for a man to act this way and then feel ashamed of it. For even moral strength is not a virtue but a mixed kind of characteristic 35, as we shall show later on.156 But let us now discuss justice.35
The emotion of shame does not befit every stage of life but only youth. For we think that young people ought to be bashful because, living by their emotions as they do, they often go wrong and then shame inhibits them. We praise young people who have a sense of shame, but 20 no one would praise an elderly man for being bashful, for we think he ought not to do anything that will bring him shame. In fact, shame is not the mark of a decent man at all, since it is a consequence of base actions. Now, base actions should not be performed, regardless of whether they really are disgraceful or whether people merely think they are. In either case they ought not to be performed, and as a result, 25 a man ought not to be ashamed. But a base man is even characterized by the fact that he is the kind of person who would perform any disgraceful action. It is absurd for a man to believe himself actually to be decent because he is the kind of person who would be ashamed if he performed some such act. For shame is felt for voluntary actions, and no decent man will ever voluntarily do what is base. So it would appear that shame is conditionally good: 30 a decent man will feel ashamed if he were to act this way; but there is nothing conditional about the virtues. But if shamelessness, i.e., to act basely and not be ashamed of it, is base, it does not follow that it is decent for a man to act this way and then feel ashamed of it. For even moral strength is not a virtue but a mixed kind of characteristic 35, as we shall show later on.156 But let us now discuss justice.35