Name: Nicomachean Ethics, Book V
Author: Aristotle

Bywater (OCT, 1894) · Ostwald (1962)

Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).

Book 5,Chapter 1 (1129a3–1130a13)

1129a

Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας

τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ

5 δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν

ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ

πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην,

ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι

καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ

10 περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ

καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ

τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ

τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων

15 οὔ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ

τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν

βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ

ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἕξεις ἀπὸ

τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ᾖ φανερά, καὶ ἡ

20 καχεξία φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία

καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης

σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς

καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ

δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγηται,

25 καὶ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ

ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ

ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν

λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον, (ἡ

γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν) οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται

30 κλεὶς ὁμωνύμως ἥ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζῴων καὶ ᾗ τὰς

θύρας κλείουσιν. εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται.

δοκεῖ δὴ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ

ἄνισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ [ὁ] δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος

καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ

In studying justice and injustice,¹⁵⁷ we must examine the kind of actions with which they are concerned, what kind of mean justice is, and 5 what the extremes are between which a just act occupies the median position. In this examination, we shall follow the same system of investigation that we used in our preceding discussions.¹⁵⁸
We see that all men mean by "justice" that characteristic which makes them performers of just actions, which makes them act justly, and which makes them wish what is just. 10 The same applies to "injustice": it makes people act unjustly and wish what is unjust. Let this general outline serve as our first basis of discussion. For what is true of the sciences and capacities is not true of characteristics.¹⁵⁹ As is well known, a given capacity, and also a given science, deals with a pair of opposites,¹⁶⁰ whereas a given characteristic is not related to anything that is opposite to itself. 15 Health, for example, does not produce effects opposite to health but only what is healthy: we say that a man has a healthy gait when he walks as a healthy man would.
Now, we often gain knowledge of (a) a characteristic by the opposite characteristic, and (b) of characteristics by those things in which they are exhibited. In other words, if (a) we can recognize a sound physical condition, 20 we can also recognize an unsound physical condition; and (b) a sound condition can be recognized from things that are in a sound condition and they from it. If, for example, firmness of flesh constitutes a sound physical condition, it necessarily follows (a) that an unsound physical condition consists in flabbiness of the flesh, and (b) that that which produces a sound physical condition causes firmness in the flesh. It follows as a general rule, (to which there are exceptions, however,) that if one term in a pair of opposites is used in more senses than one, 25 the other term, also, will be used in more than one sense. For example, if "just" is used in more senses than one, "unjust" will likewise have several senses.
Now, justice and injustice seem to be used in more than one sense, but because their different meanings are very close to one another, the ambiguity escapes notice and is less obvious than it is when the meanings are far apart, as it is, for example, if there is a great difference in external appearance:
thus the word *kleis* is used ambiguously both of the "collarbone 30" 30 beneath the neck of an animal and of the "key" with which we lock a door.¹⁶¹ Let us, then, take the various senses in which we speak of an "unjust" man. We regard as unjust both a lawbreaker and also a man who is unfair and takes more than his share, so that obviously a law-abiding and a fair man will be just. Consequently, "just" is what is lawful and fair,

1129b

1 δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης

ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τἀγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ

ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά,

τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται καὶ διώκουσιν·

5 δεῖ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὑτοῖς

ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθά. ὁ δ' ἄδικος

οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν

ἁπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μεῖον κακὸν ἀγαθόν

πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ

10 πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ

κοινόν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος,

δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά τε γὰρ

ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων

δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων,

15 στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς

ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον

τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ

καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ

πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου

20 ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν

μηδὲ ῥιπτεῖν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν

μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν

μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς

καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς

25 μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη

μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς

ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν

ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος οὔθ' ἑῷος

οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν "ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ

30 συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι." καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή,

ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἐστιν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ

ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι,

ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὑτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις

τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν.

1 and "unjust" is what is unlawful and unfair.
Since an unjust man is one who takes more than his share, he will be concerned with good things—not all good things, but only those which are involved in good and bad fortune.
These are things which are always good in an unqualified sense, but which are not always good for a particular person.
These are the things that men pray for and pursue, 5 although they ought not to do so. They should rather pray that the things which are good in an unqualified sense may also be good for them; and they should choose what is good for them.
An unjust man does not always choose the larger share.
When the choice is between things which are without qualification bad, he chooses the smaller. However, since the lesser evil seems in a sense to be good, and since taking a larger share means taking a larger share of the good, 10 he seems to be a self-aggrandizer. He is unfair, for "unfair" includes and is common to both (taking more than one's share of the good and taking less than one's share of the bad).
Since a lawbreaker is, as we saw, unjust and a law-abiding man just, it is obvious that everything lawful is in a sense just. For "lawful" is what the art of legislation has defined as such, and we call each particular enactment "just." The laws make pronouncements on every sphere of life, 15 and their aim is to secure either the common good of all or of the best, or the good of those who hold power either because of their excellence¹⁶² or on some other basis of this sort. Accordingly, in one sense we call those things "just" which produce and preserve happiness for the social and political community.
The law enjoins us to fulfill our function as brave men 20 (e.g., not to abandon our post, not to flee, and not to throw away our arms), as self-controlled men (e.g., not to commit adultery or outrage), as gentle men (e.g., not to strike or defame anyone), and similarly with the other kinds of virtue and wickedness. It commands some things and forbids others, 25 and it does so correctly when it is framed correctly, and not so well if it was drawn up in haste.
Thus, this kind of justice is complete virtue or excellence, not in an unqualified sense, but in relation to our fellow men.
And for that reason justice is regarded as the highest of all virtues, more admirable than morning star and evening star,¹⁶³
and, as the proverb has it, 30 "In justice every virtue is summed up."¹⁶⁴ It is complete virtue and excellence in the fullest sense, because it is the practice of complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can make use of his virtue not only by himself but also in his relations with his fellow men; for there are many people who can make use of their virtue in their own affairs, but who are incapable of using it in their relations with others.

1130a

1 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ

ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων.

διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ

δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ

5 γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. κάκιστος

μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος

τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ

πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ

δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία

10 ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει

ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·

ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν

πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ᾗ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς, ἀρετή.

1 Therefore, the saying of Bias¹⁶⁵ seems to be apt that "Ruling will show the man," for being a ruler already implies acting in relation to one's fellow men and within society. For the very same reason, justice alone of all the virtues is thought to be the good of another, because it is a relation to our fellow men in that 5 it does what is of advantage to others, either to a ruler or to a fellow member of society.¹⁶⁶
Now, the worst man is he who practices wickedness toward himself as well as his friends, but the best man is not one who practices virtue toward himself, but who practices it toward others, for that is a hard thing to achieve. Justice in this sense, then, is not a part of virtue but the whole of excellence or virtue, 10 and the injustice opposed to it is not part of vice but the whole of vice. The difference between virtue and justice in this sense is clear from what we have said. They are the same thing, but what they are (in terms of their definition) is not the same:¹⁶⁷ insofar as it is exhibited in relation to others it is justice, but insofar as it is simply a characteristic of this kind it is virtue.

Book 5,Chapter 2 (1130a14–1131a9)

Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι

15 γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ

μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας

μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον

ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα

ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ

20 πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν

οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ)

καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος

τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ

τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὃ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ

25 προσλαμβάνων, ὃ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν,

οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης,

ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὔ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ

κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τἆλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται

ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπί τινα μοχθηρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν,

30 ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν,

εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν

ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία

παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν

What we are investigating, however, is justice as a part of virtue; 15 for, we assert, there is such a thing is justice in this sense, as there is also injustice in this partial sense.
An indication of its existence is this: in every other kind of wickedness, the man who practices it does wrong without getting a larger share, if, for example, he throws away his shield through cowardice or slanders another in a bad temper or refuses to give financial assistance because of his stinginess.
But 20 when he does get too large a share, it is frequently not in terms of any of these vices, nor even in terms of all of them, but it certainly is in terms of some sort of baseness—for we blame him—and in terms of injustice. There exists, consequently, some other kind of injustice as a part of the injustice that comprises the whole of vice, and there is a sense in which we speak of "unjust" to express part of the unjust in the wider sense of "contrary to the law." Moreover, if one man commits adultery for profit 25 and makes money on it, while another does it at the prompting of appetite and spends and thus loses money on it, the latter would seem to be self-indulgent rather than grasping for a larger share, while the former is unjust but not self-indulgent, and obviously so because he makes a profit by it. Further, we usually ascribe all other offenses to some particular wickedness, e.g., 30 adultery to self-indulgence, deserting a comrade-in-arms to cowardice, and assault to anger; but making unjust profit is not ascribed to any wickedness other than injustice.
It is, therefore, apparent that there exists, apart from the injustice that comprises the whole of vice, another partial kind of injustice which shares the name and nature of the first

1130b

1 τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν

δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἣ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ

εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ

δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἣ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα

5 ὁ σπουδαῖος.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις

καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ποία

τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ

τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ

10 μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ

δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος

πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον

οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ'

ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ

15 αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη

τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης

καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου

καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν

τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἣ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς

20 οὖσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον ἣ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ

τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερὸν ὡς

διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς

ὅλης ἀρετῆς προσταττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν

προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος.

25 τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται

περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς

καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι,

πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ

γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν ἀνδρί τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.

30 τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου

ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων

ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν

τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν

1 in that its definition falls within the same genus. The capacity of both is revealed in our relations with others, but while the sphere of the former 5 is everything that is the concern of a morally good man, the latter deals with honor, material goods, security, or whatever single term we can find to express all these collectively, and its motive is the pleasure that comes from profit.
It is, accordingly, clear that there is more than one kind of justice, and that there exists a justice distinct from that which comprises the whole of virtue. We must now take up the problem of what it is and what qualities it has.
We drew a distinction between unjust in the sense of "unlawful" and in the sense of "unfair," and between just in the sense of "lawful" and in the sense of "fair." 10 Now, the injustice we discussed above corresponds to the sense of "unlawful." But "unfair" and "unlawful" are not identical but distinct and related to one another as the part is related to the whole; for everything unfair is unlawful, but not everything unlawful is unfair. Therefore, the unjust and injustice in the partial sense, too, are distinct from the unjust and injustice in the complete sense; 15 for the partial kind of injustice is part of complete injustice, and similarly partial justice is part of complete justice. We must, accordingly, discuss partial justice and partial injustice, and also the just and the unjust in the partial sense.
So let us dismiss that justice which is coextensive with the whole of virtue as well as its corresponding injustice, as the one consists in the exercise of the whole of virtue 20 in our relations with our fellow men and the other in the exercise of the whole of vice. Likewise, it is clear how we must determine the terms "just" and "unjust" which correspond to them. For the great majority of lawful acts are ordinances which are based on virtue as a whole: the law commands to live in conformity with every virtue and forbids to live in conformity with any wickedness. 25 What produces virtue entire are those lawful measures which are enacted for education in citizenship. We must determine later¹⁶⁸ whether the education of the individual as such, which makes a person good simply as a man, is part of politics or of some other science. For being a good man is perhaps not the same as being a good citizen of some particular kind of state, whatever it may 30 be.
One form of partial justice and of what is just in this sense is found in the distribution of honors, of material goods, or of anything else that can be divided among those who have a share in the political system. For in these matters it is possible for a man to have a share equal or unequal¹⁶⁹ to that of his neighbor.

1131a

1 δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη

δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ'

ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμὸς

ἐγγύη χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται,

5 ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος), τῶν δ'

ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμακεία

προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία,

τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμὸς θάνατος ἁρπαγὴ πήρωσις

κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.

1 A second kind of just action in the partial sense has a rectifying function in private transactions, and it is divided into two parts: (a) voluntary and (b) involuntary transactions.¹⁷⁰ (a) Voluntary transactions are, for example, sale, purchase, lending at interest, giving security, lending without interest, depositing in trust, and letting for hire. 5 They are called "voluntary" because the initiative in these transactions is voluntary. (b) Some involuntary transactions are clandestine, e.g., theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, and bearing false witness; while others happen under constraint, e.g., assault, imprisonment, murder, violent robbery, maiming, defamation, and character-smearing.

Book 5,Chapter 3 (1131a10–1131b24)

10 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὅ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, δῆλον

ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἔστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ

γὰρ πράξει ἔστι τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἴσον.

εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου

δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν

15 εἴη. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ

δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ᾗ

μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), ᾗ δ'

ἴσον, δυοῖν, ᾗ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον

ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει

20 ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ

ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς,

οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν, ἀλλ'

ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ μὴ ἴσα ἴσοι

ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν

25 τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι

πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν

αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες [ὑπάρχειν], ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ

ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἳ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ'

ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι.

30 τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ'

ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν

τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διῃρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι,

δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται

10 Since an unjust man and an unjust act are unfair or unequal, it is obvious that there exists also a median term between the two extremes of inequality. This is the fair or equal. For any action that admits of a more and a less also admits of an equal.
Now if the unjust is unequal, the just must be equal; and that is, in fact, what everyone believes without argument.¹⁷¹ Since the equal is a median, the just, too, will be a median. 15 Now the equal involves at least two terms.¹⁷² Accordingly, the just is necessarily both median and equal, and it is relative, and (it is just) for certain individuals. Inasmuch as it is median, it must be median between some extremes, i.e., between the more and the less; inasmuch as it is equal, it involves two shares that are equal; and inasmuch as it is just, it must be just for certain parties. Consequently, the just involves at least four terms: 20 there are two persons in whose eyes it is just, and the shares which are just are two.
Also, there will be the same equality between the persons and the shares: the ratio between the shares will be the same as that between the persons.¹⁷³ If the persons are not equal, their (just) shares will not be equal; but this is the source of quarrels and recriminations, when equals have and are awarded unequal shares or unequals equal shares. The truth of this is further illustrated by the principle "To each according to his deserts." 25 Everyone agrees that in distributions the just share must be given on the basis of what one deserves, though not everyone would name the same criterion of deserving: democrats say it is free birth, oligarchs that it is wealth or noble birth, and aristocrats that it is excellence.
Consequently, the just is something proportionate, 30 for proportion is not only applicable to abstract number, but also to number in a generalized sense. Proportion is equality of ratios and involves at least four terms. That a "discrete proportion"¹⁷⁴ involves four terms is obvious; but the same is also true of a "continuous proportion," for it uses one term as though it were two

1131b

1 καὶ δὶς λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως ἡ

τοῦ β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. δὶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν

ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δίς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ

τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός·

5 διῄρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἅ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος

πρὸς τὸν β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν δ, καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ

α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ

ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει, κἂν οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει.

Ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις

10 τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί,

<τὸ δ' ἄδικον> τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον,

τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν

γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει

καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον.

15 ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται

εἷς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο, τὸ ἀνάλογον·

τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ

μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει·

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος

20 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ

γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον κακόν·

ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ

δ' αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν

εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.

1 and mentions it twice, e.g., line *x* : line *y* = line *y* : line *z*. Here line *y* is mentioned twice, so that there will be four proportionate terms if line *y* is taken twice. The just, too, involves at least four terms, and the ratio (between the terms of one pair) is equal (to that between the terms of the other), 5 for the persons and things are similarly distributed.
Therefore, *A* : *B* = *c* : *d* and, by alternation, *A* : *c* = *B* : *d*.¹⁷⁵ It also follows that one whole, (i.e., person plus share,) will stand in the same ratio to the other (whole, as person stands to person).¹⁷⁶ This is the union of terms that distribution (of honors, wealth, etc.) brings about, and if it is effected in this manner, the union is just. Consequently, the combination of term (person) *A* with term (share) *c* and of term (person) *B* with term (share) *d* 10 in the distribution is just, and this kind of the just is median while the corresponding unjust violates the proportion.¹⁷⁷ For the proportional is median, and the just is proportional. Mathematicians call this kind of proportion "geometrical," since in geometrical proportion one whole is to the other as either part is to its corresponding part.¹⁷⁸ 15 But (the just) is not a continuous proportion, for in fact the person and his share cannot coincide in one single term.
The just, then, in this sense is the proportional, and the unjust is what violates the proportion. Consequently, the unjust admits of a more and a less, and this is what takes place in actual fact: a man who acts unjustly has more than his share of good, and a man who is treated unjustly has 20 less. The reverse is true in the case of evil: for in relation to a greater evil the lesser evil counts as a good, since the lesser evil is more desirable than the greater, and since what is desirable is good and what is more desirable is a greater good. This, then, is one kind of what is just.

Book 5,Chapter 4 (1131b25–1132b20)

25 Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι

καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ

τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ πρότερον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν

δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ

τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίνηται

30 ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον

τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ' ἐν

τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον

25 The one remaining form of what is just is the rectifying kind, which we find in transactions both voluntary and involuntary.
The just in this sense is different in kind from the former.
What is just in the distribution of common goods (such as honor and wealth) always follows the proportion we have described.¹⁷⁹ If it is a distribution of common funds, 30 it will follow the same ratio in which the contributions of the various members stand to one another; and the unjust opposed to just in this sense is that which violates the proportion. Now the just in transactions is also something equal (and the unjust something unequal), but (it is something equal)

1132a

1 ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ

τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον

ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ

φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει

5 ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὃ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὃ δ' ἀδικεῖται,

καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὃ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον

τοῦτο ἄνισον ὂν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν

ὃ μὲν πληγῇ ὃ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὃ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διῄρηται

τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ

10 ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς

εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη,

τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι·

ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία

τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον

15 μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον

ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον

κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν

εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη

τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν,

20 ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι

ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον

δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν

ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι.

μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ

25 δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης,

ᾧ τὸ μεῖζον τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ'

ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ

δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὑτοῦ ὅταν

λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ

30 ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ

ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι

δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής. ἐπὰν γὰρ δύο ἴσων

ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις

ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφῃρέθη μέν, μὴ προσετέθη

1 which corresponds not to a geometrical but to an arithmetical proportion.¹⁸⁰ It makes no difference whether a decent man has defrauded a bad man or vice versa, or whether it was a decent or a bad man who committed adultery. The only difference the law considers is that brought about by the damage: 5 it treats the parties as equals and asks only whether one has done and the other has suffered wrong, and whether one has done and the other has suffered damage. As the unjust in this sense is inequality, the judge tries to restore the equilibrium.
When one man has inflicted and another received a wound, or when one man has killed and the other has been killed, the doing and suffering are unequally divided; 10 by inflicting a loss on the offender, the judge tries to take away his gain and restore the equilibrium. For in involuntary transactions we use the term "gain" without any qualification, even though it is not the proper term in some instances (e.g., when a person has inflicted a wound), and we use the term "loss" in a similar way when he is the sufferer. But, at any rate, we do speak of "loss" and "gain" whenever the damage sustained can be measured. Thus, the equal occupies the middle position between the more and the less. 15 But gain and loss are a more and a less, respectively, in opposite ways: more good or less evil are gain, and the reverse is loss. The median between them, as we saw, is the equal or fair which, we assert, is just.
The just as a corrective is, therefore, a median between loss and gain. That is the reason why 20 people have recourse to a judge when they are engaged in a dispute. To go to a judge means to go to the just, for to be a judge means, as it were, to be the embodiment of what is just. They seek out a judge who will be midway between them—some (states), in fact, call judges "mediators"—in the belief that they will get what is just if they get what is median. This is another indication that the just is a kind of median, since a judge, too, may be described as mediating.
The 25 judge restores equality. As though there were a line divided into two unequal parts, he takes away the amount by which the larger part is greater than half the line and adds it to the smaller. Only when the whole has been divided into two equal parts can a man say that he has what is properly his, i.e., when he has taken an equal part. The equal is median between the greater and the smaller 30 according to arithmetical proportion.¹⁸¹ That is the reason why the just has its name, *dikaion*: it is a division into two equal parts (*dicha*), as if we were to call it *dichaion* and the judge *dichastēs*, (i.e., he who divides in two,) instead of *dikastēs*.¹⁸² For when *x* amount is subtracted from one of two equals and added to the other, the other will be larger by 2 *x*; if *x* had been subtracted from the one but had not been added to the other,

1132b

1 δέ, ἑνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἑνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον,

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῃρέθη, ἑνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριοῦμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν

δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον

ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι

5 δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ

μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν αα ββ γγ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς αα

ἀφῃρήσθω τὸ αε, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ γγ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ γδ,

ὥστε ὅλη ἡ δγγ τῆς εα ὑπερέχει τῷ γδ καὶ τῷ γζ· τῆς

ἄρα ββ τῷ γδ. [ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·

10 ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον,

καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.] ἐλήλυθε

δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἥ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ

τῆς ἑκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὑτοῦ

κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι,

15 οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν

δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ'

αὐτὰ <τὰ> δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὑτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε

ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας

μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν

20 καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

1 the other would have been larger only by *x*. Consequently, it is *x* larger than the median, and the median is *x* larger than the unit from which the subtraction was made. Accordingly, we can use this procedure to ascertain both what we must subtract from the party that has too much, and what 5 we must add to the party that has too little: we must add to the party that has too little that amount by which the median is larger and subtract from the greatest¹⁸³ the amount by which the median is smaller. Let lines *AA'*, *BB'*, and *CC'* be equal to one another; ¹⁸⁴ subtract *AE* from *AA'* and add it to *CC'* as *DC*, so that the whole line *DCC'* is larger than 10 *EA'* by *DC + CF*. *DCC'* is, therefore, larger than *BB'* by *DC*.¹⁸⁵
The terms "loss" and "gain" we have been using come from voluntary exchange. To possess more than what was one's own ⟨previously⟩ is called "making a gain," and to have less than one started out with is called "incurring a loss," e.g., 15 in buying, selling, and all other transactions in which the law permits to the agent freedom of action. But when neither party has more or less but exactly what they had contributed to the transaction, they say that they have their own without loss and without gain. In the same way, the just in involuntary transactions occupies the median between a gain and a loss: 20 it is to have an equal amount both before and after the transaction.

Book 5,Chapter 5 (1132b21–1134a16)

Δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἁπλῶς δίκαιον,

ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὡρίζοντο γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον

τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει

οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν—καίτοι

25 βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος

δίκαιον·

εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο

—πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ

δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι

30 μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ

ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς

ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς

κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ

ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ

Some people believe with the Pythagoreans that the just in the unqualified sense is reciprocity,¹⁸⁶ for the Pythagoreans used to define the just without any qualification as "suffering that which one has done to another." Now, reciprocity corresponds neither to just action as distribution nor to just action as rectification;¹⁸⁷ 25 and yet people interpret even Rhadamanthys' rule of the just in this sense: "If he suffers what he committed, then justice will be straight."¹⁸⁸ For there are many cases in which reciprocity and the just are not identical, e.g., if a magistrate, while in office, strikes a man, he should not be struck in return, and if someone strikes a magistrate, he should not only be struck in return but should, in addition, be punished 30. Moreover, there is a great difference between voluntary and involuntary action.
![Diagram: line A—E—A' over B—B' over D—C—F—C', with (=AE) marked under DC and (=AE) under CF; marginal note 28 at left](page-01-figure)
*EA'* represents the lesser, 30 *DCC'* the greater, and *BB'* the median, i.e., the just amount.
But in associations that are based on mutual exchange, the just in this sense constitutes the bond that holds the association together, that is, reciprocity in terms of a proportion and not in terms of exact equality in the return. For it is the reciprocal return of what is proportional ⟨to what one has received⟩ that holds the state together. People seek either to requite evil with evil—

1133a

1 δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι [εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει]· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ

δὲ μή, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν.

διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις

ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῷ

5 χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ

δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις.

οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ β, οἰκία

ἐφ' ᾧ γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον

παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸν

10 ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὑτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾖ τὸ κατὰ τὴν

ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἶτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον.

εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει

κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα

ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνῃροῦντο

15 γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ <ὃ> ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ

πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ

δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ,

καὶ ὅλως ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.

διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή. ἐφ'

20 ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ

μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα

ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ

οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ

τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία.

25 τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα ἑνί τινι πάντα

μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν

ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία, ἣ πάντα συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο

ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή· οἷον δ'

ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην·

30 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ

ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται

δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς

σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ.

1 for otherwise their relation is regarded as that of slaves—or good with good, for otherwise there is no mutual contribution. And it is by their mutual contribution that men are held together. That is the reason why ⟨the state⟩ erects a sanctuary of the Graces in a prominent place, in order to promote reciprocal exchange. For that is the proper province of gratitude: we should return our services 5 to one who has done us a favor, and at another time take the initiative in doing him a favor.¹⁸⁹
Reciprocal exchange in the right proportion is determined by diagonal combination of terms. Let *A* be a builder, *B* a shoemaker, *c* a house, and *d* a shoe. Now, the builder must take the shoemaker's product from the shoemaker and 10 give him part of his own product.¹⁹⁰ Thus, if (1) proportional equality is established between the goods, and (2) reciprocity effected, the fair exchange we spoke of will be realized. But if there is no proportionality, the exchange is not equal and fair, and ⟨the association of the two will⟩ not hold together. For there is nothing to prevent the product of the one from being greater than that of the other, and they must, therefore, be equalized. This is true of the other arts as well: 15 they would disappear if there were not a relationship between an active and a passive element such that the one performs and the other undergoes precisely the same thing of the same quantity and the same quality. For a community is not formed by two physicians, but by a physician and a farmer, and, in general, by people who are different and unequal. But they must be equalized; and hence everything that enters into an exchange must somehow be comparable.
It 20 is for this purpose that money has been introduced: it becomes, as it were, a middle term. For it measures all things, ⟨not only their equality but⟩ also the amount by which they exceed or fall short ⟨of one another⟩. Thus it tells us how many shoes are equal to a house or to a given quantity of food. The relation between builder and shoemaker must, therefore, correspond to the relation between a given amount of shoes and a house or a quantity of food. For if it does not, there will be no exchange and no community. 25 And the relation will not be the same unless the goods are somehow equal. Consequently, all goods must be measured by some single standard, as stated earlier, and that standard is, in fact, need, which holds everything together ⟨in a community⟩. For if men were to require nothing, or were not to require things equally, there would be no exchange or not the same kind of exchange. Now, money has by general agreement come to represent need. 30 That is why it has the name of "currency": it exists by current convention¹⁹¹ and not by nature, and it is in our power to change and invalidate it.
Thus, reciprocity will be attained when the terms have been equalized, and when, as a result, the product of the shoemaker is to the product of the farmer as the farmer is to the shoemaker.

1133b

1 εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται (εἰ

δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον), ἀλλ'

ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὑτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ

ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς α, τροφὴ γ,

5 σκυτοτόμος β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω

μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία

συνέχει ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν

ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἅτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, †ὥσπερ

ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγήν.†

10 δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης

ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα

οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι

λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον

δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα

15 τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία.

τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει·

οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ

ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν

οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα

20 γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς. ἓν δή τι δεῖ

εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο

γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι.

οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἥμισυ,

εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον

25 μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον

οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα

εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας,

ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.

Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται.

30 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ

τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ'

ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν

αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν·

1 But the figure of the proportion must not be drawn up after the exchange has taken place (else one extreme will have both excesses), but when each side still has possession of its own product.¹⁹² In this way, they are equal and members of the community, since this kind of equality can be established in their case. Let *A* be a farmer, *c* food, 5 *B* a shoemaker, and *d* his product equalized to *c*. If it were impossible to establish reciprocity between them in this manner, a community or association between them would be impossible. That it is need which holds the parties together as if they were one single unit is shown by the fact that there is no exchange when one or both parties do not stand in need of the other. For example, ⟨no exchange takes place⟩ when someone needs what we do not have, e.g., wine, and we can only offer him the privilege of exporting grain.¹⁹³ 10 Consequently, in a case like this, equality ⟨of need⟩ must be established.
Now it is money which gives us a guarantee of future exchange. If we need nothing at the moment, it guarantees that exchange will take place when the need arises. For when we bring money, it must be possible to get what we need. ⟨But it is true that⟩ what happens to goods also happens to money, i.e., it does not always have equal value. Still, it tends to be constant. 15 Therefore, the price of all goods should be fixed, for in that way there will always be exchange, and if there is exchange there is a community. Thus, money acts like a measure: it makes goods commensurable and equalizes them. For just as there is no community without exchange, there is no exchange without equality and no equality without commensurability.
Now, of course it is impossible that things differing so greatly from one another should in reality become commensurable. 20 But it can be done adequately by relating them to need. Accordingly, there must be some unit, and it must be established by arbitrary usage—hence the name "currency."¹⁹⁴ This unit makes everything commensurable, for everything is measured by money. Let *a* be a house, *b* ten minae, and *c* a bed. If the house is worth five minae, or equal to five minae, *a* = *b*/2; the bed *c*, ⟨if its value is one mina,⟩ is *b*/10. 25 It is, therefore, obvious how many beds are equal to one house, namely five. Clearly, this is the way in which exchange took place before the existence of money, for it makes no difference whether five beds or the money value of five beds is the equivalent of a house.
We have discussed what the unjust is and what the just is. 30 Now that they have been differentiated from one another, it is clear that just action is median between acting unjustly and suffering unjustly: the one is having too much and the other is having too little. Justice is a sort of mean, not in the same way as the other virtues are, but in that it is realized in a median amount,

1134a

1 ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ

δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ

διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὑτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον

οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ

5 πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ'

ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τοὐναντίον

τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ

ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ

ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφ'

10 αὑτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως

δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ

δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος

τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἑκατέρας ἐστὶν

15 ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ

δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

1 while injustice belongs to the extremes. Moreover, justice is that quality in terms of which we can say of a just man that he practices by choice what is just, and that, in making distribution between himself and another, or between two others, he will not give himself the larger and his neighbor the smaller share of what is desirable 5 (and vice versa in distributing what is harmful), but he will give an equal share as determined by proportion, and he will act in the same way in distributing between two others. Injustice, on the other hand, is the quality similarly related to what is unjust,¹⁹⁵ and the unjust is an excess and a deficiency of what is helpful and harmful, and it violates proportion. Injustice is, therefore, excess and deficiency, because it tends toward excess and deficiency: 10 in one's own case toward an excess of what is in itself helpful and toward a deficiency of what is harmful; in the case of distribution among others, although the result is by and large the same, the violation of proportion may take place in either direction. Of the offenses the lesser is to suffer unjustly and the greater to act unjustly. 15 So much for our discussion of the nature of justice and injustice, and also of the just and the unjust in their general sense.

Book 5,Chapter 6 (1134a17–1134b17)

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα

ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἑκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτης

ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ λῃστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ

20 ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ᾗ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως

ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν,

οἷον οὐ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ·

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς

πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν

25 ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ

πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ

εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ

κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις

πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ'

30 ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὑτούς·

νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ

τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς

δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία), τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ

νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν.

35 διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ

Since a man who acts unjustly is not *ipso facto* unjust, what kind of offenses must a man commit to be marked as unjust, in each of the various senses of injustice, for instance, to be marked as a thief, an adulterer, or a robber? Certainly, the fact that the offense has been committed does not make any difference: 20 a man might have sexual intercourse with a woman knowing who she is, but the motive that initiated the act might be emotion and not choice. He acts unjustly, but he is not unjust. In other words, a man may have stolen but not be a thief, and he may have committed adultery but not be an ⟨habitual⟩ adulterer, and so forth.¹⁹⁶
We stated earlier the relation between reciprocity and the just.¹⁹⁷ But we must not forget that 25 we are looking both for what is just in an unqualified sense and for what is just in social and political matters. The just in political matters is found among men who share a common life in order that their association bring them self-sufficiency, and who are free and equal, either proportionately or arithmetically.¹⁹⁸ Hence, in a society where this is not the case, there is nothing just in the political sense in the relations of the various members to one another, but there is only something which bears a resemblance to what is just. 30 For the just exists only among men whose mutual relationship is regulated by law, and law exists where injustice may occur. For legal judgment decides and distinguishes between what is just and what is unjust. Where there is injustice there is also unjust action—although unjust action does not always imply that there is injustice—and unjust action means to assign to oneself too much of things intrinsically good and too little of things intrinsically evil. 35 That is why we do not allow the rule of a man but the rule of reason, because a man takes too large a share

1134b

1 τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ

τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν

αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος (οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ

ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ

5 ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν

τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)· μισθὸς ἄρα

τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ

τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον

καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν

10 ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον,

ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὑτοῦ, αὑτὸν

δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς

αὑτόν· οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ

νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν

15 οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον

πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο

γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

1 for himself and becomes a tyrant. A ⟨true⟩ ruler, however, is the guardian of what is just, and as such he is also the guardian of equality and fairness. We think of a just ruler as one who does not get more than his share. He does not assign to himself a larger share of what is intrinsically good, unless such a share is proportionate to his deserts. 5 His labor is, therefore, for the benefit of others, and for this reason justice is called "another's good," as we stated above.¹⁹⁹ Consequently, he must be given some recompense, and this consists in honor and privilege. Those for whom this is not adequate recompense become tyrants.
What is just for the master of a slave and just for a father is similar to, but not identical with, the politically just. 10 There can be no unqualified injustice in one's relation to what is his own: a piece of property, ⟨i.e., a slave,⟩ and a child are part of one's person, as it were, until ⟨the latter⟩ reaches a certain age and becomes independent, and no one would deliberately desire to harm himself. For the same reason, there is no such thing as injustice toward oneself, and it follows that what is politically unjust and just does not apply here. For the politically just, as we saw, depends upon law and applies to people who have a natural capacity for law, 15 that is people who have the requisite equality in ruling and being ruled. Hence, just action is sooner possible toward one's wife than to one's children and property. For what is just toward one's wife is what is just in household management ⟨where husband and wife share as equals⟩. But even this is different from what is just in social and political matters.

Book 5,Chapter 7 (1134b18–1135a14)

Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ

νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν,

20 καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν

διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ

μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα,

ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ,

καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα

25 τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν

ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει,

τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως

ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς· καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς,

παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι

30 πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον

δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὒ

ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκῃ, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως,

δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει

γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδεξίους

35 γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν

What is just in the political sense can be subdivided into what is just by nature and what is just by convention. What is by nature just has the same force everywhere 20 and does not depend on what we regard or do not regard as just. In what is just by convention, on the other hand, it makes originally no difference whether it is fixed one way or another, but it does make a difference once it is fixed, for example, that a prisoner's ransom shall be one mina, or that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat but not of two sheep, and all the other measures enacted for particular occasions (such as the sacrifice offered to Brasidas)²⁰⁰ and everything enacted by decree. Now, some people²⁰¹ think that everything just exists only by convention, 25 since whatever is by nature is unchangeable and has the same force everywhere—as, for example, fire burns both here and in Persia—whereas they see that notions of what is just change. But this is not the correct view, although it has an element of truth. Among the gods, to be sure, it is probably not true at all, but among us there are things which, though naturally just, are nevertheless changeable, as are all things human. 30 Yet in spite of that, there are some things that are just by nature and others not by nature. It is not hard to see among the things which admit of being other than they are, which ones are by nature and which ones not by nature but by convention or agreement, although both kinds are equally subject to change. The same distinction will fit other matters as well: by nature, the right hand is the stronger, and yet it is possible for any man to become ambidextrous. 35 What is just as determined by agreement and advantage is like measures:

1135a

1 δικαίων ὅμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ

οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ

δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ'

ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι,

5 ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. τῶν

δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ'

ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ'

ἕκαστον ἕν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ

ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ

10 ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά

ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὔπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως

δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ

κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ'

ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἴδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα

15 τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

1 measures for wine and for grain are not equal everywhere; they are larger where people buy and smaller where they sell.²⁰² In the same way, what is just not by nature but by human enactment is no more the same everywhere than constitutions are. 5 Yet there is only one constitution that is by nature the best everywhere.
Each notion of what is just and lawful stands in the same relation ⟨to a just and lawful act⟩ as the universal to the particular. For there are many specific acts, but only one thing in each case that is just, viz., the universal. There is a difference between an act of injustice and what is unjust and between an act of justice and what is just. 10 The unjust exists by nature or by enactment. When it is performed, it is an act of injustice; before being performed it was not an act of injustice but simply unjust. The same is true for an act of justice, although strictly speaking the general term is "just act," and "act of justice" is reserved for the rectification of an act of injustice.²⁰³
But we must postpone until later an examination of the various kinds of acts of justice and of injustice, and also of their number and the sphere in which they operate.²⁰⁴

Book 5,Chapter 8 (1135a15–1136a9)

Ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων

καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ

ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε

δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε

δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκοις, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ

20 δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν γὰρ

ἑκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότ' ἐστίν· ὥστ'

ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὔπω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον

προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἑκούσιον μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται,

ὃ ἄν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ

25 μήτε ὃν μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ <ἕνεκα>, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ

τίνος ἕνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ

βίᾳ (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον,

οὐχ ἑκών· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον

πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις

30 γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω

καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὴ

ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ

βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες

15 Now that we have described what is just and unjust, we can say that a man acts unjustly and justly when he performs such acts voluntarily. When he performs them involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way, inasmuch as he performs acts which happen to be just or unjust. The unjust and the just act 20 are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary.²⁰⁵ For when a deed is voluntary it is blamed, and it is then at the same time an unjust act. Thus it will be possible for a deed to be unjust without yet being an "unjust act"²⁰⁶ if the element of voluntariness is absent. By a voluntary act, as has been stated earlier,²⁰⁷ I mean an act which lies in the agent's power to perform, performed by the agent in full knowledge and without ignorance either of the person acted on, the instrument used, or the result intended by his action 25. He must know, for example, whom 25 he is striking, with what instrument, and what result he intends to achieve. Moreover, no voluntary act is performed incidentally or under constraint. For example, if *A* takes *B*'s hand and strikes *C*, *B* does not act voluntarily, since the act was not in his power. A man may possibly strike his father, realizing that he is striking a man or a bystander, 30 but without knowing that it is his father whom he is striking. A similar distinction can be drawn as regards the result intended and the action as a whole. Thus, acts which are performed in ignorance or which, though not in ignorance, are not in the agent's power or are performed under constraint are involuntary. For in fact there are many natural processes that

1135b

1 καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἑκούσιον οὔτ'

ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως

ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ

5 φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον

ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον

καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ

συμβεβηκὸς φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. τῶν

δὲ ἑκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι,

10 προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα

δὲ ὅσ' ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς

κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν

μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ

οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη,

15 ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ'

ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως

ἡ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ

δὲ κακίας, ἁμάρτημα (ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ

ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν)· ὅταν δὲ

20 εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ

θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει

τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες

ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι

διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη·

25 ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς

τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ

ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ

ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ

ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι

30 περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι

μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες

περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν

(ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὃ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι,

1 we perform or undergo in full knowledge, none of which is either voluntary or involuntary, for example, growing old or dying.
The incidental sense may likewise apply to unjust and just action. A man might return a deposit involuntarily 5 and through fear, so that we cannot say that he does what is just or acts justly, except incidentally. Similarly, we can say that a man acts unjustly and does what is unjust only incidentally when he fails to return a deposit under compulsion and involuntarily. We perform some voluntary acts by choice and others not by choice. 10 We perform them by choice when we deliberate in advance, but actions which have not been previously deliberated upon are not performed by choice.²⁰⁸
Thus there are three types of injury that occur in communities and associations: (1) injuries committed in ignorance are mistakes, when the person affected, the act, the instrument, or result are not what the agent supposed they were. He thought he was not hitting anyone, or not with that particular missile, or not that particular person, or not for this purpose, 15 but a result was obtained which he had not intended (for example, if ⟨a dueller⟩ did not intend to wound but merely to prick) or the person or the missile were not what he thought they were. (2) When the injury inflicted happens contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a mishap; when it happens not contrary to reasonable expectation, but without malice, it is a mistake. In the case of a mistake, the source of responsibility lies within the agent; in a mishap the initiative lies outside him. (3) 20 When the injury is inflicted in full knowledge but without previous deliberation, it is an unjust act, for example, any act due to anger or to any other unavoidable or natural emotion to which human beings are subject. For when people inflict these injuries and commit these mistakes, they act unjustly, to be sure, and what they perform are unjust acts. Still, they are not *ipso facto* unjust or wicked for committing these acts, since the injury inflicted is not due to wickedness. 25 But when a man acts from choice, he is unjust and wicked.²⁰⁹
That is why acts due to anger are rightly judged not to be committed with malice aforethought. The initiative rests not with the man who acts in anger but with him who provokes it. Moreover, the issue is not whether the act took place or not but whether it was just; for feelings of anger are aroused by an apparent injustice. ⟨In such a case, people⟩ 30 do not dispute facts as they do in private transactions, where one of the parties must necessarily be a scoundrel, unless they disagree because they have forgotten the facts;²¹⁰ but they agree about the facts and dispute which side has acted justly (a man who has deliberately inflicted an injury is well aware that he has done so), so that one party thinks he has been wronged, while the other denies it.
However, if a man harms another by choice, he acts

1136a

1 ὃ δ' οὔ. ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ

κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ

τὸ ἀνάλογον ᾖ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν

προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν

5 πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δ'

οὐ συγγνωμονικά. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ

καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἁμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι'

ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν

μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

1 unjustly, and it is this kind of unjust act which makes the agent an unjust man if he acts against proportion or equality. Similarly, a man is just if he performs just acts by choice, but his action is just if only it is voluntary.²¹¹
Some 5 involuntary acts are pardonable and others are not. Wrongs which are not only performed in ignorance but actually due to ignorance are pardonable; but they are not pardonable if, although done in ignorance, they are due not to ignorance but to some emotion which is neither natural nor typical of men.²¹²

Book 5,Chapter 9 (1136a10–1137a30)

10 Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι

καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης

εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.

ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσαν, ἢ <οὐχ> ἑκοῦσαν οὐχ ἑκών;

15 πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὒ ἀλλ'

ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον; καὶ ἆρα

πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, [ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον,] ἢ

τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι·

τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ὥστ' εὔλογον

20 ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι

ἢ ἑκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε

καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται

οὐχ ἑκόντες. ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ὁ

τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν,

25 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται

ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· ὁμοίως

δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ τἄδικα

πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι·

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνατον

30 γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος.

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα

τινά, τὸ δ' ἑκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς

ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτόν, ἑκών τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐνδέχοιτο

αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τῶν ἀπορουμένων,

10 But the problem remains whether we have drawn our distinctions in the matter of acting and suffering unjustly with sufficient stringency. In the first place, we may ask whether there is any truth in what Euripides has expressed in the strange words:
> *A:* I killed my mother, brief is my report.
> *B:* Were you both willing, or neither she nor you?²¹³
Is 15 it really possible that a person voluntarily submits to unjust treatment, or is, on the contrary, all unjust treatment suffered involuntarily, just as every unjust act is performed voluntarily? Is all unjust treatment undergone voluntarily or is it all undergone involuntarily? Or do we suffer it sometimes voluntarily and sometimes involuntarily? The same applies to undergoing just treatment: all just action is performed voluntarily, so that it makes sense that acting and being treated ⟨justly or unjustly⟩ 20 should be similarly opposed to one another, and that we should either voluntarily or involuntarily undergo both unjust and just treatment. Yet it would seem strange if we were to receive all just treatment voluntarily, for some people are treated justly without being willing.
Secondly, we might also raise the question whether every person who has suffered something unjust is receiving unjust treatment, or whether the situation is the same in suffering as it is in doing. For it is possible to participate in a just act 25 incidentally 25, whether as doer or recipient, and the same is obviously also true of an unjust act. Doing unjust things is not the same as acting unjustly, and suffering something unjust is not the same as receiving unjust treatment; and the same applies to acting justly and receiving just treatment.²¹⁴ It is impossible to receive unjust treatment unless someone acts unjustly 30, or to receive just treatment unless someone acts justly.
But if acting unjustly 30 in its widest sense means to harm a person voluntarily, whereas "voluntarily" means knowing the person affected, the instrument, and the manner of acting; and if a morally weak man voluntarily harms himself, it would follow that he suffers unjust treatment voluntarily, and that it is possible for a man to act unjustly toward himself. (Here we have one more problem, namely

1136b

1 εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἑκὼν ἄν τις

δι' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἑκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἑκόντ'

ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ

βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὣς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου

5 βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἑκὼν καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει,

ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής,

ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς

ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν

πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι

10 δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει "χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι'

ἐννεαβοίων," οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι,

τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα

δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον,

δῆλον.

15 Ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δύ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ'

ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλέον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ

εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον

λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον,

εἴ τις πλέον αὑτοῦ ἑτέρῳ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἑκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς

20 αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς

ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν; ἑτέρου γὰρ

ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ.

ἔτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ

τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά γε τοῦτο,

25 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διανέμων

ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ

ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ᾧ τὸ ἑκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν·

τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἥ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν

30 λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ

οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.

ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον

οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον

γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν

1 whether it is possible to act unjustly toward oneself.)²¹⁵ 5 Moreover, moral weakness might make a man voluntarily submit to harm inflicted by another person acting voluntarily, with the result that it would be possible to receive unjust treatment voluntarily.
Surely, our definition of acting unjustly is not correct: to "harming a person knowing the person affected, the instrument, and the manner of acting" we must add "against that person's wish." Then we can conclude that, though a person can voluntarily be harmed and suffer something unjust, no one voluntarily receives unjust treatment;²¹⁶ for no one, not even a morally weak person, wishes to be harmed. A morally weak man acts contrary to his wish, for no one wishes something that he does not believe to be morally good, yet a morally weak man does what he believes he ought not to do. But when a man gives away what is his—as Homer says 10 Glaucus gave to Diomedes "armour of gold for bronze, for nine oxen's worth the worth of a hundred"²¹⁷—he does not receive unjust treatment. For while it is in his power to give, it is not in his power to receive unjust treatment: for that there must be someone to treat him unjustly. Thus it is clear that one cannot receive unjust treatment voluntarily.
There 15 still remain two points that we intended to discuss. (1) Can it ever happen that, when an unduly large share is distributed, the unjust act is committed by the person who distributes, or is it always the person who acquires it? And (2) is it possible to act unjustly toward oneself?
If it is possible to answer the first of these questions in the affirmative, that is to say, if the man who distributes and not the man who acquires too large a share acts unjustly, it follows that a person who knowingly and voluntarily assigns to someone else a larger share than to himself 20 acts unjustly toward himself. Moderate people are thought to act this way, for a decent²¹⁸ man takes less than his share. (But even this statement needs some qualification, 25 for such a man may obtain more than his share of some other good thing, for example, of glory or of something intrinsically noble, ⟨i.e., goodness⟩.) Moreover, this problem is solved by reference to our definition of acting unjustly: a man who takes less than his share suffers nothing against his wish, so that he receives no unjust treatment, at least not because he takes the smaller share, but, if at all, only because he suffers harm.
It is evident also that the man who distributes, 30 and not always he who acquires, too large a share acts unjustly. It is not the person who has the unjust share in his possession who acts unjustly, but one who performs such an act voluntarily, and that is the person with whom rests the initiative of the action. Now the initiative rests with the distributor and not with the recipient. Furthermore, the word "do" is used in many senses: it is possible to speak of an inanimate object as committing murder, or of a hand, or of a servant who does his master's bidding. In such a case, no one acts unjustly ⟨by choice⟩, though an unjust act is "done."
Again, if a judge passes judgment in ignorance of a material detail, he does not act unjustly as defined by the law and his decision is not unjust ⟨in this sense⟩, although it is in another sense. For what is just in the sight of the law is not the same as what is just in the primary sense.²¹⁹

1137a

1 ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας.

ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ

ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν

ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. Οἱ δ'

5 ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ

δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾴδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ

τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ

τὸ ἀργύριον ῥᾴδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντας

ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾴδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ

10 γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι,

ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλ' οὐ

ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· ἀλλὰ πῶς

πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔργον

ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ

15 ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς

δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον

ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται

εἶναι οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἧττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ

καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ

20 συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν

ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεὶς ἐφ' ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ

τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλὴν

κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥςπερ

καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ

25 τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ

ὡδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἁπλῶς

ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς

μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς

δ' οὐδὲν μόριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα

30 βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

1 But if he passed unjust judgment knowingly, he too²²⁰ takes more than his share, either of favor ⟨for one party⟩ or of revenge ⟨against the other⟩. Thus, a man who has passed unjust judgment for reasons of favoritism or revenge gets too large a share, just as much as if he were to share in the proceeds of unjust action. And that is in fact the case if, in awarding land unjustly, his own share is not land but money.
Men 5 believe that it is in their power to act unjustly and that it is, therefore, easy to be just. But that is not so. To have intercourse with a neighbor's wife, to strike a bystander, or to slip money into someone's hand is easy and in our power; but to do so as a result of a basic attitude or characteristic is neither easy nor in our power. Similarly, 10 people think it does not take much wisdom to know what is just and what is unjust, because it is not hard to understand the matters with which the laws deal. But these things are not just except incidentally.²²¹ No, to know how an act must be performed and how a distribution must be made in order to be just is a harder task than to know what makes men healthy. For in this field also it is easy to know what honey, wine, 15 hellebore, cautery, and surgery are, but to know how to administer them to whom and when, in order to make the patient healthy, is as great a task as to be a physician. For that very reason²²² people believe that a just man can also act unjustly, no less than an unjust man, because a just man should be not less but more capable of committing either just or unjust acts.²²³ 20 For he might have intercourse with a woman or strike another person, and a brave man might throw away his shield, turn around, and run in any direction. However, being a coward and acting unjustly does not consist in doing these things, except incidentally, but in doing them as a result of a basic attitude, or characteristic, just as being a physician and curing one's patients does not consist in performing or not performing an operation, or 25 in administering or not administering drugs, but in doing so in a certain way, ⟨i.e., in the way a physician does in virtue of his knowledge of medicine⟩.
Just action is possible between people who share in things intrinsically good, and who can have an excess and a deficiency of them. For there are some beings—including, no doubt, the gods—who cannot have too much of these goods. 30 There are others, the incurably bad, to whom not even the slightest share of good things would be beneficial but whom any of these would harm. And there are others for whom things intrinsically good are beneficial up to a certain point. And this is the case of mankind.²²⁴

Book 5,Chapter 10 (1137a31–1138a3)

Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν

ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,

ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταὐτὸν ἁπλῶς οὔθ' ὡς

ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένοις· καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς

35 ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ

The next subject we have to discuss is equity and the equitable,²²⁵ and the relation of equity to justice and of the equitable to what is just. For on examination they appear to be neither absolutely identical nor generically different. Sometimes we go so far in praising a thing or a man as "equitable 35" that35

1137b

1 ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον

ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι

φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὂν ἐπαινετόν

ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ

5 δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν

οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές,

ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον

ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον,

καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου.

10 ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν ὄντοιν

κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς

δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα

νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς,

περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν

15 ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ

τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον.

καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ

νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός

ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν

20 οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ

τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ᾗ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης

καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν

ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾔδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν.

διὸ δίκαιον μέν ἐστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου,

25 οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος.

καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου,

ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ

πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι

νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ

30 ὁ κανών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολίβδινος

κανών· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται

καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανών, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τινὸς βέλτιον

δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς

35 ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ

1 we use the word in an extended sense as a general term of praise for things in place of "good," and really mean "better" when we say "more equitable." But at other times, when we follow the logical consequences, it appears odd that the equitable should be distinct from the just and yet deserve praise. If the two terms are different, then either the just is not of great moral value,²²⁶ or the equitable is not just. 5 If both are of great moral value, they are the same.
These, then, are roughly the reasons why a problem about the equitable has arisen. All our points are in a sense correct and there is no inconsistency. For the equitable is just despite the fact that it is better than the just in one sense. But it is not better than the just in the sense of being generically different from it. 10 This means that just and equitable are in fact identical ⟨in genus⟩, and, although both are morally good, the equitable is the better of the two. What causes the problem is that the equitable is not just in the legal sense of "just" but as a corrective of what is legally just. The reason is that all law is universal, but there are some things about which it is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms. Now, in situations where 15 it is necessary to speak in universal terms but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of cases, fully realizing in what respect it misses the mark. The law itself is none the less correct. For the mistake lies neither in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case.
For such is the material of which actions are made. So in a situation in which 20 the law speaks universally, but the case at issue happens to fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming, in other words, the omission and mistake of the lawgiver due to the generality of his statement. Such a rectification corresponds to what the lawgiver himself would have said if he were present, and what he would have enacted if he had known ⟨of this particular case⟩.²²⁷ That is why the equitable is both just and also better than the just in one sense. 25 It is not better than the just in general, but better than the mistake due to the generality ⟨of the law⟩. And this is the very nature of the equitable, a rectification of law where law falls short by reason of its universality. This is also the reason why not all things are determined by law. There are some things about which it is impossible to enact a law, so that a special decree is required. For where a thing is indefinite, the rule by which it is measured is also indefinite, 30 as is, for example, the leaden rule used in Lesbian construction work.²²⁸ Just as this rule is not rigid but shifts with the contour of the stone, so a decree is adapted to a given situation.
Thus it is clear what the equitable is, that it is just, and better than just in one sense of the term. We see from this, too, what an equitable man is. 35 A man is equitable who chooses and performs acts of this sort,

1138a

1 ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ

ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια,

δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

1 who is no stickler for justice in a bad sense, but is satisfied with less than his share even though he has the law on his side. Such a characteristic is equity; it is a kind of justice and not a characteristic different from justice.

Book 5,Chapter 11 (1138a4–1138b14)

Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ, φανερὸν ἐκ

5 τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν

ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτιννύναι

ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. ἔτι

ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάπτῃ μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων ἑκών, ἀδικεῖ,

ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ· ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν

10 σφάττων ἑκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ

ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὑτὸν δ' οὔ;

ἑκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις

ζημιοῖ, καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι

ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν

15 καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν (τοῦτο

γὰρ ἄλλος ἐκείνου· ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥςπερ

ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ

ταύτην ἀδικεῖ)· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη ἀφῃρῆσθαι καὶ

προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν

20 ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἑκούσιόν

τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον· ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ

τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' αὑτόν, ταὐτὰ

ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων

25 οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ

τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ αὑτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ

λύεται τὸ αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ

ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα,

καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ

30 δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν

ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ)· ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ

ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ

κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν

τὸ ἑκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ

35 ἀδικίας. καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἧττον φαῦλον,

The preceding discussion²²⁹ has clarified the problem whether or not it is possible to act unjustly toward oneself. 5 (1) One class of just acts is that which is ordained by the law in conformity with virtue as a whole.²³⁰ For example, the law does not enjoin suicide, and what it does not enjoin it forbids.²³¹ Moreover, when a man voluntarily—that is to say, in full knowledge of the person affected and the instrument used—harms another, not in retaliation, in violation of the law, he acts unjustly. Now when a person kills himself in a fit of anger, 10 he acts voluntarily in violation of right reason; and that the law does not permit. Consequently, he acts unjustly. But toward whom? Surely toward the state, not toward himself. For he suffers voluntarily, but no one voluntarily accepts unjust treatment. That is also the reason why the state exacts a penalty, and some dishonor²³² is imposed upon a man who has taken his own life, on the grounds that he has acted unjustly toward the state.
(2) Furthermore, in those unjust acts which only²³³ make the offender unjust 15 and not completely wicked, it is impossible to act unjustly toward oneself. (This case is different from the former: in one sense an unjust man is wicked almost in the same way in which a coward is wicked, that is, not in the sense of being completely wicked. Hence he is not unjust in the sense of complete wickedness.) For if it were possible to be unjust to oneself, (a) that would imply that the same thing can be added to and taken away from the same person at the same time. But that is impossible: the just and the unjust 20 always necessarily imply more than one person. Moreover, *(b)* an unjust act is performed voluntarily, by choice, and prior to the injury suffered. We do not regard as acting unjustly a man who requites the injury he has suffered. But when a man injures himself, he acts and suffers at the same time. Again, *(c)* if a man could act unjustly toward himself, it would be possible to be treated unjustly voluntarily. In addition, *(d)* 25 no one acts unjustly without committing some unjust act in the partial sense; but no one can commit adultery with his own wife, or commit burglary in his own home, or steal his own property. Finally, *(e)* the problem of being unjust to oneself also receives a general solution from our definition dealing with the possibility of suffering unjust treatment voluntarily.²³⁴
It is further evident that both acting and being treated unjustly are evils. The one is to have less and 30 the other to have more than the median share, which corresponds to what is healthy in medicine and what brings well-being in physical training. And yet, to act unjustly is the greater evil, since acting unjustly involves vice and deserves blame—vice in the most complete and general sense, or nearly so, for not every ⟨unjust act⟩ voluntarily committed involves injustice. Suffering unjust treatment, on the other hand, does not imply vice or injustice. 35 Thus, taken by itself, suffering unjust treatment is less bad,

1138b

1 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν λέγει μείζω

νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ

συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίη

5 ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν. κατὰ μεταφορὰν

δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν δίκαιον

ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν

ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε

τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον· εἰς

10 ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅτι ἐν

τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν

ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ

τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τῶν

ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

1 but that does not mean that it may not incidentally be a greater evil. But that is of no concern to the practical art ⟨of politics⟩;²³⁵ ⟨the art of medicine⟩ calls pleurisy a more serious disorder than tripping, and yet the reverse may be true incidentally, if it happens that when you trip, you fall and as a result are killed or taken prisoner by the enemy.
⟨Although a man cannot be unjust toward himself,⟩ 5 there is an extended sense of the word "just," based upon similarity, which applies not to a man's relation to himself but to that between different parts of himself. This does not involve the just in every sense of the word, but only in the sense in which it regulates the relation between master and slave and between the head of a household and its members. For in these discussions²³⁶ a distinction is drawn between the rational and the irrational parts of the soul, and it is in view of this distinction 10 that they regard injustice toward oneself as possible, because one part can frustrate the desires of the other. So they think that there is something just in the mutual relation between these parts in the same sense in which there is in the mutual relation of ruler and ruled. So much for our description of justice and the other moral virtues.