Susemihl (Teubner, 1884) · Solomon (1915)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 3,Chapter 1 (1228a23–1230a33)
1228a
ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητές εἰσί τε ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, καὶ
αὗται προαιρετικαί, καὶ αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν
25 αὗται, καθόλου εἴρηται· καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν
ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας. —σχεδὸν δὴ
δοκεῖ πᾶσιν ὅ τ' ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι περὶ φόβους καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία
μία τῶν ἀρετῶν. διείλομεν δ' ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρότερον καὶ
θράσος καὶ φόβον ἐναντία· καὶ γάρ ἐστί πως ἀντικείμενα
30 ἀλλήλοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις ταύτας λεγόμενοι
ὁμοίως ἀντικείσονται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς
(οὗτος γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ
θαρρεῖν ἧττον ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασύς· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὸ
τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἧττον ἢ δεῖ, θαρρεῖν δὲ
35 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ παρωνυμιάζεται· ὁ γὰρ θρασὺς
παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία
ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, δεῖ δὲ μήθ'
οὕτως ὡς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι)
μήθ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ταὐτὸ ποιοῦσι,
That there are mean states, then, in the virtues, and that these are states of deliberate purpose, and that the opposite states are vices and what these are, has been stated 25in its universal form. But let us take them individually and speak of them in order; and first let us speak of bravery. All are practically agreed that the brave man is concerned with fears and that bravery is one of the virtues. We distinguished also in the table confidence and fear as contraries; in a sense they are, indeed, opposed to one another. Clearly, then, those named after these habits will be similarly opposed 30to one another, e.g. the coward, for he is so called from fearing more than he ought and being less confident than he ought, and the confident man, who is so called for fearing less than he ought and being more confident than he ought. (Hence they have names cognate to those of the qualities, e.g. 'confident' is cognate to 'confidence'.) So that since bravery is the best habit in regard to fear and confidence, and one should 35be neither like the confident (who are defective in one way, excessive in another) nor like the cowards (of whom the same may be said, only not about the same objects, but inversely, for they are defective in confidence and excessive in fear), it is clear that the middle habit between confidence and cowardice is bravery, for this is the best.
1228b
1 πλὴν οὐ περὶ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπουσι,
τῷ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουσι), δῆλον ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις
θρασύτητος καὶ δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ βελτίστη.
δοκεῖ δ' ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἄφοβος εἶναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ὁ δὲ
5 δειλὸς φοβητικός, καὶ ὃ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ
μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὃ
δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἠρέμα καὶ μόλις καὶ
ὀλιγάκις καὶ μεγάλα, καὶ ὃ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερὰ
σφόδρα, ὃ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἠρέμα. ποῖα οὖν ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος;
10 πρῶτον πότερον τὰ ἑαυτῷ φοβερὰ ἢ τὰ ἑτέρῳ; εἰ μὲν δὴ
τὰ ἑτέρῳ φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἄν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ
αὑτῷ, εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ φοβερά. ** φόβου ποιητικὰ
ἑκάστῳ ᾧ φοβερά, οἷον εἰ μὲν σφόδρα φοβερά, εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς
ὁ φόβος, εἰ δ' ἠρέμα, ἀσθενής. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον
15 μεγάλους φόβους καὶ πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. ἐδόκει δὲ
τοὐναντίον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρασκευάζειν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι
ἐν τῷ ἢ μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἠρέμα καὶ μόλις.
ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ φοβερὸν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα
20 καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον φαῦλα καὶ
οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς
παιδίοις ᾗ παιδία. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τὰ μὲν
ἁπλῶς ἐστί, τὰ δὲ τινί. ἃ μὲν δὴ δειλὸς φοβεῖται ᾗ δειλός,
τὰ μὲν οὐδενί ἐστι φοβερά, τὰ δ' ἠρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς
25 πλείστοις φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ' ἁπλῶς
φοβερὰ λέγομεν. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχει ἀφόβως,
καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ὡς φοβερὰ
αὐτῷ, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ᾗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φοβερά, ᾗ δ' ἀνδρεῖος,
οὐ φοβερὰ ἀλλ' ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἔστι μέντοι φοβερὰ
30 ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. διὸ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται ἡ
ἕξις· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὑγιεινὸς ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ
οὗτοι οὐ τῷ ὑπὸ μηθενὸς ὃ μὲν πόνου τρίβεσθαι, ὃ δ' ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς
ὑπερβολῆς, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς
εἶναι, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἠρέμα, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι.
35 οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ
τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλὴν θᾶττόν τε καὶ
μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ** καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ πάσχουσιν,
ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἠρέμα.
ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστι φοβερόν, οὐδ' ἂν φοβηθείη.
1The brave man seems to be in general fearless, the coward prone to fear; the latter fears many things and few, great things and small, and intensely and quickly, while his opposite fears either not at all or slightly and reluctantly and seldom, and great things 5only. The brave endures even what is very formidable, the coward not even what is slightly formidable. What, then, does the brave man endure? First, is it the things that appear formidable to himself or to another? If the latter, his bravery would be no considerable matter. But if it is the things formidable to himself, then he must 10find many things formidable—formidable things being things that cause fear to those who find them formidable, great fear if very formidable, slight fear if slightly formidable. Then it follows that the brave man feels much and serious fear; but on the contrary bravery seemed to make a man fearless, fearlessness consisting in fearing 15few things if any, and in fearing slightly and with reluctance. But perhaps we use 'formidable'—like pleasant' and 'good'—in two senses. Some things are pleasant or good absolutely, others to a particular person pleasant or good—but absolutely bad and not pleasant, e.g. what is useful to the wicked or pleasant to children as 20such; and similarly the formidable is either absolutely such or such to a particular person. What, then, a coward as such fears is not formidable to any one or but slightly so; but what is formidable to the majority of men or to human nature, that we call absolutely formidable. But the brave man shows himself fearless towards these 25and endures such things, they being to him formidable in one sense but in another not—formidable to him qua man, but not formidable to him except slightly so, or not at all, qua brave. These things, however, are terrible, for they are so to the majority of men. This is the reason, by the way, why the habit of the brave man is 30praised; his condition is analogous to that of the strong or healthy. For these are what they are, not because, in the case of the one, no toil, in the case of the other, no extreme, crushes them, but because they are either unaffected absolutely or affected only to a slight extent by the things that affect the many or the majority. 35The sick, then, and the weak and the, cowardly are affected by the common affections, as well as by others, only more quickly and to a greater extent than the many, and further, by the things that affect the many they are wholly unaffected or but slightly affected.
1229a
1 ἢ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον; ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις
τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἱρεῖσθαι κελεύει.
διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἤτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ
θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος. ὁ μὲν
5 οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ
θαρρεῖ· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἄμφω ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ μέσος ἐστίν.
ἃ γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ φοβεῖται.
ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει
ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ᾖ. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελεύει,
10 ταῦτα θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδ' ἂν κελεύῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος
μόνος, ἐὰν κελεύῃ.
ἔστι δ' εἴδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα· <τὰ>
αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτική·
αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὖσα. δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ δι'
15 ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ'
ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. τρίτη δ' ἡ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν,
δι' ἣν τὰ παιδία καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἳ μὲν ὑπομένουσι τὰ
φερόμενα, οἳ δὲ λαμβάνουσι τοὺς ὄφεις. ἄλλη δ' ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα,
καθ' ἣν οἵ τε κατευτυχηκότες πολλάκις ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους
20 καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος. ἄλλη δὲ
διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἷον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. ἄν τε γὰρ
ἐρᾷ, θρασὺς μᾶλλον ἢ δειλός, καὶ ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους,
ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὁ
ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως.
25 ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σύες ἀνδρεῖοι
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι
εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα
φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ
οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται. διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία.
30 κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς
παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα.
περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτιον
δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ
φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης
35 φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένοις λύπην
ἑτέρα μὲν ἄν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος
δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῷτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην
ἣν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἵαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ
αἰσχυνόμενοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις
40 ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ
1But it is still questioned whether anything is terrible to the brave man, whether he would not be incapable of fear. May we not allow him to be capable of it in the way above mentioned? For bravery consists in following reason, and reason bids one choose the noble. Therefore the man 5who endures the terrible from any other cause than this is either out of his wits or confident; but the man who does so for the sake of the noble is alone fearless and brave. The coward, then, fears even what he ought not, the confident is confident even when he ought not to be; the brave man both fears and is confident when he ought to be, and is in this 10sense a mean, for he is confident or fears as reason bids him. But reason does not bid a man to endure what is very painful or destructive unless it is noble; now the confident is confident about such things even if reason does not bid him be so, while the coward is not confident even if it does; the brave man alone is confident about them only if reason 15bids him. There are five kinds of courage, so named from a certain analogy between them; for they all endure the same things but not for the same reasons. One is a civic courage, due to the sense of shame; another is military, due to experience and knowledge, not (as Socrates said) of what is fearful, but of the resources they have to meet what is 20fearful. The third kind is due to inexperience and ignorance; it is that which makes children and madmen face objects moving towards them and take hold of snakes. Another kind is due to hope, which makes those who have often been fortunate, or those who are drunk, face dangers—for wine makes them sanguine. Another kind is due to irrational feeling, e.g. love 25or anger; for a man in love is rather confident than timid, and faces many dangers, like him who slew the tyrant in Metapontium or the man of whom stories are told in Crete. Similar is the action of anger or passion, for passion is beside itself. Hence wild boars are thought to be brave though they are not really so, for they behave as such when beside 30themselves, but at other times are variable, like confident men. But still the bravery of passion is above all natural (passion is invincible, and therefore children are excellent fighters); civic courage is the effect of law. But in truth none of these forms is courage, though all are useful for encouragement in danger. So far we have spoken of the terrible 35generally; now it is best to distinguish further. In general, then, whatever is productive of fear is called fearful, and this is all that causes destructive pain. For those who expect some other pain may perhaps have another pain and another emotion but not fear, e.g. if a man foresees that he will suffer the pain of envy or of jealousy or of shame.
1229b
1 ζῆν. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ ἔνια ἀνδρεῖοι
εἰσί, καὶ ἔνιοι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ [καὶ] δειλοί. καὶ δὴ καὶ
δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον
καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτου λύπην ἔχειν πώς. εἰ γάρ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος
5 οἷος πρὸς ἀλέας καὶ ψύχη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικός,
ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀκινδύνους οὔσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον
καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι πάθος ἀλλὰ
δι' αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνας μαλακός,
πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθής· ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξειε δειλός,
10 οὗτος δ' ἀνδρεῖος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται
μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ᾖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς
ποιητικόν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.
τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, περὶ ὅσα φαμὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον,
εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ποιητικὰ λύπης τῆς φθαρτικῆς·
15 ταῦτα μέντοι πλησίον τε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω,
καὶ τοσαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα ὥστ'
εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. ἔνια γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ
φαίνεσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερὰ καὶ διαταράττειν. οὐθὲν γὰρ
κωλύει, ὥσπερ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων
20 ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος
ἕξεις· οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων.
οἱ μὲν <οὖν> δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς ἐπιψεύδονται διὰ τὰς ἕξεις·
τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τά τε μὴ φοβερὰ δοκεῖ φοβερὰ εἶναι καὶ τὰ
ἠρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον τά τε φοβερὰ θαρραλέα
25 καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἠρέμα, τῷ δ' ἀνδρείῳ τἀληθῆ μάλιστα.
διόπερ οὔτ' εἴ τις ὑπομένοι τὰ φοβερὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρεῖος,
οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένοι φερομένους διὰ μανίαν, οὔτ'
εἰ γιγνώσκων ὅσος ὁ κίνδυνος, διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς
τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ
30 ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς
ὑπομένουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος
γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔτ' εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὔτ' εἰ
δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν μειζόνων
λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως <ἂν> ἀνδρεῖος λέγοιτο τούτων. εἰ γὰρ
35 ἦν ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλάκις ἂν δι' ἀκρασίαν ἀπέθνησκον
οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος
ἡδέος, τῶν ποιητικῶν δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ δι' ἀκρασίαν περιπίπτουσιν
εἰδότες, ὧν οὐθεὶς <ἂν> ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἑτοίμως
ἀποθνήσκειν. οὔτ' εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν,
40 οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεὶς ἀνδρεῖος, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ
1But fear only occurs in connexion with the expectation of pains whose nature is to be destructive to life. Therefore men who are very effeminate as to some things are brave, and some who are hard and enduring are cowards. Indeed, it is thought practically the special mark of bravery 5to take up a certain attitude towards death and the pain of it. For if a man were so constituted as to be patient as reason requires towards heat and cold and similar not dangerous pains, but weak and timid about death, not for any other feeling, but just because it means destruction, while another was soft in regard to these but unaffected in regard to 10death, the former would seem cowardly, the latter brave; for we speak of danger also only in regard to such objects of fear as bring near to us that which will cause such destruction; when this seems close, then we speak of danger. The objects of fear, then, in regard to which we call a man brave are, as we have said, those which appear capable of causing 15destructive pain, but only when they appear near and not far off, and are of such magnitude, real or apparent, as is not out of proportion to man, for some things must appear terrible to and must upset any man. For just as things hot and cold and certain other powers are too strong for us and the conditions of the human body, so it may be with regard to 20the emotions of the soul. The cowardly, then, and the confident are misled by their habits; for to the coward what is not terrible seems terrible, and what is slightly terrible greatly so, while in the opposite way, to the confident the terrible seems safe and the very terrible but slightly so; but the brave man thinks things what they truly are. Therefore, 25if a man faces the terrible through ignorance (e.g. if a man faces in the transport of madness the attack of a thunderbolt), he is not brave, nor yet if, knowing the magnitude of the danger, he faces it through passion—as the Celts take up their arms to go to meet the waves; in general, all the bravery of barbarians involves passion. But some face 30danger also for other pleasures—for passion is not without a certain pleasure, involving as it does the hope of vengeance. But still, whether a man faces death for this or some other pleasure or to flee from greater evils, he would not justly be called brave. For if dying were pleasant, the profligate would have often died because of his incontinence, just 35as now—since what causes death is pleasant though not death itself—many knowingly incur death through their incontinence, but none of them would be thought brave even if they do it with perfect readiness to die. Nor is a man brave if he seeks death to avoid trouble, as many do; to use Agathon's words: 'Bad men too weak for toil are in love with death.'
1230a
1 "φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσσώμενοι,
θανεῖν ἐρῶσιν."
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἕλκους ὀδύνην εὔξασθαι ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα. παραπλησίως
5 δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅνπερ
τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν.
αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὐναντίον ἔχει ἢ ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην
οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὔτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ
φοβερὰ θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱστοὺς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ'
10 ὅτι ἴσασι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν· οὔτε δι' ὃ θαρραλεώτερον
ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος
κατὰ Θέογνιν ἀνδρεία εἶεν· "πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος."
φανερῶς <δ'> ἔνιοι δειλοὶ ὄντες ὅμως ὑπομένουσι δι' ἐμπειρίαν·
τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἴσασι γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας.
15 σημεῖον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴωνται βοήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἤδη
πλησίον ᾖ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν
τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ὑπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖεν
<ἂν> ἀνδρεῖοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἕκτορά φησιν ὑπομεῖναι
τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα· "Ἕκτορα δ' αἰδὼς εἷλε·"
20 <καὶ> "Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει."
καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτ'
ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων,
ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι
ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε δι' ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ
25 μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικάς·
οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰήσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ'
ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται
πρότερον, ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό
ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετή
30 τις οὖσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε
δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν,
ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεί, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ᾖ ἀλλὰ μανικόν,
οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.
1And so the poets narrate that Chiron, because of the pain of his wound, prayed for death and release from his immortality. Similarly, all who face dangers owing to experience are not really brave; this is what, perhaps, most soldiers do. For the truth is the exact opposite of what Socrates 5thought; he held that bravery was knowledge. But those who know how to ascend masts are confident not because they know what is terrible, but because they know how to help themselves in dangers. Nor is all that makes men fight more boldly courage; for then, as Theognis puts it, strength and wealth would be bravery—'every man' (he says) 'daunted by 10poverty'. Obviously some, though cowards, face dangers because of their experience, because they do not think them dangers, as they know how to help themselves; and a proof of this is that, when they think they can get no help and the danger is close at hand, they no longer face it. But it is where shame, among all such causes, makes a man face danger that the 15man would most seem to be brave, as Homer says Hector faced the danger from Achilles—'and shame seized Hector'; and, again, 'Polydamas will be the first to taunt me'. Such bravery is civic. But the true bravery is neither this nor any of the others, but like them, as is also the bravery of brutes which from passion run to meet the blow. For a man ought to 20hold his ground though frightened, not because he will incur disrepute, nor through anger, nor because he does not expect to be killed or has powers by which to protect himself; for in that case he will not even think that there is anything to be feared. But since all virtue implies deliberate choice—we have said before what this means and that it makes a man 25choose everything for the sake of some end, and that the end is the noble—it is clear that bravery, because it is a virtue, will make a man face the fearful for some end, so that he does it neither through ignorance—for his virtue rather makes him judge correctly—nor for pleasure, but because the act is noble; since, if it be not noble but frantic, he does 30not face the danger, for that would be disgraceful. In regard, then, to what things bravery is a mean state, between what, and why, and the meaning of the fearful, we have now spoken tolerably adequately for our present purpose.
Book 3,Chapter 2 (1230a34–1231b4)
περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ τίνων
35 καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἴρηται
κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἔφοδον ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης
καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον.
λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς. ὅ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος
πως μηδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ
After this we must try to draw certain distinctions regarding profligacy and temperance. 'Profligate' has many senses. It is, in a 35sense, the unchastened and uncured, as the undivided is the not divided, and with the same two classes, i.e. the one capable, the other incapable of division; for undivided means both what is incapable of division, and what is capable but not actually divided; and so with 'profligate'.
1230b
1 τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὃ μὲν δυνατός, ὃ δ' ἀδύνατος·
ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν
μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ
ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν,
5 καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας,
περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύτην
γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκοκασίαν. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον
τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως.
πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς
10 τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσί, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας
διακεῖσθαί πως καὶ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων·
διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες
μεταφέρομεν. τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι' ἀναισθησίαν
πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἳ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους,
15 οἳ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι δ' οὐ
πάνυ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ
θάτερον ἁμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν
τῶν τοιούτων ἡδέων ἧτταν καὶ αἴσθησιν. μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ
τοιοῦτοι, οἵους οἱ κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἳ
20 οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν.
ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονάς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας
τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνας. οὐ γὰρ
περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων σώφρων
ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περί τε τὸ
25 γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἁπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἁπτόν· περὶ
γὰρ τὴν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας
ἀφροδισίων, ἢ λύπην τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς
ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐαρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι'
ὀσφρήσεως, τάς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ δυσωδίας, οὐκ
30 ἔστιν ὁ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ πάσχειν
ἢ μὴ πάσχειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος
ἢ ἵππον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀκροώμενος ᾄδοντος, μὴ βούλοιτο
μήτε ἐσθίειν μήτε πίνειν μήτε ἀφροδισιάζειν, ἀλλὰ
τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δ' ᾀδόντων ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν
35 ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ κηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σειρῆσιν.
ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ
τἆλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα
καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἁπτά. περὶ δὲ
τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται
1For it is both that which by its nature refuses chastening, and that which is of a nature to accept but has not yet received chastening for the faults in regard to which the temperate man acts rightly—e.g. children. For we give them the same name as the profligate, but 5because of this latter kind of profligacy. And, further, it is in different senses that we give the name to those hard to cure and to those whom it is quite impossible to cure through chastening. Profligacy, then, having many senses, it is clear that it has to do with certain pleasures and pains, and that the forms differ from one another and 10from other states by the kind of attitude towards these; we have already stated how, in the use of the word 'profligacy', we apply it to various states by analogy. As to those who from insensibility are unmoved by these same pleasures, some call them insensible, while others describe them as such by other names; but this state is not very 15familiar or common because all rather err in the opposite direction, and it is congenital to all to be overcome by and to be sensible to such pleasures. It is the state chiefly of such as the boors introduced on the stage by comic writers, who keep aloof from even moderate and necessary pleasures. But since temperance has to do with pleasures, 20it must also have to do with certain appetites; we must, then, ascertain which. For the temperate man does not exhibit his temperance in regard to all appetites and all pleasures, but about the objects, as it seems, of two senses, taste and touch, or rather really about those of touch alone. For his temperance is shown not in regard to visual 25pleasure in the beautiful (so long as it is unaccompanied by sexual appetite) or visual pain at the ugly; nor, again, in regard to the pleasure or pain of the ear at harmony or discord; nor, again, in regard to olfactory pleasure or pain at pleasant or disagreeable odours. Nor is a man called profligate for feeling or want of feeling in 30regard to such matters. For instance, if one sees a beautiful statue, or horse, or human being, or hears singing, without any accompanying wish for eating, drinking, or sexual indulgence, but only with the wish to see the beautiful and to hear the singers, he would not be thought profligate any more than those who were charmed by the Sirens. 35Temperance and profligacy have to do with those two senses whose objects are alone felt by and give pleasure and pain to brutes as well; and these are the senses of taste and touch, the brutes seeming insensible to the pleasures of practically all the other senses alike, e.g.
1231a
1 ἀναισθήτως διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἢ κάλλος.
οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα
αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρμόστων,
εἰ μή τί που συμβέβηκε τερατῶδες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη
5 ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τάς γε αἰσθήσεις ὀξυτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὑτάς. λέγω δὲ <μὴ> καθ'
αὑτάς, αἷς ἢ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον
ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν (δι' ἑτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν,
10 τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθ' αὑτὰς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν
εἰσίν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν
τὰς δὲ ἡδύ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν
ἡδονὴν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ' ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης
ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἁφῇ μᾶλλον
15 ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὔχονται τὴν
γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος
ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἁπτόμενα, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν,
θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς
τοιαύτας ἐστίν. οἰνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία
20 καὶ ὀψοφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας
ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἅπερ μόρια ἡ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται. περὶ
δὲ τὰς δι' ὄψεως ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἡδονὰς οὐθεὶς λέγεται
ἀκόλαστος, ἐὰν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ὀνείδους τὰς
ἁμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταύτας, καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα μὴ λέγονται ἐγκρατεῖς·
25 οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σώφρονες.
ἀναίσθητος μὲν οὖν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, ὁ οὕτως ἔχων
ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὅσων ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἀκόλαστος. πάντες
γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι,
30 καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι (οὐ γὰρ
ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες
καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες), οὐδ' ἀνάλγητοι
(οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσιν).
35 ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι
καὶ μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἡ ἕξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία.
ὥστ' εἰ σωφροσύνη ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις, περὶ ἃ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἡ περὶ
τὰ ἡδέα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη,
μεσότης οὖσα ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας· ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία·
1harmony or beauty; for they obviously have no feeling worth mentioning at the mere sight of the beautiful or the hearing of the harmonious, except, perhaps, in some marvellous instances. And with regard to pleasant and disagreeable odours it is the same, though all their senses are sharper than 5ours. They do, indeed, feel pleasure at certain odours; but these gladden them accidentally and not of their own nature, being those that give us pleasure owing to expectation and memory, e.g. the pleasure from the scent of food or drinks; for these we enjoy because of a different pleasure, that of eating or drinking; the odours enjoyed for their own nature are such as 10those of flowers; (therefore Stratonicus neatly remarked that these smell beautifully, food, &c., pleasantly). Indeed, the brutes are not excited over every pleasure connected with taste, e.g. not over those which are felt in the tip of the tongue, but only over those that are felt in the gullet, the sensation being one of touch rather than of taste. Therefore gluttons 15pray not for a long tongue but for the gullet of a crane, as did Philoxenus, the son of Eryxis. Therefore, broadly, we should regard profligacy as concerned with objects of touch. Similarly it is with such pleasures that the profligate man is concerned. For drunkenness, gluttony, lecherousness, gormandizing, and all such things are concerned with the above-mentioned 20senses; and these are the parts into which we divide profligacy. But in regard to the pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell, no one is called profligate if he is in excess, but we blame without considering disgraceful such faults, and all in regard to which we do not speak of men as continent; the incontinent are neither profligate nor temperate. The man, then, so constituted 25as to be deficient in the pleasures in which all must in general partake and rejoice is insensible (or whatever else we ought to call him); the man in excess is profligate. For all naturally take delight in these objects and conceive appetites for them, and neither are nor are called profligate; for they neither exceed by rejoicing more than is right when they get 30them, nor by feeling greater pain than they ought when they miss them; nor are they insensible, for they are not deficient in the feeling of joy or pain, but rather in excess. But since there is excess and defect in regard to these things, there is clearly also a mean, and this state is the best and opposed to both of the others; so that if the best state about the 35objects with which the profligate is concerned is temperance, temperance would be the mean state in regard to the above-mentioned sensible pleasures, the mean between profligacy and insensibility, the excess being profligacy, and the defect either nameless or expressed by the names we have suggested.
1231b
1 ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἤτοι ἀνώνυμος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόμασι
προσαγορευομένη. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν
ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ
ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.
1More accurate distinctions about the class of pleasures will be drawn in what is said later about continence and incontinence.
Book 3,Chapter 3 (1231b5–26)
5 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ πραότητος καὶ
χαλεπότητος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρᾶον περὶ λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ
γιγνομένην ὁρῶμεν ὄντα, τῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν πώς.
διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ
καὶ ἀγρίῳ (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι διαθέσεως)
10 τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη καὶ τὸν ἀνόητον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα
μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μηδ' ἐφ' ὅσοις δεῖ κινουμένους τὸν θυμόν,
ἀλλὰ προπηλακιζομένους εὐχερῶς καὶ ταπεινοὺς πρὸς τὰς
ὀλιγωρίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ μόλις,
τῷ δ' ἠρέμα τὸ σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον τὸ ὀλίγον
15 λυπεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν λύπην ἣν καλοῦμεν θυμόν. ἐπεὶ δ'
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ
καὶ ἔλλειψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, ὁ
καὶ θᾶττον καὶ μᾶλλον πάσχων καὶ πλείω χρόνον καὶ
ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὁποίοις οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς, ὁ δ' ἀνδραποδώδης
20 τοὐναντίον), δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ὁ μέσος τῆς ἀνισότητος.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτημέναι ἀμφότεραι αἱ ἕξεις ἐκεῖναι,
φανερὸν ὅτι ἐπιεικὴς ἡ μέση τούτων ἕξις· οὔτε γὰρ προτερεῖ
οὔθ' ὑστερίζει οὔτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ ὀργίζεται οὔτε οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὀργίζεται.
ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ πραότης ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ
25 πάθη ἐστίν, εἴη καὶ ἡ πραότης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ πρᾶος
μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους.
In the same way we must ascertain what is gentleness and irascibility. For we see that the gentle is concerned 5with the pain that arises from anger, being characterized by a certain attitude towards this. We have given in our list as opposed to the passionate, irascible, and savage—all such being names for the same state-the slavish and the senseless. For these are practically the names we apply to those who 10are not moved to anger even when they ought, but take insults easily and are humble towards contempt—for slowness to anger is opposed to quickness, violence to quietness, long persistence in that feeling of pain which we call anger to short. And since there is here, as we have said there is 15elsewhere, excess and defect—for the irascible is one that feels anger more quickly, to a greater degree, and for a longer time, and when he ought not, and at what he ought not, and frequently, while the slavish is the opposite—it is clear that there is a mean to this inequality. Since, then, both the 20above-mentioned habits are wrong, it is clear that the mean state between them is good; for he is neither too soon nor too late, and does not feel anger when he ought not, nor feel no anger when he ought. So that since in regard to these emotions the best condition is gentleness, gentleness would be 25a mean state, and the gentle a mean between the irascible and the slavish.
Book 3,Chapter 4 (1231b27–1232a18)
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια
καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητες. ἡ μὲν ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων
κτῆσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσει μὲν πάσῃ
30 μᾶλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ, ἀποβολῇ δὲ πάσῃ λυπούμενος μᾶλλον
ἢ δεῖ ἀνελεύθερος, ὁ δ' ἀμφότερα ἧττον ἢ δεῖ ἄσωτος,
ὁ δ' ἄμφω ὡς δεῖ ἐλευθέριος. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τὸ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ
ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός. ἐπεὶ
δ' ἐκεῖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει, ὅπου δὲ
35 ἔσχατα εἰσί, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἓν δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον
τῷ εἴδει τὸ βέλτιστον· ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα
μεσότητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας περὶ χρημάτων
κτῆσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. διχῶς δὲ τὰ χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ
τὴν χρηματιστικήν. ἣ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ χρῆσις τοῦ κτήματος
Also magnanimity, magnificence, and liberality are mean states—liberality being shown in the acquisition or expenditure of wealth. For the man who is more pleased than he ought to be with every acquisition and more pained 30than he ought to be at every expenditure is illiberal; he who feels less of both than he ought is lavish; he who feels both as he ought is liberal. (By 'as he ought', both in this and in the other cases, I mean 'as right reason directs'.) But since the two former show their nature respectively by 35excess and defect—and where there are extremes, there is also a mean and that is best, a single best for each kind of action—liberality must be the mean between lavishness and meanness in regard to the acquisition and expenditure of wealth.
1232a
1 ἐστίν, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ ἱματίου, ἣ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
μέν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως ὡς ἂν εἴ τις σταθμῷ χρήσαιτο
τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἡ πώλησις καὶ ἡ μίσθωσις· χρῆται
γὰρ ὑποδήματι. ὁ δὲ φιλάργυρος ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμά
5 ἐστιν ἐσπουδακώς, τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως ἀντὶ τῆς
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς χρήσεως ἐστίν· ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἂν εἴη
καὶ ἄσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ,
καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν αὔξησιν
διώκει· ὁ δ' ἄσωτος ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος
10 τὴν περιουσίαν δίδωσιν. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων εἴδη λέγονται
διαφέροντα τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον περὶ μόρια, οἷον ἀνελεύθερος
φειδωλὸς καὶ κίμβιξ καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, φειδωλὸς
μὲν ἐν τῷ μὴ προΐεσθαι, αἰσχροκερδὴς δ' ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν προσίεσθαι,
κίμβιξ δὲ ὁ σφόδρα περὶ μικρὰ διατεινόμενος, παραλογιστὴς
15 δὲ καὶ ἀποστερητὴς ὁ ἄδικος κατ' ἀνελευθερίαν.
καὶ τοῦ ἀσώτου ὡσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀτάκτως
ἀναλίσκειν, ἀλόγιστος δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ
λογισμοῦ λύπην.
1I take wealth and the art of wealth in two senses; the art in one sense being the proper use of one's property (say of a shoe or a coat), in the other an accidental mode of using it—not the use of a shoe for a weight, but, say, the selling of it or letting it out for money; for here too the shoe is 5used. Now the lover of money is a man eager for actual money, which is a sign of possession taking the place of the accidental use of other possessions. But the illiberal man may even be lavish in the accidental pursuit of wealth, for it is in the natural pursuit of it that he aims at increase. The lavish runs short of necessaries; but the liberal man gives his superfluities. 10There are also species of these genera which exceed or fall short as regards parts of the subject-matter of liberality, e.g. the sparing, the skinflint, the grasper at disgraceful gain, are all illiberal; the sparing is characterized by his refusal to spend, the grasper at disgraceful gain by his readiness to accept anything, the skinflint by his strong feeling over small amounts, 15while the man who has the sort of injustice that involves meanness is a false reckoner and cheat. And similarly one class of spendthrift is a waster by his disorderly expenditure, the other a fool who cannot bear the pain of calculation.
Book 3,Chapter 5 (1232a19–1233a30)
περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις
20 ἀποδιδομένων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
<ἃ> κατὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι του λανθάνει
πόρρω προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταὐτὸ
συμβέβηκεν. διὸ ἐνίοτε οἱ ἐναντίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦνται,
οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ αὐθάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ
25 ὁ θρασὺς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοροι
μέχρι τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ
ὁ θρασύς, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ὧδε ὃ δ' ὧδε· ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει
πλεῖστον. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος
προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως.
30 ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ ὅμοιος
εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅτε καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρῖναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν. δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι μεγάλα, ἃ διώκει
ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἕξιν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ἡδέα. ἡ δὲ
35 μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη· κρίνει δ' ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ
μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσειε
καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὥστε ἕπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ
αὐτὴν ἕπεσθαι πάσαις. —ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ
καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι. ἑκάστη δ' ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικοὺς ποιεῖ
As to magnanimity we must define its specific nature from the qualities that we ascribe to the magnanimous. For just as with other things, 20in virtue of their nearness and likeness up to a certain point, their divergence beyond that point escapes notice, so it is with magnanimity. Therefore, sometimes men really opposite lay claim to the same character, e.g. the lavish to that of the liberal, the self-willed to that of the dignified, the confident to that of the brave. For they are concerned with the same things, 25and are up to a certain point contiguous; thus the brave man and the confident are alike ready to face danger—but the former in one way, the latter in another; and these ways differ greatly. Now, we assert that the magnanimous man, as is indicated by the name we apply to him, is characterized by a certain greatness of soul and faculty; and so he seems like the dignified and 30the magnificent man, since magnanimity seems to accompany all the virtues. For to distinguish correctly great goods from small is laudable. Now, those goods are thought great which are pursued by the man of the best habit in regard to what seem to be pleasures; and magnanimity is the best habit. But every special virtue correctly distinguishes the greater from the less among its 35objects, as the wise man and virtue would direct, so that all the virtues seem to go with this one of magnanimity, or this with all the virtues. Further, it seems characteristic of the magnanimous man to be disdainful; each virtue makes one disdainful of what is esteemed great contrary to reason (e.g.
1232b
1 τῶν παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἷον ἀνδρεία κινδύνων (μέγα
γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν φοβερόν),
καὶ σώφρων ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐλευθέριος
χρημάτων. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα
5 σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἑτέρῳ
τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος, τί δοκεῖ
ἑνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν
ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν ἀπολογίαν
ἐπαινέσαντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλίγωρον τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστ'
10 εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου,
περὶ ὧν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν
περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς. καὶ λυπηθήσοιτ' ἂν ἀτιμαζόμενος
καὶ ἀρχόμενος ὑπὸ ἀναξίου. καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα
τυγχάνων. —οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ
15 εἶναί τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι τῶν
πολλῶν [καὶ] δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. δεῖ δὴ τοῦτο διορίσαντας
εἰπεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ τιμὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς.
ἢ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ πολλῶν τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀξίων
λόγου, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ἐπὶ τίνι ἡ τιμὴ διαφέρει. μεγάλη
20 γὰρ οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῷ τιμίαν εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τἆλλα
ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς
ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ἀρετὴ οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι
μεγαλοψύχους ποιεῖν ἑκάστη, περὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν,
25 ὥσπερ εἴπομεν. —ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστί τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς
μία μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἰδίᾳ μεγαλόψυχον τοῦτον
λεκτέον τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ
μὲν τίμια τὰ δ' ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν
δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά, καὶ τούτων
30 ἔνιοι ἄξιοι καὶ ἀξιοῦσιν αὑτούς, ἐν τούτοις ζητητέος ὁ μεγαλόψυχος.
τετραχῶς δ' ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ
ἄξιον εἶναι μεγάλων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δὲ μικρὰ
καὶ ἄξιόν τινα τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δ'
ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος
35 οἷος ἄξιος ὢν μικρῶν μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐντίμων
ἀγαθῶν, ὃ δὲ ἄξιος ὢν μεγάλων ἀξιοίη ἂν μικρῶν ἑαυτόν.
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιος μικρῶν, μεγάλων δ' ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν ψεκτός
(ἀνόητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τυγχάνειν),
ψεκτὸς δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἄξιος ὢν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων
1bravery disdains dangers of this kind—for it considers it disgraceful to hold them great; and numbers are not always fearful: so the temperate disdains many great pleasures, and the liberal wealth). But this characteristic seems to belong to the magnanimous man because he cares about few things only, 5and those great, and not because some one else thinks them so. The magnanimous man would consider rather what one good man thinks than many ordinary men, as Antiphon after his condemnation said to Agathon when he praised his defence of himself. Contempt seems particularly the special characteristic of the magnanimous man; and, again, as regards honour, life, and wealth—about 10which mankind seems to care—he values none of them except honour. He would be pained if denied honour, and if ruled by one undeserving. He delights most of all when he obtains honour. In this way he would seem to contradict himself; for to be concerned above all with honour, and yet to disdain the multitude and reputation, are inconsistent. So we must first distinguish. 15For honour, great or small, is of two kinds; for it may be given by a crowd of ordinary men or by those worthy of consideration; and, again, there is a difference according to the ground on which honour is given. For it is made great not merely by the number of those who give the honour or by their quality, but also by its being precious; but in reality, power and all 20other goods are precious and worthy of pursuit only if they are truly great, so that there is no virtue without greatness; therefore every virtue, as we have said, makes man magnanimous in regard to the object with which that virtue is concerned. But still there is a single virtue, magnanimity, alongside of the other virtues, and he who has this must be called in a special 25sense magnanimous. But since some goods are precious and some not, according to the distinction above made, and of such goods some are in truth great and some small, and of these some men are worthy and think themselves so, among these we must look for the magnanimous man. There must be four different kinds of men. For a man may be worthy of great goods and think himself 30worthy of them, and again there may be small goods and a man worthy of them and thinking himself worthy; and we may have the opposites in regard to either kind of goods; for there may be a man worthy of small who thinks himself worthy of great and esteemed goods; and, again, one worthy of great but thinking himself worthy only of small. He then who is worthy of the small 35but thinks himself worthy of the great is blameable; for it is silly and not noble that he should obtain out of proportion to his worth: the man also is blameable who being worthy of great goods, because he possesses the gifts that make a man worthy, does not think himself worthy to share in them.
1233a
1 μετέχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν· λείπεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίος
τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις, ὅστις ὢν ἄξιος μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς
ἑαυτὸν τούτων, καὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὗτος
ἐπαινετὸς καὶ μέσος τούτων. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ τιμῆς αἵρεσιν καὶ
5 χρῆσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀρίστη ἐστὶ
διάθεσις ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀποδίδομεν, καὶ οὐ
περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα, τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης
αὕτη ἐπαινετωτάτη· δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία
μεσότης ἂν εἴη, τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ὥσπερ διεγράψαμεν, ἡ
10 μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων ἀνάξιον ὄντα
χαυνότης (τοὺς τοιούτους γὰρ χαύνους λέγομεν, ὅσοι μεγάλων
οἴονται ἄξιοι εἶναι οὐκ ὄντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα μὴ
ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν μεγάλων μικροψυχία (μικροψύχου γὰρ εἶναι
δοκεῖ, ὅστις ὑπαρχόντων δι' ἃ δικαίως ἂν ἠξιοῦτο, μὴ
15 ἀξιοῖ μηθενὸς μεγάλου ἑαυτόν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν
εἶναι μεσότητα χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας. ὁ
δὲ τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων οὔτε πάμπαν ψεκτὸς οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος,
περὶ οὐδὲνἔχον ἔχ<ον> ὢν μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε
ἀξιοῖ μεγάλων, διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίον
20 εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἀξίῳ ὄντι μεγάλων τὸ μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον
<μικρῶν> ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἐναντίος οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς
εἶναι (ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἔχει)· καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ
φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ (ὧν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων ἀξιοῦσιν
αὑτοὺς ἄμφω)· καὶ ὃ μὲν γένοιτ' ἂν μεγαλόψυχος (ἀξιώσει
25 γὰρ ὧν ἐστιν ἄξιος), ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, ὃς ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ
μεγάλων κατὰ τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, τί ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μικρῶν
ἄξιος ἦν; εἰ γὰρ [ἂν] μεγάλων ἀξιῶν χαῦνος ἦν, ** ἢ
ἐλαττόνων ἔτι. διὸ καὶ οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις
μέτοικος ὢν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ' ὑπείκει· ἀλλ'
30 εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὢν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.
1There remains then the opposite of these two—the man who is worthy of great goods and thinks himself worthy of them, such being his disposition; he is the mean between the other two and is praiseworthy. Since, then, in respect of the choice and use of honour and the other esteemed goods, the best condition is 5magnanimity, and we define the magnanimous man as being this, and not as being concerned with things useful; and since this mean is the most praiseworthy state, it is clear that magnanimity is a mean. But of the opposites, as shown in our list, the quality consisting in thinking oneself worthy of great goods when not worthy is vanity—for we give the name of vain to those who think themselves 10worthy of great things though they are not; but the quality of not thinking oneself worthy of great things though one is, we call mean-spiritedness-for it is held to be the mark of the mean-spirited not to think himself worthy of any thing great though he possesses that for which he would justly be deemed worthy of it; hence, it follows that magnanimity is a mean between vanity and mean-spiritedness. 15The fourth of the sorts of men we have distinguished is neither wholly blameable nor yet magnanimous, not having to do with anything that possesses greatness, for he is neither worthy nor thinks himself worthy of great goods; therefore, he is not opposite to the magnanimous man; yet to be worthy and think oneself worthy of small goods might seem opposite to being worthy and thinking 20oneself worthy of great ones. But such a man is not opposite to the magnanimous man, for he is not to be blamed (his habit being what reason directs); he is, in fact, similar in nature to the magnanimous man; for both think themselves worthy of what they really are worthy of. He might become magnanimous, for of whatever he is worthy of he will think himself worthy. But the mean-spirited 25man who, possessed of great and honourable qualities, does not think himself worthy of great good—what would he do if he deserved only small? Either he would think himself worthy of great goods and thus be vain, or else of still smaller than he has. Therefore, no one would call a man mean-spirited because, being an alien in a city, he does not claim to govern but submits, but only one who 30does not, being well born and thinking power a great thing.
Book 3,Chapter 6 (1233a31–1233b15)
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ περὶ τὴν τυχοῦσαν
πρᾶξιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ μή που κατὰ
μεταφορὰν λέγομεν· ἄνευ δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια οὐκ
ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐκ
35 ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων ἀναλωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν
ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὴ ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῦ πρέποντος μεγέθους
προαιρετικός, καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ
τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῇ ὀρεκτικός, μεγαλοπρεπής. ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ
μεῖζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος, ἀνώνυμος· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει τινὰ
The magnificent man is not concerned with any and every action or choice, but with expenditure—unless we use the name metaphorically; without expense there cannot be magnificence. It is the fitting in ornament, but ornament is not to be got out of ordinary expenditure, but consists in surpassing the merely necessary. The man, then, 35who tends to choose in great expenditure the fitting magnitude, and desires this sort of mean, and with a view to this sort of pleasure is magnificent; the man whose inclination is to something larger than necessary but out of harmony, has no name, though he is near to those called by some tasteless and showy: e.g.
1233b
1 γειτνίασιν, οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας.
οἷον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλούσιος ὤν,
δοκεῖ πρέπειν ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν οἷον ἀγαθοδαιμονιστὰς
ἑστιῶντι, οὗτος μὲν μικροπρεπής, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους δεχόμενος
5 ἐκείνως μὴ δόξης χάριν μηδὲ δι' ἐξουσίαν ὅμοιος
τῷ σαλάκωνι, ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπής·
τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρέπει
τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι ** (καὶ γὰρ τοῦ
πρέποντος κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον) καὶ περὶ ὃ (οἷον περὶ οἰκέτου
10 γάμον ἕτερον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένου) καὶ αὐτῷ, εἴπερ
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾤετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ
πρέπειν, ἣν ἐποιήσατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν
ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἔχων πρὸς
τὴν ἀξίαν [ὃ] οὐθεὶς τούτων. καὶ ἐπ' ἐλευθεριότητος ὡσαύτως·
15 ἔστι γάρ τις οὔτ' ἐλευθέριος οὔτ' ἀνελεύθερος.
1if a rich man, spending money on the marriage of a favourite, thinks it sufficient to make such arrangements as one makes to entertain those who drink to the Good Genius, he is shabby; while one who receives guests of this sort in the way suited to a marriage feast resembles the showy man, if 5he does it neither for the sake of reputation nor to gain power; but he who entertains suitably and as reason directs, is magnificent; for what looks well is the suitable; nothing unsuitable is fitting. And what one does should be fitting. For in what is fitting is involved suitability both to the object (e.g. one thing is fitting for a servant's, another for a 10favourite's wedding) and to the entertainer both in extent and kind, e.g. one thought that the mission conducted by Themistocles to the Olympian games was not fitting to him because of his previous low station, but would have been to Cimon. But the man who is indifferent to questions of suitability is in none of the above classes. Similarly with liberality; for a man 15may be neither liberal nor illiberal.
Book 3,Chapter 7 (1233b16–1234b14)
σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ τὸ ἦθος
ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαὶ τὰ δ' ἐλλείψεις
τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικαί. —οἷον ὁ φθονερὸς καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος.
καθ' ἃς γὰρ ἕξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ
20 λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ
ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων
δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις.
μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὃ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι
τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
25 κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις·
διὸ καὶ θεὸν οἴονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν. —αἰδὼς δὲ μεσότης
ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων
δόξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ,
ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων. —φιλία δὲ μεσότης
30 ἔχθρας καὶ κολακείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα
πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἁπάσας ἀντικρούων
ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ [τε] πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν μήτ'
ἀκολουθῶν μήτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον,
φίλος. —σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας·
35 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικὸς
αὐθάδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων
ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως
ἔχων σεμνός. —ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον,
μέσος τοῦ εἴρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ
In general of the other blameable or praiseworthy qualities of character some are excesses, others defects, others means, but of feelings, e.g. the envious man and the man who rejoices over another's misfortunes. For, to consider the habits to which they owe their names, envy is pain felt at deserved good fortune, while the 20feeling of the man who rejoices at misfortunes has itself no name, but such a man shows his nature by rejoicing over undeserved ill fortune. Between them is the man inclined to righteous indignation, the name given by the ancients to pain felt at either good or bad fortune if undeserved, or to joy felt at them if deserved. Hence they make righteous indignation ( νέμεσις) 25a god. Shame is a mean between shamelessness and shyness; for the man who thinks of no one's opinion is shameless, he who thinks of every one's alike is shy, he who thinks only of that of apparently good men is modest. Friendliness is a mean between animosity and flattery; for the man who readily accommodates himself in all respects to another's desires is a 30flatterer; the man who opposes every desire is prone to enmity; the man who neither accommodates himself to nor resists every one's pleasure, but only accommodates himself to what seems to be best, is friendly. Dignity is a mean between self-will and too great obligingness; for the contemptuous man who lives with no consideration for another is self-willed; the man 35who adapts his whole life to another and is submissive to everybody is too obliging; but he who acts thus in certain cases but not in others, and only to those worthy, is dignified. The sincere and simple, or, as he is called, 'downright' man, is a mean between the dissembler and the charlatan.
1234a
1 χείρω καθ' αὑτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἴρων, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ
τὰ βελτίω ἀλαζών, ὁ δ' ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθὴς καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον
πεπνυμένος· καὶ ὅλως ὃ μὲν φιλαλήθης, ὃ δὲ φιλοψευδής. —
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐτραπελία μεσότης, καὶ ὁ εὐτράπελος μέσος
5 τοῦ ἀγροίκου καὶ δυστραπέλου καὶ τοῦ βωμολόχου. ὥσπερ γὰρ
περὶ τροφὴν ὁ σικχὸς τοῦ παμφάγου διαφέρει τῷ ὃ μὲν
μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα καὶ χαλεπῶς προσίεσθαι, ὃ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς,
οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄγροικος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν φορτικὸν καὶ βωμολόχον·
ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν γελοῖον ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς προσίεται,
10 ὃ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς καὶ ἡδέως. δεῖ δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ
τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον· οὗτος δ' εὐτράπελος.
ἡ δ' ἀπόδειξις ἡ αὐτή· ἥ τε γὰρ εὐτραπελία ἡ τοιαύτη,
καὶ μὴ ἣν μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἕξις, καὶ ἡ
μεσότης ἐπαινετή, τὰ δ' ἄκρα ψεκτά. οὔσης δὲ διττῆς τῆς
15 εὐτραπελίας (ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστι τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ
τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ᾖ τοιονδί, ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σκῶμμα ἐστίν, ἣ
δ' ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεραι μέν εἰσιν
ἀλλήλων, ἀμφότεραι μέντοι μεσότητες. καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνάμενον
τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφ' ὅσοις ἡσθήσεται <ὁ> εὖ κρίνων,
20 κἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ᾖ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ
ψυχροῦ. ὁ δ' ὅρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ <μὴ> λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν
τῷ σκωπτομένῳ ὄντι ὁποιῳοῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν
μεσότητι ὄντι ἀρέσκειν· οὗτος γὰρ κρίνει εὖ.
πᾶσαι δ' αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μέν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' ἀρεταί,
25 οὐδ' αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. ταῦτα δὲ
πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ
αὐτῶν πάθος τι ἐστίν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς
συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς
ὕστερον, ἑκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως.
30 ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ
ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην,
ἡ αἰδὼς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν
σωφροσύνην· ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς ὃ μὲν ἔμφρων, ὃ δ' ἄφρων.
ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἢ ἐκεῖνα
1For the man who knowingly and falsely depreciates himself is a dissembler; the man who exalts himself is a charlatan; the man who represents himself as he is, is sincere, and in the Homeric phrase 'intelligent'; in general the one loves truth, the other a lie. Wittiness 5also is a mean, the witty being a mean between the boorish or stiff and the buffoon. For just as the squeamish differs from the omnivorous in that the one takes little or nothing and that with reluctance, while the other accepts everything readily, so is the boor related to the vulgar buffoon; the one accepts nothing comic without difficulty, 10the other takes all easily and with pleasure. Neither attitude is right; one ought to accept some things and not others, as reason directs—and the man who does this is witty. The proof is the usual one; wittiness of this kind, supposing we do not use the word in some transferred sense, is the best habit, and the mean is praiseworthy, 15and the extremes blameable. But wit being of two kinds—one being delight in the comic, even when directed against one's self, if it be really comic, like a jeer, the other being the faculty of producing such things—the two sorts differ from one another but both are means. For the man that can produce what a good judge will be pleased at, 20even if the joke is against himself, will be midway between the vulgar and the frigid man; this definition is better than that which merely requires the thing said to be not painful to the person jeered at, no matter what sort of man he is; one ought rather to please the man who is in the mean, for he is a good judge. All these mean states 25are praiseworthy without being virtues; nor are their opposites vices—for they do not involve deliberate choice. All of them occur in the classifications of affections, for each is an affection. But since they are natural, they tend to the natural virtues; for, as will be said later, each virtue is found both naturally and also otherwise, 30viz. as including thought. Envy then tends to injustice (for the acts arising from it affect another), righteous indignation to justice, shame to temperance—whence some even put temperance into this genus. The sincere and the false are respectively sensible and foolish.
1234b
1 ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδετέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ
δὲ πολλάκις μετ' ἀλλήλων καί εἰσιν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασύδειλοι,
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως
ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ὦσιν,
5 οἱ μέσοι γίγνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστί πως τὰ ἄκρα.
αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς
τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν
ὁτὲ δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν. αἴτια δὲ τά τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα δύο,
ὀλιγότης τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ἀναισθήτων, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ'
10 ὃ ἁμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ
τρίτον, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἧττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε
τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἴρηται σχεδόν·
περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον.
1But the mean is more opposed to the extremes than these to one another, because the mean is found with neither, but the extremes often with one another, and sometimes the same people are at once cowardly and confident, or lavish in some ways, illiberal in others, and in general are lacking in uniformity in a bad sense—for 5if they lack uniformity in a good sense, men of the mean type are produced; since, in a way, both extremes are present in the mean. The opposition between the mean and the extremes does not seem to be alike in both cases; sometimes the opposition is that of the excessive extreme, sometimes that of the defective, and the causes are the two first given—rarity, e.g. of those insensible to pleasures, 10and the fact that the error to which we are most prone seems the more opposed to the mean. There is a third reason, namely, that the more like seems less opposite, e.g. confidence to bravery, lavishness to liberality. We have, then, spoken sufficiently about the other praiseworthy virtues; we must now speak of justice.