Bywater (OCT, 1894) · Ostwald (1962)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 3,Chapter 1 (1109b30–1111b3)
1109b
30 Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ
δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἑκούσιον
καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς
35 τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ
30 Virtue or excellence is, as we have seen, concerned with emotions and actions. When these are voluntary we receive praise and blame; when involuntary, we are pardoned and sometimes even pitied. Therefore, it is, I dare say, indispensable for a student of virtue to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary actions, and useful also for lawgivers, to help them in meting out honors and punishments.80
It is of course generally recognized that actions done under 35 constraint or due to ignorance are involuntary. An act is done under constraint when the initiative or source of motion comes
It is of course generally recognized that actions done under 35 constraint or due to ignorance are involuntary. An act is done under constraint when the initiative or source of motion comes
1110a
1 ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα· βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη
οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων,
οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.
ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ
5 καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι
κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σῴζοιντο
μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον
ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ
τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται
10 ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται
πράξεις, ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις· αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι
τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν
καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει,
15 λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἑκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν
τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ
ἐστίν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν
καὶ μή. ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια·
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ ταῖς
20 πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν
αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν·
ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἴσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι
ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος
μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ
25 τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς
ἂν ὑπομείναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ
γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα
μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι
30 ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι
δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ ἐστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ' ἀναγκάζονται
αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς
1 from without. It is the kind of act in which the agent or the person acted upon contributes nothing. For example, a wind might carry a person somewhere (he did not want to go), or men may do so who have him in their power. But a problem arises in regard to actions that are done through fear of a greater evil 5 or for some noble purpose, for instance, if a tyrant were to use a man's parents or children as hostages in ordering him to commit a base deed, making their survival or death depend on his compliance or refusal. Are actions of this kind voluntary or involuntary? A similar problem also arises when a cargo is jettisoned in a storm. Considering the action itself, nobody would voluntarily throw away property; 10 but when it is a matter of saving one's own life and that of his fellow passengers, any sensible man would do so. Actions of this kind are, then, of a mixed nature, although they come closer to being voluntary than to being involuntary actions. For they are desirable at the moment of action; and the end for which an action is performed depends on the time at which it is done.
Thus the terms "voluntary" and "involuntary" are to be used with reference to the moment of action. 15 In the cases just mentioned, the agent acts voluntarily, because the initiative in moving the parts of the body which act as instruments rests with the agent himself; and where the source of motion is within oneself, it is in one's power to act or not to act. Such actions, then, are voluntary, although in themselves they are perhaps involuntary, since nobody would choose to do any one of them for its own sake.
(That actions of this kind are considered as voluntary is also shown by the fact that) 20 sometimes people are even praised for doing them, for example, if they endure shameful or painful treatment in return for great and noble objectives. If the opposite is the case, reproach is heaped upon them, for only a worthless man would endure utter disgrace for no good or reasonable purpose. There are some instances in which such actions elicit forgiveness rather than praise, for example, 25 when a man acts improperly under a strain greater than human nature can bear and which no one could endure. Yet there are perhaps also acts which no man can possibly be compelled to do, but rather than do them he should accept the most terrible sufferings and death. Thus, the circumstances that compel Alcmaeon in Euripides' play to kill his own mother are patently absurd.81 In making a choice, 30 it is sometimes hard to decide what advantages and disadvantages should be weighed against one another, and what losses we should endure to gain what we want; but it is even harder to abide by a decision once it is made. For as a rule, what we look forward to is painful and what we are forced to do is base. It is because of this difficulty that praise or blame depends on whether or not a man successfully resists compulsion.
Thus the terms "voluntary" and "involuntary" are to be used with reference to the moment of action. 15 In the cases just mentioned, the agent acts voluntarily, because the initiative in moving the parts of the body which act as instruments rests with the agent himself; and where the source of motion is within oneself, it is in one's power to act or not to act. Such actions, then, are voluntary, although in themselves they are perhaps involuntary, since nobody would choose to do any one of them for its own sake.
(That actions of this kind are considered as voluntary is also shown by the fact that) 20 sometimes people are even praised for doing them, for example, if they endure shameful or painful treatment in return for great and noble objectives. If the opposite is the case, reproach is heaped upon them, for only a worthless man would endure utter disgrace for no good or reasonable purpose. There are some instances in which such actions elicit forgiveness rather than praise, for example, 25 when a man acts improperly under a strain greater than human nature can bear and which no one could endure. Yet there are perhaps also acts which no man can possibly be compelled to do, but rather than do them he should accept the most terrible sufferings and death. Thus, the circumstances that compel Alcmaeon in Euripides' play to kill his own mother are patently absurd.81 In making a choice, 30 it is sometimes hard to decide what advantages and disadvantages should be weighed against one another, and what losses we should endure to gain what we want; but it is even harder to abide by a decision once it is made. For as a rule, what we look forward to is painful and what we are forced to do is base. It is because of this difficulty that praise or blame depends on whether or not a man successfully resists compulsion.
1110b
1 ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἁπλῶς
μέν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν
συμβάλληται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν
δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι,
5 καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια.
μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ'
ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἑκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ
ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ'
ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια
10 εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ
βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ
μὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν
μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ
μὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν
15 καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον
εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ
βιασθέντος.
Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον
δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν
20 πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν
μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός
γε. τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων
δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών·
ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ'
25 ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ
γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν
ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν.
ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν
ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως
30 κακοὶ γίνονται· τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις
ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια
αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου
(ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν
1 What kind of actions can we say, then, are done under constraint? To state the matter without qualification, are all actions done under constraint of which the cause is external and to which the agent contributes nothing? On the other hand, actions which are in themselves involuntary, yet chosen under given circumstances in return for certain benefits and performed on the initiative of the 5 agent—although such actions are involuntary considered in themselves, they are nonetheless voluntary under the circumstances, and because benefits are expected in return. In fact, they have a greater resemblance to voluntary actions. For actions belong among particulars, and the particular act is here performed voluntarily. But it is not easy to lay down rules how, in making a choice, two alternatives are to be balanced against one another; there are many differences in the case of particulars.
(There is a conceivable objection to this definition of "voluntary.") Suppose someone were to assert that pleasant and noble acts are performed under constraint because the pleasant and the noble are external to us and have a compelling power.
But 10 on this view, all actions would be done under constraint:
for every man is motivated by what is pleasant and noble in everything he does. Furthermore, it is painful to act under constraint and involuntarily, but the performance of pleasant and noble acts brings pleasure. Finally, it is absurd to blame external circumstances rather than oneself for falling an easy prey to such attractions, and to hold oneself responsible for noble deeds, while pleasure is held responsible for one's base 15 deeds.
It appears, thus, that an act done under constraint is one in which the initiative or source of motion comes from without, and to which the person compelled contributes nothing.
Turning now to acts due to ignorance, we may say that all of them are non-voluntary, but they are involuntary only when they bring sorrow and regret in their train: 20 a man who has acted due to ignorance and feels no compunction whatsoever for what he has done was not a voluntary agent, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet was he involuntary, inasmuch as he feels no sorrow. There are, therefore, two distinct types of acts due to ignorance: a man who regrets what he has done is considered an involuntary agent, and a man who does not may be called a non-voluntary agent; for as the two cases are different, it is better to give each its own 25 name.
There also seems to be a difference between actions *due to* ignorance and acting *in* ignorance. A man's action is not considered to be due to ignorance when he is drunk or angry, but due to intoxication and anger, although he does not know what he is doing and is in fact acting in ignorance.
Now every wicked man is in a state of ignorance as to what he ought to do and what he should refrain from doing, and it is due to this kind of error that men become unjust and, in general, 30 immoral. But an act can hardly be called involuntary if the agent is ignorant of what is beneficial. Ignorance in moral choice does not make an act involuntary—it makes it wicked; nor does ignorance of the universal, for that invites reproach; rather, it is ignorance of the particulars82 which constitute the circumstances and the issues involved in the action.
It is on these that pity and pardon depend, for a person who
(There is a conceivable objection to this definition of "voluntary.") Suppose someone were to assert that pleasant and noble acts are performed under constraint because the pleasant and the noble are external to us and have a compelling power.
But 10 on this view, all actions would be done under constraint:
for every man is motivated by what is pleasant and noble in everything he does. Furthermore, it is painful to act under constraint and involuntarily, but the performance of pleasant and noble acts brings pleasure. Finally, it is absurd to blame external circumstances rather than oneself for falling an easy prey to such attractions, and to hold oneself responsible for noble deeds, while pleasure is held responsible for one's base 15 deeds.
It appears, thus, that an act done under constraint is one in which the initiative or source of motion comes from without, and to which the person compelled contributes nothing.
Turning now to acts due to ignorance, we may say that all of them are non-voluntary, but they are involuntary only when they bring sorrow and regret in their train: 20 a man who has acted due to ignorance and feels no compunction whatsoever for what he has done was not a voluntary agent, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet was he involuntary, inasmuch as he feels no sorrow. There are, therefore, two distinct types of acts due to ignorance: a man who regrets what he has done is considered an involuntary agent, and a man who does not may be called a non-voluntary agent; for as the two cases are different, it is better to give each its own 25 name.
There also seems to be a difference between actions *due to* ignorance and acting *in* ignorance. A man's action is not considered to be due to ignorance when he is drunk or angry, but due to intoxication and anger, although he does not know what he is doing and is in fact acting in ignorance.
Now every wicked man is in a state of ignorance as to what he ought to do and what he should refrain from doing, and it is due to this kind of error that men become unjust and, in general, 30 immoral. But an act can hardly be called involuntary if the agent is ignorant of what is beneficial. Ignorance in moral choice does not make an act involuntary—it makes it wicked; nor does ignorance of the universal, for that invites reproach; rather, it is ignorance of the particulars82 which constitute the circumstances and the issues involved in the action.
It is on these that pity and pardon depend, for a person who
1111a
1 οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ
συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.
ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς
τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ
5 τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς,
οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν
ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα·
πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε; ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον
†λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα
10 ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος
ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸν
υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι
τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ
σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείναι ἄν· καὶ θῖξαι βουλόμενος,
15 ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ
ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι
ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς
κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ
οὗ ἕνεκα. τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου
20 ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.
Ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον
δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ'
ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια
25 εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ
οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἑκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες·
εἶτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν
καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως;
ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως
30 ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι
ἐπί τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν
ἡδέα. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ
λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω,
1 acts in ignorance of a particular circumstance acts involuntarily.
It might, therefore, not be a bad idea to distinguish and enumerate these circumstances. They are: ignorance of (1) who the agent is, (2) what he is doing, (3) what thing or person is affected, and sometimes also (4) 5 the means he is using, e.g., some tool, (5) the result intended by his action, e.g., saving a life, and (6) the manner in which he acts, e.g., gently or violently.
Now no one except a madman would be ignorant of all these factors, nor can he obviously be ignorant of (1) the agent; for how could a man not know his own identity? But a person might be ignorant of (2) what he is doing. For example, he might plead that something slipped out of his mouth, or that he did not know that he was divulging a secret, 10 as Aeschylus said when he was accused of divulging the Mysteries;83 or again, as a man might do who discharges a catapult, he might allege that it went off accidentally while he only wanted to show it. Moreover, (3) someone might, like Merope, mistake a son for an enemy;84 or (4) he might mistake a pointed spear for a foil, or a heavy stone for a pumice stone.
Again, (5) someone might, in trying to save a man by giving him something to drink, in fact kill him; or, (6) 15 as in sparring, a man might intend merely to touch, and actually strike a blow.
As ignorance is possible with regard to all these factors which constitute an action, a man who acts in ignorance of any one of them is considered as acting involuntarily, especially if he is ignorant of the most important factors. The most important factors are the thing or person affected by the action and the result. 20 An action upon this kind of ignorance is called involuntary, provided that it brings also sorrow and regret in its train.
Since an action is involuntary when it is performed under constraint or through ignorance, a voluntary action would seem to be one in which the initiative lies with the agent who knows the particular circumstances in which the action is performed.
(This implies that acts due to passion and appetite are voluntary.) For it is perhaps wrong to call involuntary 25 those acts which are due to passion and appetite. For on that assumption we would, in the first place, deny that animals or even children are capable of acting voluntarily. In the second place, do we perform none of the actions that are motivated by appetite and passion voluntarily? Or do we perform noble acts voluntarily and base acts involuntarily? The latter alternative is ridiculous, since the cause in both cases is one and the same.
But 30 it is no doubt also absurd to call those things which we ought to desire "involuntary." For in some cases we should be angry and there are some things for which we should have an appetite, as for example, health and learning. Moreover, we think of involuntary actions as painful, while actions that satisfy our appetite are pleasant. And finally, what difference is there, as far as involuntariness is concerned, between a wrong committed after calculation and a wrong committed in a fit of passion? Both are to be avoided;
It might, therefore, not be a bad idea to distinguish and enumerate these circumstances. They are: ignorance of (1) who the agent is, (2) what he is doing, (3) what thing or person is affected, and sometimes also (4) 5 the means he is using, e.g., some tool, (5) the result intended by his action, e.g., saving a life, and (6) the manner in which he acts, e.g., gently or violently.
Now no one except a madman would be ignorant of all these factors, nor can he obviously be ignorant of (1) the agent; for how could a man not know his own identity? But a person might be ignorant of (2) what he is doing. For example, he might plead that something slipped out of his mouth, or that he did not know that he was divulging a secret, 10 as Aeschylus said when he was accused of divulging the Mysteries;83 or again, as a man might do who discharges a catapult, he might allege that it went off accidentally while he only wanted to show it. Moreover, (3) someone might, like Merope, mistake a son for an enemy;84 or (4) he might mistake a pointed spear for a foil, or a heavy stone for a pumice stone.
Again, (5) someone might, in trying to save a man by giving him something to drink, in fact kill him; or, (6) 15 as in sparring, a man might intend merely to touch, and actually strike a blow.
As ignorance is possible with regard to all these factors which constitute an action, a man who acts in ignorance of any one of them is considered as acting involuntarily, especially if he is ignorant of the most important factors. The most important factors are the thing or person affected by the action and the result. 20 An action upon this kind of ignorance is called involuntary, provided that it brings also sorrow and regret in its train.
Since an action is involuntary when it is performed under constraint or through ignorance, a voluntary action would seem to be one in which the initiative lies with the agent who knows the particular circumstances in which the action is performed.
(This implies that acts due to passion and appetite are voluntary.) For it is perhaps wrong to call involuntary 25 those acts which are due to passion and appetite. For on that assumption we would, in the first place, deny that animals or even children are capable of acting voluntarily. In the second place, do we perform none of the actions that are motivated by appetite and passion voluntarily? Or do we perform noble acts voluntarily and base acts involuntarily? The latter alternative is ridiculous, since the cause in both cases is one and the same.
But 30 it is no doubt also absurd to call those things which we ought to desire "involuntary." For in some cases we should be angry and there are some things for which we should have an appetite, as for example, health and learning. Moreover, we think of involuntary actions as painful, while actions that satisfy our appetite are pleasant. And finally, what difference is there, as far as involuntariness is concerned, between a wrong committed after calculation and a wrong committed in a fit of passion? Both are to be avoided;
1111b
1 δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη, ὥστε
καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου <αἱ> ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.
ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.
1 but the irrational emotions are considered no less a part of human beings than reasoning is, and hence, the actions of a man which spring from passion and appetite (are equally a part of him). It would be absurd, then, to count them as involuntary.
Book 3,Chapter 2 (1111b4–1112a17)
Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου,
5 περὶ προαιρέσεως ἕπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ
τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἡ
προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ'
ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ
τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης
10 ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὔ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες
αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἤ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοίκασιν
ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν
ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν
μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν
15 προαιρούμενος μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὔ. καὶ προαιρέσει
μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ. καὶ ἡ
μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ
οὔθ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν
κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς
20 γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη
ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ <καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον
ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι'
αὑτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν·
25 προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι
ἂν δι' αὑτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ
δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα,
προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα
μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει· ὅλως
30 γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ
δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι,
καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ'
ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ
καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν
After this definition of voluntary and involuntary actions, 5 our next task is to discuss choice.85 For choice seems to be very closely related to virtue and to be a more reliable criterion for judging character than actions are.
Choice clearly seems to be something voluntary, but it is not the same as voluntariness; voluntariness is a wider term.
For even children and animals have a share in the voluntary, but not in choice. Also, we can describe an act done on the spur of the moment 10 as a voluntary act, but not the result of choice.
It seems to be a mistake to identify choice, as some people do,86 with appetite, passion, wish, or some form of opinion.
For choice is not shared by irrational creatures, whereas appetite and passion are. Moreover, the acts of a morally weak person are accompanied by appetite, but not by choice, while a morally strong87 15 person acts from choice, but not from appetite. Also, appetite can be opposed to choice, but not appetite to appetite. Again, appetite deals with what is pleasant and painful, while choice deals neither with the pleasant nor with the painful. The resemblance between choice and passion is even slighter. For an act due to passion hardly seems to be based on choice.
Choice is not even the same as wish, 20 although the two seem to be close to one another. For choice does not have the impossible as its object, and if anyone were to assert that he was *choosing* the impossible, he would be considered a fool.
But wish can be for the impossible, e.g., immortality.88 Wish has as its objects also those things which cannot possibly be attained through our own agency. We might, for instance, wish for the victory of a particular actor or a particular athlete. 25 But no one chooses such things, for we choose only what we believe might be attained through our own agency. Furthermore, wish is directed at the end rather than the means, but choice at the means which are conducive to a given end.
For example, we *wish* to be healthy and *choose* the things that will give us health. Similarly, we say that we *wish* to be happy and describe this as our wish, but it would not be fitting to say that we *choose* to be happy. In general, 30 choice seems to be concerned with the things that lie within our power.
Again, choice cannot be identified with opinion. For opinion may refer to any matter, the eternal and the impossible no less than things within our power. Also, opinions are characterized by their truth or falsity, not by their moral goodness or badness, as choices are.
Now,
Choice clearly seems to be something voluntary, but it is not the same as voluntariness; voluntariness is a wider term.
For even children and animals have a share in the voluntary, but not in choice. Also, we can describe an act done on the spur of the moment 10 as a voluntary act, but not the result of choice.
It seems to be a mistake to identify choice, as some people do,86 with appetite, passion, wish, or some form of opinion.
For choice is not shared by irrational creatures, whereas appetite and passion are. Moreover, the acts of a morally weak person are accompanied by appetite, but not by choice, while a morally strong87 15 person acts from choice, but not from appetite. Also, appetite can be opposed to choice, but not appetite to appetite. Again, appetite deals with what is pleasant and painful, while choice deals neither with the pleasant nor with the painful. The resemblance between choice and passion is even slighter. For an act due to passion hardly seems to be based on choice.
Choice is not even the same as wish, 20 although the two seem to be close to one another. For choice does not have the impossible as its object, and if anyone were to assert that he was *choosing* the impossible, he would be considered a fool.
But wish can be for the impossible, e.g., immortality.88 Wish has as its objects also those things which cannot possibly be attained through our own agency. We might, for instance, wish for the victory of a particular actor or a particular athlete. 25 But no one chooses such things, for we choose only what we believe might be attained through our own agency. Furthermore, wish is directed at the end rather than the means, but choice at the means which are conducive to a given end.
For example, we *wish* to be healthy and *choose* the things that will give us health. Similarly, we say that we *wish* to be happy and describe this as our wish, but it would not be fitting to say that we *choose* to be happy. In general, 30 choice seems to be concerned with the things that lie within our power.
Again, choice cannot be identified with opinion. For opinion may refer to any matter, the eternal and the impossible no less than things within our power. Also, opinions are characterized by their truth or falsity, not by their moral goodness or badness, as choices are.
Now,
1112a
1 δόξῃ ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί· τῷ γὰρ
προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ
δοξάζειν οὔ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν [ἤ] τι
τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς·
5 λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις
ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς,
ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα
ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν· δοκοῦσι
δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ'
10 ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ
δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ,
οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταὐτόν
ἐστι δόξῃ τινί. τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων
οὐθέν; ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν.
15 ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις
μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε
καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.
1 perhaps no one identifies choice with opinion in general; but it would not even be correct to identify it with some particular opinion. For our character is determined by our choosing good or evil, not by the opinions we hold. We choose to take or avoid a good or an evil, but we hold opinions as to what a thing is, whom it will benefit, or how: 5 but (the decision) to take or avoid is by no means an opinion. Also, a choice is praised for being directed to the proper object or for being correctly made, but opinions are praised for being true.
Moreover, we make a choice of things which we definitely know to be good, whereas we form opinions about what we do not quite know. Nor does it seem that the same people make the best choices and also hold the best opinions: 10 some hold rather good opinions, but because of a moral depravity they do not make the right choice. Whether opinion precedes or follows choice is immaterial; for we are not concerned with this problem, but only whether choice is to be identified with some form of opinion.
Since choice, then, is none of the things mentioned, what is it or what kind of thing? As we have said, it clearly seems to be something voluntary, but not everything voluntary is the object of choice. 15 Could it be the result of preceding deliberation? (This is probably correct,) for choice involves reason and thought. The very name "choice"89 seems to suggest that it is something "chosen before" other things.
Moreover, we make a choice of things which we definitely know to be good, whereas we form opinions about what we do not quite know. Nor does it seem that the same people make the best choices and also hold the best opinions: 10 some hold rather good opinions, but because of a moral depravity they do not make the right choice. Whether opinion precedes or follows choice is immaterial; for we are not concerned with this problem, but only whether choice is to be identified with some form of opinion.
Since choice, then, is none of the things mentioned, what is it or what kind of thing? As we have said, it clearly seems to be something voluntary, but not everything voluntary is the object of choice. 15 Could it be the result of preceding deliberation? (This is probably correct,) for choice involves reason and thought. The very name "choice"89 seems to suggest that it is something "chosen before" other things.
Book 3,Chapter 3 (1112a18–1113a14)
Βουλεύονται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν
ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βουλευτὸν
20 οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος,
ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται,
οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει,
ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ
25 φύσει ἢ διά τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν.
οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων.
οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως.
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἁπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι
ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται.
30 οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ
τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἰτίαι
γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ
νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι
βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὑτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς
(To turn to deliberation:) do people deliberate about everything? And is everything an object of deliberation? Or are there some things about which one cannot deliberate? Perhaps we ought to say that an object of deliberation is what a sensible man would deliberate about, 20 but not a fool or madman.
Now, nobody deliberates about the eternal, such as the order of the universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of the square. Nor, on the other hand, do we deliberate about things that are in motion if they always occur in the same way, whether by sheer necessity, 25 by nature, or by some other cause: for example, we do not deliberate about solstices and sunrises. Neither do we deliberate about irregular occurrences, such as drought or rain, nor about chance events, such as the discovery of a treasure. We do not even deliberate about anything and everything that concerns man: no Spartan deliberates about what form of government would be best for the Scythians. 30 For none of these things can happen through our agency.
But what we do deliberate about are things that are in our power and can be realized in action; in fact, these are the only things that remain to be considered. For in addition to nature, necessity, and chance, we regard as causal principles intelligence and anything done through human agency. But of course different groups of people deliberate only about what is attainable by their own actions. Also,
Now, nobody deliberates about the eternal, such as the order of the universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of the square. Nor, on the other hand, do we deliberate about things that are in motion if they always occur in the same way, whether by sheer necessity, 25 by nature, or by some other cause: for example, we do not deliberate about solstices and sunrises. Neither do we deliberate about irregular occurrences, such as drought or rain, nor about chance events, such as the discovery of a treasure. We do not even deliberate about anything and everything that concerns man: no Spartan deliberates about what form of government would be best for the Scythians. 30 For none of these things can happen through our agency.
But what we do deliberate about are things that are in our power and can be realized in action; in fact, these are the only things that remain to be considered. For in addition to nature, necessity, and chance, we regard as causal principles intelligence and anything done through human agency. But of course different groups of people deliberate only about what is attainable by their own actions. Also,
1112b
1 ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον
περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ'
ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' ἀεί, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα,
οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικήν,
5 καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικήν, ὅσῳ ἧττον
διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ
καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ
ταύτας διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον.
10 συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες
ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. βουλευόμεθα
δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε
γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει,
οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς
15 περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων
ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι
διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου
πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν
ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν
20 ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν
εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα (φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν
ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαί, ἡ
δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις), καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει
πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν,
25 ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ
οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι
πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ
τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται
δ' ὁτὲ μὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὁτὲ δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν·
30 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὁτὲ μὲν δι' οὗ ὁτὲ δὲ πῶς
ἢ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι
ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὑτῷ πρακτῶν,
αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ
τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα,
1 there can be no deliberation in any science that is exact and self-contained, such as writing the letters of the alphabet: we have no differences of opinion as to how they are to be written.90 Rather, we deliberate about matters which are done through our own agency, though not always in the same manner, e.g., about questions of medicine or of acquiring wealth. 5 We deliberate more about navigation than about physical training, because navigation is less exact as a discipline. The same principle can also be applied to the other branches of knowledge. But we deliberate more about the arts than about the sciences, since we have more differences of opinion about them. Deliberation, then, operates in matters that hold good as a general rule, but whose outcome is unpredictable, and in cases in which an indeterminate element is involved. 10 When great issues are at stake, we distrust our own abilities as insufficient to decide the matter and call in others to join us in our deliberations.
We deliberate not about ends but about the means to attain ends: no physician deliberates whether he should cure, no orator whether he should be convincing, no statesman whether he should establish law and order, nor does any expert deliberate about the end of his profession. 15 We take the end for granted, and then consider in what manner and by what means it can be realized. If it becomes apparent that there is more than one means by which it can be attained, we look for the easiest and best; if it can be realized by one means only, we consider in what manner it can be realized by that means, and how that means can be achieved in its turn. We continue that process until we come to the first link in the chain of causation, which is the last step in order of discovery. 20 For when a man deliberates, he seems to be seeking something and to be analyzing his problem in the manner described, as he would a geometrical figure: the last step in the analysis is at once the first in constructing the figure.91 (By the way, it seems that not all investigation is deliberation—mathematical investigation is not—though every deliberation is an investigation.) Moreover, if in the process of investigation we encounter an insurmountable obstacle, for example, if we need money and none can be procured, 25 we abandon our investigation; but if it turns out to be possible, we begin to act. By "possible" I mean those things which can be realized through our own agency: for even what our friends do for us is, in a way, done through our own agency, since the initiative is our own. Sometimes the object of our investigation is to find the instruments we need and sometimes to discover how to use them. 30 The same is true of other matters, too: sometimes we have to find what the means are, and sometimes how they are to be used or through whom they can be acquired. To sum up our conclusions: (1) man is the source of his actions; (2) deliberation is concerned with things attainable by human action; and (3)
actions aim at ends other than themselves. For we cannot deliberate about ends but about the means by which ends can be attained. Nor can we deliberate about particular facts,
We deliberate not about ends but about the means to attain ends: no physician deliberates whether he should cure, no orator whether he should be convincing, no statesman whether he should establish law and order, nor does any expert deliberate about the end of his profession. 15 We take the end for granted, and then consider in what manner and by what means it can be realized. If it becomes apparent that there is more than one means by which it can be attained, we look for the easiest and best; if it can be realized by one means only, we consider in what manner it can be realized by that means, and how that means can be achieved in its turn. We continue that process until we come to the first link in the chain of causation, which is the last step in order of discovery. 20 For when a man deliberates, he seems to be seeking something and to be analyzing his problem in the manner described, as he would a geometrical figure: the last step in the analysis is at once the first in constructing the figure.91 (By the way, it seems that not all investigation is deliberation—mathematical investigation is not—though every deliberation is an investigation.) Moreover, if in the process of investigation we encounter an insurmountable obstacle, for example, if we need money and none can be procured, 25 we abandon our investigation; but if it turns out to be possible, we begin to act. By "possible" I mean those things which can be realized through our own agency: for even what our friends do for us is, in a way, done through our own agency, since the initiative is our own. Sometimes the object of our investigation is to find the instruments we need and sometimes to discover how to use them. 30 The same is true of other matters, too: sometimes we have to find what the means are, and sometimes how they are to be used or through whom they can be acquired. To sum up our conclusions: (1) man is the source of his actions; (2) deliberation is concerned with things attainable by human action; and (3)
actions aim at ends other than themselves. For we cannot deliberate about ends but about the means by which ends can be attained. Nor can we deliberate about particular facts,
1113a
1 οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ
ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. βουλευτὸν
δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ
προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθὲν προαιρετόν
5 ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς
αὑτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὑτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον·
τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν
ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς
ἃ προείλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ
10 προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις
ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι
γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν
πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
1 e.g., whether this is a loaf of bread or whether this loaf of bread has been properly baked: such facts are the object of sense perception. And if we continue deliberating each point in turn, we shall have to go on to infinity.
The object of deliberation and the object of choice are identical, except that the object of choice has already been determined, since it has been decided upon on the basis of deliberation. 5 For every man stops inquiring how he is to act when he has traced the initiative of action back to himself and to the dominant part of himself: it is this part that exercises choice. This may be illustrated by the ancient political systems represented in Homer, where the kings would make a choice and then proclaim it to the people.
Since, then, 10 the object of choice is something within our power which we desire as a result of deliberation, we may define choice as a deliberate desire for things that are within our power: we arrive at a decision on the basis of deliberation, and then let the deliberation guide our desire. So much for an outline of choice, its objects, and the fact that it is concerned with means rather than ends.
The object of deliberation and the object of choice are identical, except that the object of choice has already been determined, since it has been decided upon on the basis of deliberation. 5 For every man stops inquiring how he is to act when he has traced the initiative of action back to himself and to the dominant part of himself: it is this part that exercises choice. This may be illustrated by the ancient political systems represented in Homer, where the kings would make a choice and then proclaim it to the people.
Since, then, 10 the object of choice is something within our power which we desire as a result of deliberation, we may define choice as a deliberate desire for things that are within our power: we arrive at a decision on the basis of deliberation, and then let the deliberation guide our desire. So much for an outline of choice, its objects, and the fact that it is concerned with means rather than ends.
Book 3,Chapter 4 (1113a15–1113b2)
15 Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται, δοκεῖ
δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ.
συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν [τὸ] βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ
εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ
ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν),
20 τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ
εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ'
ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ
ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν
βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον;
25 τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ
τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις
ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς
δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ
θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ
30 ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται.
καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ
διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις
ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς
δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα
15 That wish is concerned with the end has already been stated.92 Now, some people think that its object is the good, and others think that it is what seems good.93 Those who maintain that it is the good are faced with the conclusion that a man who makes a wrong choice does not really wish what he wishes: for if it is the object of his wish it must be good, while in the case in question it is actually bad. 20 On the other hand, those who assert that the object of wish is what seems good must conclude that nothing is by nature the object of wish, but only what seems good to a particular individual. Yet different, and in many instances opposite things seem good to different individuals.
If these consequences are unacceptable, must we not admit that in an unqualified sense and from the standpoint of truth the object of wish is the good, but that for each individual it is whatever seems good to him?94 (This distinction solves the problem.) 25 Thus, what seems good to a man of high moral standards is truly the object of wish, whereas a worthless man wishes anything that strikes his fancy. It is the same with the human body: people whose constitution is good find those things wholesome which really are so, while other things are wholesome for invalids, and similarly their opinions will vary as to what is bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and so forth. (Just as a healthy man judges these matters correctly, so in moral questions) 30 a man whose standards are high judges correctly, and in each case what is truly good will appear to him to be so. Thus, what is good and pleasant differs with different characteristics or conditions, and perhaps the chief distinction of a man of high moral standards is his ability to see the truth in each particular moral question, since he is, as it were, the standard and measure for such questions. The common run of people, however, are misled by pleasure.
If these consequences are unacceptable, must we not admit that in an unqualified sense and from the standpoint of truth the object of wish is the good, but that for each individual it is whatever seems good to him?94 (This distinction solves the problem.) 25 Thus, what seems good to a man of high moral standards is truly the object of wish, whereas a worthless man wishes anything that strikes his fancy. It is the same with the human body: people whose constitution is good find those things wholesome which really are so, while other things are wholesome for invalids, and similarly their opinions will vary as to what is bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and so forth. (Just as a healthy man judges these matters correctly, so in moral questions) 30 a man whose standards are high judges correctly, and in each case what is truly good will appear to him to be so. Thus, what is good and pleasant differs with different characteristics or conditions, and perhaps the chief distinction of a man of high moral standards is his ability to see the truth in each particular moral question, since he is, as it were, the standard and measure for such questions. The common run of people, however, are misled by pleasure.
1113b
1 ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ
λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
1 For though it is not the good, it seems to be, so that they choose the pleasant in the belief that it is good and avoid pain thinking that it is evil.
Book 3,Chapter 5 (1113b3–1115a5)
Ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ
προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
5 κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν
ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ
τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ
πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν
10 ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν,
καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ
καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν,
τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα
τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν
15 πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ·
μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἑκούσιον.
ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων
ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν
20 εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ
αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσια. τούτοις
δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν
τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας
μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ
25 αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν
προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ'
ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήθ' ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν
πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ
πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἧττον πεισόμεθα
30 αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος
εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια·
ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι,
τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι
τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι,
Now, since the end is the object of wish, and since the means to the end are the objects of deliberation and choice, it follows that actions concerned with means are 5 based on choice and are voluntary actions. And the activities in which the virtues find their expression deal with means. Consequently, virtue or excellence depends on ourselves, and so does vice. For where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act, and where we can say "no," we can also say "yes." Therefore, if we have the power to act where it is noble to act, we also have the power not to act where not to act is base; 10 and conversely, if we have the power not to act where inaction is noble, we also have the power to act where action is base. But if we have the power to act nobly or basely, and likewise the power not to act, and if such action or inaction constitutes our being good and evil, we must conclude that it depends on us whether we are decent or worthless individuals. The saying, "No one is voluntarily wicked 15 nor involuntarily happy," seems to be partly false and partly true. That no one is involuntarily happy is true, but wickedness is voluntary. If we do not accept that, we must contradict the conclusions at which we have just arrived, and must deny that man is the source and begetter of his actions as a father is of his children. But if our conclusions are accepted, and 20 if we cannot trace back our actions to starting points other than those within ourselves, then all actions in which the initiative lies in ourselves are in our power and are voluntary actions.
These conclusions are corroborated by the judgment of private individuals and by the practice of lawgivers. They chastise and punish evildoers, except those who have acted under constraint or due to some ignorance for which they are not responsible, 25 but honor those who act nobly; their intention seems to be to encourage the latter and to deter the former. Yet nobody encourages us to perform what is not within our power and what is not voluntary: there would be no point in trying to stop by persuasion a man from feeling hot, in pain, or hungry, and so forth, because we will go on feeling these conditions 30 no less for that.
Even ignorance is in itself no protection against punishment if a person is thought to be responsible for his ignorance. For example, the penalty is twice as high if the offender acted in a state of drunkenness, because the initiative is his own: he had the power not to get drunk, and drunkenness was responsible for his ignorance. Moreover, punishment is inflicted for offenses committed in ignorance of such provisions of the law as the offender ought to have known or might easily have known.
These conclusions are corroborated by the judgment of private individuals and by the practice of lawgivers. They chastise and punish evildoers, except those who have acted under constraint or due to some ignorance for which they are not responsible, 25 but honor those who act nobly; their intention seems to be to encourage the latter and to deter the former. Yet nobody encourages us to perform what is not within our power and what is not voluntary: there would be no point in trying to stop by persuasion a man from feeling hot, in pain, or hungry, and so forth, because we will go on feeling these conditions 30 no less for that.
Even ignorance is in itself no protection against punishment if a person is thought to be responsible for his ignorance. For example, the penalty is twice as high if the offender acted in a state of drunkenness, because the initiative is his own: he had the power not to get drunk, and drunkenness was responsible for his ignorance. Moreover, punishment is inflicted for offenses committed in ignorance of such provisions of the law as the offender ought to have known or might easily have known.
1114a
1 κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν
ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν·
τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε
μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι
5 ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἳ μὲν
κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες·
αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον
ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν·
διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ
10 ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.
ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ
τὂν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει
ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε
βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. οὐδὲ γὰρ
15 ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς
βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ
μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ'
αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν
[καὶ ῥῖψαι]· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ
20 καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι,
διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι. οὐ μόνον
δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ
αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ
φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
25 ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς
γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης
ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν
αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ
30 δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν
ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ
φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός
1 It is also inflicted in other cases in which ignorance seems to be due to negligence: it was in the offender's power not to be ignorant, it is argued, and he could have made sure had he wanted to.
But, it might be objected, carelessness may be part of a man's character. We counter, however, by asserting that a man is himself responsible for becoming careless, 5 because he lives in a loose and carefree manner; he is likewise responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent, if he keeps on doing mischief or spending his time in drinking and the like. For a given kind of activity produces a corresponding character. This is shown by the way in which people train themselves for any kind of contest or performance: they keep on practicing for it. Thus, 10 only a man who is utterly insensitive can be ignorant of the fact that moral characteristics are formed by actively engaging in particular actions.
Moreover, it is unreasonable to maintain that a man who acts unjustly or self-indulgently does not wish to be unjust or self-indulgent. If a man is not ignorant of what he is doing when he performs acts which will make him unjust, he will of course become unjust voluntarily; nor again, can wishing any more make him stop being unjust and become just than it can make 15 a sick man healthy. Let us assume the case of a man who becomes ill voluntarily through living a dissolute life and disobeying doctors' orders. In the beginning, before he let his health slip away, he could have avoided becoming ill: but once you have thrown a stone and let it go, you can no longer recall it, even though the power to throw it was yours, for the initiative was within you. Similarly, since an unjust or a self-indulgent man initially 20 had the possibilty not to become unjust or self-indulgent, he has acquired these traits voluntarily; but once he has acquired them it is no longer possible for him not to be what he is.
There are some cases in which not only the vices of the soul, but also those of the body are voluntary and are accordingly criticized. Nobody blames a man for being ugly by nature; but we do blame those who become ugly through lack of exercise and through taking no care of their person. 25 The same applies to infirmities and physical handicaps: every one would pity rather than reproach a man who was blind by nature or whose blindness is due to disease or accident, but all would blame him if it were caused by drunkenness or some other form of self-indulgence. In other words, those bodily vices which depend on ourselves are blamed and those which do not are not blamed. 30 This being so, we may conclude that other kinds of vice for which we are blamed also depend upon ourselves.
But someone might argue as follows: "All men seek what appears good to them, but they have no control over how things appear to them;
But, it might be objected, carelessness may be part of a man's character. We counter, however, by asserting that a man is himself responsible for becoming careless, 5 because he lives in a loose and carefree manner; he is likewise responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent, if he keeps on doing mischief or spending his time in drinking and the like. For a given kind of activity produces a corresponding character. This is shown by the way in which people train themselves for any kind of contest or performance: they keep on practicing for it. Thus, 10 only a man who is utterly insensitive can be ignorant of the fact that moral characteristics are formed by actively engaging in particular actions.
Moreover, it is unreasonable to maintain that a man who acts unjustly or self-indulgently does not wish to be unjust or self-indulgent. If a man is not ignorant of what he is doing when he performs acts which will make him unjust, he will of course become unjust voluntarily; nor again, can wishing any more make him stop being unjust and become just than it can make 15 a sick man healthy. Let us assume the case of a man who becomes ill voluntarily through living a dissolute life and disobeying doctors' orders. In the beginning, before he let his health slip away, he could have avoided becoming ill: but once you have thrown a stone and let it go, you can no longer recall it, even though the power to throw it was yours, for the initiative was within you. Similarly, since an unjust or a self-indulgent man initially 20 had the possibilty not to become unjust or self-indulgent, he has acquired these traits voluntarily; but once he has acquired them it is no longer possible for him not to be what he is.
There are some cases in which not only the vices of the soul, but also those of the body are voluntary and are accordingly criticized. Nobody blames a man for being ugly by nature; but we do blame those who become ugly through lack of exercise and through taking no care of their person. 25 The same applies to infirmities and physical handicaps: every one would pity rather than reproach a man who was blind by nature or whose blindness is due to disease or accident, but all would blame him if it were caused by drunkenness or some other form of self-indulgence. In other words, those bodily vices which depend on ourselves are blamed and those which do not are not blamed. 30 This being so, we may conclude that other kinds of vice for which we are blamed also depend upon ourselves.
But someone might argue as follows: "All men seek what appears good to them, but they have no control over how things appear to them;
1114b
1 ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ
μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς
φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ
αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
5 πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ
δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ
ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν
αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν·
τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν
10 τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ
τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ
ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ
ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ
ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται
15 καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες
πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ
φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε
τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως
τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία
20 ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει
τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ
οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν
ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι
τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν·
25 ὁμοίως γάρ.
Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε
γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ <καὶ> καθ' αὑτάς, καὶ ὅτι
ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος
30 προστάξῃ. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ
ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους
κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς
1 the end appears different to different men." If, we reply, the individual is somehow responsible for his own characteristics, he is similarly responsible for what appears to him ⟨to be good⟩. But if he is not so responsible, no one is responsible for his own wrongdoing, but everyone does wrong through ignorance of the proper end, 5 since he believes that his actions will bring him the greatest good. However, the aim we take for the end is not determined by the choice of the individual himself, but by a natural gift of vision, as it were, which enables him to make correct judgments and to choose what is truly good: to be well endowed by nature means to have this natural gift. For to be well and properly provided by nature with the greatest and noblest of gifts, a gift which can be got 10 or learned from no one else, but which is one's possession in the form in which nature has given it: that is the meaning of being well endowed by nature in the full and true sense of the word.
But if this theory is true, how will virtue be any more voluntary than vice? The end has been determined for, and appears to, a good man and a bad man alike by nature or something of that sort; 15 and both will use the end thus determined as the standard for any actions they may undertake. Thus, whether the end that appears ⟨to be good⟩ to a particular person, whatever it may be, is not simply given to him by nature but is to some extent due to himself; or whether, though the end is given by nature, virtue is voluntary in the sense that a man of high moral standards performs the actions that lead up to the end voluntarily: in either case vice, too, is bound to be no less voluntary than virtue. 20 For, like the good man, the bad man has the requisite ability to perform actions through his own agency, even if not to formulate his own ends. If, then, our assertion is correct, viz., that the virtues are voluntary because we share in some way the responsibility for our own characteristics and because the ends we set up for ourselves are determined by the kind of persons we are, it follows that the vices, too, are voluntary; 25 for the same is true of them.
To sum up: we have described the virtues in general and have given an outline of the genus to which they belong, i.e., that they are means and that they are characteristics. We have stated that they spontaneously tend to produce the same kind of actions as those to which they owe their existence; that they are in our power and voluntary; and that they follow the dictates of right reason. 30 However, our actions and our characteristics are not voluntary in the same sense: we are in control of our actions from beginning to end, insofar as we know the particular circumstances surrounding them. But we control only the beginning of our characteristics:
But if this theory is true, how will virtue be any more voluntary than vice? The end has been determined for, and appears to, a good man and a bad man alike by nature or something of that sort; 15 and both will use the end thus determined as the standard for any actions they may undertake. Thus, whether the end that appears ⟨to be good⟩ to a particular person, whatever it may be, is not simply given to him by nature but is to some extent due to himself; or whether, though the end is given by nature, virtue is voluntary in the sense that a man of high moral standards performs the actions that lead up to the end voluntarily: in either case vice, too, is bound to be no less voluntary than virtue. 20 For, like the good man, the bad man has the requisite ability to perform actions through his own agency, even if not to formulate his own ends. If, then, our assertion is correct, viz., that the virtues are voluntary because we share in some way the responsibility for our own characteristics and because the ends we set up for ourselves are determined by the kind of persons we are, it follows that the vices, too, are voluntary; 25 for the same is true of them.
To sum up: we have described the virtues in general and have given an outline of the genus to which they belong, i.e., that they are means and that they are characteristics. We have stated that they spontaneously tend to produce the same kind of actions as those to which they owe their existence; that they are in our power and voluntary; and that they follow the dictates of right reason. 30 However, our actions and our characteristics are not voluntary in the same sense: we are in control of our actions from beginning to end, insofar as we know the particular circumstances surrounding them. But we control only the beginning of our characteristics:
1115a
1 ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω
χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.
Ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἑκάστης εἴπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ
5 περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν.
καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.
1 the particular steps in their development are imperceptible, just as they are in the spread of a disease; yet since the power to behave or not to behave in a given way was ours in the first place, our characteristics are voluntary.
Let us resume our discussion of the various virtues: what are they? 5 With what sort of thing do they deal? And how do they operate? The answer to these questions will also tell us how many virtues there are.
Let us resume our discussion of the various virtues: what are they? 5 With what sort of thing do they deal? And how do they operate? The answer to these questions will also tell us how many virtues there are.
Book 3,Chapter 6 (1115a6–1115b6)
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ
φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα
δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν
κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.
10 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν
νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος
εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ
δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικὴς
καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται
15 δ' ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ
τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.
πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα
μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὑτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα
ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα·
20 ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί
εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν.
οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται
ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ
μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν
25 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος
τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ
οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.
δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος
εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν
30 τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ
καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ
αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως
δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής,
καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα
35 τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ
First of all, courage: that it is a mean with respect to fear and confidence has already been shown. What we fear is obviously something fearful, and this is in general something evil. Hence it is that some people define fear as the expectation of evil.95
Now 10 it is true that we fear all evils, e.g., disrepute, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death. But it does not seem that a courageous man is concerned with all of these. There are some evils, such as disrepute, which are proper and right for him to fear and wrong not to fear: a man who fears disrepute is decent and has a sense of shame, a man who does not fear it is shameless. 15 Still, some people describe a man who fears no disrepute as courageous in a metaphorical sense, for he resembles a courageous man in that a courageous man, too, is fearless. Perhaps one should not fear poverty or disease or generally any evil that does not spring from vice or is not due to oneself. However, it is not the man who has no fear of these things who is courageous. But we call him so because of his resemblance to the courageous man. 20 For some people who are cowards on the battlefield are generous and face the loss of money cheerfully. On the other hand, a man is not a coward if he fears insult to his wife and children, or if he fears envy or the like; nor is he courageous if he is of good cheer when he is about to be flogged.
What kind of fearful things, then, are the concern of the courageous man? 25 No doubt those of the greatest moment: no person endures what is terrifying more steadfastly than he. Now, the most fearful thing of all is death; for it is the end, and once a man is dead it seems that there is no longer anything good or evil for him. But it would seem that not even death shows the courage of a man in all circumstances. For example, death by drowning or by disease does not. What kind of death, then, does bring out courage? 30 Doubtless the noblest kind, and that is death in battle, for in battle a man is faced by the greatest and most noble of dangers. This is corroborated by the honors which states as well as monarchs bestow upon courage.
Properly speaking, therefore, we might define as courageous a man who fearlessly faces a noble death and any situations that bring a sudden death. Such eventualities are usually brought about by war. 35 But of course a courageous man is also fearless at sea
Now 10 it is true that we fear all evils, e.g., disrepute, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death. But it does not seem that a courageous man is concerned with all of these. There are some evils, such as disrepute, which are proper and right for him to fear and wrong not to fear: a man who fears disrepute is decent and has a sense of shame, a man who does not fear it is shameless. 15 Still, some people describe a man who fears no disrepute as courageous in a metaphorical sense, for he resembles a courageous man in that a courageous man, too, is fearless. Perhaps one should not fear poverty or disease or generally any evil that does not spring from vice or is not due to oneself. However, it is not the man who has no fear of these things who is courageous. But we call him so because of his resemblance to the courageous man. 20 For some people who are cowards on the battlefield are generous and face the loss of money cheerfully. On the other hand, a man is not a coward if he fears insult to his wife and children, or if he fears envy or the like; nor is he courageous if he is of good cheer when he is about to be flogged.
What kind of fearful things, then, are the concern of the courageous man? 25 No doubt those of the greatest moment: no person endures what is terrifying more steadfastly than he. Now, the most fearful thing of all is death; for it is the end, and once a man is dead it seems that there is no longer anything good or evil for him. But it would seem that not even death shows the courage of a man in all circumstances. For example, death by drowning or by disease does not. What kind of death, then, does bring out courage? 30 Doubtless the noblest kind, and that is death in battle, for in battle a man is faced by the greatest and most noble of dangers. This is corroborated by the honors which states as well as monarchs bestow upon courage.
Properly speaking, therefore, we might define as courageous a man who fearlessly faces a noble death and any situations that bring a sudden death. Such eventualities are usually brought about by war. 35 But of course a courageous man is also fearless at sea
1115b
1 καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι·
οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον
τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ
τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ
5 ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέτερον
ὑπάρχει.
1 and in illness, though not in the same way as sailors are. Because of their experience, the sailors are optimistic, while the courageous man has given up hope of saving his life but finds the thought of such an (inglorious) death revolting. Furthermore, circumstances which bring out courage are those in which a man can show his prowess 5 or where he can die a noble death, neither of which is true of death by drowning or illness.96
Book 3,Chapter 7 (1115b7–1116a14)
Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι
καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε
νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ
10 μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ
ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ
ἧττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα
15 φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἣ μὲν ὅτι <ὃ> οὐ δεῖ, ἣ
δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἣ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα
ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος,
20 πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας
ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. †καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.†
τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει.
καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ
τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ
25 ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν
ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἄν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηδὲν
φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ
τοὺς Κελτούς· ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ
φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ
30 προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὡς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ
ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται,
μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν
τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ
δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ
35 καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ.
Now, the same things are not fearful to all people, and there are some things of which we say that they surpass human endurance. The latter are fearful at least to every sensible person. But terrors which are humanly bearable differ in magnitude 10 and degree, and so do the circumstances that inspire confidence. Now, the courageous man is dauntless as a human being. Hence he will fear what is fearful; but he will endure it in the right way and as reason directs for the sake of acting nobly: that is the end of virtue. It is of course possible to fear things to a greater or lesser degree, and also to fear what is not fearful. 15 Errors arise from fearing what one should not, fearing in the wrong manner, fearing at the wrong time, and so on, and similarly with events that inspire confidence.
Accordingly, he is courageous who endures and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right manner, and at the right time, and who displays confidence in a similar way. For a courageous man 20 feels and acts according to the merits of each case and as reason guides him. Now, the end of every activity corresponds to the characteristic that produces it. This also applies to a courageous man: courage is noble,97
and, accordingly, its end is noble, too; for a thing is defined by its end. Thus it is for a noble end that a courageous man endures and acts as courage demands.
To turn to the types of excess. There is no name for a man who exceeds in lack of fear. 25 (We have stated earlier that many qualities have no name.)98 But he must be a madman or immune to pain if he fears nothing, neither earthquake nor flood, as they say of the Celts. He who exceeds in confidence in a fearful situation is called reckless. A reckless man is usually thought of as boastful 30 and as someone who pretends to have courage; at any rate, he wants to appear to behave in a fearful situation as a courageous man really behaves. Therefore he imitates him whenever the situation enables him to do so. Hence most reckless men are reckless cowards: they put on a show of confidence when the situation permits, but do not stand their ground when there is something to fear.
A man who exceeds in fear is a coward: he fears the wrong things, 35 in the wrong manner, and so forth, all the way down the list.
Accordingly, he is courageous who endures and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right manner, and at the right time, and who displays confidence in a similar way. For a courageous man 20 feels and acts according to the merits of each case and as reason guides him. Now, the end of every activity corresponds to the characteristic that produces it. This also applies to a courageous man: courage is noble,97
and, accordingly, its end is noble, too; for a thing is defined by its end. Thus it is for a noble end that a courageous man endures and acts as courage demands.
To turn to the types of excess. There is no name for a man who exceeds in lack of fear. 25 (We have stated earlier that many qualities have no name.)98 But he must be a madman or immune to pain if he fears nothing, neither earthquake nor flood, as they say of the Celts. He who exceeds in confidence in a fearful situation is called reckless. A reckless man is usually thought of as boastful 30 and as someone who pretends to have courage; at any rate, he wants to appear to behave in a fearful situation as a courageous man really behaves. Therefore he imitates him whenever the situation enables him to do so. Hence most reckless men are reckless cowards: they put on a show of confidence when the situation permits, but do not stand their ground when there is something to fear.
A man who exceeds in fear is a coward: he fears the wrong things, 35 in the wrong manner, and so forth, all the way down the list.
1116a
1 ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων
μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δή τις ὁ δειλός·
πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ
θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. περὶ ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλὸς
5 καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς
αὐτά· οἳ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὃ δὲ μέσως
ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ
βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ
δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.
10 Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ
θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἱρεῖται
καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν
φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἤ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ
15 οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν.
1 He is also deficient in confidence; but his excessive fear in painful situations is more obvious. A coward is a pessimistic sort of fellow, for he fears everything. But a courageous man is the very opposite, because confidence implies optimism.
To sum up: a coward, 5 a reckless man, and a courageous man are all concerned with the same situations, but their attitudes toward them are different. The former two show excess and deficiency, while the courageous man keeps to the median and behaves as he ought. Further, reckless men are impetuous, and though they are eager before danger comes, they keep out of it when it is there; courageous men, on the other hand, are keen in the thick of action but calm beforehand.
Courage, 10 as we have stated, is a mean concerning matters that inspire confidence and fear, in the situations described. It chooses and endures what it does because it is noble to do so or base to refuse. But to seek death as an escape from poverty, love, or some other painful experience is to be a coward rather than a man of courage. For to run away from troubles is softness, and such a man does not endure death because it is noble but because he is fleeing from evil.
To sum up: a coward, 5 a reckless man, and a courageous man are all concerned with the same situations, but their attitudes toward them are different. The former two show excess and deficiency, while the courageous man keeps to the median and behaves as he ought. Further, reckless men are impetuous, and though they are eager before danger comes, they keep out of it when it is there; courageous men, on the other hand, are keen in the thick of action but calm beforehand.
Courage, 10 as we have stated, is a mean concerning matters that inspire confidence and fear, in the situations described. It chooses and endures what it does because it is noble to do so or base to refuse. But to seek death as an escape from poverty, love, or some other painful experience is to be a coward rather than a man of courage. For to run away from troubles is softness, and such a man does not endure death because it is noble but because he is fleeing from evil.
Book 3,Chapter 8 (1116a15–1117a28)
Ἔστι μὲν
οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ
πέντε τρόπους· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν.
δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ
τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς·
20 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ
ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος
ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα·
Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·
καὶ [Διομήδης]
25 Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων
"Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο."
ὡμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, ὅτι δι'
ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς
γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἄν τις
30 καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό·
χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι,
καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι
γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ
ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,
35 οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.
καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες, τὸ αὐτὸ
15 So much for our discussion of what courage is. However, there are five further types of character to which this name is also applied. (1) There is, in the first place, because of its close resemblance to true courage, the courage of the citizen soldier. Citizens, it seems, endure dangers because the laws and customs penalize and stigmatize them if they do not, and honor them if they do. 20 Hence those peoples are considered the most courageous among whom cowards are held in dishonor and courageous men in honor. It is this very type of courage which Homer describes in such characters as Diomedes and Hector:
> Polydamas will be first to put a reproach upon me,99
and:
> for 25 some day Hektor will say openly before the Trojans:
> "The son of Tydeus, running before me. . . ."100
This kind of courage bears the closest resemblance to the one we have described earlier, in that it is motivated by virtue, that is, by a sense of shame and by the desire for a noble object (to wit, honor) and avoidance of reproach as something base.
We might include under this head also 30 those who are forced to act by their superiors. They are, however, inferior (to the previous case) inasmuch as they are prompted not by a sense of shame but by fear, and because what they try to avoid is not baseness but pain. Their masters exert compulsion as Hector does when he says:
> But if I shall see any man who cowers and stays out of > battle, > 35 Him nothing shall save to escape from the dogs.101
Field commanders do the selfsame thing when they beat their troops if the latter retreat, and
> Polydamas will be first to put a reproach upon me,99
and:
> for 25 some day Hektor will say openly before the Trojans:
> "The son of Tydeus, running before me. . . ."100
This kind of courage bears the closest resemblance to the one we have described earlier, in that it is motivated by virtue, that is, by a sense of shame and by the desire for a noble object (to wit, honor) and avoidance of reproach as something base.
We might include under this head also 30 those who are forced to act by their superiors. They are, however, inferior (to the previous case) inasmuch as they are prompted not by a sense of shame but by fear, and because what they try to avoid is not baseness but pain. Their masters exert compulsion as Hector does when he says:
> But if I shall see any man who cowers and stays out of > battle, > 35 Him nothing shall save to escape from the dogs.101
Field commanders do the selfsame thing when they beat their troops if the latter retreat, and
1116b
1 δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες·
πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον
εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ
περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾠήθη
5 ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις,
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι
πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι·
φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν.
εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας,
10 δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες
ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ
παθεῖν κράτιστα· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὡπλισμένοι μάχονται
καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν
οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα
15 ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρατιῶται
δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ
λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ
φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ κἀπὶ
τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν
20 καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος· οἳ δὲ
καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ
φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ
δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν
φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν
25 ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ
ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς
κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος "σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ" καὶ
"μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε" καὶ "δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥῖνας μένος"
καὶ "ἔζεσεν αἷμα·" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν
30 τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι
διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ
θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι,
ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἕλει] ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ
δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
35 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ
οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ
1 when they line them up with a trench or something of the sort behind them: they all use compulsion. But courageous action ought to be motivated not by compulsion, but by the fact that it is noble.
(2) Secondly, experience in facing particular dangers is believed to be courage. Socrates for this very reason 5 thought courage was knowledge.102 Different people exhibit this kind of courage under different circumstances, but in warfare professional soldiers are especially noted for it. For they have the best insight into the many false alarms which war seems to (bring with it). They give the impression of being courageous, because the others do not know what is happening. Moreover, their experience enables them to be efficient in attack and in defense, 10 for they are capable of using arms and are equipped with the best for offensive as well as defensive purposes. Therefore, they fight with the advantage armed men have over unarmed, or trained athletes over amateurs; for in athletic contests it is not the most courageous who are the best fighters, 15 but the strongest and those who are physically best conditioned. When the strain of danger becomes too great, however, and when they are inferior in men and equipment, professional soldiers turn cowards: they are the first to run away, while the citizen militia stand their ground and die, as happened at the temple of Hermes.103 For citizens, flight is disgraceful 20 and death preferable to saving one's life on these terms; but the professionals go to face danger from the very outset in the belief that they are stronger, and once they realize that they are mistaken they run away, fearing death more than disgrace. But this sort of thing is not courage.
(3) Thirdly, a spirited temper is classified as courage. When men, in a fit of temper, 25 become like wild beasts and turn on those who have wounded them, they are considered courageous, because courageous men are spirited. For nothing makes a man as ready to encounter dangers as a spirited temper. That is why Homer is full of expressions like: "he put strength into his spirit" and "he aroused his might and spirit" and "bitter fierceness welled up through his nostrils" and "his blood boiled";104 for all such expressions seem to describe spirited temper as it is aroused and goes into action. 30 Now, courageous men act the way they do because it is noble, and a spirited temper gives them support. But wild beasts are motivated by pain. ⟨They attack only⟩ when they are wounded or scared, but not ⟨when they are left in peace⟩ in a forest. Thus they are not courageous, because they are spurred by pain and a roused temper 35 to rush into danger without foreseeing any of the perils that are in store for them: on this basis even asses would be courageous when they are hungry, for no beating can make them budge from their pasture.
(2) Secondly, experience in facing particular dangers is believed to be courage. Socrates for this very reason 5 thought courage was knowledge.102 Different people exhibit this kind of courage under different circumstances, but in warfare professional soldiers are especially noted for it. For they have the best insight into the many false alarms which war seems to (bring with it). They give the impression of being courageous, because the others do not know what is happening. Moreover, their experience enables them to be efficient in attack and in defense, 10 for they are capable of using arms and are equipped with the best for offensive as well as defensive purposes. Therefore, they fight with the advantage armed men have over unarmed, or trained athletes over amateurs; for in athletic contests it is not the most courageous who are the best fighters, 15 but the strongest and those who are physically best conditioned. When the strain of danger becomes too great, however, and when they are inferior in men and equipment, professional soldiers turn cowards: they are the first to run away, while the citizen militia stand their ground and die, as happened at the temple of Hermes.103 For citizens, flight is disgraceful 20 and death preferable to saving one's life on these terms; but the professionals go to face danger from the very outset in the belief that they are stronger, and once they realize that they are mistaken they run away, fearing death more than disgrace. But this sort of thing is not courage.
(3) Thirdly, a spirited temper is classified as courage. When men, in a fit of temper, 25 become like wild beasts and turn on those who have wounded them, they are considered courageous, because courageous men are spirited. For nothing makes a man as ready to encounter dangers as a spirited temper. That is why Homer is full of expressions like: "he put strength into his spirit" and "he aroused his might and spirit" and "bitter fierceness welled up through his nostrils" and "his blood boiled";104 for all such expressions seem to describe spirited temper as it is aroused and goes into action. 30 Now, courageous men act the way they do because it is noble, and a spirited temper gives them support. But wild beasts are motivated by pain. ⟨They attack only⟩ when they are wounded or scared, but not ⟨when they are left in peace⟩ in a forest. Thus they are not courageous, because they are spurred by pain and a roused temper 35 to rush into danger without foreseeing any of the perils that are in store for them: on this basis even asses would be courageous when they are hungry, for no beating can make them budge from their pasture.
1117a
1 οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. [οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ
δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον.]
φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προςλαβοῦσα
5 προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ
ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἥδονται·
οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι
δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ
διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες
10 ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς
νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι
ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα
θαρραλέοι, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κράτιστοι εἶναι καὶ
μηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι·
15 εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ
φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. διὸ
καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις
ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ
20 ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ
προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο,
τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ
οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ'
ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα
25 χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι,
φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες
τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται
ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.
1 Adulterers, too, are prompted by lust to do many daring things.105
However, the kind of courage that comes from a spirited temper seems to be the most natural and becomes true courage 5 when choice and purpose are added to it. Moreover, anger gives men pain and revenge pleasure; and although those who fight for these motives are good fighters, they are not courageous, for it is not the incentive of what is noble that makes them fight, and they are not guided by reason but by emotion. However, they have something which closely resembles courage.
(4) Nor are optimists courageous, 10 for they gain their confidence in danger from having won many victories over many people. They resemble courageous men in that both are confident; the confidence of courageous men, however, is inspired by the motives discussed above, while the confidence of optimists is based upon their belief that they are the strongest and will suffer no harm. People behave the same way when drunk: drinking makes them optimists. 15 But when things turn out contrary to their expectation they run away. On the other hand, a courageous man, as we have seen, is characterized by the fact that he endures what is fearful to man and what seems fearful to him, because to do so is noble and to do otherwise is base. For that reason it is a mark of even greater courage to be fearless and unruffled when suddenly faced with a terrifying situation than when the danger is clear beforehand. For the reaction is more prone to be due to a characteristic, since it 20 is less dependent on preparation. When we see what is coming we can make a choice based on calculation and guided by reason, but when a situation arises suddenly our actions are determined by our characteristics.
(5) Finally, people who act in ignorance of their danger give the impression of being courageous. In fact, they are not far removed from the optimists, but they are inferior in that they have none of the self-reliance which enables the optimists to hold their ground for some time. 25 Once the ignorant realize, however, that the situation is not what they suspected it was, they are deceived and run away. This is what happened to the Argives when they encountered the Spartans and took them for Sicyonians.106
So much for a description of the nature of the courageous man and of those who are believed to be courageous.
However, the kind of courage that comes from a spirited temper seems to be the most natural and becomes true courage 5 when choice and purpose are added to it. Moreover, anger gives men pain and revenge pleasure; and although those who fight for these motives are good fighters, they are not courageous, for it is not the incentive of what is noble that makes them fight, and they are not guided by reason but by emotion. However, they have something which closely resembles courage.
(4) Nor are optimists courageous, 10 for they gain their confidence in danger from having won many victories over many people. They resemble courageous men in that both are confident; the confidence of courageous men, however, is inspired by the motives discussed above, while the confidence of optimists is based upon their belief that they are the strongest and will suffer no harm. People behave the same way when drunk: drinking makes them optimists. 15 But when things turn out contrary to their expectation they run away. On the other hand, a courageous man, as we have seen, is characterized by the fact that he endures what is fearful to man and what seems fearful to him, because to do so is noble and to do otherwise is base. For that reason it is a mark of even greater courage to be fearless and unruffled when suddenly faced with a terrifying situation than when the danger is clear beforehand. For the reaction is more prone to be due to a characteristic, since it 20 is less dependent on preparation. When we see what is coming we can make a choice based on calculation and guided by reason, but when a situation arises suddenly our actions are determined by our characteristics.
(5) Finally, people who act in ignorance of their danger give the impression of being courageous. In fact, they are not far removed from the optimists, but they are inferior in that they have none of the self-reliance which enables the optimists to hold their ground for some time. 25 Once the ignorant realize, however, that the situation is not what they suspected it was, they are deceived and run away. This is what happened to the Argives when they encountered the Spartans and took them for Sicyonians.106
So much for a description of the nature of the courageous man and of those who are believed to be courageous.
Book 3,Chapter 9 (1117a29–1117b22)
Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὖσα οὐχ ὁμοίως
30 περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ
ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος
μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν,
ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ
ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ
35 ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
Although courage is concerned with feelings of confidence and of fear, it is not concerned with both to an equal extent, 30 but deals more with situations that inspire fear. For he who is unruffled in such situations and shows the right attitude toward them is more truly courageous than he who does so in situations that inspire confidence. In fact, as we have pointed out,107 men are called courageous for enduring pain. Hence courage is a painful thing and is justly praised, because it is 35 more difficult to endure what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant.
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless,
1117b
1 δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν
κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἀν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται·
τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ
στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ
5 σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ
ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.
εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος
καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται,
ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. καὶ
10 ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος
ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ
γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται
εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος,
ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ'
15 ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως
ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.
στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἧττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν
ἔχοντας· ἕτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν
20 βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν
ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ
γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
1 it would seem that the end which courage aims at is pleasant, obscured though it is by the attendant circumstances. Take athletic contests, for example: for boxers the end is pleasant—the object for which they fight, the wreath and the honors—though the blows they receive hurt them 5 (since they are made of flesh and blood) and are painful, as is all their exertion. Since these painful elements are so great in number, the goal of the fight appears small and devoid of anything pleasant. If the same thing is also true of courage, death and wounds will be painful for a courageous man and he will suffer them unwillingly, but he will endure them because it is noble to do so or base to do otherwise. 10 And the closer a man is to having virtue or excellence in its entirety and the happier he is, the more pain will death bring him. Life is more worth living for such a man than for anyone else, and he stands to lose the greatest goods, and realizes that fact, and that is painful. But he is no less courageous for that, and perhaps rather more so, since he chooses noble deeds in war in return for suffering pain. 15 Accordingly, only insofar as it attains its end is it true to say of every virtue that it is pleasant when practiced.
But perhaps this does not mean to say that men of true courage make the best professional soldiers. The best professionals are men who have less courage, but have nothing to lose; for they are willing to face dangers and will sell their lives for a small profit.
So much for our discussion of courage. On the basis of what 20 we have said, it is not difficult to comprehend at least in outline what it is.
But perhaps this does not mean to say that men of true courage make the best professional soldiers. The best professionals are men who have less courage, but have nothing to lose; for they are willing to face dangers and will sell their lives for a small profit.
So much for our discussion of courage. On the basis of what 20 we have said, it is not difficult to comprehend at least in outline what it is.
Book 3,Chapter 10 (1117b23–1118b7)
Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι
γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν
25 οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν·
ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς
αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν
ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διῃρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ
αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἑκάτερος γὰρ
30 τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας
ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως
δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν· τοὺς
γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
35 κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ
After courage let us discuss self-control,108 for these two seem to be virtues of our irrational part. We have stated earlier that 25 self-control is a mean in regard to pleasures109 (for it is concerned with pain only to a lesser extent and in a different way), and self-indulgence, too, manifests itself in the same situations. Therefore, let us now define with what kind of pleasures it is concerned.
We must first differentiate between the pleasures of the soul and the pleasures of the body. Take, for example, the pleasures of fulfilled ambition and love of learning: when the man who has attained his ambition and the man who loves learning 30 finds joy in the thing he loves, it is not his body but rather his thought that is affected. Men who indulge in these pleasures are called neither self-controlled nor self-indulgent. Similarly, these terms cannot be applied to men who indulge in any pleasures other than those of the body: we call men who are fond of hearing and of telling stories and 35 who spend their days in trivialities gossipy, but not self-indulgent,
We must first differentiate between the pleasures of the soul and the pleasures of the body. Take, for example, the pleasures of fulfilled ambition and love of learning: when the man who has attained his ambition and the man who loves learning 30 finds joy in the thing he loves, it is not his body but rather his thought that is affected. Men who indulge in these pleasures are called neither self-controlled nor self-indulgent. Similarly, these terms cannot be applied to men who indulge in any pleasures other than those of the body: we call men who are fond of hearing and of telling stories and 35 who spend their days in trivialities gossipy, but not self-indulgent,
1118a
1 λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. περὶ
δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ
ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρώμασι
καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι
5 λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν
καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως
χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ
τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ
10 συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων
ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς
μύρων ἢ ὄψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι
διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι
δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς
15 τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου·
τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες
χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν·
20 οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοὸς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι
δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ᾔσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ
φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν "ἢ [εὑρὼν] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον
αἶγα," ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἕξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς
ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
25 ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται·
αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει
ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ
κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες
καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ
30 οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα
δι' ἁφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις
λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν φάρυγγα
αὑτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ
1 nor do we call self-indulgent those who feel pain at the loss of money or of friends.
Self-control deals with the pleasures of the body, but not even with all of these. For people who find delight in visual objects such as colors, shapes, and pictures are called neither self-controlled nor self-indulgent; 5 still, even here it does seem possible to feel delight in the right manner as well as excessively or deficiently. The same is true of the objects of sound: no one terms those self-indulgent who take an excessive delight in music or in the theater, or self-controlled those who enjoy it in the right manner. Nor do we apply these terms in connection with the sense of smell, except incidentally: 10 those who like the smell of fruit, roses, or incense we do not call self-indulgent, but rather those who like the smell of perfume or fine cooking. For it is in these things that self-indulgent people take delight, because they remind them of the objects of their appetite. True, one sees other people, too, 15 finding delight in the smell of food when they are hungry, but only the self-indulgent is characterized by the delight he takes in such things, since to him they are the stimulants of appetite.
Moreover, the lower animals derive no pleasure through these senses, unless it be incidentally. Dogs do not take delight in smelling hares but in eating them: the smell only makes them perceive the hare. 20 Nor does a lion enjoy the lowing of an ox but the devouring: the lowing merely makes him perceive that the ox is close by, and consequently he seems to enjoy it. In the same way, it is not the sight of "stag or mountain goat"110 that gives him joy, but the prospect of a meal.
Thus self-control and self-indulgence are concerned with such pleasures as 25 we share with the other animals, and which therefore appear slavish and bestial. These are the pleasures of touch and taste. But they evidently involve little or no use of taste at that: for the function of taste consists in the discrimination of flavors, and that is what wine tasters and chefs do when they prepare delicacies. Now, these people do not find delight in discriminating flavors—or 30 at any rate self-indulgent people do not—but in the actual enjoyment of them, which comes about exclusively through touch in eating and in drinking as well as in sexual intercourse. That is why a certain gourmet prayed for a throat longer than a crane's, implying that he derived his pleasure from touch.111
Self-control deals with the pleasures of the body, but not even with all of these. For people who find delight in visual objects such as colors, shapes, and pictures are called neither self-controlled nor self-indulgent; 5 still, even here it does seem possible to feel delight in the right manner as well as excessively or deficiently. The same is true of the objects of sound: no one terms those self-indulgent who take an excessive delight in music or in the theater, or self-controlled those who enjoy it in the right manner. Nor do we apply these terms in connection with the sense of smell, except incidentally: 10 those who like the smell of fruit, roses, or incense we do not call self-indulgent, but rather those who like the smell of perfume or fine cooking. For it is in these things that self-indulgent people take delight, because they remind them of the objects of their appetite. True, one sees other people, too, 15 finding delight in the smell of food when they are hungry, but only the self-indulgent is characterized by the delight he takes in such things, since to him they are the stimulants of appetite.
Moreover, the lower animals derive no pleasure through these senses, unless it be incidentally. Dogs do not take delight in smelling hares but in eating them: the smell only makes them perceive the hare. 20 Nor does a lion enjoy the lowing of an ox but the devouring: the lowing merely makes him perceive that the ox is close by, and consequently he seems to enjoy it. In the same way, it is not the sight of "stag or mountain goat"110 that gives him joy, but the prospect of a meal.
Thus self-control and self-indulgence are concerned with such pleasures as 25 we share with the other animals, and which therefore appear slavish and bestial. These are the pleasures of touch and taste. But they evidently involve little or no use of taste at that: for the function of taste consists in the discrimination of flavors, and that is what wine tasters and chefs do when they prepare delicacies. Now, these people do not find delight in discriminating flavors—or 30 at any rate self-indulgent people do not—but in the actual enjoyment of them, which comes about exclusively through touch in eating and in drinking as well as in sexual intercourse. That is why a certain gourmet prayed for a throat longer than a crane's, implying that he derived his pleasure from touch.111
1118b
1 ἁφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία·
καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἄνθρωποί
ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ᾗ ζῷα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν
καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται
5 τῶν διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῄρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς
γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ
γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἁφή, ἀλλὰ περί
τινα μέρη.
1 The senses involved in self-indulgence are those most widely shared by living beings. It seems that self-indulgence is considered reprehensible for a good reason, for it inheres in us not as human beings but as animals. Therefore, it is bestial to delight in such things and to be inordinately fond of them. As a matter of fact, 5 the pleasures of touch in which free men most often indulge, such as the massages and warm baths in the gymnasia, form an exception. For ⟨the pleasure⟩ of the self-indulgent is not ⟨produced by⟩ the touch of the whole body, but by the touch of some specific parts.
Book 3,Chapter 11 (1118b8–1119a20)
Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἳ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
αἳ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική·
10 πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δὲ
ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων·
τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ
φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν·
ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω
15 τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι
ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ
τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας
ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς
20 παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν
ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ
πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων
ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί,
ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν·
25 καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ
γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ
καὶ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς
λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται
30 σώφρων οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος τῷ μή, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ
λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει
(καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ
μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.
There seem to be two kinds of appetite. The first is shared by all, the second is peculiar to some individuals and is adventitious. For example, the appetite for nourishment is common to all and natural, 10 since everyone who lacks food or drink (or occasionally both) has an appetite for it; and also, as Homer says,112 everyone who is young and vigorous has an appetite for sexual intercourse. But when it comes to appetite for some specific kind of food or sexual relation, not everybody shares it, nor do all have appetite for the same things. This appetite, therefore, is evidently more personal. Still, it has something natural about it; for different people find different things pleasant, and some things are extraordinarily pleasant to everyone.
Now 15 in the natural appetites few people go wrong, and that in only one direction, namely excess. For to eat and to drink anything until one is more than full is to exceed the natural amount, since natural appetite merely means filling a deficiency. For that reason, people who eat too much are called "belly-gorgers," inasmuch as 20 they fill their stomach beyond what is needed. Men who are all too slavish develop this trait.
On the other hand, in the pleasures peculiar to individuals many men go wrong and in many ways. For while people are said to be "partial" to something either because they find delight in things they should not, or because they find greater delight in them than most people do, or because they find them delightful in the wrong way, the self-indulgent exceed in all three respects: 25 they enjoy some things that they should not, because they are detestable things, and if there are any such things that ought to be enjoyed, they enjoy them more than they should or more than most people do.
It is thus evident that the excess in regard to pleasures is self-indulgence and that it is reprehensible. But as far as pain is concerned, there is a difference between self-control and courage. A man is not called "self-controlled" because he can endure pain or "self-indulgent" because he cannot. 30 He is called "self-indulgent" for feeling more pain than he should at not getting his pleasure (so that it is pleasure which makes him feel pain), and "self-controlled" for not feeling pain at the absence of or abstinence from his pleasure.
Now 15 in the natural appetites few people go wrong, and that in only one direction, namely excess. For to eat and to drink anything until one is more than full is to exceed the natural amount, since natural appetite merely means filling a deficiency. For that reason, people who eat too much are called "belly-gorgers," inasmuch as 20 they fill their stomach beyond what is needed. Men who are all too slavish develop this trait.
On the other hand, in the pleasures peculiar to individuals many men go wrong and in many ways. For while people are said to be "partial" to something either because they find delight in things they should not, or because they find greater delight in them than most people do, or because they find them delightful in the wrong way, the self-indulgent exceed in all three respects: 25 they enjoy some things that they should not, because they are detestable things, and if there are any such things that ought to be enjoyed, they enjoy them more than they should or more than most people do.
It is thus evident that the excess in regard to pleasures is self-indulgence and that it is reprehensible. But as far as pain is concerned, there is a difference between self-control and courage. A man is not called "self-controlled" because he can endure pain or "self-indulgent" because he cannot. 30 He is called "self-indulgent" for feeling more pain than he should at not getting his pleasure (so that it is pleasure which makes him feel pain), and "self-controlled" for not feeling pain at the absence of or abstinence from his pleasure.
1119a
1 Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ
τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων
καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ
5 δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς
ἡδονὰς καὶ ἧττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ
ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ
ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὔ·
εἰ δέ τῳ μηδέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω
10 ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος
διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ'
ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ
οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ
15 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν·
ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων
ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων
τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ
γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς
20 ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.
1 A self-indulgent man has appetite for everything pleasant or for what is most pleasant, and he is driven by his appetite to choose pleasant things at the cost of everything else. As a result, he feels pain both when he fails to get what he wants and when he has an appetite for it. His appetite is accompanied by pain, although it seems strange to feel pain because of pleasure.
On 5 the other hand, men deficient in regard to pleasures, who find less delight in them than they should, are scarcely ever found, for such insensitivity is not human. Even the animals discriminate between different kinds of food and enjoy some and not others. If there is someone to whom nothing is pleasant and who does not differentiate one thing from another, 10 he must be anything but a man. There is no name for such a creature, since he is scarcely to be found.
A self-controlled man observes the mean in these matters. He takes no pleasure in what is most pleasant to the self-indulgent, but rather finds it disgusting; in general, he takes no pleasure in what he should not, and no excessive pleasure in touch and taste. He feels neither pain nor appetite, or only moderately, when he does not have these pleasures: 15 he feels them no more than he should, nor when he should not, and so forth. But all the pleasant things that contribute to his health and well-being he desires moderately and in the way he should, and also other pleasures as long as they are neither detrimental to health and well-being nor incompatible with what is noble nor beyond his means. A man who does not observe these standards 20 loves such pleasures more than they are worth. But a self-controlled man is of a different sort: he follows right reason.
On 5 the other hand, men deficient in regard to pleasures, who find less delight in them than they should, are scarcely ever found, for such insensitivity is not human. Even the animals discriminate between different kinds of food and enjoy some and not others. If there is someone to whom nothing is pleasant and who does not differentiate one thing from another, 10 he must be anything but a man. There is no name for such a creature, since he is scarcely to be found.
A self-controlled man observes the mean in these matters. He takes no pleasure in what is most pleasant to the self-indulgent, but rather finds it disgusting; in general, he takes no pleasure in what he should not, and no excessive pleasure in touch and taste. He feels neither pain nor appetite, or only moderately, when he does not have these pleasures: 15 he feels them no more than he should, nor when he should not, and so forth. But all the pleasant things that contribute to his health and well-being he desires moderately and in the way he should, and also other pleasures as long as they are neither detrimental to health and well-being nor incompatible with what is noble nor beyond his means. A man who does not observe these standards 20 loves such pleasures more than they are worth. But a self-controlled man is of a different sort: he follows right reason.
Book 3,Chapter 12 (1119a21–1119b18)
Ἑκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.
ἣ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἣ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν,
τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν
τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον
25 δὴ ἑκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον
πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ
ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε
δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑκούσιον ἡ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον·
αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε
30 καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥιπτεῖν καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ
βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα
ἑκούσια (ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ), τὸ δ' ὅλον ἧττον·
οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας
καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι
Self-indulgence resembles voluntary ⟨action⟩ more than cowardice does. For it is motivated by pleasure, while cowardice is motivated by pain, and pleasure is something we choose, and pain something we avoid. Moreover, pain upsets and destroys the nature of the man who experiences it, but pleasure does nothing of the kind. Thus, self-indulgence is 25 more voluntary ⟨than cowardice⟩. For the same reason, it is also more reprehensible. In fact, it is easier to habituate oneself to withstand the attractions of pleasure, for life is full of them and habituation involves no danger; while the opposite is true of fearful situations.
It would seem, however, that cowardice is more voluntary than particular cowardly acts. For while cowardice itself is free from pain, cowardly acts, through the pain they entail, so upset a man that 30 he throws away his arms and disgraces himself in other ways. Hence such acts are actually considered as done under constraint. The opposite is true of a self-indulgent man. In his case, the particular acts are voluntary, inasmuch as they are done with appetite and desire, while the general characteristics are less so. No one has the urge to be self-indulgent.
We apply the word "self-indulgence" also to the naughtiness of children,113
It would seem, however, that cowardice is more voluntary than particular cowardly acts. For while cowardice itself is free from pain, cowardly acts, through the pain they entail, so upset a man that 30 he throws away his arms and disgraces himself in other ways. Hence such acts are actually considered as done under constraint. The opposite is true of a self-indulgent man. In his case, the particular acts are voluntary, inasmuch as they are done with appetite and desire, while the general characteristics are less so. No one has the urge to be self-indulgent.
We apply the word "self-indulgence" also to the naughtiness of children,113
1119b
1 γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν
πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου.
οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ
τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον
5 δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ
ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος
ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ
ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ
ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές,
10 κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν.
διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν
ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον—ὥσπερ
δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα
τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν
15 λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν
τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ
σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ
λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.
1 for this bears some resemblance to the self-indulgence we have been discussing. It makes no difference for our present purposes which of the two senses is derived from the other, but obviously what comes later in life is named after what comes earlier. The metaphor seems to be quite good: for what desires the base and what grows wild needs to be "checked" or "pruned,"114 5 and that is, above all, appetite and a child. For, like self-indulgent men, children live as their appetite directs them, and the desire for pleasure is especially strong in them. So if appetite and desire do not obey and do not subject themselves to the ruling element, they will go far astray. For the desire for pleasure is insatiable in a senseless creature and knows no bounds, and the active gratification of appetite will increase the appetite with which we were born, 10 and if the appetites are great and intense, they push aside the power of reasoning. They should, therefore, be moderate and few in number, and should never oppose the guidance of reason: that is what we mean by "obedient" and "checked." And just as a child must live as his tutor bids him live, so the appetitive element in us must be guided by the bidding of reason. 15 Consequently, the appetitive element of a self-controlled man must be in harmony with the guidance of reason. For the aim of both his appetite and his reason is to do what is noble. The appetite of a self-controlled man is directed at the right objects, in the right way, and at the right time; and this is what reason prescribes. So much for our discussion of self-control.