Susemihl (Teubner, 1884) · Solomon (1915)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 5,Chapter 1 (1246a26–1246b36)
1246a
** ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ [φίλῳ] χρήσασθαι
καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ τοῦτο ἢ <καθ'> αὑτὸ ἢ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ὀφθαλμὸς ἰδεῖν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν
διαστρέψαντα, ὥστε δύο τὸ ἓν φανῆναι. αὗται μὲν δὴ
30 ἄμφω ὅτι μὲν ὀφθαλμός· ὅτι ἦν δ' ὀφθαλμῷ **, ἄλλη δὲ
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ ἦν ἀποδόσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν. ὁμοίως
δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη· καὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν, οἷον ὅταν
ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ, ὡς ἀγνοίᾳ δὴ νῦν χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ μεταστρέψας
τὴν χεῖρα· καὶ τῷ ποδί ποτε ὡς χειρὶ καὶ
35 ταύτῃ ὡς ποδὶ χρῶνται <αἱ> ὀρχηστρίδες. εἰ δὴ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρεταὶ
ἐπιστῆμαι, εἴη ἂν καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὡς ἀδικίᾳ χρῆσθαι,
ἀδικήσει ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης τὰ ἄδικα πράττων, ὥσπερ
καὶ τὰ ἀγνοητικὰ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, φανερὸν
Here one might raise a question. One can use each thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise, and either per se or again per accidens, as, for instance, one might use the eye, as eye, for seeing, and also for falsely seeing by squinting, so that one thing appears as two. Both these uses are due to the eye being an eye, but it was 30possible to use the eye in another way— per accidens, e.g. if one could sell or eat it. Knowledge may be used similarly; it is possible to use it really or to do what is wrong, e.g. when a man voluntarily writes incorrectly, to make knowledge into ignorance for the time, as dancing-girls sometimes exchange the uses of the hand and the foot, and use the foot as a hand and the hand as a foot. If, then, all the virtues are 35kinds of knowledge, one might use justice also as injustice, and so one would be unjust and do unjust actions from justice, as ignorant things may be done from knowledge. But if this is impossible, it is clear that the virtues are not species of knowledge.
1246b
1 ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ἐπιστῆμαι αἱ ἀρεταί. οὐδ' εἰ μὴ ἔστιν
ἀγνοεῖν ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ἁμαρτάνειν μόνον, καὶ τὰ
αὐτὰ <ἃ> καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ποιεῖν, οὔ τι ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης γε
ὡς ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράξει· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη καὶ
5 ἀληθές τι, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσει κἀκείνῃ· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν
ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν ταὐτὰ ἅπερ ὁ
ἄφρων. εἰ δὲ ἁπλῆ ἦν ἑκάστου χρεία ᾗ ἕκαστον, κἂν φρονίμως
ἔπραττον οὕτω πράττοντες. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἄλλαις
ἐπιστήμαις ἄλλη κυρία ποιεῖ τὴν στροφήν· αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς
10 πασῶν κυρίας τίς; οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη γε [ἢ νοῦς]. ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδ' ἀρετή. χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος
ἀρετὴ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρῆται. τίς οὖν ἐστίν; ἢ ὥσπερ λέγεται
ἀκρασία κακία τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὡς ἀκόλαστος
ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἔχων νοῦν; ἀλλ' εἰ δή, ἂν ἰσχυρὰ ᾖ ἡ
15 ἐπιθυμία, στρέψει καὶ λογιεῖται τἀναντία ἡ ** σφι **,
δῆλον ὅτι, κἂν ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἀρετή, ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἄγνοια ᾖ,
ἕτεραι μεταποιοῦνται. ὥστε ἔσται δικαιοσύνῃ τὸ δικαίως
χρῆσθαι καὶ κακῶς καὶ φρονήσει ἀφρόνως· ὥστε καὶ τἀναντία.
ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν
20 μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ στρέψει καὶ ποιήσει
ἀγνοεῖν, ** ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ** ἀγνοίας ἐνούσης οὐ
στρέψει ταύτην, καὶ ποιήσει φρονίμως κρίνειν καὶ τὰ δέοντα,
καὶ πάλιν ἡ φρόνησις ἡ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ
ἀκολασίαν σωφρόνως πράττειν· ὅπερ δοκεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια.
25 ὥστ' ἔσται καὶ [ἡ] ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας φρονίμως. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα
ἄτοπα, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας χρῆσθαι φρονίμως,
τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶς ὁρῶμεν, ὥσπερ τὴν
ἰατρικὴν ἢ γραμματικὴν <οὐ> στρέφει ἀκολασία. ἀλλ' οὖν ὁ
τὴν ἄγνοιαν, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐναντία, διὸ τὸ μὴ ἐνεῖναι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν
30 ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, ὅλως μᾶλλον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν κακίαν
οὕτως ἔχουσαν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄδικος πάντα <ἃ> ὁ δίκαιος δύναται,
καὶ ὅλως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἡ ἀδυναμία. ὥστε δῆλον
ὅτι ἅμα φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθαὶ ἐκεῖναι αἱ ἄλλου ἕξεις, καὶ
ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως.
35 ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθόν· ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ
ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ γένος ἄλλογνώςεως γνώς<εως> **.
1And even if ignorance cannot proceed from knowledge, but only error and the doing of the same things as proceed from ignorance, it must be remembered that from justice one will not act as from injustice. But since Prudence is knowledge and something true, it may behave like knowledge; one might act imprudently though possessed of prudence, 5and commit the errors of the imprudent. But if the use of each thing as such were single, then in so acting men would still be acting prudently. Over other kinds of knowledge, then, there is something superior that diverts them; but how can there be any knowledge that diverts the highest knowledge to of all? There is no longer any knowledge or intuitive reason to do this. But neither can virtue do it, for prudence 10uses that; for the virtue of the ruling part uses that of the subject. Who is there then whose prudence is thus diverted? Perhaps the position is like that of incontinence, which is said to be a vice of the irrational part of the soul. The incontinent man is in a sense intemperate; he has reason, but supposing appetite to be strong it will twist him and he will draw the opposite conclusion. Or is it an obvious consequence 15that, similarly, if there is virtue in the irrational part, but folly in the rational, they are transformed in yet another way. Thus it will be possible to use justice unjustly and badly, and prudence foolishly—and therefore the opposite uses will also be possible. For it is absurd that vice occurring sometimes in the irrational part should twist the virtue in the rational part and make the man ignorant, but that virtue 20in the irrational part, when folly is present in the rational, should not divert the latter and make the man judge prudently and as is right, and again, prudence in the rational part should not make the intemperance in the irrational part act temperately. This seems the very essence of continence. And therefore we shall also get prudent action arising out of ignorance. But all these consequences are absurd, especially 25that of acting prudently out of ignorance, for we certainly do not see this in any other case, e.g. intemperance perverts one's medical or grammatical knowledge. But at any rate we may say that not ignorance, if opposite, (for it has no superiority), but virtue, is rather related in this way to vice in general. For whatever the unjust can do, the just can do; and in general powerlessness is covered by power. And so it 30is clear that prudence and virtue go together, and that those complex states are states of one in whom prudence and virtue are not combined, and the Socratic saying that nothing is stronger than prudence is right. But when Socrates said this of knowledge he was wrong. For prudence is virtue and not scientific knowledge, but another kind of cognition.
Book 5,Chapter 2 (1246b37–1248b7)
ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἡ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν καὶ
ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ φαμὲν καὶ τοὺς εὐτυχεῖς εὖ πράττειν ὡς καὶ
But since not only prudence and virtue produce well-doing, but we say 35also that the fortunate 'do well', thus assuming that good fortune produces well-doing and the same results as knowledge, we must inquire whether it is or is not by nature that one man is fortunate, another not, and what is the truth about these things.
1247a
1 τῆς εὐτυχίας [εὖ] ποιούσης εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης,
σκεπτέον ἆρ' ἐστι φύσει ὃ μὲν εὐτυχὴς ὃ δ' ἀτυχής,
ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τούτων. ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσί
τινες εὐτυχεῖς ὁρῶμεν. ἄφρονες γὰρ ὄντες κατορθοῦσι πολλά,
5 ἐν οἷς ἡ τύχη κυρία· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν οἷς τέχνη ἐστί, πολὺ
μέντοι καὶ τύχης ἐνυπάρχει, οἷον ἐν στρατηγίᾳ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ.
πότερον οὖν ἀπό τινος ἕξεως οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἢ οὐ τῷ
αὐτοὶ ποιοί τινες εἶναι πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν εὐτυχημάτων;
νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται ὡς φύσει τινῶν ὄντων· ἡ δὲ
10 φύσις ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρουσιν,
ὥσπερ οἳ μὲν γλαυκοὶ οἳ δὲ μελανόμματοι τῷ τὸ δεῖν
τοιονδὶ <κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τοιονδὶ> ἔχειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ εὐτυχεῖς καὶ
ἀτυχεῖς. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει κατορθοῦσι, δῆλον. οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος
[ἡ] φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί οὕτως πράττει, οἳ δ'
15 οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ τί κατορθοῦσι (τέχνη γὰρ ἂν ἦν)· ἔτι
δὲ φανερὸν <ὅτι> ὄντες ἄφρονες, οὐχ ὅτι περὶ ἄλλα (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ
οὐθὲν ἄτοπον· οἷον Ἱπποκράτης γεωμετρικὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ περὶ
τὰ ἄλλα ἐδόκει βλὰξ καὶ ἄφρων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ χρυσίον
πλέων ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ πεντηκοστολόγων
20 δι' εὐήθειαν, ὡς λέγουσιν) ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἐν οἷς εὐτυχοῦσιν
ἄφρονες. περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν οὐχ οἱ δεινότατοι
εὐτυχεῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν κύβων πτώσει ὃ μὲν οὐδέν, ἄλλος
δὲ βάλλει <πολὺ> καθ' ἣν φύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχής, ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι,
ὥσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ἔξωθέν τι εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν.
25 οἷον πλοῖον κακῶς νεναυπηγημένον ἄμεινον πολλάκις [δὲ]
πλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὑτό, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν,
[ἀλλ'] οὗτος εὐτυχὴς τὸν δαίμον' ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν.
ἀλλ' ἄτοπον θεὸν ἢ δαίμονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ
τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον. εἰ δὴ ἀνάγκη ἢ
30 φύσει ἢ νόῳ ἢ ἐπιτροπίᾳ τινὶ κατορθοῦν, τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ
ἐστί, φύσει ἂν εἶεν οἱ εὐτυχεῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε φύσις
αἰτία ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη
τοὐναντίον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνειν τύχης
δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχής, οὐκ ἂν τοιοῦτον
35 εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, οἷον ἀεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἔτι
εἰ, ὅτι τοιοσδί, ἐπιτυγχάνει ἢ ἀποτυγχάνει, ὥσπερ, ὅτι [ὁ] γλαυκός,
οὐκ ὀξὺ ὁρᾷ, οὐ τύχη αἰτία ἀλλὰ φύσις· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν εὐτυχὴς
ἀλλ' οἷον εὐφυής. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη λεκτέον, ὅτι οὓς λέγομεν
εὐτυχεῖς, οὐ διὰ τύχην εἰσίν. οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶν εὐτυχεῖς·
1For that there are fortunate men we see, who though silly are often successful in matters controlled by fortune, some also in matters involving art but into which chance largely enters, e.g. strategy and navigation. Does their success, then, arise from some acquired mental condition, or do they 5effect fortunate results not because of their own acquired qualities at all (at present men take the latter view, regarding them as having some special natural endowment); does nature, rather, make men with different qualities so that they differ from birth; as some are blue-eyed and some black-eyed because they have some particular part of a particular nature, so are 10some lucky and others unlucky? For that they do not succeed through prudence is clear, for prudence is not irrational but can give a reason why it acts as it does; but they could not say why they succeed; that would be art. Further, it is clear that they succeed though imprudent, and not merely imprudent about other things—that would not be strange at all, e.g. 15Hippocrates was a geometer, but in other respects was thought foolish and imprudent, and once on a voyage was robbed of much money by the customs-collectors at Byzantium, owing to his silliness, as we are told—but imprudent in the very business in which they are lucky. For in navigation not the cleverest are the most fortunate, but it is as in throwing dice, where one throws 20nothing, another throws something; so a man is lucky according as nature determines. Or is it because he is loved, as the phrase is, by a god, success being something coming from without, as a worse-built vessel often sails better, not owing to itself but because it has a good pilot? But, if so, the fortunate man has a good pilot, namely, the divinity. But it is absurd 25that a god or divinity should love such a man and not the best and most prudent. If, then, success must be due either to nature or intelligence or some sort of protection, and the latter two causes are out of the question, then the fortunate must be so by nature. But, on the other hand, Nature is the cause of the absolutely uniform or of the usual, Fortune the 30opposite. If, then, it is thought that unexpected success is due to chance, but that, if it is through chance that one is fortunate, the cause of his fortune is not the sort of cause that produces always or usually the same result—further, if a person succeeds or fails because he is a certain sort of man, just as a man sees badly because he is blue-eyed, then it follows that 35not fortune but nature is the cause; the man then is not fortunate but rather naturally gifted. So we must say that the people we call fortunate are not so through fortune; therefore they are not fortunate, for those goods only are in the disposal of fortune of which good fortune is the cause.
1247b
1 τύχης γάρ, ὅσων αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθῶν.
εἰ δ' οὕτως, πότερον οὐκ ἔσται τύχη ὅλως, ἢ ἔσται μέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ
αἰτία; ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι. ἔσται ἄρα καὶ
ἀγαθῶν τισιν αἰτία ἢ κακῶν. εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐξαιρετέον καὶ οὐδὲν
5 ἀπὸ τύχης φατέον γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἄλλης οὔσης αἰτίας
διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τύχην εἶναί φαμεν αἰτίαν (διὸ καὶ ὁριζόμενοι
τὴν τύχην τιθέασιν αἰτίαν ἄλογον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ,
ὡς οὔσης τινὸς φύσεως)· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πρόβλημ'
ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁρῶμέν τινας ἅπαξ εὐτυχήσαντας, διὰ
10 τί οὐ καὶ πάλιν ἄν; ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι ἕν, καὶ πάλιν.
τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αἴτιον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τύχης τοῦτο, ἀλλ'
ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποβαίνῃ, ἀπείρων καὶ ἀορίστων, ἔσται μὲν
τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἐπιστήμη δ' οὐκ ἔσται αὐτοῦ [ἢ] δι' ἀπειρίαν,
ἐπεὶ ἐμάνθανον ἄν τινες εὐτυχεῖν, ἢ καὶ πᾶσαι ἂν
15 αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Σωκράτης, εὐτυχίαι ἦσαν. τί οὖν
κωλύει συμβῆναί τινι ἐφεξῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλάκις, οὐχ
ὅτι οὕτως δεῖ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἂν εἴη τὸ κύβους ἀεὶ μακαρίαν βάλλειν;
τί δὲ δή; ἆρ' οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὁρμαὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ μὲν
ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου, καὶ πρότεραι
20 αὗται; εἰ γάρ ἐστι φύσει ἡ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος [καὶ ἡ] ὄρεξις,
φύσει γε ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βαδίζοι ἂν πᾶν. εἰ δή τινές
εἰσιν εὐφυεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἄδικοι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ᾄδειν, οὕτως
εὖ πεφύκασι καὶ ἄνευ λόγου ὁρμῶσιν, ** ἡ φύσις πέφυκε, καὶ
ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ τούτου καὶ τότε καὶ οὕτως ὡς δεῖ καὶ οὗ δεῖ
25 καὶ ὅτε, οὗτοι κατορθώσουσι, κἂν τύχωσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες καὶ ἄλογοι,
ὥσπερ καὶ εὖ ἔσονται οὐ διδασκαλικοὶ ὄντες. οἱ δέ γε
τοιοῦτοι εὐτυχεῖς, ὅσοι ἄνευ λόγου κατορθοῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ. φύσει ἄρα οἱ εὐτυχεῖς εἶεν ἄν. —ἢ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται
ἡ εὐτυχία; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται ἀπὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς
30 καὶ προελομένων πρᾶξαι, τὰ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον. καὶ ἐν
ἐκείνοις, <ἐν οἷς> κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι, κατορθοῦντας καὶ
εὐτυχῆσαι φαμέν· καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις, εἰ ἐβουλεύοντο ** ἂν ἢ
ἔλαττον ἔλαβον τἀγαθόν. ἐκείνους μὲν τοίνυν εὐτυχεῖν διὰ
φύσιν ἐνδέχεται (ἡ γὰρ ὁρμὴ καὶ ὄρεξις οὖσα οὗ ἔδει
35 κατώρθωσεν, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς ἦν ἠλίθιος· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐνταῦθα,
ὅταν μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὀρθὸς εἶναι, τύχη δ'
αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὖσα, αὐτὴ [δ'] ὀρθὴ οὖσα ἔσωσεν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε δι'
ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσατο πάλιν οὕτω καὶ ἠτύχησεν)· ἐν δὲ δὴ
τοῖς ἑτέροις πῶς ἔσται ἡ εὐτυχία κατ' εὐφυΐαν ὀρέξεως καὶ
1But if this is so, shall we say that fortune does not exist at all, or that it exists but is not a cause? No, it must both exist and be a cause. It will, then, also cause good or evil to certain people. But whether it is to be wholly removed, and we ought to say that nothing happens by chance, but do say that chance is 5a cause simply because, though there is some other cause, we do not see it (and therefore, in defining chance, some make it a cause incalculable to human reasoning, taking it to be a genuine reality)—this would be matter for another inquiry. But since we see people who are fortunate once only, why should they not be fortunate to a second time for the same reason, and a third time? For the same 10antecedent is cause of the same consequent. Then this cannot be a matter of chance. But when the same. event follows from indefinite and undetermined antecedents, it will be for a particular man good or evil, but there will not be the science that comes by experience of it, since otherwise some lucky people would have learned it, or even—as Socrates said—all the sciences would have been kinds of good 15luck. What, then, prevents such things happening to a man often in succession, not because he has a certain character, but as, say, dice might continually throw a lucky number? But again, are there not in the soul impulses, some from reason and others from irrational desire, the latter being the earlier? For if the impulse arising from appetite for the pleasant is natural, the desire also would by nature 20march in each case towards the good. If, then, some have a fortunate natural endowment—as musical people, though they have not learned to sing, are fortunately endowed in this way—and move without reason in the direction given them by their nature, and desire that which they ought at the time and in the manner they ought, such men are successful, even if they are foolish and irrational, just as 25the others will sing well though not able to teach singing. And such men are fortunate, namely those who generally succeed without the aid of reason. Men, then, who are fortunate will be so by nature. Perhaps, however, good fortune' is a phrase with several senses. For some things are done from impulse and are due to deliberate choice, and others not, but the opposite; and if, in the former cases, 30they succeed where they seem to have reasoned badly, we say that they have been lucky; and again, in the latter cases, if they wished for a different good or less of the good than they got. Men who are lucky in the former way, then, may be fortunate by nature, for the impulse and the desire was for the right object and succeeded, but the reasoning was silly; and people in this case, when it happens 35that their reasoning seems incorrect but desire is the cause of their reasoning, are saved by the rightness of their desire; but on another occasion a man reasons again in this way owing to appetite and turns out unfortunate. But in the other cases how can the good luck be due to a natural goodness in desire and appetite?
1248a
1 ἐπιθυμίας; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία καὶ τύχη διττή,
κἀκεῖ ἡ αὐτή, ἢ πλείους αἱ εὐτυχίαι. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρῶμεν
παρὰ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοὺς
εὐτυχοῦντας τινάς, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἴτιον τῆς
5 εὐτυχίας. ἐκείνη δὲ πότερον [ἡ] εὐτυχία ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἣ ἐπεθύμησεν
ὧν ἔδει καὶ ὅτεἔδειτο ἔδει**το λογισμὸς ἀνθρώπινος οὐκ
ἂν τούτου εἴη. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον τοῦτο, οὐδὲ φυσική
ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἀλλὰ διαφθείρεται ὑπὸ τινός. εὐτυχεῖν
μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ, ὅτι ἡ τύχη τῶν παρὰ λόγον αἰτία,
10 τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ λόγον (παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ καθόλου)·
ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ διὰ
τοῦτο. ὥσθ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὐ δείκνυσιν ὅτι φύσει εὐτυχεῖν,
ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐτυχεῖν διὰ τύχην
κατορθοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν· οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τύχη αἰτία
15 οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν πάντων ὧν δοκεῖ. τοῦτο μέντ'
ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις, ἆρ' αὐτοῦ τούτου τύχη αἰτία, τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι
οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ. ἢ οὕτως γε πάντων ἔσται; καὶ γὰρ
τοῦ νοῆσαι καὶ βουλεύσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐβουλεύσατο βουλευσάμενος,
καὶ τοῦτ' ἐβουλεύσατο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀρχή τις,
20 οὐδ' ἐνόησε νοήσας πρότερον <ἢ> νοῆσαι, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον. οὐκ
ἄρα τοῦ νοῆσαι ὁ νοῦς ἀρχή, οὐδὲ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι βουλή.
τί οὖν ἄλλο πλὴν τύχη; ὥστ' ἀπὸ τύχης ἅπαντα ἔσται. ἢ
ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη ἔξω, αὕτη δὲ [διὰ τί]
τοιαύτη τῷ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν; τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον
25 τοῦτ' ἐστί, τίς ἡ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. δῆλον
δὴ ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ θεός, [καὶ] κἀν ἐκείνῳ. κινεῖ γάρ
πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον· λόγου δ' ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος,
ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον· τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἴη καὶ
νοῦ πλὴν θεός; ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο,
30 ὃ οἱ πάλαι ἔλεγον, εὐτυχεῖς καλοῦνται οἳ ἂν ὁρμήσωσι, κατορθοῦσιν
ἄλογοι ὄντες, καὶ βουλεύεσθαι οὐ συμφέρει αὐτοῖς.
ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλεύσεως
(οἳ δὲ τὸν λόγον· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔχουσι) καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν, τοῦτο
δ' οὐ δύνανται. ἄλογοι γὰρ ὄντες ἐπιτυγχάνουσι· καὶ τούτων
35 φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, καὶ
μόνον οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οἳ μὲν δι'
ἐμπειρίαν, οἳ δὲ διὰ συνήθειάν τε ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι·
τῷ θεῷ δὲ αὗται. τοῦτο καὶ εὖ ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ
τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὧν ἀπολύεται ὁ λόγος οὗτος. διὸ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ
40 καὶ εὐθυόνειροι. ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπολυομένου τοῦ
1But surely the good fortune and chance spoken of here and in the other case are the same, or else there is more than one sort of good fortune, and chance has two meanings. But since we see some men lucky contrary to all knowledge and right reasonings, it is clear that the cause of luck must be something different from 5these. But is it luck or not by which a man desires what and when he ought, though for him human reasoning could not lead to this? For that is not altogether unreasonable, whereof the desire is natural, though reason is misled by something. The man, then, is thought to have good luck, because luck is the cause of things contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason (for it is contrary to 10science and the universal). But probably it does not spring from chance, but seems so for the above reason. So that this argument shows not that good luck is due to nature, but that not all who seem to be lucky are successful owing to fortune, but rather owing to nature; nor does it show that there is no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the cause of anything, but only not of all that 15it seems to be the cause of. This, however, one might question: whether fortune is the cause of just this, viz. desiring what and when one ought. But will it not in this case be the cause of everything, even of thought and deliberation? For one does not deliberate after previous deliberation which itself presupposed deliberation, but there is some starting-point; nor does one think after thinking 20previously to thinking, and so ad infinitum. Thought, then, is not the starting-point of thinking nor deliberation of deliberation. What, then, can be the starting-point except chance? Thus everything would come from chance. Perhaps there is a starting-point with none other outside it, and this can act in this sort of way by being such as it is. The object of our search is this—what is the 25commencement of movement in the soul? The answer is clear: as in the universe, so in the soul, God moves everything. For in a sense the divine element in us moves everything. The starting-point of reasoning is not reasoning, but something greater. What, then, could be greater even than knowledge and intellect but God? Not virtue, for virtue is an instrument of the intellect. And for this reason, as I 30said a while ago, those are called fortunate who, whatever they start on, succeed in it without being good at reasoning. And deliberation is of no advantage to them, for they have in them a principle that is better than intellect and deliberation, while the others have not this but have intellect; they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For, though lacking reason, they attain the 35attribute of the prudent and wise—that their divination is speedy; and we must mark off as included in it all but the judgement that comes from reasoning; in some cases it is due to experience, in others to habituation in the use of reflection: and both experience and habituation use God. This quality sees well the future and the present, and these are the men in whom the reasoning-power is relaxed.
1248b
1 λόγου ἰσχύειν μᾶλλον· καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ μνημονεύουσι
μᾶλλον ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς, τῷ ἐρρωμενέστερον
εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον. φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι δύο εἴδη εὐτυχίας, ἣ
μὲν θεία (διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχὴς διὰ θεὸν κατορθοῦν) <ἣ δὲ φύσει>.
5 οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν διορθωτικός, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ὁ
παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν· ἄλογοι δ' ἀμφότεροι. καὶ ἣ μὲν συνεχὴς
εὐτυχία μᾶλλον, αὕτη δὲ οὐ συνεχής.
1Hence we have the melancholic men, the dreamers of what is true. For the moving principle seems to become stronger when the reasoning-power is relaxed. So the blind remember better, their memory being freed from concern with the visible. It is clear, then, that there are two kinds 5of good luck, the one divine—and so the lucky seem to succeed owing to God; men of this sort seem to succeed in following their aim, the others to succeed contrary to their aim; both are irrational, but the one is persistent good luck, the other not.
Book 5,Chapter 3 (1248b8–1249b25)
κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον·
ἐπεὶ δὲ χωρὶς διείλομεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ
10 τῆς ἀρετῆς διαρθρωτέον τῆς ἐκ τούτων, ἣν ἐκαλοῦμεν ἤδη καλοκἀγαθίαν.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη τὸν ταύτης ἀληθῶς τευξόμενον
τῆς προσηγορίας ἔχειν τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀρετάς, φανερόν.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθενὸς οἷόν τ' ἄλλως ἔχειν.
οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὅλον μὲν τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει, μέρος δ' οὐθέν, ἀλλ'
15 ἀναγκαῖον πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα τὸν αὐτὸν
ἔχειν τρόπον τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλὸν
κἀγαθὸν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ
ἔχοντα διαφοράν. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστίν, ἃ
αὐτὰ αὑτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἱρετά. τούτων δὲ καλά, ὅσα δι'
20 αὑτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἀφ' ὧν
αἵ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη
καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις, καὶ οἱ σώφρονες· ἐπαινετὴ
γὰρ καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγίεια ἐπαινετόν· οὐδὲ
γὰρ τὸ ἔργον· οὐδὲ τὸ ἰσχυρῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰσχύς. ἀλλ'
25 ἀγαθὰ μέν, ἐπαινετὰ δ' οὔ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο δῆλον καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. ἀγαθὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ᾧ τὰ
φύσει ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀγαθά. τὰ γὰρ περιμάχητα καὶ μέγιστα
εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἀγαθά, τιμὴ καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ σώματος
ἀρεταὶ καὶ εὐτυχίαι καὶ δυνάμεις, ἀγαθὰ μὲν φύσει
30 ἐστίν, ἐνδέχεται δ' εἶναι βλαβερά τισι διὰ τὰς ἕξεις. οὔτε
γὰρ ἄφρων οὔτ' ἄδικος ἢ ἀκόλαστος ὢν οὐδὲν ἂν ὀνήσειε χρώμενος
αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ κάμνων τῇ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος τροφῇ
χρώμενος οὐδ' ὁ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνάπηρος τοῖς τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ
τοῖς τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις. καλὸς δὲ κἀγαθὸς τῷ τῶν
35 ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δι' αὑτὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικὸς
εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αὑτῶν ἕνεκα. καλὰ δ' ἐστὶν
αἵ τε ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς. —ἔστι δέ τις
ἕξις πολιτική, οἵαν οἱ Λάκωνες ἔχουσιν ἢ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι
ἔχοιεν ἄν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἕξις τοιαύτη. εἰσὶ γὰρ οἳ οἴονται
40 τὴν ἀρετὴν δεῖν μὲν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκεν.
About each virtue by itself we have already spoken; now since we have distinguished their natures 10separately, To we must describe clearly the excellence that arises out of the combination of them, what we have already called nobility and goodness. That he who truly deserves this denomination must have the separate virtues is clear; it cannot be otherwise with other things either, for no one is healthy in his entire body and yet healthy in no part of 15it, but the most numerous and important parts, if not all, must be in the same condition as the whole. Now goodness and nobility-and-goodness differ not only in name but also in themselves. For all goods have ends which are to be chosen for their own sake. Of these, we call noble those which, existing all of them for their own sake, are praised. For 20these are those which are the source of praised acts and are themselves praised, such as justice itself and just acts; also temperate acts, for temperance is praised, but health is not praised, for its effect is not; nor vigorous action, for vigour is not. These are good but not praised. Induction makes this clear about the rest, too. A good man, then, 25is one for whom the natural goods are good. For the goods men fight for and think the greatest—honour, wealth, bodily excellences, good fortune, and power—are naturally good, but may be to some hurtful because of their dispositions. For neither the imprudent nor the unjust nor the intemperate would get any good from the employment of them, any more than 30an invalid from the food of a healthy man, or one weak and maimed from the equipment of one in health and sound in all limbs. A man is noble and good because those goods which are noble are possessed by him for themselves, and because he practises the noble and for its own sake, the noble being the virtues and the acts that proceed from virtue. There 35is also what we may call the 'civic' disposition, such as the Laconians have, and others like them might have; its nature would be something like this—there are some who think one should have virtue, but only for the sake of the natural goods, and so such men are good (for the natural goods are good for them), but they have not nobility and goodness.
1249a
1 διὸ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσί (τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ
αὐτοῖς ἐστίν), καλοκἀγαθίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει
αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ δι' αὑτά, καὶ προαιροῦνται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ,
καὶ οὐ μόνον ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ καλὰ μὲν
5 φύσει ὄντα, ἀγαθὰ δὲ φύσει ὄντα τούτοις καλά. καλὰ
γάρ ἐστιν ὅταν, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι καὶ αἱροῦνται, καλὰ ᾖ,
διότι τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ καλά ἐστι τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά. καλὸν
γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· ἄξιος δ' οὗτος
τούτων. καὶ τὸ πρέπον καλόν· πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ, πλοῦτος
10 εὐγένεια δύναμις. ὥστε τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ
συμφέροντα καὶ καλά ἐστι· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς διαφωνεῖ
τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ κἀκείνοις ἀγαθὰ ἐστί, τῷ
δ' ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθά. τῷ δὲ <καλῷ> κἀγαθῷ καὶ καλά. πολλὰς
γὰρ καὶ καλὰς πράξεις δι' αὑτὰς ἔπραξεν. ὁ δ' οἰόμενος τὰς
15 ἀρετὰς ἔχειν δεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς
τὰ καλὰ πράττει. ἔστιν οὖν καλοκἀγαθία ἀρετὴ τέλειος.
καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι
τά τε ἁπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ καὶ τὰ [τε] ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα.
οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει· διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων
20 καὶ ἥδιστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιοῦσιν.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστί τις ὅρος καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει
τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον
ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ ὑγιαῖνον, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον,
οὐκέτι· οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἱρέσεις
25 τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι
1For it is not true of them that they acquire the noble for itself, that they purpose acts good and noble at once—more than this, that what is not noble by nature but good by nature is noble to them; for objects are noble when a man's motives for acting and choosing them are noble. Wherefore to the noble and good man the naturally good 5is noble—for what is just is noble, justice is proportion to merit, and the perfect man merits these things; or what is fitting is noble, and to the perfect man these things, wealth, high birth, and power, are fitting. So that to the perfect man things profitable are also noble; but to the many the profitable and the noble do not coincide, for things absolutely good are not good for them as they are for the good man; 10to the 'noble and good' man they are also noble, for he does many noble deeds by reason of them. But the man who thinks he ought to have the virtues for the sake of external goods does deeds that are noble only per accidens. 'Nobility and goodness', then, is complete virtue. About pleasure, too, we have spoken, what it is and in what sense good; we have said that the absolutely pleasant is also noble, and the absolutely 15good pleasant. But pleasure only arises in action; therefore the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly: that this should be so is no idle demand of man. But since the doctor has a standard by reference to which he distinguishes the healthy from the unhealthy body, and with reference to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, while if less or more is done health is the 20result no longer, so in regard to actions and choice of what is naturally good but not praiseworthy, the good man should have a standard both of disposition and of choice, and similarly in regard to avoidance of excess or deficiency of wealth and good fortune, the standard being—as above said—'as reason directs'; this corresponds to saying in regard to diet that the standard should be medical science and its principles.
1249b
1 ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ [περὶ] φυγῆς
<καὶ περὶ> χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων.
ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος·
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν
5 εἴπειεν ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης. τοῦτο δ'
ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ. δεῖ δὴ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζῆν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν
τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος, οἷον δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότου καὶ ἕκαστον
πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος
10 φύσει συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καὶ
ἕκαστον ἂν δέοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν ζῆν (αὕτη δὲ διττή·
ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια· ταύτης
δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνη)· οὕτω δ' ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν. οὐ
γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φρόνησις
15 ἐπιτάττει (διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· διώρισται δ' ἐν ἄλλοις),
ἐπεὶ κεῖνός γε οὐθενὸς δεῖται. ἥτις οὖν αἵρεσις καὶ κτῆσις
τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἢ
σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη
ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος· ἥτις δ' ἢ δι' ἔνδειαν
20 ἢ δι' ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν,
αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος τῆς
ψυχῆς ὅρος ἄριστος, τὸ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου
μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾗ τοιοῦτον.
τις μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς
25 τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον· **.
1But this, though true, is not clear. One must, then, here as elsewhere, live with reference to the ruling principle and with reference to the formed habit and the activity of the ruling principle, as the slave must live with 5reference to that of the master, and each of us by the rule proper to him. But since man is by nature composed of a ruling and a subject part, each of us should live according to the governing element within himself—but this is ambiguous, for medical science governs in one sense, health 10in another, the former existing for the latter. And so it is with the theoretic faculty; for God is not an imperative ruler, but is the end with a view to which prudence issues its commands (the word 'end' is ambiguous, and has been distinguished elsewhere), for God at least needs 15nothing. What choice, then, or possession of the natural goods—whether bodily goods, wealth, friends, or other things—will most produce the contemplation of God, that choice or possession is best; this is the noblest standard, but any that through deficiency or excess hinders one 20from the contemplation and service of God is bad; this man possesses in his soul, and this is the best standard for the soul-to perceive the irrational part of the soul, as such, as little as possible. So much, then, for the standard of perfection and the object of the absolute goods.