Susemihl (Teubner, 1884) · Solomon (1915)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 1,Chapter 1 (1214a1–1214b5)
1214a
1 Ὁ μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος
συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητῴου, διελὼν
οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ
τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ποιήσας
5 κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
πάντων ἥδιστον δ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν·
ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν. ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον
καὶ ἄριστον ἁπάντων οὖσα ἥδιστον ἐστίν.
πολλῶν δ' ὄντων θεωρημάτων ἃ περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα καὶ
10 περὶ ἑκάστην φύσιν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν
αὐτῶν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις
καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος. ὅσα μὲν οὖν
ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικήν, λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα
καιρόν, ὅ τι περ οἰκεῖον ἦν τῇ μεθόδῳ· πρῶτον δὲ
15 σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει
γίγνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας,
ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιὰν διαφέροντες,
ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὔσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς
εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διά τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ
20 φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ' ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ
τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἤτοι καθάπερ
οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιπνοίᾳ
δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην (πολλοὶ
25 γὰρ ταὐτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν).
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία διὰ τούτων ἁπάντων ἢ τινῶν
ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἄδηλον (ἅπασαι
γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πίπτουσιν εἰς ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς·
καὶ γὰρ <τὰς> ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἁπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης
30 ἄν τις συναγάγοι πράξεις)· τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν
μακαρίως καὶ καλῶς εἴη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα, τοῖς εἶναι
δοκοῦσιν αἰρετωτάτοις. οἳ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγιστον
εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθόν, οἳ δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἳ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν.
καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνιοι περὶ τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν
1The man who stated his judgement in the god's precinct in Delos made an inscription on the propylaeum to the temple of Leto, in which he separated from one another the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant as not all properties of the 5same thing; he wrote, 'Most beautiful is what is most just, but best is health, and pleasantest the obtaining of what one desires.' But let us disagree with him; for happiness is at once the most beautiful and best of all things and also the pleasantest. Now about each thing and kind there 10are many views that are disputed and need investigation; of these some concern knowledge only, some the acquisition of things and the performance of acts as well. About those which involve speculative philosophy only we must at a suitable opportunity say what is relevant to that study. But first 15we must consider in what the happy life consists and how it is to be acquired, whether all who receive the epithet 'happy' become so by nature (as we become tall, short, or of different complexions), or by teaching (happiness being a sort of science), or by some sort of discipline—for men 20acquire many qualities neither by nature nor by teaching but by habituation, bad qualities if they are habituated to the bad, good if to the good. Or do men become happy in none of these ways, but either—like those possessed by nymphs or deities—through a sort of divine influence, being as it 25were inspired, or through chance? For many declare happiness to be identical with good luck. That men, then, possess happiness through all or some or one of these causes is evident; for practically all new creations come under these principles—for all acts arising from intelligence may be 30included among acts that arise from knowledge. Now to be happy, to live blissfully and beautifully, must consist mainly in three things, which seem most desirable; for some say prudence is the greatest good, some virtue, and some pleasure.
1214b
1 διαμφισβητοῦσι, συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον
εἰς αὐτήν, οἳ μὲν ὡς οὖσαν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνησιν
τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἳ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετήν, οἳ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων
τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δ'
5 ἐκ δυοῖν, τοῖς δ' ἐν ἑνί τινι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως.
1Some also dispute about the magnitude of the contribution made by each of these elements to happiness, some declaring the contribution of one to be greater, some that of another,—these regarding prudence as a greater good than virtue, those the opposite, while others regard pleasure as a greater good 5than either: and some consider the happy life to be compounded of all or of two of these, while others hold it to consist in one of them alone.
Book 1,Chapter 2 (1214b6–27)
περὶ δὴ τούτων ἐπιστήσαντας, ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν
κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ
καλῶς ζῆν, ἤτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν, πρὸς
ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις (ὡς τό γε
10 μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρός τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης
πολλῆς σημεῖον ἐστίν), μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὑτῷ
διορίσασθαι μήτε προπετῶς μήτε ῥαθύμως, ἐν τίνι
τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὖ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν, ὧν τ' ἄνευ
15 οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν· ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο
καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς καὶ ὧν
ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς (ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν
οὐκ ἴδια τῆς ὑγιείας οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὡς
εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οἷον ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν
20 ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ κινήσεως μετέχειν οὐθὲν ἂν ὑπάρξειεν
ἡμῖν οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τὰ δ' ἴδια μᾶλλον περὶ ἑκάστην
φύσιν· ἃ δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως οἰκεῖον
πρὸς εὐεξίαν τοῖς εἰρημένοις κρεωφαγία καὶ τῶν περιπάτων
οἱ μετὰ δεῖπνον). ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἴτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως
25 περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων·
ὧν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας
εἶναι νομίζουσι.
First then about these things we must enjoin every one that has the power to live according to his own choice to set up for himself some object for the beautiful life to aim at, (whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture), 10with reference to which he will then do all his acts, since not to have one's life organized in view of some end is a mark of much folly. Then above all we must first define to ourselves without hurry or carelessness in which of our belongings the happy life is lodged, and what are the indispensable conditions of its attainment—for health is not the same as the indispensable 15conditions of health; and so it is with many other things, e.g. the beautiful life and its indispensable conditions are not identical. Of such things some are not peculiar to health or even to life, but common—to speak broadly—to all dispositions and actions, e.g. without breathing or being awake or having the power of movement we could enjoy neither good nor evil; 20but some are indispensable conditions in a more special sense and peculiar to each kind of thing, and these it is specially important to observe; e.g. the eating of meat and walking after meals are more peculiarly the indispensable conditions of a good physical state than the more general conditions mentioned above. For herein is the cause of the disputes about happy living, 25its nature and causes; for some take to be elements in happiness what are merely its indispensable conditions.
Book 1,Chapter 3 (1214b28–1215a19)
πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκοπεῖν, ὅσας ἔχουσί
τινες περὶ αὐτῆς, περίεργον (πολλὰ γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς
30 παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ παραφρονοῦσι, περὶ ὧν ἂν
οὐθεὶς νοῦν ἔχων διαπορήσειεν· δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλ'
οἳ μὲν ἡλικίας ἐν ᾗ μεταβαλοῦσιν, οἳ δὲ κολάσεως ἰατρικῆς
ἢ πολιτικῆς· κόλασις γὰρ ἡ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ
ἐλάττων ἐστίν), ὁμοίως δὲ ταύταις οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν <ἐπισκεπτέον>
To examine then all the views held about happiness is superfluous, for children, sick people, and the insane all have views, but no sane person would dispute over them; for such persons need not argument but years in which they may change, or else medical or 30political correction—for medicine, no less than stripes, is a correction. Similarly we have not to consider the views of the multitude (for they talk without consideration about almost everything, and most about happiness); for it is absurd to apply argument to those who need not argument but suffering.
1215a
1 (εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα
περὶ [ἐπισκεπτέονεὐδαιμονίας] <εὐδαι>μονίας· ἄτοπον γὰρ προσφέρειν λόγον
τοῖς λόγου μηθὲν δεομένοις, ἀλλὰ πάθους)· ἐπεὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι
περὶ ἑκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ βίου
5 τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσίν. ταύτας οὖν καλῶς
ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων
ἔλεγχοι τῶν ἐναντιουμένων αὐτοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσίν. —
ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ λανθάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς
ἃ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν
10 τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν, εἴ τῳ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώτερον
εἰπεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην
ἂν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις
ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη
πολλοῖς (οὐ γάρ ἐστι δι' ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτῆσις [οὐδὲ] ἐπ' αὐτοῖς
15 οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας)· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα
εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ
ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι
μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κεῖσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
τοῖς αὑτοὺς παρασκευάζουσι ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.
1But since every study has its special problems, evidently there are such relating to the best life and best existence; the opinions then that put these difficulties it is well to examine, for a disputant's refutation of what is opposed to his argument is 5a demonstration of the argument itself. Further, it is proper not to neglect these considerations, especially with a view to that at which all inquiry should be directed, viz. the causes that enable us to share in the good and beautiful life—if any one finds it invidious to call it the blessed life—and with a view to 10the hope we may have of attaining each good. For if the beautiful life consists in what is due to fortune or nature, it would be something that many cannot hope for, since its acquisition is not in their power, nor attainable by their care or activity; but if it depends on the individual and his personal acts being 15of a certain character, then the supreme good would be both more general and more divine, more general because more would be able to possess it, more divine because happiness would then be the prize offered to those who make themselves and their acts of a certain character.
Book 1,Chapter 4 (1215a20–1215b14)
20 ἔσται δὲ φανερὰ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων
καὶ διαπορουμένων, ἂν καλῶς ὁρισθῇ τί χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι
τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποιόν τινα μόνον εἶναι τὴν
ψυχήν, καθάπερ τινὲς ᾠήθησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων,
ἢ δεῖ μὲν καὶ ποιόν τινα ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, μᾶλλον
25 δὲ δεῖ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι ποιὰς τινάς.
διῃρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν <οὐδ'> ἀμφισβητούντων
τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων,
οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ
χρηματισμὸν καὶ τὰς βαναύσους (λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς
30 πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἑδραίας
καὶ μισθαρνικάς, χρηματιστικὰς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ἀγορὰς μὲν καὶ
πράσεις καπηλικάς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων
τριῶν ὄντων, τῶν καὶ πρότερον ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν
ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ
35 ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὁρῶμεν καὶ βίους ὄντας, οὓς οἱ ἐπ' ἐξουσίας
τυγχάνοντες προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἅπαντες, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον
Most of the doubts and difficulties raised 20will become clear, if we define well what we ought to think happiness to be, whether that it consists merely in having the soul of a certain character—as some of the sages and older writers thought—or whether the man must indeed be of a certain character, but it is even more necessary that his acts should be of a 25certain character. Now if we make a division of the kinds of life, some do not even pretend to this sort of well-being, being only pursued for the sake of what is necessary, e.g. those concerned with vulgar arts, or with commercial or servile occupations—by vulgar I mean arts pursued only with a view to reputation, by 30servile those which are sedentary and wage-earning, by commercial those connected with buying in markets and huckstering in shops. But there are also three goods directed to a happy employment of life, those which we have above called the three greatest of human goods, virtue, prudence, and pleasure. We thus see that 35there are three lives which all those choose who have power, viz.
1215b
1 ἀπολαυστικόν. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος βούλεται
περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς καλάς (αὗται δ'
εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὁ δ' ἀπολαυστικὸς περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
5 τὰς σωματικάς. διόπερ <ἕτερος> ἕτερον τὸν εὐδαίμονα
προσαγορεύει, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. Ἀναξαγόρας
μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, "οὐθεὶς",
εἶπεν, "ὧν σὺ νομίζεις· ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἄν τίς σοι φανείη"· τοῦτον δ'
ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος, ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον
10 ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον
ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ' ἴσως ᾤετο
τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἤ τινος
θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν
μακάριον εἶναι.
1the lives of 'the political man', the philosopher, the voluptuary; for of these the philosopher intends to occupy himself with prudence and contemplation of truth, the 'political man' with noble acts (i.e. those springing from virtue), the volup-tuary with bodily pleasures. 5Therefore the latter calls a different person happy, as was indeed said before. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae being asked, 'Who was the happiest of men?' answered, 'None of those you suppose, but one who would appear a strange being to you,' because he saw that the questioner thought it impossible for one not great and beautiful or rich to deserve the 10epithet 'happy', while he himself perhaps thought that the man who lived painlessly and pure of injustice or else engaged in some divine contemplation was really, as far as a man may be, blessed.
Book 1,Chapter 5 (1215b15–1216b25)
15 περὶ πολλῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑτέρων οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸ κρῖναι
καλῶς, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ οὗ πᾶσι ῥᾷστον εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ
παντὸς ἀνδρὸς τὸ γνῶναι, τί τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν αἱρετόν, καὶ
λαβὼν ἄν τις ἔχοι πλήρη τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι
τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, <δι' ἃ> προΐενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον νόσους
20 περιωδυνίας χειμῶνας· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
αἱρετὸν ἦν, εἴ τις αἵρεσιν ἐδίδου, διά γε ταῦτα τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις <τίς> ὁ βίος, ὃν ζῶσιν ἔτι παῖδες ὄντες;
καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνακάμψαι πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείνειεν
εὖ φρονῶν. ἔτι δὲ πολλὰ τῶν τε μηδεμίαν ἐχόντων [μὲν] ἡδονὴν
25 ἢ λύπην, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων μὲν ἡδονὴν μὴ καλὴν δέ,
τοιαῦτ' ἐστιν ὥστε τὸ μὴ εἶναι κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν. ὅλως
δ' εἴ τις ἅπαντα συναγάγοι ὅσα πράττουσι μὲν καὶ πάσχουσιν
ἅπαντες, ἑκόντες μέντοι μηθὲν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ μηδ'
αὐτοῦ χάριν, καὶ προσθείη χρόνου πλῆθος ἀπέραντόν τι, οὐ
30 μᾶλλον ἕνεκ' ἄν τις τούτων ἕλοιτο ζῆν ἢ μὴ ζῆν. ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων,
ἀφαιρεθεισῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, ἃς τὸ γινώσκειν
ἢ βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
οὐδ' ἂν εἷς προτιμήσειε τὸ ζῆν, μὴ παντελῶς ὢν ἀνδράποδον.
35 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ ταύτην ποιουμένῳ τὴν αἵρεσιν
οὐθὲν ἂν διενέγκειε γενέσθαι θηρίον ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ὁ γοῦν ἐν
About many other things it is difficult to judge well, but most difficult about that on which judgement seems to all easiest and the knowledge of it 15in the power of any man—viz. what of all that is found in living is desirable, and what, if attained, would satisfy our desire. For there are many consequences of life that make men fling away life, as disease, excessive pain, storms, so that it is clear that, if one were given the power of choice, not to be born at all would, as far at least as 20these reasons go, have been desirable. Further, the life we lead as children is not desirable, for no one in his senses would consent to return again to this. Further, many incidents involving neither pleasure nor pain or involving pleasure but not of a noble kind are such that, as far as they are concerned, non-existence is preferable to life. 25And generally, if one were to bring together all that all men do and experience but not willingly because not for its own sake, and were to add to this an existence of infinite duration, one would none the more on account of these experiences choose existence rather than non-existence. But further, neither for the pleasure of eating alone or 30that of sex, if all the other pleasures were removed that knowing or seeing or any other sense provides men with, would a single man value existence, unless he were utterly servile, for it is clear that to the man making this choice there would be no difference between being born a brute and a man; at any rate the ox in Egypt, which they reverence 35as Apis, in most of such matters has more power than many monarchs.
1216a
1 Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς, ὃν ὡς Ἆπιν τιμῶσιν, ἐν πλείοσι τῶν τοιούτων
ἐξουσιάζει πολλῶν μοναρχῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν
τοῦ καθεύδειν ἡδονήν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει καθεύδειν ἀνέγερτον
ὕπνον ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἐτῶν
5 ἀριθμὸν χιλίων ἢ ὁποσωνοῦν, ἢ ζῆν ὄντα φυτόν; τὰ γοῦν
φυτὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἔοικε μετέχειν ζωῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ
παιδία. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐν τῇ μητρὶ
γένεσιν πεφυκότα μὲν διατελεῖ, καθεύδοντα δὲ τὸν πάντα
χρόνον. ὥστε φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὅτι διαφεύγει σκοπουμένους,
10 τί τὸ εὖ καὶ τί τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ζῆν.
τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρός τινα διαποροῦντα
τοιαῦτ' ἄττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκ' ἄν τις
ἕλοιτο γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι "τοῦ" φάναι "θεωρῆσαι
τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν".
15 οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἕνεκεν τὴν αἵρεσιν ᾤετο τιμίαν
εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον μακαρίζοντες ἢ Σμινδυρίδην
τὸν Συβαρίτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν ζώντων τὸν
ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται
τάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· ἕτεροι δέ τινες οὔτ' ἂν φρόνησιν
20 οὐδεμίαν οὔτε τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἕλοιντο μᾶλλον ἢ
τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. αἱροῦνται γοῦν οὐ μόνον ἔνιοι
δόξης χάριν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μέλλοντες εὐδοκιμήσειν.
ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς
προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ὁ
25 μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστι πράξεων προαιρετικὸς
αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν
ἅπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.
ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντες ἐπὶ τρεῖς βίους
φέρουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν·
30 τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ
τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ' οὐ τίνες
εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσί τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ
μή, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι, καὶ πότερον εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν καλῶς
ἡδονάς τινας, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον
35 τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἕτεραι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως
οἴονται τὸν εὐδαίμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς
καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν, τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν
ἑκατέρου τίς ἐστι, καὶ πότερον μόρια ταῦτα τῆς ἀγαθῆς
40 ζωῆς ἐστίν, ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ
1We may say the same of the pleasure of sleeping. For what is the difference between sleeping an unbroken sleep from one's first day to one's last, say for a thousand or any number of years, and living the life of a plant? Plants 5at any rate seem to possess this sort of existence, and similarly children; for children, too, continue having their nature from their first coming into being in their mother's womb, but sleep the entire time. It is clear then from these considerations that men, though they look, fail to 10see what is well-being, what is the good in life. And so they tell us that Anaxagoras answered a man who was raising problems of this sort and asking why one should choose rather to be born than not—'for the sake of viewing the heavens and the whole order of the universe'. He, then, 15thought the choice of life for the sake of some sort of knowledge to be precious; but those who felicitate Sardanapallus or Smindyrides the Sybarite or any other of those who live the voluptuary's life, these seem all to place happiness in the feeling of pleasure. But others would rather 20choose virtuous deeds than either any sort of wisdom or sensual pleasures; at any rate some choose these not only for the sake of reputation, but even when they are not going to win credit by them; but most 'political' men are not truly so called; they are not in truth 'political', for the 25'political' man is one who chooses noble acts for their own sake, while most take up the 'political' life for the sake of money and greed. From what has been said, then, it is clear that all connect happiness with one or other of three lives, the 'political', the philosophic, and the 30voluptuary's. Now among these the nature and quality and sources of the pleasure of the body and sensual enjoyment are clear, so that we have not to inquire what such pleasures are, but whether they tend to happiness or not and how they tend, and whether—supposing it right to attach to the 35noble life certain pleasures—it is right to attach these, or whether some other sort of participation in these is a necessity, but the pleasures through which men rightly think the happy man to live pleasantly and not merely painlessly are different. But about these let us inquire later.
1216b
1 προσάπτουσιν αὐτὰ κἂν εἰ μὴ πάντες εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν,
ἀλλ' οὖν οἱ λόγου ἄξιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντες.
Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾤετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν
τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεζήτει τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ
5 ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτ'
εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾤετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς,
ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι
δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν
καὶ ἐσμὲν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. διόπερ ἐζήτει
10 τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, ἀλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων. τοῦτο δὲ
ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν (οὐθὲν
γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης
οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι
τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις·
15 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς
πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρησίμους αὐτὰς ἡμῖν)· τῶν
δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ
γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἰατρικῆς, εὐνομία δὲ ἤ τι τοιοῦθ'
ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς. καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἕκαστον
20 τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι
τιμιώτατον τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ
γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι,
οὐδέ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ
ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ
25 ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.
1First let us consider about virtue and prudence, the nature of each, and whether they are parts of the good life either in themselves or through the actions that arise from them, since all—or at least all important thinkers—connect happiness with these. Socrates, then, 5the elder, thought the knowledge of virtue to be the end, and used to inquire what is justice, what bravery and each of the parts of virtue; and his conduct was reasonable, for he thought all the virtues to be kinds of knowledge, so that to know justice and to be just came simultaneously; for the moment that we have learned geometry 10or architecture we are architects and geometers. Therefore he inquired what virtue is, not how or from what it arises. This is correct with regard to theoretical knowledge, for there is no other part of astronomy or physics or geometry except knowing and contemplating the nature of the things which are the subjects of those sciences; 15though nothing prevents them from being in an incidental way useful to us for much that we cannot do without. But the end of the productive sciences is different from science and knowledge, e.g. health from medical science, law and order (or something of the sort) from political science. Now to know anything that is noble is itself noble; 20but regarding virtue, at least, not to know what it is, but to know out of what it arises is most precious. For we do not wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, nor what justice is but to be just, just as we wish to be in health rather than to know what being in health is, and to have our body in good condition rather than to 25know what good condition is.
Book 1,Chapter 6 (1216b26–1217a17)
πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ
τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς
φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι
συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον
30 γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει
γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον
δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων
οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν
ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι
35 συγκεχυμένως. διαφέρουσι δ' οἱ λόγοι περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον,
οἵ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ μὴ φιλοσόφως. διόπερ
καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν περίεργον εἶναι τὴν
τοιαύτην θεωρίαν, δι' ἧς οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὸ διὰ τί. φιλόσοφον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον.
40 δεῖται μέντοι τοῦτο πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ
About all these matters we must try to get conviction by argument, using perceived facts as evidence and illustration. It would be best that all men should clearly concur with what we are going to say, but if that is unattainable, then that all should in some way at least concur. And this if converted they 30will do, for every man has some contribution to make to the truth, and with this as a starting-point we must give some sort of proof about these matters. For by advancing from true but obscure judgements he will arrive at clear ones, exchanging ever the usual confused statement for more real knowledge. Now in every inquiry there is a 35difference between philosophic and unphilosophic argument; therefore we should not think even in political philosophy that the sort of consideration which not only makes the nature of the thing evident but also its cause is superfluous; for such consideration is in every inquiry the truly philosophic method. But this needs much caution.
1217a
1 διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφου εἶναι τὸ μηθὲν εἰκῇ λέγειν ἀλλὰ
μετὰ λόγου, πολλάκις λανθάνουσι λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους
τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὁτὲ μὲν δι'
ἄγνοιαν, ὁτὲ δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν, ὑφ' ὧν ἁλίσκεσθαι συμβαίνει
5 καὶ τοὺς ἐμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ τούτων
τῶν μήτ' ἐχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν
ἢ πρακτικήν. πάσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν·
ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστι περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
κρίνειν τούς τ' οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους.
10 καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς κρίνειν τὸν τῆς αἰτίας
λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διά τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως, ὅτι προσέχειν
οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις
μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις (νῦν δ' ὁπότ' ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν,
ἀναγκάζονται πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις
15 τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεδεῖχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ
μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ἥν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ
διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.
1For there are some who, through thinking it to be the mark of philosopher to make no arbitrary statement but always to give a reason, often unawares give reasons foreign to the subject and idle—this they do sometimes from ignorance, sometimes because they are charlatans—by 5which reasons even men experienced and able to act are trapped by those who neither have nor are capable of having practical and constructive intelligence. And this happens to them from want of culture; for inability in regard to each matter to distinguish reasonings appropriate to the subject from those foreign to it is want of culture. And it 10is well to criticize separately the reason that gives the cause and the conclusion both because of what has just been said, viz. that one should attend not merely to what is inferred by argument, but often attend more to perceived facts—whereas now when men are unable to see a flaw in the argument they are compelled to believe what has been 15said—and because often that which seems to have been shown by argument is true indeed, but not for the cause which the argument assigns; for one may prove truth by means of falsehood, as is clear from the Analytics.
Book 1,Chapter 7 (1217a18–40)
πεπροοιμιασμένων δὲ [καὶ] τούτων, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι
πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων,
20 ζητοῦντες ἐπὶ τὸ σαφῶς εὑρεῖν τί ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
ὁμολογεῖται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν
ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχ'
ἂν εἴη καὶ βελτίονός τινος ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία,
οἷον θεοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ζῴων, ὅσα χείρω τὴν φύσιν
25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν κοινωνεῖ ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας·
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ' ἰχθὺς οὐδ'
ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθέν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ
φύσει μετέχει θείου τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ζῇ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν.
30 ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον·
νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτὰ
τὰ δ' οὐ πρακτά. τοῦτο δὲ λέγομεν οὕτως, διότι ἔνια τῶν ὄντων
οὐθὲν μετέχει κινήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· καὶ ταῦτ'
ἴσως ἄριστα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἔνια δὲ πρακτὰ μέν, ἀλλὰ
35 πρακτὰ κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν
(καὶ γὰρ ὧν ἕνεκα πράττομεν καὶ ἃ τούτων ἕνεκα
μετέχει πράξεως, οἷον καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον
τίθεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὰ τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, τά
θ' ὑγιεινὰ καὶ τὰ χρηματιστικά), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
40 τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν ἄριστον θετέον.
After these further preliminary remarks let us start on our discourse from what we have called the first confused judgements, and 20then seek to discover a clear judgement about the nature of happiness. Now this is admitted to be the greatest and best of human goods—we say human, for there might perhaps be a happiness peculiar to some superior being, e.g. a god; for of the other animals, which are inferior in their nature to men, none have a right to the epithet 'happy'; 25for no horse, bird, or fish is happy, nor anything the name of which does not imply some share of a divine element in its nature; but in virtue of some other sort of participation in good things some have a better existence, some a worse. But we must see later that this is so. At present we say that of goods some are within the range of human 30action, some not; and this we say because some things—and therefore also some good things—are incapable of change, yet these are perhaps as to their nature the best. Some things, again, are within the range of action, but only to beings superior to us. But since 'within the range of action' is an ambiguous phrase—for both that for the sake of 35which we act and the things we do for its sake have to do with practice and thus we put among things within the range of action both health and wealth and the acts done for the sake of these ends, i.e. wholesome conduct and money-bringing conduct—it is clear that we must regard happiness as the best of what is within the range of action for man.
Book 1,Chapter 8 (1217b1–1218b27)
1217b
1 σκεπτέον τοίνυν τί τὸ ἄριστον, καὶ λέγεται ποσαχῶς.
ἐν τρισὶ δὴ μάλιστα φαίνεται δόξαις εἶναι τοῦτο. φασὶ γὰρ
ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι
τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾧ ὑπάρχει τό τε πρώτῳ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
5 τὸ αἰτίῳ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι. ταῦτα
δ' ὑπάρχειν ἀμφότερα τῇ ἰδέᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. λέγω δὲ ἀμφότερα
τό τε πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον
ἀγαθοῖς τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι. μάλιστά τε γὰρ
τἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι κατ' ἐκείνης ἀληθῶς (κατὰ μετοχὴν
10 γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητα τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνης εἶναι), καὶ πρῶτον
τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ μετεχομένου ἀναιρεῖσθαι
καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ἰδέας, ἃ λέγεται τῷ μετέχειν ἐκείνης,
τὸ δὲ πρῶτον τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον. ὥστ'
εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ χωριστὴν
15 εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἰδέας.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ διασκοπεῖν περὶ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἑτέρας
τε διατριβῆς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ λογικωτέρας ἐξ ἀνάγκης
(οἱ γὰρ ἅμα ἀναιρετικοί τε καὶ κοινοὶ λόγοι κατ' οὐδεμίαν
εἰσὶν ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην)· εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ
20 αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἰδέαν μὴ μόνον
ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς.
ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς
λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. —ἔπειτ' εἰ καὶ
ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἰδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, μή ποτ' οὐδὲ
25 χρήσιμος πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις. —πολλαχῶς
γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό
τε γὰρ ὄν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διῄρηται, σημαίνει τὸ μὲν τί
ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ πότε, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ κινεῖν, καὶ τὸ
30 ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν πτώσεών ἐστι τούτων, ἐν οὐσίᾳ μὲν ὁ
νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεός, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῷ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ
τὸ μέτριον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε ὁ καιρός, τὸ δὲ διδάσκον καὶ
τὸ διδασκόμενον περὶ κίνησιν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν ἕν τί
ἐστι περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη
35 ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως
λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μιᾶς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι, οἷον τὸν
καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα ἕτερον καιρὸν θεωρεῖ καὶ
ἑτέρα ἕτερον μέτριον, οἷον περὶ τροφὴν μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ
τὸ μέτριον ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς
40 πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέραν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε
1We must then examine what is the best, and in how many senses we use the word. The answer is principally contained in three views. For men say that the good per se is the best of all things, the good per se being that whose property is to be the original good and the cause by 5its presence in other things of their being good; both of which attributes belong to the Idea of good (I mean by 'both' that of being the original good and also the cause of other things being good by its presence in them); for good is predicated of this Idea most truly (other things being good by participation in and likeness to this); and 10this is the original good, for the destruction of that which is participated in involves also the destruction of that which participates in the Idea, and is named from its participation in it. But this is the relation of the first to the later, so that the Idea of good is the good per se; for this is also (they say) separable from what participates 15in it, like all other Ideas. The discussion, however, of this view belongs necessarily to another inquiry and one for the most part more logical, for arguments that are at once destructive and general belong to no other science but logic. But if we must speak briefly about these matters, we say first that it is to speak abstractly and idly 20to assert that there is an Idea whether of good or of anything whatever—this has been considered in many ways both in our popular and in our philosophic discussions. Next, however much there are Ideas and in particular an Idea of good, they are perhaps useless with a view to a good life and to action. For the good has many senses, as numerous 25as those of being. For being, as we have divided it in other works, signifies now what a thing is, now quality, now quantity, now time, and again some of it consists in passivity, some in activity; and the good is found in each of these modes, in substance as mind and God, in quality as justice, in quantity as moderation, in time as opportunity, 30while as examples of it in change, we have that which teaches and that which is being taught. As then being is not one in all that we have just mentioned, so neither is good; nor is there one science either of being or of the good; not even things named good in the same category are the objects of a single science, e.g. opportunity or 35moderation; but one science studies one kind of opportunity or moderation, and another another: e.g. opportunity and moderation in regard to food are studied by medicine and gymnastics, in military matters by the art of strategy, and similarly with other sorts of action, so that it can hardly be the province of one science to study the good per se.
1218a
1 σχολῇ αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς. —ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις
ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ
ταῦτα, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν. εἴη γὰρ ἄν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον·
πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένου
5 τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον. οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον
πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον
τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ
τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον. **. —** εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι
τὴν ἰδέαν, οἷον εἰ χωριστὸν ποιήσειέ τις τὸ κοινόν. εἰ γάρ ἐστι
10 δικαιοσύνη ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀνδρεία. ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι
ἀγαθόν. τὸ οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν.
τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πλὴν ὅτι ἀίδιον καὶ χωριστόν; ἀλλ' οὐθὲν μᾶλλον
λευκὸν τὸ πολλὰς ἡμέρας λευκὸν τοῦ μίαν ἡμέραν· ὥστ'
οὐδὲ <τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι· οὐδὲ> δὴ τὸ κοινὸν
15 ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸ τῇ ἰδέᾳ· πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει <τὸ> κοινόν. —ἀνάπαλιν
δὲ καὶ δεικτέον ἢ ὡς νῦν δεικνύουσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ
ἐκ τῶν ἀνομολογουμένων ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ ὁμολογούμενα
εἶναι ἀγαθὰ δεικνύουσιν, ἐξ ἀριθμῶν, ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη
καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἀγαθόν· τάξεις γὰρ καὶ ἀριθμοί, ὡς τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς
20 καὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ
ἀγαθόν. δεῖ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, οἷον ὑγιείας ἰσχύος
σωφροσύνης, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις μᾶλλον τὸ καλόν.
πάντα γὰρ τάδε τάξις καὶ ἠρεμία· εἰ ἄρα, ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον·
ἐκείνοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα μᾶλλον. —παράβολος δὲ
25 καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ
ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἐφίενται λέγονται φανερῶς,
ἀλλὰ λίαν ἁπλῶς τοῦτο φασί, καὶ ὄρεξιν εἶναι πῶς ἄν
τις ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷς ζωὴ μὴ ὑπάρχει; δεῖ δὲ περὶ τούτου πραγματευθῆται,
καὶ μὴ ἀξιοῦν μηθὲν ἀλόγως, ἃ καὶ μετὰ λόγου
30 πιστεῦσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον. —τό τε φάναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι
ἑνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές· ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται,
ὀφθαλμὸς ὄψεως, σῶμα ὑγιείας, οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν, ἔχει ἀπορίας τοιαύτας,
καὶ ὅτι οὐ χρήσιμον τῇ πολιτικῇ, ἀλλ' ἴδιόν τι
35 ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις, οἷον γυμναστικῇ εὐεξία
[ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον· ἢ γὰρ οὐδεμιᾷ
χρήσιμον αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶδος ἢ πάσαις ὁμοίως· ἔτι
οὐ πρακτόν]· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδὲ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν οὔτε αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν
1Further, in things having a natural succession, an earlier and a later, there is no common element beyond, and, further, separable from, them, for then there would be something prior to the first; for the common and separable element would be prior, because with its destruction 5the first would be destroyed as well; e.g. if the double is the first of the multiples, then the universal multiple cannot be separable, for it would be prior to the double, if the common element turns out to be the Idea, as it would be if one made the common element separable: for if justice is good, and so also is bravery, there is then, they say, a 10good per se, for which they add ' per se ' to the general definition; but what could this mean except that it is 'eternal' and 'separable'? But what is white for many days is no whiter than that which is white for a single day; so not even the common good would be identical with 'the Idea', for it is the common property of all. But we should show the 15nature of the good per se in the opposite way to that now used. For now from what is not agreed to possess the good they demonstrate the things admitted to be good, e.g. from numbers they demonstrate that justice and health are goods, for they are arrangements and numbers, and it is assumed that goodness is a property of numbers and units because 20unity is the good itself. But they ought, from what are admitted to be goods, e.g. health, strength, and temperance, to demonstrate that beauty is present even more in the changeless; for all these things in the sensible world are order and rest; but if so, then the changeless is still more beautiful, for it has these attributes still more. And it is 25a bold way to demonstrate that unity is the good per se to say that numbers have desire; for no one says distinctly how they desire, but the saying is altogether too unqualified. And how can one suppose that there is desire where there is no life? One should consider seriously about this and not assume without reasons what it is not easy to believe 30even with reasons. And to say that all existing things desire some one good is not true; for each seeks its own special good, the eye vision, the body health, and so on. There are then these difficulties in the way of there being a good per se; further, it would be useless to political philosophy, which, like all others, has its particular good, e.g. 35as gymnastic has good bodily condition. [Further, there is the argument written in the discourse—that the Idea itself of good is useful to no art or to all arts in the same way. Further, it is not practicable.]
1218b
1 ἐστι (καὶ γὰρ ἂν μικρῷ ὑπάρξαι ἀγαθῷ) οὔτε πρακτόν.
οὐ γὰρ ὅπως ὑπάρξει τὸ ὁτῳοῦν ὑπάρχον ἡ ἰατρικὴ πραγματεύεται,
ἀλλ' ὅπως ὑγίεια. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν
ἑκάστη. ἀλλὰ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἔστι τι αὐτοῦ καλόν,
5 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρακτὸν τὸ δ' οὐ πρακτόν. πρακτὸν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον
ἀγαθόν, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις.
φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε ἡ ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ τὸ ζητούμενον αὐτὸ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, οὔτε τὸ κοινόν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκίνητον καὶ οὐ
πρακτόν, τὸ δὲ κινητὸν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ πρακτόν)· τὸ δ' οὗ
10 ἕνεκα ὡς τέλος ἄριστον καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὑφ' αὑτὸ καὶ
πρῶτον πάντων. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ
τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν
κυρίαν πασῶν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ
καὶ φρόνησις. διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς τὰς
15 ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦται εἶναι· πρὸς δ' ἀλλήλας εἴ τι διαφέρουσιν,
ὕστερον λεκτέον. ὅτι δ' αἴτιον τὸ τέλος τοῖς ὑφ' αὑτό,
δηλοῖ ἡ διδασκαλία. ὁρισάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τἆλλα
δεικνύουσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ οὗ
ἕνεκα. οἷον ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοδί, ἀνάγκη τόδε εἶναι
20 τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτήν· τὸ δ' ὑγιεινὸν τῆς ὑγιείας αἴτιον
ὡς κινῆσαν, καὶ τότε τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι
τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἔτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθεὶς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ὑγίεια,
ἂν μὴ σοφιστὴς ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἰατρός (οὗτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις
λόγοις σοφίζονται), ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν.
25 τὸ δ' ὡς τέλος ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν πρακτῶν,
σκεπτέον ποσαχῶς τὸ ἄριστον πάντων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο ἄριστον,
μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν.
1And similarly neither is good as a universal either the good per se (for it might belong even to a small good) or practicable; for medicine does not consider how to procure an attribute that may be an attribute of anything, but how to procure health; and so each of the other arts. But 'good' is 5ambiguous, and there is in it a noble part, and part is practicable but the rest not so. The sort of good that is practicable is an object aimed at, but not the good in things unchanging. It is clear, then, that neither the Idea of good nor the good as universal is the good per se that we are actually seeking; for the one is unchanging and not practical, and the 10other though changing is still not practical. But the object aimed at as end is best, and the cause of all that comes under it, and first of all goods. This then would be the good per se, the end of all human action. And this would be what comes under the master-art of all, which is politics, economics, and prudence; for these mental habits differ from all others by 15their being of this nature; whether they differ from one another must be stated later. And that the end is the cause of all that comes under it, the method of teaching shows; for the teacher first defines the end and thence shows of each of the other things that it is good; for the end aimed at is the cause. E.g. since to be in health is so and so, so and so must needs 20be what conduces to it; the wholesome is the efficient cause of health and yet only of its actual existence; it is not the cause of health being good. Further, no one demonstrates that health is good (except he is a sophist and no doctor, but one who produces deceptive arguments from inappropriate considerations), any more than any other principle. We must now 25consider, making a fresh start, in how many senses the good as the end of man, the best in the field of action, is the best of all, since this is best.