Bywater (OCT, 1894) · Ostwald (1962)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 7,Chapter 1 (1145a15–1145b20)
1145a
15 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν,
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη, κακία ἀκρασία
θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα
μάλιστ' ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν,
20 ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ <τοῦ> Ἕκτορος
πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός, "οὐδὲ
ἐῴκει ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο." ὥστ'
εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς
ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει
25 ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία
οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἣ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἣ
δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον
ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν,
<οἳ> ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν, οὕτω καὶ
30 ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς
βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις·
καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας
οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως
τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας
35 εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς
λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ
15 We have to make a fresh start now by pointing out that the qualities of character to be avoided are three in kind: vice, moral weakness, and brutishness. The opposites of two of these are obvious: one is called virtue or excellence and the other moral strength. The most fitting description of the opposite of brutishness would be to say that it is superhuman virtue, 20 a kind of heroic and divine excellence; just as Homer has Priam say about Hector that he was of surpassing excellence:
> for he did not seem like > one who was child of a mortal man, but of god.301
Therefore, if, as is said, an excess of virtue can change a man into a god, 25 the characteristic opposed to brutishness must evidently be something of this sort. For just as vice and virtue do not exist in brute beasts, no more can they exist in a god.
The quality of gods is something more worthy of honor than ⟨human⟩ virtue or excellence, and the quality of a brute is generically different from ⟨human⟩ vice.
If it is rare to find a man who is divine—as the Spartans, for example, customarily use the attribute "divine man" to express an exceptionally high degree of admiration for a person 30—it is just as rare that a brute is found among men. It does happen, 30 particularly among barbarians, but in some cases disease and physical disability can make a man brutish. "Brutishness" is also used as a term of opprobrium for those who exceed all other men in vice.
But we must defer until later302 some mention of this kind of disposition, 35 and vice has already been discussed.303 We must now discuss moral weakness, softness, and effeminacy, and also moral strength and tenacity. We will do so on the assumption that each of these two sets of characteristics
> for he did not seem like > one who was child of a mortal man, but of god.301
Therefore, if, as is said, an excess of virtue can change a man into a god, 25 the characteristic opposed to brutishness must evidently be something of this sort. For just as vice and virtue do not exist in brute beasts, no more can they exist in a god.
The quality of gods is something more worthy of honor than ⟨human⟩ virtue or excellence, and the quality of a brute is generically different from ⟨human⟩ vice.
If it is rare to find a man who is divine—as the Spartans, for example, customarily use the attribute "divine man" to express an exceptionally high degree of admiration for a person 30—it is just as rare that a brute is found among men. It does happen, 30 particularly among barbarians, but in some cases disease and physical disability can make a man brutish. "Brutishness" is also used as a term of opprobrium for those who exceed all other men in vice.
But we must defer until later302 some mention of this kind of disposition, 35 and vice has already been discussed.303 We must now discuss moral weakness, softness, and effeminacy, and also moral strength and tenacity. We will do so on the assumption that each of these two sets of characteristics
1145b
1 ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκατέραν
αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δ',
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον
διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ
5 ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ
κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται
τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
Δοκεῖ δὴ ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων
καὶ [τῶν] ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία
10 τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ
ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ
λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ
πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ
ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ
15 καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἳ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἳ δ' οὔ,
καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως,
οἳ δ' ἑτέρους εἶναί φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὁτὲ μὲν
οὔ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὁτὲ δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους
ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ
20 θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
1 is neither identical with virtue or with wickedness nor generically different from it, but different species respectively of the covering genera, ⟨namely, qualities to be sought and qualities to be avoided⟩.
The proper procedure will be the one we have followed in our treatment of other subjects: we must present phenomena, ⟨that is, the observed facts of moral life and the current beliefs about them,⟩ and, after first stating the problems inherent in these, we must, if possible, demonstrate 5 the validity of all the beliefs about these matters,304 and, if not, the validity of most of them or of the most authoritative. For if the difficulties are resolved and current beliefs are left intact, we shall have proved their validity sufficiently.
Now the current beliefs are as follows: (1) Moral strength and tenacity are qualities of great moral value and deserve praise, 10 while moral weakness and softness are base and deserve blame. (2) A man who is morally strong tends to abide by the results of his calculation, and a morally weak man tends to abandon them. (3) A morally weak man does, on the basis of emotion, what he knows to be base, whereas a morally strong man, knowing that certain appetites are base, refuses to follow them and accepts the guidance of reason. (4) Though a self-controlled man is called morally strong and tenacious, 15 some people affirm and others deny ⟨the converse, namely,⟩ that a morally strong person is self-controlled in every respect; likewise, some people call a self-indulgent person "morally weak"
and a morally weak person "self-indulgent" without discriminating between the two, while others say that they are different. (5) Sometimes it is said that a man of practical wisdom cannot possibly be morally weak, and sometimes people who have practical wisdom and who are clever are said to be morally weak. (6) 20 Finally, it is said that moral weakness is shown even in anger and in the pursuit of honor and profit.
These, then, are the opinions commonly heard.
The proper procedure will be the one we have followed in our treatment of other subjects: we must present phenomena, ⟨that is, the observed facts of moral life and the current beliefs about them,⟩ and, after first stating the problems inherent in these, we must, if possible, demonstrate 5 the validity of all the beliefs about these matters,304 and, if not, the validity of most of them or of the most authoritative. For if the difficulties are resolved and current beliefs are left intact, we shall have proved their validity sufficiently.
Now the current beliefs are as follows: (1) Moral strength and tenacity are qualities of great moral value and deserve praise, 10 while moral weakness and softness are base and deserve blame. (2) A man who is morally strong tends to abide by the results of his calculation, and a morally weak man tends to abandon them. (3) A morally weak man does, on the basis of emotion, what he knows to be base, whereas a morally strong man, knowing that certain appetites are base, refuses to follow them and accepts the guidance of reason. (4) Though a self-controlled man is called morally strong and tenacious, 15 some people affirm and others deny ⟨the converse, namely,⟩ that a morally strong person is self-controlled in every respect; likewise, some people call a self-indulgent person "morally weak"
and a morally weak person "self-indulgent" without discriminating between the two, while others say that they are different. (5) Sometimes it is said that a man of practical wisdom cannot possibly be morally weak, and sometimes people who have practical wisdom and who are clever are said to be morally weak. (6) 20 Finally, it is said that moral weakness is shown even in anger and in the pursuit of honor and profit.
These, then, are the opinions commonly heard.
Book 7,Chapter 2 (1145b21–1146b7)
Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεταί
τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε
εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης,
ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.
25 Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ
οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ
τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος
ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ
τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας.
30 ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἴεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει
γενέσθαι, φανερόν. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι
τὰ δ' οὔ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν,
τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον
οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην
35 ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις
The problems we might raise are these. ⟨As to (3):⟩ how can a man be morally weak in his actions, when his basic assumption is correct ⟨as to what he should do⟩? Some people claim that it is impossible for him to be morally weak if he has knowledge ⟨of what he ought to do⟩. Socrates, for example, believed that it would be strange if, when a man possesses knowledge, something else should overpower it and drag it about like a slave.305 25 In fact, Socrates was completely opposed to the view ⟨that a man may know what is right but do what is wrong⟩, and did not believe that moral weakness exists. He claimed that no one acts contrary to what is best in the conviction ⟨that what he is doing is bad⟩, but through ignorance ⟨of the fact that it is bad⟩.306
Now this theory is plainly at variance with the observed facts, and one ought to investigate the emotion ⟨involved in the acts of a morally weak man⟩: if it comes about through ignorance, what manner of ignorance is it? 30 For evidently a man who is morally weak in his actions does not think ⟨that he ought to act the way he does⟩ before he is in the grip of emotion.
There are some people307 who accept only certain points ⟨of Socrates' theory⟩, but reject others. They agree that nothing is better or more powerful than *knowledge*, but they do not agree that no one acts contrary to what he *thought* was the better thing to do. Therefore, they say, a morally weak person does not have knowledge 35 but opinion when he is overpowered by pleasures.
However, if it really is opinion and not knowledge, if, in other words, the basic conviction
Now this theory is plainly at variance with the observed facts, and one ought to investigate the emotion ⟨involved in the acts of a morally weak man⟩: if it comes about through ignorance, what manner of ignorance is it? 30 For evidently a man who is morally weak in his actions does not think ⟨that he ought to act the way he does⟩ before he is in the grip of emotion.
There are some people307 who accept only certain points ⟨of Socrates' theory⟩, but reject others. They agree that nothing is better or more powerful than *knowledge*, but they do not agree that no one acts contrary to what he *thought* was the better thing to do. Therefore, they say, a morally weak person does not have knowledge 35 but opinion when he is overpowered by pleasures.
However, if it really is opinion and not knowledge, if, in other words, the basic conviction
1146a
1 ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἠρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι,
συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας
ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν
ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης;
5 αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς
ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φρονίμου
εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἑκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ
ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν
10 τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ
ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων· οὔτε
γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν
δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα
ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα
15 σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ'
εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα. ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ
ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ
ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται
τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν
20 τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ
τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς
λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα
βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ
γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ
25 διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν
τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ
ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. συμβαίνει δὴ ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη
μετ' ἀκρασίας ἀρετή· τἀναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει
διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τἀγαθὰ
30 κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τἀγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ
κακὰ πράξει. ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων
τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ
λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι
ἄν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ
35 φαμὲν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ
1 which resists ⟨the emotion⟩ is not strong but weak, as it is when people are in doubt, we can forgive a man for not sticking to his opinions in the face of strong appetites. But we do not forgive wickedness or anything else that deserves blame ⟨as moral weakness does. Hence it must be something stronger than opinion which is overpowered⟩. But does that mean that it is practical wisdom308
which resists ⟨the appetite⟩? 5 This, after all, is the strongest ⟨kind of conviction⟩. But that would be absurd: for it would mean that the same man will have practical wisdom and be morally weak at the same time, and there is no one who would assert that it is the mark of a man of practical wisdom to perform voluntarily the basest actions. In addition, it has been shown before that a man of practical wisdom is a man of action309— for he is concerned with ultimate particulars310—and that he possesses the other virtues.311
Furthermore, ⟨as regards (4)⟩: 10 if being a morally strong person involves having strong and base appetites, a self-controlled man will not be morally strong nor a morally strong man self-controlled. It is out of character for a self-controlled person to have excessive or base appetites. Yet a morally strong man certainly must have such appetites: for if the appetites are good, the characteristic which prevents him from following them is bad, and that would mean that moral strength 15 is not always morally good. If, on the other hand, our appetites are weak and not base, there is nothing extraordinary in resisting them, nor is it a great achievement if they are base and weak.312
Again, ⟨to take (1) and (2),⟩ if moral strength makes a person abide by any and every opinion, it is a bad thing; for example, if it makes him persist in a false opinion. And if moral weakness makes a man abandon any and every opinion, moral weakness will occasionally be morally good, as, for example, in the case of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*.
Neoptolemus 20 deserves praise when he does not abide by the resolution which Odysseus had persuaded him to adopt, because it gives him pain to tell a lie.313
Further, ⟨concerning (1) and (3),⟩ the sophistic argument presents a problem. The Sophists want to refute their opponents by leading them to conclusions which contradict generally accepted facts. Their purpose is to have success bring them the reputation of being clever, and the syllogism which results only becomes a problem or quandary ⟨for their opponents⟩. For the mind is in chains when, 25 because it is dissatisfied with the conclusion it has reached, it wishes not to stand still, while on the other hand its inability to resolve the argument makes forward movement impossible. Now, they have one argument which leads to the conclusion that folly combined with moral weakness is virtue. This is the way it runs: ⟨if a man is both foolish and morally weak,⟩ he acts contrary to his conviction because of his moral weakness; but ⟨because of his folly,⟩ his conviction is that good things 30 are bad and that he ought not to do them. Therefore, ⟨acting contrary to his conviction,⟩ he will do what is good and not what is bad.
A further problem ⟨arises from (2) and (4)⟩. A person who, in his actions, pursues, and prefers what is pleasant, convinced or persuaded ⟨that it is good⟩,314 would seem to be better than one who acts the same way not on the basis of calculation, but because of moral weakness. For since he may be persuaded to change his mind, he can be cured more easily. To a morally weak man, on the other hand, 35 applies the proverb, "When water chokes you, what can you wash it down with?"
which resists ⟨the appetite⟩? 5 This, after all, is the strongest ⟨kind of conviction⟩. But that would be absurd: for it would mean that the same man will have practical wisdom and be morally weak at the same time, and there is no one who would assert that it is the mark of a man of practical wisdom to perform voluntarily the basest actions. In addition, it has been shown before that a man of practical wisdom is a man of action309— for he is concerned with ultimate particulars310—and that he possesses the other virtues.311
Furthermore, ⟨as regards (4)⟩: 10 if being a morally strong person involves having strong and base appetites, a self-controlled man will not be morally strong nor a morally strong man self-controlled. It is out of character for a self-controlled person to have excessive or base appetites. Yet a morally strong man certainly must have such appetites: for if the appetites are good, the characteristic which prevents him from following them is bad, and that would mean that moral strength 15 is not always morally good. If, on the other hand, our appetites are weak and not base, there is nothing extraordinary in resisting them, nor is it a great achievement if they are base and weak.312
Again, ⟨to take (1) and (2),⟩ if moral strength makes a person abide by any and every opinion, it is a bad thing; for example, if it makes him persist in a false opinion. And if moral weakness makes a man abandon any and every opinion, moral weakness will occasionally be morally good, as, for example, in the case of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*.
Neoptolemus 20 deserves praise when he does not abide by the resolution which Odysseus had persuaded him to adopt, because it gives him pain to tell a lie.313
Further, ⟨concerning (1) and (3),⟩ the sophistic argument presents a problem. The Sophists want to refute their opponents by leading them to conclusions which contradict generally accepted facts. Their purpose is to have success bring them the reputation of being clever, and the syllogism which results only becomes a problem or quandary ⟨for their opponents⟩. For the mind is in chains when, 25 because it is dissatisfied with the conclusion it has reached, it wishes not to stand still, while on the other hand its inability to resolve the argument makes forward movement impossible. Now, they have one argument which leads to the conclusion that folly combined with moral weakness is virtue. This is the way it runs: ⟨if a man is both foolish and morally weak,⟩ he acts contrary to his conviction because of his moral weakness; but ⟨because of his folly,⟩ his conviction is that good things 30 are bad and that he ought not to do them. Therefore, ⟨acting contrary to his conviction,⟩ he will do what is good and not what is bad.
A further problem ⟨arises from (2) and (4)⟩. A person who, in his actions, pursues, and prefers what is pleasant, convinced or persuaded ⟨that it is good⟩,314 would seem to be better than one who acts the same way not on the basis of calculation, but because of moral weakness. For since he may be persuaded to change his mind, he can be cured more easily. To a morally weak man, on the other hand, 35 applies the proverb, "When water chokes you, what can you wash it down with?"
1146b
1 ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ
<ἄλλα> πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον [ἄλλα] πράττει. ἔτι εἰ
περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής;
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δ' εἶναί τινας
5 ἁπλῶς.
Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων
δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς
ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν.
1 For if he had been persuaded to act the way he does, he would have stopped acting that way when persuaded to change his mind. But as it is, though persuaded that he ought to do one thing, he nevertheless does another.315
Finally, if everything is the province of moral weakness and moral strength, who would be morally weak in the unqualified sense of the word? No one has every form of moral weakness, but we do say of some people that they are 5 morally weak in an unqualified sense.
These are the sort of problems that arise. Some of the conflicting opinions must be removed and others must be left intact. For the solution of a problem is the discovery ⟨of truth⟩.
Finally, if everything is the province of moral weakness and moral strength, who would be morally weak in the unqualified sense of the word? No one has every form of moral weakness, but we do say of some people that they are 5 morally weak in an unqualified sense.
These are the sort of problems that arise. Some of the conflicting opinions must be removed and others must be left intact. For the solution of a problem is the discovery ⟨of truth⟩.
Book 7,Chapter 3 (1146b8–1147b19)
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον
εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες· εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ
10 καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν
ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν
ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός
ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς
θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον
15 ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ ὣς ἔχοντες
τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι
μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ οὒ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὒ ἀλλ'
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια
ἢ οὔ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής,
20 ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα
ἁπλῶς ἔχειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ
δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὃ δ' οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει
δέ. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην
25 εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον·
ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται
ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες
μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν,
οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν
30 ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος.
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ
ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος
λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ
καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν [τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα]·
35 τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο
Our first step is, then, to examine (1) whether morally weak people act knowingly or not, and, if knowingly, in what sense. Secondly, (2) we must establish the kind of questions with which a morally weak 10 and a morally strong man are concerned. I mean, are they concerned with all pleasure and pain or only with certain distinct kinds of them? Is a morally strong person the same as a tenacious person or are they different? Similar questions must also be asked about all other matters germane to this study.
The starting point of our investigation is the question *(a)* 15 whether the morally strong man and the morally weak man have their distinguishing features in the situations with which they are concerned or in their manner ⟨of reacting to the situation⟩. What I mean is this: does a morally weak person owe his character to certain situations ⟨to which he reacts⟩, or to the manner ⟨in which he reacts⟩, or to both? Our second question *(b)* is whether or not moral weakness and moral strength are concerned with all ⟨situations and feelings. The answer to both these questions is that⟩ a man who is morally weak in the unqualified sense is not ⟨so described because of his reaction 20⟩ to every situation, but only to those situations in which also a self-indulgent man may get 20 involved. Nor is he morally weak because of the mere fact of his relationship to these situations, ⟨namely, that he yields to temptation⟩. In that case moral weakness would be the same as self-indulgence. Instead, his moral weakness is defined by the manner ⟨in which he yields⟩. For a self-indulgent person is led on by his own choice, since he believes that he should always pursue the pleasure of the moment. A morally weak man, on the other hand, does not think he should, but pursues it, nonetheless.
(1) The contention that it is true opinion rather than knowledge which a morally weak man violates in his actions 25 has no bearing on our argument. For some people have no doubts when they hold an opinion, and think they have exact knowledge. Accordingly, if we are going to say that the weakness of their belief is the reason why those who hold opinion will be more liable to act against their conviction than those who have knowledge, we shall find that there is no difference between knowledge and opinion. For some people are no less firmly convinced of what they believe 30 than others are of what they know: Heraclitus is a case in point.316 *(a)* But the verb "to know" has two meanings: a man is said to "know" both when he does not use the knowledge he has and when he does use it. Accordingly, when a man does wrong it will make a difference whether he is not exercising317 the knowledge he has, ⟨viz., that it is wrong to do what he is doing⟩, or whether he is exercising it. 35 In the latter case, we would be baffled, but not if he acted without exercising his knowledge.
Moreover, *(b)*
The starting point of our investigation is the question *(a)* 15 whether the morally strong man and the morally weak man have their distinguishing features in the situations with which they are concerned or in their manner ⟨of reacting to the situation⟩. What I mean is this: does a morally weak person owe his character to certain situations ⟨to which he reacts⟩, or to the manner ⟨in which he reacts⟩, or to both? Our second question *(b)* is whether or not moral weakness and moral strength are concerned with all ⟨situations and feelings. The answer to both these questions is that⟩ a man who is morally weak in the unqualified sense is not ⟨so described because of his reaction 20⟩ to every situation, but only to those situations in which also a self-indulgent man may get 20 involved. Nor is he morally weak because of the mere fact of his relationship to these situations, ⟨namely, that he yields to temptation⟩. In that case moral weakness would be the same as self-indulgence. Instead, his moral weakness is defined by the manner ⟨in which he yields⟩. For a self-indulgent person is led on by his own choice, since he believes that he should always pursue the pleasure of the moment. A morally weak man, on the other hand, does not think he should, but pursues it, nonetheless.
(1) The contention that it is true opinion rather than knowledge which a morally weak man violates in his actions 25 has no bearing on our argument. For some people have no doubts when they hold an opinion, and think they have exact knowledge. Accordingly, if we are going to say that the weakness of their belief is the reason why those who hold opinion will be more liable to act against their conviction than those who have knowledge, we shall find that there is no difference between knowledge and opinion. For some people are no less firmly convinced of what they believe 30 than others are of what they know: Heraclitus is a case in point.316 *(a)* But the verb "to know" has two meanings: a man is said to "know" both when he does not use the knowledge he has and when he does use it. Accordingly, when a man does wrong it will make a difference whether he is not exercising317 the knowledge he has, ⟨viz., that it is wrong to do what he is doing⟩, or whether he is exercising it. 35 In the latter case, we would be baffled, but not if he acted without exercising his knowledge.
Moreover, *(b)*
1147a
1 τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει
πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ
καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ'
ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ
5 τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ
συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν
τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ·
κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε
δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν.
10 ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν
ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν
μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ
ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον
καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἵ γε ἐν
15 τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων
καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν,
ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν
λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς
ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι
20 τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους,
καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι
δ' οὔπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε καθάπερ
τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς
ἀκρατευομένους. ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἄν τις ἐπιβλέψειε
25 τὴν αἰτίαν. ἣ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν
καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία
γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι
τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς·
οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς
30 ἕν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ
κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου
ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἣ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ
ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία
ἐνοῦσα, ἣ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει·
35 κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει
1 since there are two kinds of premise,318
⟨namely, universal and particular,⟩ it may well happen that a man knows both ⟨major and minor premise of a practical syllogism⟩ and yet acts against his knowledge, because the ⟨minor⟩ premise which he uses is universal rather than particular. ⟨In that case, he cannot apply his knowledge to his action,⟩ for the actions to be performed are particulars. Also, there are two kinds of universal term to be distinguished: one applies to *(i)* the agent, 5 and the other *(ii)* to the thing. For example, when a person knows that dry food is good for all men, ⟨he may also know⟩ *(i)* that he is a man, or *(ii)* that this kind of food is dry. But whether the particular food before him is of this kind is something of which ⟨a morally weak man⟩ either does not have the knowledge or does not exercise it. So we see that there will be a tremendous difference between these two ways of knowing. We do not regard it as at all strange that ⟨a morally weak person⟩ "knows" in the latter sense ⟨with one term nonspecific⟩, but it would be surprising if he "knew" in the other sense, ⟨namely with both terms apprehended as concrete particulars⟩.
There 10 is *(c)* another way besides those we have so far described, in which it is possible for men to have knowledge. When a person has knowledge but does not use it, we see that "having" a characteristic319 has different meanings. There is a sense in which a person both has and does not have knowledge, for example, when he is asleep, mad, or drunk. 15 But this is precisely the condition of people who are in the grip of the emotions. Fits of passion, sexual appetites, and some other such passions actually cause palpable changes in the body, and in some cases even produce madness. Now it is clear that we must attribute to the morally weak a condition similar to that of men who are asleep, mad, or drunk. That the words they utter spring from knowledge ⟨as to what is good⟩ is no evidence to the contrary. 20 People can repeat geometrical demonstrations and verses of Empedocles even when affected by sleep, madness, and drink; and beginning students can reel off the words they have heard, but they do not yet know the subject. The subject must grow to be part of them, and that takes time. We must, therefore, assume that a man who displays moral weakness repeats the formulae (of moral knowledge) in the same way as an actor speaks his lines.
Further, (*d*) we may also look at the cause (of moral weakness) from the viewpoint of the science of human nature,320 in the following way. 25 (In the practical syllogism,) one of the premises, the universal, is a current belief, while the other involves particular facts which fall within the domain of sense perception. When two premises are combined into one, (i.e., when the universal rule is realized in a particular case,) the soul is thereupon bound to affirm the conclusion, and if the premises involve action, the soul is bound to perform this act at once. For example, if (the premises are): "Everything sweet ought to be tasted" and "This thing before me is sweet" 30 ("this thing" perceived as an individual particular object), a man who is able (to taste) and is not prevented is bound to act accordingly at once.321
Now, suppose that there is within us one universal opinion forbidding us to taste (things of this kind), and another (universal) opinion which tells us that everything sweet is pleasant, and also (a concrete perception), determining our activity, that the particular thing before us is sweet; and suppose further that the appetite (for pleasure) happens to be present. (The result is that) one opinion tells us to avoid that thing, while appetite, 35 capable as it is of setting in motion each part of our body, drives us to it. (This is the case we have been looking for, the defeat of reason in moral weakness.)
⟨namely, universal and particular,⟩ it may well happen that a man knows both ⟨major and minor premise of a practical syllogism⟩ and yet acts against his knowledge, because the ⟨minor⟩ premise which he uses is universal rather than particular. ⟨In that case, he cannot apply his knowledge to his action,⟩ for the actions to be performed are particulars. Also, there are two kinds of universal term to be distinguished: one applies to *(i)* the agent, 5 and the other *(ii)* to the thing. For example, when a person knows that dry food is good for all men, ⟨he may also know⟩ *(i)* that he is a man, or *(ii)* that this kind of food is dry. But whether the particular food before him is of this kind is something of which ⟨a morally weak man⟩ either does not have the knowledge or does not exercise it. So we see that there will be a tremendous difference between these two ways of knowing. We do not regard it as at all strange that ⟨a morally weak person⟩ "knows" in the latter sense ⟨with one term nonspecific⟩, but it would be surprising if he "knew" in the other sense, ⟨namely with both terms apprehended as concrete particulars⟩.
There 10 is *(c)* another way besides those we have so far described, in which it is possible for men to have knowledge. When a person has knowledge but does not use it, we see that "having" a characteristic319 has different meanings. There is a sense in which a person both has and does not have knowledge, for example, when he is asleep, mad, or drunk. 15 But this is precisely the condition of people who are in the grip of the emotions. Fits of passion, sexual appetites, and some other such passions actually cause palpable changes in the body, and in some cases even produce madness. Now it is clear that we must attribute to the morally weak a condition similar to that of men who are asleep, mad, or drunk. That the words they utter spring from knowledge ⟨as to what is good⟩ is no evidence to the contrary. 20 People can repeat geometrical demonstrations and verses of Empedocles even when affected by sleep, madness, and drink; and beginning students can reel off the words they have heard, but they do not yet know the subject. The subject must grow to be part of them, and that takes time. We must, therefore, assume that a man who displays moral weakness repeats the formulae (of moral knowledge) in the same way as an actor speaks his lines.
Further, (*d*) we may also look at the cause (of moral weakness) from the viewpoint of the science of human nature,320 in the following way. 25 (In the practical syllogism,) one of the premises, the universal, is a current belief, while the other involves particular facts which fall within the domain of sense perception. When two premises are combined into one, (i.e., when the universal rule is realized in a particular case,) the soul is thereupon bound to affirm the conclusion, and if the premises involve action, the soul is bound to perform this act at once. For example, if (the premises are): "Everything sweet ought to be tasted" and "This thing before me is sweet" 30 ("this thing" perceived as an individual particular object), a man who is able (to taste) and is not prevented is bound to act accordingly at once.321
Now, suppose that there is within us one universal opinion forbidding us to taste (things of this kind), and another (universal) opinion which tells us that everything sweet is pleasant, and also (a concrete perception), determining our activity, that the particular thing before us is sweet; and suppose further that the appetite (for pleasure) happens to be present. (The result is that) one opinion tells us to avoid that thing, while appetite, 35 capable as it is of setting in motion each part of our body, drives us to it. (This is the case we have been looking for, the defeat of reason in moral weakness.)
1147b
1 ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ
καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία
ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου ὑπόληψιν
5 ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.
πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ
ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος
καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων
ἀκούειν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε
10 αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει
ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι
ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους.
καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι
δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει
15 Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι
δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται
διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα
καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι, τοσαῦτα
εἰρήσθω.
1 Thus it turns out that a morally weak man acts under the influence of some kind of reasoning and opinion, an opinion which is not intrinsically but only incidentally opposed to right reason; for it is not opinion but appetite that is opposed to right reason.322 And this explains why animals cannot be morally weak: they do not have conceptions of universals, 5 but have only the power to form mental images323 and memory of particulars.
How is the (temporary) ignorance of a morally weak person dispelled and how does he regain his (active) knowledge (of what is good)? The explanation is the same as it is for drunkenness and sleep, and it is not peculiar to the affect of moral weakness. To get it we have to go to the students of natural science.324
The final premise, 10 consisting as it does in an opinion about an object perceived by the senses, determines our action. When in the grip of emotion, a morally weak man either does not have this premise, or he has it not in the sense of knowing it, but in the sense of uttering it as a drunken man may utter verses of Empedocles. (Because he is not in active possession of this premise,) and because the final (concrete) term of his reasoning is not a universal and does not seem to be an object of scientific knowledge in the same way that a universal is, (for both these reasons) 15 we seem to be led to the conclusion which Socrates sought to establish. Moral weakness does not occur in the presence of knowledge in the strict sense, and it is sensory knowledge, not science, which is dragged about by emotion.325
This completes our discussion of the question whether a morally weak person acts with knowledge or without knowledge, and in what sense it is possible for him to act knowingly.
How is the (temporary) ignorance of a morally weak person dispelled and how does he regain his (active) knowledge (of what is good)? The explanation is the same as it is for drunkenness and sleep, and it is not peculiar to the affect of moral weakness. To get it we have to go to the students of natural science.324
The final premise, 10 consisting as it does in an opinion about an object perceived by the senses, determines our action. When in the grip of emotion, a morally weak man either does not have this premise, or he has it not in the sense of knowing it, but in the sense of uttering it as a drunken man may utter verses of Empedocles. (Because he is not in active possession of this premise,) and because the final (concrete) term of his reasoning is not a universal and does not seem to be an object of scientific knowledge in the same way that a universal is, (for both these reasons) 15 we seem to be led to the conclusion which Socrates sought to establish. Moral weakness does not occur in the presence of knowledge in the strict sense, and it is sensory knowledge, not science, which is dragged about by emotion.325
This completes our discussion of the question whether a morally weak person acts with knowledge or without knowledge, and in what sense it is possible for him to act knowingly.
Book 7,Chapter 4 (1147b20–1148b14)
20 Πότερον δ' ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ
μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν
οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἵ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ
καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ
τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἱρετὰ μὲν
25 καθ' αὑτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά
(λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ
τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν
περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην),
τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτά (λέγω δ'
30 οἷον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
ἡδέων)· τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς,
προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους
καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ'
35 ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν·
(2) The next point we have to discuss is 20 whether it is possible for a man to be morally weak in the unqualified sense, or whether the moral weakness of all who have it is concerned with particular situations. If the former is the case, we shall have to see with what kind of situations he is concerned.
Now, it is clearly in their attitude to pleasures and pains that men are morally strong and tenacious and morally weak and soft. There are two sources of pleasure: some are necessary, and others are desirable 25 in themselves but admit of excess. The necessary kind are those concerned with the body: I mean sources of pleasure such as food and drink and sexual intercourse, in short, the kind of bodily pleasures which we assigned to the sphere of self-indulgence and self-control.326 By sources of pleasure which are not necessary but desirable in themselves, I mean, for example, 30 victory, honor, wealth, and similar good and pleasant things. Now, (*a*) those who violate the right reason that they possess by excessive indulgence in the second type of pleasures, are not called morally weak in the unqualified sense, but only with a qualification: we call them "morally weak in regard to material goods," or profit, or honor, or anger, but not "morally weak" pure and simple. They are different from the morally weak in the unqualified sense and share the same name only by analogy, 35 as in our example of the man called Man, who won an Olympic victory.327
Now, it is clearly in their attitude to pleasures and pains that men are morally strong and tenacious and morally weak and soft. There are two sources of pleasure: some are necessary, and others are desirable 25 in themselves but admit of excess. The necessary kind are those concerned with the body: I mean sources of pleasure such as food and drink and sexual intercourse, in short, the kind of bodily pleasures which we assigned to the sphere of self-indulgence and self-control.326 By sources of pleasure which are not necessary but desirable in themselves, I mean, for example, 30 victory, honor, wealth, and similar good and pleasant things. Now, (*a*) those who violate the right reason that they possess by excessive indulgence in the second type of pleasures, are not called morally weak in the unqualified sense, but only with a qualification: we call them "morally weak in regard to material goods," or profit, or honor, or anger, but not "morally weak" pure and simple. They are different from the morally weak in the unqualified sense and share the same name only by analogy, 35 as in our example of the man called Man, who won an Olympic victory.327
1148a
1 ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν,
ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία
ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις
ἢ ἁπλῶς οὖσα ἢ κατά τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐδείς. τῶν δὲ
5 περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν
σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν
ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολάς—καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων,
πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν
περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν—ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν
10 διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ
τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ·
καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ'
οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταὐτὸ τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον
τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων
15 οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι·
οἳ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ'
οἳ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἳ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον
ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα διώκει τὰς
ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ
20 τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προςγένοιτο
ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας
λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν
αἳ μέν εἰσι <τῶν> τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν
γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά), τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ
25 μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ
κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν
ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ
τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν
30 καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες
ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι
τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ
1 In his case there is not much difference between the general definition of man and the definition proper to him alone, and yet there was a difference. (That there is similarly a difference between the two senses of morally weak) is shown by the fact that we blame moral weakness—regardless of whether it is moral weakness in the unqualified sense or moral weakness concerning some particular bodily pleasure—not only as an error, but also as a kind of vice. But we do not blame as vicious those (who are morally weak in matters of material goods, profit, ambition, anger, and so forth).
(*b*) We now come to 5 those bodily enjoyments which, we say,328 are the sphere of the self-controlled and the self-indulgent. Here a man who pursues the excesses of things pleasant and avoids excesses of things painful (of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and of anything we feel by touch or taste), and does so not by choice 10 but against his choice and thinking, is called "morally weak" without the addition of "in regard to suchand 10-such," e.g., "in regard to feelings of anger," but simply morally weak without qualification. The truth of this is proved by the fact that persons who indulge in bodily pleasures are called "soft," but not persons who indulge in feelings of anger and so forth. For this reason, we class the morally weak man with the self-indulgent, and the morally strong with the self-controlled. But we do not include (in the same category) those who indulge in feelings of anger, 15 because moral weakness and self-indulgence are, in a way, concerned with the same pleasures and pains. That is, they are concerned with the same pleasures and pains but not in the same way. Self-indulgent men pursue the excess by choice, but the morally weak do not exercise choice.
That is why we are probably more justified in calling a person self-indulgent who shows little or no appetite in pursuing an excess of pleasures and in avoiding moderate pains, than a person who is driven by strong appetite (to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain). 20 For what would the former do, if, in addition, he had the vigorous appetite of youth and felt strong pain at lacking the objects necessary for his pleasure?
Some appetites and desires are generically noble and worth while—(let us remember) our earlier329 distinction of pleasant things into those which are by nature desirable, the opposite of these, 25 and those which are intermediate between the two— for example, material goods, profit, victory, and honor. Now, people are not blamed for being affected by all these and similar objects of pleasure and by those of the intermediate kind, nor are they blamed for having an appetite or a liking for them; they are blamed only for the manner in which they do so, if they do so to excess. This, by the way, is why (we do not regard as wicked) all those who, contrary to right reason, are overpowered by something that is noble and good by nature, or who pursue 30 it—those, for example, who devote themselves to the pursuit of honor or to their children and parents more than they should. All these things are good, and those who devote themselves to them are praised. And yet even here there is an element of excess, if, like Niobe, one were to fight against the gods (for the sake of one's children), or if one showed the same excessively foolish
(*b*) We now come to 5 those bodily enjoyments which, we say,328 are the sphere of the self-controlled and the self-indulgent. Here a man who pursues the excesses of things pleasant and avoids excesses of things painful (of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and of anything we feel by touch or taste), and does so not by choice 10 but against his choice and thinking, is called "morally weak" without the addition of "in regard to suchand 10-such," e.g., "in regard to feelings of anger," but simply morally weak without qualification. The truth of this is proved by the fact that persons who indulge in bodily pleasures are called "soft," but not persons who indulge in feelings of anger and so forth. For this reason, we class the morally weak man with the self-indulgent, and the morally strong with the self-controlled. But we do not include (in the same category) those who indulge in feelings of anger, 15 because moral weakness and self-indulgence are, in a way, concerned with the same pleasures and pains. That is, they are concerned with the same pleasures and pains but not in the same way. Self-indulgent men pursue the excess by choice, but the morally weak do not exercise choice.
That is why we are probably more justified in calling a person self-indulgent who shows little or no appetite in pursuing an excess of pleasures and in avoiding moderate pains, than a person who is driven by strong appetite (to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain). 20 For what would the former do, if, in addition, he had the vigorous appetite of youth and felt strong pain at lacking the objects necessary for his pleasure?
Some appetites and desires are generically noble and worth while—(let us remember) our earlier329 distinction of pleasant things into those which are by nature desirable, the opposite of these, 25 and those which are intermediate between the two— for example, material goods, profit, victory, and honor. Now, people are not blamed for being affected by all these and similar objects of pleasure and by those of the intermediate kind, nor are they blamed for having an appetite or a liking for them; they are blamed only for the manner in which they do so, if they do so to excess. This, by the way, is why (we do not regard as wicked) all those who, contrary to right reason, are overpowered by something that is noble and good by nature, or who pursue 30 it—those, for example, who devote themselves to the pursuit of honor or to their children and parents more than they should. All these things are good, and those who devote themselves to them are praised. And yet even here there is an element of excess, if, like Niobe, one were to fight against the gods (for the sake of one's children), or if one showed the same excessively foolish
1148b
1 ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει
μωραίνειν)· μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ
εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὑτό,
φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. ὁμοίως
5 δ' οὐδ' ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν· δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προςεπιτιθέντες
τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν
ἰατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν
κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι
10 ἑκάστην αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι
κἀκεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις
ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ
θυμοῦ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῆ
θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.
1 devotion to his father as did Satyros, nicknamed "the filial."330 So we see that there cannot be any wickedness in this area, because, as we stated, each of these things is in itself naturally desirable. But excess in one's attachment to them is base and must be 5 avoided.
Similarly, there cannot be moral weakness in this area (of things naturally desirable). Moral weakness is not only something to be avoided, but it is also something that deserves blame. Still, because there is a similarity in the affect, people do call it "moral weakness," but they add "in regard to (such-and-such)," in the same way as they speak of a "bad" doctor or a "bad" actor without meaning to imply that the person is bad in the unqualified sense. So just as in the case of the doctor and the actor (we do not speak of "badness" in the unqualified sense), because their badness is not vice but only 10 something similar to vice by analogy, so it is clear that, in the other case, we must understand by "moral weakness" and "moral strength" only that which operates in the same sphere as self-control and self-indulgence. When we use these terms of anger, we do so only in an analogous sense. Therefore, we add a qualification and say "morally weak in regard to anger," just as we say "morally weak in regard to honor or profit."
Similarly, there cannot be moral weakness in this area (of things naturally desirable). Moral weakness is not only something to be avoided, but it is also something that deserves blame. Still, because there is a similarity in the affect, people do call it "moral weakness," but they add "in regard to (such-and-such)," in the same way as they speak of a "bad" doctor or a "bad" actor without meaning to imply that the person is bad in the unqualified sense. So just as in the case of the doctor and the actor (we do not speak of "badness" in the unqualified sense), because their badness is not vice but only 10 something similar to vice by analogy, so it is clear that, in the other case, we must understand by "moral weakness" and "moral strength" only that which operates in the same sphere as self-control and self-indulgence. When we use these terms of anger, we do so only in an analogous sense. Therefore, we add a qualification and say "morally weak in regard to anger," just as we say "morally weak in regard to honor or profit."
Book 7,Chapter 5 (1148b15–1149a23)
15 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ
μὲν ἁπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῴων καὶ ἀνθρώπων,
τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθη
γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων
ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις· λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις,
20 οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ
παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἢ οἵοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων
περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων
κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν,
ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις,
25 αἳ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ
τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου
τὸ ἧπαρ) αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις
καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει
30 τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ
παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν
εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύουσιν
ἀλλ' ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως
ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν
(1) 15 Some things are pleasant by nature, partly (*a*) without qualification, and partly (*b*) pleasant for different classes of animals and humans. Then (2) there are things which are not pleasant by nature, but which come to be pleasant (*a*) through physical disability, (*b*) through habit, or (*c*) through an (innate) depravity of nature. We can observe characteristics corresponding to each of the latter group (2), just as (we did in discussing (1), things pleasant by nature). I mean (2*c*) characteristics of brutishness, for instance, 20 the female who is said to rip open pregnant women and devour the infants; or what is related about some of the savage tribes near the Black Sea, that they delight in eating raw meat or human flesh, and that some of them lend each other their children for a feast; or the story told about Phalaris.331
These are characteristics of brutishness. Another set of characteristics (2*a*) 25 develops through disease and occasionally through insanity, as, for example, in the case of the man who offered his mother as a sacrifice to the gods and ate of her, or the case of the slave who ate the liver of his fellow slave. Other characteristics are the result of disease or (2*b*) of habit, e.g., plucking out one's hair, gnawing one's fingernails, or even chewing coal or earth, and also sexual relations between males. These practices are, in some cases, due to nature, 30 but in other cases they are the result of habit, when, for example, someone has been sexually abused from childhood.
When nature is responsible, no one would call the persons affected morally weak any more than one would call women morally weak, because they are passive and not active in sexual intercourse. Nor would we apply the term to persons in a morbid condition as a result of habit. To have one of these characteristics means to be outside the
These are characteristics of brutishness. Another set of characteristics (2*a*) 25 develops through disease and occasionally through insanity, as, for example, in the case of the man who offered his mother as a sacrifice to the gods and ate of her, or the case of the slave who ate the liver of his fellow slave. Other characteristics are the result of disease or (2*b*) of habit, e.g., plucking out one's hair, gnawing one's fingernails, or even chewing coal or earth, and also sexual relations between males. These practices are, in some cases, due to nature, 30 but in other cases they are the result of habit, when, for example, someone has been sexually abused from childhood.
When nature is responsible, no one would call the persons affected morally weak any more than one would call women morally weak, because they are passive and not active in sexual intercourse. Nor would we apply the term to persons in a morbid condition as a result of habit. To have one of these characteristics means to be outside the
1149a
1 ὅρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸν δ'
ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ
καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα
5 γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία
καὶ χαλεπότης αἳ μὲν θηριώδεις αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις
εἰσίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν
ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὃ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει
διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι
10 καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια
γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς,
ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν
τινὰ ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ
Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων
15 ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον
ἔχειν· ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἡ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἁπλῶς
λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἣ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ
νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἣ μὲν θηριώδης ἣ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς
20 δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ
ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα
ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν
καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον.
1 limits of vice, just as brutishness, too, lies outside the limits of vice. To have such characteristics and to master them or be mastered by them does not constitute moral (strength or) weakness in an unqualified sense but only by analogy, just as a person is not to be called morally weak without qualification when he cannot master his anger, but only morally weak in regard to the emotion involved.
For all 5 excessive folly, cowardice, self-indulgence, and ill-temper is either brutish or morbid. When someone is by nature the kind of person who fears everything, even the rustling of a mouse, his cowardice is brutish, while the man's fear of the weasel was due to disease.332 In the case of folly, those who are irrational by nature 10 and live only by their senses, as do some distant barbarian tribes, are brutish, whereas those whose irrationality is due to a disease, such as epilepsy, or to insanity, are morbid.
Sometimes it happens that a person merely possesses one of these characteristics without being mastered by it—I mean, for example, if a Phalaris had restrained his appetite so as not to eat the flesh of a child or so as not to indulge in some perverse form of sexual pleasure. 15 But it also happens that a man not only has the characteristic but is mastered by it. Thus, just as the term "wickedness" refers in its unqualified sense to man alone, while in another sense it is qualified by the addition of "brutish" or "morbid," in precisely the same way it is plain that there is a brutish and a morbid kind of moral weakness (i.e., being mastered by brutishness or disease), but in its unqualified sense the term "moral weakness" 20 refers only to human self-indulgence.
It is, accordingly, clear that moral weakness and moral strength operate only in the same sphere as do self-indulgence and self-control, and that the moral weakness which operates in any other sphere is different in kind, and is called "moral weakness" only by extension, not in an unqualified sense.
For all 5 excessive folly, cowardice, self-indulgence, and ill-temper is either brutish or morbid. When someone is by nature the kind of person who fears everything, even the rustling of a mouse, his cowardice is brutish, while the man's fear of the weasel was due to disease.332 In the case of folly, those who are irrational by nature 10 and live only by their senses, as do some distant barbarian tribes, are brutish, whereas those whose irrationality is due to a disease, such as epilepsy, or to insanity, are morbid.
Sometimes it happens that a person merely possesses one of these characteristics without being mastered by it—I mean, for example, if a Phalaris had restrained his appetite so as not to eat the flesh of a child or so as not to indulge in some perverse form of sexual pleasure. 15 But it also happens that a man not only has the characteristic but is mastered by it. Thus, just as the term "wickedness" refers in its unqualified sense to man alone, while in another sense it is qualified by the addition of "brutish" or "morbid," in precisely the same way it is plain that there is a brutish and a morbid kind of moral weakness (i.e., being mastered by brutishness or disease), but in its unqualified sense the term "moral weakness" 20 refers only to human self-indulgence.
It is, accordingly, clear that moral weakness and moral strength operate only in the same sphere as do self-indulgence and self-control, and that the moral weakness which operates in any other sphere is different in kind, and is called "moral weakness" only by extension, not in an unqualified sense.
Book 7,Chapter 6 (1149a24–1150a8)
Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία
25 ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ
θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ
ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον
ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν
σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως
30 ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας
μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία
ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ
τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν
35 μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν
At this point we may observe that moral weakness in anger is less base 25 than moral weakness in regard to the appetites. For (1) in a way, anger seems to listen to reason, but to hear wrong, like hasty servants, who run off before they have heard everything their master tells them, and fail to do what they were ordered, or like dogs, which bark as soon as there is a knock without waiting to see if the visitor is a friend. 30 In the same way, the heat and swiftness of its nature make anger hear but not listen to an order, before rushing off to take revenge. For reason and imagination indicate that an insult or a slight has been received, and anger, drawing the conclusion, as it were, that it must fight against this sort of thing, simply flares up at once. Appetite, on the other hand, 35 is no sooner told by reason and perception that something is pleasant
1149b
1 ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ
δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ. αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς
τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.
ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν,
5 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ
πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ
ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν
μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα
τύπτοι "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος" ἔφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν,"
10 καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας "καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ" ἔφη, "ὅταν ἀνὴρ
γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν·" καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ
παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλκύσαι
τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι.
ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός,
15 ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην
φασίν· "δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·" καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα
Ὅμηρος· "πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος."
ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία
αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ
20 κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν
πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς
ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία
ἡ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὡς μὲν
τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν,
25 καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας
καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς
διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἳ
μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ
μεγέθει, αἳ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἳ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα.
30 τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία
μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα
λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινι ὅλως
ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ
καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν
35 οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι
1 than it rushes off to enjoy it. Consequently, while anger somehow follows reason, appetite does not. Hence appetite is baser (than anger). For when a person is morally weak in anger, he is in a sense overcome by reason, but the other is not overcome by reason but by appetite.
Further, (2) it is more excusable to follow one's natural desires, 5 inasmuch as we are also more inclined to pardon such appetites as are common to all men and to the extent that they are common to all. Now anger and ill temper are more natural than are the appetites which make us strive for excess and for what is not necessary. Take the example of the man who was defending himself against the charge of beating his father with the words: "Yes, I did it: my father, too, used to beat his father, and he beat his, 10 and"—pointing to his little boy —"he will beat me when he grows up to be a man. It runs in the family." And the story goes that the man who was being dragged out of the house by his son asked him to stop at the door, on the grounds that he himself had not dragged his father any further than that.
Moreover, (3) the more underhanded a person is, the more unjust he is. Now, a hot-tempered man is not underhanded; 15 nor is anger: it is open. But appetite has the same attribute as Aphrodite, who is called "weaver of guile on Cyprus born,"333 and as her "pattern-pierced zone," of which Homer says: "endearment that steals the heart away even from the thoughtful."334 Therefore, since moral weakness of this type (which involves the appetite) is more unjust and baser than moral weakness concerning anger, it is this type which constitutes moral weakness in the unqualified sense and is even a kind of vice.335
Again, 20 (4) no one feels pain when insulting another without provocation, whereas everyone who acts in a fit of anger acts with pain. On the contrary, whoever unprovoked insults another, feels pleasure. If, then, acts which justify outbursts of anger are more unjust than others, it follows that moral weakness caused by appetite (is more unjust than moral weakness caused by anger), for anger does not involve unprovoked insult.
It is now clear that moral weakness in regard to the appetites is more disgraceful than moral weakness displayed in anger, 25 and also that moral strength and weakness operate in the sphere of the bodily appetites and pleasures. But we must still grasp the distinctions to be made within bodily appetites and pleasures. For, as we stated at the beginning,336 some pleasures are human, i.e., natural in kind as well as in degree, while others are brutish, and others again are due to physical disability and disease. 30 It is only with the first group of these, (i.e., the human pleasures,) that self-control and self-indulgence are concerned. For that reason, we do not call beasts either self-controlled or self-indulgent; if we do so, we do it only metaphorically, in cases where a337 general distinction can be drawn between one class of animals and another on the basis of wantonness, destructiveness, and indiscriminate voracity. (This use is only metaphorical) because beasts are incapable of choice and calculation, 35 but (animals of this type) stand outside the pale of their nature, just as madmen do among humans.
Further, (2) it is more excusable to follow one's natural desires, 5 inasmuch as we are also more inclined to pardon such appetites as are common to all men and to the extent that they are common to all. Now anger and ill temper are more natural than are the appetites which make us strive for excess and for what is not necessary. Take the example of the man who was defending himself against the charge of beating his father with the words: "Yes, I did it: my father, too, used to beat his father, and he beat his, 10 and"—pointing to his little boy —"he will beat me when he grows up to be a man. It runs in the family." And the story goes that the man who was being dragged out of the house by his son asked him to stop at the door, on the grounds that he himself had not dragged his father any further than that.
Moreover, (3) the more underhanded a person is, the more unjust he is. Now, a hot-tempered man is not underhanded; 15 nor is anger: it is open. But appetite has the same attribute as Aphrodite, who is called "weaver of guile on Cyprus born,"333 and as her "pattern-pierced zone," of which Homer says: "endearment that steals the heart away even from the thoughtful."334 Therefore, since moral weakness of this type (which involves the appetite) is more unjust and baser than moral weakness concerning anger, it is this type which constitutes moral weakness in the unqualified sense and is even a kind of vice.335
Again, 20 (4) no one feels pain when insulting another without provocation, whereas everyone who acts in a fit of anger acts with pain. On the contrary, whoever unprovoked insults another, feels pleasure. If, then, acts which justify outbursts of anger are more unjust than others, it follows that moral weakness caused by appetite (is more unjust than moral weakness caused by anger), for anger does not involve unprovoked insult.
It is now clear that moral weakness in regard to the appetites is more disgraceful than moral weakness displayed in anger, 25 and also that moral strength and weakness operate in the sphere of the bodily appetites and pleasures. But we must still grasp the distinctions to be made within bodily appetites and pleasures. For, as we stated at the beginning,336 some pleasures are human, i.e., natural in kind as well as in degree, while others are brutish, and others again are due to physical disability and disease. 30 It is only with the first group of these, (i.e., the human pleasures,) that self-control and self-indulgence are concerned. For that reason, we do not call beasts either self-controlled or self-indulgent; if we do so, we do it only metaphorically, in cases where a337 general distinction can be drawn between one class of animals and another on the basis of wantonness, destructiveness, and indiscriminate voracity. (This use is only metaphorical) because beasts are incapable of choice and calculation, 35 but (animals of this type) stand outside the pale of their nature, just as madmen do among humans.
1150a
1 τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον
δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν
πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ
5 φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή.
παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον
ἄδικον. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν
κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.
1 Brutishness is a lesser evil than vice, but it is more horrifying. For (in a beast) the better element cannot be perverted, as it can be in man, since it is lacking. (To compare a brute beast and a brutish man) is like comparing an inanimate with an animate being to see which is more evil. For the depravity 5 of a being which does not possess the source that initiates its own motion is always less destructive (than the depravity of a being that possesses this source), and intelligence is such a source. A similar comparison can be made between injustice (as such) and an unjust man: each is in some sense worse than the other, for a bad man can do ten thousand times as much harm as a beast.338
Book 7,Chapter 7 (1150a9–1150b28)
Περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
10 καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ
σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε
ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ
ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς
ὃ δ' ἐγκρατής, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὃ δὲ καρτερικός.
15 μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον
πρὸς τὰς χείρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί
εἰσιν αἳ δ' οὔ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδ' αἱ
ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας,
ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων †ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς†
20 ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον,
ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων
τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν.
25 τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὃ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν
ἡδονήν, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας,
ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων
εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν,
ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ
30 εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος
χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας
εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὃ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ
μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια
35 ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ
καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια
As regards the pleasures, pains, 10 appetites, and aversions that come to us through touch and taste, and which we defined earlier339 as the sphere of self-indulgence and self-control, it is possible to be the kind of person who is overcome even by those which most people master; but it is also possible to master those by which most people are overcome. Those who are overcome by pleasure or master it are, respectively, morally weak and morally strong; and in the case of pain, they are, respectively, soft and tenacious. 15 The disposition which characterizes the majority of men lies between these two, although they tend more to the inferior characteristics.
Some pleasures are necessary, up to a certain point, and others are not, whereas neither excesses nor deficiencies of pleasure are necessary. The same is also true of appetites and pains. From all this it follows that a man is self-indulgent when he pursues excesses of pleasant things, or when he (pursues necessary pleasures) to excess, 20 by choice,340 for their own sakes, and not for an ulterior result. A man of this kind inevitably feels no regret, and is as a result incorrigible. For a person who feels no regret is incorrigible.341 A person deficient (in his pursuit of the necessary pleasures) is the opposite (of self-indulgent), and the man who occupies the middle position is self-controlled. In the same way, a man who avoids bodily pain (is self-indulgent), provided he does so by choice and not because he is overcome by them.
A 25 choice is not exercised either by a person who is driven by pleasure, or by a person who is avoiding the pain of (unsatisfied) appetite. There is, accordingly, a difference between indulging by choice and not by choice. Everyone would think worse of a man who would perform some disgraceful act actuated only slightly or not at all by appetite, than of a person who was actuated by a strong appetite. And we would regard as worse a man who feels no anger as he beats another man, than someone who does so 30 in anger. For what would he do, if he were in the grip of emotion when acting? Hence a self-indulgent man is worse than one who is morally weak.
So we see that one of the characteristics described, (viz., the deliberate avoidance of pain,) constitutes rather a kind of softness, while a person possessing the other, (viz., the deliberate pursuit of excessive pleasures,) is self-indulgent.
A morally strong is opposed to a morally weak man, and a tenacious to a soft man. For being tenacious consists in offering resistance, 35 while moral strength consists in mastering. Resistance and mastery are two different things, just as not being defeated differs from winning a victory. Hence, moral strength is more desirable
Some pleasures are necessary, up to a certain point, and others are not, whereas neither excesses nor deficiencies of pleasure are necessary. The same is also true of appetites and pains. From all this it follows that a man is self-indulgent when he pursues excesses of pleasant things, or when he (pursues necessary pleasures) to excess, 20 by choice,340 for their own sakes, and not for an ulterior result. A man of this kind inevitably feels no regret, and is as a result incorrigible. For a person who feels no regret is incorrigible.341 A person deficient (in his pursuit of the necessary pleasures) is the opposite (of self-indulgent), and the man who occupies the middle position is self-controlled. In the same way, a man who avoids bodily pain (is self-indulgent), provided he does so by choice and not because he is overcome by them.
A 25 choice is not exercised either by a person who is driven by pleasure, or by a person who is avoiding the pain of (unsatisfied) appetite. There is, accordingly, a difference between indulging by choice and not by choice. Everyone would think worse of a man who would perform some disgraceful act actuated only slightly or not at all by appetite, than of a person who was actuated by a strong appetite. And we would regard as worse a man who feels no anger as he beats another man, than someone who does so 30 in anger. For what would he do, if he were in the grip of emotion when acting? Hence a self-indulgent man is worse than one who is morally weak.
So we see that one of the characteristics described, (viz., the deliberate avoidance of pain,) constitutes rather a kind of softness, while a person possessing the other, (viz., the deliberate pursuit of excessive pleasures,) is self-indulgent.
A morally strong is opposed to a morally weak man, and a tenacious to a soft man. For being tenacious consists in offering resistance, 35 while moral strength consists in mastering. Resistance and mastery are two different things, just as not being defeated differs from winning a victory. Hence, moral strength is more desirable
1150b
1 καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ
ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ
γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα
μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν
5 κάμνοντα οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὤν. ὁμοίως
δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις
ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν,
θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ
Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ
10 Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν
πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε
Ξενοφάντῳ· ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν,
τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ
φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν
15 ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ
ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι,
ἔστι δὲ μαλακός. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις·
τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης
ἐστίν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια. οἳ
20 μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ
τὸ πάθος, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους·
ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται,
οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες
ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτ'
25 ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ
τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ
διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι
τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.
1 than tenacity. A man who is deficient (in his resistance to pains) which most people withstand successfully is soft and effeminate. For effeminacy is a form of softness. A man of this kind lets his cloak trail, in order to save himself the pain of lifting it up, and plays the invalid 5 without believing himself to be involved in the misery which a true invalid suffers.
The situation is similar in the case of moral strength and moral weakness. If a person is overcome by powerful and excessive pleasures or pains, we are not surprised. In fact, we find it pardonable if he is overcome while offering resistance, as, for example, Theodectes' Philoctetes342 does when bitten by the snake, 10 or as Cercyon in Carcinus' *Alope*,343 or as people who try to restrain their laughter burst out in one great guffaw, as actually happened to Xenophantus.344 But we are surprised if a man is overcome by and unable to withstand those (pleasures and pains) which most people resist successfully, unless his disposition is congenital or caused by disease, as among the kings of Scythia, for example, 15 in whom softness is congenital,345 and as softness distinguishes the female from the male.
A man who loves amusement is also commonly regarded as being self-indulgent, but he is actually soft. For amusement is relaxation, inasmuch as it is respite from work, and a lover of amusement is a person who goes in for relaxation to excess.
One kind of moral weakness is impetuosity and another is a lack of strength. 20 People of the latter kind deliberate but do not abide by the results of their deliberation, because they are overcome by emotion, while the impetuous are driven on by emotion, because they do not deliberate. (If they deliberated, they would not be driven on so easily,) for as those who have just been tickled are immune to being tickled again,346 so some people are not overcome by emotion, whether pleasant or painful, when they feel and see it coming and have roused themselves and their power of reasoning in good time. 25 Keen and excitable persons are the most prone to the impetuous kind of moral weakness. Swiftness prevents the keen and vehemence the excitable from waiting for reason to guide them, since they tend to be led by their imagination.
The situation is similar in the case of moral strength and moral weakness. If a person is overcome by powerful and excessive pleasures or pains, we are not surprised. In fact, we find it pardonable if he is overcome while offering resistance, as, for example, Theodectes' Philoctetes342 does when bitten by the snake, 10 or as Cercyon in Carcinus' *Alope*,343 or as people who try to restrain their laughter burst out in one great guffaw, as actually happened to Xenophantus.344 But we are surprised if a man is overcome by and unable to withstand those (pleasures and pains) which most people resist successfully, unless his disposition is congenital or caused by disease, as among the kings of Scythia, for example, 15 in whom softness is congenital,345 and as softness distinguishes the female from the male.
A man who loves amusement is also commonly regarded as being self-indulgent, but he is actually soft. For amusement is relaxation, inasmuch as it is respite from work, and a lover of amusement is a person who goes in for relaxation to excess.
One kind of moral weakness is impetuosity and another is a lack of strength. 20 People of the latter kind deliberate but do not abide by the results of their deliberation, because they are overcome by emotion, while the impetuous are driven on by emotion, because they do not deliberate. (If they deliberated, they would not be driven on so easily,) for as those who have just been tickled are immune to being tickled again,346 so some people are not overcome by emotion, whether pleasant or painful, when they feel and see it coming and have roused themselves and their power of reasoning in good time. 25 Keen and excitable persons are the most prone to the impetuous kind of moral weakness. Swiftness prevents the keen and vehemence the excitable from waiting for reason to guide them, since they tend to be led by their imagination.
Book 7,Chapter 8 (1150b29–1151a28)
Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός·
30 ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς
πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,
ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ἀνίατος ὃ δ' ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία
τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία
τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἣ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς
35 πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας·
ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.
A self-indulgent man, as we stated,347 is one who feels no regret, 30 since he abides by the choice he has made. A morally weak person, on the other hand, always feels regret. Therefore, the formulation of the problem, as we posed it above,348 does not correspond to the facts: it is a self-indulgent man who cannot be cured, but a morally weak man is curable. For wickedness is like a disease such as dropsy or consumption, while moral weakness resembles epilepsy: the former is chronic, the latter intermittent. 35 All in all, moral weakness and vice are generically different from each other. A vicious man is not aware of his vice, but a morally weak man knows his weakness.
1151a
1 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον
ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους
ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ
ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου
5 οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ
ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους
"Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ
10 ἀξύνετοι," καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικήσουσι δέ.
ἐπεὶ δ' ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν
τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς
ἡδονάς, ὃ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος
διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὔ·
15 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣ μὲν φθείρει ἣ
δὲ σῴζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν
τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς
τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ
ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ
20 τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς
παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον
οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς
οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων <ὢν> τοῦ ἀκολάστου,
25 οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ
ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς
διά γε τὸ πάθος. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἣ μὲν σπουδαία
ἕξις, ἣ δὲ φαύλη.
1 Among the morally weak, those who lose themselves (in emotion, i.e., the impetuous,) are better than those who have a rational principle but do not abide by it, (i.e., those who lack strength). For they are overcome by a lesser emotion and do not yield without previous deliberation, as the impetuous do. A man who has this kind of moral weakness resembles those who get drunk quickly and on little wine, 5 or on less wine than most people do.
That moral weakness is not a vice (in the strict sense) is now evident, though in a certain sense it is perhaps one.349 For moral weakness violates choice, whereas vice is in accordance with choice. Nevertheless, they are similar in the actions to which they lead, just as Demodocus said of the Milesians:
> The Milesians are no stupid crew, > 10 except that they do what the stupid do.350
Similarly, the morally weak are not unjust, but they will act like unjust men.
A morally weak man is the kind of person who pursues bodily pleasures to excess and contrary to right reason, though he is not persuaded (that he ought to do so); the self-indulgent, on the other hand, is persuaded to pursue them because he is the kind of man who does so. This means that it is the former who is easily persuaded to change his mind, but the latter is not. 15 For virtue or excellence preserves and wickedness destroys the initiating motive or first cause (of action), and in actions the initiating motive or first cause is the end at which we aim, as the hypotheses are in mathematics. For neither in mathematics nor in moral matters does reasoning teach us the principles or starting points; it is virtue, whether natural or habitual, that inculcates right opinion about the principle or first premise. 20 A man who has this right opinion is self-controlled, and his opposite is self-indulgent.
But there exists a kind of person who loses himself under the impact of emotion and violates right reason, a person whom emotion so overpowers that he does not act according to the dictates of right reason, but not sufficiently to make him the kind of man who is persuaded that he must abandon himself completely to the pursuit of such pleasures. This is the morally weak man: he is better than the self-indulgent, 25 and he is not bad in the unqualified sense of the word. For the best thing in him is saved: the principle or premise (as to how he should act). Opposed to him is another kind of man, who remains steadfast and does not lose himself, at least not under the impact of emotion. These considerations make it clear that moral strength is a characteristic of great moral worth, while moral weakness is bad.
That moral weakness is not a vice (in the strict sense) is now evident, though in a certain sense it is perhaps one.349 For moral weakness violates choice, whereas vice is in accordance with choice. Nevertheless, they are similar in the actions to which they lead, just as Demodocus said of the Milesians:
> The Milesians are no stupid crew, > 10 except that they do what the stupid do.350
Similarly, the morally weak are not unjust, but they will act like unjust men.
A morally weak man is the kind of person who pursues bodily pleasures to excess and contrary to right reason, though he is not persuaded (that he ought to do so); the self-indulgent, on the other hand, is persuaded to pursue them because he is the kind of man who does so. This means that it is the former who is easily persuaded to change his mind, but the latter is not. 15 For virtue or excellence preserves and wickedness destroys the initiating motive or first cause (of action), and in actions the initiating motive or first cause is the end at which we aim, as the hypotheses are in mathematics. For neither in mathematics nor in moral matters does reasoning teach us the principles or starting points; it is virtue, whether natural or habitual, that inculcates right opinion about the principle or first premise. 20 A man who has this right opinion is self-controlled, and his opposite is self-indulgent.
But there exists a kind of person who loses himself under the impact of emotion and violates right reason, a person whom emotion so overpowers that he does not act according to the dictates of right reason, but not sufficiently to make him the kind of man who is persuaded that he must abandon himself completely to the pursuit of such pleasures. This is the morally weak man: he is better than the self-indulgent, 25 and he is not bad in the unqualified sense of the word. For the best thing in him is saved: the principle or premise (as to how he should act). Opposed to him is another kind of man, who remains steadfast and does not lose himself, at least not under the impact of emotion. These considerations make it clear that moral strength is a characteristic of great moral worth, while moral weakness is bad.
Book 7,Chapter 9 (1151a29–1152a5)
Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποιᾳοῦν
30 προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ
ὁποιᾳοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ
τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ
ἠπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιᾳοῦν,
καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
35 ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ
Is a man morally strong when he abides by any and every dictate of reason and 30 choice, or only when he abides by the right choice? And is a man morally weak when he does not abide by every choice and dictate of reason, or only when he fails to abide by the rational dictate which is not false and the choice which is right? This is the problem we stated earlier.351 Or is it true reason and right choice as such, but any other kind of choice incidentally, 35 to which the one remains steadfast and the other does not? (This seems to be the correct answer,) for if a person chooses and pursues the attainment of *a* by means of *b*,
1151b
1 αἱρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἱρεῖται,
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ
καθ' αὑτό. ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιᾳοῦν δόξῃ ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει
ὃ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἁπλῶς δὲ [ὁ] τῇ ἀληθεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ
5 ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἱ
δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἳ ὅμοιον μέν τι ἔχουσι
τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς
τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὃ μὲν γὰρ διὰ
πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει [ὁ ἐγκρατής], ἐπεὶ
10 εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· οἳ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου,
ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες
καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι'
ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται,
15 καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ᾖ ὥσπερ
ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι'
ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος·
καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ
20 γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυςσέως
ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὔτ'
ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἧττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς
χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ [τοιοῦτος]
25 τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατὴς
οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ
τὸ ἧττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει.
δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας
τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται·
30 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι
φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον
εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ
καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ
σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς
35 οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς
1 his pursuit and choice are for *a* as such but for *b* incidentally. And by "as such" we mean "in the unqualified sense." Therefore, there is a sense in which the one abides by and the other abandons any and every kind of opinion, but in the unqualified sense, only true opinion.
There are those 5 who remain steadfast to their opinion and are called "obstinate." They are hard to convince and are not easily persuaded to change their mind. They bear a certain resemblance to a morally strong person, just as an extravagant man resembles one who is generous, and a reckless man resembles one who is confident. But they are, in fact, different in many respects. The one, the morally strong, will be a person who does not change under the influence of emotion and appetite, 10 but on occasion he will be persuaded (by argument). Obstinate men, on the other hand, are not easily persuaded by rational argument; but to appetites they are amenable, and in many cases are driven on by pleasures. The various kinds of obstinate people are the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish. The opinionated let themselves be influenced by pleasure and pain: they feel the joy of victory, when someone fails to persuade them to change their mind, 15 and they feel pain when their views are overruled, like decrees that are declared null and void. As a result, they bear a greater resemblance to the morally weak than to the morally strong.
Then there are those who do not abide by their decisions for reasons other than moral weakness, as, for example, Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*.352 Granted it was under the influence of pleasure that he did not remain steadfast, but it was a noble pleasure: 20 it was noble in his eyes to be truthful, but he was persuaded by Odysseus to tell a lie. For not anybody who acts under the influence of pleasure is self-indulgent, bad, or morally weak, but only those who do so under the influence of a base pleasure.
There is also a type who feels less joy than he should at the things of the body and, therefore, does not abide by the dictates of reason. 25 The median between this type and the morally weak man is the man of moral strength. For a morally weak person does not abide by the dictates of reason, because he feels more joy than he should (in bodily things), but the man under discussion feels less joy than he should. But a morally strong man remains steadfast and does not change on either account. Since moral strength is good, it follows that both characteristics opposed to it are bad, as they in fact turn out to be. 30 But since one of the two opposites is in evidence only in a few people and on few occasions, moral strength is generally regarded as being the only opposite of moral weakness, just as self-control is thought to be opposed only to self-indulgence.
Since many terms are used in an analogical sense, we have come to speak analogically of the "moral strength" of a self-controlled man. (There is a resemblance between the two) 35 since a morally strong man is the kind of person who does nothing contrary to the dictates of reason under the influence of bodily pleasures, and the same is true of a self-controlled man.
There are those 5 who remain steadfast to their opinion and are called "obstinate." They are hard to convince and are not easily persuaded to change their mind. They bear a certain resemblance to a morally strong person, just as an extravagant man resembles one who is generous, and a reckless man resembles one who is confident. But they are, in fact, different in many respects. The one, the morally strong, will be a person who does not change under the influence of emotion and appetite, 10 but on occasion he will be persuaded (by argument). Obstinate men, on the other hand, are not easily persuaded by rational argument; but to appetites they are amenable, and in many cases are driven on by pleasures. The various kinds of obstinate people are the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish. The opinionated let themselves be influenced by pleasure and pain: they feel the joy of victory, when someone fails to persuade them to change their mind, 15 and they feel pain when their views are overruled, like decrees that are declared null and void. As a result, they bear a greater resemblance to the morally weak than to the morally strong.
Then there are those who do not abide by their decisions for reasons other than moral weakness, as, for example, Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*.352 Granted it was under the influence of pleasure that he did not remain steadfast, but it was a noble pleasure: 20 it was noble in his eyes to be truthful, but he was persuaded by Odysseus to tell a lie. For not anybody who acts under the influence of pleasure is self-indulgent, bad, or morally weak, but only those who do so under the influence of a base pleasure.
There is also a type who feels less joy than he should at the things of the body and, therefore, does not abide by the dictates of reason. 25 The median between this type and the morally weak man is the man of moral strength. For a morally weak person does not abide by the dictates of reason, because he feels more joy than he should (in bodily things), but the man under discussion feels less joy than he should. But a morally strong man remains steadfast and does not change on either account. Since moral strength is good, it follows that both characteristics opposed to it are bad, as they in fact turn out to be. 30 But since one of the two opposites is in evidence only in a few people and on few occasions, moral strength is generally regarded as being the only opposite of moral weakness, just as self-control is thought to be opposed only to self-indulgence.
Since many terms are used in an analogical sense, we have come to speak analogically of the "moral strength" of a self-controlled man. (There is a resemblance between the two) 35 since a morally strong man is the kind of person who does nothing contrary to the dictates of reason under the influence of bodily pleasures, and the same is true of a self-controlled man.
1152a
1 ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δ' οὐκ ἔχων
φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι
παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὃ δ' οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες,
5 ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν καὶ
οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὃ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος.
1 But while a morally strong man has base appetites, a self-controlled man does not and is, moreover, a person who finds no pleasure in anything that violates the dictates of reason. A morally strong man, on the other hand, does find pleasure in such things, but he is not driven by them. There is also a similarity between the morally weak and the self-indulgent 5 in that both pursue things pleasant to the body; but they are different in that a self-indulgent man thinks he ought to pursue them, while the morally weak thinks he should not.
Book 7,Chapter 10 (1152a6–36)
Οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ
ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ
σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὤν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον
φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός
10 —τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν
ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα
διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς
πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν
δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν—οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν,
15 ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἑκὼν μέν (τρόπον
γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὔ·
ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος·
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν
βουλεύσηται, ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. καὶ
20 ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ
δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ
Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν
ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·
ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένῃ.
25 ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν
πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὃ δ' ἧττον τῆς
τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ
μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων
δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾷον
30 γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος
χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει
φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δή
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία
35 καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας,
εἴρηται.
It is not possible for the same person to have practical wisdom and be morally weak at the same time, for it has been shown353 that a man of practical wisdom is *ipso facto* a man of good character. Moreover, to be a man of practical wisdom, one must not only know (what one ought to do), but he must also be able to act accordingly. But a morally weak man is not able so to act. 10 However, there is no reason why a clever man354 could not be morally weak. That is why occasionally people are regarded as possessing practical wisdom, but as being morally weak at the same time; it is because cleverness differs from practical wisdom in the way we have described in our first discussion of the subject. They are closely related in that both follow the guidance of reason, but they differ in that (practical wisdom alone) involves moral choice.
Furthermore, a morally weak man does not act like a man who has knowledge and exercises it, 15 but like a man asleep or drunk. Also, even though he acts voluntarily—for he knows in a sense what he is doing and what end he is aiming at— he is not wicked, because his moral choice is good,355 and that makes him only half-wicked. He is not unjust, either, for he is no underhanded plotter.356 (For plotting implies deliberation,) whereas one type of morally weak man does not abide by the results of his deliberation, while the other, the excitable type, does not even deliberate. So we see that a morally weak person 20 is like a state which enacts all the right decrees and has laws of a high moral standard, but does not apply them, a situation which Anaxandrides made fun of: "Thus wills the state, that cares not for its laws."357 A wicked man, on the other hand, resembles a state which does apply its laws, but the laws are bad.
In relation to the characteristics possessed by most people, 25 moral weakness and moral strength lie at the extremes. For a morally strong person remains more steadfast and a morally weak person less steadfast than the capacity of most men permits.
The kind of moral weakness displayed by excitable people is more easily cured than the moral weakness of those who deliberate but do not abide by their decisions; and those who are morally weak through habituation are more curable than those who are morally weak by nature. 30 For it is easier to change habit than to change nature. Even habit is hard to change, precisely because it resembles nature, as Euenus says:
> A habit, friend, is of long practice born, > and practice ends in fashioning man's nature.358
We have now completed our definitions of moral strength, moral weakness, tenacity, 35 and softness, and stated how these characteristics are related to one another.
Furthermore, a morally weak man does not act like a man who has knowledge and exercises it, 15 but like a man asleep or drunk. Also, even though he acts voluntarily—for he knows in a sense what he is doing and what end he is aiming at— he is not wicked, because his moral choice is good,355 and that makes him only half-wicked. He is not unjust, either, for he is no underhanded plotter.356 (For plotting implies deliberation,) whereas one type of morally weak man does not abide by the results of his deliberation, while the other, the excitable type, does not even deliberate. So we see that a morally weak person 20 is like a state which enacts all the right decrees and has laws of a high moral standard, but does not apply them, a situation which Anaxandrides made fun of: "Thus wills the state, that cares not for its laws."357 A wicked man, on the other hand, resembles a state which does apply its laws, but the laws are bad.
In relation to the characteristics possessed by most people, 25 moral weakness and moral strength lie at the extremes. For a morally strong person remains more steadfast and a morally weak person less steadfast than the capacity of most men permits.
The kind of moral weakness displayed by excitable people is more easily cured than the moral weakness of those who deliberate but do not abide by their decisions; and those who are morally weak through habituation are more curable than those who are morally weak by nature. 30 For it is easier to change habit than to change nature. Even habit is hard to change, precisely because it resembles nature, as Euenus says:
> A habit, friend, is of long practice born, > and practice ends in fashioning man's nature.358
We have now completed our definitions of moral strength, moral weakness, tenacity, 35 and softness, and stated how these characteristics are related to one another.
Book 7,Chapter 11 (1152b1–24)
1152b
1 Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν
φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες
ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς λέγομεν.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τήν
5 τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ
ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς
εἶναί φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε
καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
10 καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ
φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ
ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν,
ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία
δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις
15 οἰκίᾳ. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ
ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί,
καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τῇ τῶν ἀφροδισίων·
οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία
ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία
20 καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας,
ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ὅτι βλαβεραί·
νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐ τἄριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι
οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ'
ἐστίν.
1 It is the role of a political philosopher to study pleasure and pain. For he is the supreme craftsman of the end to which we look when we call one particular thing bad and another good in the unqualified sense. Moreover, an examination of this subject is one of the tasks we must logically undertake, since we established360 5 that virtue and vice of character are concerned with pains and pleasures, and most people claim that happiness involves pleasure. That is why the word "blessed" is derived from the word "enjoy."361
Now, (1) some people believe that no pleasure is good, either in itself or incidentally, since the good and pleasure are not the same thing.362 (2) 10 Others hold that, though some pleasures are good, most of them are bad.363 (3) Then there is a third view, according to which it is impossible for pleasure to be the highest good, even if all pleasures are good.364
⟨The following arguments are advanced to support (1) the contention that⟩ pleasure is not a good at all: (*a*) All pleasure is a process or coming-to-be leading to the natural state ⟨of the subject⟩ and perceived ⟨by the subject⟩; but no process is of the same order as its ends, e.g., the building process is not of the same order as a house.365 15 Further, (*b*) a self-controlled man avoids pleasures. Again, (*c*) a man of practical wisdom does not pursue the pleasant, but what is free from pain.366
Moreover, (*d*) pleasures are an obstacle to good sense: the greater the joy one feels, e.g., in sexual intercourse, the greater the obstacle; for no one is capable of rational insight while enjoying sexual relations.367 Also, (*e*) there is no art of pleasure; yet every good is the result of an art. Finally, (*f*) 20 children and beasts pursue pleasures, ⟨whereas they do not know what is good⟩.
⟨The arguments for the view (2) that⟩ not all pleasures are good are: (*a*) Some pleasures are disgraceful and cause for reproach; and (*b*) some pleasures are harmful, for there are pleasant things that may cause disease.368
⟨And the argument in favor of (3), the contention that⟩ pleasure is not the highest good, is that it is not an end but a process or coming-to-be.369 These are roughly the views put forward.
Now, (1) some people believe that no pleasure is good, either in itself or incidentally, since the good and pleasure are not the same thing.362 (2) 10 Others hold that, though some pleasures are good, most of them are bad.363 (3) Then there is a third view, according to which it is impossible for pleasure to be the highest good, even if all pleasures are good.364
⟨The following arguments are advanced to support (1) the contention that⟩ pleasure is not a good at all: (*a*) All pleasure is a process or coming-to-be leading to the natural state ⟨of the subject⟩ and perceived ⟨by the subject⟩; but no process is of the same order as its ends, e.g., the building process is not of the same order as a house.365 15 Further, (*b*) a self-controlled man avoids pleasures. Again, (*c*) a man of practical wisdom does not pursue the pleasant, but what is free from pain.366
Moreover, (*d*) pleasures are an obstacle to good sense: the greater the joy one feels, e.g., in sexual intercourse, the greater the obstacle; for no one is capable of rational insight while enjoying sexual relations.367 Also, (*e*) there is no art of pleasure; yet every good is the result of an art. Finally, (*f*) 20 children and beasts pursue pleasures, ⟨whereas they do not know what is good⟩.
⟨The arguments for the view (2) that⟩ not all pleasures are good are: (*a*) Some pleasures are disgraceful and cause for reproach; and (*b*) some pleasures are harmful, for there are pleasant things that may cause disease.368
⟨And the argument in favor of (3), the contention that⟩ pleasure is not the highest good, is that it is not an end but a process or coming-to-be.369 These are roughly the views put forward.
Book 7,Chapter 12 (1152b25–1153a35)
25 Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ
τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ
αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις,
καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἳ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ
30 δ' οὒ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ
ὀλίγον χρόνον αἱρεταί, <ἁπλῶς> δ' οὔ· αἳ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ
φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν
καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις,
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί
35 εἰσιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου
ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν
25 But the following considerations will show that the arguments we have enumerated do not lead us to the conclusion that (1) pleasure is not a good, or (3) that it is not the highest good. In the first place, ⟨to answer argument (1*a*) and (3),⟩ we use the word "good" in two senses: a thing may be good in the unqualified sense, or "good" for a particular person.
Hence the term has also two meanings when applied to natural states and characteristics ⟨of persons⟩, and consequently also when applied to their motions and processes.
This means that motions and processes which are generally held to be bad are partly bad without qualification, 30 but not bad for a particular person, and even desirable for him; and partly not even desirable for a particular person except on occasion and for a short time, though they are not desirable in an unqualified sense. Others again are not even pleasures, but only appear to be, for example, all processes accompanied by pain and undergone for remedial purposes, such as the processes to which the sick are subjected.
Secondly, the good has two aspects: it is both an activity and a characteristic. Now, the processes which restore us to our natural characteristic condition are only incidentally pleasant; 35 but the activity which is at work when our appetites ⟨want to see us restored⟩ is the activity of that part of our characteristic condition and natural state which has been left unimpaired. For that matter, there are pleasures which do not involve pain and appetite (e.g., the activity of studying)370 and we
Hence the term has also two meanings when applied to natural states and characteristics ⟨of persons⟩, and consequently also when applied to their motions and processes.
This means that motions and processes which are generally held to be bad are partly bad without qualification, 30 but not bad for a particular person, and even desirable for him; and partly not even desirable for a particular person except on occasion and for a short time, though they are not desirable in an unqualified sense. Others again are not even pleasures, but only appear to be, for example, all processes accompanied by pain and undergone for remedial purposes, such as the processes to which the sick are subjected.
Secondly, the good has two aspects: it is both an activity and a characteristic. Now, the processes which restore us to our natural characteristic condition are only incidentally pleasant; 35 but the activity which is at work when our appetites ⟨want to see us restored⟩ is the activity of that part of our characteristic condition and natural state which has been left unimpaired. For that matter, there are pleasures which do not involve pain and appetite (e.g., the activity of studying)370 and we
1153a
1 ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν [ἐνέργειαι], τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς
οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρουμένης
τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας
μὲν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις·
5 καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ
οὔθ' ἁπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα
διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. ἔτι οὐκ
ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι
τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως
10 πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν
ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι,
ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ
οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως,
15 ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τισιν
εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται
εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια
ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν.
ταύτῃ οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατά γε τοῦτο,
20 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἐμποδίζει
δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἡδονή, ἀλλ'
αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον
ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν. τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι
ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης
25 ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως·
καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς
εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν
τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν,
τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ
30 ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας
καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν
ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωματικάς
(τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ'
ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας,
35 ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος.
1 experience them when there is nothing deficient in our natural state.371 ⟨That processes of restoration are only incidentally pleasant⟩ is shown by the fact that the pleasant things which give us joy while our natural state is being replenished are not the same as those which give us joy once it has been restored.
Once restored, we feel joy at what is pleasant in the unqualified sense, but while the replenishment goes on, we enjoy even its opposite: for instance, 5 we enjoy sharp and bitter things, none of which are pleasant either by nature or in the unqualified sense. Consequently, the pleasures ⟨derived from them, too, are not pleasant either by nature or in the unqualified sense⟩, for the difference that exists between various pleasant things is the same as that which is found between the pleasures derived from them.
In the third place, there is no need to believe that there exists something better than pleasure which is different from it, just as, according to some, the end is better than the process which leads to it. For pleasures are not processes, nor do all pleasures involve processes: 10 they are activities and an end, and they result not from the process of development we undergo, but from the use we make of the powers we have.
Nor do all pleasures have an end other than themselves; that is only true of the pleasures of those who are being led to the perfection of their natural states. For that reason, it is not correct, either, to say that pleasure is a process perceived ⟨by the subject⟩: one should rather call it an "activity of our characteristic condition as determined by our natural state,"
and 15 instead of "perceived" we should call it "unobstructed."
⟨There are some372 who believe pleasure to be process on the ground that it is good in the true sense of the word, for they think that activity is process, but it is, as a matter of fact, different.⟩ The argument (2*b*) that pleasures are bad, because some pleasant things may cause disease, is like arguing that wholesome things ⟨are bad, because⟩ some of them are bad for making money. Both pleasant and wholesome things are bad in the relative senses mentioned, but that does not make them bad in themselves: even studying is occasionally harmful to 20 health.
Also, (1*d*) neither practical wisdom nor any characteristic is obstructed by the pleasure arising from it, but only by alien pleasures extraneous to it. The pleasures arising from study and learning will only intensify study and learning, ⟨but they will never obstruct it⟩.
The argument (1*e*) that no pleasure is the result of an art makes good sense. For art never produces any activity at all:
it 25 produces the capacity for the activity. Nevertheless, the arts of perfume-making as well as of cooking are generally regarded as arts of pleasure.
The arguments (1*b*) that a self-controlled person avoids pleasure, (1*c*) that a man of practical wisdom pursues a life free from pain, and (1*f*) that children and beasts pursue pleasure, are all refuted by the same consideration. We have stated373 in what sense pleasures are good without 30 qualification and in what sense not all pleasures are good. These last mentioned are the pleasures which beasts and children pursue, while a man of practical wisdom wants to be free from the pain which they imply. They are the pleasures that involve appetite and pain, i.e., the bodily pleasures—for they are of this sort—and their excesses, in terms of which a self-indulgent man is self-indulgent. That is why a self-controlled man avoids these pleasures. 35 But there are pleasures even for the self-controlled.
Once restored, we feel joy at what is pleasant in the unqualified sense, but while the replenishment goes on, we enjoy even its opposite: for instance, 5 we enjoy sharp and bitter things, none of which are pleasant either by nature or in the unqualified sense. Consequently, the pleasures ⟨derived from them, too, are not pleasant either by nature or in the unqualified sense⟩, for the difference that exists between various pleasant things is the same as that which is found between the pleasures derived from them.
In the third place, there is no need to believe that there exists something better than pleasure which is different from it, just as, according to some, the end is better than the process which leads to it. For pleasures are not processes, nor do all pleasures involve processes: 10 they are activities and an end, and they result not from the process of development we undergo, but from the use we make of the powers we have.
Nor do all pleasures have an end other than themselves; that is only true of the pleasures of those who are being led to the perfection of their natural states. For that reason, it is not correct, either, to say that pleasure is a process perceived ⟨by the subject⟩: one should rather call it an "activity of our characteristic condition as determined by our natural state,"
and 15 instead of "perceived" we should call it "unobstructed."
⟨There are some372 who believe pleasure to be process on the ground that it is good in the true sense of the word, for they think that activity is process, but it is, as a matter of fact, different.⟩ The argument (2*b*) that pleasures are bad, because some pleasant things may cause disease, is like arguing that wholesome things ⟨are bad, because⟩ some of them are bad for making money. Both pleasant and wholesome things are bad in the relative senses mentioned, but that does not make them bad in themselves: even studying is occasionally harmful to 20 health.
Also, (1*d*) neither practical wisdom nor any characteristic is obstructed by the pleasure arising from it, but only by alien pleasures extraneous to it. The pleasures arising from study and learning will only intensify study and learning, ⟨but they will never obstruct it⟩.
The argument (1*e*) that no pleasure is the result of an art makes good sense. For art never produces any activity at all:
it 25 produces the capacity for the activity. Nevertheless, the arts of perfume-making as well as of cooking are generally regarded as arts of pleasure.
The arguments (1*b*) that a self-controlled person avoids pleasure, (1*c*) that a man of practical wisdom pursues a life free from pain, and (1*f*) that children and beasts pursue pleasure, are all refuted by the same consideration. We have stated373 in what sense pleasures are good without 30 qualification and in what sense not all pleasures are good. These last mentioned are the pleasures which beasts and children pursue, while a man of practical wisdom wants to be free from the pain which they imply. They are the pleasures that involve appetite and pain, i.e., the bodily pleasures—for they are of this sort—and their excesses, in terms of which a self-indulgent man is self-indulgent. That is why a self-controlled man avoids these pleasures. 35 But there are pleasures even for the self-controlled.
Book 7,Chapter 13 (1153b1–1154a7)
1153b
1 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ
φευκτόν· ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἣ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική.
τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾗ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν,
ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ
5 Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον
τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν
τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. τἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν
τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ
ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἑκάστης
10 ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά
ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην
εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ
τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν,
ἁπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον
15 εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως·
οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία
τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν
καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται
ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις
20 περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ
ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς
τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ
οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως
οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
25 ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους
τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·
φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα λαοί
πολλοί ...
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν
30 οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι
πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν
φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον.
ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ
ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ
35 πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι
To continue: there is general agreement that 1 pain is bad and must be avoided. One kind of pain is bad in the unqualified sense, and another kind is bad, because in some way or other it obstructs us. Now, the opposite of a thing to be avoided—in the sense that it must be avoided and is bad— is good. It follows, therefore, necessarily that pleasure is a good. 5 Speusippus tried to solve the question by saying that, just as the greater is opposed both to the less and to the equal, ⟨so pleasure is opposed both to pain and to the good⟩.374 But this solution does not come out correctly: surely, he would not say that pleasure is essentially a species of evil.375
But (2*a*) even if some pleasures are bad, it does not mean that the highest good cannot be some sort of pleasure, just as the highest good may be some sort of knowledge, even though some kinds of knowledge are bad. Perhaps we must even draw the necessary conclusion that it is; for since 10 each characteristic has its unobstructed activities, the activity of all characteristics or of one of them—depending on whether the former or the latter constitutes happiness—if unobstructed, must be the most desirable of all. And this activity is pleasure.
Therefore, the highest good is some sort of pleasure, despite the fact that most pleasures are bad and, if you like, bad in the unqualified sense of the word. It is for this reason that everyone thinks that the happy life is a pleasant life, 15 and links pleasure with happiness. And it makes good sense this way: for no activity is complete and perfect as long as it is obstructed, and happiness is a complete and perfect thing.
This is why a happy man also needs the goods of the body, external goods, and the goods of fortune, in order not to be obstructed by their absence.
But those who assert376 that a man 20 is happy even on the rack and even when great misfortunes befall him, provided that he is good, are talking nonsense, whether they know it or not. Since happiness also needs fortune, some people regard good fortune as identical with happiness. But that is not true, for even good fortune, if excessive, can be an obstruction; perhaps we are, in that case, no longer justified in calling it "good fortune," for its definition is determined by its relation to happiness.
Also, 25 the fact that all beasts and all men pursue pleasure is some indication that it is, in a sense, the highest good:
> There is no talk that ever quite dies down, > if spread by many men. . . .377
But since no single nature and no single characteristic condition 30 is, or is regarded, as the best ⟨for all⟩, people do not all pursue the same pleasure, yet all pursue pleasure. Perhaps they do not even pursue the pleasure which they think or would say they pursue, but they all pursue the same ⟨thing⟩, pleasure. For everything has by nature something divine about it. But the bodily pleasures have arrogated the name "pleasure" unto themselves as their own private possession, because everyone tends to follow them and 35 participates in them more frequently than in any others. Accordingly, since these are the only pleasures with which they are familiar,
But (2*a*) even if some pleasures are bad, it does not mean that the highest good cannot be some sort of pleasure, just as the highest good may be some sort of knowledge, even though some kinds of knowledge are bad. Perhaps we must even draw the necessary conclusion that it is; for since 10 each characteristic has its unobstructed activities, the activity of all characteristics or of one of them—depending on whether the former or the latter constitutes happiness—if unobstructed, must be the most desirable of all. And this activity is pleasure.
Therefore, the highest good is some sort of pleasure, despite the fact that most pleasures are bad and, if you like, bad in the unqualified sense of the word. It is for this reason that everyone thinks that the happy life is a pleasant life, 15 and links pleasure with happiness. And it makes good sense this way: for no activity is complete and perfect as long as it is obstructed, and happiness is a complete and perfect thing.
This is why a happy man also needs the goods of the body, external goods, and the goods of fortune, in order not to be obstructed by their absence.
But those who assert376 that a man 20 is happy even on the rack and even when great misfortunes befall him, provided that he is good, are talking nonsense, whether they know it or not. Since happiness also needs fortune, some people regard good fortune as identical with happiness. But that is not true, for even good fortune, if excessive, can be an obstruction; perhaps we are, in that case, no longer justified in calling it "good fortune," for its definition is determined by its relation to happiness.
Also, 25 the fact that all beasts and all men pursue pleasure is some indication that it is, in a sense, the highest good:
> There is no talk that ever quite dies down, > if spread by many men. . . .377
But since no single nature and no single characteristic condition 30 is, or is regarded, as the best ⟨for all⟩, people do not all pursue the same pleasure, yet all pursue pleasure. Perhaps they do not even pursue the pleasure which they think or would say they pursue, but they all pursue the same ⟨thing⟩, pleasure. For everything has by nature something divine about it. But the bodily pleasures have arrogated the name "pleasure" unto themselves as their own private possession, because everyone tends to follow them and 35 participates in them more frequently than in any others. Accordingly, since these are the only pleasures with which they are familiar,
1154a
1 ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα·
τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ
5 λύπη, εἴπερ μηδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ
δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι
αὐτοῦ.
1 people think they are the only ones that exist.
It is also evident that if pleasure, i.e., the activity ⟨of our faculties⟩, is not good, it will be impossible for a happy man to live pleasantly. For to what purpose would he need pleasure, if it were not a good and if it is possible that a happy man's life is one of pain? For if pain is neither good nor bad, 5 pleasure is not, either: so why should he avoid it? Surely, the life of a morally good man is no pleasanter ⟨than that of anyone else⟩, if his activities are not more pleasant.
It is also evident that if pleasure, i.e., the activity ⟨of our faculties⟩, is not good, it will be impossible for a happy man to live pleasantly. For to what purpose would he need pleasure, if it were not a good and if it is possible that a happy man's life is one of pain? For if pain is neither good nor bad, 5 pleasure is not, either: so why should he avoid it? Surely, the life of a morally good man is no pleasanter ⟨than that of anyone else⟩, if his activities are not more pleasant.
Book 7,Chapter 14 (1154a8–1154b34)
Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς
λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί,
10 ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. διὰ τί οὖν
αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. ἢ
οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν
ἐστιν; ἢ μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων
ὅσων μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων
15 δ' ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν
ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν,
ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ
ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ἐναντίως
δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως·
20 οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι
τὴν ὑπερβολήν.
Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον
τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν·
ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν
25 ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον
διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν
καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικήν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται
30 αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον
φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἳ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις (ἢ
ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων
ἀνθρώπων), αἳ δ' ἰατρεῖαι [ὅτι] ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ
The subject of the pleasures of the body demands the attention of the proponents of the view that, though some pleasures —for instance, the noble pleasures—are highly desirable, 10 the pleasures of the body—that is, the pleasures which are the concern of the self-indulgent man—are not. If that is true, why then are the pains opposed to them bad? For bad has good as its opposite. Is it that the necessary pleasures are good in the sense in which anything not bad is good? Or are they good up to a certain point? For all characteristics and motions which cannot have an excess of good cannot have an excess of pleasure, either; but those which can have an excess of good 15 can also have an excess of pleasure. Now, excess is possible in the case of the goods of the body, and it is the pursuit of excess, but not the pursuit of necessary pleasures, that makes a man bad. For all men get some kind of enjoyment from good food, wine, and sexual relations, but not everyone enjoys these things in the proper way. The reverse is true of pain:
a bad person does not avoid an excess of it, but he avoids it altogether. 20 For the opposite of an excess is pain only for the man who pursues the excess.
It is our task not only to say what is true, but also to state what causes error, since that helps carry conviction. For when we can give a reasoned explanation why something which appears to be true is, in fact, not true, 25 it makes us give greater credence to what is true. Accordingly, we must now explain why the pleasures of the body appear to be more desirable.
The first reason, then, is that pleasure drives out pain.
When men experience an excess of pain, they pursue excessive pleasure and bodily pleasure in general, in the belief that it will remedy the pain. These remedial ⟨pleasures⟩ become very intense—and 30 that is the very reason why they are pursued —because they are experienced in contrast with their opposite.
As a matter of fact, these two reasons which we have stated378 also explain why pleasure is not regarded as having any moral value: some pleasures are the actions that spring from a bad natural state—either congenitally bad, as in the case of a beast, or bad by habit, as in the case of a bad man —while other pleasures are remedial and indicate a deficient natural state, and to be in one's natural state is better than to be moving toward it.
a bad person does not avoid an excess of it, but he avoids it altogether. 20 For the opposite of an excess is pain only for the man who pursues the excess.
It is our task not only to say what is true, but also to state what causes error, since that helps carry conviction. For when we can give a reasoned explanation why something which appears to be true is, in fact, not true, 25 it makes us give greater credence to what is true. Accordingly, we must now explain why the pleasures of the body appear to be more desirable.
The first reason, then, is that pleasure drives out pain.
When men experience an excess of pain, they pursue excessive pleasure and bodily pleasure in general, in the belief that it will remedy the pain. These remedial ⟨pleasures⟩ become very intense—and 30 that is the very reason why they are pursued —because they are experienced in contrast with their opposite.
As a matter of fact, these two reasons which we have stated378 also explain why pleasure is not regarded as having any moral value: some pleasures are the actions that spring from a bad natural state—either congenitally bad, as in the case of a beast, or bad by habit, as in the case of a bad man —while other pleasures are remedial and indicate a deficient natural state, and to be in one's natural state is better than to be moving toward it.
1154b
1 γίνεσθαι· αἳ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελεουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ
τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὑτοῖς δίψας
τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον,
5 ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς
χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν.
ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσι,
τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν·
ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φασίν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ
10 νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ
ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται ἀεὶ
ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν
κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν· ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ
λύπην ἥ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ᾖ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ
15 ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν
οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὗται δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ
μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα
τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος
ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι·
20 φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως. οὐκ
ἀεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν
φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἄν
τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν
δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ
25 εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται.
διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον
κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ ἡδονὴ
μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων
γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ
30 ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη
μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς
καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ
αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.
1 But since the remedial pleasures only arise in the process of reaching the perfected state, they are morally good only incidentally.
The second reason is that the pleasures of the body are pursued because of their intensity by those incapable of enjoying other pleasures. Take, for example, those who induce themselves to be thirsty.379 There is no objection to this practice, if the pleasures are harmless; 5 but if they are harmful, it is bad. For many people have nothing else to give them joy, and because of their nature, it is painful for them to feel neither ⟨pleasure nor pain⟩. Actually, animal nature is under a constant strain, as the students of natural science attest380
when they say that seeing and hearing are painful, but ⟨we do not feel the pain because,⟩ as they assert, we have become accustomed to it. Similarly, whereas the growing process ⟨we go through⟩ 10 in our youth puts us into the same ⟨exhilarated⟩ state as that of a drunken man, and ⟨makes⟩ youth the age of pleasure,381 excitable382 natures, on the other hand, always need remedial action: as a result of ⟨the excess of black bile in their⟩ constitutional blend, their bodies are exposed to constant gnawing sensations, and they are always in a state of vehement desire. Now, since pain is driven out by the pleasure opposed to it or by any strong pleasure at all,383 15 excitable people become self-indulgent and bad.
Pleasures unattended by pain do not admit of excess. The objects of these pleasures are what is pleasant by nature and not what is incidentally pleasant. By "things incidentally pleasant" I mean those that act as remedies. For since it is through some action of that part of us which has remained sound that a cure is effected, the remedy is regarded as being pleasant. But ⟨pleasant by nature it is not⟩: 20 pleasant by nature are those things which produce the action of an unimpaired natural state.
There is no single object that continues to be pleasant forever, because our nature is not simple but contains another natural element, which makes us subject to decay. Consequently, whenever one element does something, it runs counter to the nature of the other; and whenever the two elements are in a state of equilibrium, the act performed seems neither painful nor pleasant. 25 If there is a being with a simple nature, the same action will always be the most pleasant to him. That is why the divinity always enjoys one single and simple pleasure:384 for there is not only an activity of motion but also an activity of immobility, and pleasure consists in rest rather than in motion. But "change in all things is pleasant," as the poet has it,385 because of some evil in us.
For just as a man who changes easily is bad, 30 so also is a nature that needs to change. The reason is that such a nature is not simple and not ⟨entirely⟩ good.
This completes our discussion of moral strength and moral weakness, and of pleasure and pain. We have stated what each of them is and in what sense some of them are good and some bad. It now remains to talk about friendship.
The second reason is that the pleasures of the body are pursued because of their intensity by those incapable of enjoying other pleasures. Take, for example, those who induce themselves to be thirsty.379 There is no objection to this practice, if the pleasures are harmless; 5 but if they are harmful, it is bad. For many people have nothing else to give them joy, and because of their nature, it is painful for them to feel neither ⟨pleasure nor pain⟩. Actually, animal nature is under a constant strain, as the students of natural science attest380
when they say that seeing and hearing are painful, but ⟨we do not feel the pain because,⟩ as they assert, we have become accustomed to it. Similarly, whereas the growing process ⟨we go through⟩ 10 in our youth puts us into the same ⟨exhilarated⟩ state as that of a drunken man, and ⟨makes⟩ youth the age of pleasure,381 excitable382 natures, on the other hand, always need remedial action: as a result of ⟨the excess of black bile in their⟩ constitutional blend, their bodies are exposed to constant gnawing sensations, and they are always in a state of vehement desire. Now, since pain is driven out by the pleasure opposed to it or by any strong pleasure at all,383 15 excitable people become self-indulgent and bad.
Pleasures unattended by pain do not admit of excess. The objects of these pleasures are what is pleasant by nature and not what is incidentally pleasant. By "things incidentally pleasant" I mean those that act as remedies. For since it is through some action of that part of us which has remained sound that a cure is effected, the remedy is regarded as being pleasant. But ⟨pleasant by nature it is not⟩: 20 pleasant by nature are those things which produce the action of an unimpaired natural state.
There is no single object that continues to be pleasant forever, because our nature is not simple but contains another natural element, which makes us subject to decay. Consequently, whenever one element does something, it runs counter to the nature of the other; and whenever the two elements are in a state of equilibrium, the act performed seems neither painful nor pleasant. 25 If there is a being with a simple nature, the same action will always be the most pleasant to him. That is why the divinity always enjoys one single and simple pleasure:384 for there is not only an activity of motion but also an activity of immobility, and pleasure consists in rest rather than in motion. But "change in all things is pleasant," as the poet has it,385 because of some evil in us.
For just as a man who changes easily is bad, 30 so also is a nature that needs to change. The reason is that such a nature is not simple and not ⟨entirely⟩ good.
This completes our discussion of moral strength and moral weakness, and of pleasure and pain. We have stated what each of them is and in what sense some of them are good and some bad. It now remains to talk about friendship.