Ross (OCT, 1957) · Jowett (1885)
Jowett (1885)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 5,Chapter 1 (1301a19–1302a15)
1301a
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ὧν προειλόμεθα σχεδὸν
20 εἴρηται περὶ πάντων· ἐκ τίνων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτεῖαι
καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων, καὶ τίνες ἑκάστης πολιτείας
φθοραί, καὶ ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται, ἔτι
δὲ σωτηρίαι τίνες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης εἰσίν, ἔτι δὲ
διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σῴζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστη, σκεπτέον
25 ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν
τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλαὶ γεγένηνται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν
ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτου
δ' ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν
γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὁτιοῦν ὄντας οἴεσθαι ἁπλῶς ἴσους
30 εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἁπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι
νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἕν τι ὄντας ὅλως
εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες
ἁπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). εἶτα οἱ μὲν ὡς ἴσοι
ὄντες πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσι μετέχειν· οἱ δ' ὡς ἄνισοι
35 ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον. ἔχουσι
μὲν οὖν τι πᾶσαι δίκαιον, ἡμαρτημέναι δ' ἁπλῶς εἰσιν.
καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν
ἣν ἑκάτεροι τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας,
στασιάζουσιν. πάντων δὲ δικαιότατα μὲν ἂν στασιάζοιεν,
40 ἥκιστα δὲ τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες· μάλιστα
19The design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly completed. 20Next in order follow the causes of revolution in states, how many, and of what nature they are; what modes of destruction apply to particular states, and out of what, and into what they mostly change; also what are the modes of preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and by what means each state may be best preserved: these questions remain to be considered.
25In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgment of justice and proportionate equality, although mankind fail attaining them, as I have already explained. Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; 30because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things; while the oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, 35claim too much, which is one form of inequality. 40All these forms of government have a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution.
25In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgment of justice and proportionate equality, although mankind fail attaining them, as I have already explained. Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; 30because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things; while the oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, 35claim too much, which is one form of inequality. 40All these forms of government have a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution.
1301b
1 γὰρ εὔλογον ἀνίσους ἁπλῶς εἶναι τούτους μόνον. εἰσὶ
δέ τινες οἳ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων
αὑτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν
οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος. ἀρχαὶ
5 μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν αὗται καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεών εἰσιν, ὅθεν
στασιάζουσιν· διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς· ὁτὲ
μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκυίας
ἄλλην μεταστήσωσιν, οἷον ἐκ δημοκρατίας ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ
δημοκρατίαν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν
10 ἐκ τούτων, ἢ ταύτας ἐξ ἐκείνων, ὁτὲ δ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν
πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται
τὴν αὐτήν, δι' αὑτῶν δ' εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἷον τὴν
ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν· ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ
ἧττον, οἷον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι
15 ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ἢ δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον
δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν, ἢ ἵνα ἐπιταθῶσιν ἢ ἀνεθῶσιν· ἔτι πρὸς
τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας, οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι
ἢ ἀνελεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί φασι Λύσανδρόν
20 τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ Παυσανίαν
τὸν βασιλέα τὴν ἐφορείαν, καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν
ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον (ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρχων
βουλὴν ἐποίησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκές ἐστιν
ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν
25 ἐπιψηφίζηται ἀρχή τις, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ
εἷς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ). πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον
ἡ στάσις, οὐ μὴν εἰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (ἀΐδιος
γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐν ἴσοις)· ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον
ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
30 ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ
πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον, κατ' ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ
λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἴσῳ τὰ τρία τοῖν
δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ
ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός· ἴσον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ
35 τὸ ἓν τοῖν δυοῖν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἡμίση. ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ
ἁπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ
ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι ὦσιν, ὅλως ἴσοι
νομίζουσιν εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἄνισοι, πάντων
ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται
40 πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία· εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ
Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel 1(for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal), but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so. There is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank; for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors. 5Here then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments; the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy, 10or from either of them into constitutional government or aristocracy, and conversely; the other not affecting the constitution, when, without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get the administration into their own hands. Further, there is a question of degree; an oligarchy, for example, may become more or 15less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained. Or the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution only, e.g., the establishment or overthrow of a particular office: as at Sparta it is said that Lysander 20attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and King Pausanias, the Ephoralty. At Epidamnus, too, the change was partial. For instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a council was appointed; but to this day the magistrates are the only members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the Heliaea when 25an election takes place, and the office of the single archon was another oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion- for instance, a perpetual monarchy among equals; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion.
Now equality is of two kinds, 30numerical and proportional; by the first I mean sameness or equality in number or size; by the second, equality of ratios. For example, the excess of three over two is numerically equal to the excess of two over one; whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four 35that one is of two, namely, the half. As I was saying before, men agree that justice in the abstract is proportion, but they differ in that some think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in all. Hence there are two principal 40forms of government, democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers are more common.
Now equality is of two kinds, 30numerical and proportional; by the first I mean sameness or equality in number or size; by the second, equality of ratios. For example, the excess of three over two is numerically equal to the excess of two over one; whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four 35that one is of two, namely, the half. As I was saying before, men agree that justice in the abstract is proportion, but they differ in that some think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in all. Hence there are two principal 40forms of government, democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers are more common.
1302a
1 ἐν ὀλίγοις, ταῦτα δ' ἐν πλείοσιν· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ
οὐδαμοῦ ἑκατόν, εὔποροι δὲ <καὶ ἄποροι> πολλοὶ πολλαχοῦ. τὸ δὲ
ἁπλῶς πάντῃ καθ' ἑκατέραν τετάχθαι τὴν ἰσότητα φαῦλον.
φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος· οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος
5 ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ
τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου μὴ ἀπαντᾶν εἰς τὸ
τέλος κακόν τι. διὸ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμητικῇ ἰσότητι χρῆσθαι,
τὰ δὲ τῇ κατ' ἀξίαν. ὅμως δὲ ἀσφαλεστέρα καὶ
ἀστασίαστος μᾶλλον ἡ δημοκρατία τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. ἐν μὲν
10 γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγγίνονται δύο, ἥ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους
στάσις καὶ ἔτι ἡ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις
ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μόνον, αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅ τι
καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐγγίνεται τῷ δήμῳ στάσις· ἔτι δὲ
ἡ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δήμου ἢ ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων·
15 ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἀσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν.
In what city shall we find a hundred persons of good birth and of virtue? whereas the rich everywhere abound. That a state should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is not a good thing; the proof is the fact that 5such forms of government never last. They are originally based on a mistake, and, as they begin badly, cannot fall to end badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed; numerical in some cases, and proportionate in others.
Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy. 10For in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs. No dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. And we may further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, 15and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.
Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy. 10For in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs. No dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. And we may further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, 15and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.
Book 5,Chapter 2 (1302a16–1302b4)
Ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τίνων αἵ τε στάσεις γίνονται
καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, ληπτέον καθόλου
πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. εἰσὶ δὴ σχεδὸν
ὡς εἰπεῖν τρεῖς τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἃς διοριστέον καθ' αὑτὰς τύπῳ
20 πρῶτον. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν πῶς τε ἔχοντες στασιάζουσι καὶ
τίνων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τρίτον τίνες ἀρχαὶ γίνονται τῶν πολιτικῶν
ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων. τοῦ μὲν οὖν
αὐτοὺς ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν αἰτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα
θετέον περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες. οἱ μὲν
25 γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφιέμενοι στασιάζουσιν ἂν νομίζωσιν ἔλαττον
ἔχειν ὄντες ἴσοι τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος
καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ
πλέον ἔχειν ἀλλ' ἴσον ἢ ἔλαττον (τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι
δικαίως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως)· ἐλάττους τε γὰρ ὄντες
30 ὅπως ἴσοι ὦσι στασιάζουσι, καὶ ἴσοι ὄντες ὅπως μείζους.
πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες στασιάζουσιν, εἴρηται· περὶ ὧν δὲ
στασιάζουσιν ἐστὶ κέρδος καὶ τιμὴ καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις. καὶ
γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες καὶ ζημίαν, ἢ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἢ τῶν
φίλων, στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ
35 τῶν κινήσεων, ὅθεν αὐτοί τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον
τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν
ἑπτὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἔστι δ' ὡς πλείους. ὧν δύο μέν ἐστι
ταὐτὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως· διὰ κέρδος γὰρ
καὶ διὰ τιμὴν παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα κτήσωνται
40 σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους
In considering how dissensions and poltical revolutions arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect constitutions generally. They may be said to be three in number; and we have now to give an outline of each. 20We want to know (1) what is the feeling? (2) what are the motives of those who make them? (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels? The universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned; viz., 25the desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors; pretensions which may and may not be just. Inferiors revolt 30in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. The motives for making them are the desire of gain and honor, or the fear of dishonor and loss; the authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonor from themselves or their friends. The causes and reasons 35of revolutions, whereby men are themselves affected in the way described, and about the things which I have mentioned, viewed in one way may be regarded as seven, and in another as more than seven. 1Two of them have been already noticed; but they act in a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honor- not, as in the case which I have just supposed, in order to obtain them 40for themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them.
1302b
1 ὁρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας
τούτων· ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχήν, διὰ καταφρόνησιν,
διὰ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ἔτι δὲ
ἄλλον τρόπον δι' ἐριθείαν, δι' ὀλιγωρίαν, διὰ μικρότητα,
5 διὰ ἀνομοιότητα.
Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state; causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of elements.
Book 5,Chapter 3 (1302b5–1303b16)
Τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι
δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν· ὑβριζόντων
τε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ πλεονεκτούντων στασιάζουσι
καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς διδούσας
τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
10 ἰδίων ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. —δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμή, καὶ
τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως· καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι
καὶ ἄλλους ὁρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν· ταῦτα
δὲ ἀδίκως μὲν γίνεται ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἢ τιμῶνταί
τινες ἢ ἀτιμάζωνται, δικαίως δὲ ὅταν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν.
15 —δι' ὑπεροχὴν δέ, ὅταν τις ᾖ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων (ἢ εἷς ἢ
πλείους) ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος·
γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μοναρχία ἢ
δυναστεία· διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ εἰώθασιν ὀστρακίζειν, οἷον ἐν Ἄργει
καὶ Ἀθήνησιν· καίτοι βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ ἐνέσονται
20 τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες, ἢ ἐάσαντας γενέσθαι ἰᾶσθαι
ὕστερον. —διὰ δὲ φόβον στασιάζουσιν οἵ τε ἠδικηκότες, δεδιότες
μὴ δῶσι δίκην, καὶ οἱ μέλλοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι, βουλόμενοι
φθάσαι πρὶν ἀδικηθῆναι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ῥόδῳ συνέστησαν
οἱ γνώριμοι ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας.
25 —διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον
ἔν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ μὴ μετέχοντες
τῆς πολιτείας (κρείττους γὰρ οἴονται εἶναι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς
δημοκρατίαις οἱ εὔποροι καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ
ἀναρχίας, οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις
30 μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, καὶ
ἡ Μεγαρέων δι' ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων, καὶ ἐν
Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὁ
δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως. γίνονται δὲ καὶ δι' αὔξησιν
τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεταβολαὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὥσπερ
35 γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται καὶ δεῖ αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνάλογον
ἵνα μένῃ ἡ συμμετρία, εἰ δὲ μή, φθείρεται, ὅταν ὁ
μὲν ποὺς τεττάρων πηχῶν ᾖ τὸ δ' ἄλλο σῶμα δυοῖν σπιθαμαῖν,
ἐνίοτε δὲ κἂν εἰς ἄλλου ζῴου μεταβάλοι μορφήν,
εἰ μὴ μόνον κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν
40 αὐξάνοιτο παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὕτω καὶ πόλις σύγκειται
What share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions, and how they work, is plain enough. When the magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains 10either at the expense of individuals or of the public. It is evident, again, what an influence honor exerts and how it is a cause of revolution. Men who are themselves dishonored and who see others obtaining honors rise in rebellion; the honor or dishonor when undeserved is unjust; and just when awarded according to merit.
15Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the state and the power of the government; this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family oligarchy. And therefore, in some places, as at Athens and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism. But how much better to provide from the first that there should be 20no such pre-eminent individuals instead of letting them come into existence and then finding a remedy.
Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have committed wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemy. Thus at 5Rhodes the notables conspired against the people through fear of the suits that were brought against them. 25Contempt is also a cause of insurrection and revolution; for example, in oligarchies- when those who have no share in the state are the majority, they revolt, because they think that they are the stronger. Or, again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state; at Thebes, for example, where, after the 30battle of Oenophyta, the bad administration of the democracy led to its ruin. At Megara the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat occasioned by disorder and anarchy. And at Syracuse the democracy aroused contempt before the tyranny of Gelo arose; at Rhodes, before the insurrection.
Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase in any part of the state. 1For as a body is made up of many members, and every member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved; but loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and, should 40the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal: even so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly; for example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states.
15Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the state and the power of the government; this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family oligarchy. And therefore, in some places, as at Athens and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism. But how much better to provide from the first that there should be 20no such pre-eminent individuals instead of letting them come into existence and then finding a remedy.
Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have committed wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemy. Thus at 5Rhodes the notables conspired against the people through fear of the suits that were brought against them. 25Contempt is also a cause of insurrection and revolution; for example, in oligarchies- when those who have no share in the state are the majority, they revolt, because they think that they are the stronger. Or, again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state; at Thebes, for example, where, after the 30battle of Oenophyta, the bad administration of the democracy led to its ruin. At Megara the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat occasioned by disorder and anarchy. And at Syracuse the democracy aroused contempt before the tyranny of Gelo arose; at Rhodes, before the insurrection.
Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase in any part of the state. 1For as a body is made up of many members, and every member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved; but loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and, should 40the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal: even so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly; for example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states.
1303a
1 ἐκ μερῶν, ὧν πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αὐξανόμενον, οἷον τὸ
τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις.
συμβαίνει δ' ἐνίοτε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τύχας, οἷον ἐν Τάραντι
ἡττηθέντων καὶ ἀπολομένων πολλῶν γνωρίμων ὑπὸ τῶν
5 Ἰαπύγων μικρὸν ὕστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο
ἐκ πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἄργει τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ ἀπολομένων
ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λάκωνος ἠναγκάσθησαν παραδέξασθαι
τῶν περιοίκων τινάς, καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχούντων
πεζῇ οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττους ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου
10 στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δὲ
τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, ἧττον δέ· πλειόνων γὰρ
τῶν εὐπόρων γινομένων ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐξανομένων μεταβάλλουσιν
εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δυναστείας. —μεταβάλλουσι
δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄνευ στάσεως διά τε τὰς ἐριθείας, ὥςπερ
15 ἐν Ἡραίᾳ (ἐξ αἱρετῶν γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίησαν κληρωτάς,
ὅτι ᾑροῦντο τοὺς ἐριθευομένους), καὶ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν, ὅταν
ἐάσωσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας παριέναι τοὺς μὴ τῇ
πολιτείᾳ φίλους, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὠρεῷ κατελύθη ἡ ὀλιγαρχία
τῶν ἀρχόντων γενομένου Ἡρακλεοδώρου, ὃς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας
20 πολιτείαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν κατεσκεύασεν. —ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ
μικρόν. λέγω δὲ παρὰ μικρόν, ὅτι πολλάκις λανθάνει μεγάλη
γινομένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορῶσι
τὸ μικρόν, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ μικρὸν ἦν τὸ τίμημα, τέλος
δ' <ἀπ'> οὐθενὸς ἦρχον, ὡς ἐγγίζον ἢ μηθὲν διαφέρον τοῦ
25 μηθὲν τὸ μικρόν. στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον, ἕως ἂν
συμπνεύσῃ· ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις
γίγνεται, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ· διὸ ὅσοι ἤδη
συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλεῖστοι διεστασίασαν· οἷον
Τροιζηνίοις Ἀχαιοὶ συνῴκησαν Σύβαριν, εἶτα πλείους οἱ
30 Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενοι ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Τροιζηνίους, ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος
συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις· καὶ ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρῖται τοῖς
συνοικήσασιν (πλεονεκτεῖν γὰρ ἀξιοῦντες ὡς σφετέρας τῆς
χώρας ἐξέπεσον)· καὶ Βυζαντίοις οἱ ἔποικοι ἐπιβουλεύοντες
φωραθέντες ἐξέπεσον διὰ μάχης· καὶ Ἀντισσαῖοι τοὺς Χίων
35 φυγάδας εἰσδεξάμενοι διὰ μάχης ἐξέβαλον· Ζαγκλαῖοι
δὲ Σαμίους ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοί· καὶ Ἀπολλωνιᾶται
οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ ἐποίκους ἐπαγαγόμενοι
ἐστασίασαν· καὶ Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ τοὺς ξένους
And this disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident, as at Tarentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables were slain in a battle 5with the Iapygians just after the Persian War, the constitutional government in consequence becoming a democracy; or as was the case at Argos, where the Argives, after their army had been cut to pieces on the seventh day of the month by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, were compelled to admit to citizen some of their Perioeci; and at Athens, when, after frequent defeats of their infantry at the time of the Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced in number, 10because the soldiers had to be taken from the roll of citizens. Revolutions arise from this cause as well, in democracies as in other forms of government, but not to so great an extent. When the rich grow numerous or properties increase, the form of government changes into an oligarchy or a government of families. Forms of government also change- sometimes even without revolution, owing to election contests, 15as at Heraea (where, instead of electing their magistrates, they took them by lot, because the electors were in the habit of choosing their own partisans); or owing to carelessness, when disloyal persons are allowed to find their way into the highest offices, as at Oreum, where, upon the accession of Heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy was overthrown, and 20changed by him into a constitutional and democratical government.
Again, the revolution may be facilitated by the slightness of the change; I mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the constitution through neglect of a small matter; at Ambracia, for instance, the qualification for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to nothing. 25For the Ambraciots thought that a small qualification was much the same as none at all.
Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at once acquire a common spirit; for a state is not the growth of a day, any more than it grows out of a multitude brought together by accident. Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution; for example, the Achaeans who joined the Troezenians in the foundation of Sybaris, 30becoming later the more numerous, expelled them; hence the curse fell upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with their fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out. 1At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the people of Antissa, who 35had received the Chian exiles, fought with them, and drove them out; and the Zancleans, after having received the Samians, were driven by them out of their own city.
Again, the revolution may be facilitated by the slightness of the change; I mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the constitution through neglect of a small matter; at Ambracia, for instance, the qualification for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to nothing. 25For the Ambraciots thought that a small qualification was much the same as none at all.
Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at once acquire a common spirit; for a state is not the growth of a day, any more than it grows out of a multitude brought together by accident. Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution; for example, the Achaeans who joined the Troezenians in the foundation of Sybaris, 30becoming later the more numerous, expelled them; hence the curse fell upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with their fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out. 1At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the people of Antissa, who 35had received the Chian exiles, fought with them, and drove them out; and the Zancleans, after having received the Samians, were driven by them out of their own city.
1303b
1 καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἐστασίασαν καὶ
εἰς μάχην ἦλθον· καὶ Ἀμφιπολῖται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων
ἐποίκους ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ τούτων οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν. στασιάζουσι
δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἀδικούμενοι, ὅτι
5 οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἴσων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἴσοι ὄντες,
ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ γνώριμοι, ὅτι μετέχουσι τῶν
ἴσων οὐκ ἴσοι ὄντες. στασιάζουσι δὲ ἐνίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ
τοὺς τόπους, ὅταν μὴ εὐφυῶς ἔχῃ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τὸ μίαν
εἶναι πόλιν, οἷον ἐν Κλαζομεναῖς οἱ ἐπὶ Χυτῷ πρὸς τοὺς
10 ἐν νήσῳ, καὶ Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς· καὶ Ἀθήνησιν οὐχ
ὁμοίως εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιᾶ οἰκοῦντες
τῶν τὸ ἄστυ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις αἱ διαβάσεις
τῶν ὀχετῶν, καὶ τῶν πάνυ σμικρῶν, διασπῶσι τὰς
φάλαγγας, οὕτως ἔοικε πᾶσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν διάστασιν.
15 μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἴσως διάστασις ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία, εἶτα
πλοῦτος καὶ πενία, καὶ οὕτως δὴ ἑτέρα ἑτέρας μᾶλλον, ὧν
μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστί.
The citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a revolution; the Syracusans, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having admitted strangers and 1mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to blows; the people of Amphipolis, having received Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by them.
Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated, because, 5as I said before, they are equals, and have not an equal share, and in democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share.
Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state. For example, the Chytians at Clazomenae did not agree with the people of 10the island; and the people of Colophon quarrelled with the Notians; at Athens too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than those who live in the city. For just as in war the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a city. 15The greatest opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice; next comes that of wealth and poverty; and there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is this difference of place.
Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated, because, 5as I said before, they are equals, and have not an equal share, and in democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share.
Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state. For example, the Chytians at Clazomenae did not agree with the people of 10the island; and the people of Colophon quarrelled with the Notians; at Athens too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than those who live in the city. For just as in war the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a city. 15The greatest opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice; next comes that of wealth and poverty; and there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is this difference of place.
Book 5,Chapter 4 (1303b17–1304b18)
Γίγνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις
οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν, στασιάζουσι δὲ περὶ μεγάλων.
μάλιστα δὲ καὶ αἱ μικραὶ ἰσχύουσιν, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις
20 γένωνται, οἷον συνέβη καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις
χρόνοις. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ δύο νεανίσκων στασιασάντων
<τῶν> ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὄντων, περὶ ἐρωτικὴν αἰτίαν.
θατέρου γὰρ ἀποδημοῦντος ἑταῖρος ὤν τις τὸν ἐρώμενον αὐτοῦ
ὑπεποιήσατο, πάλιν δ' ἐκεῖνος τούτῳ χαλεπήνας τὴν γυναῖκα
25 αὐτοῦ ἀνέπεισεν ὡς αὑτὸν ἐλθεῖν· ὅθεν προσλαμβάνοντες
τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας. διόπερ
ἀρχομένων εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ διαλύειν τὰς
τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίνεται
τὸ ἁμάρτημα, ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἥμισυ εἶναι παντός,
30 ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἁμάρτημα ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς
τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν. ὅλως δὲ αἱ τῶν γνωρίμων στάσεις
συναπολαύειν ποιοῦσι καὶ τὴν ὅλην πόλιν, οἷον ἐν
Ἑστιαίᾳ συνέβη μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, δύο ἀδελφῶν περὶ τῆς
πατρῴας νομῆς διενεχθέντων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορώτερος,
35 ὡς οὐκ ἀποφαίνοντος τὴν οὐσίαν οὐδὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν ὃν
εὗρεν ὁ πατήρ, προσήγετο τοὺς δημοτικούς, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἔχων
οὐσίαν πολλὴν τοὺς εὐπόρους. καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης
διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν
In revolutions the occasions may be trifling, but great interests are at stake. Even trifles are most important when they concern the rulers, 20as was the case of old at Syracuse; for the Syracusan constitution was once changed by a love-quarrel of two young men, who were in the government. The story is that while one of them was away from home his beloved was gained over by his companion, and he to revenge himself seduced 25the other's wife. They then drew the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and so split all the people into portions. We learn from this story that we should be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men. The mistake lies in the beginning- as the proverb says- 'Well begun is half done'; 30so an error at the beginning, though quite small, bears the same ratio to the errors in the other parts. In general, when the notables quarrel, the whole city is involved, as happened in Hesdaea after the Persian War. The occasion was the division of an inheritance; 35one of two brothers refused to give an account of their father's property and the treasure which he had found: so the poorer of the two quarrelled with him and enlisted in his cause the popular party, the other, who was very rich, the wealthy classes.
At Delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage was the beginning of all the troubles which followed. In this case the bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride, and went away without taking her.
At Delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage was the beginning of all the troubles which followed. In this case the bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride, and went away without taking her.
1304a
1 ὕστερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα, ὡς ἦλθεν
ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην, οὐ λαβὼν ἀπῆλθεν, οἱ δ' ὡς ὑβρισθέντες
ἐνέβαλον τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων θύοντος, κἄπειτα ὡς ἱερόσυλον
ἀπέκτειναν. καὶ περὶ Μυτιλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων
5 στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχὴ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ
πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ᾧ Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν
αὐτῶν· Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος
δύο θυγατέρας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβὼν τοῖς υἱέσιν αὑτοῦ
Δέξανδρος ἦρξε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρώξυνε,
10 πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως. καὶ ἐν Φωκεῦσιν ἐξ ἐπικλήρου
στάσεως γενομένης περὶ Μνασέαν τὸν Μνάσωνος πατέρα καὶ
Εὐθυκράτη τὸν Ὀνομάρχου, ἡ στάσις αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
πολέμου κατέστη τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ
ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν· ὑπομνηστευσάμενος
15 γάρ τις, ὡς ἐζημίωσεν αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦ ὑπομνηστευθέντος
πατήρ, γενόμενος τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἅτερος συμπαρέλαβε τοὺς
ἐκτὸς τῆς πολιτείας ὡς ἐπηρεασθείς. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ
εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ
εὐδοκιμῆσαί τι ἢ αὐξηθῆναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον τῆς πόλεως,
20 οἷον ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκιμήσασα ἐν τοῖς
Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ
πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα
νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ
θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν,
25 καὶ ἐν Ἄργει οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες περὶ τὴν ἐν
Μαντινείᾳ μάχην τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεχείρησαν
καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος
γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας
εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν, καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι Φόξον
30 τὸν τύραννον μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ὁ δῆμος ἀνελὼν εὐθὺς
εἴχετο τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ πάλιν ὡσαύτως
Περίανδρον συνεκβαλὼν τοῖς ἐπιθεμένοις ὁ δῆμος τὸν τύραννον
εἰς ἑαυτὸν περιέστησε τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ ὅλως δὴ
δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, ὡς οἱ δυνάμεως αἴτιοι γενόμενοι,
35 καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ πλῆθος
ὁποιονοῦν, στάσιν κινοῦσιν· ἢ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες
τιμωμένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν
οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων. κινοῦνται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι
καὶ ὅταν τἀναντία εἶναι δοκοῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἰσάζῃ
Whereupon her relations, thinking that they were insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure among his offerings while he was sacrificing, and then slew him, pretending that he had been robbing the temple. At Mytilene, too, a dispute about heiresses 5was the beginning of many misfortunes, and led to the war with the Athenians in which Paches took their city. A wealthy citizen, named Timophanes, left two daughters; Dexander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them for his sons; but he was rejected in his suit, whereupon he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians (10of whom he was proxenus) to interfere. A similar quarrel about an heiress arose at Phocis between Mnaseas the father of Mnason, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus; this was the beginning of the Sacred War. A marriage-quarrel was also the cause of a change in the government of Epidamnus. A certain man betrothed his daughter 15to a person whose father, having been made a magistrate, fined the father of the girl, and the latter, stung by the insult, conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow the state.
Governments also change into oligarchy or into democracy or into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or some other section of the state, increase in power or renown. Thus at Athens 20the reputation gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian War, seemed to tighten the reins of government. On the other hand, the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire due to command of the sea, strengthened the democracy. 25At Argos, the notables, having distinguished themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the democracy. At Syracuse, the people, having been the chief authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed the constitutional government into democracy. At Chalcis, 30the people, uniting with the notables, killed Phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. At Ambracia, the people, in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander, transferred the government to themselves. And generally it should be remembered that those who have secured power to the state, 35whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. 1For either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others.
Governments also change into oligarchy or into democracy or into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or some other section of the state, increase in power or renown. Thus at Athens 20the reputation gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian War, seemed to tighten the reins of government. On the other hand, the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire due to command of the sea, strengthened the democracy. 25At Argos, the notables, having distinguished themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the democracy. At Syracuse, the people, having been the chief authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed the constitutional government into democracy. At Chalcis, 30the people, uniting with the notables, killed Phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. At Ambracia, the people, in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander, transferred the government to themselves. And generally it should be remembered that those who have secured power to the state, 35whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. 1For either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others.
1304b
1 ἀλλήλοις, οἷον οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος, μέσον δ' ᾖ μηθὲν
ἢ μικρὸν πάμπαν· ἂν γὰρ πολὺ ὑπερέχῃ ὁποτερονοῦν τῶν
μερῶν, πρὸς τὸ φανερῶς κρεῖττον τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ θέλει κινδυνεύειν.
διὸ καὶ οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες οὐ ποιοῦσι στάσιν
5 ὡς εἰπεῖν· ὀλίγοι γὰρ γίγνονται πρὸς πολλούς. καθόλου μὲν
οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι τῶν
στάσεων καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τοῦτον ἔχουσι τὸν τρόπον· κινοῦσι
δὲ τὰς πολιτείας ὁτὲ μὲν διὰ βίας ὁτὲ δὲ δι' ἀπάτης,
διὰ βίας μὲν ἢ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἢ ὕστερον ἀναγκάζοντες.
10 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττή. ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸ
πρῶτον ἑκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἶθ' ὕστερον
βίᾳ κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν Τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον
ἐξηπάτησαν φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν
πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευσάμενοι
15 δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρῶντο τὴν πολιτείαν· ὁτὲ δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
τε πείσαντες καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων ἑκόντων ἄρχουσιν
αὐτῶν. ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων συμβέβηκε γίνεσθαι τὰς μεταβολάς.
Revolutions also break out when opposite parties, e.g., 1the rich and the people, are equally balanced, and there is little or no middle class; for, if either party were manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent in virtue usually do not stir up insurrections, 5always being a minority. Such are the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable.
Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud. Force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or afterwards. 10Fraud, again, is of two kinds; for (1) sometimes the citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a change of government, and afterwards they are held in subjection against their will. This was what happened in the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians, and, having cheated the people, 15still endeavored to retain the government. (2) In other cases the people are persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained. The revolutions which effect constitutions generally spring from the above-mentioned causes.
Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud. Force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or afterwards. 10Fraud, again, is of two kinds; for (1) sometimes the citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a change of government, and afterwards they are held in subjection against their will. This was what happened in the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians, and, having cheated the people, 15still endeavored to retain the government. (2) In other cases the people are persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained. The revolutions which effect constitutions generally spring from the above-mentioned causes.
Book 5,Chapter 5 (1304b19–1305a36)
Καθ' ἕκαστον δ' εἶδος πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων μερίζοντας
20 τὰ συμβαίνοντα δεῖ θεωρεῖν. αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα
μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν·
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίᾳ συκοφαντοῦντες τοὺς τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας
συστρέφουσιν αὐτούς (συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς
φόβος), τὰ δὲ κοινῇ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπάγοντες. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ
25 πολλῶν ἄν τις ἴδοι γιγνόμενον οὕτω. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κῷ ἡ
δημοκρατία μετέβαλε πονηρῶν ἐγγενομένων δημαγωγῶν
(οἱ γὰρ γνώριμοι συνέστησαν)· καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ· μισθοφοράν
τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπόριζον, καὶ ἐκώλυον ἀποδιδόναι
τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας
30 δίκας ἠναγκάσθησαν συστάντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον.
κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ὁ δῆμος μετὰ τὸν
ἀποικισμὸν εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς· ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ
ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐξέπιπτον, ἔπειτα ἀθροισθέντες οἱ
ἐκπίπτοντες καὶ κατελθόντες κατέλυσαν τὸν δῆμον. παραπλησίως
35 δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία· οἱ
γὰρ δημαγωγοί, ἵνα χρήματα ἔχωσι δημεύειν, ἐξέβαλον
πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων, ἕως πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν τοὺς φεύγοντας,
οἱ δὲ κατιόντες ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι τὸν δῆμον καὶ
κατέστησαν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. συνέβη δὲ ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ
And now, taking each constitution separately, 20we must see what follows from the principles already laid down.
Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in public stir up the people against them. The truth 25of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At Cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them; and they, in consequence of 30the suits which were brought against them, were compelled to combine and put down the democracy. The democracy at Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in the same manner 35the democracy at Megara was overturned; there the demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and, engaging and defeating the people, established the oligarchy.
Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in public stir up the people against them. The truth 25of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At Cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them; and they, in consequence of 30the suits which were brought against them, were compelled to combine and put down the democracy. The democracy at Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in the same manner 35the democracy at Megara was overturned; there the demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and, engaging and defeating the people, established the oligarchy.
1305a
1 Κύμην ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἣν κατέλυσε Θρασύμαχος.
σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄν τις ἴδοι θεωρῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς
τοῦτον ἐχούσας τὸν τρόπον. ὁτὲ μὲν γάρ, ἵνα
χαρίζωνται, ἀδικοῦντες τοὺς γνωρίμους συνιστᾶσιν, ἢ τὰς οὐσίας
5 ἀναδάστους ποιοῦντες ἢ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὁτὲ δὲ
διαβάλλοντες, ἵν' ἔχωσι δημεύειν τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλουσίων.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς
καὶ στρατηγός, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον· σχεδὸν γὰρ
οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγόνασιν.
10 αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μή, ὅτι τότε
μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγούντων (οὐ γάρ
πω δεινοὶ ἦσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ηὐξημένης οἱ
δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μέν, δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν
πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται, πλὴν εἴ που βραχύ τι γέγονε
15 τοιοῦτον. ἐγίγνοντο δὲ τυραννίδες πρότερον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν
καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζεσθαί τισιν, ὥσπερ
ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρυτανείας (πολλῶν γὰρ ἦν καὶ μεγάλων
κύριος ὁ πρύτανις). ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας
εἶναι τότε τὰς πόλεις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν τὸν
20 δῆμον ἄσχολον ὄντα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις, οἱ προστάται τοῦ
δήμου, ὅτε πολεμικοὶ γένοιντο, τυραννίδι ἐπετίθεντο. πάντες
δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἦν ἡ
ἀπέχθεια ἡ πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους, οἷον Ἀθήνησί τε Πεισίστρατος
στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακούς, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις
25 τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν
ποταμὸν ἐπινέμοντας, καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου
καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν
πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς
πατρίας δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην· ὅπου γὰρ αἱρεταὶ
30 μὲν αἱ ἀρχαί, μὴ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων δέ, αἱρεῖται δὲ ὁ δῆμος,
δημαγωγοῦντες οἱ σπουδαρχιῶντες εἰς τοῦτο καθιστᾶσιν
ὥστε κύριον εἶναι τὸν δῆμον καὶ τῶν νόμων. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ
μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἧττον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς
ἄρχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον. τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατιῶν
35 αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται πᾶσαι σχεδὸν διὰ ταύτας
τὰς αἰτίας.
The same thing happened with 1the democracy of Cyme, which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most states the changes have been of this character. For sometimes the demagogues, in order to curry favor with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to combine; either 5they make a division of their property, or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate.
Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were originally demagogues. 10They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power; at any rate instances to the contrary are few and slight. 15Tyrannies were more common formerly than now, for this reason also, that great power was placed in the hands of individuals; thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters. Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the fields, 20busy at their work; and their chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara 25slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy, which he found by the river side, where they had put them to graze in land not their own. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the people. Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy; for where there is a popular election of 30the magistrates and no property qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at last even to set them above the laws. A more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates.
35These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies.
Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were originally demagogues. 10They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power; at any rate instances to the contrary are few and slight. 15Tyrannies were more common formerly than now, for this reason also, that great power was placed in the hands of individuals; thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters. Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the fields, 20busy at their work; and their chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara 25slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy, which he found by the river side, where they had put them to graze in land not their own. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the people. Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy; for where there is a popular election of 30the magistrates and no property qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at last even to set them above the laws. A more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates.
35These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies.
Book 5,Chapter 6 (1305a37–1306b21)
Αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι [διὰ] δύο μάλιστα τρόπους
τοὺς φανερωτάτους. ἕνα μὲν ἐὰν ἀδικῶσι τὸ πλῆθος·
πᾶς γὰρ ἱκανὸς γίνεται προστάτης, μάλιστα δ' ὅταν ἐξ
40 αὐτῆς συμβῇ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεσθαι τὸν ἡγεμόνα, καθάπερ
ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις, ὃς καὶ ἐτυράννησεν ὕστερον τῶν
There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies: (1) First, when the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is good enough to be their champion, especially if he be 40himself a member of the oligarchy, as Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. But revolutions which commence outside the governing class may be further subdivided.
1305b
1 Ναξίων. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφοράς.
ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εὐπόρων, οὐ τῶν ὄντων
δ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, γίγνεται κατάλυσις, ὅταν ὀλίγοι σφόδρα
ὦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς, οἷον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ καὶ ἐν
5 Ἴστρῳ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι συμβέβηκεν·
οἱ γὰρ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐκίνουν, ἕως μετέλαβον
οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πρότερον τῶν ἀδελφῶν, ὕστερον δ'
οἱ νεώτεροι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχουσιν ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν ἅμα πατήρ
τε καὶ υἱός, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ ὁ πρεσβύτερος καὶ ὁ νεώτερος
10 ἀδελφός· καὶ ἔνθα μὲν πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία,
ἐν Ἴστρῳ δ' εἰς δῆμον ἀπετελεύτησεν, ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ δ' ἐξ
ἐλαττόνων εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν· μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Κνίδῳ
ἡ ὀλιγαρχία στασιασάντων τῶν γνωρίμων αὐτῶν πρὸς αὑτοὺς
διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους μετέχειν καί, καθάπερ εἴρηται, εἰ πατήρ,
15 υἱὸν μὴ μετέχειν, μηδ' εἰ πλείους ἀδελφοί, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν
πρεσβύτατον· ἐπιλαβόμενος γὰρ στασιαζόντων ὁ δῆμος, καὶ
λαβὼν προστάτην ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων, ἐπιθέμενος ἐκράτησεν,
ἀσθενὲς γὰρ τὸ στασιάζον· καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς
τῶν Βασιλιδῶν ὀλιγαρχίας ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, καίπερ
20 καλῶς ἐπιμελομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ὅμως διὰ
τὸ ὑπ' ὀλίγων ἄρχεσθαι ἀγανακτῶν ὁ δῆμος μετέβαλε
τὴν πολιτείαν. κινοῦνται δ' αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ
διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων (ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διττή,
ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις—ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς
25 κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγοι ὦσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ
περὶ Χαρικλέα ἴσχυσαν τοὺς Τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ
ἐν τοῖς Τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον—
ἢ ὅταν τὸν ὄχλον δημαγωγῶσιν οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὄντες,
οἷον ἐν Λαρίσῃ οἱ πολιτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς
30 τὸν ὄχλον ἐδημαγώγουν, καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι
αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν
ἀρχαὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσὶν ἢ ἑταιριῶν, αἱροῦνται
δ' οἱ ὁπλῖται ἢ ὁ δῆμος, ὅπερ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ συνέβαινεν, καὶ
ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματός ἐστι—δημαγωγοῦντες
35 γὰρ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν,
ὅπερ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ἐγένετο τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ—ἔτι δ'
ὅταν ἔνιοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἕλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οἱ γὰρ τὸ
ἴσον ζητοῦντες ἀναγκάζονται βοηθὸν ἐπαγαγέσθαι τὸν δῆμον).
γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν
40 ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι
καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ ἢ
Sometimes, when the government is very exclusive, the revolution is brought about by persons of the wealthy class who are excluded, as happened at Massalia and 5Istros and Heraclea, and other cities. Those who had no share in the government created a disturbance, until first the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted; for in some places father and son, in others elder and younger brothers, do not hold office together. 10At Massalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional government, but at Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was enlarged to 600. At Cnidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a considerable change. For the notables fell out among themselves, because only a few shared in the government; there existed among them the rule already mentioned, that father 15and son not hold office together, and, if there were several brothers, only the eldest was admitted. The people took advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who were divided, and division is always a source of weakness. The city of Erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, 20and ruled well, by the Basilidae, but the people took offense at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the constitution.
(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue. Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of two sorts: either (a) he practices upon the oligarchs themselves (for, 25although the oligarchy are quite a small number, there may be a demagogue among them, as at Athens Charicles' party won power by courting the Thirty, that of Phrynichus by courting the Four Hundred); or (b) the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the people. This was the case at Larissa, where the guardians of the citizens 30endeavored to gain over the people because they were elected by them; and such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are elected, as at Abydos, not by the class to which they belong, but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they may be required to have a high qualification, or to be members of a political club; or, again, where the law-courts are composed of persons outside the government, the oligarchs flatter the people 35in order to obtain a decision in their own favor, and so they change the constitution; this happened at Heraclea in Pontus. 1Again, oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them; for then those who desire equal rights are compelled to call in the people.
(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue. Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of two sorts: either (a) he practices upon the oligarchs themselves (for, 25although the oligarchy are quite a small number, there may be a demagogue among them, as at Athens Charicles' party won power by courting the Thirty, that of Phrynichus by courting the Four Hundred); or (b) the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the people. This was the case at Larissa, where the guardians of the citizens 30endeavored to gain over the people because they were elected by them; and such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are elected, as at Abydos, not by the class to which they belong, but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they may be required to have a high qualification, or to be members of a political club; or, again, where the law-courts are composed of persons outside the government, the oligarchs flatter the people 35in order to obtain a decision in their own favor, and so they change the constitution; this happened at Heraclea in Pontus. 1Again, oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them; for then those who desire equal rights are compelled to call in the people.
1306a
1 κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον (ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις,
καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Κλεότιμος τοὺς
ἐποίκους τοὺς Χαλκιδέων ἤγαγε, καὶ ἐλθόντων διεστασίασεν
αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εὐπόρους, καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὁ τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν
5 πρὸς Χάρητα πράξας ἐνεχείρησε μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν
διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν)· ὁτὲ μὲν οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπιχειροῦσί τι κινεῖν,
ὁτὲ δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινά, ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν ἢ οὗτοι πρὸς
αὑτοὺς ἢ οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας, ὅπερ ἐν
Ἀπολλωνίᾳ συνέβη τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ. ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία
10 οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὑτῆς. σημεῖον δὲ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ
πολιτεία· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν κύριοί εἰσι
διὰ τὸ χρῆσθαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς. καταλύονται δὲ
καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἑτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐμποιῶσιν.
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὄντος τῶν
15 μεγίστων ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν οἱ ὀλίγοι πάντες, ὅπερ ἐν
Ἤλιδι συνέβη ποτέ· τῆς πολιτείας γὰρ δι' ὀλίγων οὔσης
τῶν γερόντων ὀλίγοι πάμπαν ἐγίνοντο διὰ τὸ ἀιδίους εἶναι
ἐνενήκοντα ὄντας, τὴν δ' αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ
ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων. γίγνεται δὲ μεταβολὴ
20 τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ,
ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀπιστίαν στρατιώταις
ἀναγκαζομένων χρῆσθαι (ᾧ γὰρ ἂν ἐγχειρίσωσιν,
οὗτος πολλάκις γίνεται τύραννος, ὥσπερ ἐν Κορίνθῳ Τιμοφάνης·
ἂν δὲ πλείους, οὗτοι αὑτοῖς περιποιοῦνται δυναστείαν·
25 ὁτὲ δὲ ταῦτα δεδιότες μεταδιδόασι τῷ πλήθει τῆς
πολιτείας διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ χρῆσθαι)· ἐν δὲ
τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι
τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ, ὃς
ἐνίοτε γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων, ὅπερ συνέβη ἐν Λαρίσῃ
30 ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν περὶ Σῖμον, καὶ ἐν
Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἑταιριῶν ὧν ἦν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου. γίνονται
δὲ στάσεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περιωθεῖσθαι ἑτέρους ὑφ' ἑτέρων τῶν
ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ καταστασιάζεσθαι κατὰ γάμους
ἢ δίκας, οἷον ἐκ γαμικῆς μὲν αἰτίας αἱ εἰρημέναι
35 πρότερον (καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱππέων
Διαγόρας κατέλυσεν ἀδικηθεὶς περὶ γάμον), ἐκ
δὲ δικαστηρίου κρίσεως ἡ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ στάσις ἐγένετο καὶ <ἡ> ἐν
Θήβαις, ἐπ' αἰτίᾳ μοιχείας δικαίως μὲν στασιαστικῶς δὲ
ποιησαμένων τὴν κόλασιν τῶν μὲν ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κατ' Εὐρυτίωνος,
Changes in the oligarchy also occur when the oligarchs waste their private property by extravagant living; for then they want to innovate, and either try to make themselves tyrants, or 1install some one else in the tyranny, as Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse, and as at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus introduced Chalcidian colonists, and when they arrived, stirred them up against the rich. For a like reason in Aegina the person who carried on the negotiation 5with Chares endeavored to revolutionize the state. Sometimes a party among the oligarchs try directly to create a political change; sometimes they rob the treasury, and then either the thieves or, as happened at Apollonia in Pontus, those who resist them in their thieving quarrel with the rulers. But an oligarchy which is at unity with itself 10is not easily destroyed from within; of this we may see an example at Pharsalus, for there, although the rulers are few in number, they govern a large city, because they have a good understanding among themselves.
Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy is created within the original one, that is to say, when the whole governing body is small 15and yet they do not all share in the highest offices. Thus at Elis the governing body was a small senate; and very few ever found their way into it, because the senators were only ninety in number, and were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the Lacedaemonian elders. 20Oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in war and in peace; in war because, not being able to trust the people, the oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; or if there are more generals than one they make themselves into a company of tyrants. 25Sometimes the oligarchs, fearing this danger, give the people a share in the government because their services are necessary to them. And in time of peace, from mutual distrust, the two parties hand over the defense of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two factions, who often ends the master of both. This happened at Larissa 30when Simos the Aleuad had the government, and at Abydos in the days of Iphiades and the political clubs. Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. Of quarrels about marriages I have already mentioned some instances; 35another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a marriage.
Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy is created within the original one, that is to say, when the whole governing body is small 15and yet they do not all share in the highest offices. Thus at Elis the governing body was a small senate; and very few ever found their way into it, because the senators were only ninety in number, and were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the Lacedaemonian elders. 20Oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in war and in peace; in war because, not being able to trust the people, the oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; or if there are more generals than one they make themselves into a company of tyrants. 25Sometimes the oligarchs, fearing this danger, give the people a share in the government because their services are necessary to them. And in time of peace, from mutual distrust, the two parties hand over the defense of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two factions, who often ends the master of both. This happened at Larissa 30when Simos the Aleuad had the government, and at Abydos in the days of Iphiades and the political clubs. Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. Of quarrels about marriages I have already mentioned some instances; 35another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a marriage.
1306b
1 τῶν δ' ἐν Θήβαις κατ' Ἀρχίου (ἐφιλονείκησαν γὰρ
αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ὥστε δεθῆναι ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ κύφωνι).
πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας
ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τινῶν δυσχερανάντων κατελύθησαν,
5 ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Κνίδῳ καὶ ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλιγαρχία.
γίγνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μεταβολαὶ καὶ τῆς
καλουμένης πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ἐν ὅσαις ἀπὸ
τιμήματος βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς
ἄρχουσιν. πολλάκις γὰρ ὅταν ταχθῇ πρῶτον τίμημα πρὸς
10 τοὺς παρόντας καιρούς, ὥστε μετέχειν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ
ὀλίγους ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς μέσους, εὐετηρίας γιγνομένης
δι' εἰρήνην ἢ δι' ἄλλην τιν' εὐτυχίαν συμβαίνει πολλαπλασίου
γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος ἀξίας τὰς αὐτὰς κτήσεις, ὥστε
πάντας πάντων μετέχειν, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκ προσαγωγῆς καὶ
15 κατὰ μικρὸν γινομένης τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ λανθανούσης,
ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ θᾶττον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι
καὶ στασιάζουσι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας (ὅλως δὲ καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι
καὶ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς
ἐναντίας πολιτείας ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, οἷον
20 ἐκ τῶν ἐννόμων δημοκρατιῶν καὶ ὀλιγαρχιῶν εἰς τὰς κυρίους
καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνας).
A revolution at Heraclea, and another at Thebes, both arose out of decisions of law-courts upon a charge of adultery; in both cases the punishment was just, but executed in the spirit of party, at Heraclea upon Eurytion, 1and at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the agora. Many oligarchies have been destroyed by some members of the ruling class taking offense at their excessive despotism; 5for example, the oligarchy at Cnidus and at Chios.
Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies which limit the office of counselor, judge, or other magistrate to persons having a certain money qualification, often occur by accident. The qualification may have been originally fixed according to 10the circumstances of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or in a constitutional government the middle class. But after a time of prosperity, whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as valuable, and then everybody participates in every office; 15this happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions in oligarchies.
We must remark generally both of democracies and oligarchies, that they sometimes change, not into the opposite forms of government, but only into another variety of the same class; I mean to say, 20from those forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated by law into those which are arbitrary, and conversely.
Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies which limit the office of counselor, judge, or other magistrate to persons having a certain money qualification, often occur by accident. The qualification may have been originally fixed according to 10the circumstances of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or in a constitutional government the middle class. But after a time of prosperity, whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as valuable, and then everybody participates in every office; 15this happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions in oligarchies.
We must remark generally both of democracies and oligarchies, that they sometimes change, not into the opposite forms of government, but only into another variety of the same class; I mean to say, 20from those forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated by law into those which are arbitrary, and conversely.
Book 5,Chapter 7 (1306b22–1307b25)
Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίνονται αἱ στάσεις αἱ μὲν
διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν, ὅπερ εἴρηται κινεῖν καὶ
τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν
25 εἶναί πως (ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες, οὐ μέντοι
διὰ ταὐτὸν ὀλίγοι)· ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ
ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
ἀναγκαῖον ὅταν ᾖ τι πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς
ὁμοίων κατ' ἀρετήν, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρθενίαι
30 (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν), οὓς φωράσαντες ἐπιβουλεύσαντας
ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς, ἢ ὅταν τινὲς ἀτιμάζωνται
μεγάλοι ὄντες καὶ μηθενὸς ἥττους κατ' ἀρετὴν
ὑπό τινων ἐντιμοτέρων, οἷον Λύσανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων,
ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων
35 ὁ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς
Σπαρτιάτας· ἔτι ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀπορῶσι λίαν οἱ δ' εὐπορῶσιν
(καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται· συνέβη
δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὑπὸ τὸν Μεσηνιακὸν πόλεμον·
δῆλον δὲ [καὶ] τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης
In aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when a few only share in the honors of the state; a cause which has been already shown to affect oligarchies; for an aristocracy 25is a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy, is the government of a few, although few not for the same reason; hence the two are often confounded. And revolutions will be most likely to happen, and must happen, when the mass of the people are of the high-spirited kind, and have a notion that they are as good as their rulers. Thus at Lacedaemon the so-called Partheniae, 30who were the [illegitimate] sons of the Spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being detected, were sent away to colonize Tarentum. Again, revolutions occur when great men who are at least of equal merit are dishonored by those higher in office, as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta; or, when a brave man is excluded from the honors of the state, like Cinadon, 35who conspired against the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus; or, again, when some are very poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most often the result of war, as at Lacedaemon in the days of the Messenian War; this is proved from the poem of Tyrtaeus, entitled 'Good Order'; for he speaks of certain citizens who were ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of the land.
1307a
1 Εὐνομίας· θλιβόμενοι γάρ τινες διὰ τὸν πόλεμον
ἠξίουν ἀνάδαστον ποιεῖν τὴν χώραν)· ἔτι ἐάν τις μέγας ᾖ
καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μείζων εἶναι, ἵνα μοναρχῇ, ὥσπερ ἐν
Λακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Παυσανίας ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν
5 πόλεμον, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἄννων. λύονται δὲ μάλιστα
αἵ τε πολιτεῖαι καὶ αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ
τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου παρέκβασιν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ μὴ μεμεῖχθαι
καλῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν,
ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν,
10 μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο· λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆμον καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν.
ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαί τε πειρῶνται μιγνύναι καὶ
αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν. διαφέρουσι γὰρ
τῶν ὀνομαζομένων πολιτειῶν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τούτῳ, καὶ
διὰ τοῦτ' εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἧττον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι αὐτῶν·
15 τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινούσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας
καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας· διόπερ
ἀσφαλέστεραι αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἑτέρων εἰσίν· κρεῖττόν
τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες,
οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις, ἂν ἡ πολιτεία διδῷ τὴν ὑπεροχήν,
20 ὑβρίζειν ζητοῦσι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν. ὅλως δ' ἐφ' ὁπότερον ἂν
ἐγκλίνῃ ἡ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ ταῦτα μεθίσταται ἑκατέρων τὸ
σφέτερον αὐξανόντων, οἷον ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δῆμον, ἀριστοκρατία
δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἢ εἰς τἀναντία, οἷον ἡ μὲν
ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δῆμον (ὡς ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ περισπῶσιν εἰς
25 τοὐναντίον οἱ ἀπορώτεροι), αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν
(μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ
αὑτῶν)· συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις. διὰ μὲν γὰρ
τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἔλαττον
μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην
30 τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία
ὀλιγαρχικωτέρα ἦν, ὥστε ἐδύναντο πλεονεκτεῖν) ὁ [δὲ]
δῆμος γυμνασθεὶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐγένετο κρείττων,
ἕως ἀφεῖσαν τῆς χώρας ὅσοι πλείω ἦσαν ἔχοντες.
ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς
35 εἶναι μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν
Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται· καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν
ὅ τι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ
θέλουσιν, διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς
Διονύσιον κηδείας, ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἂν
40 ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμειγμένῃ. μάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν αἱ
Again, revolutions arise when an individual who is great, and might be greater, wants to rule alone, as, at Lacedaemon, Pausanias, who was general in the Persian 5War, or like Hanno at Carthage.
Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former, the ill-mingling of the two elements, democracy and oligarchy; in the latter, of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, 10but especially democracy and oligarchy. For to combine these is the endeavor of constitutional governments; and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like aim, but differ from polities in the mode of combination; hence some of them are more and some less permanent. 15Those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy constitutional governments. And therefore the latter are the safer of the two; for the greater the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal they are contented. But the rich, if the constitution gives them power, 20are apt to be insolent and avaricious; and, in general, whichever way the constitution inclines, in that direction it changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy an oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and aristocracy may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea that they are being wronged, force the constitution to take 25an opposite form. In like manner constitutional governments change into oligarchies. The only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own.
What I have just mentioned actually happened at Thurii, where the qualification for office, at first high, was therefore reduced, and the magistrates increased in number. 30The notables had previously acquired the whole of the land contrary to law; for the government tended to oligarchy, and they were able to encroach.... But the people, who had been trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those who had too much gave up their land.
Again, since all aristocratical governments incline to oligarchy, 35the notables are apt to be grasping; thus at Lacedaemon, where property tends to pass into few hands, the notables can do too much as they like, and are allowed to marry whom they please. 1The city of Locri was ruined by a marriage connection with Dionysius, but such a thing could never have happened in a democracy, or 40in a wellbalanced aristocracy.
Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former, the ill-mingling of the two elements, democracy and oligarchy; in the latter, of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, 10but especially democracy and oligarchy. For to combine these is the endeavor of constitutional governments; and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like aim, but differ from polities in the mode of combination; hence some of them are more and some less permanent. 15Those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy constitutional governments. And therefore the latter are the safer of the two; for the greater the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal they are contented. But the rich, if the constitution gives them power, 20are apt to be insolent and avaricious; and, in general, whichever way the constitution inclines, in that direction it changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy an oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and aristocracy may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea that they are being wronged, force the constitution to take 25an opposite form. In like manner constitutional governments change into oligarchies. The only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own.
What I have just mentioned actually happened at Thurii, where the qualification for office, at first high, was therefore reduced, and the magistrates increased in number. 30The notables had previously acquired the whole of the land contrary to law; for the government tended to oligarchy, and they were able to encroach.... But the people, who had been trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those who had too much gave up their land.
Again, since all aristocratical governments incline to oligarchy, 35the notables are apt to be grasping; thus at Lacedaemon, where property tends to pass into few hands, the notables can do too much as they like, and are allowed to marry whom they please. 1The city of Locri was ruined by a marriage connection with Dionysius, but such a thing could never have happened in a democracy, or 40in a wellbalanced aristocracy.
1307b
1 ἀριστοκρατίαι μεταβάλλουσαι τῷ λύεσθαι κατὰ μικρόν,
ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν
πολιτειῶν, ὅτι αἴτιον τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρόν ἐστιν·
ὅταν γάρ τι προῶνται τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο
5 καὶ ἄλλο μικρῷ μεῖζον εὐχερέστερον κινοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν πάντα
κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων
πολιτείας. νόμου γὰρ ὄντος διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν στρατηγεῖν, γενόμενοί
τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει
τῶν φρουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς
10 πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως κατασχήσειν, τοῦτον τὸν
νόμον λύειν ἐπεχείρησαν πρῶτον, ὥστ' ἐξεῖναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς
συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὁρῶντες τὸν δῆμον αὐτοὺς χειροτονήσοντα
προθύμως. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόντων,
οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι, ὁρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐναντιοῦσθαι
15 συνεπείσθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοῦτον κινήσαντας
τὸν νόμον ἐάσειν τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν, ὕστερον δὲ βουλόμενοι
κωλύειν ἄλλων κινουμένων οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποίουν οὐθέν,
ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν
τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. πᾶσαι δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι
20 λύονται ὁτὲ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν ὁτὲ δ' ἔξωθεν, ὅταν ἐναντία
πολιτεία ᾖ ἢ πλησίον ἢ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν.
ὅπερ συνέβαινεν ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· οἱ μὲν
γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες
τοὺς δήμους κατέλυον. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται
25 τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἴρηται σχεδόν.
I have already remarked that in all states revolutions are occasioned by trifles. 1In aristocracies, above all, they are of a gradual and imperceptible nature. The citizens begin by giving up some part of the constitution, 5and so with greater ease the government change something else which is a little more important, until they have undermined the whole fabric of the state. At Thurii there was a law that generals should only be re-elected after an interval of five years, and some young men who were popular with the soldiers of the guard for their military prowess, despising 10the magistrates and thinking that they would easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual commands; for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to elect them. Whereupon the magistrates who had charge of these matters, and who are called councillors, at first determined to resist, 15but they afterwards consented, thinking that, if only this one law was changed, no further inroad would be made on the constitution. But other changes soon followed which they in vain attempted to oppose; and the state passed into the hands of the revolutionists, who established a dynastic oligarchy.
All constitutions 20are overthrown either from within or from without; the latter, when there is some government close at hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; the Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the Lacedaemonians the democracies.
25I have now explained what are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions in states.
All constitutions 20are overthrown either from within or from without; the latter, when there is some government close at hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; the Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the Lacedaemonians the democracies.
25I have now explained what are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions in states.
Book 5,Chapter 8 (1307b26–1309a32)
Περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης πολιτείας
ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ
ἔχομεν δι' ὧν φθείρονται αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἔχομεν καὶ δι' ὧν
σῴζονται· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ
30 σωτηρίᾳ ἐναντίον. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολιτείαις
ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τηρεῖν ὅπως μηθὲν παρανομῶσι,
καὶ μάλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάττειν· λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυομένη
ἡ παρανομία, ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα
ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον. λανθάνει δὲ ἡ δαπάνη
35 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίγνεσθαι· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια
ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος "εἰ ἕκαστον μικρόν,
καὶ πάντα"· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ· τὸ
γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ
μικρῶν. μίαν μὲν οὖν φυλακὴν ταύτην πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
40 δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι· ἔπειτα μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς σοφίσματος χάριν
We have next to consider what means there are of preserving constitutions in general, and in particular cases. In the first place it is evident that if we know the causes which destroy constitutions, we also know the causes which preserve them; for opposites produce opposites, 30and destruction is the opposite of preservation.
In all well-attempered governments there is nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law, more especially in small matters; for transgression creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of small expenses in time eats up a fortune. 35The expense does not take place at once, and therefore is not observed; the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which says that 'if each part is little, then the whole is little.' 40this is true in one way, but not in another, for the whole and the all are not little, although they are made up of littles.
In all well-attempered governments there is nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law, more especially in small matters; for transgression creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of small expenses in time eats up a fortune. 35The expense does not take place at once, and therefore is not observed; the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which says that 'if each part is little, then the whole is little.' 40this is true in one way, but not in another, for the whole and the all are not little, although they are made up of littles.
1308a
1 πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος συγκειμένοις, ἐξελέγχεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν
ἔργων (ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτειῶν σοφίσματα, πρότερον
εἴρηται). ἔτι δ' ὁρᾶν ὅτι ἔνιαι μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀριστοκρατίαι
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι
5 τὰς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ εὖ χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς
γινομένους καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ
πολιτεύματι, τοὺς μὲν μὴ μετέχοντας τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
τῷ τοὺς ἡγεμονικοὺς αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ
τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς
10 εἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὑτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῷ χρῆσθαι
ἀλλήλοις δημοτικῶς. ὃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ δημοτικοί,
τὸ ἴσον, τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον
ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστίν. διὸ ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι,
πολλὰ συμφέρει τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημάτων,
15 οἷον τὸ ἑξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἵνα πάντες οἱ
ὅμοιοι μετέχωσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι
(διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐγγίγνονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται πρότερον), ἔπειθ' ἧττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπίπτουσιν αἱ
ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον κακουργῆσαι
20 ὀλίγον χρόνον ἄρχοντας καὶ πολύν, ἐπεὶ διὰ
τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ δημοκρατίαις γίγνονται τυραννίδες·
ἢ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ ἐπιτίθενται τυραννίδι,
ἔνθα μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἔνθα δ' οἱ δυνάσται, ἢ οἱ τὰς
μεγίστας ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, ὅταν πολὺν χρόνον ἄρχωσιν). σῴζονται
25 δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν
διαφθειρόντων, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς· φοβούμενοι
γὰρ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν. ὥστε δεῖ
τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ἵνα
φυλάττωσι καὶ μὴ καταλύωσιν ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλακὴν
30 τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω ἐγγὺς ποιεῖν.
ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν
νόμων πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ φυλάττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεικίας
ὄντας πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς, ὡς τὸ ἐν
ἀρχῇ γινόμενον κακὸν γνῶναι οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλὰ πολιτικοῦ
35 ἀνδρός. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα γιγνομένην
μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ πολιτείας, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ
τοῦτο μενόντων μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τιμημάτων εὐπορίας δὲ
νομίσματος γιγνομένης, συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκοπεῖν
τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν, ἐν ὅσαις μὲν
40 πόλεσι τιμῶνται κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον,
In the first place, then, men should guard against the beginning of change, and in the second place they should not rely upon the political devices of which I have already spoken 1invented only to deceive the people, for they are proved by experience to be useless. Further, we note that oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last, not from any inherent stability in such forms of government, 5but because the rulers are on good terms both with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the leading spirits among them. They should never wrong the ambitious in a matter of honor, or the common people 10in a matter of money; and they should treat one another and their fellow citizen in a spirit of equality. The equality which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient among equals. Hence, if the governing class are numerous, many democratic institutions are useful; 15for example, the restriction of the tenure of offices to six months, that all those who are of equal rank may share in them. Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues are very likely to arise among them, as I have already remarked. The short tenure of office prevents oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of families; it is not easy for a person to do any great harm 20when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. For the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of the state, who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, and have a long tenure of them.
25Constitutions are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes the government keep in hand the constitution. Wherefore the ruler who has 30a care of the constitution should invent terrors, and bring distant dangers near, in order that the citizens may be on their guard, and, like sentinels in a night watch, never relax their attention. He should endeavor too by help of the laws to control the contentions and quarrels of the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from catching the spirit of contention. 35No ordinary man can discern the beginning of evil, but only the true statesman.
25Constitutions are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes the government keep in hand the constitution. Wherefore the ruler who has 30a care of the constitution should invent terrors, and bring distant dangers near, in order that the citizens may be on their guard, and, like sentinels in a night watch, never relax their attention. He should endeavor too by help of the laws to control the contentions and quarrels of the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from catching the spirit of contention. 35No ordinary man can discern the beginning of evil, but only the true statesman.
1308b
1 ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζοσι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἢ πενταετηρίδος, κἂν ᾖ
πολλαπλάσιον ἢ πολλοστημόριον τοῦ πρότερον, ἐν ᾧ αἱ τιμήσεις
κατέστησαν τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον εἶναι καὶ τὰ τιμήματα
ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἐπιτείνοντας
5 κατὰ τὴν πολλαπλασίωσιν, ἐὰν δ' ἐλλείπῃ, ἀνιέντας
καὶ ἐλάττω ποιοῦντας τὴν τίμησιν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις
καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις, μὴ ποιούντων [μὲν] οὕτως ἔνθα
μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔνθα δὲ δυναστείαν γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει,
ἐκείνως δὲ ἐκ μὲν πολιτείας δημοκρατίαν, ἐκ δ' ὀλιγαρχίας
10 πολιτείαν ἢ δῆμον. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ
καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ καὶ πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ μήτ' αὐξάνειν
λίαν μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πειρᾶσθαι
μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμὰς ἢ βραχὺ
μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, καὶ φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς
15 εὐτυχίαν), εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γ' ἀθρόας δόντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
πάλιν ἀθρόας, ἀλλ' ἐκ προσαγωγῆς· καὶ μάλιστα μὲν
πειρᾶσθαι τοῖς νόμοις οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν ὥστε μηδένα ἐγγίγνεσθαι
πολὺ ὑπερέχοντα δυνάμει μήτε φίλων μήτε χρημάτων,
εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.
20 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους νεωτερίζουσιν, δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν
ἀρχήν τινα τὴν ἐποψομένην τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς
τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν,
ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ἑκάστῃ· καὶ τὸ εὐημεροῦν δὲ τῆς πόλεως
25 ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· τούτου δ'
ἄκος τὸ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς
πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (λέγω δ' ἀντικεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς
τῷ πλήθει, καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις), καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι
ἢ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν
30 εὐπόρων ἢ τὸ μέσον αὔξειν (τοῦτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ
τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις). μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ
καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ οὕτω τετάχθαι ὥστε
μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν. τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς
ὀλιγαρχικαῖς δεῖ τηρεῖν. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγανακτοῦσιν εἰργόμενοι
35 τοῦ ἄρχειν οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίρουσιν ἐάν τις
ἐᾷ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν, ὥστ' ἐὰν οἴωνται τὰ κοινὰ
κλέπτειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, τότε γ' ἀμφότερα λυπεῖ, τό τε
τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν· μοναχῶς δὲ
καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν,
40 εἰ τοῦτο κατασκευάσειέ τις. ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοὺς
As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional governments by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises, not out of any variation in the qualification but only out of the increase of money, it is well to compare the general valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those cities in which the census is taken annually 1and in larger cities every third or fifth year. If the whole is many times greater or many times less than when the ratings recognized by the constitution were fixed, there should be power given by law to raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater 5or less. Where this is not done a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrowed to a rule of families; or in the opposite case constitutional government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either 10constitutional government or democracy.
It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every other form of government not to allow the disproportionate increase of any citizen but to give moderate honor for a long time rather than great honor for a short time. For men are easily spoilt; not every one can bear prosperity. 15But if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honors which are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at once. Especially should the laws provide against any one having too much power, whether derived from friends or money; if he has, he should be sent clean out of the country. 20And since innovations creep in through the private life of individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. And for a like reason an increase of prosperity 25in any part of the state should be carefully watched. The proper remedy for this evil is always to give the management of affairs and offices of state to opposite elements; such opposites are the virtuous and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another way is to combine the poor and the rich in one body, 30or to increase the middle class: thus an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from inequality.
But above all every state should be so administered and so regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make money. In oligarchies special precautions should be used against this evil. For the people do not take any great offense at being kept out of the government- 35indeed they are rather pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their private business- but what irritates them is to think that their rulers are stealing the public money; then they are doubly annoyed; for they lose both honor and profit. If office brought no profit, then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be combined; 40for both notables and people might have their wishes gratified.
It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every other form of government not to allow the disproportionate increase of any citizen but to give moderate honor for a long time rather than great honor for a short time. For men are easily spoilt; not every one can bear prosperity. 15But if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honors which are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at once. Especially should the laws provide against any one having too much power, whether derived from friends or money; if he has, he should be sent clean out of the country. 20And since innovations creep in through the private life of individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. And for a like reason an increase of prosperity 25in any part of the state should be carefully watched. The proper remedy for this evil is always to give the management of affairs and offices of state to opposite elements; such opposites are the virtuous and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another way is to combine the poor and the rich in one body, 30or to increase the middle class: thus an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from inequality.
But above all every state should be so administered and so regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make money. In oligarchies special precautions should be used against this evil. For the people do not take any great offense at being kept out of the government- 35indeed they are rather pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their private business- but what irritates them is to think that their rulers are stealing the public money; then they are doubly annoyed; for they lose both honor and profit. If office brought no profit, then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be combined; 40for both notables and people might have their wishes gratified.
1309a
1 γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἔχειν ἃ βούλονται ἀμφοτέρους.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς
γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοῦτο δ'
ἔσται ὅταν μὴ ᾖ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν· οἱ γὰρ ἄποροι
5 οὐ βουλήσονται ἄρχειν τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ εὔποροι δυνήσονται διὰ τὸ
μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν· ὥστε συμβήσεται τοῖς μὲν
ἀπόροις γίγνεσθαι εὐπόροις διὰ τὸ διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς
ἔργοις, τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων.
10 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ ἡ παράδοσις γιγνέσθω
τῶν χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἀντίγραφα
κατὰ φατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλὰς τιθέσθωσαν·
τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν τιμὰς εἶναι δεῖ νενομοθετημένας
τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν
15 εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀναδάστους,
ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρπούς, ὃ ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν
λανθάνει γιγνόμενον, βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βουλομένους κωλύειν
λειτουργεῖν τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας,
οἷον χορηγίας καὶ λαμπαδαρχίας καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται·
20 ἐν δ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι
πολλήν, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφ' ὧν λήμματα <ἔστι> τούτοις ἀπονέμειν,
κἄν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ
ἐπιτίμια εἶναι ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας μὴ
κατὰ δόσιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος, μηδὲ πλειόνων ἢ μιᾶς
25 τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁμαλώτεραι αἱ οὐσίαι
εἶεν καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων εἰς εὐπορίαν ἂν καθίσταιντο πλείους.
συμφέρει δὲ καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν
ἄλλων ἢ ἰσότητα ἢ προεδρίαν νέμειν τοῖς ἧττον κοινωνοῦσι
τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν μὲν δήμῳ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἐν δ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ
30 τοῖς ἀπόροις, πλὴν ὅσαι ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας,
ταύτας δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ἐγχειρίζειν μόνοις ἢ
πλείοσιν.
All would be able to hold office, which is the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates, which is the aim of aristocracy. And this result may be accomplished when there is no possibility of making money out of the offices; for the poor 5will not want to have them when there is nothing to be gained from them- they would rather be attending to their own concerns; and the rich, who do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to take them; and so the poor will keep to their work and grow rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower class. 10In order to avoid peculation of the public money, the transfer of the revenue should be made at a general assembly of the citizens, and duplicates of the accounts deposited with the different brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. And honors should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation of being incorruptible. In democracies 15the rich should be spared; not only should their property not be divided, but their incomes also, which in some states are taken from them imperceptibly, should be protected. It is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are willing from undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the giving of choruses, torch-races, and the like. 20In an oligarchy, on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should go to them; if any of the wealthy classes insult them, the offender should be punished more severely than if he had wronged one of his own class. Provision should be made that estates pass by inheritance and not by gift, and no person should have more than one inheritance; 25for in this way properties will be equalized, and more of the poor rise to competency. It is also expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have less share in the government (i.e., to the rich in a democracy and 30to the poor in an oligarchy) an equality or preference in all but the principal offices of state. The latter should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the governing class.
Book 5,Chapter 9 (1309a33–1310a38)
Τρία δέ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρξειν τὰς
κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν
35 πολιτείαν, ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς,
τρίτον δ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν
πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ
πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι
διαφοράς). ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ ταῦτα
40 πάντα περὶ τὸν αὐτόν, πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν·
There are three qualifications required in those who have to fill the highest offices- (1) first of all, loyalty to the established 35constitution; (2) the greatest administrative capacity; (3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to each form of government; for, if what is just is not the same in all governments, the quality of justice must also differ. 1There may be a doubt, however, when all these qualities do not meet 40in the same person, how the selection is to be made; suppose, for example, a good general is a bad man and not a friend to the constitution, and another man is loyal and just, which should we choose?
1309b
1 οἷον εἰ στρατηγικὸς μέν τις εἴη, πονηρὸς δὲ καὶ μὴ τῇ πολιτείᾳ
φίλος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος καὶ φίλος, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι
τὴν αἵρεσιν; ἔοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν εἰς δύο, τίνος πλεῖον
μετέχουσι πάντες καὶ τίνος ἔλαττον· διὸ ἐν στρατηγίᾳ μὲν
5 εἰς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς (ἔλαττον γὰρ στρατηγίας
μετέχουσι, τῆς δ' ἐπιεικείας πλεῖον), ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ
καὶ ταμιείᾳ τἀναντία (πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἢ ὅσην
οἱ πολλοὶ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινὴ πᾶσιν). ἀπορήσειε
δ' ἄν τις, ἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ φιλία,
10 τί δεῖ τῆς ἀρετῆς; ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο.
ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἔχοντας ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι,
ὥστε καθάπερ καὶ αὑτοῖς οὐχ ὑπηρετοῦσιν εἰδότες καὶ φιλοῦντες
αὑτούς, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὐθὲν κωλύει ἔχειν
ἐνίους; ἁπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγομεν
15 ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα σῴζει τὰς πολιτείας,
καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν
ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ
μὴ βουλομένου. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν,
ὃ νῦν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, τὸ μέσον·
20 πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκούντων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρατίας
καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. οἱ δ' οἰόμενοι
ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρετὴν ἕλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν,
ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι, καθάπερ ῥὶς ἔστι παρεκβεβηκυῖα μὲν τὴν
εὐθύτητα τὴν καλλίστην πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμόν, ἀλλ'
25 ὅμως ἔτι καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ μὴν
ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐπιτείνῃ τις ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, πρῶτον
μὲν ἀποβαλεῖ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ μορίου, τέλος δ' οὕτως
ὥστε μηδὲ ῥῖνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ
τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ
30 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς
[ἄλλας] πολιτείας. καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν
ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν ἱκανῶς, καίπερ ἐξεστηκυίας τῆς βελτίστης
τάξεως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπιτείνῃ μᾶλλον ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν, πρῶτον
μὲν χείρω ποιήσει τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δ' οὐδὲ πολιτείαν.
35 διὸ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν,
ποῖα σῴζει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποῖα φθείρει τὴν
δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν
ἄνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁμαλότης
40 γένηται τῆς οὐσίας ἄλλην ἀνάγκη εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν,
In making the election ought we not to consider two points? what qualities are common, and what are rare. Thus in the choice of a general, 5we should regard his skill rather than his virtue; for few have military skill, but many have virtue. In any office of trust or stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be observed; for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge is of a sort which all men possess.
It may, however, be asked 10what a man wants with virtue if he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone will make him do what is for the public interest. But may not men have both of them and yet be deficient in self-control? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public?
Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enactments are held to be for the interest of 15various constitutions, all these preserve them. And the great preserving principle is the one which has been repeatedly mentioned- to have a care that the loyal citizen should be stronger than the disloyal. Neither should we forget the mean, which at the present day is lost sight of in perverted forms of government; 20for many practices which appear to be democratical are the ruin of democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies. Those who think that all virtue is to be found in their own party principles push matters to extremes; they do not consider that disproportion destroys a state. A nose which varies from the ideal of straightness to a hook or snub 25may still be of good shape and agreeable to the eye; but if the excess be very great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direction or defect in the other; and 30this is true of every other part of the human body. The same law of proportion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, but if any one attempts to push the principles of either to an extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end by having none at all. 35Wherefore the legislator and the statesman ought to know what democratical measures save and what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy. For neither the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are included in it. 1If equality 40of property is introduced, the state must of necessity take another form; for when by laws carried to excess one or other element in the state is ruined, the constitution is ruined.
It may, however, be asked 10what a man wants with virtue if he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone will make him do what is for the public interest. But may not men have both of them and yet be deficient in self-control? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public?
Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enactments are held to be for the interest of 15various constitutions, all these preserve them. And the great preserving principle is the one which has been repeatedly mentioned- to have a care that the loyal citizen should be stronger than the disloyal. Neither should we forget the mean, which at the present day is lost sight of in perverted forms of government; 20for many practices which appear to be democratical are the ruin of democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies. Those who think that all virtue is to be found in their own party principles push matters to extremes; they do not consider that disproportion destroys a state. A nose which varies from the ideal of straightness to a hook or snub 25may still be of good shape and agreeable to the eye; but if the excess be very great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direction or defect in the other; and 30this is true of every other part of the human body. The same law of proportion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, but if any one attempts to push the principles of either to an extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end by having none at all. 35Wherefore the legislator and the statesman ought to know what democratical measures save and what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy. For neither the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are included in it. 1If equality 40of property is introduced, the state must of necessity take another form; for when by laws carried to excess one or other element in the state is ruined, the constitution is ruined.
1310a
1 ὥστε φθείροντες τοῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νόμοις φθείρουσι
τὰς πολιτείας. ἁμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις
καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαγωγοί,
ὅπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων (δύο γὰρ
5 ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ τὴν πόλιν, μαχόμενοι τοῖς εὐπόροις, δεῖ δὲ
τοὐναντίον αἰεὶ δοκεῖν λέγειν ὑπὲρ τῶν εὐπόρων), ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις
ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς, καὶ τοὺς ὅρκους
ἐναντίους ἢ νῦν ὀμνύναι τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν
ἐνίαις ὀμνύουσι "καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω
10 ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν", χρὴ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι
τοὐναντίον, ἐπισημαινομένους ἐν τοῖς ὅρκοις ὅτι "οὐκ
ἀδικήσω τὸν δῆμον". μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων
πρὸς τὸ διαμένειν τὰς πολιτείας, οὗ νῦν ὀλιγωροῦσι πάντες,
τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας. ὄφελος γὰρ οὐθὲν τῶν
15 ὠφελιμωτάτων νόμων καὶ συνδεδοξασμένων ὑπὸ πάντων
τῶν πολιτευομένων, εἰ μὴ ἔσονται εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι
ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημοτικῶς,
εἰ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοί, ὀλιγαρχικῶς. εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐφ'
ἑνὸς ἀκρασία, ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι
20 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τοῦτο, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ
ὀλιγαρχοῦντες ἢ οἱ δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι, ἀλλ' οἷς δυνήσονται
οἱ μὲν ὀλιγαρχεῖν οἱ δὲ δημοκρατεῖσθαι. νῦν δ' ἐν
μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων υἱοὶ τρυφῶσιν, οἱ
δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων γίγνονται γεγυμνασμένοι καὶ πεπονηκότες,
25 ὥστε καὶ βούλονται μᾶλλον καὶ δύνανται νεωτερίζειν· ἐν δὲ
ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρατικαῖς
τοὐναντίον τοῦ συμφέροντος καθέστηκεν, αἴτιον δὲ τούτου
ὅτι κακῶς ὁρίζονται τὸ ἐλεύθερον. δύο γάρ ἐστιν οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία
δοκεῖ ὡρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ
30 ἐλευθερίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον δίκαιον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἴσον δ' ὅ τι
ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλήθει, τοῦτ' εἶναι κύριον, ἐλεύθερον δὲ [καὶ
ἴσον] τὸ ὅ τι ἂν βούληταί τις ποιεῖν· ὥστε ζῇ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις
δημοκρατίαις ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, καὶ εἰς ὃ χρῄζων,
ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φαῦλον· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ
35 οἴεσθαι δουλείαν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ
σωτηρίαν. ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν αἱ πολιτεῖαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ
φθείρονται, καὶ διὰ τίνων σῴζονται καὶ διαμένουσιν, ὡς
ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν τοσαῦτά ἐστιν.
There is an error common both to oligarchies and to democracies: in the latter the demagogues, when the multitude are above the law, 5are always cutting the city in two by quarrels with the rich, whereas they should always profess to be maintaining their cause; just as in oligarchies the oligarchs should profess to maintaining the cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For there are cities in which they swear- 'I will be an enemy to the people, and will devise all the harm against them 10which I can'; but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very opposite feeling; in the form of their oath there should be an express declaration- 'I will do no wrong to the people.'
But of all the things which I have mentioned that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government, and yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected. 15The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically or oligarchically, if the laws are oligarchical. For there may be a want of self-discipline in states as well as in individuals. Now, to have been educated 20in the spirit of the constitution is not to perform the actions in which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an oligarchy live in luxury, but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil, 25and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolution. And in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. For two principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of the majority and 30freedom. Men think that what is just is equal; and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will; and that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, 'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong; men should not 35think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their salvation.
I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and destruction of states, and the means of their preservation and continuance.
But of all the things which I have mentioned that which most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government, and yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected. 15The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically or oligarchically, if the laws are oligarchical. For there may be a want of self-discipline in states as well as in individuals. Now, to have been educated 20in the spirit of the constitution is not to perform the actions in which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an oligarchy live in luxury, but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil, 25and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolution. And in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state. For two principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of the majority and 30freedom. Men think that what is just is equal; and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will; and that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, 'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong; men should not 35think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their salvation.
I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and destruction of states, and the means of their preservation and continuance.
Book 5,Chapter 10 (1310a39–1313a14)
Λείπεται δ' ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας, ἐξ ὧν τε
40 φθείρεται καὶ δι' ὧν σῴζεσθαι πέφυκεν. σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλήσια
1I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its 40destruction and preservation.
1310b
1 τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα
περὶ τὰς βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας. ἡ μὲν
γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς
ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας·
5 διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐστίν, ἅτε ἐκ δυοῖν
συγκειμένη κακῶν καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας
ἔχουσα τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὑπάρχει
δ' ἡ γένεσις εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐναντίων ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν μοναρχιῶν·
ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τοῖς
10 ἐπιεικέσι γέγονεν, καὶ καθίσταται βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ
καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους, ὁ δὲ τύραννος ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ
τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους, ὅπως ὁ δῆμος ἀδικῆται μηδὲν
ὑπ' αὐτῶν. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. σχεδὸν
15 γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν
ὡς εἰπεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους. αἱ
μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν τῶν τυραννίδων, ἤδη
τῶν πόλεων ηὐξημένων, αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἐκ τῶν βασιλέων
παρεκβαινόντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας ἀρχῆς
20 ὀρεγομένων, αἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν αἱρετῶν ἐπὶ τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς
(τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον οἱ δῆμοι καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τὰς
δημιουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας), αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν,
αἱρουμένων ἕνα τινὰ κύριον ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. πᾶσι
γὰρ ὑπῆρχε τοῖς τρόποις τούτοις τὸ κατεργάζεσθαι ῥᾳδίως,
25 εἰ μόνον βουληθεῖεν, διὰ τὸ δύναμιν προϋπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν
βασιλικῆς ἀρχῆς τοῖς δὲ τὴν τῆς τιμῆς· οἷον Φείδων μὲν
περὶ Ἄργος καὶ ἕτεροι τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλείας
ὑπαρχούσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν
τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δ' ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύψελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ
30 καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθήνησι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις
καὶ ἕτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν
εἴπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν.
κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν, ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένος,
ἢ κατ' εὐεργεσίας, ἢ κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἅπαντες
35 γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη
εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον
κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ δ' ἐλευθερώσαντες,
ὥσπερ Κῦρος, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν,
ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ
40 Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ
1What I have said already respecting forms of constitutional government applies almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms; 5it is therefore most injurious to its subjects, being made up of two evil forms of government, and having the perversions and errors of both. These two forms of monarchy are contrary in their very origin. The appointment of a king is the resource of 10the better classes against the people, and he is elected by them out of their own number, because either he himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions; whereas a tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against the notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. History shows that almost 15all tyrants have been demagogues who gained the favor of the people by their accusation of the notables. At any rate this was the manner in which the tyrannies arose in the days when cities had increased in power. Others which were older originated in the ambition of kings 20wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become despots. Others again grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates; for in ancient times the people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others arose out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some individual supreme over the highest offices. In any of these ways an ambitious man had no difficulty, 25if he desired, in creating a tyranny, since he had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one of the officers of state. Thus Pheidon at Argos and several others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants; Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding great offices. Whereas Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth, 30Peisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others who afterwards became tyrants, were at first demagogues.
And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or on benefits conferred, or on these claims with power added to them. For all who have obtained this honor 35have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and nations; some, like Codrus, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war; others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and 40Molossian kings. The idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people against insult and oppression.
And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or on benefits conferred, or on these claims with power added to them. For all who have obtained this honor 35have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and nations; some, like Codrus, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war; others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and 40Molossian kings. The idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people against insult and oppression.
1311a
1 μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηθὲν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ
δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηθέν· ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται
πολλάκις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας
ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἡδύ,
5 βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ
μὲν χρημάτων τυραννικά, τὰ δ' εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικὰ μᾶλλον·
καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτική, τυραννικὴ δὲ
διὰ ξένων. ὅτι δ' ἡ τυραννὶς ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας
καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, φανερόν· ἐκ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας
10 τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διαμένειν
ἀναγκαῖον μόνως τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὴν τρυφήν),
καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν (διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν
ποιοῦνται τῶν ὅπλων), καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ
τοῦ ἄστεως ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων κοινόν, καὶ
15 τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος· ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ
πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ διαφθείρειν λάθρᾳ καὶ φανερῶς
καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὡς ἀντιτέχνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
ἐμποδίους. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς
ἐπιβουλάς, τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μὴ
20 δουλεύειν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμά
ἐστιν, ἡ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων σταχύων κόλουσις, ὡς
δέον αἰεὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναιρεῖν. καθάπερ
οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περί τε
τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας·
25 διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ διὰ καταφρόνησιν
ἐπιτίθενται πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ταῖς μοναρχίαις
(τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας μάλιστα δι' ὕβριν), ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ
τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταὐτά, καθάπερ
κἀκεῖ, καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας·
30 μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μονάρχοις,
ὧν ἐφίενται πάντες. τῶν δ' ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα
γίγνονται τῶν ἀρχόντων, αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν
δι' ὕβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. τῆς δ' ὕβρεως οὔσης πολυμεροῦς,
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίγνεται τῆς ὀργῆς· τῶν δ' ὀργιζομένων
35 σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλ'
οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς. οἷον ἡ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προπηλακίσαι
μὲν τὴν Ἁρμοδίου ἀδελφὴν ἐπηρεάσαι δ' Ἁρμόδιον
(ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἁρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφήν, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστογείτων
διὰ τὸν Ἁρμόδιον), ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ
40 τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπίνοντα μετὰ
Whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has no regard to any public interest, except as conducive to his private ends; his aim is pleasure, 5the aim of a king, honor. Wherefore also in their desires they differ; the tyrant is desirous of riches, the king, of what brings honor. And the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyrant mercenaries.
That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, 10the end is wealth; (for by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury). Both mistrust the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms. Both agree too in injuring the people and driving them out of the city and dispersing them. 15From democracy tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power; and also because plots against them are contrived by men of this dass, who either want to rule or to escape 20subjection. Hence Periander advised Thrasybulus by cutting off the tops of the tallest ears of corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens who overtop the rest. And so, as I have already intimated, the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in forms of constitutional government; subjects attack their sovereigns 25out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by them. And of injustice, the most common form is insult, another is confiscation of property.
The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. 30Monarchs have great wealth and honor, which are objects of desire to all mankind. The attacks are made sometimes against their lives, sometimes against the office; where the sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. Any sort of insult (and there are many) may stir up anger, and when men are angry, 35they commonly act out of revenge, and not from ambition. For example, the attempt made upon the Peisistratidae arose out of the public dishonor offered to the sister of Harmodius and the insult to himself. He attacked the tyrant for his sister's sake, and Aristogeiton joined in the attack for the sake of Harmodius. 1A conspiracy was also formed against Periander, 40the tyrant of Ambracia, because, when drinking with a favorite youth, he asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him.
That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, 10the end is wealth; (for by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury). Both mistrust the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms. Both agree too in injuring the people and driving them out of the city and dispersing them. 15From democracy tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power; and also because plots against them are contrived by men of this dass, who either want to rule or to escape 20subjection. Hence Periander advised Thrasybulus by cutting off the tops of the tallest ears of corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens who overtop the rest. And so, as I have already intimated, the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in forms of constitutional government; subjects attack their sovereigns 25out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by them. And of injustice, the most common form is insult, another is confiscation of property.
The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. 30Monarchs have great wealth and honor, which are objects of desire to all mankind. The attacks are made sometimes against their lives, sometimes against the office; where the sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. Any sort of insult (and there are many) may stir up anger, and when men are angry, 35they commonly act out of revenge, and not from ambition. For example, the attempt made upon the Peisistratidae arose out of the public dishonor offered to the sister of Harmodius and the insult to himself. He attacked the tyrant for his sister's sake, and Aristogeiton joined in the attack for the sake of Harmodius. 1A conspiracy was also formed against Periander, 40the tyrant of Ambracia, because, when drinking with a favorite youth, he asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him.
1311b
1 τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν εἰ ἤδη ἐξ αὐτοῦ κύει· ἡ δὲ
Φιλίππου ὑπὸ Παυσανίου διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν
ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ
Δέρδα διὰ τὸ καυχήσασθαι εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ
5 τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα
παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. πολλαὶ
δ' ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχῦναι
τῶν μονάρχων τινάς. οἷον καὶ ἡ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέλαον·
αἰεὶ γὰρ βαρέως εἶχε πρὸς τὴν ὁμιλίαν, ὥστε ἱκανὴ καὶ
10 ἐλάττων <ἂν> ἐγένετο πρόφασις—ἢ διότι τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδεμίαν
ἔδωκεν ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτέραν,
κατεχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου πρὸς Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον,
ἔδωκε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἐλιμείας, τὴν δὲ νεωτέραν τῷ
υἱεῖ Ἀμύντᾳ, οἰόμενος οὕτως ἂν ἐκεῖνον ἥκιστα διαφέρεσθαι
15 καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας· ἀλλὰ τῆς γε ἀλλοτριότητος
ὑπῆρχεν ἀρχὴ τὸ βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν
χάριν. συνεπέθετο δὲ καὶ Ἑλλανοκράτης ὁ Λαρισαῖος διὰ
τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· ὡς γὰρ χρώμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐ
κατῆγεν ὑποσχόμενος, δι' ὕβριν καὶ οὐ δι' ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
20 ᾤετο εἶναι τὴν γεγενημένην ὁμιλίαν. Πύθων δὲ
καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Αἴνιοι Κότυν διέφθειραν τῷ πατρὶ τιμωροῦντες,
Ἀδάμας δ' ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι
παῖς ὢν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς ὑβρισμένος. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ
εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκισθῆναι πληγαῖς ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν διέφθειραν,
25 οἱ δ' ἐνεχείρησαν ὡς ὑβρισθέντες, καὶ τῶν περὶ
τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ βασιλικὰς δυναστείας. οἷον ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ
τοὺς Πενθιλίδας Μεγακλῆς περιιόντας καὶ τύπτοντας ταῖς
κορύναις ἐπιθέμενος μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀνεῖλεν, καὶ ὕστερον
Σμέρδης Πενθίλον πληγὰς λαβὼν καὶ παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς
30 ἐξελκυσθεὶς διέφθειρεν. καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ' ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος
ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος·
αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ὅτι αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι
Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν εἰπόντος
τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσωδίαν τοῦ στόματος. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ
35 διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἱ μὲν ἀνῃρέθησαν οἱ δ' ἐπεβουλεύθησαν.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ φόβον· ἓν γάρ τι τοῦτο τῶν αἰτίων
ἦν, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας· οἷον
Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δαρεῖον,
ὅτι ἐκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσαντος Ξέρξου, ἀλλ' οἰόμενος
40 συγγνώσεσθαι ὡς ἀμνημονοῦντα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν. αἱ δὲ διὰ
Philip, too, was attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. 5Evagoras of Cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult; for his wife had been carried off by Evagoras's son. Many conspiracies have originated in shameful attempts made by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. Such was the attack of Crataeas upon Archelaus; he had always hated the connection with him, and so, when Archelaus, having promised him 10one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to the king of Elymeia, when he was hard pressed in a war against Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus, and the younger to his own son Amyntas, under the idea that Amyntas would then be less likely to quarrel 15with his son by Cleopatra- Crataeas made this slight a pretext for attacking Archelaus, though even a less reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the estrangement was the disgust which he felt at his connection with the king. And from a like motive Hellonocrates of Larissa conspired with him; for when Archelaus, who was his lover, did not fulfill his promise of restoring him to his country, 20he thought that the connection between them had originated, not in affection, but in the wantonness of power. Pytho, too, and Heracleides of Aenos, slew Cotys in order to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him when a child.
Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed 25or attempted to kill officers of state and royal princes by whom they have been injured. Thus, at Mytilene, Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the Penthilidae, as they were going about and striking people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who had been beaten and 30torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew him. In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack; he was enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged; for the poet had been irritated at some remark made by Decamnichus on the foulness of his breath. Many other examples might be cited 35of murders and conspiracies which have arisen from similar causes.
Fear is another motive which, as we have said, has caused conspiracies as well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government. 1Thus Artapanes conspired against Xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would be accused of hanging Darius against his orders-he having been under the impression that 40Xerxes would forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that the offense would be forgiven.
Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed 25or attempted to kill officers of state and royal princes by whom they have been injured. Thus, at Mytilene, Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the Penthilidae, as they were going about and striking people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who had been beaten and 30torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew him. In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack; he was enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged; for the poet had been irritated at some remark made by Decamnichus on the foulness of his breath. Many other examples might be cited 35of murders and conspiracies which have arisen from similar causes.
Fear is another motive which, as we have said, has caused conspiracies as well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government. 1Thus Artapanes conspired against Xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would be accused of hanging Darius against his orders-he having been under the impression that 40Xerxes would forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that the offense would be forgiven.
1312a
1 καταφρόνησιν, ὥσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλον ἰδών τις ξαίνοντα
μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν (εἰ ἀληθῆ ταῦτα οἱ μυθολογοῦντες
λέγουσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε ἂν γένοιτο
τοῦτο ἀληθές), καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ ὑστέρῳ Δίων ἐπέθετο διὰ τὸ
5 καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶν τούς τε πολίτας οὕτως ἔχοντας καὶ
αὐτὸν ἀεὶ μεθύοντα. καὶ τῶν φίλων δέ τινες ἐπιτίθενται
διὰ καταφρόνησιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν
ὡς λήσοντες. καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν τὴν
ἀρχὴν τρόπον τινὰ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ἐπιτίθενται· ὡς
10 δυνάμενοι γὰρ καὶ καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ κινδύνου διὰ τὴν δύναμιν
ἐπιχειροῦσι ῥᾳδίως, ὥσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς μονάρχοις,
οἷον Κῦρος Ἀστυάγει καὶ τοῦ βίου καταφρονῶν καὶ
τῆς δυνάμεως διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐξηργηκέναι αὐτὸν
δὲ τρυφᾶν, καὶ Σεύθης ὁ Θρᾷξ Ἀμαδόκῳ στρατηγὸς ὤν.
15 οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ πλείω τούτων ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον καὶ καταφρονοῦντες
καὶ διὰ κέρδος, ὥσπερ Ἀριοβαρζάνῃ Μιθριδάτης
(μάλιστα δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐγχειροῦσιν οἱ τὴν φύσιν
μὲν θρασεῖς, τιμὴν δ' ἔχοντες πολεμικὴν παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις·
ἀνδρεία γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἐστίν), δι' ἃς
20 ἀμφοτέρας, ὡς ῥᾳδίως κρατήσοντες, ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις.
τῶν δὲ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἕτερος τρόπος ἔστι τῆς
αἰτίας παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους πρότερον. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι
τοῖς τυράννοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν ὁρῶντες κέρδη τε μεγάλα καὶ
τιμὰς μεγάλας οὔσας αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν
25 ἐπιτιθεμένων ἕκαστος προαιρεῖται κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ'
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, οὗτοι δ' ὥσπερ κἂν
ἄλλης τινὸς γενομένης πράξεως περιττῆς καὶ δι' ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ
γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὕτω καὶ
τοῖς μονάρχοις ἐγχειροῦσιν, οὐ κτήσασθαι βουλόμενοι
30 μοναρχίαν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐλάχιστοί γε τὸν
ἀριθμόν εἰσιν οἱ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὁρμῶντες· ὑποκεῖσθαι
γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τοῦ σωθῆναι μηδὲν φροντίζειν, ἂν μὴ
μέλλῃ κατασχήσειν τὴν πρᾶξιν. οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν μὲν δεῖ
τὴν Δίωνος ὑπόληψιν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δ' αὐτὴν ἐγγενέσθαι πολλοῖς·
35 ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μετ' ὀλίγων ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Διονύσιον
οὕτως ἔχειν φάσκων ὡς, ὅποι περ ἂν δύνηται προελθεῖν,
ἱκανὸν αὑτῷ τοσοῦτον μετασχεῖν τῆς πράξεως, οἷον εἰ μικρὸν
ἐπιβάντα τῆς γῆς εὐθὺς συμβαίη τελευτῆσαι, τοῦτον
καλῶς ἔχειν αὑτῷ τὸν θάνατον. φθείρεται δὲ τυραννὶς ἕνα
40 μὲν τρόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη πολιτειῶν, ἔξωθεν,
Another motive is 1contempt, as in the case of Sardanapalus, whom some one saw carding wool with his women, if the storytellers say truly; and the tale may be true, if not of him, of some one else. Dion attacked the younger Dionysius because 5he despised him, and saw that he was equally despised by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk. Even the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt; for the confidence which he reposes in them breeds contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt; 10the assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing of the danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands. Thus generals of armies attack monarchs; as, for example, Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life, and believing that his power was worn out. Thus again, Seuthes the Thracian conspired against Amadocus, whose general he was.
15And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly out of contempt and partly from the love of gain.
Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success; for courage is emboldened by power, and the union of the 20two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory.
Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different way as well as in those already mentioned. 25There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of gains and honors however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous and honorable in the world; they wish to acquire, not 30a kingdom, but a name. It is rare, however, to find such men; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he fail. He must have the resolution of Dion, 35who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying 'that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed; such a death would be welcome to him.' this is a temper to which few can attain.
Once more, tyrannies, 40like all other governments, are destroyed from without by some opposite and more powerful form of government. That such a government will have the will to attack them is clear; for the two are opposed in principle; and all men, if they can, do what they will.
15And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly out of contempt and partly from the love of gain.
Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success; for courage is emboldened by power, and the union of the 20two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory.
Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different way as well as in those already mentioned. 25There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of gains and honors however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous and honorable in the world; they wish to acquire, not 30a kingdom, but a name. It is rare, however, to find such men; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he fail. He must have the resolution of Dion, 35who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying 'that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed; such a death would be welcome to him.' this is a temper to which few can attain.
Once more, tyrannies, 40like all other governments, are destroyed from without by some opposite and more powerful form of government. That such a government will have the will to attack them is clear; for the two are opposed in principle; and all men, if they can, do what they will.
1312b
1 ἐὰν ἐναντία τις ᾖ πολιτεία κρείττων (τὸ μὲν γὰρ
βούλεσθαι δῆλον ὡς ὑπάρξει διὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς
προαιρέσεως· ἃ δὲ βούλονται, δυνάμενοι πράττουσι πάντες),
ἐναντίαι δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος μὲν τυραννίδι καθ' Ἡσίοδον
5 ὡς κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία
τυραννίς ἐστιν), βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία διὰ
τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς πολιτείας (διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πλείστας
κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας καὶ Συρακούσιοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ὃν
ἐπολιτεύοντο καλῶς)· ἕνα δ' ἐξ αὑτῆς, ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες
10 στασιάζωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν
περὶ Διονύσιον, ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος Θρασυβούλου τοῦ Ἱέρωνος
ἀδελφοῦ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Γέλωνος δημαγωγοῦντος καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς
ὁρμῶντος, ἵν' αὐτὸς ἄρχῃ, τῶν δὲ οἰκείων συστάντων,
ἵνα μὴ τυραννὶς ὅλως καταλυθῇ ἀλλὰ Θρασύβουλος—οἱ
15 δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν, ὡς καιρὸν ἔχοντες, ἐξέβαλον ἅπαντας
αὐτούς· Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεστὴς ὢν καὶ
προσλαβὼν τὸν δῆμον, ἐκεῖνον ἐκβαλὼν διεφθάρη. δύο δὲ
οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' ἃς μάλιστ' ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσι, μίσους
καὶ καταφρονήσεως, θάτερον μὲν ἀεὶ τούτων ὑπάρχει
20 τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μῖσος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι πολλαὶ
γίνονται τῶν καταλύσεων. σημεῖον δέ· τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτησαμένων
οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ διεφύλαξαν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ δὲ
παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπολλύασι πάντες. ἀπολαυστικῶς
γὰρ ζῶντες εὐκαταφρόνητοί τε γίνονται καὶ
25 πολλοὺς καιροὺς παραδιδόασι τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. μόριον δέ
τι τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν δεῖ τιθέναι· τρόπον γάρ τινα
τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτία γίνεται πράξεων. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρακτικώτερον
τοῦ μίσους· συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται διὰ τὸ
μὴ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος (μάλιστα δὲ συμβαίνει
30 τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν διὰ τὴν ὕβριν, δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἥ τε
τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν κατελύθη τυραννὶς καὶ πολλαὶ τῶν
ἄλλων), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ μετὰ
λύπης πάρεστιν, ὥστε οὐ ῥᾴδιον λογίζεσθαι, ἡ δ' ἔχθρα ἄνευ
λύπης. ὡς δὲ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν, ὅσας αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν
35 τῆς τε ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας καὶ τῆς
δημοκρατίας τῆς ἐσχάτης, τοσαύτας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος
θετέον· καὶ γὰρ αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι διαιρεταὶ τυραννίδες.
βασιλεία δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἔξωθεν ἥκιστα φθείρεται,
διὸ καὶ πολυχρόνιός ἐστιν· ἐξ αὐτῆς δ' αἱ πλεῖσται φθοραὶ
40 συμβαίνουσιν. φθείρεται δὲ κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ἕνα μὲν
Democracy is antagonistic to tyranny, on the principle of Hesiod, 5'Potter hates Potter,' because they are nearly akin, for the extreme form of democracy is tyranny; and royalty and aristocracy are both alike opposed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type. And therefore the Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well governed.
Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, when the reigning family 10are divided among themselves, as that of Gelo was, and more recently that of Dionysius; in the case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, flattered the son of Gelo and led him into excesses in order that he might rule in his name. Whereupon the family got together a party to get rid of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny; but 15those of the people who conspired with them seized the opportunity and drove them all out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked and expelled him with the assistance of the people; he afterwards perished himself.
There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies- hatred and contempt. 20Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their power, but those who have inherited, have lost it, almost at once; for, living in luxurious ease, they have become contemptible, and 25offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is often times even more ready to strike- the angry are more impetuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational principle. 30And men are very apt to give way to their passions when they are insulted. To this cause is to be attributed the fall of the Peisistratidae and of many others. Hatred is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless.
In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned as destroying 35the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny; indeed the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed among several persons. Kingly rule is little affected by external causes, and is therefore lasting; it is generally destroyed from within. 1And there are two ways in which the destruction may come about; (1) when the members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer the state too much after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority contrary to the law.
Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, when the reigning family 10are divided among themselves, as that of Gelo was, and more recently that of Dionysius; in the case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, flattered the son of Gelo and led him into excesses in order that he might rule in his name. Whereupon the family got together a party to get rid of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny; but 15those of the people who conspired with them seized the opportunity and drove them all out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked and expelled him with the assistance of the people; he afterwards perished himself.
There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies- hatred and contempt. 20Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their power, but those who have inherited, have lost it, almost at once; for, living in luxurious ease, they have become contemptible, and 25offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is often times even more ready to strike- the angry are more impetuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational principle. 30And men are very apt to give way to their passions when they are insulted. To this cause is to be attributed the fall of the Peisistratidae and of many others. Hatred is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless.
In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned as destroying 35the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny; indeed the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed among several persons. Kingly rule is little affected by external causes, and is therefore lasting; it is generally destroyed from within. 1And there are two ways in which the destruction may come about; (1) when the members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer the state too much after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority contrary to the law.
1313a
1 στασιασάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας, ἄλλον δὲ
τρόπον τυραννικώτερον πειρωμένων διοικεῖν, ὅταν εἶναι κύριοι
πλειόνων ἀξιῶσι καὶ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. οὐ γίγνονται δ' ἔτι
βασιλεῖαι νῦν, ἀλλ' ἄν περ γίγνωνται, μοναρχίαι καὶ τυραννίδες
5 μᾶλλον, διὰ τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἑκούσιον μὲν ἀρχὴν
εἶναι, μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν, πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ
μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὥστε ἀπαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος
καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὥστε διὰ μὲν τοῦτο ἑκόντες
οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν· ἂν δὲ δι' ἀπάτης ἄρξῃ τις ἢ βίας,
10 ἤδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις
τιθέναι δεῖ τῆς φθορᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέναις
καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς εὐκαταφρονήτους, καὶ τὸ δύναμιν
μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικὴν ἀλλὰ βασιλικὴν τιμὴν
ὑβρίζειν· ῥᾳδία γὰρ ἐγίνετο ἡ κατάλυσις· μὴ βουλομένων
Royalties do not now come into existence; where such forms of government arise, they are rather monarchies or tyrannies. 5For the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects, and he is supreme in all important matters; but in our own day men are more upon an equality, and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office. Hence mankind will not, if they can help, endure it, and any one who obtains power by force or fraud 10is at once thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies a further cause of destruction is the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and, although possessing not tyrannical power, but only royal dignity, are apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then readily effected; for there is an end to the king when his 15subjects do not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts, whether they like him or not.
The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these and the like causes.
The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these and the like causes.
Book 5,Chapter 11 (1313a15–1315b10)
15 γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς, ἀλλὰ τύραννος καὶ μὴ
βουλομένων. φθείρονται μὲν οὖν αἱ μοναρχίαι διὰ ταύτας
καὶ τοιαύτας ἑτέρας αἰτίας.
Σῴζονται δὲ δηλονότι ὡς ἁπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τῶν
ἐναντίων, ὡς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῷ τὰς μὲν βασιλείας ἄγειν
20 ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλαττόνων ὦσι κύριοι,
πλείω χρόνον ἀναγκαῖον μένειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν· αὐτοί
τε γὰρ ἧττον γίγνονται δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἴσοι μᾶλλον,
καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων φθονοῦνται ἧττον. διὰ γὰρ
τοῦτο καὶ ἡ περὶ Μολοττοὺς πολὺν χρόνον βασιλεία διέμεινεν,
25 καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε εἰς δύο μέρη
διαιρεθῆναι τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ πάλιν Θεοπόμπου μετριάσαντος
τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν ἐπικαταστήσαντος·
τῆς γὰρ δυνάμεως ἀφελὼν ηὔξησε τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν
βασιλείαν, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ ἐποίησεν οὐκ ἐλάττον' ἀλλὰ
30 μείζον' αὐτήν. ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα ἀποκρίνασθαί
φασιν αὐτόν, εἰποῦσαν εἰ μηδὲν αἰσχύνεται τὴν βασιλείαν
ἐλάττω παραδιδοὺς τοῖς υἱέσιν ἢ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβεν·
"οὐ δῆτα" φάναι· "παραδίδωμι γὰρ πολυχρονιωτέραν."
αἱ δὲ τυραννίδες σῴζονται κατὰ δύο τρόπους τοὺς ἐναντιωτάτους,
35 ὧν ἅτερός ἐστιν ὁ παραδεδομένος καὶ καθ' ὃν διοικοῦσιν
οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων τὴν ἀρχήν. τούτων δὲ τὰ
πολλά φασι καταστῆσαι Περίανδρον τὸν Κορίνθιον· πολλὰ
δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς Περσῶν ἀρχῆς ἔστι τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν.
ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάλαι λεχθέντα πρὸς σωτηρίαν, ὡς οἷόν τε,
40 τῆς τυραννίδος, τὸ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας κολούειν καὶ τοὺς φρονηματίας
ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ μήτε συσσίτια ἐᾶν μήτε ἑταιρίαν
And they are preserved, to speak generally, by the opposite causes; or, if we consider them separately, (1) royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers. 20The more restricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired; for then they are more moderate and not so despotic in their ways; and they are less envied by their subjects. This is the reason why the kingly office has lasted so long among the Molossians. 25And for a similar reason it has continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards further limited by Theopompus in various respects, more particularly by the establishment of the Ephoralty. He diminished the power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain sense not less, but greater. 30There is a story that when his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons a royal power which was less than he had inherited from his father, 'No indeed,' he replied, 'for the power which I leave to them will be more lasting.'
As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite ways. 35One of them is the old traditional method in which most tyrants administer their government. 1Of such arts Periander of Corinth is said to have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the Persians in the administration of their government.
As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite ways. 35One of them is the old traditional method in which most tyrants administer their government. 1Of such arts Periander of Corinth is said to have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the Persians in the administration of their government.
1313b
1 μήτε παιδείαν μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ πάντα
φυλάττειν ὅθεν εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι δύο, φρόνημά τε καὶ πίστις,
καὶ μήτε σχολὰς μήτε ἄλλους συλλόγους ἐπιτρέπειν γίγνεσθαι
σχολαστικούς, καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὅτι μάλιστα
5 ἀγνῶτες ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται πάντες (ἡ γὰρ γνῶσις πίστιν
ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους)· καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας αἰεὶ
φανεροὺς εἶναι καὶ διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
ἥκιστα λανθάνοιεν τί πράττουσι, καὶ φρονεῖν ἂν ἐθίζοιντο
μικρὸν αἰεὶ δουλεύοντες)· καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα Περσικὰ
10 καὶ βάρβαρα τυραννικά ἐστιν (πάντα γὰρ ταὐτὸν δύναται)·
καὶ τὸ μὴ λανθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι ὅσα τυγχάνει τις λέγων
ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλ' εἶναι κατασκόπους, οἷον
περὶ Συρακούσας αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι, καὶ οὓς
ὠτακουστὰς ἐξέπεμπεν Ἱέρων, ὅπου τις εἴη συνουσία καὶ σύλλογος
15 (παρρησιάζονταί τε γὰρ ἧττον, φοβούμενοι τοὺς τοιούτους,
κἂν παρρησιάζωνται, λανθάνουσιν ἧττον)· καὶ τὸ διαβάλλειν
ἀλλήλοις καὶ συγκρούειν καὶ φίλους φίλοις καὶ
τὸν δῆμον τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ τὸ
πένητας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους τυραννικόν, ὅπως ἥ τε φυλακὴ
20 τρέφηται καὶ πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες ἄσχολοι
ὦσιν ἐπιβουλεύειν. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου αἵ τε πυραμίδες
αἱ περὶ Αἴγυπτον καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελιδῶν
καὶ τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου ἡ οἰκοδόμησις ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν,
καὶ τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργων τὰ Πολυκράτεια (πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα
25 δύναται ταὐτόν, ἀσχολίαν καὶ πενίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων)· καὶ
ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν, οἷον ἐν Συρακούσαις (ἐν πέντε γὰρ
ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινεν).
ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποιὸς ὁ τύραννος, ὅπως δὴ ἄσχολοί
τε ὦσι καὶ ἡγεμόνος ἐν χρείᾳ διατελῶσιν ὄντες. καὶ ἡ
30 μὲν βασιλεία σῴζεται διὰ τῶν φίλων, τυραννικὸν δὲ τὸ
μάλιστ' ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς φίλοις, ὡς βουλομένων μὲν πάντων,
δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων. καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν
δὲ γιγνόμενα τὴν τελευταίαν τυραννικὰ πάντα, γυναικοκρατία
τε περὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλωσι κατὰ τῶν
35 ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων ἄνεσις διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· οὔτε γὰρ
ἐπιβουλεύουσιν οἱ δοῦλοι καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς τυράννοις,
εὐημεροῦντάς τε ἀναγκαῖον εὔνους εἶναι καὶ ταῖς τυραννίσι
καὶ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἶναι βούλεται
μόναρχος. διὸ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἔντιμος, παρὰ
40 μὲν τοῖς δήμοις ὁ δημαγωγός (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ δημαγωγὸς τοῦ
δήμου κόλαξ), παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τυράννοις οἱ ταπεινῶς ὁμιλοῦντες,
There are firstly the prescriptions mentioned some distance back, for the preservation of a tyranny, in so far as this is possible; viz., that the tyrant should lop off those who are too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must not allow common meals, clubs, 1education, and the like; he must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people 5from knowing one another (for acquaintance begets mutual confidence). Further, he must compel all persons staying in the city to appear in public and live at his gates; then he will know what they are doing: if they are always kept under, they will learn to be humble. In short, he should practice these and the like Persian 10and barbaric arts, which all have the same object. A tyrant should also endeavor to know what each of his subjects says or does, and should employ spies, like the 'female detectives' at Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers whom Hiero was in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting; 15for the fear of informers prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do, they are more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is to sow quarrels among the citizens; friends should be embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his subjects; he thus provides against 20the maintenance of a guard by the citizen and the people, having to keep hard at work, are prevented from conspiring. The Pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy; also the offerings of the family of Cypselus, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean monuments at Samos; all these works 25were alike intended to occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring into the treasury their whole property. 30The tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may have something to do and be always in want of a leader.
1314a
1 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον κολακείας. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο πονηρόφιλον
ἡ τυραννίς· κολακευόμενοι γὰρ χαίρουσιν, τοῦτο δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἷς
ποιήσειε φρόνημα ἔχων ἐλεύθερον, ἀλλὰ φιλοῦσιν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς,
ἢ οὐ κολακεύουσιν. καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πονηρά·
5 ἥλῳ γὰρ ὁ ἧλος, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία. καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ
χαίρειν σεμνῷ μηδ' ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννικόν (αὑτὸν γὰρ
εἶναι μόνον ἀξιοῖ τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος, ὁ δ' ἀντισεμνυνόμενος
καὶ ἐλευθεριάζων ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν
τῆς τυραννίδος· μισοῦσιν οὖν ὥσπερ καταλύοντας τὴν
10 ἀρχήν)· καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι συσσίτοις καὶ συνημερευταῖς ξενικοῖς
μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικοῖς τυραννικόν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους
τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἀντιποιουμένους—ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ
μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς, οὐθὲν δ' ἐλλείπει
μοχθηρίας. ἔστι δ' ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντα ταῦτα περιειλημμένα
15 τρισὶν εἴδεσιν. στοχάζεται γὰρ ἡ τυραννὶς τριῶν, ἑνὸς μὲν
τοῦ μικρὰ φρονεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους (οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἂν μικρόψυχος
ἐπιβουλεύσειεν), δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστεῖν ἀλλήλοις (οὐ
καταλύεται γὰρ πρότερον τυραννὶς πρὶν ἢ πιστεύσωσί τινες
ἑαυτοῖς· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι πολεμοῦσιν ὡς βλαβεροῖς
20 πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι δεσποτικῶς,
ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πιστοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις εἶναι καὶ μὴ καταγορεύειν μήτε ἑαυτῶν μήτε τῶν
ἄλλων)· τρίτον δ' ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων (οὐθεὶς γὰρ
ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις, ὥστε οὐδὲ τυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ
25 δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης). εἰς οὓς μὲν οὖν ὅρους ἀνάγεται τὰ
βουλεύματα τῶν τυράννων, οὗτοι τρεῖς τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες·
πάντα γὰρ ἀναγάγοι τις ἂν τὰ τυραννικὰ πρὸς ταύτας
τὰς ὑποθέσεις, τὰ μὲν ὅπως μὴ πιστεύωσιν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ
δ' ὅπως μὴ δύνωνται, τὰ δ' ὅπως μικρὸν φρονῶσιν. ὁ μὲν
30 οὖν εἷς τρόπος δι' οὗ γίγνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι τοιοῦτός
ἐστιν· ὁ δ' ἕτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις
τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἔστι δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς
τῶν βασιλειῶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς βασιλείας εἷς τρόπος τῆς
φθορᾶς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τυραννικωτέραν, οὕτω τῆς τυραννίδος
35 σωτηρία τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικωτέραν, ἓν φυλάττοντα
μόνον, τὴν δύναμιν, ὅπως ἄρχῃ μὴ μόνον βουλομένων
ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. προϊέμενος γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο
προΐεται καὶ τὸ τυραννεῖν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπόθεσιν
δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν
40 ὑποκρινόμενον τὸν βασιλικὸν καλῶς, πρῶτον μὲν δοκεῖν
And whereas the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power.
Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power given to women in their families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters; for slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. For the people too would fain be a monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant, the flatterer is held in honor; in democracies he is the demagogue; and the tyrant also has those who associate with him in a humble spirit, 1which is a work of flattery.
Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a freeman in him will lower himself by flattery; good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter them. Moreover, the bad are useful for bad purposes; 5'nail knocks out nail,' as the proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or independence; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his 10power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table; for the one are enemies, but the Others enter into no rivalry with him.
Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves his power; there is no wickedness too great for him. 20All that we have said may be summed up 15under three heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant.
Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power given to women in their families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters; for slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. For the people too would fain be a monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant, the flatterer is held in honor; in democracies he is the demagogue; and the tyrant also has those who associate with him in a humble spirit, 1which is a work of flattery.
Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a freeman in him will lower himself by flattery; good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter them. Moreover, the bad are useful for bad purposes; 5'nail knocks out nail,' as the proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or independence; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his 10power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table; for the one are enemies, but the Others enter into no rivalry with him.
Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves his power; there is no wickedness too great for him. 20All that we have said may be summed up 15under three heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant.
1314b
1 φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν, μήτε δαπανῶντα <εἰς> δωρεὰς τοιαύτας
ἐφ' αἷς τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅταν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὲν
λαμβάνωσιν ἐργαζομένων καὶ πονούντων γλίσχρως, διδῶσι
δ' ἑταίραις καὶ ξένοις καὶ τεχνίταις ἀφθόνως, λόγον τε
5 ἀποδιδόντα τῶν λαμβανομένων καὶ δαπανωμένων, ὅπερ
ἤδη πεποιήκασί τινες τῶν τυράννων (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις διοικῶν
οἰκονόμος ἀλλ' οὐ τύραννος εἶναι δόξειεν· οὐ δεῖ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι
μή ποτε ἀπορήσῃ χρημάτων κύριος ὢν τῆς πόλεως·
ἀλλὰ τοῖς γ' ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας
10 καὶ συμφέρει τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἢ καταλιπεῖν ἀθροίσαντας·
ἧττον γὰρ ἂν οἱ φυλάττοντες ἐπιτιθεῖντο τοῖς πράγμασιν,
εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερώτεροι τῶν τυράννων τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσιν οἱ
φυλάττοντες τῶν πολιτῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συναποδημοῦσιν, οἱ
δὲ ὑπομένουσιν)· ἔπειτα τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας
15 δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τῆς τε οἰκονομίας ἕνεκα συνάγοντα, κἄν
ποτε δεηθῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς καιρούς, ὅλως τε
αὑτὸν παρασκευάζειν φύλακα καὶ ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ
μὴ ὡς ἰδίων· καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν,
ἔτι δὲ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας
20 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἰδεῖσθαι· τούτου μέντοι τυγχάνειν οὐ ῥᾴδιον
ὄντα εὐκαταφρόνητον, διὸ δεῖ κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν
ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆται, ἀλλὰ τῆς πολεμικῆς, καὶ δόξαν ἐμποιεῖν
περὶ αὑτοῦ τοιαύτην· ἔτι δὲ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι
μηδένα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑβρίζοντα, μήτε νέον μήτε
25 νέαν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν περὶ αὐτόν, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν γυναῖκας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ὡς
καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὕβρεις πολλαὶ τυραννίδες ἀπολώλασιν·
περί τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς τοὐναντίον ποιεῖν
ἢ νῦν τινες τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον εὐθὺς
30 ἕωθεν τοῦτο δρῶσιν, καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἀλλὰ
καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἵν'
ὡς εὐδαίμονας καὶ μακαρίους θαυμάσωσιν), ἀλλὰ μάλιστα
μὲν μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε φαίνεσθαι
τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν (οὔτε γὰρ εὐεπίθετος οὔτ' εὐκαταφρόνητος
35 ὁ νήφων, ἀλλ' ὁ μεθύων, οὐδ' ὁ ἄγρυπνος, ἀλλ'
ὁ καθεύδων)· τοὐναντίον τε ποιητέον τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων
σχεδὸν πάντων (κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεῖ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν
πόλιν ὡς ἐπίτροπον ὄντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον)· ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς
τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως (ἧττόν τε
40 γὰρ φοβοῦνται τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων,
These are, (1) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody; (2) the creation of mistrust among them; for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to have confidence in one another; and this is the reason why tyrants are at war with the good; they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they would not be ruled despotically but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other men; (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred: (1) he sows distrust among his subjects; (2) he takes away their power; (3) he humbles them.
This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite principle of action. The nature of this latter method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like the rule of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful; he must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the character of a king. In the first place he should pretend 1a care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making presents of a sort at which the common people get excited when they see their hard-won earnings snatched from them and lavished on courtesans and strangers and artists. 5He should give an account of what he receives and of what he spends (a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants); for then he will seem to be a steward of the public rather than a tyrant; nor need he fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he will ever be in want of money. 15Such a policy is at all events 10much more advantageous for the tyrant when he goes from home, than to leave behind him a hoard, for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the one accompany him, but the others remain behind.
This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite principle of action. The nature of this latter method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like the rule of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful; he must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the character of a king. In the first place he should pretend 1a care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making presents of a sort at which the common people get excited when they see their hard-won earnings snatched from them and lavished on courtesans and strangers and artists. 5He should give an account of what he receives and of what he spends (a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants); for then he will seem to be a steward of the public rather than a tyrant; nor need he fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he will ever be in want of money. 15Such a policy is at all events 10much more advantageous for the tyrant when he goes from home, than to leave behind him a hoard, for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the one accompany him, but the others remain behind.
1315a
1 ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν
τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον ὡς συμμάχους
ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεούς), δεῖ δὲ ἄνευ ἀβελτερίας φαίνεσθαι
τοιοῦτον· τούς τε ἀγαθοὺς περί τι γιγνομένους τιμᾶν οὕτως
5 ὥστε μὴ νομίζειν ἄν ποτε τιμηθῆναι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν
αὐτονόμων ὄντων, καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς ἀπονέμειν
αὐτόν, τὰς δὲ κολάσεις δι' ἑτέρων ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων.
κοινὴ δὲ φυλακὴ πάσης μοναρχίας τὸ μηθένα
ποιεῖν ἕνα μέγαν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, πλείους (τηρήσουσι γὰρ ἀλλήλους),
10 ἐὰν δ' ἄρα τινὰ δέῃ ποιῆσαι μέγαν, μή τοι τό γε
ἦθος θρασύν (ἐπιθετικώτατον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦθος περὶ
πάσας τὰς πράξεις), κἂν τῆς δυνάμεώς τινα δοκῇ παραλύειν,
ἐκ προσαγωγῆς τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ μὴ πᾶσαν ἀθρόον
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἔτι δὲ πάσης μὲν ὕβρεως εἴργεσθαι,
15 παρὰ πάσας δὲ δυεῖν, τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα [κολάσεως]
καὶ τῆς εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν. μάλιστα δὲ ταύτην ποιητέον
τὴν εὐλάβειαν περὶ τοὺς φιλοτίμους· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἰς
τὰ χρήματα ὀλιγωρίαν οἱ φιλοχρήματοι φέρουσι βαρέως,
τὴν δ' [εἰς] ἀτιμίαν οἵ τε φιλότιμοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν
20 ἀνθρώπων. διόπερ ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι δεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ τὰς
μὲν κολάσεις πατρικῶς φαίνεσθαι ποιούμενον καὶ μὴ δι'
ὀλιγωρίαν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ὁμιλίας δι' ἐρωτικὰς
αἰτίας ἀλλὰ μὴ δι' ἐξουσίαν, ὅλως δὲ τὰς δοκούσας ἀτιμίας
ἐξωνεῖσθαι μείζοσι τιμαῖς. τῶν δ' ἐπιχειρούντων ἐπὶ
25 τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθορὰν οὗτοι φοβερώτατοι καὶ δέονται
πλείστης φυλακῆς ὅσοι μὴ προαιροῦνται περιποιεῖσθαι τὸ
ζῆν διαφθείραντες. διὸ μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς ὑβρίζεσθαι
νομίζοντας ἢ αὑτοὺς ἢ ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν·
ἀφειδῶς γὰρ ἑαυτῶν ἔχουσιν οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ἐπιχειροῦντες,
30 καθάπερ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος εἶπε, χαλεπὸν φάσκων εἶναι
θυμῷ μάχεσθαι, ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πόλεις
ἐκ δύο συνεστήκασι μορίων, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀπόρων ἀνθρώπων
καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ὑπολαμβάνειν
δεῖ σῴζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων
35 ἀδικεῖσθαι μηδέν, ὁπότεροι δ' ἂν ὦσι κρείττους, τούτους
ἰδίους μάλιστα ποιεῖσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὡς, ἂν ὑπάρξῃ τοῦτο
τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὔτε δούλων ἐλευθέρωσιν ἀνάγκη ποιεῖσθαι
τὸν τύραννον οὔτε ὅπλων παραίρεσιν· ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον
μέρος πρὸς τῇ δυνάμει προστιθέμενον ὥστε κρείττους εἶναι
40 τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων. περίεργον δὲ τὸ λέγειν καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν
τοιούτων· ὁ γὰρ σκοπὸς φανερός, ὅτι δεῖ μὴ τυραννικὸν
In the second place, he should be seen to collect taxes and to require public services only for state purposes, and that he may form a fund in case of war, and generally he ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to him, but to the public. He should appear, not harsh, but dignified, and when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence, and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a great soldier, and produce the impression that he is one. Neither he nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least offense against modesty towards the young of either sex who are his subjects, and the women of his family should observe a like self-control towards other women; the insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies. In the indulgence of pleasures he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not only begin at dawn and pass whole days in sensuality, but want other men to see them, that they may admire their happy and blessed lot. In these things a tyrant should if possible be moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices to the world; for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised and attacked; not so he who is temperate and wide awake. His conduct should be the very reverse of nearly everything which has been said before about tyrants. He ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the Gods; for 1if men think that a ruler is religious and has a reverence for the Gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very Gods fighting on his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought foolish. 10And he should honor men 15of merit, and 5make them 20think that they would 25not be held in more 30honor by the citizens if 35they had a free 40government.
1315b
1 ἀλλ' οἰκονόμον καὶ βασιλικὸν εἶναι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις
καὶ μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ' ἐπίτροπον, καὶ τὰς μετριότητας
τοῦ βίου διώκειν, μὴ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν
γνωρίμους καθομιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δημαγωγεῖν. ἐκ γὰρ
5 τούτων ἀναγκαῖον οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω καὶ
ζηλωτοτέραν τῷ βελτιόνων ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ τεταπεινωμένων
μηδὲ μισούμενον καὶ φοβούμενον διατελεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρονιωτέραν, ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν διακεῖσθαι
κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἤτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα,
10 καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ' ἡμιπόνηρον.
1The honor he should distribute himself, but the 5punishment should be inflicted by officers and courts of law. 10It is a precaution which is taken by all monarchs not to 15make one person great; but if one, then two or more should 20be raised, that they may look sharply after one another. If 25after all some one has to be made great, he should not be a 30man of bold spirit; for such dispositions are ever most 35inclined to strike. And if any one is to be deprived of his power, 40let it b
Book 5,Chapter 12 (1315b11–1316b27)
Καίτοι πασῶν ὀλιγοχρονιώταται τῶν πολιτειῶν εἰσιν
ὀλιγαρχία καὶ τυραννίς. πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον ἡ
περὶ Σικυῶνα τυραννίς, ἡ τῶν Ὀρθαγόρου παίδων καὶ αὐτοῦ
Ὀρθαγόρου· ἔτη δ' αὕτη διέμεινεν ἑκατόν. τούτου δ' αἴτιον
15 ὅτι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐχρῶντο μετρίως καὶ πολλὰ τοῖς νόμοις
ἐδούλευον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πολεμικὸς γενέσθαι Κλεισθένης
οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις
ἐδημαγώγουν. λέγεται γοῦν Κλεισθένης τὸν ἀποκρίναντα
τῆς νίκης αὐτὸν ὡς ἐστεφάνωσεν· ἔνιοι δ' εἰκόνα φασὶν
20 εἶναι τοῦ κρίναντος οὕτως τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ
καθήμενον. φασὶ δὲ καὶ Πεισίστρατον ὑπομεῖναί ποτε προςκληθέντα
δίκην εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον. δευτέρα δὲ περὶ Κόρινθον
ἡ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη διετέλεσεν ἔτη τρία
καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ἓξ μῆνας· Κύψελος μὲν γὰρ ἐτυράννησεν
25 ἔτη τριάκοντα, Περίανδρος δὲ τετταράκοντα καὶ
ἥμισυ, Ψαμμίτιχος δ' ὁ Γόργου τρία ἔτη. τὰ δ' αἴτια
ταὐτὰ καὶ ταύτης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος δημαγωγὸς ἦν
καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν διετέλεσεν ἀδορυφόρητος, Περίανδρος
δ' ἐγένετο μὲν τυραννικός, ἀλλὰ πολεμικός. τρίτη δ' ἡ
30 τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν Ἀθήνησιν. οὐκ ἐγένετο δὲ συνεχής· δὶς
γὰρ ἔφυγε Πεισίστρατος τυραννῶν· ὥστ' ἐν ἔτεσι τριάκοντα
καὶ τρισὶν ἑπτακαίδεκα ἔτη τούτων ἐτυράννησεν, ὀκτωκαίδεκα
δὲ οἱ παῖδες, ὥστε τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο ἔτη τριάκοντα
καὶ πέντε. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἡ περὶ Ἱέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα περὶ
35 Συρακούσας. ἔτη δ' οὐδ' αὕτη πολλὰ διέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ
σύμπαντα δυεῖν δέοντα εἴκοσι· Γέλων μὲν γὰρ ἑπτὰ τυραννήσας
τῷ ὀγδόῳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν, δέκα δ' Ἱέρων,
Θρασύβουλος δὲ τῷ ἑνδεκάτῳ μηνὶ ἐξέπεσεν. αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ
τῶν τυραννίδων ὀλιγοχρόνιαι πᾶσαι γεγόνασι παντελῶς.
40 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας,
ἐξ ὧν τε φθείρονται καὶ πάλιν σῴζονται, σχεδὸν
1316a
1 εἴρηται περὶ πάντων. ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ
τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς.
τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὔσης οὐ
λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἰδίως. φησὶ γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ μὴ
5 μένειν μηθὲν ἀλλ' ἔν τινι περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴν δ'
εἶναι τούτων "ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο
ἁρμονίας παρέχεται", λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος
ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός, ὡς τῆς φύσεώς ποτε φυούσης
φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ
10 λέγων ἴσως οὐ κακῶς (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἶναί τινας οὓς παιδευθῆναι
καὶ γενέσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνδρας ἀδύνατον), ἀλλ'
αὕτη τί ἂν ἴδιος εἴη μεταβολὴ τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνου λεγομένης
ἀρίστης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν καὶ τῶν
γιγνομένων πάντων; καὶ διά γε τὸν χρόνον, δι' ὃν λέγει
15 πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἅμα ἀρξάμενα γίγνεσθαι
ἅμα μεταβάλλει, οἷον εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς
τροπῆς, ἅμα ἄρα μεταβάλλει; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν
ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει; πλεονάκις γὰρ
εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν μεταβάλλουσι πᾶσαι αἱ πολιτεῖαι ἢ τὴν
20 σύνεγγυς. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταβολῶν.
ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Λακωνικῆς, φησί, μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν
ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ
ἐκ δημοκρατίας. καίτοι καὶ ἀνάπαλιν μεταβάλλουσιν, οἷον
ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς μοναρχίαν.
25 ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὔτ' εἰ ἔσται μεταβολὴ οὔτ',
εἰ [μὴ] ἔσται, διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν καὶ εἰς ποίαν πολιτείαν, τούτου
δ' αἴτιον ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἶχε λέγειν· ἀόριστον γάρ,
ἐπεὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνον δεῖ εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην· οὕτω
γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο συνεχὲς καὶ κύκλος. ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ
30 εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὥσπερ ἡ Σικυῶνος ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος
εἰς τὴν Κλεισθένους, καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Χαλκίδι
ἡ Ἀντιλέοντος, καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν
Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ
Χαρίλλου ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ <ἡ> ἐν Καρχηδόνι. καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα
35 μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ
σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν
Παναιτίου τυραννίδα καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου καὶ ἐν
Ῥηγίῳ εἰς τὴν Ἀναξιλάου καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν
ὡσαύτως. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν διὰ
40 τοῦτο μεταβάλλειν ὅτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματισταὶ οἱ
1316b
1 ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι οἱ πολὺ ὑπερέχοντες ταῖς
οὐσίαις οὐ δίκαιον οἴονται εἶναι ἴσον μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως
τοὺς κεκτημένους μηθὲν τοῖς κεκτημένοις· ἐν πολλαῖς τε
ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐκ ἔξεστι χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶν οἱ
5 κωλύοντες, ἐν Καρχηδόνι δὲ δημοκρατουμένῃ χρηματίζονται
καὶ οὔπω μεταβεβλήκασιν. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι
δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων.
τί γὰρ αὕτη μᾶλλον τῆς Λακωνικῆς πέπονθεν ἢ ὁποιασοῦν
ἄλλης, οὗ μὴ πάντες κέκτηνται ἴσα ἢ μὴ πάντες ὁμοίως
10 εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες; οὐδενὸς δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου ἢ πρότερον
οὐδὲν ἧττον μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς δῆμον ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἂν
γένωνται πλείους οἱ ἄποροι, καὶ ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν,
ἐὰν κρεῖττον ᾖ τοῦ πλήθους τὸ εὔπορον καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμελῶσιν
οἱ δὲ προσέχωσι τὸν νοῦν. πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι'
15 ὧν γίγνονται αἱ μεταβολαί, οὐ λέγει ἀλλ' <ἢ> μίαν, ὅτι ἀσωτευόμενοι
<καὶ> κατατοκιζόμενοι γίγνονται πένητες, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
πλουσίων ὄντων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος·
ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολέσωσι τὰς
οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐθὲν γίγνεται
20 δεινόν, καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν οὐθὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τότε εἰς δῆμον
ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κἂν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν,
κἂν ἀδικῶνται ἢ ὑβρίζωνται, στασιάζουσι καὶ μεταβάλλουσι
τὰς πολιτείας, κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι τὴν οὐσίαν, διὰ τὸ
ἐξεῖναι ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν· οὗ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἐλευθερίαν
25 εἶναί φησιν. πλειόνων δ' οὐσῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ δημοκρατιῶν,
ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης ἑκατέρας λέγει τὰς μεταβολὰς
ὁ Σωκράτης.