Susemihl (Teubner, 1884) · Solomon (1915)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 4,Chapter 1 (1234b18–1235b12)
1234b
περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστι καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ τίς ὁ φίλος,
καὶ πότερον ἡ φιλία μοναχῶς λέγεται ἢ πλεοναχῶς, καὶ
20 εἰ πλεοναχῶς, πόσα ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πῶς χρηστέον τῷ φίλῳ
καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν, ἐπισκεπτέον οὐθενὸς ἧττον τῶν
περὶ τὰ ἤθη καλῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν. τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργον
εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ
τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι φίλους ἑαυτοῖς
25 εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἔτι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
ἄδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν, καὶ ὁ
αὐτὸς δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία
ἠθική τις εἶναι ἕξις, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ποιῆσαι ὥστε μὴ
ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς φίλους ποιῆσαι· οἱ γὰρ ἀληθινοὶ φίλοι οὐκ
30 ἀδικοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐὰν δίκαιοι ὦσιν, οὐκ ἀδικήσουσιν· ἢ
ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἢ ἐγγύς τι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φιλία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν τὸν φίλον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνομεν, τὴν
δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν δεινότατον, ὅτι ὁ βίος ἅπας καὶ
ἡ ἑκούσιος ὁμιλία μετὰ τούτων· μετ' οἰκείων γὰρ ἢ μετὰ συγγενῶν
Friendship, what it is and of what nature, who is a friend, and whether friendship has one or many senses (and if many, how many), and, further, how we 20should treat a friend, and what is justice in friendship—all this must be examined not less than any of the things that are noble and desirable in character. For it is thought to be the special business of the political art to produce friendship, and men say that virtue is useful for this, for those who are unjustly treated by one another cannot be friends to one another. 25Further, all say that justice and injustice are specially exhibited towards friends; the same man seems both good and a friend, and friendship seems a sort of moral habit; and if one wishes to act without injustice, it is enough to make friends, for genuine friends do not act unjustly. But neither will men act unjustly if they are just; therefore justice and friendship are 30either the same or not far different. Further, men believe a friend to be among the greatest of goods, and friendlessness and solitude to be most terrible, because all life and voluntary association is with friends; for we spend our days with our family, kinsmen, or comrades, children, parents, or wife.
1235a
1 ἢ μεθ' ἑταίρων συνδιημερεύομεν, ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ
γυναικός. καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν
μόνον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους νενομοθέτηται, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.
ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οἱ ἔξωθεν
5 παραλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγοντες· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς
μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὅθεν εἴρηται
"ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον·"
"καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν·"
"ἔγνω δὲ φώρ τε φῶρα, καὶ λύκος λύκον."
10 οἱ δὲ φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσμοῦσιν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες
τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, διὸ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κύν'
ἔφη καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κεραμῖδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλεῖστον ὅμοιον.
οἳ μὲν οὖν οὕτω τὸ φίλον λέγουσιν· οἳ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ
φασὶν εἶναι φίλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν πᾶσιν
15 εἶναι φίλον, ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ, ἀλλ' ὑγροῦ,
ὅθεν εἴρηται "ἐρᾷ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖα" καὶ τὸ "μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ."
ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ εἰς τοὐναντίον. τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἐχθρὸν τῷ ὁμοίῳ· καὶ γὰρ
"κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει",
καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενα πολέμια ἀλλήλοις ζῷα.
20 αὗται μὲν οὖν αἱ ὑπολήψεις τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν. αἳ μὲν γὰρ
τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον πολέμιον,
"τῷ πλέονι δ' αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται
τοὔλασσον, ἐχθρᾶς θ' ἡμέρας κατάρχεται",
ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ δὲ φιλία
25 δοκεῖ συνάγειν· οἳ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος
ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι
"ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,"
οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ
ζῷα ἄνευ θήλεως καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων. —δύο μὲν αὗται δόξαι
30 περὶ φιλίας εἰσί, λίαν τε καθόλου <καὶ> κεχωρισμέναι τοσοῦτον·
ἄλλαι δὲ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω καὶ οἰκεῖαι τῶν φαινομένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ τοὺς φαύλους εἶναι φίλους, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς
ἀγαθούς· τοῖς δ' ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ φιλοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες τὰ τέκνα
(φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἐνοῦσα φιλία· προαποθνήσκειν
35 γοῦν αἱροῦνται τῶν τέκνων)· τοῖς δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι
μόνον. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα
καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἀποβάλλουσιν· ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων
ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας παραβάλλων,
καὶ τὰ μόρια ὅτι ῥιπτοῦμεν τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος
1The private justice practised to friends depends on ourselves alone, while justice towards all others is determined by the laws, and does not depend on us. Many questions are raised about friendship. There is the view of those who include the external 5world and give the term an extended meaning; for some think that like is friend to like, whence the saying 'how God ever draws like to like'; or the saying 'crow to crow'; or 'thief knows thief, and wolf wolf'. The physicists even systematize the whole of nature on the principle that like goes to like—whence Empedocles 10said that the dog sat on the tile because it was most like it. Some, then, describe a friend thus, but others say that opposites are friends; for they say the loved and desired is in every case a friend, but the dry does not desire the dry but the moist—whence the sayings, 'Earth loves the rain', and 'in all things 15change is pleasant'; but change is change to an opposite. And like hates like, for 'potter is jealous of potter', and animals nourished from the same source are enemies. Such, then, is the discrepancy between these views; for some think the like a friend, and the opposite an enemy—'the less is ever the enemy of the 20more, and begins a day of hate'; and, further, the places of contraries are separated, but friendship seems to bring together. But others think opposites are friends, and Heraclitus blames the poet who wrote 'may strife perish from among gods and men'; for (says he) there could not be harmony without the low and the 25high note, nor living things without male and female, two opposites. There are, then, these two views about friendship; and when so far separated from one another both are too broad. There are other views that come nearer to and are more suitable to observed facts. Some think that bad men cannot be friends but only the 30good; while others think it strange that mothers should not love their own children. (Even among the brutes we find such friendship; at least they choose to die for their children.) Some, again, think that we only regard the useful as a friend, their proof being that all pursue the useful, but the useless, even in 35themselves, they throw away (as old Socrates said, citing the case of our spittle, hairs, and nails), and that we cast off useless parts, and in the end at death our very body, the corpse being useless; but those who have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt.
1235b
1 τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ· ἄχρηστος γὰρ ὁ νεκρός. οἷς δὲ
χρήσιμον, φυλάττουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. —ταῦτα δὴ πάντα
δοκεῖ μὲν ὑπεναντία ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. τό τε γὰρ <ὅμοιον>
ἄχρηστον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ ἐναντιότης ὁμοιότητος ἀπέχει πλεῖστον,
5 καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀχρηστότατον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· φθαρτικὸν γὰρ τοῦ
ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον. —ἔτι δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ κτήσασθαι
φίλον· τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γνῶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄνευ
ἀτυχίας (τοῖς γὰρ εὖ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες δοκεῖν
φίλοι εἶναι)· οἳ δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς συνδιαμένουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις
10 ἀξιοῦσι πιστεύειν, ὡς ἐξαπατῶντας καὶ προσποιουμένους, ἵνα
κτήσωνται διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτυχούντων ὁμιλίας πάλιν εὐτυχούντων
φιλίαν.
1Now all these things [i.e. likeness, contrariety, utility] seem opposed to one another; for the like is useless to the like, and contrariety is furthest removed from likeness, and the contrary is most useless to its contrary, for contraries destroy one another. Further, some think it 5easy to acquire a friend, others a very rare thing to recognize one, and impossible without misfortune; for all wish to seem friends to the prosperous. But others would have us distrust even those who remain with us in misfortune, alleging that they are deceiving us and making pretence, that by giving their company to us when we are in misfortune they may 10obtain our friendship when we are again prosperous.
Book 4,Chapter 2 (1235b13–1238b14)
ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τά τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων
μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις.
15 τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα·
μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις.
συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι <μὲν> ὡς
ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. —ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον
τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ φιλούμενον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦμεν
20 οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον (οὐθεὶς γὰρ
"ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ"),
ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτῃ μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδὺ, εἰ δὲ
ὃ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
περὶ δὴ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν τούτοις πειρατέον
25 διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε. τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητὸν
ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὀρεκτόν·
φαινόμενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται
κἂν μὴ δοκῇ. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταὐτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ
ἡ δόξα. ὅτι μέντοι φίλον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, δῆλον.
30 τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. τῶν
γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἁπλῶς
δὲ οὔ. καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδέα. τὰ
μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντί φαμεν σώματι συμφέροντα
ἁπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὔ, οἷον
35 φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἁπλῶς
σώματι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι καὶ ὁλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ
φωτὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐν τῷ σκότει· καίτοι τῷ ὀφθαλμιῶντι
ἐναντίως. καὶ οἶνος ἡδίων οὐχ ὁ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ τὴν γλῶτταν
ὑπὸ οἰνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ οὔτε ὄξος παρεγχέουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ
We must, then, find a method that will best explain the views held on these topics, and also put an end to difficulties and contradictions. And this will happen if the contrary views are seen to be held with some show of reason; such a view will be most in harmony with the facts of observation; and both 15the contradictory statements will in the end stand, if what is said is true in one sense but untrue in another. Another puzzle is whether the good or the pleasant is the object of love. For if we love what we desire —and love is of this kind, for 'none is a lover but one who ever loves'—and if desire is for the pleasant, in this way the object of love would 20be the pleasant; but if it is what we wish for, then it is the good—the good and the pleasant being different. About all these and the other cognate questions we must attempt to gain clear distinctions, starting from the following principle. The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good. Now this is why the pleasant is desired, 25for it is an apparent good; for some think it such, and to some it appears such, though they do not think so. For appearance and opinion do not reside in the same part of the soul. It is clear, then, that we love both the good and the pleasant. This being settled, we must make another assumption. Of the good some is absolutely good, some good to a particular 30man, though not absolutely; and the same things are at once absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. For we say that what is advantageous to a body in health is absolutely good for a body, but not what is good for a sick body, such as drugs and the knife. Similarly, things absolutely pleasant to a body are those pleasant to a healthy and unaffected 35body, e.g. seeing in light, not in darkness, though the opposite is the case to one with ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not that which is pleasant to one whose tongue has been spoilt by inebriety (for such men add vinegar to it), but that which is pleasant to sensation unspoiled.
1236a
1 ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθήσει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἃ
τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀλλ' ἃ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν. ἀμφοτέρων
γοῦν μεμνημένοι ταῦθ' αἱρούμεθα. ὡς δ' ἔχει παιδίον
καὶ θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθεστῶτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος
5 καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ φρόνιμον. τούτοις δὲ ἡδέα
τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλά.
ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιόνδ' εἶναι
λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὠφέλιμον καὶ χρήσιμον),
ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ
10 τινὶ καὶ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων
δι' ἕκαστον τούτων ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἱρεῖσθαί τι καὶ
φιλεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπον. τὸν μὲν γὰρ <τῷ> τοιόνδε καὶ
δι' ἀρετήν, τὸν δ' ὅτι ὠφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν δ' ὅτι
ἡδὺς καὶ δι' ἡδονήν. φίλος δὴ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος ἀντιφιλῇ,
15 καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτούς.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἓν ἁπάσας
μηδ' ὡς εἴδη ἑνὸς γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως.
πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν.
καὶ <γὰρ> ψυχὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ
20 ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ' οὗ λόγος ἐν ἡμῖν
ὑπάρχει. οἷον ὄργανον ἰατρικὸν, ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἰατρὸς χρήσαιτο·
ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου. ζητεῖται
μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον· διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι [τὸ]
πρῶτον λαμβάνουσιν καὶ πρῶτον καθόλου, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος.
25 ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ δύνανται πάντ' ἀποδιδόναι
τὰ φαινόμενα. οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόττοντος ἑνὸς λόγου οὐκ
οἴονται <τὰς> ἄλλας φιλίας εἶναι· αἳ δ' εἰσὶ μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως
εἰσίν· οἳ δ' ὅταν ἡ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμόττῃ, ὡς οὖσαν καθόλου
ἄν, εἴπερ ἦν πρώτη, οὐδ' εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἄλλας φασίν· ἔστι
30 δὲ πολλὰ εἴδη φιλίας. τῶν γὰρ ῥηθέντων ἦν ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ
διώρισται τριχῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν. ἣ μὲν γὰρ διώρισται
δι' ἀρετήν, ἣ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἣ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.
τούτων ἡ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἡ [διὰ] τῶν πλείστων
φιλία (διὰ γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμοι εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ
35 μέχρι τούτου, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία
"Γλαῦκ' ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ τὸν σοφὸν φίλον ἔσκε μάχηται,"
καὶ "οὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆας"),
ἡ δὲ δι' ἡδονὴν τῶν νέων (τούτου γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν· διὸ εὐμετάβολος
φιλία ἡ τῶν νέων· μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὰ ἤθη κατὰ τὰς
1So with the soul; what is pleasant not to children or brutes, but to the adult, is really pleasant; at least, when we remember both we choose the latter. And as the child or brute is to the adult man, so are the bad and foolish to the good and sensible. To these, that which suits their habit is pleasant, 5and that is the good and noble. Since, then, 'good' has many meanings—for one thing we call good because its nature is such, and another because it is profitable and useful—and further, the pleasant is in part absolutely pleasant and absolutely good, and in part pleasant to a particular individual and apparent good; just as in the case of inanimate things we may choose and love a 10thing for either of these reasons, so in the case of a man loving one because of his character or because of virtue, another because he is profitable and useful, another because he is pleasant, and for pleasure. And a man becomes a friend when he is loved and returns that love, and this is recognized by the two men in question. There must, then, be three kinds of love, not all 15being so named for one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet having the same name quite by mere accident. For all the senses of love are related to one which is the primary, just as is the case with the word 'medical', and just as we speak of a medical soul, body, instrument, or act, but properly the name belongs to that primarily so called. The primary is that of which the 20definition is implied in the definition of all; e.g. a medical instrument is one that a medical man would use, but the definition of the instrument is not implied in that of medical man'. Everywhere, then, we seek for the primary. But because the universal is primary, they also take the primary to be universal, and this is an error. And so they are not able to do justice to all the 25observed facts about friendship; for since one definition will not suit all, they think there are no other friendships; but the others are friendships, only not similarly so. But they, finding the primary friendship will not suit, assuming it would be universal if really primary, deny that the other friendships even are friendships; whereas there are many species of friendship; 30this was part of what we have already said, since we have distinguished the three senses of friendship—one due to virtue, another to usefulness, a third to pleasantness. Of these the friendship based on usefulness is of course that of the majority; men love one another because of their usefulness and to the extent of this; so we have the proverb 'Glaucus, a helper is a friend so long 35as he fights', and 'the Athenians no longer know the Megarians'. But the friendship based on pleasure is that of the young, for they are sensitive to pleasure; therefore also their friendship easily changes; for with a change in their characters as they grow up there is also a change in their pleasures.
1236b
1 ἡλικίας μεταβάλλει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ), ἡ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῶν βελτίστων.
φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
ἐστιν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν
γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένῳ καὶ ἀντιφιλῶν.
5 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνον ὑπάρχει φιλία
(μόνον γὰρ αἰσθάνεται προαιρέσεως)· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν
τοῖς θηρίοις, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ μικρόν τι φαίνεται ἐνυπάρχον
καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα,
οἷον τὸν τροχίλον φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος τῷ κροκοδείλῳ, καὶ ὡς
10 οἱ μάντεις τὰς συνεδρείας καὶ διεδρείας λέγουσιν. καὶ οἱ
φαῦλοι ἂν εἶεν φίλοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ
διὰ τὸ ἡδύ. οἳ δ' ὅτι ἡ πρώτη οὐχ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, οὔ
φασι φίλους εἶναι· ἀδικήσει γὰρ ὅ γε φαῦλος τὸν φαῦλον,
οἱ δ' ἀδικούμενοι οὐ φιλοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς. οἳ δὲ φιλοῦσι
15 μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ τάς γε ἑτέρας οὐθὲν
κωλύει. δι' ἡδονὴν γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλήλους βλαπτόμενοι,
ὡς ἂν ὦσιν ἀκρατεῖς· οὐ δοκοῦσι δ' οὐδ' οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες
ἀλλήλους φίλοι εἶναι, ὅταν κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ζητῶσιν, ὅτι
οὐχ ἡ πρώτη. ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ βέβαιος, αὕτη δὲ ἀβέβαιος.
20 ἣ δ' ἐστὶ μέν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δέ, ἀλλ'
ἀπ' ἐκείνης. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν τὸν φίλον
βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα ἐστί, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον·
καθ' ἕνα δὲ λόγον πάσας ἀδύνατον. λείπεται τοίνυν οὕτως,
ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μόνη <ἡ> πρώτη φιλία, ἔστι δὲ ὡς πᾶσαι,
25 οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχον ἔχουσαι πρὸς ἑαυτάς, οὔτε
καθ' ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἕν.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἅμα,
ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ, ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ πρῶτος
ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ δι' αὑτὸν αὐτὸς αἱρετός (ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι
30 τοιοῦτον· ὡς γὰρ βούλεταί τις δι' αὑτὸν εἶναι τἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη
καὶ αὐτὸν αἱρεῖσθαι εἶναι), ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἡδύς
ἐστιν ἁπλῶς· διὸ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὁπωσοῦν φίλος ἡδύς. —ἔτι δὲ
διοριστέον περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον· ἔχει ⌜ἐπίστασιν, πότερον⌟ γὰρ *
τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν φίλον, καὶ πότερον
35 τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ φιλητὸν
ἡδύ, ἢ οὔ. ἄμφω γὰρ εἰς ταὐτὸ συνακτέον· τά τε γὰρ
μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἁπλῶς τύχῃ φευκτά· καὶ
τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὃ
ζητεῖται, τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθά. ἔστι γὰρ
1But the friendship based on virtue is that of the best men. It is clear from this that the primary friendship, that of good men, is a mutual returning of love and purpose. For what is loved is dear to him who loves it, but a man loving another man is himself dear also to the man loved. This friendship, 5then, is peculiar to man, for he alone perceives another's purpose. But the other friendships are found also among the brutes where utility is in some degree present, both between tame animals and men, and between animals themselves, as in the case mentioned by Herodotus of the friendship between the sandpiper and the crocodile, and the coming together and parting of birds that 10soothsayers speak of. The bad may be friends to one another on the ground both of usefulness and of pleasure; but some deny them to be friends, because there is not the primary friendship between them; for a bad man will injure a bad man, and those who are injured by one another do not love one another; but in fact they love, only not with the primary friendship. Nothing prevents their 15loving with the other kinds; for owing to pleasure they put up with each other's injury, so long as they are incontinent. But those whose love is based on pleasure do not seem to be friends, when we look carefully, because their friendship is not of the primary kind, being unstable, while that is stable; it is, however, as has been said, a friendship, only not the primary kind but 20derived from it. To speak, then, of friendship in the primary sense only is to do violence to facts, and makes one assert paradoxes; but it is impossible for all friendships to come under one definition. The only alternative left is that in a sense there is only one friendship, the primary; but in a sense all kinds are friendship, not as possessing a common name accidentally without 25being specially related to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather as in relation to one and the same thing. But since the same thing is at the same time absolutely good and absolutely pleasant (if nothing interferes), and the genuine friend is absolutely the friend in the primary sense, and such is the man desirable for himself (and he must be such; for the 30man to whom one wishes good to happen for himself, one must also desire to exist), the genuine friend is also absolutely pleasant; hence any sort of friend is thought pleasant; but here one ought rather to distinguish further, for the subject needs reflection. Is what is good for one's self or what is good absolutely dear? and is actual loving attended with pleasure, so that the 35loved object is pleasant, or not? For the two must be harmonized. For what is not absolutely good, but perhaps bad, is something to avoid, and what is not good for one's self is nothing to one; but what is sought is that the absolutely good should be good in the further sense of being good to the individual.
1237a
1 αἱρετὸν μὲν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν·
ἃ δεῖ συμφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ
ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται. ** εὐθέτως δὲ
καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἄνθρωπος ὤν (φύσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ
5 ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ
εὐφυὴς ἀφυοῦς, διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἡ ὁδός· ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ
καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο διαφωνῇ, οὔπω σπουδαῖον τελέως·
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν· τῷ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν
τἀγαθὸν τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκρασία ἐστίν.
10 ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ πρώτη φιλία κατ' ἀρετήν, ἔσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοί. τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ὅτι χρήσιμοι, ἀλλ' ἄλλον
τρόπον· διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ τῳδὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν.
καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. ἄλλο
γὰρ τὸ ἁπλῶς ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον γυμνάζεσθαι
15 πρὸς τὸ φαρμακεύεσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἡ ἀνθρώπου
ἀρετή. ἔστω γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων·
ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου ἀρετὴ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ
μὴ ἐκείνῳ. ὁμοίως δὴ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ
ἐπιστατέον, καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν ἐστιν ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φιλία,
20 καὶ τί διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ φιλεῖν, [καὶ]
πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθός, κἂν εἰ μὴ ἡδύς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο,
διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κατ'
ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φαίνεται. δῆλον δ' ὅτι ὥσπερ
ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωρίαι καὶ μαθήσεις
25 αἰσθηταὶ μάλιστα τῷ ἡδεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις,
καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν. φύσει γοῦν τὸ
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς, καὶ οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ.
διὸ εὐθὺς τὰ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις χαίρει, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἥδιστον
ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθέντι·
30 ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ'
ἡδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων γνωρίσεως, δῆλον ὅτι
καὶ ὅλως ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἁπλῶς
ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων, ὅτι ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ
φιλία ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἡ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον
35 αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια, αὕτη δ' οὐκ ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φιλοῦντι,
δυνάμεως δὲ πάσης ἔξω· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ <ᾗ> ἕτερον. διὸ
τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
φιλεῖσθαι φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν
ἐν ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀψύχῳ· φιλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὰ
40 ἄψυχα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὸ φιλούμενον
1For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, but for each individual his own; and these must agree. Virtue brings about this agreement, and the political art exists to make them agree for those to whom as yet they do not. And one who is a human being is ready and on the road for this 5(for by nature that which is absolutely good is good to him), and man rather than woman, and the gifted rather than the ungifted; but the road is through pleasure; the noble must be pleasant. But when these two disagree a man cannot yet be perfectly good, for incontinence may arise; for it is in the disagreement of the good with the pleasant in the passions that 10incontinence occurs. So that since the primary friendship is grounded on virtue, friends of this sort will be themselves absolutely good, and this not because they are useful, but in another way. For good to the individual and the absolutely good are two, and as with the profitable so with habits. For the absolutely profitable differs from what is profitable 15to certain people, as taking exercise does from taking drugs. So that the habit called human virtue is of two kinds, for we will assume man to be one of the things excellent by nature; therefore the virtue of the naturally excellent is an absolute good, but the virtue of that which is not thus good only to it. Similarly, then, with the pleasant. For here one 20must pause and examine whether friendship can exist without pleasure, how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which of the two—goodness or pleasure—the loving depends, whether one loves a man because he is good even if not pleasant, and in any case not for his pleasantness. Now, loving having two senses, does actual love seem to involve pleasure 25because activity is good? It is clear that just as in science what we have recently contemplated and learnt is most perceptible because of its pleasantness, so also is the recognition of the familiar, and the same account applies to both. Naturally, at least, the absolutely good is absolutely pleasant, and pleasant to those to whom it is good. From which it 30at once follows that like takes pleasure in like, and that nothing is so pleasant to man as man; and if this is so even before they are perfect, it is clear it must be so when they are perfected; and the good man is perfect. But if active loving is a mutual choice with pleasure in each other's acquaintanceship, it is clear that in general the primary friendship 35is a reciprocal choice of the absolutely good and pleasant because it is good and pleasant; and friendship itself is the habit from which such choice springs. For its function is an activity, and this is not external, but in the one who feels love, but the function of every faculty is external; for it is in something different or in one's self qua different.
1237b
1 [ὅ] ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι ᾗ φιλούμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον
τῷ φίλῳ ᾗ φίλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ ᾗ μουσικὸς ἢ ᾗ ἰατρικός· ἡδονὴ
τοίνυν ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ᾗ αὐτός, αὕτη φιλική. αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ,
οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος. ὥστ' ἂν μὴ χαίρῃ ᾗ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡ
5 πρώτη φιλία. οὐδὲ δεῖ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθὲν τῶν συμβεβηκότων
μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνειν. τί γὰρ σφόδρα δυσώδης
λείπεται; ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τῷ εὐνοεῖν, συζῇ δὲ μή.
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· αἱ δ'
ἄλλαι δι' αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦνται. βέβαιον γάρ
10 τι δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία· μόνη δ' αὕτη βέβαιος. τὸ γὰρ κεκριμένον
βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μηδὲ ῥᾳδίως [οὐ] ποιεῖ
τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθήν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος·
ἡ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου. δεῖ γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ
λέγει καὶ Θέογνις·
15 οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός,
πρὶν πειραθείης ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου.
οὐδ' ἄνευ χρόνου φίλος, ἀλλὰ βούλονται φίλοι, καὶ μάλιστα
λανθάνει ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ὡς φιλία. ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως
ἔχωσι φίλοι εἶναι, διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ ἀλλήλοις,
20 οἴονται οὐ βούλεσθαι φίλοι, ἀλλ' εἶναι φίλοι. τὸ δ'
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οὐ
γὰρ εἰ βούλονται ὑγιαίνειν, ὑγιαίνουσιν, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἰ φίλοι
βούλονται, ἤδη καὶ φίλοι εἰσίν. σημεῖον δέ· εὐδιάβλητοι γὰρ
οἱ διακείμενοι ἄνευ πείρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὧν μὲν
25 γὰρ πεῖραν δεδώκασιν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ εὐδιάβλητοι, περὶ ὧν
δὲ μή, πεισθεῖεν ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν οἱ διαβάλλοντες.
ἅμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις αὕτη ἡ
φιλία· ἄπιστος γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ κακοήθης πρὸς πάντας·
αὑτῷ γὰρ μετρεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους. διὸ εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν
30 οἱ ἀγαθοί, ἂν μὴ διὰ πεῖραν ἀπιστῶσιν. οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι
αἱροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλου, καὶ οὐθεὶς φιλεῖ
μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ πράγματα. ὥστ' οὐ φίλοι. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται
οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων· προσνέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς
πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις. οὐ γίνεται ἄρ'
35 ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἐν πολλοῖς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πεῖραν
λαβεῖν· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ ἂν ἔδει συζῆσαι. οὐδὲ δὴ αἱρετέον
ὁμοίως περὶ ἱματίου καὶ φίλου· καίτοι ἐν πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦ
νοῦν ἔχοντος δυοῖν τὸ βέλτιον αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ
χείρονι πάλαι ἐχρῆτο, τῷ βελτίονι δὲ μηδέπω, τοῦθ' αἱρετέον,
40 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου τὸν ἀγνῶτα εἰ βελτίων·
1Therefore to love is to feel pleasure, but not to be loved; for to be loved is the activity of what is lovable, but to love is the activity of friendship also; and the one is found only in the animate, the other also in the inanimate, for even inanimate things are loved. But since active loving is to treat the loved qua 5loved, and the friend is loved by the friend qua friend and not qua musician or doctor, the pleasure coming from him merely as being himself is the pleasure of friendship; for he loves the object as himself and not for being something else. So that if he does not rejoice in him for being good the primary friendship does not exist, nor should any of his incidental qualities hinder more than his goodness 10gives pleasure. For if a man has an unpleasant odour he is left. For he must be content with goodwill without actual association. This then is primary friendship, and all admit it to be friendship. It is through it that the other friendships seem friendships to some, but are doubted to be such by others. For friendship seems something stable, and this alone is stable. For a formed decision is stable, 15and where we do not act quickly or easily, we get the decision right. There is no stable friendship without confidence, but confidence needs time. One must then make trial, as Theognis says, 'You cannot know the mind of man or woman till you have tried them as you might cattle.' Nor is a friend made except through time; they do indeed wish to be friends, and such a state easily passes muster as friendship. 20For when men are eager to be friends, by performing every friendly service to one another they think they not merely wish to be, but are friends. But it happens with friendship as with other things; as man is not in health merely because he wishes to be so, neither are men at once friends as soon as they wish to be friends. The proof is that men in this condition, without having made trial of one 25another, are easily made enemies; wherever each has allowed the other to test him, they are not easily made enemies; but where they have not, they will be persuaded whenever those who try to break up the friendship produce evidence. It is clear at the same time that this friendship does not exist between the bad, for the bad man feels distrust and is malignant to all, measuring others by himself. 30Therefore the good are more easily deceived unless experience has taught them distrust. But the bad prefer natural goods to a friend and none of them loves a man so much as things; therefore they are not friends. The proverbial 'community among friends' is not found among them; the friend is made a part of things, not things regarded as part of the friend. The primary friendship then is not found between 35many, for it is hard to test many men, for one would have to live with each. Nor. should one choose a friend like a garment. Yet in all things it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two alternatives; and if one has used the worse garment for a long time and not the better, the better is to be chosen, but not in place of an old friend one of whom you do not know whether he is better.
1238a
1 οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄνευ πείρας οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος,
ἀλλὰ χρόνου δεῖ. διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν
ἁλῶν· ἅμα δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ σοί, εἰ δὴ φίλος ἔσται σοὶ φίλος. ἀγαθὸς μὲν γὰρ
5 ἁπλῶς ἐστι τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθός,
ἁπλῶς <δ'> ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτ' ἄμφω,
ὥστε ὅ ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ τούτου ἄλλῳ, εἰ καὶ μὴ
ἁπλῶς μὲν σπουδαίῳ, ἄλλῳ δ' ἀγαθός, ὅτι χρήσιμος. τὸ
δὲ πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι φίλον καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν κωλύει· οὐ
10 γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν.
ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φιλία τῶν
βεβαίων, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων. καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται
"ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιον, οὐ τὰ χρήματα."
πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅτι χρόνος
15 λέγεται δεικνύναι τὸν φιλούμενον, καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μᾶλλον
τῶν εὐτυχιῶν. τότε γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ <τὰ> τῶν φίλων (οὗτοι γὰρ
μόνοι ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ ἃ αἱ εὐτυχίαι
καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, αἱροῦνται μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τούτων τὰ
μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι)· ἡ δ' ἀτυχία δηλοῖ τοὺς μὴ ὄντως
20 ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόντας. ὁ δὲ χρόνος
δηλοῖ ἀμφοτέρους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δῆλος, ἀλλ'
ὁ ἡδὺς μᾶλλον. πλὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺς ταχύ. ὅμοιοι
γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς οἴνοις καὶ ἐδέσμασιν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ
τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ταχὺ δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς
25 καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τὸ
ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ τῷ τέλει ὁριστέον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὁμολογήσαιεν δ' ἂν
καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ
τοῦ πόματος καλοῦσι γλύκιον· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαῖνον οὐχ
ἡδύ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχές, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξαπατᾷ.
30 ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία, καὶ δι' ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἡ
κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐστί, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον·
αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἐγγίνονται φιλίαι καὶ ἐν παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις
καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις. ὅθεν λέγεται, "ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει" καὶ
"κακὸς κακῷ <δὲ> συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ."
35 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τοὺς φαύλους,
οὐχ ᾗ φαῦλοι ἢ μηδέτεροι, ἀλλ' οἷον ᾠδικοὶ ἄμφω, ἢ
ὃ μὲν φιλῳδὸς ὁ δ' ᾠδικὸς ἐστίν, καὶ ᾗ πάντες ἔχουσιν
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταύτῃ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἔτι χρήσιμοι
ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν
1For a friend is not to be had without trial nor in a single day, but there is need of time and so 'the bushel of salt' has become proverbial. He must also be not merely good absolutely but good for you, if the friend is to be a friend to you. For a man is good absolutely by being good, but a friend 5by being good for another, and absolutely good and friend when these two attributes are combined so that what is absolutely good is good for the other, or else not absolutely good, but good to another in the sense of useful. But the need of active loving also prevents one from being at the same time a friend to many; for one cannot be active towards many at the same time. 10From these facts then it is clear that it is correctly said that friendship is a stable thing, just as happiness is a thing sufficient in itself. It has been rightly said, 'for nature is stable but not wealth', but it is still better to say 'virtue' than 'nature'; and Time is said to show the friend, and bad fortune rather than good fortune. For then it is clear that the 15goods of friends are common (for these alone instead of things naturally good and evil—which are the matters with which good and bad fortune are concerned—choose a man rather than the existence of some of those things and the non-existence of others). But misfortune shows those who are not really friends, but friends only for some accidental utility. But time reveals both sorts; 20for even the useful man does not show his usefulness quickly, as the pleasant man does his pleasantness; yet the absolutely pleasant is not quick to show himself either. For men are like wines and meats; the pleasantness of them shows itself quickly, but if it continues longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and so it is with men. For the absolutely pleasant must be 25determined as such by the end it realizes and the time for which it continues pleasant. Even the vulgar would admit this, judging not merely according to results but in the way in which, speaking of a drink, they call it sweeter. For this is unpleasant not for the result but from not being continuous, though it deceives us at the start. The first friendship then—by reason of 30which the others get the name—is that based on virtue and due to the pleasure of virtue, as has been said before; the other kinds occur also in children, brutes, and bad men, whence the sayings, 'like is pleased with like' and 'bad adheres to bad from pleasure'. And the bad may be pleasant to one another, not qua bad or qua neither good nor bad, but (say) as both being 35musicians, or the one fond of music and the other a musician, and inasmuch as all have some good in them, and in this way they harmonize with one another. Further, they might be useful and profitable to one another, not absolutely but in relation to their purpose, in virtue of some neutral characteristic.
1238b
1 προαίρεσιν, ἢ <ᾗ> οὐδέτεροι. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπιεικῆ
φαύλῳ εἶναι φίλον. καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν
προαίρεσιν, ὁ μὲν φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ,
ὃ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, τῷ δὲ
5 φαύλῳ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἀγαθά,
ἁπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ᾗ πενία
συμφέρει ἢ νόσος, <καὶ> ταῦτα τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκα,
ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φάρμακον πιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ βούλεται **,
ἀλλὰ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα βούλεται. ἔτι καθ' οὓς τρόπους καὶ ἀλλήλοις
10 οἱ μὴ σπουδαῖοι εἶεν ἂν φίλοι. εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἡδὺς οὐχ
ᾗ φαῦλος, ἀλλ' ᾗ τῶν κοινῶν τινος μετέχει, οἷον εἰ μουσικός.
ἔτι ᾗ ἔνι τι πᾶσιν ἐπιεικές· διὸ ἔνιοι ὁμιλητικοὶ εἶεν
ἂν καὶ σπουδαίῳ. ἢ ᾗ προσαρμόττουσιν ἑκάστῳ· ἔχουσι
γάρ τι πάντες τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
1Also a bad man may be a friend to a good, the bad being of use to the good in relation to the good man's existing purpose, the good to the incontinent in relation to his existing purpose, and to the bad in relation to his natural purpose. And he will wish for his friend what is good, the absolutely good absolutely, and 5conditionally what is good for the friend, so far as poverty or illness is of advantage to him—and these for the sake of absolute goods; taking a medicine is an instance, for that no one wishes, but wishes only for some particular purpose. Further, a good man and a bad man may be friends in the way in which those not good might be friends to one another. A man might be pleasant, not as bad but as 10partaking in some common property, e.g. as being musical, or again, so far as there is something good in all (for which reason some might be glad to associate even with the good), or in so far as they suit each individual; for all have something of the good.
Book 4,Chapter 3 (1238b15–39)
15 τρία μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις
κατ' ἰσότητά πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία. καὶ γὰρ οἱ κατ'
ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητί πώς εἰσιν ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἀλλήλοις.
ἄλλη δὲ διαφορὰ τούτων ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολήν, ὥσπερ θεοῦ
ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ
20 ὅλως ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
ἕτερον· κατ' ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ' ἀριθμὸν δ' οὐκ ἴσον.
ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης πρὸς
τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων διαφοραὶ εἰσίν· ἄλλη
πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὕτη μὲν ὡς
25 ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, ἣ δὲ εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα.
ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι.
γελοῖον γάρ, εἴ τις ἐγκαλοίη τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ
ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ.
φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν, τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον
30 τρόπον. καὶ ἡδονὴ διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἥ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ
αὑτοῦ κτήματι ἢ παιδί, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ.
ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν δι' ἡδονὴν οἳ μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα εἰσίν, οἳ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν.
διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνως οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ὁμοίως
35 χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. δῆλον δ' ἐν
τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις
πολλάκις. ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἐρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος αὐτοῖς
ἐπὶ τὴν προθυμίαν. διὸ εὑρηκέναι νεῖκος ὁ ἐρώμενος· τοιαῦτ'
ἂν οὐκ ἐρῶν λέγοι. οἳ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.
These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of them the word friendship implies a kind of equality. For even those who are friends through 15virtue are mutually friends by a sort of equality of virtue. But another variety is the friendship of superiority to inferiority, e.g. as the virtue of a god is superior to that of a man (for this is another kind of friendship)—and in general that of ruler to subject; just as justice in this case is different, for here it is a proportional equality, not numerical equality. Into this class falls the 20relation of father to son and of benefactor to beneficiary; and there are varieties of these again, e.g. there is a difference between the relation of father to son, and of husband to wife, the latter being that of ruler to subject, the former that of benefactor to beneficiary. In these varieties there is not at all, or at least not in equal degree, the return of love for love. For it would be 25ridiculous to accuse God because the love one receives in return from him is not equal to the love given him, or for the subject to make the same complaint against his ruler. For the part of a ruler is to receive not to give love, or at least to give love in a different way. And the pleasure is different, and that of the man who needs nothing over his own possessions or child, and that of him who lacks 30over what comes to him, are not the same. Similarly also with those who are friends through use or pleasure, some are on an equal footing with each other, in others there is the relation of superiority and inferiority. Therefore those who think themselves to be on the former footing find fault if the other is not equally useful to and a benefactor of them; and similarly with regard to pleasure. This 35is obvious in the case of lover and beloved; for this is The lover does frequently a cause of strife between them. not perceive that the passion in each has not the same reason; therefore Aenicus has said 'a beloved, not a lover, would say such things'. But they think that there is the same reason for the passion of each.
Book 4,Chapter 4 (1239a1–1239b2)
1239a
1 ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται, τριῶν ὄντων εἰδῶν φιλίας, κατ'
ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὗται πάλιν
διῄρηνται εἰς δύο· αἳ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἳ δὲ καθ'
ὑπεροχὴν εἰσίν. φιλίαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφότεραι, φίλοι δ' οἱ
5 κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ
φίλος, φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι
μὲν δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φιλῇ, ὀνειδίζεται ὡς ἀνάξιον
φιλῶν. τῇ γὰρ ἀξίᾳ τῶν φίλων μετρεῖται καί τινι
ἴσῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν δι' ἡλικίας ἔλλειψιν ἀνάξια ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι,
10 τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην τοιαύτην
ὑπεροχήν. ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἧττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν
ἀξιοῦν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησίμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡδεῖ καὶ κατ' ἀρετήν.
ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται ἀμφισβητήσεις
(τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ
15 ἐν ξύλου σταθμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐν χρυσίῳ· ἀλλὰ τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς
κρίνουσιν· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς
μέγα, τὸ δ' ἀλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν)· ὅταν δὲ
ὑπερβολὴ ᾖ, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι
ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν θεόν. φανερὸν
20 δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μέν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ, τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν δ' ἔστιν
ἄνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι. —δῆλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον
οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατ' ἰσότητα·
ἅμα γὰρ ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ
ὑπεροχή. διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου·
25 ἄμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ κολακευομένῳ.
μάλιστα δ' οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι· τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν
ὑπεροχῇ. φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἳ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἳ δὲ φιλότιμοι.
φιλητικὸς δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ
φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλότιμος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων
30 τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ
τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῇ ὁ φιλητικός. ἔνεστι γὰρ ἀνάγκη
ἐνεργοῦντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἔστι γὰρ λανθάνειν
φιλούμενον, φιλοῦντα δ' οὔ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν
φιλίαν τὸ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι
35 κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημεῖον δέ· ἕλοιτ' ἂν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον,
εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄμφω, γιγνώσκειν ἢ γιγνώσκεσθαι, οἷον
ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς αἱ γυναῖκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη
ἡ Ἀντιφῶντος. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεσθαι
αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν,
40 τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἕνεκα. διὸ καὶ
1There being, then, as has been said, three kinds of friendship—based on virtue, utility, and pleasantness—these again are subdivided each into two, one kind based on equality, the other on superiority. Both are friendships, but only those between whom there is equality are friends; it would be absurd 5for a man to be the friend of a child, yet certainly he loves and is loved by him. Sometimes the superior ought to be loved, but if he loves, he is reproached for loving one undeserving; for measurement is made by the worth of the friends and a sort of [i.e. proportional] equality. Some then, owing to inferiority in age, do not deserve to receive an equal love, and others 10because of virtue or birth or some other such superiority possessed by the other person. The superior ought to claim either not to return the love or not to return it in the same measure, whether in the friendship of utility, pleasure, or virtue. Where the superiority is small, disputes naturally arise; for the small is in some cases of no account, e.g. in weighing wood, though 15not in weighing gold. But men judge wrongly what is small; for their own good by its nearness seems great, that of another by its distance small. But when the difference is excessive, then not even those affected seek to make out that their love should be returned or equally returned, e.g. as if a man were to claim this from God. It is clear then that men are friends when on an 20equality with each other, but we may have return of love without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek the friendship of superiority rather than that of equality; for in the former they obtain both love and superiority. Therefore with some the flatterer is more valued than the friend, for he procures the appearance of both love and superiority for the object of 25his flattery. The ambitious are especially of this kind; for to be an object of admiration involves superiority. By nature some grow up loving, and others ambitious; the former is one who delights rather in loving than in being loved, the other is rather fond of honour. He, then, who delights in being loved and admired really loves superiority; the other, the loving, is fond 30of the pleasure of loving. This by his mere activity of loving he must have; for to be loved is an accident; one may be loved without knowing it, but not love. Loving, rather than being loved, depends on lovingness; being loved rather depends on the nature of the object of love. And here is a proof. The friend or lover would choose, if both were not possible, rather to know than 35to be known, as we see women do when allowing others to adopt their children, e.g. Antiphon's Andromache. For wishing to be known seems to be felt on one's own account and in order to get, not to do, some good; but wishing to know is felt in order that one may do and love. Therefore we praise those who persist in their love towards the dead; for they know but are not known.
1239b
1 τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐπαινοῦμεν·
γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκονται.
1That, then, there are several sorts of friendship, that they are three in number, and what are the differences between being loved and having love returned, and between friends on an equality and friends in a relation of superiority and inferiority, has now been stated.
Book 4,Chapter 5 (1239b3–1240a4)
ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας, καὶ πόσοι τρόποι, ὅτι
τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ φίλοι
5 διαφέρουσιν, οἵ τε κατ' ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ' ὑπεροχήν,
εἴρηται· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φίλον λέγεται καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ὥςπερ
καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη, ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν συμπαραλαμβανόντων
(οἳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιόν φασιν εἶναι φίλον, οἳ δὲ
τὸ ἐναντίον), λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσι πρὸς τὰς
10 εἰρημένας φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον καὶ εἰς τὸ
ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλοῦν, τὸ δὲ
κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὅμοιος ἀεὶ καὶ οὐ
μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἦθος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ ἄφρων οὐθὲν
ἔοικεν ἕωθεν καὶ ἑσπέρας. διὸ ἐὰν μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ
15 φαῦλοι, οὐ φίλοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ διίστανται· ἡ δ' οὐ βέβαιος
φιλία οὐ φιλία. ὥστε οὕτως μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, ὅτι <τὸ> ἀγαθὸν
ὅμοιον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις
ταὔθ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ φύσει αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ
καὶ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ ἕξεις καὶ συνημερεύσεις τοῖς ὁμογενέσιν
20 ἥδισται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις· καὶ ταύτῃ ἐνδέχεται
καὶ τοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν.
κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ.
τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον ὡς τὸ χρήσιμον· αὐτὸ
γὰρ αὑτῷ τὸ ὅμοιον ἄχρηστον. διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δεῖται
25 καὶ δοῦλος δεσπότου, καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡδὺ
καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν τὸ ἐναντίον ὡς χρήσιμον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν
τέλει ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ τύχῃ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ,
ἐν τῷ τέλει μὲν ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀρέγεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὸ
θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ. ἔστι δέ πως καὶ
30 ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὀρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ
τὸ μέσον· ὡς σύμβολα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ οὕτω
γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἓν μέσον. ἔτι κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι
τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος. ὀρέγονται γὰρ οὐκ
ἀλλήλων τἀναντία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέσου. ὑπερψυχθέντες γάρ,
35 ἐὰν θερμανθῶσιν, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, καὶ ὑπερθερμανθέντες,
ἐὰν ψυχθῶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
εἰ δὲ μή, ἀεὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις. ἀλλὰ χαίρει
ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας τοῖς φύσει ἡδέσιν, οἳ
δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξιστᾶσι τῆς φύσει ἕξεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν
40 τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἐστίν· τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται,
But since 'friendly' 5is also used more universally, as was indeed said at the beginning, by those who take in extraneous considerations—some saying that the like is friendly, and some the contrary,—we must speak also of the relation of these friendships to those previously mentioned. The like is brought both under the pleasant and under the good, for the good is simple, but the 10bad various in form; and the good man is ever like himself and does not change in character; but the bad and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning. Therefore unless the bad come to some agreement, they are not friends to one another but are parted; but unstable friendship is not friendship. So thus the like is friendly, 15because the good is like; but it may also be friendly because of pleasure; for those like one another have the same pleasures, and everything too is by nature pleasant to itself. Therefore the voices, habits, and company of those of the same species are pleasantest to each side, even in the animals other than man; and in this way it is possible for even the 20bad to love one another: 'pleasure glues the bad to the bad.' But opposites are friendly through usefulness; for the like is useless to itself; therefore master needs slave, and slave master; man and wife need one another, and the opposite is pleasant and desired qua useful, not as included in the end but as a means towards it. For when a thing has obtained 25what it desires, it has reached its end and no longer desires the opposite, e.g. heat does not desire cold, nor dryness moisture. Yet in a sense the love of the contrary is love of the good; for the opposites desire one another because of the mean; they desire one another like tallies because thus out of the two arises a single mean. Further, the love is 30accidentally of the opposite, but per se of the mean, for opposites desire not one another but the mean. For if over-chilled they return to the mean by being warmed, and if over-warmed by being chilled. And so with everything else. Otherwise they are ever desiring, never in the mean states; but that which is in the mean delights without desire in what is naturally 35pleasant, while the others delight in all that puts them out of their natural condition. This kind of relation then is found also among inanimate things; but love occurs when the relation is found among the living. Therefore some delight in what is unlike themselves, the rigid in the witty, the energetic in the lazy; for they reduce each other to the mean state.
1240a
1 ὅταν ᾖ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων. διὸ ἐνίοτε ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν,
οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥαθύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον
γὰρ καθίστανται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν, ὥςπερ
ἐλέχθη, τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
1Accidentally, then, as has been said, opposites are friendly, because of the good. The number then of kinds of friendship, and the different senses in which we speak of 'friends' and of persons as 'loving' and 'loved', both where this constitutes friendship and where it does not, have now been stated.
Book 4,Chapter 6 (1240a5–1240b37)
5 πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες διαφοραὶ καθ' ἃς
λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμενοι,
καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται·
περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν.
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις μάλιστα ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος
10 εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς
τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ δοκοῦνθ'
ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦται, τὰ δ'
ὅμοια φαίνεται ὄντα. ἔστι γάρ πως κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη
ἡ φιλία, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ διῃρημένοις τὸ φιλεῖσθαι
15 καὶ φιλεῖν· δι' ἃ μᾶλλον οὕτως αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, <ὡς>
ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται πῶς ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων,
τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ
ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός,
καὶ εἰ ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὑτόν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ
20 ταῦτα καὶ διῃρημένοις· ᾗ δὴ δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ὑπάρχει
πως ταῦτα, ᾗ δ' οὐ διῃρημένα, οὐχ ὑπάρχει.
ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕξεως [ὡς] οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν
διωρισμένοι, καθ' οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν.
δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τἀγαθὰ ἢ οἷα οἴεται
25 ἀγαθά, μὴ δι' αὑτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον
ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ μὴ δι' αὑτὸν, κἂν εἰ
μὴ διανέμων τἀγαθά, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε
μάλιστα φιλεῖν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἱρεῖται δι'
αὐτὴν τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες
30 τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μάχεται δὴ
ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα. οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς,
οἳ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἳ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἴονται φιλεῖσθαι.
ἔτι τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι ⌜ἀγαπᾶν
θήσομεν⌟, οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας, ὅτι χαλεποὶ
35 ἀλγοῦντες, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτούς, * ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς
τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες ὄρνιθες. βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστά
γε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο, ὅτι
[μὴ] ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν· <τὸ γὰρ
The question whether a 5man is a friend to himself or not requires much inquiry. For some think that every man is above all a friend to himself; and they use this friendship as a canon by which to test his friendship to all other friends. If we look to argument and to the properties usually thought characteristic of friends, then the two kinds of friendship are in some of these respects opposed to one another, but in others alike. 10For this friendship—that to oneself—is, in a way, friendship by analogy, not absolutely. For loving and being loved requires two separate individuals. Therefore a man is a friend to himself rather in the sense in which we have described the incontinent and continent as willing or unwilling, namely in the sense that the parts of his soul are in a certain relation to each other; and all problems of this 15sort have a similar explanation, e.g. whether a man can be a friend or enemy to himself, and whether a man can wrong himself. For all these relations require two separate individuals; so far then as the soul is two, these relations can in a sense belong to it; so far as these two are not separate, the relations cannot belong to it. By a man's attitude to himself the other modes of friendship, under which 20we are accustomed to consider friendship in this discourse, are determined. For a man seems to us a friend, who wishes the good or what he thinks to be such to some one, not on his own account but for the sake of that other; or, in another way, if he wishes for another man existence—even if he is not bestowing goods, still less existence—on that other's account and not on his own, he would seem most of 25all to be a friend to him. And in yet another manner he would be a friend to him whom he wishes to live with merely for the sake of his company and for no other reason; thus fathers wish the existence of their sons, but prefer to live with others. Now these various ways of friendship are discordant with one another. For some think they are not loved, unless the other wishes them this or that good, some 30unless their existence or their society is desired. Further, to sorrow with the sorrowing, for no other reason than their sorrow, we shall regard as love (e.g. slaves towards their masters feel grief because their masters when in trouble are cruel to them, not for the sake of the masters themselves)—as mothers feel towards their children, and birds that share one another's pains. For the friend wants, if 35possible, not merely to feel pain along with his friend, but to feel the same pain, e.g. to feel thirsty when he is thirsty, if that were possible, and if not, then to feel a pain as like as possible. The same words are applicable to joy, which, if felt for no other reason than that the other feels joy, is a sign of friendship.
1240b
1 χαίρειν> μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκεῖνον, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλικόν. ἔτι
τὰ τοιάδε λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ [μὴ]
μίαν ψυχὴν εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρεται
πρὸς τὸν ἕνα. καὶ γὰρ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ
5 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εὖ ποιεῖ διά τι
ἕτερον, οὐδὲ χάριτος. οὐ δὲ λέγει ὅτι ἐποίησεν ᾗ εἷς· δοκεῖ
γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι ὁ δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ
φιλεῖν. καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ τὸ συζῆν καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν
καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὴ
10 δύνασθαι ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν.
οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὁ εἷς, καὶ ἴσως ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. —πάντα
δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτόν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πονηρῷ
διαφωνεῖ, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ
καὶ ἐχθρὸν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι· ᾗ δ' εἷς καὶ
15 ἀδιαίρετος, ὀρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ. τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ
κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πολλοί,
καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἔμπληκτος. ὥστε
καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
ὅτι γάρ πῃ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός,
20 ταύτῃ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος καὶ ὀρεκτός· φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος,
ἀλλ' ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς οὔθ' ἅμα λοιδορεῖται
ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκρατής, οὔτε ὁ ὕστερος τῷ πρότερον,
ὥσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός, οὔτε ὁ ἔμπροσθεν τῷ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ
ὁ ψεύστης. ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ διορίζουσιν,
25 ὥσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπουδαῖος. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς
τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαῖον αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν
αὑτοῖς, ἀποκτιννύασιν αὑτούς· ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ
ἀγαθός. ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἁπλῶς ὢν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς
αὑτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι δύ' ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ ἃ φύσει
30 βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπάσαι ἀδύνατον. διὸ ἐπ'
ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν
ἄλλων ζῴων <οὔ>, οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ **, οὐκ ἄρα φίλος.
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἤδη ἔχῃ προαίρεσιν· ἤδη
γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. —ἔοικε δ' ἡ
35 φιλία ἡ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ κατὰ συγγένειαν· οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἐφ'
αὑτοῖς λῦσαι, ἀλλὰ κἂν διαφέρωνται, ὅμως οὗτοι μὲν
ἔτι συγγενεῖς, ὃ δὲ ἔτι εἷς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ.
1Further, we say about friendship such things as that friendship is equality, and true friends a single soul. All such phrases point back to the single individual; for a man wishes good to himself in this fashion; for no one benefits himself for some, further reason or speaks well of himself for a certain 5consideration, because his action is that of an individual; for he who shows that he loves wishes not to love but to be thought to love. And wishing the existence above all of the friend, living with him, sharing his joy and his grief, unity of soul with the friend, the impossibility of even living without one another, and the dying together are characteristic of a single individual. (For such is 10the condition of the individual and he is perhaps company to himself.) All these characters then we find in the relation of the good man to himself. In the bad man, e.g. the incontinent, there is variance, and for this reason it seems possible for a man to be at enmity with himself; but so far as he is single and indivisible, he is an object of desire to himself. Such is the good man, 15the man whose friendship is based on virtue, for the wicked man is not one but many, in the same day other than himself and fickle. So that a man's friendship for himself is at bottom friendship towards the good; for because a man is in a sense like himself, single, and good for himself, so far he is a friend and object of desire to himself. And this is natural to man; but the bad man is 20unnatural. The good man never finds fault with himself at the moment of his act, like the incontinent, nor the later with the earlier man, like the penitent, nor the earlier with the later, like the liar. Generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as 'Coriscus' to 'good Coriscus'. For it is clear that some identical portion of them is good; for 25when they blame themselves, they kill themselves. But every one seems good to himself. But the man that is good absolutely, seeks to be a friend to himself, as has been said, since he has within him two parts which by nature desire to be friends and which it is impossible to tear apart. Therefore in the case of man each is thought to be the friend of himself; but not so with the other 30animals; e.g. the horse is himself to himself... therefore not a friend. Nor are children, till they have attained the power of deliberate choice; for already then the mind is at variance with the appetite. One's friendship to oneself resembles the friendship arising from kinship; for neither bond can be dissolved by one's own power; but, even if they quarrel, the kinsmen remain kinsmen; and 35so the man remains one so long as he lives. The various senses then of loving, and how all friendships reduce to the primary kind, is clear from what has been said.
Book 4,Chapter 7 (1240b38–1241a33)
ποσαχῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ
φιλίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·
It is appropriate to the inquiry to study agreement of feeling and kindly feeling; for some identify these, and others think they cannot exist apart.
1241a
1 οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας.
δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων.
ἔστι δ' ἡ εὔνοια τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἕτερον
οὔτε ταὐτόν. διῃρημένης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους,
5 οὔτ' ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὔτ' ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐστίν. εἴτε γὰρ
ὅτι χρήσιμον, βούλεται αὐτῷ τἀγαθά, οὐ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ
δι' αὑτὸν βούλοιτ' ἄν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ ** καὶ ἡ εὔνοια οὐκ
αὐτοῦ εὔνοια τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾧ εὐνοεῖ· εἰ
δὴ ἦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος φιλίᾳ, κἂν τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὐνόουν. ὥστε
10 δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὔνοια ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ
μὲν εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν
ἃ βούλεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εὔνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος
πᾶς εὔνους, ὁ δ' εὔνους οὐ πᾶς φίλος. ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ
ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλία.
15 ** δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἵ τε φίλοι ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες
φίλοι εἶναι. ἔστι δ' οὐ περὶ πάντα ἡ ὁμόνοια ἡ φιλική,
ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζῆν
συντείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν
(ἔστι γὰρ τἀναντία τὸ κινοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ
20 διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο), οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖν
καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμόνοια·
οἵ γε φαῦλοι ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες βλάπτουσιν
ἀλλήλους. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμονοία οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι,
ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ φιλία· ἀλλ' ἣ μὲν πρώτη καὶ φύσει
25 σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἔστι τοὺς φαύλους ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ καθ'
ἣν καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν
καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχωσιν. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν
ὀρέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὗ ὀρέγονται.
ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται, ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται·
30 οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ' οὐ μαχοῦνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ ὁμόνοια, ὅταν
περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾖ, μὴ
τοῦ ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία
πολιτική.
1Now kindly feeling is not altogether different from friendship, nor yet the same; for when we distinguish friendship according to its three sorts, kindly feeling is found neither in the friendship of usefulness nor in that of pleasure. For if one wishes well to the other because that is useful to one, one 5would be so wishing not for the object's sake, but for his own; but goodwill seems like... to be not for the sake of him who feels the goodwill, but for the sake of him towards whom it is felt. But if goodwill existed in the friendship towards the pleasant, then men would feel goodwill towards things inanimate. So that it is clear that goodwill is concerned with the friendship that 10depends on character; but goodwill shows itself in merely wishing, friendship in also doing what one wishes. For goodwill is the beginning of friendship; every friend has goodwill, but not all who have goodwill are friends. He who has goodwill only is like a man at the beginning, and therefore it is the beginning of friendship, not friendship itself. For friends seem to agree in 15feeling, and those who agree in feeling seem to be friends. Friendly agreement is not about all things, but only about things that may be done by those in agreement and what relates to their common life. Nor is it agreement merely in thought or merely in desire, for it is possible to know one thing and desire the opposite, as in the incontinent the motives disagree, nor if a man 20agrees with another in deliberate choice, does he necessarily agree in desire. Agreement is only found in the case of good men; at least, bad men when they choose and desire the same things harm one another. Agreement, like friendship, does not appear to have a single meaning; but still in its primary and natural form it is morally good; and so the bad cannot agree; the agreement 25of the bad, when they choose and desire the same things, is something different. And the two parties must so desire the same thing that it is possible for both to get what they desire; for if they desire that which cannot belong to both, they will quarrel; but those in agreement will not quarrel. There is agreement when the two parties make the same choice as to who is to rule, who 30to be ruled, meaning by 'the same', not that each one should choose himself, but that both should choose the same person. Agreement is the friendship of fellow citizens. So much then about agreement and goodwill.
Book 4,Chapter 8 (1241a34–1241b9)
περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα·
35 ἀπορεῖται δὲ διὰ τί μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες
εὖ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὖ τοὺς ποιήσαντας. δοκεῖ
δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι τοὐναντίον. τοῦτο δ' ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἄν τις
διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον συμβαίνειν· τῷ
μὲν γὰρ ὀφείλεται, τὸν δ' ἀποδοῦναι δεῖ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
40 μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυσικόν. ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αἱρετώτερον,
It is disputed why benefactors are more fond of the benefited than the benefited of their benefactors. The opposite seems to be just. One might suppose it happens from 35consideration of utility and what is profitable to oneself; for the benefactor has a debt due to him, while the benefited has to repay a debt. This, however, is not all; the reason is partly the general natural principle—activity is more desirable. There is the same relation between the effect and the activity, the benefited being as it were an effect or creation of the benefactor.
1241b
1 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὁ δ'
εὖ παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ζῴοις ἡ περὶ τὰ τέκνα σπουδὴ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ <τὰ>
γεννώμενα σῴζειν. καὶ φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες τὰ
5 τέκνα (καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων) ἢ φιλοῦνται· καὶ οὗτοι
πάλιν τὰ αὑτῶν ἢ τοὺς γεννήσαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν
εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον· καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον
οἴονται αὑτῶν εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ
διορίζουσι, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν μήτηρ.
1Hence in animals their strong feeling for their children, both in begetting them and in preserving them afterwards. And so fathers love their children—and still more mothers—more than they are loved by them. And these again love their own children more than; their parents, 5because nothing is so good as activity; in fact, mothers love more than fathers because they think the children to be more their own creation; for the amount of work is measured by the difficulty, and the mother suffers more in birth. So much then for friendship towards oneself and among more than one.
Book 4,Chapter 9 (1241b10–40)
10 καὶ περὶ μὲν φιλίας τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ τῆς ἐν πλείοσι
διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· δοκεῖ δὲ τό τε δίκαιον εἶναι
ἴσον τι καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται
ἰσότης [ἡ] φιλότης. αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος·
κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου
15 συνέστηκεν, ὥστε ὅσα εἴδη φιλίας, καὶ δικαίου καὶ κοινωνίας,
καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐγγὺς
ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς
σῶμα καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς
δοῦλον, τούτων μὲν οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δύ' ἐστίν,
20 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἕν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνός [οὐδέν]. οὐδὲ διαιρετὸν
τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ἑνὸς οὗ ἕνεκα
ἐστίν. τό τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ
δεσπότου ὁ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν,
τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὥσπερ δοῦλος ἄψυχος. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι
25 εἰσὶν [ἢ] μόριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν
φρατέρων ἢ τῶν ὀργίων, ἢ αἱ χρηματιστικαὶ ἔτι πολιτεῖαι.
αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι ἐν οἰκείοις συνυπάρχουσι, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ
καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἁρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις)· βασιλικὴ μὲν ἡ τοῦ
30 γεννήσαντος, ἀριστοκρατικὴ δ' ἡ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, πολιτεία
δ' ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννὶς
ὀλιγαρχία δῆμος. καὶ τὰ δίκαια δὴ τοσαῦτα.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν,
καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἴδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας.
35 κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ <δημοκρατικὴ> κοινωνία καὶ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ
φιλία, τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὅρῳ μετρεῖται· κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ ἀριστοκρατικὴ
ἀρίστη καὶ βασιλική. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δίκαιον τῷ ὑπερέχοντι
καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. καὶ ἡ φιλία
δὲ ὁμοίως πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις
40 ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.
But both justice seems to be a sort of 10equality and friendship also involves equality, if the saying is not wrong that 'love is equality'. Now constitutions are all of them a particular form of justice; for a constitution is a partnership, and every partnership rests on justice, so that whatever be the number of species of friendship, there are the same of justice and partnership; 15these all border on one another, and the species of one have differences akin to those of the other. But since there is the same relation between soul and body, artisan and tool, and master and slave, between each of these pairs there is no partnership; for they are not two, but the first term in each is one, and the second a part of this one, 20but not itself one. Nor is the good to be divided between the two, but that of both belongs to the one for the sake of which the pair exists. For the body is the soul's congenital tool, while the slave is as it were a part and detachable tool of the master, the tool being a sort of inanimate slave. The other partnerships are a part of the 25civic partnership, e.g. those of the phratries and priestly colleges or pecuniary partnerships. All constitutions are found together in the household, both the true and the corrupt forms, for the same thing is true in constitutions as of harmonies. The government of the children by the father is royal, the relation of husband and wife aristocratic, 30the relation of brothers that of a commonwealth; the corruption of these three are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. The forms of justice then are also so many in number. But since equality is either numerical or proportional, there will be various species of justice, friendship, and partnership; on numerical equality rests the commonwealth, 35and the friendship of comrades—both being measured by the, same standard, on proportional the aristocratic (which is best), and the royal. For the same thing is not just for the superior and the inferior; what is proportional is just. Such is the friendship between father and child; and the same sort of thing may be seen in partnerships.
Book 4,Chapter 10 (1242a1–1243b38)
1242a
1 λέγονται δὲ φιλίαι συγγενικὴ ἑταιρικὴ κοινωνικὴ
ἡ λεγομένη πολιτική. ἔστι μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἔχουσα
εἴδη, ἣ μὲν ὡς ἀδελφῶν, ἣ δ' ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶν (καὶ
γὰρ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ἡ πατρική, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμόν,
5 οἷον ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἑταιρικῆς· ἐπιλαμβάνουσι
γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρέσβειον)· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ συνέστηκε
μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ μάλιστα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ
αὐταρκεῖν δοκοῦσι συνελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ συνῆλθόν γ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ
συζῆν χάριν. μόνη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ παρ' αὐτὴν παρέκβασις
10 οὐ μόνον φιλίαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν·
αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καθ' ὑπεροχήν. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τῇ τῶν
χρησίμων φιλίᾳ, διὰ τὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.
ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνῆλθον πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕνεκα κοινοῦ
τινος (οἷον γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχή) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρωμένου ἕνεκεν.
15 συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἧς
δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἐστίν. ** καὶ τὸ τρυπάνῳ
εἶναι διττόν, ὧν τὸ κυριώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ τρύπησις.
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ εἴδει σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.
τὸ δὴ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ ὁμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν δίκαιόν
20 τι ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν πρὸς φίλον.
τό τε γὰρ δίκαιόν τισι καὶ κοινωνοῖς, καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνός,
ὃ μὲν γένους, ὃ δὲ βίου. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον
πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῷον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ
τἆλλά ποτε συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι [καὶ] θήλει καὶ
25 ἄρρενι ἀλλ' αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν, ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν
ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πρὸς οὓς φύσει συγγένεια ἐστίν· καὶ κοινωνία
τοίνυν καὶ δίκαιόν τι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πόλις εἴη· οἰκία δ'
ἐστί τις φιλία. δεσπότου μὲν οὖν καὶ δούλου ἥπερ καὶ
τέχνης καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, αἱ δὲ
30 τοιαῦται οὔτε φιλίαι οὔτε δικαιοσύναι, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον,
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον· γυναικὸς
δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία· πατρὸς
δὲ καὶ υἱοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ
εὖ ποιήσαντος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει ἄρχοντος
35 πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον· ἣ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν
πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑταιρικὴ μάλιστα ἡ κατ' ἰσότητα.
"οὐ γάρ τι νόθος τῷδ' ἀπεδείχθην·
ἀμφοῖν δὲ πατὴρ αὑτὸς ἐκλήθη
Ζεὺς ἐμὸς ἄρχων."
40 ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἴσον ζητούντων λέγεται. διὸ ἐν οἰκίᾳ
1We speak of friendships of kinsmen, comrades, partners, the so-called 'civic friendship'. That of kinsmen has more than one species, that of brothers, that of father and sons. There is the friendship based on proportion, as that of the father to his children, and that based on mere number, e.g. that of brothers, 5for this latter resembles the friendship of comrades; for here too age gives certain privileges. Civic friendship has been established mainly in accordance with utility; for men seem to have come together because each is not sufficient for himself, though they would have come together anyhow for the sake of living in company. Only the civic friendship and its parallel corruption are not merely 10friendships, but the partnership is that of friends; other friendships rest on the relation of superiority. The justice belonging to the friendship of those useful to one another is pre-eminently justice, for it is civic or political justice. The concurrence of the saw and the art that uses it is of another sort; for it is not for some end common to both—it is like instrument and soul—but 15for the sake of the user. It is true that the tool itself receives attention, and it is just that it should receive it, for its function, that is; for it exists for the sake of its function. And the essence of a gimlet is twofold, but more properly it is its activity, namely boring. In this class come the body and a slave, as has been said before. To inquire, then, how to behave to a friend 20is to look for a particular kind of justice, for generally all justice is in relation to a friend. For justice involves a number of individuals who are partners, and the friend is a partner either in family or in one's scheme of life. For man is not merely a political but also a household-maintaining animal, and his unions are not, like those of the other animals, confined to certain times, 25and formed with any chance partner, whether male or female; but in a special sense man is not a lonely being, but has a tendency to partnership with those to whom he is by nature akin. There would, then, be partnership and a kind of justice, even if there were no State; and the household is a kind of friendship; the relation, indeed, of master and servant is that of an art and its tools, 30a soul and its body; and these are not friendships, nor forms of justice, but something similar to justice; just as health is not justice, but something similar. But the friendship of man and wife is a friendship based on utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that of God to man, of the benefactor to the benefited, and in general of the natural ruler to the natural 35subject. That of brothers to one another is eminently that of comrades, inasmuch as it involves equality—'for I was not declared a bastard brother to him; but the same Zeus, my king, was called the father of both of us.' For this is the language of men that seek equality. Therefore in the household first we have the sources and springs of friendship, of political organization, and of justice.
1242b
1 πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαὶ φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας καὶ δικαίου.
ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλίαι τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρετήν, κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,
κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, τούτων δὲ ἑκάστης δύο διαφοραί (ἣ μὲν
γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἣ δὲ κατ' ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν,
5 τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων
δῆλον), ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ'
οὐχ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον,
ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττονος
γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ, διακείμενος ὥσπερ
10 ἄρχων πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον
κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνιῶν
οὕτω συμβαίνει. ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἴσου μετέχουσιν,
ὁτὲ δὲ λόγῳ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον ἀριθμῷ εἰσήνεγκον
ἀργύριον, ἴσον καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ διαλαμβάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ
15 μὴ ἴσον, ἀνάλογον. ὁ δ' ὑπερεχόμενος τοὐναντίον στρέφει
τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν. δόξειε δ'
ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὁ ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἡ φιλία
καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. δεῖ ἄρα τινὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀνισάσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι
ἀνάλογον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τιμή, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι
20 φύσει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ ἰσασθῆναι τὸ
κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμήν.
ἡ δὲ κατ' ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτική. ἡ δὲ πολιτική
ἐστι μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀλλήλαις
φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοίως
25 "οὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆας",
καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ
χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἡ φιλία· ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄρχον καὶ
ἀρχόμενον οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε τὸ βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν
τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα ὅπως εὖ ποιῇ ὁ θεός, ἀλλ'
30 ἵνα ἴσον ᾖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας. κατ' ἰσότητα δὴ
βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρησίμου φιλίας
εἴδη δύο, ἣ μὲν νομικὴ ἣ δ' ἠθική. βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν
πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες
καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι. διὸ εἴρηται "μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ."
35 ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν <ᾖ> ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, [καὶ]
νομική· ὅταν δ' ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι
φιλία καὶ ἑταιρική. διὸ μάλιστα ἔγκλημα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ
φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν. ἕτεραι γὰρ φιλίαι ἡ
κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν· οἳ δ' ἀμφότερα
40 βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου
1But since there are three sorts of friendship, based on virtue, utility, and pleasantness respectively, and two varieties of each of these—for each of them may imply either superiority or equality—and the justice involved in these is clear from the debates that have been held on it, in a friendship 5between superior and inferior the claim for proportion takes different forms, the superior's claim being one for inverse proportion, i.e. as he is to the inferior, so should what he receives from the inferior be to what the inferior receives from him, he being in the position of ruler to subject; if he cannot get that, he demands at least numerical equality. For so it is 10in the other associations, the two members enjoying an equality sometimes of number, sometimes of ratio. For if they contributed numerically equal sums of money, they divide an equal amount, and by an equal number; if not equal sums, then they divide proportionally. But the inferior inverts this proportion and joins crosswise. But in this way the superior would seem to come 15off the worse, and friendship and partnership to be a gratuitous burden. Equality must then be restored and proportion created by some other means; and this means is honour, which by nature belongs to a ruler or god in relation to a subject. The profit and the honour must be equated. But civic friendship is that resting on equality; it is based on utility; and just as 20cities are friends to one another, so in the like way are citizens. 'The Athenians no longer know the Megarians'; nor do citizens one another, when they are no longer useful to one another, and the friendship is merely a temporary one for a particular exchange of goods. There is here, too, the relation of ruler and subject which is neither the natural relation, nor that 25involved in kingship, but each is ruler and ruled in turn; nor is it either's purpose to act with the free beneficence of a god, but that he may share equally in the good and in the burdensome service. Civic friendship, then, claims to be one based on equality. But of the friendship of utility there are two kinds, the strictly legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to 30equality and to the object as sellers and buyers do; hence the proverb 'a fixed wage for a friend'. When, then, friendship proceeds by contract, it is of the civic and strictly legal kind; but when each of the two parties leaves the return for his services to be fixed by the other, we have the moral friendship, that of comrades. Therefore recrimination is very frequent in 35this sort of friendship; and the reason is that it is unnatural; for friendships based on utility and based on virtue are different; but these wish to have both together, associating together really for the sake of utility, but representing their friendship as moral, like that of good men; pretending to trust one another they make out their friendship to be not merely legal.
1243a
1 ἕνεκα, ἠθικὴν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπιεικεῖς, διὸ ὡς πιστεύοντες
οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν
πλεῖστα ἐγκλήματα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀνέγκλητον, οἱ δ'
ἡδεῖς ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται· οἱ δὲ χρήσιμοι
5 οὐκ εὐθὺς διαλύονται, ἂν μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἑταιρικῶς προςφέρωνται)·
ὅμως δὲ τῆς χρησίμου ἡ νομικὴ ἀνέγκλητος.
ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν νομικὴ διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται
γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ ἴσον), ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἑκούσιος. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ νόμος
ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὁμιλοῦσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι δίκας τῶν ἑκουσίων
10 συναλλαγμάτων, ὀρθῶς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πέφυκε
δίκαιον εἶναι, οἳ δ' ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττουσιν.
ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα
αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, πῶς ἑκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ
μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύσωσιν. καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ
15 κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα βλέποντα τὸ
ὑπηρετηθὲν, πόσον, ἢ ποῖον ἦν τῷ πεπονθότι. ἐνδέχεται
γὰρ ὅπερ λέγει Θέογνις·
"σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεά, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα."
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ,
20 σοὶ μὲν παιδιὰν τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐντεῦθεν δ'
εἴρηται τὰ ἐγκλήματα. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὡς
μέγα ὑπηρετήσας, ὅτι δεομένῳ ἐποίησιν, ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο,
λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὠφέλειαν πόσον ἠδύνατο, ἀλλ' οὐ
τί ἦν αὐτῷ· ὃ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅσον
25 αὐτῷ. ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει. ὃ
μὲν γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῷ μικρὸν ἀπέβη, ὃ δ' ὅσον αὐτῷ μέγα
ἐδύνατο, οἷον εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἄξιον ὠφέλησεν, ὃ
μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ὃ δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ
ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα περὶ τούτων
30 ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότ' ἦν, ὃ δὲ
πῶς νῦν, ἂν μὴ διείπωνται. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς
τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν
προαίρεσιν. ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐστί, καὶ δικαιοσύνη
φιλική. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι, διότι καλλίων μὲν
35 ἡ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἡ χρησίμη. οἳ δ' ἄρχονται
μὲν ὡς οἱ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν ὄντες· ὅταν δ'
ἄντικρυς ᾖ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν.
ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ καλόν· διὸ καὶ
1For in general there are more recriminations in the useful friendship than in either of the other two (for virtue is not given to recrimination, and pleasant friends having got what they wanted, and given what they had, are done with it; but useful friends do not dissolve their association at once, if their relations are not merely legal 5but those of comrades); still the legal form of useful friendship is free from recrimination. The legal association is dissolved by a money-payment (for it measures equality in money), but the moral is dissolved by voluntary consent. Therefore in some countries the law forbids lawsuits for voluntary transactions between those who associate thus as friends, and rightly; for good men do not go to law with one another; and such 10as these have dealings with one another as good men themselves, and dealing with men who can be trusted. In this kind of friendship it is uncertain how either will recriminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other, not in a limited legal way but on the basis of their characters. It is a further problem on which of two grounds we are to determine what is just, whether by looking to the amount of the service rendered, 15or to what was its character for the recipient; for, to borrow the language of Theognis, the service may be 'Small to thee, O goddess, but great to me'. Or the opposite may happen, as in the saying, 'this is sport to you but death to me.' Hence, as we have said, come recriminations. For the benefactor claims a return on the ground of having done a great service, because he has done it at the request of the other, or with 20some other plea of the great value of the benefit to the other's interest, saying nothing about what it was to himself; while the recipient insists on its value to the benefactor, not on its value to himself. Sometimes the receiver inverts the position, insisting how little the benefit has turned out to him, while the doer insists on its great magnitude to him, e.g. if at considerable risk one has benefited another to the extent 25of a drachma, the one insists on the greatness of the risk, the other on the smallness of the money, just as in the repayment of money—for there the dispute is on this point—the one claims the value of it when it was lent, the other concedes only the value of it now when it is returned, unless they have made an explicit provision in the contract. Civic friendship, then, looks to the agreement and the thing, moral friendship 30to the purpose; here then we have more truly justice, and a friendly justice. The reason of the quarrel is that moral friendship is more noble, but useful friendship more necessary; men come, then, proposing to be moral friends, i.e. friends through virtue; but when some private interest stands in the way, they show clearly they were not so. For the multitude aim at the noble only when they have plenty of everything else; 35and at noble friendship similarly. So that it is clear what distinctions should be drawn in these matters. If the two are moral friends, we must look to see if the purpose of each is equal; and then nothing more should be claimed by either from the other.
1243b
1 τὴν καλλίω φιλίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλεπτέον
εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιωτέον θατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου· εἰ
δ' ὡς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί, ὡς ἂν ἐλυσιτέλει ὁμολογοῦσιν·
5 ἂν δ' ὃ μὲν φῇ ὧδε ὃ δὲ ἐκείνως, οὐ καλὸν μὲν
ἀντιποιῆσαι, δέον τοὺς καλοὺς λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ θατέρου, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ διείποντο ὡς ἠθικῶς, δεῖ κρίνειν
τίνα, μηδ' ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐξαπατᾶν. ὥστε
δεῖ στέργειν αὐτὸν τὴν τύχην. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ κατὰ
10 προαίρεσιν, δῆλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθὼν μὴ ἀποδῴη
δι' ἀδυναμίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἠδύνατο, καλῶς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀνέχεται
κατὰ δύναμιν λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας. ἀλλὰ τῷ
πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἕξει, ἂν μὴ φήσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον
δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.
15 πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις τοῖς μὴ κατ'
εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον. χαλεπὸν γὰρ μετρῆσαι
ἑνὶ τῷδε τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν
ἐρωτικῶν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ὡς [τὸν] ἡδὺν ἐπὶ τὸ συζῆν, ὃ δ'
ἐκεῖνον ἐνίοτε ὡς χρήσιμον· ὅταν δὲ παύσηται τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἄλλου
20 γινομένου ἄλλος γίνεται, καὶ τότε λογίζονται παντί τινος, καὶ ὡς
Πύθων καὶ Παμμένης διεφέροντο καὶ ὡς διδάσκαλος καὶ μαθητής
(ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἑνὶ μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Ἡρόδικος
ὁ ἰατρὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀποδιδόντα μικρὸν τὸν μισθόν,
καὶ ὡς ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδεῖ,
25 ὃ δ' ὡς χρησίμῳ ὡμίλει· ὃ δ' ἐπεὶ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι, αὐτὸν
αὑτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον
ᾄσαντα εὐφρᾶναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποσχόμενος ἐκείνῳ. ὅμως
δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωριστέον· ἑνὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρητέον
καὶ ἐνταῦθ', ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅρῳ, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀνάλογον γὰρ
30 μετρητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία. πῶς
γὰρ κοινωνήσει γεωργῷ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθήσεται
τὰ ἔργα; τοῖς δὲ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον
μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ὃ μὲν σοφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὃ δ' ἐκείνῳ
ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον, εἶτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς
35 ἑκάτερον. εἰ γὰρ ὃ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἥμισυ ἔδωκεν, ὃ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος
μὴ πολλοστὸν μέρος, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος ἀδικεῖ. ἔστι δὲ κἀνταῦθα
ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φῇ ὃ μὲν ὡς χρησίμους
συνελθεῖν αὐτούς, ὃ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ὡς κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ φιλίαν.
1But if their friendship is of the useful or civic kind, we must consider what would have been profitable lines for an agreement. And if one declares that they are friends on one basis, but the other on the other, it is not honourable, if one ought to do something in return, merely to use fine language; and so too, 5in the other case, but since they have not declared their friendship a moral friendship, some one must be made judge, so that neither cheats the other by a false pretence; and so each must put up with his luck. But that moral friendship is based on purpose is clear, since even if after receiving great benefits one does not repay them through inability, but repays only to the extent of his ability, 10he acts honourably; and God is satisfied at getting sacrifices as good as our power allows. But a seller of goods will not be satisfied if the buyer says he cannot pay more; nor will a lender of money. Recriminations are common in dissimilar friendships, where action and reaction are not in the same straight line; and it is not easy to see what is just. For it is hard to measure by just 15this one unit different directions; we find this in the relation of lovers, for there the one pursues the other as the one pleasant person, in order to live with him, while the latter seeks the other at times for his utility. When the love is over, one changes as the other changes. Then they calculate the quid pro quo; thus Python and Pammenes quarrelled; and so in general do teacher and pupil 20(for knowledge and money have no common measure), and so Herodicus the doctor quarrelled with a patient who paid him only a small fee; such too was the case of the king and the lyre-player; the former regarded his associate as pleasant, the latter his as useful; and so the king, when he had to pay, chose to regard himself as an associate of the pleasant kind, and said that just as the player 25had given him pleasure by singing, so he had given the player pleasure by his promise. But it is clear here too how one should decide; the measurement must be by one measure, only here not by a number but by a ratio; we must measure by proportion, just as one measures in the associations of citizens. For how is a cobbler to have dealings with a farmer unless one equates the work of the two by 30proportion? so to all whose exchanges are not of the same for the same, proportion is the measure, e.g. if the one complains that he has given wisdom, and the other that he has given money, we must measure first the ratio of wisdom to wealth, and then what has been given for each. For if the one gives half of the lesser, and the other does not give even a small fraction of the greater object, 35it is clear that the latter does injustice. Here, too, there may be a dispute at the start, if one party pretends they have come together for use, and the other denies this and alleges that they have met from some other kind of friendship.
Book 4,Chapter 11 (1244a1–36)
1244a
1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλου, σκεπτέον
πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τὰ χρήσιμα ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ
ἀντιποιοῦντι καὶ δυναμένῳ. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόβλημα ἐστί,
πότερον τὸν φίλον ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὖ ποιητέον μᾶλλον. ἂν
5 μὲν γὰρ <ὁ> φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπόν, ἂν
μή τις τὸ μὲν αὐξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα
ποιῶν, ἐπιεικῆ δὲ ἠρέμα· εἰ δὲ μή, πολλὰ προβλήματα
γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὃ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὃ δὲ ἔσται, οὔπω δέ, ἢ
ὃ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δ' οὔ, ὃ δὲ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἔσται, ** ἀλλ'
10 ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον. μὴ γάρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης, ποιήσας
"λόγων δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,
ἔργον δ' ἐκεῖνος ἔργον <ὃς> παρέσχετο."
καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἃ δεῖ τῇ μητρί· καίτοι
βελτίων ὁ πατήρ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδ' ἔχει
15 πάσας τὰς τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινάς· ἴσως οὖν ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ,
ἄλλα δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. οἷον οὐχ εἰ σῖτον δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα,
καὶ συζῆν τούτῳ δεῖ· οὐδ' ᾧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἃ μὴ οὗτος
δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος. ἀλλ' οἳ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες τούτῳ
πάντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ διδόασιν οὐ δέον, οὐδενός εἰσιν ἄξιοι.
20 καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μέν πώς
εἰσι φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ
βούλεσθαι τὰ κείνῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τῷ εὖ ποιήσαντι καὶ τῷ
ὁποῖος δεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει οὗτος ὁ ὁρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας),
ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθ' ἡδονὴν
25 τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν· πάντες δ' οὗτοι οἱ ὅροι κατὰ
φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δ' οὐδείς. διὸ πολλοὶ
εἰσί, καὶ ἕκαστος μιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὤν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ εἶναι
προαίρεσις. καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ ** βούλεται
τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ αὑτοῦ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ
30 καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ συζῆν οὐ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡδεῖ.
ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἀλλήλους ἔνιοι· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μᾶλλον,
ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὸ φιλεῖ κἀκείνους οἷον διότι
ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον εἵλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο· χρησιμώτερος
γάρ. διὸ <οὐ> δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μᾶλλον
35 εἵλετο ἀντὶ ἥττονος. οἳ δ' ἐγκαλοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι
τὸν ἀγαθόν, πρότερον ζητήσαντες τὸν ἡδὺν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον.
1As regards the good man who is loved for his virtue, we must consider whether we ought to render useful services and help to him, or to one who makes a return and has power. This is the same problem as whether we ought rather to benefit a friend or a virtuous man. For if a man is both virtuous and a friend, there is perhaps no great difficulty, 5if one does not exaggerate the one quality and minimize the other, making him very much of a friend, but not much of a good man. But in other cases many problems arise, e.g. if the one has been but will no longer remain so, and the other will be but is not yet what he is going to be, or the one was but is not, and the other is but has not been and will not be. But the other is a harder question. For perhaps Euripides is right in 10saying, 'A word is your just pay for a word, but a deed for him who has given deeds.' And one must not do everything for one's father, but there are some things also one should do for one's mother, though a father is the better of the two. For, indeed, even to Zeus we do not sacrifice all things, nor does he have all honours but only some. Perhaps, then, there are things which should be rendered to the useful friend and others to 15the good one; e.g. because a man gives you food and what is necessary, you need not give him your society; nor, therefore, need you give the man to whom you grant your society that which not he but the useful friend gives. Those who doing this give all to the object of their love, when they ought not, are worthless. And the various definitions of friendship that we give in our discourse all belong to friendship in some sense, but 20not to the same friendship. To the useful friend applies the fact that one wishes what is good for him, and to a benefactor, and in fact to any kind of friend—for this definition does not distinguish the class of friendship; to another we should wish existence, of another we should wish the society, to the friend on the basis of pleasure sympathy in joy and grief is the proper gift. All these definitions are appropriate to some 25friendship, but none to a single unique thing, friendship. Hence there are many definitions, and each appears to belong to a single unique thing, viz. friendship, though really it does not, e.g. the purpose to maintain the friend's existence. For the superior friend and benefactor wishes the existence of that which he has made, and to him who has given one existence one ought to give it in return, but not necessarily one's society; 30that gift is for the pleasant friend. Some friends wrong one another; they love rather the things than the possessor of them; and so they love the persons much as they choose wine because it is pleasant, or wealth because it is useful; for wealth is more useful than its owner. Therefore the owner is indignant, as if the other had preferred his wealth to him as to something inferior. But the other side complain in turn; for they 35now look to find in him a good man, when before they looked for one pleasant or useful.
Book 4,Chapter 12 (1244b1–1246a25)
1244b
1 σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκείας καὶ φιλίας, πῶς
ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον,
εἴ τις εἴη κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ ** φίλος.
εἰ κατ' ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς αὐταρκέστατος,
5 εἰ ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τί ἂν δέοι φίλου; οὔτε γὰρ
τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὔτε τῶν εὐφρανούντων
οὔτε τοῦ συζῆν· αὐτὸς γὰρ αὑτῷ ἱκανὸς συνεῖναι. μάλιστα
δὲ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἐπὶ θεοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδενὸς προσδεόμενος
οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδ' ἔσται αὐτῷ οὔτε μηθὲν δεσπότου.
10 ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεήσεται
φίλου, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστα ζῶντι, καὶ
ἀεὶ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅπως ὦσι φίλοι,
ἀλλ' ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ
15 συζῆν αἱρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε φανερὸν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν
ὡς οὐ χρήσεως ἕνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδ' ὠφελείας, ἀλλὰ
δι' ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γὰρ μηθενὸς ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν,
τότε τοὺς συναπλαυσομένους ζητοῦσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους
μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ποιήσοντας. ἀμείνω δ' ἔχομεν κρίσιν
20 αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετ' ἐνδείας, ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζῆν
ἀξίων δεόμεθα φίλων. περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον,
μή ποτε τὸ μέν τι λέγεται καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανθάνει
διὰ τὴν παραβολήν. δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατ'
ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
25 καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ
τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὑτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ
αὑτὸν γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτατον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν
πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ ὄρεξις· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι γνῶσιν
τινά. εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέμοι καὶ ποιήσειε τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ
30 καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ ** (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ
λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἔστι μὴ λανθάνειν),
οὐθὲν ἂν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἀνθ' αὑτοῦ· τὸ δ'
ὅμοιον τοῦ ζῆν ἀνθ' αὑτοῦ ἄλλον. εὐλόγως δὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτερον. δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα συνθεῖναι
35 δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τε τὸ ζῆν [καὶ] αἱρετόν, καὶ ὅτι
τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν
1We must also consider about independence and friendship, and the relations they have to one another. For one might doubt whether, if a man be in all respects independent, he will have a friend, if one seeks a friend from want and the good man is perfectly independent. If the possessor of virtue is 5happy, why should he need a friend? For the independent man neither needs useful people nor people to cheer him, nor society; his own society is enough for him. This is most plain in the case of a god; for it is clear that, needing nothing, he will not need a friend, nor have one, supposing that he does not need one. So that the happiest man will least need a friend, and only 10as far as it is impossible for him to be independent. Therefore the man who lives the best life must have fewest friends, and they must always be becoming fewer, and he must show no eagerness for men to become his friends, but despise not merely the useful but even men desirable for society. But surely this makes it all the clearer that the friend is not for use or help, but 15that the friend through virtue is the only friend. For when we need nothing, then we all seek others to share our enjoyment, those whom we may benefit rather than those who will benefit us. And we judge better when independent than when in want, and most of all we then seek friends worthy to be lived with. But as to this problem, we must see if we have not been partially 20right, and partially missed the truth owing to our illustration. It will be clear if we ascertain what is life in its active sense and as end. Clearly, it is perception and knowledge, and therefore life in society is perception and knowledge in common. And mere perception and mere knowledge is most desirable to every one, and hence the desire of living is congenital in all; 25for living must be regarded as a kind of knowledge. If then we were to cut off and abstract mere knowledge and its opposite—this passes unnoticed in the argument as we have given it, but in fact need not remain unnoticed—there would be no difference between this and another's knowing instead of oneself; and this is like another's living instead of oneself. But naturally the 30perception and knowledge of oneself is more desirable. For we must take two things into consideration, that life is desirable and also the good, and thence that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as belongs to them. If, then, of such a pair of corresponding series there is always one series of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are in 35general constituted by their participation in the nature of the determined,....
1245a
1 τοιαύτην φύσιν. εἰ οὖν ἐστιν ἀεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ἡ
ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἱρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν
ἐστιν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὡρισμένης φύσεως·
ὥστε τὸ αὑτοῦ βούλεσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὑτὸν εἶναι τοιονδὶ
5 βούλεσθαι ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατ' αὐτούς ἐσμεν ἕκαστον τούτων,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι
ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς γίνεται ταύτῃ καὶ
κατὰ τοῦτο, καθὰ πρότερον αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ᾗ καὶ οὗ, γνωστὸς
δὲ γινώσκων)· ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν ἀεὶ βούλεται, ὅτι
10 βούλεται ἀεὶ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ γνωστόν.
τὸ δὴ συζῆν αἱρεῖσθαι δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοπουμένοις πως
εὔηθες (ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, οἷον
τοῦ συνεσθίειν ἢ τοῦ συμπίνειν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον
οὖσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ χωρίς, ἂν ἀφέλῃς τὸν λόγον;
15 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον·
ἅμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μανθάνειν τοῖς αὐταρκέσι
φίλοις οἷόν τε· μανθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ,
διδάσκοντος δ' ὁ φίλος, ἡ δ' ὁμοιότης φιλία)· ἀλλὰ μὴν
φαίνεταί γε, καὶ πάντες ἥδιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν
20 φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὗ
δύναται ἀρίστου, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς,
τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μουσικῆς, τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας. καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ
εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ. διό φησι "μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι", ὥστ' οὐ δεῖ
γενέσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τούτου γινομένου. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως
25 δοκεῖ φιλίᾳ ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἴσθησιν. —ὁ μὲν τοίνυν
λόγος ἐκεῖνά φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὕτω φαίνεται
γινόμενον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παρακρούεταί πως ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν.
σκεπτέον ἔνθεν τἀληθές. ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι,
30 ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησίν, ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός.
διέσπασται δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐφ' ἑνὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ
κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν τὸ συγγενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα
ὅμοιος ἕτερος, ἄλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ
μόριον ἕτερος ἕτερον. ἀλλ' οὐθέν τε ἧττον βούλεται ὥσπερ
35 αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι
τὸ αὑτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ <τὸν φίλον γνωρίζειν
τὸ> αὑτόν πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνήδεσθαι
καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκείνου
ἅμα αἴσθησις ἀεί), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειοτέρας ἡδονάς. αἴτιον
1so that to wish to perceive one's self is to wish oneself to be of a certain definite character,—since, then, we are not in ourselves possessed of each of such characters, but only by participation in these qualities in perceiving and knowing—for the perceiver becomes perceived in that way and in that respect in which 5he first perceives, and according to the way in which and the object which he perceives; and the knower becomes known in the same way—therefore it is for this reason that one always desires to live, because one always desires to know; and this is because he himself wishes to be the object known. The choice to live with others might seem, from a certain point of view, silly—(first, in the case 10of things common also to the other animals, e.g. eating together, drinking together; for what is the difference between doing these things in the neighbourhood of others or apart from them, if you take away speech? But even to share in speech of a casual kind does not make the case different. Further, for friends who are self-dependent neither teaching nor learning is possible; for if one 15learns, he is not as he should be: and if he teaches, his friend is not; and likeness is friendship)—but surely it is obviously so, and all of us find greater pleasure in sharing good things with friends as far as these come to each—I mean the greatest good one can share; but to some it falls to share in bodily delights, to others in artistic contemplation, to others in philosophy. And the friend 20must be present too; whence the proverb, 'distant friends are a burden', so that men must not be at a distance from one another when there is friendship between them. Hence sensuous love seems like friendship; for the lover aims at the society of his beloved, but not as ideally he ought, but in a merely sensuous way. The argument, then, says what we have before mentioned, raising difficulties; 25but the facts are as we saw later, so that it is clear that the objector is in a way misleading us. We must see the truth from this: a friend wants to be, in the words of the proverb, 'another Heracles', 'a second self': but he is severed from his friend, and it is hard to find in two people the characteristics of a single individual. But though a friend is by nature what is most akin to his 30friend, one man is like another in body, and another like him in soul, and one like him in one part of the body or soul, and another like him in another. But none the less does a friend wish to be as it were a separate self. Therefore to perceive a friend must be in a way to perceive one's self and to know one's self. So that even the vulgar forms of pleasure and life in the society of a friend 35are naturally pleasant (for perception of the friend always takes place at the same time), but still more the communion in the diviner pleasures. And the reason is, that it is always pleasanter to see one's self enjoying the superior good. And this is sometimes a passion, sometimes an action, sometimes something else.
1245b
1 δ' ὅτι ἀεὶ ἥδιον ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ. τοῦτο
δ' ἐστὶν ὁτὲ μὲν πάθος, ὁτὲ δὲ πρᾶξις, ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι. εἰ
δ' αὐτὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν
συνεργεῖν, ἡ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστά γε. διὸ <δεῖ> συνθεωρεῖν
5 καὶ συνευωχεῖσθαι, οὐ τὰ διὰ τροφὴν καὶ τὰ
ἀναγκαῖα· αἱ τοιαῦται ** ὁμιλίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολαύσεις.
ἀλλ' ἕκαστος οὗ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν
τούτῳ βούλεται συζῆν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν
ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων αἱροῦνται μάλιστα. —ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν
10 καὶ δεῖ συζῆν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὅτι
ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος μάλιστα τοιοῦτος, φανερόν·
ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐφαίνετο, καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως συνέβαινε
λέγοντος ἀληθῆ. κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς παραβολῆς
ἀληθοῦς οὔσης ἡ λύσις <οὐκ> ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ τοιοῦτος
15 οἷος δεῖσθαι φίλου, καὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἀξιοῦμεν. καίτοι κατὰ
τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ νοήσει ὁ σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ
θεὸς εὖ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρ' αὐτὸς
αὑτόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον,
ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν.
20 καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὔχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν
ὡς οὐθεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἄμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς. ἐνδεχομένου
γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι ὡς πλείστοις
αἱρετώτατον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν
ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι, ὥστ' οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ πολλοὺς
25 κτήσασθαι (πείρας γὰρ δεῖ), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὖσι χρήσασθαι.
καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπεῖναι εὖ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον βουλόμεθα,
ὁτὲ δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἅμα βούλεσθαι
εἶναι φιλικόν. ἐνδεχομένου μὲν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὖ, τοῦτο
πάντες αἱροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸν
30 Ἡρακλῆ ἴσως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ εἵλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ
μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεῖ θητεύειν. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν
εἴπειεν καὶ ὃν ὁ Λάκων ἔσκωψεν, ἐπεί τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν
χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους. δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ
μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς συμμεθέξεως τῶν
35 χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ
ταῦτα ἀμφότερα συμβαίνει εὐλόγως. δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μηθὲν
εἶναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὡς <μὴ> ἰδεῖν τὸν φίλον· δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν
αἱρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὑτοῦ. διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ
γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὑτῶν
1But if it is pleasant for a man himself to live. well and also his friend, and in their common life to engage in mutually helpful activity, their partnership surely would be above all in things included in the end. Therefore men should contemplate in common and feast in common, only not on the pleasures of food or 5on necessary pleasures; such society does not seem to be true society, but sensuous enjoyment. But the end which each can attain is that in which he desires the society of another; if that is not possible, men desire to benefit and be benefited by friends in preference to others. That society then is right, that all wish it above all things, and that the happiest and best man tends especially 10to do so, is clear. But that the contrary appeared as the conclusion of the argument was also reasonable, since the argument said what was true. For it is in respect of the comparison of the two cases that the solution is found, the case compared being in itself truly enough stated. For because God is not such as to need a friend, the argument claims the same of the man who resembles God. But 15by this reasoning the virtuous man will not even think; for the perfection of God is not in this, but in being superior to thinking of aught beside himself. The reason is, that with us welfare involves a something beyond us, but the deity is his own well-being. As to our seeking and praying for many friends, while we say that the man who has many friends has no friend, both are correct. For 20if it is possible to live with and share the perceptions of many at the same time, it is most desirable that these should be as numerous as possible; but since this is most difficult, the activity of joint perception must exist among fewer. So that it is not only hard to get many friends—for probation is necessary—but also to use them when you have got them. Sometimes we wish the object of our 25love to be happy away from us, sometimes to share the same fortune as ourselves; the wish to be together is characteristic of friendship. For if the two can both be together and be happy, all choose this; but if they cannot be both, then we choose as the mother of Heracles might have chosen, e.g. that her son should be a god rather than in her company but a serf to Eurystheus. One might say 30something like the jesting remark of the Laconian, when some one bade him in a storm to summon the Dioscuri. It appears to be the mark of one who loves to keep the object of his love from sharing in hardships, but of the beloved to wish to share them; the conduct of both is reasonable. For nothing ought to be so painful to a friend as his friend should be pleasant to him, but it is thought that 35he ought not to choose what is for his own interest. Therefore men keep their friends from participation in their calamities; their own suffering is enough, that they may not show themselves studying their own interest, and choosing joy at the cost of a friend's pain, or relief by not bearing their troubles alone.
1246a
1 σκοποῦντες καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπουμένου τοῦ φίλου. ** ἔτι
δὲ τὸ κουφότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά. ἐπεὶ δ'
αἱρετὸν τό τ' εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μετ'
ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερόν πως ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μείζονος.
5 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἅμα, ἤδη διαφέρονται
καὶ οἴονται τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα πάντων φιλικόν, [καὶ] ὥσπερ
συνδειπνεῖν ἅμα φασὶν ἥδιον ταὐτὰ ἔχοντας· οἳ δ' ἂν
μέντοι οὐ βούλονται. ἐπεὶ δ' εἴ γέ τις ὑπερβολὰς ποιήσει,
** ὁμολογῶσιν ἅμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἢ εὖ σφόδρα
10 χωρίς. ** παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας. ὁτὲ
μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπεῖναι οὐδὲ λυπεῖν, ὅταν μηθὲν
μέλλωσι ποιήσειν πλέον· ὁτὲ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἥδιστον παρεῖναι.
τὸ δὲ τῆς ὑπεναντιώσεως ταύτης καὶ μάλ' εὔλογον. διὰ
γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ λυπούμενον
15 ἢ ἐν φαύλῃ ὄντα ἕξει τὸν φίλον θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν
ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τὸ δ' ὁρᾶν τὸν φίλον
ἡδύ, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡδίστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν,
καὶ μὴ κάμνοντα, εἰ αὐτός· ὥστε ὁπότερον ἂν τούτων ᾖ
μᾶλλον ἡδύ, ποιεῖ τὴν ῥοπὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι παρεῖναι ἢ μή.
20 καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν
αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτιμοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ
πράττειν εὖ μηδ' εἶναι ἀνάγκαι ** αὐτοῖς κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίοτε
τοὺς ἐρωμένους συναποτιννύασι. μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ οἰκείου
αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ποτὲ
25 εὖ ἔπραττε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ ᾤετο ἀεὶ κακῶς πράττειν. **
1But since both well-being and participation are desirable, it is clear that participation with a smaller good is more desirable than to enjoy a greater good in solitude. But since the weight to be attached to participation is not ascertained, men differ, and some think that participation in all things at 5once is the mark of friendship, e.g. they say that it is better to dine together than separately, though having the same food: others wish them to share prosperity, since (they say) if one takes extreme cases, great adversity in company is on a par with great prosperity enjoyed alone. We have something similar in the case of ill-fortune. For sometimes we wish our friends to be 10absent and we wish to give them no pain, when they are not going to be of any use to us; at another time we find it pleasantest for them to be present. But this contradiction is quite reasonable. For this happens in consequence of what we have mentioned above, and because we often simply avoid the sight of a friend in pain or in bad condition, as we should the sight of ourselves so 15placed; yet to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can be (because of the above-mentioned cause), and, indeed, to see him ill is pleasant if you are ill yourself. So that whichever of these two is the pleasanter decides us whether to wish the friend present or not. This also happens, for the same reason, in the case of the worse sort of men; for they are most anxious that 20their friends should not fare well nor even exist if they themselves have to fare badly. Therefore some kill the objects of their love with themselves. For they think that if the objects of their love are to survive they perceive their own trouble more acutely, just as one who remembered that once he had been happy would feel it more than if he thought himself to be always unhappy.