Ross (OCT, 1957) · Jowett (1885)
Jowett (1885)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 6,Chapter 1 (1316b31–1317a39)
1316b
Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραὶ καὶ τίνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ
καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάξεως
καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποία πρὸς ποίαν συντέτακται
πολιτείαν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν,
35 ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται
πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν εἴδη πλείω δημοκρατίας ὄντα
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτειῶν, ἅμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ
τι λοιπόν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν
συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἑκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ
40 τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεπτέον πάντων
31We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of law-courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms of government. We have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of constitutions, 35how and from what causes they arise.
40Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes of organization which are proper and advantageous to each, adding what remains to be said about them.
40Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes of organization which are proper and advantageous to each, adding what remains to be said about them.
1317a
1 τῶν τρόπων· ταῦτα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας
ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι καὶ
πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνδυασμοὺς
οὓς δεῖ μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν, οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δ' εἰσὶ νῦν, οἷον ἂν
5 τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας ὀλιγαρχικῶς
ᾖ συντεταγμένον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς,
ἢ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ὀλιγαρχικῶς,
ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας, ἢ
κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον μὴ πάντα συντεθῇ τὰ τῆς πολιτείας
10 οἰκεῖα. ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν ἁρμόττει
πόλιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποίῳ
πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν,
εἴρηται πρότερον· ὅμως δ' <ἐπεὶ> δεῖ γενέσθαι δῆλον μὴ μόνον
ποία τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρίστη ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
15 πῶς δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἐπέλθωμεν
συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας εἴπωμεν·
ἅμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης πολιτείας φανερόν,
αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσί τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν. ληπτέον δὲ
πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ δημοτικὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα
20 ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντιθεμένων
τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας εἴδη γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ
πλείους δημοκρατίας μιᾶς εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γάρ
εἰσιν αἰτίαι δι' ἅσπερ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους εἰσί, πρῶτον
μὲν ἡ λεχθεῖσα πρότερον, ὅτι διάφοροι οἱ δῆμοι (γίνεται
25 γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλῆθος, τὸ δὲ βάναυσον καὶ θητικόν·
ὧν τοῦ πρώτου τῷ δευτέρῳ προσλαμβανομένου, καὶ τοῦ
τρίτου πάλιν τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίω
καὶ χείρω γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ
τὴν αὐτήν), δευτέρα δὲ περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγομεν. τὰ γὰρ ταῖς
30 δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντ' εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας
οἰκεῖα ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας·
τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω, τῇ δ' ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα, τῇ δ'
ἅπαντα ταῦτα. χρήσιμον δ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν πρός
τε τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἣν ἄν τις αὐτῶν τύχῃ βουλόμενος,
35 καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις. ζητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας
καθιστάντες ἅπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν,
ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ
τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴρηται πρότερον.
νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ ὧν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν.
Moreover, we ought to consider the various combinations of these 1modes themselves; for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments incline to democracies.
When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean such as these: 5when the deliberative part of the government and the election of officers is constituted oligarchically, and the law-courts aristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to office aristocratical, or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state.
10I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of these governments is the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to consider 15how these and other forms of government are to be established.
First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics 20of democracy, since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government arise. There are several of these differing from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. One (1) has been already mentioned- differences of population; for the popular element may consist of 25husbandmen, or of mechanics, or of laborers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its very nature is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the various properties and 30characteristics of democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy, 35or only to remodel an existing one. Founders of states try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs, as I have already remarked when speaking of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such states.
When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean such as these: 5when the deliberative part of the government and the election of officers is constituted oligarchically, and the law-courts aristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to office aristocratical, or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state.
10I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of these governments is the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to consider 15how these and other forms of government are to be established.
First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics 20of democracy, since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government arise. There are several of these differing from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. One (1) has been already mentioned- differences of population; for the popular element may consist of 25husbandmen, or of mechanics, or of laborers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its very nature is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the various properties and 30characteristics of democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy, 35or only to remodel an existing one. Founders of states try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs, as I have already remarked when speaking of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such states.
Book 6,Chapter 2 (1317a40–1318a10)
40 Ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία
(τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν, ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ
The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common opinion of men, can 40only be enjoyed in such a state; this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy.
1317b
1 ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας· τούτου γὰρ στοχάζεσθαί φασι
πᾶσαν δημοκρατίαν)· ἐλευθερίας δὲ ἓν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι
καὶ ἄρχειν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ
ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τούτου δ'
5 ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον, καὶ ὅ τι
ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτ' εἶναι τέλος καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι
τὸ δίκαιον· φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν·
ὥστε ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις συμβαίνει κυριωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς
ἀπόρους τῶν εὐπόρων· πλείους γάρ εἰσι, κύριον δὲ τὸ τοῖς
10 πλείοσι δόξαν. ἓν μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας σημεῖον τοῦτο, ὃν
τίθενται πάντες οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρον· ἓν δὲ τὸ
ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔργον εἶναί
φασιν, εἴπερ τοῦ δουλεύοντος τὸ ζῆν μὴ ὡς βούλεται. τῆς
μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅρος οὗτος δεύτερος· ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἐλήλυθε
15 τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ μηθενός, εἰ δὲ
μή, κατὰ μέρος, καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. τούτων δ' ὑποκειμένων καὶ τοιαύτης
οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα δημοτικά· τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι
τὰς ἀρχὰς πάντας ἐκ πάντων, τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν
20 ἑκάστου ἕκαστον δ' ἐν μέρει πάντων, τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης,
τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος μηθενὸς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ ὅτι μικροτάτου,
τὸ μὴ δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλιγάκις
ἢ ὀλίγας ἔξω τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, τὸ ὀλιγοχρονίους εἶναι τὰς
25 ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δικάζειν πάντας
καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων, ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ
τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ
πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων, τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν
κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων, ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν
30 μηθενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων κυρίαν (τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν δημοτικώτατον
βουλή, ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εὐπορία πᾶσιν· ἐνταῦθα
γὰρ ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν δύναμιν· εἰς
αὑτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει τὰς κρίσεις πάσας ὁ δῆμος εὐπορῶν
μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ
35 ταύτης), ἔπειτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκκλησίαν
δικαστήρια ἀρχάς, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ
δικαστήρια καὶ <τὴν> βουλὴν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τὰς κυρίας, ἢ
τῶν ἀρχῶν ἃς ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων. ἔτι ἐπειδὴ
ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται,
40 τὰ δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ τἀναντία τούτων εἶναι, ἀγένεια πενία
βαναυσία· ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀίδιον εἶναι,
One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality; 5whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority 10is supreme. This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes. This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men 15to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality.
Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as follows the election of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule 20over each, and each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and skill, should be made by lot; that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one; that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of few except military offices: that the tenure of all 25offices, or of as many as possible, should be brief, that all men should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all should judge, in all matters, or in most and in the greatest and most important- such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and the magistrates 30over none or only over a very few. Of all magistracies, a council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power; for the people then draw all cases to themselves, as I said in the previous discussion. 35The next characteristic of democracy is payment for services; assembly, law courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together. 1And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, wealth, and education, 40the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these- low birth, poverty, mean employment.
Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as follows the election of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule 20over each, and each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and skill, should be made by lot; that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one; that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of few except military offices: that the tenure of all 25offices, or of as many as possible, should be brief, that all men should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all should judge, in all matters, or in most and in the greatest and most important- such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and the magistrates 30over none or only over a very few. Of all magistracies, a council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power; for the people then draw all cases to themselves, as I said in the previous discussion. 35The next characteristic of democracy is payment for services; assembly, law courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together. 1And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, wealth, and education, 40the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these- low birth, poverty, mean employment.
1318a
1 ἐὰν δέ τις καταλειφθῇ ἐξ ἀρχαίας μεταβολῆς, τό γε περιαιρεῖσθαι
τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς
ποιεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτ' ἐστί· συμβαίνει
δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ
5 (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἅπαντας κατ' ἀριθμόν) ἡ μάλιστ'
εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος. ἴσον γὰρ τὸ
μηθὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ
κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξ ἴσου κατ' ἀριθμόν·
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοιεν τήν τ' ἰσότητα τῇ πολιτείᾳ
10 καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.
Another note is that no magistracy is perpetual, 1but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are the points common to all democracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of democratic justice, 5that all should count equally; for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than the rich, and should not be the only rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their numbers. And in this way men think that they will secure equality 10and freedom in their state.
Book 6,Chapter 3 (1318a11–1318b5)
Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἕξουσι τὸ ἴσον, πότερον
δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν, χιλίοις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων,
καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἴσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ
οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν
15 μὲν οὕτως, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ
ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν αἱρέσεων καὶ τῶν
δικαστηρίων. πότερον οὖν αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία δικαιοτάτη κατὰ
τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος; φασὶ
γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν,
20 οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῇ πλείονι οὐσίᾳ· κατὰ
πλῆθος γὰρ οὐσίας φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δεῖν. ἔχει δ' ἀμφότερα
ἀνισότητα καὶ ἀδικίαν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι, τυραννίς
(καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἷς ἔχῃ πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων,
κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος), εἰ
25 δ' ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἀδικήσουσι δημεύοντες τὰ
τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.
τίς ἂν οὖν εἴη ἰσότης ἣν ὁμολογήσουσιν ἀμφότεροι, σκεπτέον
ἐξ ὧν ὁρίζονται δικαίων ἀμφότεροι. λέγουσι γὰρ ὡς ὅ τι
ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῦτ' εἶναι δεῖ κύριον·
30 ἔστω δὴ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι πάντως, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη
τετύχηκεν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πόλις, πλούσιοι καὶ πένητες, ὅ τι ἂν
ἀμφοτέροις δόξῃ ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ
τἀναντία δόξῃ, ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους καὶ ὧν τὸ τίμημα πλεῖον·
οἷον, εἰ οἱ μὲν δέκα οἱ δὲ εἴκοσιν, ἔδοξε δὲ τῶν μὲν πλουσίων
35 τοῖς ἓξ τῶν δ' ἀπορωτέρων τοῖς πεντεκαίδεκα, προσγεγένηνται
τοῖς μὲν πένησι τέτταρες τῶν πλουσίων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις
πέντε τῶν πενήτων· ὁποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει
συναριθμουμένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέροις, τοῦτο κύριον. ἐὰν δὲ
ἴσοι συμπέσωσι, κοινὴν εἶναι ταύτην νομιστέον ἀπορίαν ὥσπερ
40 νῦν ἐὰν δίχα ἡ ἐκκλησία γένηται ἢ τὸ δικαστήριον· ἢ
Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Are we to assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications of five hundred rich men? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, 15still retaining the same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of the courts?- Which, according to the democratical notion, is the juster form of the constitution- this or one based on numbers only? Democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree, 20oligarchs that to which the wealthier class; in their opinion the decision should be given according to the amount of property. In both principles there is some inequality and injustice. For if justice is the will of the few, any one person who has more wealth than all the rest of the rich put together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the sole power- but this would be tyranny; or if 25justice is the will of the majority, as I was before saying, they will unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality which they both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice.
Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. 30Granted: but not without some reserve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed- the poor and the rich- that is to be deemed law, on which both or the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved 35by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, 40when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient.
Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. 30Granted: but not without some reserve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed- the poor and the rich- that is to be deemed law, on which both or the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved 35by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, 40when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient.
1318b
1 γὰρ ἀποκληρωτέον ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον. ἀλλὰ περὶ
μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, κἂν ᾖ πάνυ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν
τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅμως ῥᾷον τυχεῖν ἢ συμπεῖσαι
τοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ
5 δίκαιον οἱ ἥττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν
But, although it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality and 5justice, but the stronger care for none of these things.
Book 6,Chapter 4 (1318b6–1319b29)
Δημοκρατιῶν δ' οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη μὲν ἡ πρώτη
τάξει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις· ἔστι δὲ
καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν αὕτη. λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὥσπερ ἄν
τις διέλοι τοὺς δήμους. βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός
10 ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν ὅπου ζῇ τὸ
πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν
οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν
διὰ δὲ τὸ [μὴ] ἔχειν τἀνακαῖα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι
καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἥδιον αὐτοῖς
15 τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, ὅπου ἂν μὴ ᾖ
λήμματα μεγάλα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον
ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ
γὰρ τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας ὑπέμενον καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας
ὑπομένουσιν, ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ μηδ'
20 ἀφαιρῆται μηθέν· ταχέως γὰρ οἱ μὲν πλουτοῦσιν αὐτῶν
οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀποροῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ ἑλέσθαι καὶ
εὐθύνειν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν ἔνδειαν, εἴ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν,
ἐπεὶ παρ' ἐνίοις δήμοις, κἂν μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς αἱρέσεως
τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλά τινες αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων,
25 ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ βουλεύεσθαι κύριοι ὦσιν, ἱκανῶς
ἔχει τοῖς πολλοῖς· καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι σχῆμά
τι δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ἦν. διὸ δὴ καὶ
συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον ῥηθείσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὑπάρχειν
εἴωθεν, αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ
30 δικάζειν πάντας, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μεγίστας αἱρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ
τιμημάτων, τὰς μείζους ἀπὸ μειζόνων, ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων
μὲν μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ
πολιτευομένους οὕτω πολιτεύεσθαί τε καλῶς (αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ
αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται, τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς
35 ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦντος), καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις
ἀρκοῦσαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν τάξιν· ἄρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ'
ἄλλων χειρόνων, καὶ ἄρξουσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν
εἶναι κυρίους ἑτέρους. τὸ γὰρ ἐπανακρέμασθαι, καὶ μὴ πᾶν
ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ, συμφέρον ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία
40 τοῦ πράττειν ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις οὐ δύναται φυλάττειν τὸ ἐν
Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the in the previous discussion, the best is that which comes first in order; it is also the oldest of them all. I am speaking of them according to the natural classification of their inhabitants. For the best material of democracy is an agricultural population; 10there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having the necessaries of life they are always at work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed, 15they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of government or office where no great gains can be made out of them, for the many are more desirous of gain than of honor. A proof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oligarchies, if they are allowed to work and 20are not deprived of their property; for some of them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. Moreover, they have the power of electing the magistrates and calling them to account; their ambition, if they have any, is thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although they do not all share in the appointment of offices, except through representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, 25as at Mantinea; yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. Hence it is both expedient and customary in the aforementioned type of democracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, 30and sit in the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons having a qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for which a qualification is required, then those who are marked out by special ability should be appointed. Under such a form of government the citizens are sure to be governed well (for the offices will always be held by the best persons; the people are willing enough to elect them 35and are not jealous of the good). 1The good and the notables will then be satisfied, for they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call them to account.
1319a
1 ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαῦλον. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν
ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἄρχειν
τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας, μηδὲν ἐλαττουμένου τοῦ
πλήθους. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη τῶν δημοκρατιῶν ἀρίστη, φανερόν,
5 καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν
δῆμον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργικὸν τὸν δῆμον τῶν
τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἀρχαῖον
χρήσιμοι πάντως, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι
πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπό τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ
10 καὶ τὴν πόλιν (ἦν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι
νενομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξεῖναι τοὺς πρώτους κλήρους·
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ὀξύλου νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτόν τι δυνάμενος,
τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἴς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης
ἑκάστῳ γῆς), νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ,
15 πρὸς γὰρ ὃ λέγομέν ἐστι χρήσιμος· ἐκεῖνοι γάρ, καίπερ
ὄντες πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην, ὅμως πάντες γεωργοῦσιν·
τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τηλικαῦτα μόρια διαιροῦντες ὥστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς
τιμήσεσι καὶ τοὺς πένητας. μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος
20 βέλτιστος δῆμός ἐστιν ὅπου νομεῖς εἰσι καὶ ζῶσιν ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων·
πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως,
καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις μάλισθ' οὗτοι γεγυμνασμένοι
τὰς ἕξεις καὶ χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα καὶ δυνάμενοι
θυραυλεῖν. τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλήθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ
25 ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι, πολλῷ φαυλότερα
τούτων· ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς
ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων καὶ
τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικόν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ
περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίεσθαι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον
30 γένος ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾳδίως ἐκκλησιάζει· οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ
τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὔτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὔθ' ὁμοίως
δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει τὴν
χώραν τὴν θέσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε [τὴν χώραν] πολὺ τῆς
πόλεως ἀπηρτῆσθαι, ῥᾴδιον καὶ δημοκρατίαν ποιεῖσθαι χρηστὴν
35 καὶ πολιτείαν· ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀγρῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποικίας, ὥστε δεῖ, κἂν ἀγοραῖος
ὄχλος ᾖ, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκκλησίας ἄνευ
τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατασκευάζειν
τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, εἴρηται· φανερὸν
40 δὲ καὶ πῶς τὰς ἄλλας. ἑπομένως γὰρ δεῖ παρεκβαίνειν
Every man should be responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is allowed, there is nothing to restrain 1the evil which is inherent in every man. But the principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due. It is evident that this is the best kind of democracy, 5and why? Because the people are drawn from a certain class. Some of the ancient laws of most states were, all of them, useful with a view to making the people husbandmen. They provided either that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land, or that, if he did, the land should not be within a certain distance from the town 10or the acropolis. Formerly in many states there was a law forbidding any one to sell his original allotment of land. There is a similar law attributed to Oxylus, which is to the effect that there should be a certain portion of every man's land on which he could not borrow money. 15A useful corrective to the evil of which I am speaking would be the law of the Aphytaeans, who, although they are numerous, and do not possess much land, are all of them husbandmen. For their properties are reckoned in the census; not entire, but only in such small portions that even the poor may have more than the amount required.
Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, 20are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained of any for war, robust in body and able to camp out. The people 25of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life is inferior; there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders or laborers. Besides, 30people of this class can readily come to the assembly, because they are continually moving about in the city and in the agora; whereas husbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet, or equally feel the want of assembling together. Where the territory also happens to extend to a distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy 35or constitutional government; for the people are compelled to settle in the country, and even if there is a town population the assembly ought not to meet, in democracies, when the country people cannot come. We have thus explained how the first and best form of democracy should be constituted; it is clear that 40the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a regular order, and the population which is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind.
Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, 20are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained of any for war, robust in body and able to camp out. The people 25of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life is inferior; there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders or laborers. Besides, 30people of this class can readily come to the assembly, because they are continually moving about in the city and in the agora; whereas husbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet, or equally feel the want of assembling together. Where the territory also happens to extend to a distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy 35or constitutional government; for the people are compelled to settle in the country, and even if there is a town population the assembly ought not to meet, in democracies, when the country people cannot come. We have thus explained how the first and best form of democracy should be constituted; it is clear that 40the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a regular order, and the population which is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind.
1319b
1 καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν. τὴν δὲ τελευταίαν,
διὰ τὸ πάντας κοινωνεῖν, οὔτε πάσης ἐστὶ πόλεως
φέρειν, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον διαμένειν μὴ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν
εὖ συγκειμένην (ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην
5 καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρότερον τὰ πλεῖστα
σχεδόν). πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δημοκρατίαν
καὶ τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν εἰώθασιν οἱ προεστῶτες
προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστους καὶ ποιεῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον
τοὺς γνησίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόθους καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ὁποτερουοῦν
10 πολίτου, λέγω δὲ οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός· ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκεῖον
τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι μὲν οὖν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ
κατασκευάζειν οὕτω, δεῖ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν μέχρι
ἂν ὑπερτείνῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέσων,
καὶ τούτου μὴ πέρα προβαίνειν· ὑπερβάλλοντες γὰρ
15 ἀτακτοτέραν τε ποιοῦσι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους
πρὸς τὸ χαλεπῶς ὑπομένειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν παροξύνουσι
μᾶλλον, ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἴτιον γενέσθαι περὶ
Κυρήνην· ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παρορᾶται, πολὺ δὲ
γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ
20 τοιαῦτα κατασκευάσματα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν
τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷς Κλεισθένης τε Ἀθήνησιν ἐχρήσατο βουλόμενος
αὐξῆσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ περὶ Κυρήνην οἱ τὸν
δῆμον καθιστάντες. φυλαί τε γὰρ ἕτεραι ποιητέαι πλείους
καὶ φατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα
25 καὶ κοινά, καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναμειχθῶσι
πάντες ἀλλήλοις, αἱ δὲ συνήθειαι διαζευχθῶσιν
αἱ πρότερον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατασκευάσματα
δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ πάντα, λέγω δ' οἷον ἀναρχία τε δούλων
(αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη μέχρι του συμφέρουσα) καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless well regulated by laws and customs. The more general causes which tend to destroy this 5or other kinds of government have been pretty fully considered. In order to constitute such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit including as many as they can, and making citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the illegitimate, and of those who have only one parent 10a citizen, whether father or mother; for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in which demagogues proceed. Whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonalty exceeds that of the notables and of the middle class- beyond this not to go. When in excess of this point, 15the constitution becomes disorderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. 20Measures like those which Cleisthenes passed when he wanted to increase the power of the democracy at Athens, or such as were taken by the founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of democracy. Fresh tribes and brotherhoods should be established; the private rites of families should be restricted 25and converted into public ones; in short, every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and get rid of old connections. Again, the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic; such, for instance, as the license permitted to slaves (which may 30be to a certain extent advantageous) and also that of women and children, and the aflowing everybody to live as he likes. Such a government will have many supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober manner.
Book 6,Chapter 5 (1319b30–1320b17)
30 παίδων, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὅπως τις βούλεται παρορᾶν· πολὺ γὰρ
ἔσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν· ἥδιον γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς
τὸ ζῆν ἀτάκτως ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως.
Ἔστι δ' [ἔργον] τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλομένων συνιστάναι
τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν οὐ τὸ καταστῆσαι μέγιστον
35 ἔργον οὐδὲ μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅπως σῴζηται μᾶλλον· μίαν γὰρ
ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας οὐ χαλεπὸν μεῖναι πολιτευομένους
ὁπωσοῦν. διὸ δεῖ, περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτηρίαι
καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατασκευάζειν
τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβουμένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα,
40 τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους, καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους,
The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal 35business of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such a state, for any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. The legislator should therefore endeavor to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states; he should guard against the destructive elements, and 40should make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of states. 1He must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest.
1320a
1 οἳ περιλήψονται μάλιστα τὰ σῴζοντα τὰς πολιτείας,
καὶ μὴ νομίζειν τοῦτ' εἶναι δημοτικὸν μηδ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν
ὃ ποιήσει τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατεῖσθαι
ἢ ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὃ πλεῖστον χρόνον. οἱ δὲ νῦν δημαγωγοὶ
5 χαριζόμενοι τοῖς δήμοις πολλὰ δημεύουσι διὰ
τῶν δικαστηρίων. διὸ δεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπράττειν τοὺς κηδομένους
τῆς πολιτείας, νομοθετοῦντας μηδὲν εἶναι δημόσιον
τῶν καταδικαζομένων καὶ φερόμενον πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, ἀλλ'
ἱερόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντες οὐθὲν ἧττον εὐλαβεῖς ἔσονται
10 (ζημιώσονται γὰρ ὁμοίως), ὁ δ' ὄχλος ἧττον καταψηφιεῖται
τῶν κρινομένων, λήψεσθαι μηδὲν μέλλων. ἔτι δὲ τὰς
γινομένας δημοσίας δίκας ὡς ὀλιγίστας αἰεὶ ποιεῖν, μεγάλοις
ἐπιτιμίοις τοὺς εἰκῇ γραφομένους κωλύοντας· οὐ γὰρ
τοὺς δημοτικοὺς ἀλλὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἰώθασιν εἰσάγειν, δεῖ
15 δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὔνους εἶναι τοὺς
πολίτας, εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γε ὡς πολεμίους νομίζειν τοὺς
κυρίους. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ τελευταῖαι δημοκρατίαι πολυάνθρωποί
τέ εἰσι καὶ χαλεπὸν ἐκκλησιάζειν ἀμίσθους, τοῦτο δ' ὅπου
πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πολέμιον τοῖς γνωρίμοις
20 (ἀπό τε γὰρ εἰσφορᾶς καὶ δημεύσεως ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι
καὶ δικαστηρίων φαύλων, ἃ πολλὰς ἤδη δημοκρατίας ἀνέτρεψεν),
ὅπου μὲν οὖν πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, δεῖ
ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας, καὶ δικαστήρια πολλῶν μὲν ὀλίγας
δ' ἡμέρας (τοῦτο γὰρ φέρει μὲν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι
25 τοὺς πλουσίους τὰς δαπάνας, ἐὰν οἱ μὲν εὔποροι μὴ
λαμβάνωσι δικαστικόν, οἱ δ' ἄποροι, φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ
κρίνεσθαι τὰς δίκας πολὺ βέλτιον· οἱ γὰρ εὔποροι πολλὰς
μὲν ἡμέρας οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἀπεῖναι, βραχὺν
δὲ χρόνον ἐθέλουσιν), ὅπου δ' εἰσὶ πρόσοδοι, μὴ ποιεῖν ὃ
30 νῦν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ποιοῦσιν (τὰ γὰρ περιόντα νέμουσιν· λαμβάνουσι
δὲ ἅμα καὶ πάλιν δέονται τῶν αὐτῶν· ὁ τετρημένος
γάρ ἐστι πίθος ἡ τοιαύτη βοήθεια τοῖς ἀπόροις). ἀλλὰ
δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὁρᾶν ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν
ἄπορον ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν.
35 τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος. ἐπεὶ
δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν προςόδων
γινόμενα συναθροίζοντας ἀθρόα χρὴ διανέμειν τοῖς
ἀπόροις, μάλιστα μὲν εἴ τις δύναται τοσοῦτον ἀθροίζειν ὅσον
εἰς γηδίου κτῆσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ
The demagogues of our own day 5often get property confiscated in the law-courts in order to please the people. But those who have the welfare of the state at heart should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned should not be public and go into the treasury but be sacred. Thus offenders will be as much afraid, 10for they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations; for it is the practice to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although 15the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.
Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables (20for the money must be obtained by a property tax and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies); where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This system has two advantages: first, 25the rich do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid; and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues 30the demagogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. 1Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy; 35measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or husbandry.
Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables (20for the money must be obtained by a property tax and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies); where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This system has two advantages: first, 25the rich do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid; and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues 30the demagogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. 1Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy; 35measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or husbandry.
1320b
1 γεωργίας, καί, εἰ μὴ πᾶσι δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φυλὰς ἤ
τι μέρος ἕτερον ἐν μέρει διανέμειν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τὰς
ἀναγκαίας συνόδους τοὺς εὐπόρους εἰσφέρειν τὸν μισθόν, ἀφειμένους
τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιῶν. τοιοῦτον δέ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνιοι
5 πολιτευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηνται τὸν δῆμον· ἀεὶ γάρ
τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν
εὐπόρους. χαριέντων δ' ἐστὶ καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων καὶ
διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρέπειν
ἐπ' ἐργασίας. καλῶς δ' ἔχει μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντίνων.
10 ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κοινὰ ποιοῦντες τὰ κτήματα τοῖς ἀπόροις ἐπὶ τὴν
χρῆσιν εὔνουν παρασκευάζουσι τὸ πλῆθος· ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς
πάσας ἐποίησαν διττάς, τὰς μὲν αἱρετὰς τὰς δὲ κληρωτάς,
τὰς μὲν κληρωτὰς ὅπως ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν μετέχῃ, τὰς δ'
αἱρετὰς ἵνα πολιτεύωνται βέλτιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. καὶ
15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δ'
αἱρετούς. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς δημοκρατίας κατασκευάζειν,
εἴρηται.
1And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies; and should in return be excused from useless public services. 5By administering the state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections of the people; their policy is from time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns, where they grow rich. It is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving of imitation, 10for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, they gain their good will. Moreover, they divide all their offices into two classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others by lot; the latter, that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better administered. 15A like result may be gained by dividing the same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot.
Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted.
Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted.
Book 6,Chapter 6 (1320b18–1321a4)
Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας πῶς δεῖ φανερὸν
ἐκ τούτων. ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γὰρ δεῖ συνάγειν ἑκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν,
20 πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν δημοκρατίαν ἀναλογιζόμενον,
τὴν μὲν εὔκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην—
αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ, <ἐν> ᾗ δεῖ τὰ
τιμήματα διαιρεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω τὰ δὲ μείζω ποιοῦντας,
ἐλάττω μὲν ἀφ' ὧν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μεθέξουσιν ἀρχῶν,
25 μείζω δ' ἀφ' ὧν τῶν κυριωτέρων· τῷ τε κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα
μετέχειν ἐξεῖναι τῆς πολιτείας, τοσούτου εἰσαγομένου
τοῦ δήμου πλήθους διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος μεθ' οὗ κρείττονες ἔσονται
τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων· ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ
βελτίονος δήμου τοὺς κοινωνούς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην
30 ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐπιτείνοντας δεῖ μικρὸν κατασκευάζειν. τῇ δ'
ἀντικειμένῃ τῇ τελευταίᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ, τῇ δυναστικωτάτῃ
καὶ τυραννικωτάτῃ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, ὅσῳ περ χειρίστη, τοσούτῳ
δεῖ πλείονος φυλακῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν εὖ σώματα
διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν
35 καλῶς ἔχοντα τοῖς πλωτῆρσιν ἐπιδέχεται πλείους ἁμαρτίας
ὥστε μὴ φθείρεσθαι δι' αὐτάς, τὰ δὲ νοσερῶς ἔχοντα τῶν
σωμάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα καὶ πλωτήρων
τετυχηκότα φαύλων οὐδὲ τὰς μικρὰς δύναται φέρειν ἁμαρτίας,
οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ χείρισται πλείστης δέονται
From these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing what should be the constitution of oligarchies. We have only to reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy 20with the corresponding form of democracy.
The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitutional government. In this there ought to be two standards of qualification; the one high, the other low- the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and 25the higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights of citizenship. The number of those admitted should be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out of the better class of the people. The principle, 30narrowed a little, gives another form of oligarchy; until at length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its badness. For as healthy bodies and ships 35well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require the greatest care.
The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitutional government. In this there ought to be two standards of qualification; the one high, the other low- the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and 25the higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights of citizenship. The number of those admitted should be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out of the better class of the people. The principle, 30narrowed a little, gives another form of oligarchy; until at length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its badness. For as healthy bodies and ships 35well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require the greatest care.
1321a
1 φυλακῆς. τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία
σῴζει (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν
ἀξίαν)· τὴν δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δῆλον ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῆς
εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας.
1The populousness of democracies generally preserves them (for e state need not be much increased,since there is no necessity tha number is to democracy in the place of justice based on proportion); whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite 5principle, viz., good order.
Book 6,Chapter 7 (1321a5–1321b3)
5 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἔστι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους,
γεωργικὸν βαναυσικὸν ἀγοραῖον θητικόν, τέτταρα δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα
πρὸς πόλεμον, ἱππικὸν ὁπλιτικὸν ψιλὸν ναυτικόν,
ὅπου μὲν συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι ἱππάσιμον, ἐνταῦθα
μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει κατασκευάζειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσχυράν
10 (ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τοῖς οἰκοῦσι διὰ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως,
αἱ δ' ἱπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσίν),
ὅπου δ' ὁπλιτικήν, τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν (τὸ γὰρ ὁπλιτικὸν
τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων), ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ
δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοτικὴ πάμπαν. νῦν μὲν οὖν
15 ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἔστιν, ὅταν διαστῶσι, πολλάκις
ἀγωνίζονται χεῖρον· δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φάρμακον παρὰ τῶν
πολεμικῶν λαμβάνειν στρατηγῶν, οἳ συνδυάζουσι πρὸς τὴν
ἱππικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν τὴν ἁρμόττουσαν τῶν
ψιλῶν. ταύτῃ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν οἱ δῆμοι
20 τῶν εὐπόρων· ψιλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες πρὸς ἱππικὴν καὶ ὁπλιτικὴν
ἀγωνίζονται ῥᾳδίως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάναι ταύτην
τὴν δύναμιν ἐφ' ἑαυτούς ἐστι καθιστάναι, δεῖ δὲ διῃρημένης
τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρεσβυτέρων τῶν
δὲ νέων, ἔτι μὲν ὄντας νέους τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκεσθαι
25 τὰς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψιλὰς ἐργασίας, ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ
παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων· τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν
γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἤτοι καθάπερ εἴρηται
πρότερον, τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις, ἢ καθάπερ Θηβαίοις,
ἀποσχομένοις χρόνον τινὰ τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων, ἢ καθάπερ
30 ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κρίσιν ποιουμένους τῶν ἀξίων τῶν ἐν τῷ
πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς
κυριωτάταις, ἃς δεῖ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν, δεῖ
προσκεῖσθαι λειτουργίας, ἵν' ἑκὼν ὁ δῆμος μὴ μετέχῃ καὶ
συγγνώμην ἔχῃ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὡς μισθὸν πολὺν διδοῦσι τῆς
35 ἀρχῆς. ἁρμόττει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσιόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγαλοπρεπεῖς
καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν, ἵνα τῶν περὶ
τὰς ἑστιάσεις μετέχων ὁ δῆμος καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶν κοσμουμένην
τὰ μὲν ἀναθήμασι τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομήμασιν ἄσμενος
ὁρᾷ μένουσαν τὴν πολιτείαν· συμβήσεται δὲ καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις
40 εἶναι μνημεῖα τῆς δαπάνης. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο νῦν οἱ περὶ
τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας οὐ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον· τὰ λήμματα
γὰρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὴν τιμήν. διόπερ εὖ ἔχει λέγειν
As there are four chief divisions of the common people- husbandmen, mechanics, retail traders, laborers; so also there are four kinds of military forces- the cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light armed troops, the navy. When the country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely to be established. 10For the security of the inhabitants depends upon a force of this sort, and only rich men can afford to keep horses. The second form of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry; for this service is better suited to the rich than to the poor. But the light-armed and the naval element are wholly democratic; and nowadays, 15where they are numerous, if the two parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle. A remedy for this state of things may be found in the practice of generals who combine a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed. And this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil contests; being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy 20being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry. An oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes raises a power against itself. And therefore, since the ages of the citizens vary and some are older and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, taught 25the agile movements of light-armed troops; and these, when they have been taken out of the ranks of the youth, should become light-armed warriors in reality. The oligarchy should also yield a share in the government to the people, either, as I said before, to those who have a property qualification, or, as in the case of Thebes, to those who have abstained for a certain number of years from mean employments, or, as 30at Massalia, to men of merit who are selected for their worthiness, whether previously citizens or not. The magistracies of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the people will not desire them and will take no offense at the privileges of their rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. 35It is fitting also that the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or erect some public edifice, and then the people who participate in the entertainments, and see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire an alteration in the government, and the notables 40will have memorials of their munificence.
1321b
1 ταύτας εἶναι δημοκρατίας μικράς. πῶς μὲν οὖν χρὴ καθιστάναι
τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, διωρίσθω
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
This, however, is anything but the fashion of our modern oligarchs, who are as covetous of gain as they are of honor; oligarchies like theirs may be well described 1as petty democracies. Enough of the manner in which democracies and oligarchies should be organized.
Book 6,Chapter 8 (1321b4–1323a10)
Ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι καλῶς
5 τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, πόσαι καὶ τίνες καὶ τίνων, καθάπερ
εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν χωρὶς
ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον
ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐν μὲν
ταῖς μικραῖς ἐλάττους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις
10 πλείους, ὥσπερ τυγχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον· ποίας
οὖν ἁρμόττει συνάγειν καὶ ποίας χωρίζειν, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.
πρώτη μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν
ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ᾗ δεῖ τινα ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περί τε
τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον
15 πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ μὲν ὠνεῖσθαι τὰ δὲ πωλεῖν πρὸς
τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑπογυιότατον
πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, δι' ἣν δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν
συνελθεῖν. ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς
ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ δημοσίων καὶ ἰδίων, ὅπως
20 εὐκοσμία ᾖ, καὶ τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν
σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις, καὶ τῶν ὁρίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
ὅπως ἀνεγκλήτως ἔχωσιν, καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἄλλα τῆς ἐπιμελείας
ὁμοιότροπα. καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν
τοιαύτην ἀρχήν, ἔχει δὲ μόρια πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν
25 ἑτέρους ἐφ' ἕτερα καθιστᾶσιν ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρωποτέραις πόλεσιν,
οἷον τειχοποιοὺς καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων
φύλακας. ἄλλη δ' ἀναγκαία τε καὶ παραπλησία ταύτῃ·
περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν γάρ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐστὶ καὶ
[τὰ] περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεως· καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας τούτους
30 οἱ μὲν ἀγρονόμους οἱ δ' ὑλωρούς. αὗται μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί
εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς, ἄλλη δ' ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῶν
κοινῶν ἀναφέρονται, παρ' ὧν φυλαττόντων μερίζονται πρὸς
ἑκάστην διοίκησιν· καλοῦσι δ' ἀποδέκτας τούτους καὶ ταμίας.
ἑτέρα δ' ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ τά τε ἴδια συμβόλαια
35 καὶ τὰς κρίσεις [ἐκ] τῶν δικαστηρίων· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς
αὐτοῖς τούτοις καὶ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ
τὰς εἰσαγωγάς. ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν μερίζουσι καὶ ταύτην εἰς
πλείους, ἔστι δ' <οὗ> μία κυρία τούτων πάντων· καλοῦνται δὲ
ἱερομνήμονες καὶ ἐπιστάται καὶ μνήμονες καὶ τούτοις ἄλλα
40 ὀνόματα σύνεγγυς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη
δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ
τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων
Next in order follows the right distribution 5of offices, their number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spoken. No state can exist not having the necessary offices, and no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order. In small states, as we have already remarked, there must not be many of them, but in larger there must be 10a larger number, and we should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated.
First among necessary offices is that which has the care of the market; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to maintain order. For 15in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another's wants; this is the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing and so fulfill the purpose for which men come together into one state. A second office of a similar kind undertakes the supervision and 20embellishment of public and private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature. This is commonly called the office of City Warden, and has various departments, which, 25in more populous towns, are shared among different persons, one, for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbors. There is another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country- the magistrates who hold this office are called 30Wardens of the country, or Inspectors of the woods. Besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which is distributed among the various departments; these are called Receivers or Treasurers. Another officer registers all private contracts, 35and decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and also all preliminary proceedings. This office again is sometimes subdivided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest. These officers are called Recorders or Sacred Recorders, Presidents, and the like.
Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and also the most difficult, viz., that to which is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according to the registers; and also the 40custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to it; no one will undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any one who does is loath to execute the law.
First among necessary offices is that which has the care of the market; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to maintain order. For 15in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another's wants; this is the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing and so fulfill the purpose for which men come together into one state. A second office of a similar kind undertakes the supervision and 20embellishment of public and private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature. This is commonly called the office of City Warden, and has various departments, which, 25in more populous towns, are shared among different persons, one, for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbors. There is another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country- the magistrates who hold this office are called 30Wardens of the country, or Inspectors of the woods. Besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which is distributed among the various departments; these are called Receivers or Treasurers. Another officer registers all private contracts, 35and decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and also all preliminary proceedings. This office again is sometimes subdivided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest. These officers are called Recorders or Sacred Recorders, Presidents, and the like.
Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and also the most difficult, viz., that to which is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according to the registers; and also the 40custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to it; no one will undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any one who does is loath to execute the law.
1322a
1 κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων.
χαλεπὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστι διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν, ὥστε
ὅπου μὴ μεγάλα ἔστι κερδαίνειν, οὔτ' ἄρχειν ὑπομένουσιν
αὐτὴν οὔθ' ὑπομείναντες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους·
5 ἀναγκαία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελος γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκας περὶ
τῶν δικαίων, ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὥστ' εἰ μὴ
γιγνομένων κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ
γιγνομένων. διὸ βέλτιον μὴ μίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν,
ἀλλ' ἄλλους ἐξ ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, καὶ περὶ τὰς προθέσεις
10 τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων ὡσαύτως πειρᾶσθαι διαιρεῖν, ἔτι δ'
ἔνια πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς
τῶν ἔνων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἑτέρας
καταδικασάσης ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον ἀστυνόμους
τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἑτέρους.
15 ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλάττων ἀπέχθεια ἐνῇ τοῖς πραττομένοις,
τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον λήψονται τέλος αἱ πράξεις· τὸ μὲν οὖν τοὺς
αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους ἀπέχθειαν
ἔχει διπλῆν, τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς <ποιεῖ αὐτοὺς> πολεμίους
πᾶσιν. πολλαχοῦ δὲ δὴ διῄρηται καὶ ἡ φυλάττουσα πρὸς τὴν
20 πραττομένην, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν <ἡ> τῶν Ἕνδεκα καλουμένων. διὸ
βέλτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ <αὐτὸ> σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ
περὶ ταύτην. ἀναγκαία μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐχ ἧττον τῆς εἰρημένης,
συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς φεύγειν μάλιστα ταύτην τὴν
ἀρχήν, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ποιεῖν κυρίους· αὐτοὶ
25 γὰρ δέονται φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἢ φυλάττειν ἄλλους δύνανται.
διὸ δεῖ μὴ μίαν ἀποτεταγμένην ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρὸς
αὐτούς, μηδὲ συνεχῶς τὴν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων, ὅπου
τις ἐφήβων ἢ φρουρῶν ἔστι τάξις, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δεῖ κατὰ
μέρη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέρους. ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς
30 ἀρχὰς ὡς ἀναγκαιοτάτας θετέον εἶναι πρώτας, μετὰ δὲ
ταύτας τὰς ἀναγκαίας μὲν οὐθὲν ἧττον, ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι
τεταγμένας· καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται
πολλῆς. τοιαῦται δ' εἶεν ἂν αἵ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως,
καὶ ὅσαι τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας. δεῖ
35 δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ πυλῶν τε καὶ τειχῶν φυλακῆς
ὁμοίως ἐπιμελητὰς εἶναι καὶ ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως
τῶν πολιτῶν. ἔνθα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ
πλείους εἰσίν, ἔνθα δ' ἐλάττους, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσι
μία περὶ πάντων. καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολεμάρχους
5Still the office is necessary; for judicial decisions are useless if they take no effect; and if society cannot exist without them, neither can it exist without the execution of them. It is an office which, being so unpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but divided among several taken from different courts. 10In like manner an effort should be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are on the register of public debtors. Some sentences should be executed by the magistrates also, and in particular penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should be exacted by the incoming ones; and as regards those due to magistrates already in office, when one court has given judgement, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora, and others again should exact the fines imposed by them. 15For penalties are more likely to be exacted when less odium attaches to the exaction of them; but a double odium is incurred when the judges who have passed also execute the sentence, and if they are always the executioners, they will be the enemies of all.
In many places, 20while one magistracy executes the sentence, another has the custody of the prisoners, as, for example, 'the Eleven' at Athens. It is well to separate off the jailorship also, and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioners; but good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it; 25for they themselves require a guard, and are not fit to guard others. There ought not therefore to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should take charge of it.
These are the 30indispensable officers, and should be ranked first; next in order follow others, equally necessary, but of higher rank, and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such are the officers to which are committed the guard of the city, and other military functions. 35Not only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal the citizens. 1In some states there are many such offices; in others there are a few only, while small states are content with one; these officers are called generals or commanders.
In many places, 20while one magistracy executes the sentence, another has the custody of the prisoners, as, for example, 'the Eleven' at Athens. It is well to separate off the jailorship also, and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioners; but good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it; 25for they themselves require a guard, and are not fit to guard others. There ought not therefore to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should take charge of it.
These are the 30indispensable officers, and should be ranked first; next in order follow others, equally necessary, but of higher rank, and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such are the officers to which are committed the guard of the city, and other military functions. 35Not only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal the citizens. 1In some states there are many such offices; in others there are a few only, while small states are content with one; these officers are called generals or commanders.
1322b
1 τοὺς τοιούτους. ἔτι δὲ κἂν ὦσιν ἱππεῖς ἢ ψιλοὶ ἢ τοξόται ἢ
ναυτικόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἑκάστων ἐνίοτε καθίσταται ἀρχή,
αἳ καλοῦνται ναυαρχίαι καὶ ἱππαρχίαι καὶ ταξιαρχίαι, καὶ
κατὰ μέρος δὲ αἱ ὑπὸ ταύτας τριηραρχίαι καὶ λοχαγίαι
5 καὶ φυλαρχίαι καὶ ὅσα τούτων μόρια. τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἕν τι τούτου
ἐστὶν εἶδος, ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτην
τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνιαι τῶν ἀρχῶν,
εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσαι, διαχειρίζουσι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν, ἀναγκαῖον
ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν,
10 αὐτὴν μηθὲν διαχειρίζουσαν ἕτερον· καλοῦσι δὲ τούτους
οἱ μὲν εὐθύνους οἱ δὲ λογιστὰς οἱ δ' ἐξεταστὰς οἱ δὲ συνηγόρους.
παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάλιστα κυρία
πάντων ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ
τὴν εἰσφορὰν ἣ προκάθηται τοῦ πλήθους, ὅπου κύριός ἐστιν ὁ
15 δῆμος· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ συνάγον τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας.
καλεῖται δὲ ἔνθα μὲν πρόβουλοι διὰ τὸ προβουλεύειν, ὅπου
δὲ πλῆθός ἐστι, βουλὴ μᾶλλον. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν
ἀρχῶν σχεδὸν τοσαῦταί τινές εἰσιν· ἄλλο δ' εἶδος ἐπιμελείας
ἡ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, οἷον ἱερεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν
20 περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι
τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται
πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην
ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσιν, ἐνιαχοῦ
δὲ πολλὰς καὶ κεχωρισμένας τῆς ἱερωσύνης, οἷον ἱεροποιοὺς
25 καὶ ναοφύλακας καὶ ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων.
ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς
πάσας, ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ'
ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἑστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμήν· καλοῦσι δ' οἱ μὲν
ἄρχοντας τούτους οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις. αἱ μὲν
30 οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι περὶ τούτων, ὡς εἰπεῖν συγκεφαλαιωσαμένους,
περί τε τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ
καὶ περὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ τὰ ἀναλισκόμενα, καὶ περὶ
ἀγορὰν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἔτι
περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια, καὶ συναλλαγμάτων ἀναγραφὰς
35 καὶ πράξεις καὶ φυλακὰς καὶ ἐπιλογισμούς τε καὶ ἐξετάσεις
καὶ προσευθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, καὶ τέλος αἳ περὶ τὸ
βουλευόμενόν εἰσι <περὶ> τῶν κοινῶν· ἴδιαι δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις
καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν, ἔτι δὲ φροντιζούσαις
εὐκοσμίας, γυναικονομία νομοφυλακία παιδονομία
Again, if a state has cavalry or light-armed troops or archers or a naval force, it will sometimes happen that each of these departments has separate officers, who are called admirals, or generals of cavalry or of light-armed troops. And there are subordinate officers called naval captains, and captains of light-armed troops and 5of horse; having others under them: all these are included in the department of war. Thus much of military command.
But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must of necessity be another office which examines and audits them, 10and has no other functions. Such officers are called by various names- Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants, Controllers. Besides all these offices there is another which is supreme over them, and to this is often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of measures, or at all events it presides, 15in a democracy, over the assembly. For there must be a body which convenes the supreme authority in the state. In some places they are called 'probuli,' because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy more commonly 'councillors.' These are the chief political offices.
Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of religion priests and guardians 20see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the Gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in larger ones there are a great many besides the priesthood; for example, superintendents of public worship, 25guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices, except any which the law assigns to the priests; such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public hearth of the city. They are sometimes called archons, sometimes kings, and sometimes prytanes.
30These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows: offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbors, with the country; also with the courts of law, with the records of contracts, 35with execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of magistrates; lastly, there are those which preside over the public deliberations of the state. 1There are likewise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order: such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of the law, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic and Dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles.
But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must of necessity be another office which examines and audits them, 10and has no other functions. Such officers are called by various names- Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants, Controllers. Besides all these offices there is another which is supreme over them, and to this is often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of measures, or at all events it presides, 15in a democracy, over the assembly. For there must be a body which convenes the supreme authority in the state. In some places they are called 'probuli,' because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy more commonly 'councillors.' These are the chief political offices.
Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of religion priests and guardians 20see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the Gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in larger ones there are a great many besides the priesthood; for example, superintendents of public worship, 25guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices, except any which the law assigns to the priests; such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public hearth of the city. They are sometimes called archons, sometimes kings, and sometimes prytanes.
30These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows: offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbors, with the country; also with the courts of law, with the records of contracts, 35with execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of magistrates; lastly, there are those which preside over the public deliberations of the state. 1There are likewise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order: such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of the law, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic and Dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles.
1323a
1 γυμνασιαρχία, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικοὺς
καὶ Διονυσιακούς, κἂν εἴ τινας ἑτέρας συμβαίνει
τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας. τούτων δ' ἔνιαι φανερῶς εἰσιν οὐ
δημοτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, οἷον γυναικονομία καὶ παιδονομία·
5 τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν
ὥσπερ ἀκολούθοις διὰ τὴν ἀδουλίαν. τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν ἀρχῶν
καθ' ἃς αἱροῦνταί τινες ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίους, νομοφυλάκων προβούλων
βουλῆς, οἱ μὲν νομοφύλακες ἀριστοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικὸν
δ' οἱ πρόβουλοι, βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
10 ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν.
1Some of these are clearly not democratic offices; for example, the guardianships of women and children- 5the poor, not having any slaves, must employ both their women and children as servants.
Once more: there are three offices according to whose directions the highest magistrates are chosen in certain states- guardians of the law, probuli, councillors- of these, the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. 10Enough of the different kinds of offices.
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Once more: there are three offices according to whose directions the highest magistrates are chosen in certain states- guardians of the law, probuli, councillors- of these, the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. 10Enough of the different kinds of offices.
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