Bywater (OCT, 1894) · Ostwald (1962)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 8,Chapter 1 (1155a3–1155b16)
1155a
Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἕποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι
γὰρ ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν
5 βίον. ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ
ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας
κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεία· τί γὰρ ὄφελος
τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἣ γίγνεται
μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθείη
10 καὶ σῴζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα.
ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην
οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ
ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον
τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθείας, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ
15 πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω·" καὶ γὰρ
νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε
πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν
τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι
καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα,
20 καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους
ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον
ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις
συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν
σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὅμοιόν τι τῇ
25 φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν
ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν· καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων
οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας,
καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον
δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους
30 ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἕν τι εἶναι·
καὶ ἔτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.
Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἳ μὲν γὰρ
ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους,
ὅθεν τὸν ὅμοιόν φασιν ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ κολοιὸν ποτὶ
35 κολοιόν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἳ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας
Continuing in a sequence, the next subject which we shall have to discuss is friendship. For it is some sort of excellence or virtue, or involves virtue, and it is, moreover, most indispensable for life. 5 No one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all other goods. Rich men and those who hold office and power are, above all others, regarded as requiring friends. For what good would their prosperity do them if it did not provide them with the opportunity for good works?
And the best works done and those which deserve the highest praise are those that are done to one's friends. 10 How could prosperity be safeguarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is the greater are the risks it brings with it. Also, in poverty and all other kinds of misfortune men believe that their only refuge consists in their friends. Friends help young men avoid error; to older people they give the care and help needed to supplement the failing powers of action which infirmity brings in its train; 15 and to those in their prime they give the opportunity to perform noble actions. ⟨This is what is meant when men quote Homer's verse:⟩ "When two go together . . .":387 friends enhance our ability to think and to act. Also, it seems that nature implants friendship in a parent for its offspring and in offspring for its parent, not only among men, but also among birds and most animals. ⟨Not only members of the same family group but⟩ also members of the same race feel it for one another, 20 especially human beings, and that is why we praise men for being humanitarians or "lovers of their fellow men." Even when traveling abroad one can see how near and dear and friendly every man may be to another human being.
Friendship also seems to hold states together, and lawgivers apparently devote more attention to it than to justice. For concord seems to be something similar to friendship, 25 and concord is what they most strive to attain, while they do their best to expel faction, the enemy of concord. When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition. In fact, the just in the fullest sense is regarded as constituting an element of friendship.
Friendship is noble as well as necessary: we praise those who love their friends and 30 consider the possession of many friends a noble thing. And further, we believe of our friends that they are good men.
There are, however, several controversial points about friendship. Some people388 define it as a kind of likeness, and say that friends are those who are like us; hence, according to them, the proverb: "Like to like,"389 "Birds of a feather flock together 35,"390 and so forth. On the other side there are those who say that when people are alike they quarrel with one another like potters.39135
And the best works done and those which deserve the highest praise are those that are done to one's friends. 10 How could prosperity be safeguarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is the greater are the risks it brings with it. Also, in poverty and all other kinds of misfortune men believe that their only refuge consists in their friends. Friends help young men avoid error; to older people they give the care and help needed to supplement the failing powers of action which infirmity brings in its train; 15 and to those in their prime they give the opportunity to perform noble actions. ⟨This is what is meant when men quote Homer's verse:⟩ "When two go together . . .":387 friends enhance our ability to think and to act. Also, it seems that nature implants friendship in a parent for its offspring and in offspring for its parent, not only among men, but also among birds and most animals. ⟨Not only members of the same family group but⟩ also members of the same race feel it for one another, 20 especially human beings, and that is why we praise men for being humanitarians or "lovers of their fellow men." Even when traveling abroad one can see how near and dear and friendly every man may be to another human being.
Friendship also seems to hold states together, and lawgivers apparently devote more attention to it than to justice. For concord seems to be something similar to friendship, 25 and concord is what they most strive to attain, while they do their best to expel faction, the enemy of concord. When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition. In fact, the just in the fullest sense is regarded as constituting an element of friendship.
Friendship is noble as well as necessary: we praise those who love their friends and 30 consider the possession of many friends a noble thing. And further, we believe of our friends that they are good men.
There are, however, several controversial points about friendship. Some people388 define it as a kind of likeness, and say that friends are those who are like us; hence, according to them, the proverb: "Like to like,"389 "Birds of a feather flock together 35,"390 and so forth. On the other side there are those who say that when people are alike they quarrel with one another like potters.39135
1155b
1 τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων
ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων
ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν
πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ
5 ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν
καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις
ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι.
τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ
οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ
10 ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον
πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς
ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἓν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν
ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον
καὶ [τὸ] ἧττον, οὐχ ἱκανῷ πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ
15 τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ [τὸ] ἧττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. εἴρηται δ'
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.
1 There are also more profound investigations into the matter along the lines of natural science: Euripides speaks of the parched earth as loving the rain while the majestic heaven, filled with rain, loves to fall upon the earth;392
Heraclitus 5 says that opposites help one another, that different elements produce the most beautiful harmony, and that everything comes into being through strife;393 while Empedocles394
and others express the opposite view that like strives for like.
Let us leave aside problems which are an aspect of natural science—for they are not germane to our present field of study —and investigate those which pertain to man 10 and are relevant to character and the emotions. For example, can friendship develop in all men, or is it impossible for those who are wicked to be friends? Is there only one kind of friendship, or are there more than one? Those who think that there is only one kind on the ground that friendship admits of degrees rely on insufficient evidence: 15 things different in kind also admit of degrees. But these matters have been discussed before.395
Heraclitus 5 says that opposites help one another, that different elements produce the most beautiful harmony, and that everything comes into being through strife;393 while Empedocles394
and others express the opposite view that like strives for like.
Let us leave aside problems which are an aspect of natural science—for they are not germane to our present field of study —and investigate those which pertain to man 10 and are relevant to character and the emotions. For example, can friendship develop in all men, or is it impossible for those who are wicked to be friends? Is there only one kind of friendship, or are there more than one? Those who think that there is only one kind on the ground that friendship admits of degrees rely on insufficient evidence: 15 things different in kind also admit of degrees. But these matters have been discussed before.395
Book 8,Chapter 2 (1155b17–1156a5)
Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος
τοῦ φιλητοῦ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν,
τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον
20 εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ
ἂν εἴη τἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τἀγαθὸν
φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν
ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ
25 δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ· φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ
τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον.
τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων
φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ
βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι
30 τἀγαθά, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σῴζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς
ἔχῃ)· τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ
ταὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι
φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν; πολλοὶ γάρ
35 εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς
The answers to these questions will perhaps become clear once we have ascertained what is the object worthy of affection.396 For, it seems, we do not feel affection for everything, but only for the lovable, and that means what is good, pleasant, or useful. However, since we regard a thing as useful 20 when it serves as a means to some good or pleasure, we can say that as ends ⟨only⟩ the good and the pleasant are worthy of affection. Which good, then, is it that men love? Is it the good ⟨in general⟩ or is it what is good for them? For there is sometimes a discrepancy between these two, and a discrepancy also in the case of what is pleasant. Now it seems that each man loves what is good for him: in an unqualified sense it is the good which is worthy of affection, but for each individual it is what is good for him. Now in fact 25 every man does not love what is really good for him, but what appears to him to be good. But that makes no difference ⟨for our discussion⟩. It simply follows that what appears good will appear worthy of affection.
While there are three causes of affection or friendship, we do not speak of "friendship" to describe the affection we feel for inanimate objects, since inanimate objects do not reciprocate affection and we do not wish for their good. It would surely be ridiculous to wish for the good of wine: 30 if one wishes it at all, it is that the wine may keep, so that we can have it ourselves. But men say that we ought to wish for the good of our friend for the friend's sake. When people wish for our good in this way, we attribute good will to them, if the same wish is not reciprocated by us. If the good will is on a reciprocal basis, it is friendship. Perhaps we should add: "provided that we are aware of the good will." For many people 35 have good will toward persons they have never seen, but whom they assume to be decent
While there are three causes of affection or friendship, we do not speak of "friendship" to describe the affection we feel for inanimate objects, since inanimate objects do not reciprocate affection and we do not wish for their good. It would surely be ridiculous to wish for the good of wine: 30 if one wishes it at all, it is that the wine may keep, so that we can have it ourselves. But men say that we ought to wish for the good of our friend for the friend's sake. When people wish for our good in this way, we attribute good will to them, if the same wish is not reciprocated by us. If the good will is on a reciprocal basis, it is friendship. Perhaps we should add: "provided that we are aware of the good will." For many people 35 have good will toward persons they have never seen, but whom they assume to be decent
1156a
1 εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι
πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους
δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ
ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας
5 δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.
1 and useful, and one of these persons may well reciprocate this feeling. Accordingly, the two parties appear to have good will toward one another; but how can they be called "friends" when they are unaware how they are disposed toward one another? We conclude, therefore, that to be friends men must have good will for one another, must each wish for the good of the other 5 on the basis of one of the three motives mentioned, and must each be aware of one another's good will.
Book 8,Chapter 3 (1156a6–1156b32)
Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἴδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις
ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη, ἰσάριθμα
τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα,
οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις
10 ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους
οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ'
ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ
ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς
αὑτοῖς. οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς
15 ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ
οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ
συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐστὶν ὅςπερ
ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ᾗ πορίζουσιν
οἳ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἳ δ' ἡδονήν. εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί
20 εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς
ἢ χρήσιμοι ὦσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει,
ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ
φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας
πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ
25 φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν
ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ
συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ'
ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται
τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ὦσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
30 γάρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας
δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι'
ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα
διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὑτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης
καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται
35 φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει,
These three motives differ from one another in kind, and so do the corresponding types of affection and friendship. In other words, there are three kinds of friendship, corresponding in number to the objects worthy of affection. In each of these, the affection can be reciprocated so that the partner is aware of it, and the partners wish for each other's good in terms of the motive on which their affection is based.397 10 Now, when the motive of the affection is usefulness, the partners do not feel affection for one another *per se* but in terms of the good accruing to each from the other. 15 The same is also true of those whose friendship is based on pleasure: we love witty people not for what they are, but for the pleasure they give us.
So we see that when the useful is the basis of affection, men love because of the good they get out of it, and when pleasure is the basis, for the pleasure they get out of it. In other words, the friend is loved not because he is a friend, but because he is useful or pleasant. Thus, these two kinds are friendship only incidentally, since the object of affection is not loved for being the kind of person he is, but for providing some good or pleasure. Consequently, such friendships are easily dissolved 20 when the partners do not remain unchanged: the affection ceases as soon as one partner is no longer pleasant or useful to the other. Now, usefulness is not something permanent, but differs at different times. Accordingly, with the disappearance of the motive for being friends, the friendship, too, is dissolved, since the friendship owed its existence to these motives.
Friendships of this kind seem to occur most commonly among old people, 25 because at that age men do not pursue the pleasant but the beneficial. They are also found among young men and those in their prime who are out for their own advantage. Such friends are not at all given to living in each other's company, for sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant. Therefore, they have no further need of this relationship, if they are not mutually beneficial. 30 They find each other pleasant only to the extent that they have hopes of some good coming out of it. The traditional friendship between host and guest is also placed in this group.
Friendship of young people seems to be based on pleasure.
For their lives are guided by emotion, and they pursue most intensely what they find pleasant and what the moment brings. As they advance in years, different things come to be pleasant for them. Hence they become friends quickly and just as quickly cease to be friends. 35 For as another thing becomes pleasant, the friendship, too, changes,
So we see that when the useful is the basis of affection, men love because of the good they get out of it, and when pleasure is the basis, for the pleasure they get out of it. In other words, the friend is loved not because he is a friend, but because he is useful or pleasant. Thus, these two kinds are friendship only incidentally, since the object of affection is not loved for being the kind of person he is, but for providing some good or pleasure. Consequently, such friendships are easily dissolved 20 when the partners do not remain unchanged: the affection ceases as soon as one partner is no longer pleasant or useful to the other. Now, usefulness is not something permanent, but differs at different times. Accordingly, with the disappearance of the motive for being friends, the friendship, too, is dissolved, since the friendship owed its existence to these motives.
Friendships of this kind seem to occur most commonly among old people, 25 because at that age men do not pursue the pleasant but the beneficial. They are also found among young men and those in their prime who are out for their own advantage. Such friends are not at all given to living in each other's company, for sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant. Therefore, they have no further need of this relationship, if they are not mutually beneficial. 30 They find each other pleasant only to the extent that they have hopes of some good coming out of it. The traditional friendship between host and guest is also placed in this group.
Friendship of young people seems to be based on pleasure.
For their lives are guided by emotion, and they pursue most intensely what they find pleasant and what the moment brings. As they advance in years, different things come to be pleasant for them. Hence they become friends quickly and just as quickly cease to be friends. 35 For as another thing becomes pleasant, the friendship, too, changes,
1156b
1 τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ
δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ
τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις
τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ
5 συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν
φιλίαν οὕτως.
Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν
ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ᾗ
ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ
10 τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὑτοὺς γὰρ
οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων
φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ὦσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν
ἑκάτερος ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
15 ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἑκάστῳ
γὰρ καθ' ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,
τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία
μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα
τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστιν
20 ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά
τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὑτούς·
†ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια† καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ
ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστίν, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν
δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ'
25 εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προςδεῖται
χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ
ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι·
οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν
ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως
30 τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι εἶναι,
οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν
γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὔ.
1 and the pleasure of a young man changes quickly. Also, young people are prone to fall in love, since the greater part of falling in love is a matter of emotion and based on pleasure. That is why they form a friendship and give it up again so quickly that the change often takes place within the same day. But they do wish to be together all day 5 and to live together, because it is in this way that they get what they want out of their friendship.
The perfect form of friendship is that between good men who are alike in excellence or virtue. For these friends wish alike for one another's good because they are good men, and they are good *per se,* ⟨that is, their goodness is something intrinsic, not incidental⟩. Those who wish for their friends'
good for their friends' sake are friends in the truest sense, 10 since their attitude is determined by what their friends are and not by incidental considerations. Hence their friendship lasts as long as they are good, and ⟨that means it will last for a long time, since⟩ goodness or virtue is a thing that lasts. In addition, each partner is both good in the unqualified sense and good for his friend. For those who are good, i.e., good without qualification, are also beneficial to one another. In the same double sense, they are also pleasant to one another:
for 15 good men are pleasant both in an unqualified sense and to one another, since each finds pleasure in his own proper actions and in actions like them, and the actions of good men are identical with or similar to one another. That such a friendship is lasting stands to reason, because in it are combined all the qualities requisite for people to be friends. For, ⟨as we have seen,⟩ every friendship is based on some good 20 or on pleasure—either in the unqualified sense or relative to the person who feels the affection—and implies some similarity ⟨between the friends⟩. Now this kind of friendship has all the requisite qualities we have mentioned and has them *per se,* that is, as an essential part of the characters of the friends.
For in this kind of friendship the partners are like one another,398 and the other objects worthy of affection—the unqualified good and the unqualified pleasant—are also found in it, and these are the highest objects worthy of affection. It is, therefore, in the friendship of good men that feelings of affection and friendship exist in their highest and best form.
Such 25 friendships are of course rare, since such men are few.
Moreover, time and familiarity are required. For, as the proverb has it, people cannot know each other until they have eaten the specified ⟨measure of⟩ salt together. One cannot extend friendship to or be a friend of another person until each partner has impressed the other that he is worthy of affection, and until each has won the other's confidence. 30 Those who are quick to show the signs of friendship to one another are not really friends, though they wish to be; they are not true friends unless they are worthy of affection and know this to be so. The wish to be friends can come about quickly, but friendship cannot.
The perfect form of friendship is that between good men who are alike in excellence or virtue. For these friends wish alike for one another's good because they are good men, and they are good *per se,* ⟨that is, their goodness is something intrinsic, not incidental⟩. Those who wish for their friends'
good for their friends' sake are friends in the truest sense, 10 since their attitude is determined by what their friends are and not by incidental considerations. Hence their friendship lasts as long as they are good, and ⟨that means it will last for a long time, since⟩ goodness or virtue is a thing that lasts. In addition, each partner is both good in the unqualified sense and good for his friend. For those who are good, i.e., good without qualification, are also beneficial to one another. In the same double sense, they are also pleasant to one another:
for 15 good men are pleasant both in an unqualified sense and to one another, since each finds pleasure in his own proper actions and in actions like them, and the actions of good men are identical with or similar to one another. That such a friendship is lasting stands to reason, because in it are combined all the qualities requisite for people to be friends. For, ⟨as we have seen,⟩ every friendship is based on some good 20 or on pleasure—either in the unqualified sense or relative to the person who feels the affection—and implies some similarity ⟨between the friends⟩. Now this kind of friendship has all the requisite qualities we have mentioned and has them *per se,* that is, as an essential part of the characters of the friends.
For in this kind of friendship the partners are like one another,398 and the other objects worthy of affection—the unqualified good and the unqualified pleasant—are also found in it, and these are the highest objects worthy of affection. It is, therefore, in the friendship of good men that feelings of affection and friendship exist in their highest and best form.
Such 25 friendships are of course rare, since such men are few.
Moreover, time and familiarity are required. For, as the proverb has it, people cannot know each other until they have eaten the specified ⟨measure of⟩ salt together. One cannot extend friendship to or be a friend of another person until each partner has impressed the other that he is worthy of affection, and until each has won the other's confidence. 30 Those who are quick to show the signs of friendship to one another are not really friends, though they wish to be; they are not true friends unless they are worthy of affection and know this to be so. The wish to be friends can come about quickly, but friendship cannot.
Book 8,Chapter 4 (1156b33–1157b4)
Αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ
τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἑκατέρῳ
35 παρ' ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν. ἡ δὲ
This, then, is perfect and complete friendship, both in terms of time and in all other respects, and each partner receives in all matters what he gives the other, in the same or in a similar form; 35 that is what friends should be able to count on.
1157a
1 διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς
ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι
ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι
μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον
5 ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον
τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ
ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὃ
δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας
ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ
10 ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία)· πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν,
ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις
ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ
χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν.
οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι
15 διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ
τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ
φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς
φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῳοῦν, δι' αὑτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι
μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ
20 μή τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία
ἀδιάβλητός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ
τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν
ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιοῦται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις
25 οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι
λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις
(δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ
συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥςπερ
οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς
30 τοιούτους, εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ
κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ᾗ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ'
ὁμοιότητα· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιόν τι, ταύτῃ φίλοι·
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὗται
συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
35 καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
1 Friendship based on what is pleasant bears some resemblance to this kind, for good men are pleasant to one another.
The same is also true of friendship based on the useful, for good men are useful to one another. Here, too, friendships are most durable when each one receives what he gives to the other, 5 for example, pleasure, and not only that: he must also receive it from the same source, as happens, for example, in friendships between witty people, but not in the case of lover and beloved. For lover and beloved do not find pleasure in the same objects: the lover finds it in seeing his beloved, while the beloved receives it from the attention paid to him by his lover. But when the bloom of youth passes, the friendship sometimes passes, too: the lover does not find the sight pleasant ⟨any more⟩, 10 and the beloved no longer receives the attentions of the lover. Still, many do remain friends if, through familiarity, they have come to love each other's characters, ⟨discovering that⟩ their characters are alike. But when it is the useful and not the pleasant that is exchanged in a love affair, the partners are less truly friends and their friendship is less durable. Those whose friendship is based on the useful dissolve it as soon as it ceases to be to their advantage, 15 since they were friends not of one another but of what was profitable for them.
To be friends with one another on the basis of pleasure and usefulness is, accordingly, also possible for bad people, just as it is for good men with bad, and for one who is neither good nor bad with any kind of person at all. But it is clear that good men alone can be friends on the basis of what they are, for bad people do not find joy in one another, unless they see some material advantage coming to 20 them.
Also, only the friendship of good men is proof against slander. For a man does not easily trust anyone's word about a person whom he has himself tried and tested over a long period of time. The friendship of good men implies mutual trust, the assurance that neither partner will ever wrong the other, and all other things that we demand of true friendship. 25 In the other kinds of friendship, however, there is no safeguard against slander and lack of trust.
⟨When we say "other kinds of friendship," we do so⟩ because people call "friends" even those whose relation is based on usefulness, just as states speak of other states as "friendly."
⟨⟨The analogy holds⟩ because alliances between states seem to be motivated by their mutual advantage.⟩ Similarly, those who like one another for the pleasure they get are called "friends," as children are "friends" with one another. In view of that, we, too, should perhaps call such persons "friends"
and 30 posit several kinds of friendship: in the primary and proper sense of the word, we call "friendship" that which exists between good men as good men. The other kinds are "friendship" on the basis of the similarity ⟨they bear to the primary kind⟩. In this sense, people are friends to the extent that ⟨their relationship is based upon⟩ some good and something similar to ⟨the basis of the primary kind of friendship⟩. Thus to pleasure-lovers the pleasant is a good. But these two kinds of friendship are very unlikely to coincide: the same persons do not become friends on the basis of usefulness and on the basis of what is pleasant. 35 For things which are related only incidentally are not usually found coupled together.
The same is also true of friendship based on the useful, for good men are useful to one another. Here, too, friendships are most durable when each one receives what he gives to the other, 5 for example, pleasure, and not only that: he must also receive it from the same source, as happens, for example, in friendships between witty people, but not in the case of lover and beloved. For lover and beloved do not find pleasure in the same objects: the lover finds it in seeing his beloved, while the beloved receives it from the attention paid to him by his lover. But when the bloom of youth passes, the friendship sometimes passes, too: the lover does not find the sight pleasant ⟨any more⟩, 10 and the beloved no longer receives the attentions of the lover. Still, many do remain friends if, through familiarity, they have come to love each other's characters, ⟨discovering that⟩ their characters are alike. But when it is the useful and not the pleasant that is exchanged in a love affair, the partners are less truly friends and their friendship is less durable. Those whose friendship is based on the useful dissolve it as soon as it ceases to be to their advantage, 15 since they were friends not of one another but of what was profitable for them.
To be friends with one another on the basis of pleasure and usefulness is, accordingly, also possible for bad people, just as it is for good men with bad, and for one who is neither good nor bad with any kind of person at all. But it is clear that good men alone can be friends on the basis of what they are, for bad people do not find joy in one another, unless they see some material advantage coming to 20 them.
Also, only the friendship of good men is proof against slander. For a man does not easily trust anyone's word about a person whom he has himself tried and tested over a long period of time. The friendship of good men implies mutual trust, the assurance that neither partner will ever wrong the other, and all other things that we demand of true friendship. 25 In the other kinds of friendship, however, there is no safeguard against slander and lack of trust.
⟨When we say "other kinds of friendship," we do so⟩ because people call "friends" even those whose relation is based on usefulness, just as states speak of other states as "friendly."
⟨⟨The analogy holds⟩ because alliances between states seem to be motivated by their mutual advantage.⟩ Similarly, those who like one another for the pleasure they get are called "friends," as children are "friends" with one another. In view of that, we, too, should perhaps call such persons "friends"
and 30 posit several kinds of friendship: in the primary and proper sense of the word, we call "friendship" that which exists between good men as good men. The other kinds are "friendship" on the basis of the similarity ⟨they bear to the primary kind⟩. In this sense, people are friends to the extent that ⟨their relationship is based upon⟩ some good and something similar to ⟨the basis of the primary kind of friendship⟩. Thus to pleasure-lovers the pleasant is a good. But these two kinds of friendship are very unlikely to coincide: the same persons do not become friends on the basis of usefulness and on the basis of what is pleasant. 35 For things which are related only incidentally are not usually found coupled together.
1157b
1 Εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν
φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ
ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὑτοὺς φίλοι· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθοί.
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
5 καὶ τῷ ὡμοιῶσθαι τούτοις.
1 These are the kinds into which friendship is divided. Accordingly, bad men will be friends on the basis of pleasure or usefulness, since these are the respects in which they are like each other, while good men will be friends on the basis of what they are, that is, because they are good. The good are friends in the unqualified sense, but the others are friends only incidentally and by reason of the similarity they bear to the former.
Book 8,Chapter 5 (1157b5–36)
Ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἳ
μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἳ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις
καὶ πορίζουσι τἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωριςμένοι
τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μέν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ'
10 ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν
ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία
γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
"πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν." οὐ φαίνονται
δ' οὔθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὔθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ
15 γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν
τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται
τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ
δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις ἐοίκασι
μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν
20 (ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ
καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προςήκει)·
συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς
ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ δοκεῖ
ἔχειν.
25 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ
πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ'
ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν φίλησις
πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἕξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἧττον
30 πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἕξεως· καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς
φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕξιν.
καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ
ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος. ἑκάτερος
35 οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης,
5 As in the case of virtues, some men are called "good" because of a characteristic they have and others because of an activity in which they engage, so in the case of friendship there is a distinction ⟨between the activity of friendship and the lasting characteristic⟩. When friends live together, they enjoy each other's presence and provide each other's good. When, however, they are asleep or separated geographically, they do not actively engage in their friendship, but they are still characterized by an attitude which could express itself in active friendship. 10 For it is not friendship in the unqualified sense but only its activity that is interrupted by distance. But if the absence lasts for some time, it apparently also causes the friendship itself to be forgotten. Hence the saying: "Out of sight, out of mind."399
Neither old nor sour people are apparently disposed to forming friendships. 15 There is only little pleasure one can get from them, and no one can spend his days in painful or unpleasant company: we see that nature avoids what is painful more than anything else and aims at what is pleasant. Those who extend friendship to one another without living together are more like men of good will than like friends. For nothing characterizes friends as much as living in each other's company. 20 Material advantage is desired by those who stand in need, but company is something which is wanted even by men who are supremely happy, for they are the least suited to live in isolation. But it is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they are pleasant ⟨in one another's eyes⟩ and find joy in the same things. It is this quality which seems typical of comradeship.
The 25 highest form of friendship, then, is that between good men, as we have stated repeatedly. For what is good or pleasant without qualification is regarded as an object of affection and of choice, while for each individual it is what is good or pleasant to him. But for a good man, a good man is the object of affection and of choice for both these reasons.
Now, affection resembles an emotion, while friendship is rather a characteristic or lasting attitude. For it is equally possible to feel affection for inanimate objects, ⟨which cannot reciprocate the affection,⟩ 30 but mutual affection involves choice, and choice springs from a characteristic. Also, men wish their friends' good for the sake of those for whom they feel friendship, and this attitude is not determined by an emotion but by a characteristic. Also, in loving a friend they love their own good. For when a good man becomes a friend he becomes a good to the person whose friend he is. Thus, 35 each partner both loves his own good and makes an equal return in the good he wishes for his partner and in the pleasure he gives him. Now friendship is said to be equality,400
and both those qualities inhere especially in the relationship between good men.
Neither old nor sour people are apparently disposed to forming friendships. 15 There is only little pleasure one can get from them, and no one can spend his days in painful or unpleasant company: we see that nature avoids what is painful more than anything else and aims at what is pleasant. Those who extend friendship to one another without living together are more like men of good will than like friends. For nothing characterizes friends as much as living in each other's company. 20 Material advantage is desired by those who stand in need, but company is something which is wanted even by men who are supremely happy, for they are the least suited to live in isolation. But it is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they are pleasant ⟨in one another's eyes⟩ and find joy in the same things. It is this quality which seems typical of comradeship.
The 25 highest form of friendship, then, is that between good men, as we have stated repeatedly. For what is good or pleasant without qualification is regarded as an object of affection and of choice, while for each individual it is what is good or pleasant to him. But for a good man, a good man is the object of affection and of choice for both these reasons.
Now, affection resembles an emotion, while friendship is rather a characteristic or lasting attitude. For it is equally possible to feel affection for inanimate objects, ⟨which cannot reciprocate the affection,⟩ 30 but mutual affection involves choice, and choice springs from a characteristic. Also, men wish their friends' good for the sake of those for whom they feel friendship, and this attitude is not determined by an emotion but by a characteristic. Also, in loving a friend they love their own good. For when a good man becomes a friend he becomes a good to the person whose friend he is. Thus, 35 each partner both loves his own good and makes an equal return in the good he wishes for his partner and in the pleasure he gives him. Now friendship is said to be equality,400
and both those qualities inhere especially in the relationship between good men.
1158a
1 μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.
1 Friendship does not arise easily among the sour and the old, inasmuch as they are rather grouchy and find little joy in social relations. For a good temper and sociability are regarded as being most typical of and most conducive to friendship.
That 5 is why young men become friends quickly and old men do not: people do not become friends of those in whom they find no joy. (This also applies to the sour.) Such men do, however, display good will toward one another, since one may wish for another's good and be ready to meet his needs. But they are not really friends, because they do not spend their days together and do not find joy in one another, 10 and these seem to be the chief marks of friendship.
To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many people at the same time. For love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique. It does not easily happen that one man finds many people very pleasing at the same time, nor perhaps does it easily happen that there are many people who are good. Also, one must have some experience of the other person 15 and have come to be familiar with him, and that is the hardest thing of all. But it is possible to please many people on the basis of usefulness and pleasantness, since many have these qualities, and the services they have to offer do not take a long time ⟨to recognize⟩.
Of these two kinds of friendship, the one that is based on what is pleasant bears a closer resemblance to ⟨true⟩ friendship, when both partners have the same to offer and when they find joy in one another 20 or in the same objects. Friendships of young people are of this kind. There is a greater element of generosity in such friendships, whereas friendships based on usefulness are for hucksters. Also, those who are supremely happy have no need of useful people, but they do need pleasant ones: they do wish to live in the company of others, and, though they can bear what is painful for a short time, no one could endure it continually—in fact, no one could continually endure 25 the Good itself,401 if that were painful to him. It is for this reason that they seek friends who are pleasant. They should, however, look for friends who are good as well as pleasant, and not only good, but good for them; for in this way they will have everything that friends should have.
People in positions of power seem to keep their various friends in separate compartments. One group of friends is useful to them and another pleasant, 30 but rarely do the same men belong in both groups. For these potentates do not seek friends who are both pleasant and virtuous nor friends who are useful for the attainment of noble objects. On the contrary, when their aim is to get something pleasant they seek witty people, ⟨and when they want what is useful, they seek⟩ men who are clever at carrying out their orders, and these qualities are hardly ever found in the same person. Now, as we have stated,402 it is the good man who is pleasant and useful at the same time. But such a man does not become the friend of someone whose station is superior to his own, 35 unless that person is also superior to him in virtue. Unless that is the case, his friendship will not be based on ⟨proportionate⟩ equality, since he will not be surpassed ⟨by a virtue⟩ proportionate ⟨to the surpassing power⟩.403 But potentates of this sort are not often found.
That 5 is why young men become friends quickly and old men do not: people do not become friends of those in whom they find no joy. (This also applies to the sour.) Such men do, however, display good will toward one another, since one may wish for another's good and be ready to meet his needs. But they are not really friends, because they do not spend their days together and do not find joy in one another, 10 and these seem to be the chief marks of friendship.
To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many people at the same time. For love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique. It does not easily happen that one man finds many people very pleasing at the same time, nor perhaps does it easily happen that there are many people who are good. Also, one must have some experience of the other person 15 and have come to be familiar with him, and that is the hardest thing of all. But it is possible to please many people on the basis of usefulness and pleasantness, since many have these qualities, and the services they have to offer do not take a long time ⟨to recognize⟩.
Of these two kinds of friendship, the one that is based on what is pleasant bears a closer resemblance to ⟨true⟩ friendship, when both partners have the same to offer and when they find joy in one another 20 or in the same objects. Friendships of young people are of this kind. There is a greater element of generosity in such friendships, whereas friendships based on usefulness are for hucksters. Also, those who are supremely happy have no need of useful people, but they do need pleasant ones: they do wish to live in the company of others, and, though they can bear what is painful for a short time, no one could endure it continually—in fact, no one could continually endure 25 the Good itself,401 if that were painful to him. It is for this reason that they seek friends who are pleasant. They should, however, look for friends who are good as well as pleasant, and not only good, but good for them; for in this way they will have everything that friends should have.
People in positions of power seem to keep their various friends in separate compartments. One group of friends is useful to them and another pleasant, 30 but rarely do the same men belong in both groups. For these potentates do not seek friends who are both pleasant and virtuous nor friends who are useful for the attainment of noble objects. On the contrary, when their aim is to get something pleasant they seek witty people, ⟨and when they want what is useful, they seek⟩ men who are clever at carrying out their orders, and these qualities are hardly ever found in the same person. Now, as we have stated,402 it is the good man who is pleasant and useful at the same time. But such a man does not become the friend of someone whose station is superior to his own, 35 unless that person is also superior to him in virtue. Unless that is the case, his friendship will not be based on ⟨proportionate⟩ equality, since he will not be surpassed ⟨by a virtue⟩ proportionate ⟨to the surpassing power⟩.403 But potentates of this sort are not often found.
Book 8,Chapter 6 (1158a1–1158b10)
Ἐν δὲ τοῖς
στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἧττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῳ
δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα
γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ
5 νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὔ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται
φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί.
ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται
γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ
πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις,
10 ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον
κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν
πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα
πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)· πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν
σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν
15 λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον.
διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται·
πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.
τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλίᾳ ἡ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν
ταὐτὰ ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς
20 αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν
ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων.
καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ·
συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν
χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ
25 τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν.
δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὑτοῖς·
οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς
ἐξουσίαις διῃρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι
γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἄμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ
30 οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους
εἰς τὰ καλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμενοι,
τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν, ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεται
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος·
ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἐὰν μὴ
35 καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον
ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.
1 Friendship does not arise easily among the sour and the old, inasmuch as they are rather grouchy and find little joy in social relations. For a good temper and sociability are regarded as being most typical of and most conducive to friendship.
That 5 is why young men become friends quickly and old men do not: people do not become friends of those in whom they find no joy. (This also applies to the sour.) Such men do, however, display good will toward one another, since one may wish for another's good and be ready to meet his needs. But they are not really friends, because they do not spend their days together and do not find joy in one another, 10 and these seem to be the chief marks of friendship.
To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many people at the same time. For love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique. It does not easily happen that one man finds many people very pleasing at the same time, nor perhaps does it easily happen that there are many people who are good. Also, one must have some experience of the other person 15 and have come to be familiar with him, and that is the hardest thing of all. But it is possible to please many people on the basis of usefulness and pleasantness, since many have these qualities, and the services they have to offer do not take a long time ⟨to recognize⟩.
Of these two kinds of friendship, the one that is based on what is pleasant bears a closer resemblance to ⟨true⟩ friendship, when both partners have the same to offer and when they find joy in one another 20 or in the same objects. Friendships of young people are of this kind. There is a greater element of generosity in such friendships, whereas friendships based on usefulness are for hucksters. Also, those who are supremely happy have no need of useful people, but they do need pleasant ones: they do wish to live in the company of others, and, though they can bear what is painful for a short time, no one could endure it continually—in fact, no one could continually endure 25 the Good itself,401 if that were painful to him. It is for this reason that they seek friends who are pleasant. They should, however, look for friends who are good as well as pleasant, and not only good, but good for them; for in this way they will have everything that friends should have.
People in positions of power seem to keep their various friends in separate compartments. One group of friends is useful to them and another pleasant, 30 but rarely do the same men belong in both groups. For these potentates do not seek friends who are both pleasant and virtuous nor friends who are useful for the attainment of noble objects. On the contrary, when their aim is to get something pleasant they seek witty people, ⟨and when they want what is useful, they seek⟩ men who are clever at carrying out their orders, and these qualities are hardly ever found in the same person. Now, as we have stated,402 it is the good man who is pleasant and useful at the same time. But such a man does not become the friend of someone whose station is superior to his own, 35 unless that person is also superior to him in virtue. Unless that is the case, his friendship will not be based on ⟨proportionate⟩ equality, since he will not be surpassed ⟨by a virtue⟩ proportionate ⟨to the surpassing power⟩.403 But potentates of this sort are not often found.
That 5 is why young men become friends quickly and old men do not: people do not become friends of those in whom they find no joy. (This also applies to the sour.) Such men do, however, display good will toward one another, since one may wish for another's good and be ready to meet his needs. But they are not really friends, because they do not spend their days together and do not find joy in one another, 10 and these seem to be the chief marks of friendship.
To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many people at the same time. For love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique. It does not easily happen that one man finds many people very pleasing at the same time, nor perhaps does it easily happen that there are many people who are good. Also, one must have some experience of the other person 15 and have come to be familiar with him, and that is the hardest thing of all. But it is possible to please many people on the basis of usefulness and pleasantness, since many have these qualities, and the services they have to offer do not take a long time ⟨to recognize⟩.
Of these two kinds of friendship, the one that is based on what is pleasant bears a closer resemblance to ⟨true⟩ friendship, when both partners have the same to offer and when they find joy in one another 20 or in the same objects. Friendships of young people are of this kind. There is a greater element of generosity in such friendships, whereas friendships based on usefulness are for hucksters. Also, those who are supremely happy have no need of useful people, but they do need pleasant ones: they do wish to live in the company of others, and, though they can bear what is painful for a short time, no one could endure it continually—in fact, no one could continually endure 25 the Good itself,401 if that were painful to him. It is for this reason that they seek friends who are pleasant. They should, however, look for friends who are good as well as pleasant, and not only good, but good for them; for in this way they will have everything that friends should have.
People in positions of power seem to keep their various friends in separate compartments. One group of friends is useful to them and another pleasant, 30 but rarely do the same men belong in both groups. For these potentates do not seek friends who are both pleasant and virtuous nor friends who are useful for the attainment of noble objects. On the contrary, when their aim is to get something pleasant they seek witty people, ⟨and when they want what is useful, they seek⟩ men who are clever at carrying out their orders, and these qualities are hardly ever found in the same person. Now, as we have stated,402 it is the good man who is pleasant and useful at the same time. But such a man does not become the friend of someone whose station is superior to his own, 35 unless that person is also superior to him in virtue. Unless that is the case, his friendship will not be based on ⟨proportionate⟩ equality, since he will not be surpassed ⟨by a virtue⟩ proportionate ⟨to the surpassing power⟩.403 But potentates of this sort are not often found.
1158b
1 Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ
αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον
ἀνθ' ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας·
ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττόν εἰσιν αὗται φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται.
5 δοκοῦσι δὲ [καὶ] δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα
ταὐτοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ
τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει
ἣ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κἀκείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν
μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως
10 μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι,
δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.
1 In sum, the friendships we have so far discussed are based on equality; both partners receive and wish the same thing from and for one another, or they exchange one thing for another, for instance, pleasure for material advantage. That these kinds of friendship are inferior to and less lasting ⟨than true friendship⟩ has already been stated.404 5 Because of their resemblance and dissimilarity to the same thing, ⟨namely, to true friendship,⟩ they are regarded both as being and as not being friendship. They appear to be friendship in that they are like the friendship which is based on virtue or excellence:
one of these friendships has what is pleasant and the other has what is useful, and both these elements are inherent in friendship based on virtue. But since friendship based on virtue is proof against slander and lasting, while these kinds —besides many other differences—change 10 quickly, they do not appear to be friendships, because of their dissimilarity.
one of these friendships has what is pleasant and the other has what is useful, and both these elements are inherent in friendship based on virtue. But since friendship based on virtue is proof against slander and lasting, while these kinds —besides many other differences—change 10 quickly, they do not appear to be friendships, because of their dissimilarity.
Book 8,Chapter 7 (1158b11–1159a11)
Ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος
τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ
πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρί τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι
πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων·
15 οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους,
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα,
οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα
γὰρ ἑκάστου τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι'
ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.
20 ταὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ
ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς
γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ [υἱέσιν] ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος
ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν
πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν
25 δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν,
καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως·
ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεταί πως
ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.
Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ
30 φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον
πρώτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν
δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς
ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν
35 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν·
πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ
There exists another kind of friendship, which involves the superiority of one of the partners over the other, as in the friendship between father and son, and, in general, between an older and a younger person, between husband and wife, and between any kind of ruler and his subject. These kinds of friendship are different ⟨not only from those which involve equality, but⟩ also from one another: 15 the friendship which parents have for their children is not the same as that which a ruler has for his subjects, and even the friendship of a father for his son is different from that of the son for his father, and the friendship of a husband for his wife differs from that of a wife for her husband. For in each of these cases, the virtue or excellence and the function of each partner is different, and the cause of their affection, too, is different. Therefore, the affection and friendship they feel are correspondingly different. 20 It is clear that the partners do not receive the same thing from one another and should not seek to receive it. But when children render to their parents what is due to those who gave them life, and when parents render what is due to their children, the friendship between them will be lasting and equitable. In all friendships which involve the superiority of one of the partners, 25 the affection, too, must be proportionate: the better and more useful partner should receive more affection than he gives, and similarly for the superior partner in each case. For when the affection is proportionate to the merit of each partner, there is in some sense equality between them. And equality, as we have seen, seems to be part of friendship.
But the term "equal"405 apparently does not have the same meaning in friendship as it does in matters of justice. 30 In matters of justice, the equal is primarily proportionate to merit, and its quantitative sense, ⟨i.e., strict equality,⟩ is secondary; in friendship, on the other hand, the quantitative meaning ⟨of strict equality⟩ is primary and the sense of equality proportionate to merit is secondary. This becomes clear if there is a wide disparity between the partners as regards their virtue, vice, wealth, or anything else. For then they are no longer friends 35 or even expect to be friends. The most striking example of this is the gods, for their superiority in all good things is exceeding.
But the term "equal"405 apparently does not have the same meaning in friendship as it does in matters of justice. 30 In matters of justice, the equal is primarily proportionate to merit, and its quantitative sense, ⟨i.e., strict equality,⟩ is secondary; in friendship, on the other hand, the quantitative meaning ⟨of strict equality⟩ is primary and the sense of equality proportionate to merit is secondary. This becomes clear if there is a wide disparity between the partners as regards their virtue, vice, wealth, or anything else. For then they are no longer friends 35 or even expect to be friends. The most striking example of this is the gods, for their superiority in all good things is exceeding.
1159a
1 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι
οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ
μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν
ὁρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι
5 μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ
ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ
μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι
ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά. εἰ
δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ
10 ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ
δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα·
αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθά.
1 But the same point is clear in the case of kings. Persons much inferior to them in station do not expect to be friends with kings, nor do insignificant people expect to be friends with the best and wisest men. There is no exact line of demarcation in such cases to indicate up to what point ⟨of inequality⟩ men can still be friends. 5 The friendship can still remain even when much is taken away, but when one partner is quite separated from the other, as in the case of the divinity, it can remain no longer. This raises the question whether or not we wish our friends the greatest of all goods, namely, to be gods. For ⟨if that wish were fulfilled,⟩ they would no longer be our friends, and, since friends are something good, we would have lost this good. Accordingly, if our assertion406 is correct that a man wishes his friend's good for his friend's sake, 10 the friend would have to remain the man he was. Consequently, one will wish the greatest good for his friend as a human being. But perhaps not all the greatest goods, for each man wishes for his own good most of all.
Book 8,Chapter 8 (1159a12–1159b24)
Οἱ πολλοὶ
δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ
15 φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον
φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ
τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δι' αὑτὸ δ' ἐοίκασιν
αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι
γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι
20 διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἄν του
δέωνται· ὡς δὴ σημείῳ τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ)·
οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότων ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι
τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὑτῶν· χαίρουσι
δή, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.
25 τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον
εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ
εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι
εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔνιαι
γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι,
30 ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχηται,
ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας,
καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προςήκει
ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας
οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων
35 ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν,
Most people, because of ambition, seem to wish to receive affection rather than to give it. That is why most men like flattery, 15 for a flatterer is or pretends to be a friend in an inferior position, who pretends to give more affection than he receives. Receiving affection is regarded as closely related to being honored, and honor is, of course, the aim of most people. But, it seems, they do not choose honor for its own sake but only because it is incidental to something else. For most men enjoy being honored by those who occupy positions of power, 20 because it raises their hopes. They think they will get anything they need from the powerful, and they enjoy the honor they get as a token of benefits to come. Those, on the other hand, who desire honor from good and knowing men aim at having their own opinion of themselves confirmed.
They, therefore, enjoy ⟨the honor they get⟩ because ⟨their belief in⟩ their own goodness is reassured by the judgment of those who say that they are good. 25 But ⟨unlike honor⟩, affection is enjoyed for its own sake. Thus, receiving affection would seem to be better than receiving honor, and friendship would seem to be desirable for its own sake.
Nevertheless, friendship appears to consist in giving rather than in receiving affection. This is shown by the fact that mothers enjoy giving affection. Some mothers give their children away to be brought up by others, and though they know them and feel affection for them 30 they do not seek to receive affection in return, if they cannot have it both ways. It seems to be sufficient for them to see their children prosper and to feel affection for them, even if the children do not render their mother her due, because they do not know her.407 Since, then, friendship consists in giving rather ⟨than in receiving⟩ affection, and since we praise those who love their friends, 35 the giving of affection seems to constitute the proper virtue of friends, so that people who give affection to one another according to each other's merit
They, therefore, enjoy ⟨the honor they get⟩ because ⟨their belief in⟩ their own goodness is reassured by the judgment of those who say that they are good. 25 But ⟨unlike honor⟩, affection is enjoyed for its own sake. Thus, receiving affection would seem to be better than receiving honor, and friendship would seem to be desirable for its own sake.
Nevertheless, friendship appears to consist in giving rather than in receiving affection. This is shown by the fact that mothers enjoy giving affection. Some mothers give their children away to be brought up by others, and though they know them and feel affection for them 30 they do not seek to receive affection in return, if they cannot have it both ways. It seems to be sufficient for them to see their children prosper and to feel affection for them, even if the children do not render their mother her due, because they do not know her.407 Since, then, friendship consists in giving rather ⟨than in receiving⟩ affection, and since we praise those who love their friends, 35 the giving of affection seems to constitute the proper virtue of friends, so that people who give affection to one another according to each other's merit
1159b
1 οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ
ἄνισοι μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης
καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὑτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
5 μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα,
ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ'
αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ
τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὑτοῖς διαμένουσιν
ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι,
10 χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς
ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ
ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ
τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὴς
εἰδότι· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὤν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται
15 ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἄν τις ἕλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ
ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ
ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν·
ὁμοίως δὴ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον
ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου
20 καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ
μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ
γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν
ἀλλοτριώτερα.
1 are lasting friends and their friendship is a lasting friendship. It is in this way that even unequals are most likely to be friends, since equality may thus be established between them ⟨by a difference in the amount of affection given⟩. Friendship is equality408 and likeness, and especially the likeness of those who are similar in virtue. Because they are steadfast in themselves, 5 they are also steadfast toward one another; they neither request nor render any service that is base. On the contrary, one might even say that they prevent base services; for what characterizes good men is that they neither go wrong themselves nor let their friends do so. Bad people, on the other hand, do not have the element of constancy, for they do not remain similar even to themselves. But they do become friends for a short 10 time, when they find joy in one another's wickedness 10. Friends who are useful and pleasant to one another stay together for a longer time, for as long as they continue to provide each other with pleasures or material advantages.
It is chiefly from opposite partners that friendship based on usefulness seems to come into being, for example, from the combination of poor and rich, or ignorant and learned.
For a man aims at getting something he lacks, 15 and gives something else in return for it. We might also bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly, under this heading ⟨of the union of opposites⟩. That is why lovers occasionally appear ridiculous, when they expect to receive as much affection as they give. If they are similarly lovable, they are equally entitled to expect affection, but if they have nothing lovable about them, this is a ridiculous expectation.
But 20 perhaps opposites do not aim at each other as such but only incidentally, and perhaps their desire is really for what is median, since that is a good. The dry, for example, does not desire to become wet, but to arrive at a middle state, and similarly with the hot and with all other opposing principles. But let us dismiss these questions, as they belong to another subject, ⟨namely, physics⟩.
It is chiefly from opposite partners that friendship based on usefulness seems to come into being, for example, from the combination of poor and rich, or ignorant and learned.
For a man aims at getting something he lacks, 15 and gives something else in return for it. We might also bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly, under this heading ⟨of the union of opposites⟩. That is why lovers occasionally appear ridiculous, when they expect to receive as much affection as they give. If they are similarly lovable, they are equally entitled to expect affection, but if they have nothing lovable about them, this is a ridiculous expectation.
But 20 perhaps opposites do not aim at each other as such but only incidentally, and perhaps their desire is really for what is median, since that is a good. The dry, for example, does not desire to become wet, but to arrive at a middle state, and similarly with the hot and with all other opposing principles. But let us dismiss these questions, as they belong to another subject, ⟨namely, physics⟩.
Book 8,Chapter 9 (1159b25–1160a30)
25 Ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἥ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἁπάσῃ
γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προςαγορεύουσι
γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρατιώτας,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ'
30 ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων," ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ
γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις
πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἳ μὲν μᾶλλον
35 αἳ δ' ἧττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ
25 As we stated initially,409 it seems that friendship and the just deal with the same objects and involve the same persons. For there seems to be a notion of what is just in every community,410 and friendship seems to be involved as well. Men address as friends their fellow travelers on a voyage, their fellow soldiers, and similarly also those who are associated with them in other kinds of community. 30 Friendship is present to the extent that men share something in common, for that is also the extent to which they share a view of what is just. And the proverb "friends hold in common what they have" is correct, for friendship consists in community. Brothers and bosom companions hold everything in common, while all others only hold certain definite things in common—some more and others less, since some friendships are more intense than others. 35 Questions of what is just also differ ⟨with different forms of friendship⟩.
1160a
1 ταὐτὰ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
οὐδ' ἑταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἑκάστους τούτων, καὶ
αὔξησιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα
5 ἀποστερῆσαι ἑταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ
βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὁντινοῦν
ἄλλον. αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον,
ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα. αἱ
δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοίκασι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπορεύονται
10 γὰρ ἐπί τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοί τι τῶν
εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος
χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου
γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι
τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη
15 τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν
πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται
δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως
ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται.
[ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν
20 καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας.]
πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ
τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς
ἅπαντα τὸν βίον * * θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας
συνόδους, τιμάς <τε> ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις
25 πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ
σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς
οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον
τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὴ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς
πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς
30 τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.
1 What is just is not the same for parents with regard to their children and for brothers with regard to one another, nor is it the same for bosom companions as for fellow citizens, and similarly in the other kinds of friendship.
There is of course a corresponding difference in what is unjust in each of these relationships: the gravity of an unjust act increases in proportion as the person to whom it is done is a closer friend. It is, for example, 5 more shocking to defraud a bosom companion of money than a fellow citizen, to refuse help to a brother than to refuse it to a stranger, or to strike one's father than to strike any other person. It is natural that the element of justice increases with ⟨the closeness of⟩ the friendship, since friendship and what is just exist in the same relationship and are coextensive in range.
All communities are like parts of the political community ⟨or state⟩. Men combine 10 with an eye to some advantage or to provide some of the necessities of life, and we think of the political community as having initially come together and as enduring to secure the advantage ⟨of its members⟩. This is indeed the goal which lawgivers aim at, and men call "just"
what is to the common advantage. Now, all other forms of community aim at some partial advantage. 15 Sailors associate for the advantages seafaring brings in the form of making money and something of that sort. Soldiers work together for the advantages war brings and what they desire is money, victory, or the conquest of a city. 20 Similarly fellow tribesmen and fellow demesmen411 come together when they offer sacrifice and hold gatherings for such a purpose, which pays homage to the gods and provides recreation 25 and pleasure for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and festive gatherings ⟨of the tribes and demes⟩ take place after the harvest as a kind of offering of first fruits, for these were the seasons at which people used to have most leisure. But all these communities seem to be encompassed by the community that is the state; for the political community does not aim at the advantage of the moment, but at what is advantageous for the whole of life. Thus all associations seem to be parts of the political community, 30 but the kind of friendship prevalent in each will be determined by the kind of association it is.
There is of course a corresponding difference in what is unjust in each of these relationships: the gravity of an unjust act increases in proportion as the person to whom it is done is a closer friend. It is, for example, 5 more shocking to defraud a bosom companion of money than a fellow citizen, to refuse help to a brother than to refuse it to a stranger, or to strike one's father than to strike any other person. It is natural that the element of justice increases with ⟨the closeness of⟩ the friendship, since friendship and what is just exist in the same relationship and are coextensive in range.
All communities are like parts of the political community ⟨or state⟩. Men combine 10 with an eye to some advantage or to provide some of the necessities of life, and we think of the political community as having initially come together and as enduring to secure the advantage ⟨of its members⟩. This is indeed the goal which lawgivers aim at, and men call "just"
what is to the common advantage. Now, all other forms of community aim at some partial advantage. 15 Sailors associate for the advantages seafaring brings in the form of making money and something of that sort. Soldiers work together for the advantages war brings and what they desire is money, victory, or the conquest of a city. 20 Similarly fellow tribesmen and fellow demesmen411 come together when they offer sacrifice and hold gatherings for such a purpose, which pays homage to the gods and provides recreation 25 and pleasure for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and festive gatherings ⟨of the tribes and demes⟩ take place after the harvest as a kind of offering of first fruits, for these were the seasons at which people used to have most leisure. But all these communities seem to be encompassed by the community that is the state; for the political community does not aim at the advantage of the moment, but at what is advantageous for the whole of life. Thus all associations seem to be parts of the political community, 30 but the kind of friendship prevalent in each will be determined by the kind of association it is.
Book 8,Chapter 10 (1160a31–1161a9)
Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις,
οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία
τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν
τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν
35 εἰώθασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ
βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις δὲ βασιλείας
There are three ⟨true⟩ forms of constitution413 and an equal number of perversions—corruptions, as it were—from these.
The ⟨true⟩ constitutions are kingship, aristocracy, and, in the third place, a constitution based on property qualification, 35 to which the description "timocratic"414 seems appropriate, though most people are used to calling it "constitutional government." Of these three, kingship is the best and timocracy the worst.
The ⟨true⟩ constitutions are kingship, aristocracy, and, in the third place, a constitution based on property qualification, 35 to which the description "timocratic"414 seems appropriate, though most people are used to calling it "constitutional government." Of these three, kingship is the best and timocracy the worst.
1160b
1 μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ
πλεῖστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ,
ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς
ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ
5 τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὑτῷ μὲν οὐκ
ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς
ἄν τις εἴη βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ·
τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης
ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ.
10 μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ
ἐστι μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς, ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος
γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακίᾳ τῶν
ἀρχόντων, οἳ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ
πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
15 ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι
δὴ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ
τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται·
πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι
πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ
20 δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας
εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι·
ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾷστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα
δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν
ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας
25 ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει· ἐντεῦθεν
δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ
γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις
δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς
υἱέσιν. τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ
30 τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν
ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων
γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ
φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ
περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἁρμόζει,
35 ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδωσιν. ἁπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν
μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ
1 The perversion of kingship is tyranny: both are forms of one-man rule, but the difference between them is very considerable. A tyrant looks out for his own advantage, whereas a king looks out for the advantage of his subjects. For only a person who is self-sufficient and superior ⟨to his subjects⟩ in all good things can be a king. 5 A person such as that needs nothing in addition to what he has, and will, therefore, not look to his own advantage, but to that of his subjects. If he is not a man of this sort, he will be king ⟨in name only and⟩ merely by virtue of the lot.415 Tyranny is the exact opposite of kingship in that the tyrant pursues his own good. In the case of tyranny, it is even more obvious that it is the worst ⟨form of government than in the case of timocracy, which is still, after all, a constitutional form of government⟩: what is opposite to the best is the 10 worst.
Kingship leads to tyranny. For tyranny is the depraved form of one-man rule, and a wicked king turns into a tyrant.
⟨Similarly,⟩ aristocracy may change to oligarchy through the vice of its rulers, when they fail to distribute according to merit what the city has to offer, when they take all or most good things for themselves, 15 when they appoint always the same people to public office, and when they value wealth more highly than anything else. The result will be that a few wicked men rule instead of the most honest. ⟨The third process of deterioration is from⟩ timocracy to democracy. These two border on one another. For, ⟨like democracy,⟩ timocracy too tends to be essentially rule of the majority, and all those who meet the property qualifications are equal. ⟨Of the perverted forms,⟩ 20 democracy is the least wicked, since its perversion of the constitutional kind of government is only small.
These, then, are the ways in which constitutions are most likely to change, since the transition ⟨in these three cases⟩ is shortest and most easily effected.
Resemblances to these forms of government—models, as it were—can be found in the household. The community or association of father and sons has the form of kingship, 25 since the father's concern is for his children. That is precisely the reason why Homer addresses Zeus as "Father," for kingship means paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the rule of the father is tyrannical, since they treat their sons like slaves. The association of master and slave, too, is tyrannical, 30 since it is the master's advantage which is accomplished in it.
Now, while the relationship of slavery appears correct, the Persian tyranny ⟨of the father⟩ is mistaken: different kinds of subjects416 need different kinds of rule. The association of husband and wife is evidently aristocratic. For the husband's rule depends on his worth or merit, and the sphere of his rule is that which is proper to a man. 35 Whatever is more suited to a woman he turns over to his wife. But whenever the husband takes the authority over all ⟨household⟩ matters into his hand, he transforms the association into an oligarchy, since in doing so he violates the principle of merit
Kingship leads to tyranny. For tyranny is the depraved form of one-man rule, and a wicked king turns into a tyrant.
⟨Similarly,⟩ aristocracy may change to oligarchy through the vice of its rulers, when they fail to distribute according to merit what the city has to offer, when they take all or most good things for themselves, 15 when they appoint always the same people to public office, and when they value wealth more highly than anything else. The result will be that a few wicked men rule instead of the most honest. ⟨The third process of deterioration is from⟩ timocracy to democracy. These two border on one another. For, ⟨like democracy,⟩ timocracy too tends to be essentially rule of the majority, and all those who meet the property qualifications are equal. ⟨Of the perverted forms,⟩ 20 democracy is the least wicked, since its perversion of the constitutional kind of government is only small.
These, then, are the ways in which constitutions are most likely to change, since the transition ⟨in these three cases⟩ is shortest and most easily effected.
Resemblances to these forms of government—models, as it were—can be found in the household. The community or association of father and sons has the form of kingship, 25 since the father's concern is for his children. That is precisely the reason why Homer addresses Zeus as "Father," for kingship means paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the rule of the father is tyrannical, since they treat their sons like slaves. The association of master and slave, too, is tyrannical, 30 since it is the master's advantage which is accomplished in it.
Now, while the relationship of slavery appears correct, the Persian tyranny ⟨of the father⟩ is mistaken: different kinds of subjects416 need different kinds of rule. The association of husband and wife is evidently aristocratic. For the husband's rule depends on his worth or merit, and the sphere of his rule is that which is proper to a man. 35 Whatever is more suited to a woman he turns over to his wife. But whenever the husband takes the authority over all ⟨household⟩ matters into his hand, he transforms the association into an oligarchy, since in doing so he violates the principle of merit
1161a
1 οὐχ ᾗ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι
οὖσαι· οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον
καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικῇ
δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον
5 ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις
διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία
δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα
γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ
ἑκάστῳ ἐξουσία.
1 and does not rule by virtue of his superiority. Sometimes the wife rules because she is an heiress. But of course this kind of rule is not in terms of excellence or virtue, but is based on wealth and power, just as in oligarchies. The association of brothers, on the other hand, resembles timocratic rule: they are equal 5 except to the extent that they differ in age. Therefore, if the difference in age is great, their friendship is no longer of the fraternal kind. Democracy, in turn, is found principally in habitations which have no master, where everyone is on an equal footing, and also in communities where the ruler is weak and everyone can do as he pleases.
Book 8,Chapter 11 (1161a10–1161b10)
10 Καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ'
ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους
ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους,
εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν,
ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα
15 ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική,
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ
εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. καὶ
τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν
πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευομένων.
20 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται
οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταὐτὸ ἀλλὰ τὸ
κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς
γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν
γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἁρμόζον ἑκάστῳ·
25 οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ
ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιῶται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς
καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ
κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικήν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ
ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ
30 καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν
τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς
γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ
φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ
35 ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελεῖται
10 Each of these constitutions exhibits friendship to the same extent that it exhibits ⟨a notion of⟩ what is just. The friendship of a king for those who live under his rule depends on his superior ability to do good. He confers benefits upon his subjects, since he is good and cares for them in order to promote their welfare, just as a shepherd cares for his 15 sheep.
Hence, Homer spoke of Agamemnon as "shepherd of the people." The friendship of a father ⟨for his children⟩ is of the same kind, but it differs in the magnitude of benefits bestowed. For he is the author of their being, which is regarded as the greatest good, and he is responsible for maintaining and educating them. We also attribute these benefits to our ancestors. Furthermore, it is by nature that a father rules over his children, ancestors over their descendants, and a king over his subjects. 20 These kinds of friendship depend on superiority, and that is why we ⟨do not only love but⟩ also honor our parents.
Accordingly, in those relationships the same thing is not just for both partners, but what is just depends on worth or merit, and the same is true for friendship.
The friendship between husband and wife is the same as that in an aristocracy. It is based on excellence or virtue: the superior partner gets a larger share of good, and each gets 25 what is suited to him, and the same relationship holds for what is just.
The friendship of brothers is like friendship among bosom companions. For they are equal and belong to the same age group, and where that is the case, men generally have the same emotions and the same characters. The kind of friendship which we find in a timocratic form of government is also similar to this friendship between brothers. For ⟨in timocratic government⟩ the citizens tend to be equal and decent. They hold office in turn and on an equal footing, and, accordingly, their friendship too is based on equality.
In 30 the perverted constitutions, the role of friendship decreases to the same extent as the part played by the just. It is least significant in the worst form: in a tyranny, friendship has little or no place. For where ruler and ruled have nothing in common, there is no friendship ⟨nor any justice⟩, either.
Thus there is nothing just in the relation of a craftsman to his tool, 35 of the soul to the body, and of a master to his slave. It is true that in all these cases ⟨the instrument⟩ derives a benefit from its user,
Hence, Homer spoke of Agamemnon as "shepherd of the people." The friendship of a father ⟨for his children⟩ is of the same kind, but it differs in the magnitude of benefits bestowed. For he is the author of their being, which is regarded as the greatest good, and he is responsible for maintaining and educating them. We also attribute these benefits to our ancestors. Furthermore, it is by nature that a father rules over his children, ancestors over their descendants, and a king over his subjects. 20 These kinds of friendship depend on superiority, and that is why we ⟨do not only love but⟩ also honor our parents.
Accordingly, in those relationships the same thing is not just for both partners, but what is just depends on worth or merit, and the same is true for friendship.
The friendship between husband and wife is the same as that in an aristocracy. It is based on excellence or virtue: the superior partner gets a larger share of good, and each gets 25 what is suited to him, and the same relationship holds for what is just.
The friendship of brothers is like friendship among bosom companions. For they are equal and belong to the same age group, and where that is the case, men generally have the same emotions and the same characters. The kind of friendship which we find in a timocratic form of government is also similar to this friendship between brothers. For ⟨in timocratic government⟩ the citizens tend to be equal and decent. They hold office in turn and on an equal footing, and, accordingly, their friendship too is based on equality.
In 30 the perverted constitutions, the role of friendship decreases to the same extent as the part played by the just. It is least significant in the worst form: in a tyranny, friendship has little or no place. For where ruler and ruled have nothing in common, there is no friendship ⟨nor any justice⟩, either.
Thus there is nothing just in the relation of a craftsman to his tool, 35 of the soul to the body, and of a master to his slave. It is true that in all these cases ⟨the instrument⟩ derives a benefit from its user,
1161b
1 μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ
ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ
βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν·
ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος.
5 ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ'
ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς
πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ
φιλία δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς
τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις
10 ἐπὶ πλεῖον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.
1 but there can be neither friendship nor anything just in a relationship to inanimate objects. Nor can either exist with a horse or an ox, nor with a slave as slave, since the partners have nothing in common. For a slave is a living tool, and a tool is an inanimate slave. 5 Accordingly, inasmuch as he is a slave, there can be no friendship with him, but there can be friendship with him as a man. For there seems to be some element of justice in any human being's relationship to a man capable of sharing in law and contract.
Therefore, friendship, too, is possible with him inasmuch as he is a human being. Consequently, friendship and the just can play a small part even in tyrannies. 10 In democracies, their part is larger, since where the citizens are equal, they have many things in common.
Therefore, friendship, too, is possible with him inasmuch as he is a human being. Consequently, friendship and the just can play a small part even in tyrannies. 10 In democracies, their part is larger, since where the citizens are equal, they have many things in common.
Book 8,Chapter 12 (1161b11–1162a33)
Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.
ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις τήν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικήν.
αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί,
καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ
15 καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν
ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται
πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἠρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς·
οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα,
τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον
20 δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ
τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνωκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ
τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ
ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὀδοὺς θρὶξ ὁτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐδὲν
τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἧττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἳ μὲν
25 γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου
τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἴσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ
δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν
τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι
αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα,
30 ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι·
ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ·
ὅθεν φασὶ ταὐτὸν αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ
δὴ ταὐτό πως καὶ ἐν διῃρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν
καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἧλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα,
35 καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ
All friendship, as we have stated,417 involves a community or association. But we should probably consider friendship between kinsmen and friendship between bosom companions separately. Friendships between fellow citizens, fellow tribesmen, fellow voyagers, and so forth, ⟨as compared with these,⟩ seem to be determined to a greater extent by the ⟨external⟩ community, in that they are evidently 15 based on some sort of an agreement ⟨to do certain things in common⟩. With these we might also classify the friendship between host and guest.
There are, apparently, many kinds of friendship among kinsmen, but all seem to depend upon parental friendship.
For parents love their children as something which belongs to them, while children love their parents because they owe their being to them. 20 But parents know better that the offspring is theirs than children know that they are their parents' offspring, and the bond which ties the begetter to the begotten is closer than that which ties the generated to its author. For that which has sprung from a thing belongs to its source, for example, a tooth, a hair, and so forth belongs to its owner, but the source does not belong at all—or only to a lesser degree —to that which has sprung from it. Moreover, ⟨there is also a difference between the love of parents and the love of children⟩ in point of time: 25 parents love their children as soon as they are born, but children their parents only as, with the passage of time, they acquire understanding or perception.
This also explains why affection felt by mothers is greater ⟨than that of fathers⟩.
So we see that parents love their children as themselves:
offspring is, as it were, another self, "other" because it exists separately. Children love their parents because they were born of them, 30 while brothers love one another because they were born of the same parents: the identical relation they have with their parents makes them identical with one another. This is the origin of expressions like "of the same blood," "of the same stock," and so forth. Brothers are, therefore, in a sense identical, though the identity resides in separate persons. Of great importance to friendship is common upbringing and closeness in age: "Two of an age ⟨delight each other⟩" and 35 "familiarity makes for fellowship."418 That is why friendship between brothers resembles friendship between club members or bosom companions.419
There are, apparently, many kinds of friendship among kinsmen, but all seem to depend upon parental friendship.
For parents love their children as something which belongs to them, while children love their parents because they owe their being to them. 20 But parents know better that the offspring is theirs than children know that they are their parents' offspring, and the bond which ties the begetter to the begotten is closer than that which ties the generated to its author. For that which has sprung from a thing belongs to its source, for example, a tooth, a hair, and so forth belongs to its owner, but the source does not belong at all—or only to a lesser degree —to that which has sprung from it. Moreover, ⟨there is also a difference between the love of parents and the love of children⟩ in point of time: 25 parents love their children as soon as they are born, but children their parents only as, with the passage of time, they acquire understanding or perception.
This also explains why affection felt by mothers is greater ⟨than that of fathers⟩.
So we see that parents love their children as themselves:
offspring is, as it were, another self, "other" because it exists separately. Children love their parents because they were born of them, 30 while brothers love one another because they were born of the same parents: the identical relation they have with their parents makes them identical with one another. This is the origin of expressions like "of the same blood," "of the same stock," and so forth. Brothers are, therefore, in a sense identical, though the identity resides in separate persons. Of great importance to friendship is common upbringing and closeness in age: "Two of an age ⟨delight each other⟩" and 35 "familiarity makes for fellowship."418 That is why friendship between brothers resembles friendship between club members or bosom companions.419
1162a
1 ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων
συνῳκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ'
οἳ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἳ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω
τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις,
5 καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον·
εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασι τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι
αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ
ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων,
ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ
10 ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς
ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ
γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέστεροι
οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες
ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ
15 βεβαιοτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν
τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ
φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία
πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν
20 ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον
τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν
βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς
καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες
τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ
25 καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετήν,
εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ χαίροιεν ἂν
τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θᾶττον
οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν,
συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς βιωτέον ἀνδρὶ
30 πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον
φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται
τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἑταῖρον
καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.
1 The bond between cousins and between other relations is based on the bond between brothers, and thus on the fact that they are ⟨ultimately⟩ descended from the same parents. They feel a more or a less close attachment to one another, depending on how close or remote the common forebear is.
The friendship of children to their parents 5 and of man to the gods is friendship to what is good and superior. For ⟨parents⟩ are the greatest benefactors ⟨children have⟩: they are responsible for their being and their nurture, and for their education once they have been born. But this kind of friendship has also a higher degree of what is pleasant and useful than does friendship with persons outside the family, inasmuch as the partners have more of their life in 10 common.
Friendship between brothers has elements which are also found in friendship between bosom companions. It has them in a higher degree when the brothers are good men and, in general, when they are like one another, inasmuch as they are more closely linked together and have been loving one another since birth, and inasmuch as children of the same parents, who have been brought up together and have received a similar education, are more alike in character. Also, there is the test of time to which brothers are subjected more thoroughly and reliably than anyone else. 15 The friendly relationships among other relatives are analogous, ⟨that is, they vary in proportion to the closeness of their kinship⟩.
The friendship between man and wife420 seems to be inherent in us by nature. For man is by nature more inclined to live in couples than to live as a social and political being, inasmuch as the household is earlier421 and more indispensable than the state, and to the extent that procreation is a bond more universal to all living things ⟨than living in a state⟩.
In the case of other animals, 20 the association goes no further than this. But human beings live together not merely for procreation, but also to secure the needs of life. There is division of labor from the very beginning and different functions for man and wife. Thus they satisfy one another's needs by contributing each his own to the common store. For that reason, this kind of friendship brings both usefulness 25 and pleasantness with it, and if the partners are good, it may even be based on virtue or excellence. For each partner has his own peculiar excellence and they can find joy in that fact.
Children are regarded as the bond that holds them together, and that is why childless marriages break up more easily. For children are a good common to both partners, and what people have in common holds them together. How a man is to regulate his life in relation to his wife and, in general, 30 how a person is to regulate his life in relation to his friend, appears to be tantamount to inquiring what constitutes just conduct for them. For just behavior between friends is apparently not the same as between strangers, or as between bosom companions or club members, or between schoolmates.
The friendship of children to their parents 5 and of man to the gods is friendship to what is good and superior. For ⟨parents⟩ are the greatest benefactors ⟨children have⟩: they are responsible for their being and their nurture, and for their education once they have been born. But this kind of friendship has also a higher degree of what is pleasant and useful than does friendship with persons outside the family, inasmuch as the partners have more of their life in 10 common.
Friendship between brothers has elements which are also found in friendship between bosom companions. It has them in a higher degree when the brothers are good men and, in general, when they are like one another, inasmuch as they are more closely linked together and have been loving one another since birth, and inasmuch as children of the same parents, who have been brought up together and have received a similar education, are more alike in character. Also, there is the test of time to which brothers are subjected more thoroughly and reliably than anyone else. 15 The friendly relationships among other relatives are analogous, ⟨that is, they vary in proportion to the closeness of their kinship⟩.
The friendship between man and wife420 seems to be inherent in us by nature. For man is by nature more inclined to live in couples than to live as a social and political being, inasmuch as the household is earlier421 and more indispensable than the state, and to the extent that procreation is a bond more universal to all living things ⟨than living in a state⟩.
In the case of other animals, 20 the association goes no further than this. But human beings live together not merely for procreation, but also to secure the needs of life. There is division of labor from the very beginning and different functions for man and wife. Thus they satisfy one another's needs by contributing each his own to the common store. For that reason, this kind of friendship brings both usefulness 25 and pleasantness with it, and if the partners are good, it may even be based on virtue or excellence. For each partner has his own peculiar excellence and they can find joy in that fact.
Children are regarded as the bond that holds them together, and that is why childless marriages break up more easily. For children are a good common to both partners, and what people have in common holds them together. How a man is to regulate his life in relation to his wife and, in general, 30 how a person is to regulate his life in relation to his friend, appears to be tantamount to inquiring what constitutes just conduct for them. For just behavior between friends is apparently not the same as between strangers, or as between bosom companions or club members, or between schoolmates.
Book 8,Chapter 13 (1162a34–1163a23)
Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται,
35 καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ
καθ' ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ
There are, as we said at the outset,422 three kinds of friendship. 35 Within each kind, people may either be friends on the basis of equality or one partner may be superior to the other.
In other words, equally good persons can become friends
In other words, equally good persons can become friends
1162b
1 ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,
ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους
μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν,
τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι.
5 γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ
τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν
γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται
(τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἁμιλλωμένων
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ
10 εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἂν ᾖ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται
εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται,
οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται.
οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν
γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος
15 δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ
συνημερεύειν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ'
ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται,
καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται
ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ
20 δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες
δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν,
τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ
χρήσιμον φιλίας ἣ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἣ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται
οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι
25 καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ
ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ
δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ
τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον,
φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διόπερ ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων
30 δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας.
ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται
ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλέον,
ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας
καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει
35 διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά,
προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ
1 or a better man can become the friend of a worse, and, similarly, those who find each other pleasant or whose relation is based on usefulness may be equal or unequal in the benefits they confer upon one another. In view of all this, those who are equal must respect the principle of equality by giving equal affection to one another and by establishing equality in other respects, while those who are unequal must make a return proportionate to their superiority or inferiority.
Complaints 5 and reproaches occur only or chiefly in friendships based on usefulness, as is to be expected. For when people are friends on the basis of virtue or excellence, they are eager to do good to one another, since that is a mark of excellence as well as of friendship. In this kind of competition, complaints and quarrels do not exist, for no one is annoyed at a person for giving affection and being his benefactor; 10 on the contrary, a cultivated man retaliates by doing good in turn. If a person gives more than he receives, he will have no complaints against his friend, since he accomplishes what he set out to do: for each one desires ⟨to give as well as receive⟩ what is good.
Nor do complaints occur very much in friendships based on pleasure. For the desire of both partners is fulfilled at the same time if they enjoy spending time together. In fact, 15 a man would impress us as ridiculous if he complained that he did not find his friend delightful, since he is free not to spend his days with him.
However, friendship based on usefulness is subject to complaints. For where material advantage is the purpose of the relationship, people always want more and think they have less than they should have; they blame their partners that they are not getting all they need, though they deserve it. ⟨In this case,⟩ 20 the benefactors are unable to satisfy the wants of the recipients.
The just, it seems, has two aspects: one is unwritten and the other laid down by law. Friendship based on usefulness has two corresponding aspects: one kind seems to be moral and the other legal. Now, complaints are most liable to arise when the partners contract their friendship in one of these forms and dissolve it in terms of the other. 25 A friendship formed on fixed conditions is legal friendship. ⟨It takes two forms:⟩ one is purely commercial and is an exchange from hand to hand, while the other is more generous in allowing time for payment, though it is still based on a *quid-pro-quo* agreement. In this kind of relationship, the obligation is clear and not open to dispute, and, further, the delay in payment contains an element of friendship. That is why in some places 30 such cases are not actionable, and the belief is that people who have transacted business with each other in good faith ought to be on good terms with one another.
The moral kind of friendship, on the other hand, is not formed on fixed conditions. Gifts are given or favors done to the partner as a friend, but the giver expects to get back an equal or greater amount on the assumption that this was not a gift but a loan. He will complain because he has not contracted his friendship in the same form in which he dissolves it, ⟨i.e., he acts as if he had contracted it on fixed terms⟩. 35 The reason for this is that all men or most wish for what is noble, but in fact prefer what is to their material advantage. It is noble to do good to another person without expecting good in return, but it is profitable to be the recipient of good deeds.
Complaints 5 and reproaches occur only or chiefly in friendships based on usefulness, as is to be expected. For when people are friends on the basis of virtue or excellence, they are eager to do good to one another, since that is a mark of excellence as well as of friendship. In this kind of competition, complaints and quarrels do not exist, for no one is annoyed at a person for giving affection and being his benefactor; 10 on the contrary, a cultivated man retaliates by doing good in turn. If a person gives more than he receives, he will have no complaints against his friend, since he accomplishes what he set out to do: for each one desires ⟨to give as well as receive⟩ what is good.
Nor do complaints occur very much in friendships based on pleasure. For the desire of both partners is fulfilled at the same time if they enjoy spending time together. In fact, 15 a man would impress us as ridiculous if he complained that he did not find his friend delightful, since he is free not to spend his days with him.
However, friendship based on usefulness is subject to complaints. For where material advantage is the purpose of the relationship, people always want more and think they have less than they should have; they blame their partners that they are not getting all they need, though they deserve it. ⟨In this case,⟩ 20 the benefactors are unable to satisfy the wants of the recipients.
The just, it seems, has two aspects: one is unwritten and the other laid down by law. Friendship based on usefulness has two corresponding aspects: one kind seems to be moral and the other legal. Now, complaints are most liable to arise when the partners contract their friendship in one of these forms and dissolve it in terms of the other. 25 A friendship formed on fixed conditions is legal friendship. ⟨It takes two forms:⟩ one is purely commercial and is an exchange from hand to hand, while the other is more generous in allowing time for payment, though it is still based on a *quid-pro-quo* agreement. In this kind of relationship, the obligation is clear and not open to dispute, and, further, the delay in payment contains an element of friendship. That is why in some places 30 such cases are not actionable, and the belief is that people who have transacted business with each other in good faith ought to be on good terms with one another.
The moral kind of friendship, on the other hand, is not formed on fixed conditions. Gifts are given or favors done to the partner as a friend, but the giver expects to get back an equal or greater amount on the assumption that this was not a gift but a loan. He will complain because he has not contracted his friendship in the same form in which he dissolves it, ⟨i.e., he acts as if he had contracted it on fixed terms⟩. 35 The reason for this is that all men or most wish for what is noble, but in fact prefer what is to their material advantage. It is noble to do good to another person without expecting good in return, but it is profitable to be the recipient of good deeds.
1163a
1 ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. δυναμένῳ
δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν [καὶ ἑκόντι] (ἄκοντα
γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον· ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ
καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει—οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι'
5 αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος—καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα
διαλυτέον)· καὶ † ὁμολογήσαι δ' † ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν·
ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ διδοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν. ὥστ' εἰ δυνατόν,
ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ
ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένῃ ἢ μή. ἀμφισβήτησιν
10 δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ
πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος
εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν
παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ'
ἑτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἳ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα
15 τῶν παρ' αὑτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν
κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις. ἆρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον
τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος
γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν
ἴσην· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται,
20 καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλέον·
κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ
ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς
ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.
1 Accordingly, if the recipient is able to do so, he ought to return an equivalent of what he received, and he ought to give it willingly.423 For we must not treat a man as our friend against his will: in other words, we must realize that we went wrong at the beginning when we accepted a good deed from the wrong person. ⟨In this case⟩ the benefactor was not a friend and did not act from a motive of friendship. 5 We ought, therefore, to break off the relationship as if we had been the recipient of a good deed on fixed conditions. ⟨If we had realized at the beginning what the relationship would be,⟩ we would have agreed to make return if able to do so. On the other hand, if we were unable to repay, even the giver would not have expected us to do so. Therefore, we should make return if we can. But one should examine at the beginning by whom the good deed is done and what his conditions are, so that one can accept it on these conditions or reject it.
It 10 is a moot question whether we ought to measure a good deed by the material advantage the recipient derives from it, and make the return commensurate with this advantage, or whether it should be measured by the beneficence of the person who performs it. Recipients minimize the action and say that what they received meant little to their benefactors, and that they might just as well have got it from someone else.
Givers, on the contrary, assert that they gave the most valuable thing they had, 15 that it was not available from any other source, and that it was given at a critical moment or in an emergency.
Now, since the friendship is based on usefulness the material advantage to the recipient is surely the true measure. It is he who stands in need, while the other satisfies it in the expectation of getting an equivalent return. Accordingly, the value of the assistance is just as great as the amount of benefit received, and, therefore, 20 the recipient must repay the amount of the advantage he reaped from it—or even more, for that would be nobler. In friendship based on excellence or virtue, however, there are no complaints, and the moral purpose or choice of the giver serves as a kind of measure. For the decisive factor for virtue and character lies in moral choice.
It 10 is a moot question whether we ought to measure a good deed by the material advantage the recipient derives from it, and make the return commensurate with this advantage, or whether it should be measured by the beneficence of the person who performs it. Recipients minimize the action and say that what they received meant little to their benefactors, and that they might just as well have got it from someone else.
Givers, on the contrary, assert that they gave the most valuable thing they had, 15 that it was not available from any other source, and that it was given at a critical moment or in an emergency.
Now, since the friendship is based on usefulness the material advantage to the recipient is surely the true measure. It is he who stands in need, while the other satisfies it in the expectation of getting an equivalent return. Accordingly, the value of the assistance is just as great as the amount of benefit received, and, therefore, 20 the recipient must repay the amount of the advantage he reaped from it—or even more, for that would be nobler. In friendship based on excellence or virtue, however, there are no complaints, and the moral purpose or choice of the giver serves as a kind of measure. For the decisive factor for virtue and character lies in moral choice.
Book 8,Chapter 14 (1163a24–1163b28)
Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις·
25 ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται,
διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν
αὑτῷ πλέον ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον· ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον
ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ
30 κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. οἴονται
γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν
οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ
δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι
τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ
35 ἢ δυνάστῃ φίλον εἶναι, μηδέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν;
In those friendships, too, in which one partner is superior to the other, disagreements occur. 25 Each partner thinks that he is entitled to more than the other, and when he gets it the friendship ends. If one partner is better than the other, he thinks he has more than the other coming to him, since the larger share ought to be assigned to the good. The same thing happens when one of the partners is more useful than the other; people say that a useless man should not have as large a share ⟨as a useful person⟩. A friendship becomes a public service424 30 if what the man gets out of his friendship is not what he deserves on the basis of his contribution. The usual view is that a friendship should be like a business partnership:425 those who contribute more should also take more of the proceeds. The inferior partner who stands in need takes the reverse position. It is the mark of a good friend, he argues, to come to the aid of the needy. What is the use of being a friend of a man of high moral standards 35 or power, they ask, if you are to get nothing out of it?
1163b
1 ἔοικε δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλέον
νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι
τιμῆς τῷ δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς
καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία
5 τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται·
οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων·
τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ
κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν
καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει·
10 τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ
τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ
σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις
ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς
ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.
15 τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς
καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν ἀξίαν ποτ' ἂν ἀποδοίη, εἰς
δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν δόξειεν
οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν·
20 ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν
ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ' ἀεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται,
ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή. ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδείς ποτ'
ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ· χωρὶς
γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ
25 διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν,
μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ
δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
1 Now it seems that both partners are right in their claims: each is entitled to get a larger share from the friendship, but not a larger share of the same thing. The superior partner ought to be given a larger share of honor and the needy partner a larger share of profit. For the reward of excellence and beneficence is honor, whereas profit is the ⟨form taken by⟩ assistance to one in need.
We 5 see the same situation also in political systems. A person who contributes nothing good to the common interest is not held in honor. For what belongs to the community is given to him who works for the common good, and this common possession is honor. It is impossible to enrich oneself at the expense of the community and to be honored by the community at the same time. Yet no one can put up with the smaller share in everything. 10 Therefore, if a man sustains financial loss, honor is his reward, and if he is venal, money. For a return proportionate to merit restores equality and preserves the friendship, as we have said.426
Accordingly, this is the basis for relations between unequals. The person who has profited in money or in excellence must give honor in return, for in giving that he gives what it is possible for him to give. 15 Friendship demands the possible; it does not demand what the giver deserves. In some cases, in fact, it is impossible to make the kind of return which the giver deserves, for instance, in the honors we pay to the gods and to our parents. Here no one could ever make a worthy return, and we regard a man as good if he serves them to the best of his ability.
That is why it would seem that a son does not have the right to disown his father, whereas a father has the right to disown his son. 20 A debtor must pay his debt, but nothing a son may have done ⟨to repay his father⟩ is a worthy return for everything his father has provided for him, and therefore he will always be in his debt. But a creditor is free to remit the debt, and a father likewise. At the same time it seems unlikely that any father would break off relations with his son, unless the son were exceedingly wicked. For apart from the natural friendship ⟨which a father feels for his son⟩, it is only human not to reject the assistance ⟨which a son may offer in old age⟩. 25 The son, on the other hand, if he is wicked, will regard the task of satisfying his father's needs as something to be avoided or not to be eagerly pursued. For most people wish to be the recipients of good deeds, but avoid performing them because they are unprofitable. So much, then, on this subject.
We 5 see the same situation also in political systems. A person who contributes nothing good to the common interest is not held in honor. For what belongs to the community is given to him who works for the common good, and this common possession is honor. It is impossible to enrich oneself at the expense of the community and to be honored by the community at the same time. Yet no one can put up with the smaller share in everything. 10 Therefore, if a man sustains financial loss, honor is his reward, and if he is venal, money. For a return proportionate to merit restores equality and preserves the friendship, as we have said.426
Accordingly, this is the basis for relations between unequals. The person who has profited in money or in excellence must give honor in return, for in giving that he gives what it is possible for him to give. 15 Friendship demands the possible; it does not demand what the giver deserves. In some cases, in fact, it is impossible to make the kind of return which the giver deserves, for instance, in the honors we pay to the gods and to our parents. Here no one could ever make a worthy return, and we regard a man as good if he serves them to the best of his ability.
That is why it would seem that a son does not have the right to disown his father, whereas a father has the right to disown his son. 20 A debtor must pay his debt, but nothing a son may have done ⟨to repay his father⟩ is a worthy return for everything his father has provided for him, and therefore he will always be in his debt. But a creditor is free to remit the debt, and a father likewise. At the same time it seems unlikely that any father would break off relations with his son, unless the son were exceedingly wicked. For apart from the natural friendship ⟨which a father feels for his son⟩, it is only human not to reject the assistance ⟨which a son may offer in old age⟩. 25 The son, on the other hand, if he is wicked, will regard the task of satisfying his father's needs as something to be avoided or not to be eagerly pursued. For most people wish to be the recipients of good deeds, but avoid performing them because they are unprofitable. So much, then, on this subject.