Ross (OCT, 1957) · Jowett (1885)
Jowett (1885)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 2,Chapter 1 (1260b27–1261a9)
1260b
Ἐπεὶ δὲ προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς
πολιτικῆς, τίς κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι μάλιστα
κατ' εὐχήν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολιτείας,
30 αἷς τε χρῶνταί τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομεῖσθαι
λεγομένων, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημέναι
καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τό τ' ὀρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῇ
καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἕτερον μὴ
δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ
35 καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην
δοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον. ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον
ἥπερ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη
γὰρ ἤτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός,
ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μή. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς κοινωνεῖν φανερὸν
40 ὡς ἀδύνατον (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τίς ἐστι, καὶ
πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἷς ὁ τῆς
27Our urpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, 30both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry because 35all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.
We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. 40Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in common and some not.
We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. 40Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in common and some not.
1261a
1 μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολῖται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως)·
ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνῆσαι, πάντων βέλτιον
κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν
μὲν τινῶν δ' οὒ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν
5 καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις, ὥςπερ
ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης
φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι καὶ τὰς
κτήσεις. τοῦτο δὴ πότερον ὡς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχειν, ἢ κατὰ
τὸν ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νόμον;
That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the constitution is a community, and must at any rate have a common place- 1one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that one city. But should a well ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children 5and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato. Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society.
Book 2,Chapter 2 (1261a10–1261b15)
10 Ἔχει δὴ δυσχερείας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς
γυναῖκας κοινάς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι τὸν
τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.
ἔτι δὲ πρός, τὸ τέλος ὅ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς μὲν
εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διώρισται.
15 λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἄριστον ὂν ὅτι μάλιστα
πᾶσαν· λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην <τὴν> ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης. καίτοι
φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϊοῦσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις
ἔσται· πλῆθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, γινομένη τε
μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως ἄνθρωπος δ' ἐξ οἰκίας
20 ἔσται· μᾶλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίημεν ἄν,
καὶ τὸν ἕνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὥστ' εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο
δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον· ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ
πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων.
οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμμαχία
25 καὶ πόλις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἂν ᾖ
τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἴδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν),
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλεῖον ἑλκύσειε (διοίσει δὲ τῷ
τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὦσι κεχωρισμένοι
τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες)· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἓν
30 γενέσθαι, εἴδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς
σῴζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον·
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἴσοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι· ἅμα
γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ
κατά τινα ἄλλην τάξιν [ἢ] χρόνου. καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν
35 τρόπον τοῦτον ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον
οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ σκυτοτόμοι
καὶ τέκτονες ἦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ
τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικήν, δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βέλτιον
ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν, ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν διὰ τὸ τὴν
There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the principle on which Socrates rests the 10necessity of such an institution evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated. 15I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state the better.' Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state? since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; 20for the family may be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance 25The usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less (in like manner, a state differs from a nation, when the nation has not its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian sort of life); but the elements out of which a unity is 30to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have already remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they cannot an rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that 35upon this plan they all govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters.
1261b
1 φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν
εἴτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν. πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτό γε
μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἴκειν τό θ' ὁμοίους εἶναι
ἔξω ἀρχῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ' ἄρχονται κατὰ μέρος
5 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων
ἕτεροι ἑτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὡς
οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες,
καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς
πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ· καίτοι τό γε ἑκάστου ἀγαθὸν σῴζει ἕκαστον.
10 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἑνοῦν ζητεῖν
τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστερον
ἑνός, πόλις δ' οἰκίας, καὶ βούλεταί γ' ἤδη τότε εἶναι πόλις
ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους·
εἴπερ οὖν αἱρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἓν τοῦ
15 μᾶλλον αἱρετώτερον.
And since it is better that this should be so in politics as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the same persons in power where this is possible, yet where this is not possible by reason of the 1natural equality of the citizens, and at the same time it is just that an should share in the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad), an approximation to this is that equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart from official position, be treated alike. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, 5as if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner when they hold office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them. 10Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is 15more desirable than the greater.
Book 2,Chapter 3 (1261b16–1262a24)
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτο ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστ'
εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται
κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ
μὴ ἐμόν· τοῦτο γὰρ οἴεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν
20 πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν
ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης
(ἕκαστος γὰρ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυναῖκα
δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου
δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὡσαύτως)· νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτως φήσουσιν οἱ
25 κοιναῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάντες
μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν
πάντες μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν παραλογισμός
τίς ἐστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν (τὸ γὰρ πάντες
καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, διὰ τὸ διττὸν καὶ
30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοὺς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διό ἐστι τὸ πάντας
τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδὶ μὲν καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὡδὶ
δ' οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν)· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἑτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ
λεγόμενον. ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων
κοινόν· τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν
35 ἧττον, ἢ ὅσον ἑκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει· πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς
ἑτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκετικαῖς
διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χεῖρον ὑπηρετοῦσι
τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δ' ἑκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν
υἱοί, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὡς ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχὼν
40 ὁμοίως ἐστὶν υἱός· ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλιγωρήσουσιν.
But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow from the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time,' which, according to Socrates, is the sign of perfect unity 20in a state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own son and the same person his wife, and so of his property and of all that falls to his lot. This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who had their 25had their wives and children in common; they would say 'all' but not 'each.' In like manner their property would be described as belonging to them, not severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in the term 'all': like some other words, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and even 30in abstract argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another objection to the proposal. For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, 35hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody 40will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike.
1262a
1 ἔτι οὕτως
ἕκαστος "ἐμὸς" λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς,
ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὤν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος, τοῦτον
τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων, ἢ ὅσων ἡ
5 πόλις ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων· ἄδηλον γὰρ ᾧ συνέβη γενέσθαι
τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω
κρεῖττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον, τὸ αὐτὸ [μὲν] προσαγορεύοντας
δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων, ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸν αὑτοῦ
10 προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτόν, ὁ δ' ἀνεψιόν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ
συγγένειαν [ἢ] πρὸς αἵματος ἢ κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ κηδείαν
αὑτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕτερος φράτορα
φυλέτην. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
υἱόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ μή τινας
15 ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας
καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας αἳ γίνονται τοῖς
τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ
ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν
τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γάρ τισι
20 τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γινόμενα
τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δέ τινες καὶ
γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οἷον ἵπποι καὶ βόες, αἳ
σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὅμοια ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσιν,
ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα Δικαία ἵππος.
1Further, upon this principle, every one will use the word 'mine' of one who is prospering or the reverse, however small a fraction he may himself be of the whole number; the same boy will be 'so and so's son,' the son of each of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the 5citizens; and even about this he will not be positive; for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But which is better- for each to say 'mine' in this way, making a man the same relation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or to use the word 'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the same person is called by one man his own son whom another 10calls his own brother or cousin or kinsman- blood relation or connection by marriage either of himself or of some relation of his, and yet another his clansman or tribesman; and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's fashion! Nor is there any way of preventing 15brothers and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another. Geographers declare such to be the fact; they say that in part of 20Upper Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born are assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness. And some women, like the females of other animals- for example, mares and cows- have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare 25called Honest.
Book 2,Chapter 4 (1262a25–1262b36)
25 Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι
τοῖς ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ
φόνους ἀκουσίους τοὺς δὲ ἑκουσίους, καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας·
ὧν οὐδὲν ὅσιόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς
μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἄπωθεν·
30 ἃ καὶ πλεῖον συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγνοούντων ἢ γνωριζόντων,
καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωριζομένων ἐνδέχεται τὰς
νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μή, οὐδεμίαν. ἄτοπον δὲ
καὶ τὸ κοινοὺς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφελεῖν
τῶν ἐρώντων, τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλῦσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις
35 τὰς ἄλλας ἃς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν
ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν
μόνον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι' ἄλλην
μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὡς λίαν δὲ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γινομένης,
ὅτι δ' ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἢ υἱός, οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ ἀλλήλων,
40 μηδὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν. ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς
εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας
Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when there is no relationship. 30Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary expiations of them cannot be made. Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after having made the children common, should hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only, but should permit love and familiarities 35between father and son or between brother and brother, than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them love of this sort is improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another 40made no difference.
1262b
1 ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ἧττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία κοινῶν ὄντων
τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους
πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν. ὅλως δὲ
συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τοὐναντίον διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὧν προςήκει
5 τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ δι' ἣν
αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα
καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἰόμεθα μέγιστον
εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτως γὰρ ἂν ἥκιστα στασιάζοιεν),
καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεῖ μάλισθ' ὁ Σωκράτης,
10 ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ κἀκεῖνος εἶναί φησι τῆς φιλίας ἔργον,
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην
ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων
συμφῦναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἕνα·
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἕνα,
15 ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῆ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν
κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἢ υἱὸν
πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὺ εἰς πολὺ
ὕδωρ μειχθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει
καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων
20 τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὂν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ
τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱῶν ἢ υἱὸν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς
ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων. δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν· ὧν
οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. ἀλλὰ
25 μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ
τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων
εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν τίνα ἔσται τρόπον·
καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας
τίσι τίνας διδόασιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα μᾶλλον
30 ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οἷον αἰκίας ἔρωτας φόνους·
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύσουσιν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας
καὶ μητέρας τοὺς φύλακας οἵ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες
καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας,
ὥστ' εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν
35 συγγένειαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
This community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen 1than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel. In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of which 5good laws ought to have, and the intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would defeat itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and the preservative of them against revolutions; neither is there anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the state 10which he and all the world declare to be created by friendship. But the unity which he commends would be like that of the lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow together in the excess of their affection, and from being two to become one, in which case one or both would certainly perish. 15Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my father.' As a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of community, the idea of relationship which is based upon 20these names will be lost; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection- that a thing is your own and that it is your only one-neither can exist in such a state as this.
25Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom. And the previously mentioned evils, 30such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call the members of the class they have left brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of 35consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and children, let this be our conclusion.
25Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom. And the previously mentioned evils, 30such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call the members of the class they have left brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of 35consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and children, let this be our conclusion.
Book 2,Chapter 5 (1262b37–1264b25)
Ἐχόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως,
τίνα τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι
τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν
40 εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν. τοῦτο δ' ἄν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ
τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω
Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property: should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common or not? 40This question may be discussed separately from the enactments about women and children.
1263a
1 δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν πότερον (κἂν ᾖ ἐκεῖνα χωρίς, καθ'
ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πᾶσι) τάς γε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον,
ἢ τὰς χρήσεις, οἷον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρίς, τοὺς δὲ
καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἔνια ποιεῖ
5 τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἢ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωργεῖν
κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας χρήσεις
(λέγονται δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν
βαρβάρων), ἢ καὶ τὰ γήπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινούς. ἑτέρων
μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ
10 ῥᾴων, αὐτῶν δ' αὑτοῖς διαπονούντων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις
πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἴσων ἀλλ' ἀνίσων ἀναγκαῖον
ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν ἢ λαμβάνοντας
πολλά, ὀλίγα δὲ πονοῦντας, τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνουσι,
15 πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν
πάντων χαλεπόν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων.
δηλοῦσι δ' αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ
πλεῖστοι διαφέρονται, ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προςκρούοντες
ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις μάλιστα
20 προσκρούομεν οἷς πλεῖστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας
τὰς ἐγκυκλίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας
τε καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερείας· ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον
ἔχει, ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἔθεσι καὶ τάξει νόμων ὀρθῶν, οὐ μικρὸν
ἂν διενέγκαι. ἕξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν·
25 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις
καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πὼς μὲν εἶναι κοινάς, ὅλως
δ' ἰδίας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διῃρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα
πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιδώσουσιν ὡς πρὸς
ἴδιον ἑκάστου προσεδρεύοντος· δι' ἀρετὴν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι,
30 κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένον,
ὡς οὐκ ὂν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις
τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτ' ἄν· ἰδίαν γὰρ ἕκαστος τὴν κτῆσιν
ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρῆται
35 κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται
τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἰδίοις, ἔτι δ' ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, κἂν
δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων, [ἐν] τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερὸν
τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει
ποιεῖν κοινάς· ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου
40 τοῦτ' ἔργον ἴδιόν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὅσον
διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιόν τι. μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς
1Even supposing that the women and children belong to individuals, according to the custom which is at present universal, may there not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common? Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is the practice 5of some nations. Or (2), the soil may be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided among individuals for their private use; this is a form of common property which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or (3), the soil and the produce may be alike common.
When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different and easier to deal with; 10but when they till the ground for themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume much. 15But indeed there is always a difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in common, but especially in their having common property. The partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point; for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any trifle which turns up. So with servants: we are most able to 20take offense at those with whom we most we most frequently come into contact in daily life.
These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property; the present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems. 25Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, 30'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common.' Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further. For, although every man has his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. 35The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were their own; and when they lack provisions on a journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout the country. 40It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition.
When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different and easier to deal with; 10but when they till the ground for themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume much. 15But indeed there is always a difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in common, but especially in their having common property. The partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point; for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any trifle which turns up. So with servants: we are most able to 20take offense at those with whom we most we most frequently come into contact in daily life.
These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property; the present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems. 25Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, 30'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common.' Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further. For, although every man has his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. 35The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were their own; and when they lack provisions on a journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout the country. 40It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition.
1263b
1 αὑτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῦτο φυσικόν.
τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ
φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ
καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν
5 ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ
βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἑταίροις ἥδιστον· ὃ γίνεται τῆς
κτήσεως ἰδίας οὔσης. ταῦτά τε δὴ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἓν
ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα δυοῖν
ἀρεταῖν φανερῶς, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
10 (ἔργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὔσης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφροσύνην),
ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις· οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται
φανερὸς ἐλευθέριος ὤν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον οὐδεμίαν·
ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος
ἔργον ἐστίν.
15 εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος
ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν· ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται,
νομίζων ἔσεσθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς
ἅπαντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων
ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ
20 κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους
περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων
κολακείας· ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ
διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοινωνοῦντας
πολλῷ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὁρῶμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρὶς
25 τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνιῶν
διαφερομένους, πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτημένους
ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις. ἔτι δὲ δίκαιοιν μὴ μόνον λέγειν
ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων
ἀγαθῶν· φαίνεται δ' εἶναι πάμπαν ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος. αἴτιον
30 δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν
οὐκ οὖσαν ὀρθήν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί πως μίαν καὶ τὴν
οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς οὐκ
ἔσται προϊοῦσα πόλις, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἔσται μέν, ἐγγὺς δ' οὖσα
τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις τὴν
35 συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν.
ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὄν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν
κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν· καὶ τόν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν
εἰσάγειν καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπουδαίαν
ἄτοπον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἴεσθαι διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς
40 ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ
τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ
Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling 1implanted by nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the miser's love of money; for all, or almost all, men love money and other such objects in a measure. 5And further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property. These advantages are lost by excessive unification of the state. The exhibition of two virtues, besides, is visibly annihilated in such a state: first, temperance towards women 10(for it is an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance' sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of property. No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property.
15Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, 20suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause- the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, 25though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property.
Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they are to lead appears to be quite impracticable. The error 30of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, like 35harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by 40philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the legislator has made property common.
15Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, 20suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause- the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, 25though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property.
Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they are to lead appears to be quite impracticable. The error 30of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, like 35harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by 40philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the legislator has made property common.
1264a
1 νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσε. δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι χρὴ
προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, ἐν οἷς
οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν, εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν· πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν
εὕρηται μέν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνῆκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ χρῶνται
5 γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερὸν εἴ τις τοῖς ἔργοις
ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ
δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν,
τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φατρίας καὶ φυλάς.
ὥστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον πλὴν μὴ γεωργεῖν
10 τοὺς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας τίς
ἔσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, οὔτ' εἴρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε ῥᾴδιον
εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τό γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλλων
πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν διώρισται, πότερον
15 καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ
καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας ἰδίους
ἢ κοινούς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάντων,
τί διοίσουσιν οὗτοι ἐκείνων τῶν φυλάκων; ἢ τί πλεῖον
τοῖς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν, ἢ τί μαθόντες ὑπομενοῦσι
20 τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐὰν μή τι σοφίζωνται τοιοῦτον οἷον Κρῆτες;
ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τἆλλα ταὐτὰ τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες μόνον ἀπειρήκασι
τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κτῆσιν. εἰ δέ, καθάπερ
ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις ἔσται τὰ
τοιαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλει
25 δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας
ἀλλήλαις. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ
γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας· ἐγκλήματα
δὲ καὶ δίκαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν
φησὶ κακά, πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Σωκράτης
30 ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεήσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν,
οἷον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
τοιούτων, ἀποδιδοὺς μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἔτι δὲ
κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργοὺς <τοὺς> ἀποφορὰν
φέροντας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονημάτων
35 πλήρεις, ἢ τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις εἱλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας
καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ' ὁμοίως εἴτε
μή, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων τίς ἡ
τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τίνες. ἔστι δ' οὔθ'
εὑρεῖν ῥᾴδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρον μικρὸν τὸ ποιούς τινας εἶναι
40 τούτους πρὸς τὸ σῴζεσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. ἀλλὰ
1Let us remember that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes they are not put together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have. 5Great light would be thrown on this subject if we could see such a form of government in the actual process of construction; for the legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and dividing its constituents into associations for common meals, and into phratries and tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, 10a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians try to enforce already.
But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in such a community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who are not guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been determined: 15are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in common? Or is each individual to have his own? And are the wives and children to be individual or common. If, like the guardians, they are to have all things in common, what do they differ from them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government? Or, upon what principle would they submit, 20unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community? 25Must it not contain two states in one, each hostile to the other He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real citizens. But if so the suits and quarrels, and all the evils which Socrates affirms to exist in other states, will exist equally among them. He says indeed that, 30having so good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, for example laws about the city or about the markets; but then he confines his education to the guardians. Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute. But in that case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and conceited 35than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. And whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither is it easy to discover this, nor is their character of small importance 40if the common life of the guardians is to be maintained.
But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in such a community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who are not guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been determined: 15are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in common? Or is each individual to have his own? And are the wives and children to be individual or common. If, like the guardians, they are to have all things in common, what do they differ from them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government? Or, upon what principle would they submit, 20unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community? 25Must it not contain two states in one, each hostile to the other He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real citizens. But if so the suits and quarrels, and all the evils which Socrates affirms to exist in other states, will exist equally among them. He says indeed that, 30having so good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, for example laws about the city or about the markets; but then he confines his education to the guardians. Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute. But in that case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and conceited 35than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. And whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither is it easy to discover this, nor is their character of small importance 40if the common life of the guardians is to be maintained.
1264b
1 μὴν εἴ γε τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας ποιήσει κοινὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις
ἰδίας, τίς οἰκονομήσει ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἱ ἄνδρες
αὐτῶν—κἂν εἰ κοιναὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες;
ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν,
5 ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς
ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ καὶ
τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης. ἀεὶ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς
αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας· τοῦτο δὲ στάσεως αἴτιον γίνεται καὶ παρὰ
τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἦ που δῆθεν παρά γε θυμοειδέσι
10 καὶ πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ
ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν ἄλλοις
ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλοις μέμεικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσός,
ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φησὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺς γινομένοις
μεῖξαι χρυσόν, τοῖς δ' ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον
15 τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ
τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν
εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ
εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ πάντων ἢ μὴ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν ἢ
τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν
20 ὧνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ
ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύνατον.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, τίνες ἕτεροι;
οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἵ γε τεχνῖται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βαναύσων.
ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν ταύτας
25 τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑτέρας.
1Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property, the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house? And who will do so if the agricultural class have both their property and their wives in common? Once more: it is absurd to argue, from the analogy of the animals, 5that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to manage a household. The government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. And if this is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much more among high-spirited warriors? 10But that the persons whom he makes rulers must be the same is evident; for the gold which the God mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at another time to another, but always to the same: as he says, 'God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; but brass and iron 15in those who are meant to be artisans and husbandmen.' Again, he deprives the guardians even of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like 20the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in neither of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The Republic of which Socrates discourses 25has all these difficulties, and others quite as great.
Book 2,Chapter 6 (1264b26–1266a30)
Σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς Νόμους ἔχει τοὺς
ὕστερον γραφέντας, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι
μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ περὶ
ὀλίγων πάμπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περί τε γυναικῶν
30 καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, καὶ
τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν (διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ
πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ
προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ
κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν,
35 πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς μεθέξουσιν ἤ τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα
δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ τούτους καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τούτων
οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας
οἴεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς
τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῖς ἔξωθεν πεπλήρωκε
40 τὸν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι
The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions only; such as the community of women 30and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state. The population is divided into two classes- one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of counselors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artisans 35are to have a share in the government, and whether they, too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of 40the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the education of the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution.
1265a
1 τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ Νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι
τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν, καὶ
ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρὸν
περιάγει πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν. ἔξω γὰρ
5 τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα
ταὐτὰ ἀποδίδωσιν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ
παιδείαν τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπεχομένους
ζῆν, καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως· πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ
φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων
10 τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακισχιλίων. τὸ μὲν
οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ
κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν, καλῶς δὲ
πάντα ἴσως χαλεπόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος δεῖ
μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαβυλωνίας
15 ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ἧς ἀργοὶ πεντακιςχίλιοι
θρέψονται, καὶ περὶ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπόντων
ἕτερος ὄχλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι
κατ' εὐχήν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ τὸν
νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρός τε
20 τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖναι
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τόπους, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν
ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν, μὴ μονωτικόν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν
αὐτὴν τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλοις ἃ
χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν χώραν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω
25 τόπους)· εἰ δέ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον
μήτε τὸν κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον δεῖ φοβεροὺς
εἶναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, μὴ μόνον ἐλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἀπελθοῦσιν. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὁρᾶν δεῖ, μή ποτε
βέλτιον ἑτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον. τοσαύτην γὰρ
30 εἶναί φησι δεῖν ὥστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἶπεν
ὥστε ζῆν εὖ. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καθόλου μᾶλλον. ἔτι δ' ἔστι σωφρόνως
μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὅρος τὸ
σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ μὲν τὸ
τρυφᾶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἐπιπόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ'
35 εἰσὶν ἕξεις αἱρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρῆσιν αὗται, οἷον
οὐσίᾳ πράως μὲν ἢ ἀνδρείως χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ
καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἕξεις ἀναγκαῖον περὶ
αὐτὴν εἶναι ταύτας. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ
περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖναι
40 τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον ὡς ἱκανῶς ἀνομαλισθησομένην
εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσωνοῦν γεννωμένων,
This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the exception 5of the community of women and property, he supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the same education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only difference is that in the Laws, the common meals are extended to women, and 10the warriors number 5000, but in the Republic only 1000.
The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected. We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citizens, just now mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylon, 15or some other huge site, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities.
It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two points- 20the people and the country. But neighboring countries also must not be forgotten by him, firstly because the state for which he legislates is to have a political and not an isolated life. For a state must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbors, and not merely useful at home. 25Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or states, still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating.
There is another point: Should not the amount of property be defined in some way which differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates says that a man should have so much property 30as will enable him to live temperately, which is only a way of saying 'to live well'; this is too general a conception. Further, a man may live temperately and yet miserably. A better definition would be that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally; if the two are parted, liberally will combine with luxury; temperance will be associated with toil. For liberality and temperance are the only 35eligible qualities which have to do with the use of property. A man cannot use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property. 1There is an inconsistency, too, in too, in equalizing the property and not regulating the number of the citizens; 40the population is to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be the case in existing states.
The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected. We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citizens, just now mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylon, 15or some other huge site, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities.
It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two points- 20the people and the country. But neighboring countries also must not be forgotten by him, firstly because the state for which he legislates is to have a political and not an isolated life. For a state must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbors, and not merely useful at home. 25Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or states, still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating.
There is another point: Should not the amount of property be defined in some way which differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates says that a man should have so much property 30as will enable him to live temperately, which is only a way of saying 'to live well'; this is too general a conception. Further, a man may live temperately and yet miserably. A better definition would be that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally; if the two are parted, liberally will combine with luxury; temperance will be associated with toil. For liberality and temperance are the only 35eligible qualities which have to do with the use of property. A man cannot use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property. 1There is an inconsistency, too, in too, in equalizing the property and not regulating the number of the citizens; 40the population is to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be the case in existing states.
1265b
1 ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεῖ δὲ
τοῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν·
νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ, διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς
ὁποσονοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀδιαιρέτων οὐσῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς παράζυγας
5 μηδὲν ἔχειν, ἐάν τ' ἐλάττους ὦσι τὸ πλῆθος ἐάν τε
πλείους. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν ὡρίσθαι τῆς οὐσίας
τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, ὥστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννᾶν, τοῦτο
δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἂν
συμβαίνῃ τελευτᾶν τινας τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν
10 τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δ' ἀφεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς
πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἴτιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις,
ἡ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φείδων
μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὢν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς
οἴκους ἴσους ᾠήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,
15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος·
ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τοὐναντίον ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ περὶ
μὲν τούτων πῶς οἰόμεθα βέλτιον ἂν ἔχειν, λεκτέον ὕστερον·
ἐλλέλειπται δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας
πῶς ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων. φησὶ γὰρ
20 δεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὸ στημόνιον ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης,
οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἔχειν δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ
δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίησι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας,
διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τινός;
καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μή ποτ' οὐ
25 συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἑκάστῳ ἔνειμε
διελὼν χωρίς, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. ἡ δὲ σύνταξις
ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ὀλιγαρχία,
μέση δὲ τούτων, ἣν καλοῦσι πολιτείαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὁπλιτευόντων
ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει
30 ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, καλῶς εἴρηκεν ἴσως·
εἰ δ' ὡς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς. τάχα
γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακώνων ἄν τις ἐπαινέσειε μᾶλλον, ἢ κἂν
ἄλλην τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δεῖ
τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐξ ἁπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτειῶν μεμειγμένην,
35 διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν (εἶναι
γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας
φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν
δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ
κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς
40 ἐφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρατεῖσθαι
δὲ κατά τε τὰ συσσίτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν
But greater care will be required than now; for among ourselves, whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is always distributed among them, and therefore no one is in want; but, if the property were incapable of division as in the Laws, the supernumeraries, 5whether few or many, would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of 10sterility in married persons. The neglect of this subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the most ardent legislators, thought that the families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, 15although originally all the lots may have been of different sizes: but in the Laws the opposite principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right arrangement will have to be explained hereafter.
There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says 20that they should be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different wools. He allows that a man's whole property may be increased fivefold, but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household 25be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns to each individual two homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult to live in two houses.
The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity, and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now, if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest number of states, 30he was very likely right, but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, 35and they praise the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for 40the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life. 1In the Laws it is maintained that the best constitution is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of all.
There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says 20that they should be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different wools. He allows that a man's whole property may be increased fivefold, but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household 25be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns to each individual two homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult to live in two houses.
The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity, and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now, if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest number of states, 30he was very likely right, but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, 35and they praise the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for 40the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life. 1In the Laws it is maintained that the best constitution is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of all.
1266a
1 καθ' ἡμέραν)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δέον συγκεῖσθαι
τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος,
ἃς ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἄν τις θείη πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστας
πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μιγνύντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ
5 πλειόνων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων. ἔπειτ' οὐδ' ἔχουσα
φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρατικά·
μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπορωτέροις
10 ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας
ἤ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ' ἀφεῖσθαι, τοῦτο δ'
ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἶναι
τοὺς ἄρχοντας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων.
ὀλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν. αἱροῦνται
15 μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος,
εἶτα πάλιν ἴσους ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου· εἶτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων,
πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες ἦν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων,
ἐκ δὲ [τοῦ τετάρτου] τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρώτοις
καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις· εἶτ' ἐκ τούτων ἴσον ἀφ' ἑκάστου τιμήματος
20 ἀποδεῖξαί φησι δεῖν ἀριθμόν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ
ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ἐνίους μὴ
αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὡς μὲν οὖν
οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην
πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ὕστερον ῥηθησομένων,
25 ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις·
ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἱρετῶν
αἱρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον. εἰ γάρ τινες συστῆναι θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι
τὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱρεθήσονται βούλησιν. τὰ
μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις τοῦτον ἔχει
30 τὸν τρόπον.
But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the constitution is better 5which is made up of more numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates; for although the appointment of them by lot from among those who have been already selected combines both elements, the way in which the rich 10are compelled by law to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavor to have the greater number of the magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both these are oligarchical features. The oligarchical principle prevails also in the choice of the council, for 15all are compelled to choose, but the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, and of an equal number out of the second class and out of the third class, but not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of the first three classes; and the selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory on the first and second. Then, from the persons so chosen, 20he says that there ought to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be given to the better sort of people, who have the larger incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being compelled will not vote. These considerations, and others which will be adduced 25when the time comes for examining similar polities, tend to show that states like Plato's should not be composed of democracy and monarchy. There is also a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are themselves elected; for, if but a small number choose to combine, the elections will always go as they desire. Such is the constitution 30which is described in the Laws.
Book 2,Chapter 7 (1266a31–1267b21)
Εἰσὶ δέ τινες πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ
δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν, πᾶσαι δὲ τῶν καθεστηκυιῶν
καὶ καθ' ἃς πολιτεύονται νῦν ἐγγύτερόν εἰσι τούτων ἀμφοτέρων.
οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς
35 γυναῖκας ἄλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν
γυναικῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄρχονται μᾶλλον.
δοκεῖ γάρ τισι τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μέγιστον τετάχθαι
καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαί φασι τὰς στάσεις πάντας.
διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος·
40 φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο
Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to established or existing ones than either of Plato's. No one else has introduced such novelties as the community of 35women and children, or public tables for women: other legislators begin with what is necessary. In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn. 1This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first 40to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions.
1266b
1 δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπὸν ᾤετο ποιεῖν, τὰς
δ' ἤδη κατοικουμένας ἐργωδέστερον μέν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ' ἂν
ὁμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προῖκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν
λαμβάνειν δὲ μή, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν
5 δέ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς Νόμους γράφων μέχρι μέν τινος
ᾤετο δεῖν ἐᾶν, πλεῖον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλαχίστης
μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθάπερ
εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν τοὺς
οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὃ λανθάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττοντας
10 πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν·
ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγεθος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθμός,
ἀνάγκη τόν γε νόμον λύεσθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς λύσεως
φαῦλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας· ἔργον
γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διότι μὲν οὖν ἔχει
15 τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ὁμαλότης,
καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαίνονται διεγνωκότες, οἷον καὶ
Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις ἔστι νόμος ὃς κωλύει
κτᾶσθαι γῆν ὁπόσην ἂν βούληταί τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λοκροῖς νόμος
20 ἐστὶ μὴ πωλεῖν ἐὰν μὴ φανερὰν ἀτυχίαν δείξῃ συμβεβηκυῖαν,
ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασῴζειν (τοῦτο δὲ λυθὲν
καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν
αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὡρισμένων τιμημάτων
εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν)· ἀλλ' ἔστι τὴν ἰσότητα μὲν
25 ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δ' ἢ λίαν εἶναι πολλήν, ὥστε
τρυφᾶν, ἢ λίαν ὀλίγην, ὥστε ζῆν γλίσχρως. δῆλον οὖν ὡς
οὐχ ἱκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ
τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτι δ' εἴ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειεν
οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
30 ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένοις
ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν εἴπειεν ὁ Φαλέας ὅτι
ταῦτα τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός· οἴεται γὰρ δυοῖν τούτοιν ἰσότητα
δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας.
ἀλλὰ τήν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν
35 εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν
εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ἔσονται
προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμφοτέρων.
ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς
κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοὐναντίον δὲ περὶ
40 ἑκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον,
1He thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a state was already established; and that then the shortest way of compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them.
5Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed, any citizen to possess more than five times the minimum qualification But those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to forget- that the legislator who fixes the 10amount of property should also fix the number of children; for, if the children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions. That 15the equalization of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a law 20that a man is not to sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification. Again, 25where there is equality of property, the amount may be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount. Further, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not 30the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws. But Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in be 35in having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice, or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honor, though 40in opposite ways. For the common people quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honor; as the poet says, "The bad and good alike in honor share.
5Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed, any citizen to possess more than five times the minimum qualification But those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to forget- that the legislator who fixes the 10amount of property should also fix the number of children; for, if the children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions. That 15the equalization of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a law 20that a man is not to sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification. Again, 25where there is equality of property, the amount may be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount. Further, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not 30the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws. But Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in be 35in having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice, or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honor, though 40in opposite ways. For the common people quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honor; as the poet says, "The bad and good alike in honor share.
1267a
1 οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι· ὅθεν καὶ "ἐν
δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ ἠμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός". οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ
ἄνθρωποι διὰ τἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὧν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει
τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν ἢ
5 πεινῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν· ἐὰν
γὰρ μείζω ἔχωσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν
ταύτης ἰατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν· οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν
ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βραχεῖα
10 καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη· τρίτον δ', εἴ τινες
βούλοιντο δι' αὑτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ
φιλοσοφίας ἄκος. αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται· ἐπεὶ
ἀδικουσί γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ
τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσιν· διὸ καὶ
15 αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ
τύραννον)· ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον
ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἔτι τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται
κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρὸς αὑτοὺς πολιτεύσονται καλῶς,
δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας.
20 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολεμικὴν
ἰσχύν, περὶ ἧς ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν εἴρηκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
περὶ τῆς κτήσεως. δεῖ γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς
χρήσεις ἱκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν κινδύνους·
διόπερ οὔτε τοσοῦτον δεῖ πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὅσου οἱ
25 πλησίον καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν
οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιόντας, οὔθ' οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι
πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων.
ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, ὅ τι
συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἴσως οὖν ἄριστος ὅρος τὸ μὴ λυσιτελεῖν
30 τοῖς κρείττοσι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμεῖν, ἀλλ'
οὕτως ὡς ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. οἷον Εὔβουλος
Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολιορκεῖν ἐκέλευσεν
αὐτόν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χωρίον,
λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν δαπάνην· ἐθέλειν γὰρ ἔλαττον
35 τούτου λαβὼν ἐκλιπεῖν ἤδη τὸν Ἀταρνέα· ταῦτα δ'
εἰπὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννουν γενόμενον παύσασθαι
τῆς πολιορκίας. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ
τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας εἶναι τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν
πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ [ἂν] οἱ
40 χαρίεντες ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἴσων ὄντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ
φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δ'
" There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is 5hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to crime; men also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of desire- they wish to cure some desire, going beyond the necessities of life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the only reason- they may desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit crimes.
Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions 10and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others. The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence 15great is the honor bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes.
There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to neighboring nations, and to all who are outside of it. 20The government must be organized with a view to military strength; and of this he has said not a word. And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state should not be so large that 25more powerful neighbors may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule; but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage. The best limit will probably be, that 30a more powerful neighbor must have no inducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth, but only such as he would have had if you had possessed less. There is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the time. 'For,' said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum 35than that to leave Atarneus at once.' These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and he desisted from the siege.
The equalization of property is one of the things that tend to prevent the citizens from quarrelling. 1Not that the gain in this direction is very great.
Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions 10and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others. The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence 15great is the honor bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes.
There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to neighboring nations, and to all who are outside of it. 20The government must be organized with a view to military strength; and of this he has said not a word. And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state should not be so large that 25more powerful neighbors may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule; but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage. The best limit will probably be, that 30a more powerful neighbor must have no inducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth, but only such as he would have had if you had possessed less. There is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the time. 'For,' said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum 35than that to leave Atarneus at once.' These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and he desisted from the siege.
The equalization of property is one of the things that tend to prevent the citizens from quarrelling. 1Not that the gain in this direction is very great.
1267b
1 ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκανὸν
διωβελία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἤδη τοῦτ' ᾖ πάτριον, ἀεὶ δέονται
τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς ἄπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἧς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ
5 ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμαλίζειν,
τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν
ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ
δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἥττους τε ὦσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶνται.
οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εἴρηκεν. περὶ
10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτῆσιν ἰσάζει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων
καὶ βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευὴ
πολλὴ τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων· ἢ πάντων οὖν τούτων ἰσότητα
ζητητέον ἢ τάξιν τινὰ μετρίαν, ἢ πάντα ἐατέον. φαίνεται
δ' ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μικράν,
15 εἴ γ' οἱ τεχνῖται πάντες δημόσιοι ἔσονται καὶ μὴ
πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ δημοσίους
εἶναι τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους, δεῖ (καθάπερ ἐν
Ἐπιδάμνῳ τε, καὶ Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν Ἀθήνησι)
τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας
20 σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἄν τις θεωρήσειεν, εἴ τι τυγχάνει
καλῶς εἰρηκὼς ἢ μὴ καλῶς.
For the nobles will be dissatisfied because they think themselves worthy of more than an equal share of honors; and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution. 1And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men 5live only for the gratification of it. The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated. Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas is imperfect; 10for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of what are called his movables. Now either all these things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must an be let alone. It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city only, 15if, as he supposes, all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a supplementary part of the body of citizens. But if there is a law that artisans are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those engaged on public works, as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced.
20From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his ideas.
20From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his ideas.
Book 2,Chapter 8 (1267b22–1269a28)
Ἱππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφῶντος Μιλήσιος (ὃς καὶ τὴν τῶν
πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὗρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος
καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον περιττότερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως
25 ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ζῆν περιεργότερον τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ
κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ, ἔτι δὲ ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλεεινῆς δέ,
οὐκ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρόνους,
λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν εἶναι βουλόμενος)
πρῶτος τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων ἐνεχείρησέ τι περὶ πολιτείας
30 εἰπεῖν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκεύαζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει
μὲν μυρίανδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διῃρημένην· ἐποίει γὰρ
ἓν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἓν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προπολεμοῦν
καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον. διῄρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη τὴν
χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν τὴν δ' ἰδίαν· ὅθεν
35 μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἱεράν, ἀφ' ὧν
δ' οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν
ἰδίαν. ᾤετο δ' εἴδη καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνον· περὶ
ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν,
ὕβριν βλάβην θάνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἓν τὸ
40 κύριον, εἰς ὃ πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρίσθαι
δοκούσας δίκας· τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ τινῶν γερόντων
Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same who invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the Piraeus- a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into a general eccentricity of life, 25which made some think him affected (for he would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; but these were worn on a cheap but warm garment both in winter and summer); he, besides aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature, was the first person not a statesman who made inquiries about 30the best form of government.
The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided into three parts- one of artisans, one of husbandmen, and a third of armed defenders of the state. He also divided the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third private: the first was set apart 35to maintain the customary worship of the Gods, the second was to support the warriors, the third was the property of the husbandmen. He also divided laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that there are three subjects of lawsuits- insult, injury, and homicide. He likewise instituted a single 40final court of appeal, to which all causes seeming to have been improperly decided might be referred; this court he formed of elders chosen for the purpose.
The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided into three parts- one of artisans, one of husbandmen, and a third of armed defenders of the state. He also divided the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third private: the first was set apart 35to maintain the customary worship of the Gods, the second was to support the warriors, the third was the property of the husbandmen. He also divided laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that there are three subjects of lawsuits- insult, injury, and homicide. He likewise instituted a single 40final court of appeal, to which all causes seeming to have been improperly decided might be referred; this court he formed of elders chosen for the purpose.
1268a
1 αἱρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ
ψηφοφορίας ᾤετο γίγνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστον πινάκιον,
ἐν ᾧ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἁπλῶς, τὴν δίκην, εἰ
δ' ἀπολύοι ἁπλῶς, κενόν, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, τοῦτο
5 διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ᾤετο νενομοθετῆσθαι καλῶς· ἀναγκάζειν
γὰρ ἐπιορκεῖν ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. ἔτι δὲ
νόμον ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν εὑρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, ὅπως
τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτώντων
ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὡς οὔπω τοῦτο
10 παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον (ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὗτος
ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων)· τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας
αἱρετοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι πάντας. δῆμον δ' ἐποίει τὰ
τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δ' αἱρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν
καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα καὶ
15 τὰ μάλιστα ἀξιόλογα τῆς Ἱπποδάμου τάξεως ταῦτ' ἐστίν·
ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλήθους
τῶν πολιτῶν. οἵ τε γὰρ τεχνῖται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ
τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες, οἱ μὲν
γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνῖται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε ὅπλα,
20 ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα κεκτημένων. μετέχειν
μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ
τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἐχόντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολιτοφύλακας
καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν)· μὴ
μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οἷόν τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν
25 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; "ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα
γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν". τοῦτο δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον μὴ
πολλοὺς ὄντας· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέχειν
τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως;
ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τί χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνίτας μὲν
30 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πᾶσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν),
καὶ δύνανται διαγίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν
ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ
ὅπλα κεκτημένοις τὴν τροφὴν εὐλόγως ἂν ἦσάν τι τῆς
πόλεως μέρος, νῦν δ' ἰδίαν ἔχουσιν καὶ ταύτην ἰδίᾳ γεωργήσουσιν.
35 ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινήν, ἀφ' ἧς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἕξουσι
τὴν τροφήν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μάχιμον
ἕτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης· εἰ
δ' ἕτεροί τινες ἔσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἴδια γεωργούντων καὶ τῶν
μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μόριον ἔσται τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, οὐδενὸς
40 μετέχον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ
τις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τούς τε τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν
γεωργοῦντας, τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν
He was further of opinion that the decisions of the courts ought not to be given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one should have a tablet on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal; but, if he partly acquitted and partly condemned, he was 5to distinguish accordingly. To the existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to be guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. He also enacted that those who discovered anything for the good of the state should be honored; and he provided that the children of citizens who died in battle should be maintained at the public expense, as if such an enactment 10had never been heard of before, yet it actually exists at Athens and in other places. As to the magistrates, he would have them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes already mentioned, and those who were elected were to watch over the interests of the public, of strangers, and of orphans. 15These are the most striking points in the constitution of Hippodamus. There is not much else.
The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken is the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, 20and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior class. That they should share in all the offices is an impossibility; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two other classes have no share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens? 25It may be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they are, why should the other classes share in the government at all, or have power to appoint magistrates? Further, what use are farmers to the city? Artisans 30there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen too, if they really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government. But in the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private benefit. 35Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make a distinction between them. 1If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has no place in the state 40and no share in anything.
The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken is the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, 20and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior class. That they should share in all the offices is an impossibility; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two other classes have no share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens? 25It may be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they are, why should the other classes share in the government at all, or have power to appoint magistrates? Further, what use are farmers to the city? Artisans 30there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen too, if they really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government. But in the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private benefit. 35Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make a distinction between them. 1If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has no place in the state 40and no share in anything.
1268b
1 ἕκαστος γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίαις, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ
τῆς <αὐτῆς> γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὑτοῖς τε τὴν τροφὴν
λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα
πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως
5 ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντα, τῆς δίκης ἁπλῶς
γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητήν. τοῦτο δὲ
ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνται
γὰρ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ
ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον τούτου τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ
10 παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογῶνται πρὸς
ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχώδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν
ὀφείλειν μὲν ὁ δικαστὴς οἴηται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δ' ὅσον ὁ δικαζόμενος;
ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρινεῖ
δέκα μνᾶς (ἢ ὁ μὲν πλέον ὁ δ' ἔλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε,
15 ὁ δὲ τέτταρας, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριοῦσιν·
οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος
ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἔτι δ' οὐδὲν ἐπιορκεῖν
ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἁπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα,
εἴπερ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἔγκλημα γέγραπται, δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μηδὲν
20 ὀφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς·
ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ, ὁ καταδικάσας, μὴ νομίζων ὀφείλειν
τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὑρίσκουσί τι τῇ πόλει
συμφέρον ὡς δεῖ γίνεσθαί τινα τιμήν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφαλὲς
τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον· ἔχει
25 γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἂν τύχῃ, πολιτείας. ἐμπίπτει
δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἑτέραν· ἀποροῦσι
γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ
κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν ᾖ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διόπερ
οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέρει
30 κινεῖν, ἐνδέχεται δ' εἰσηγεῖσθαί τινας νόμων λύσιν ἢ
πολιτείας ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν,
ἔτι μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστείλασθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ,
ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ
κινεῖν. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν,
35 οἷον ἰατρικὴ κινηθεῖσα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ
καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ μίαν
τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικήν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην
ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δ' ἂν γεγονέναι φαίη τις
ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἁπλοῦς
40 εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες,
καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐωνοῦντο παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τε
λοιπὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐστί που νομίμων εὐήθη πάμπαν ἐστίν,
Or, if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands, and those of the public as well, they will have difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce which will maintain 1two households: and why, in this case, should there be any division, for they might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same land and the same lots? There is surely a great confusion in all this.
Neither is the law to commended 5which says that the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their judgement; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators 10take pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with one another. Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks that damages should be given, but not so much as the suitor demands? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten minae (or in general the suitor asks for more and the judge allows less), while another judge allows five, 15another four minae. In this way they will go on splitting up the damages, and some will grant the whole and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken? Again, no one contends that he who votes for a simple acquittal or condemnation perjures himself, if the indictment has been laid in an unqualified form; and this is just, for 20the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him.
To honor those who discover anything which is useful to the state is a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot safely be enacted by law, 25for it may encourage informers, and perhaps even lead to political commotions. This question involves another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, if an 30changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretense of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution. But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we had better go a little into detail, for, as I was saying, there is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem desirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences have certainly been beneficial; 35medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art and craft have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art. That improvement has occurred is shown by the fact that old customs are exceedingly simple 40and barbarous. For the ancient Hellenes went about armed and bought their brides of each other.
Neither is the law to commended 5which says that the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their judgement; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators 10take pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with one another. Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks that damages should be given, but not so much as the suitor demands? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten minae (or in general the suitor asks for more and the judge allows less), while another judge allows five, 15another four minae. In this way they will go on splitting up the damages, and some will grant the whole and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken? Again, no one contends that he who votes for a simple acquittal or condemnation perjures himself, if the indictment has been laid in an unqualified form; and this is just, for 20the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him.
To honor those who discover anything which is useful to the state is a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot safely be enacted by law, 25for it may encourage informers, and perhaps even lead to political commotions. This question involves another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, if an 30changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretense of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution. But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we had better go a little into detail, for, as I was saying, there is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem desirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences have certainly been beneficial; 35medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art and craft have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art. That improvement has occurred is shown by the fact that old customs are exceedingly simple 40and barbarous. For the ancient Hellenes went about armed and bought their brides of each other.
1269a
1 οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμος ἔστιν, ἂν πλῆθός τι
παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὑτοῦ συγγενῶν,
ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα. ζητοῦσι δ'
ὅλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τἀγαθὸν πάντες· εἰκός τε τοὺς
5 πρώτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσώθησαν,
ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ
λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὥστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς
τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἐᾶν
ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας,
10 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι·
καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γράφειν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ
τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι κινητέοι
καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον
ἐπισκοποῦσιν εὐλαβείας ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ
15 ᾖ τὸ μὲν βέλτιον μικρόν, τὸ δ' ἐθίζειν εὐχερῶς λύειν τοὺς
νόμους φαῦλον, φανερὸν ὡς ἐατέον ἐνίας ἁμαρτίας καὶ τῶν
νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὠφελήσεται
κινήσας ὅσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν ἐθισθείς.
ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· οὐ γὰρ
20 ὅμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχὺν
οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο
δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τὸ ῥᾳδίως
μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους
καινοὺς ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν ἐστι τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἔτι δ' εἰ
25 καὶ κινητέοι, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ
οὔ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι ἢ τισίν; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγάλην
διαφοράν. διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν·
ἄλλων γάρ ἐστι καιρῶν.
The remains of ancient laws which have come down to us are quite absurd; 1for example, at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good, and not merely what their fathers had. 5But the primeval inhabitants, whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary or even foolish people among ourselves (such is certainly the tradition concerning the earth-born men); and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions. Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. As in other sciences, 10so in politics, it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed; but when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be required. For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, 15when the advantage is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not gain so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience. The analogy of the arts is false; 20a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in an art. For the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law. Even if 25we admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons? These are very important questions; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion.
Book 2,Chapter 9 (1269a29–1271b19)
Περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς Κρητικῆς,
30 σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, δύο εἰσὶν
αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν
ἀρίστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δ' εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν
καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς
πολιτείας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι
35 τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογούμενόν
ἐστιν· τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν. ἥ τε
γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ εἵλωτες (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες
τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν)· περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρῆτας
40 οὐδέν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν. αἴτιον δ' ἴσως τὸ τὰς γειτνιώσας
In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, 30and indeed in all governments, two points have to be considered: first, whether any particular law is good or bad, when compared with the perfect state; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set before his citizens. That in a well-ordered state the citizens 35should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained. 40The Thessalian Penestae have often risen against their masters, and the Helots in like manner against the Lacedaemonians, for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait.
1269b
1 πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι
σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν <ταῖς> καὶ
αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιῶντες
ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες·
5 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφίσταντο διὰ
τὸ πολεμεῖν ἔτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Περραιβοῖς
καὶ Μάγνησιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τό γε
τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐργῶδες εἶναι, τίνα δεῖ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλῆσαι
τρόπον· ἀνιέμενοί τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσιν
10 ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι
καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον
τρόπον οἷς τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἱλωτείαν. ἔτι δ' ἡ
περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας
βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὥσπερ γὰρ
15 οἰκίας μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγὺς
τοῦ δίχα διῃρῆσθαι δεῖ νομίζειν εἴς τε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλῆθος
καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὥστ' ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως
ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ
νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ συμβέβηκεν· ὅλην γὰρ
20 τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικήν, κατὰ
μὲν τοὺς ἄνδρας φανερός ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν
ἐξημέληκεν· ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν
καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ
τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχωσι γυναικοκρατούμενοι,
25 καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ
πολεμικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἢ κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεροι φανερῶς
τετιμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε
γὰρ ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεῦξαι τὸν Ἄρην
πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν
30 ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατοκώχιμοι πάντες
οἱ τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Λάκωσι τοῦθ' ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ
διῳκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι
τί διαφέρει γυναῖκας ἄρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν
γυναικῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ταὐτὸ γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ'
35 οὔσης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ' αἱ τῶν
Λακώνων ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς·
χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν,
θόρυβον δὲ παρεῖχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν
40 οὖν ἔοικε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκωσιν εὐλόγως ἡ τῶν γυναικῶν
Nothing, however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; the reason probably is that the neighboring 1cities, even when at war with one another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their interest, since they themselves have a dependent population. Whereas all the neighbors of the Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, were their enemies. 5In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the slaves occurred because the Thessalians were still at war with the neighboring Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Besides, if there were no other difficulty, the treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome affair; for, if not kept in hand, they are insolent, and think that they are as good as 10their masters, and, if harshly treated, they hate and conspire against them. Now it is clear that when these are the results the citizens of a state have not found out the secret of managing their subject population.
Again, the license of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the happiness of the state. For, 15a husband and wife being each a part of every family, the state may be considered as about equally divided into men and women; and, therefore, in those states in which the condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no laws. And this is what has actually happened at Sparta; 20the legislator wanted to make the whole state hardy and temperate, and he has carried out his intention in the case of the men, but he has neglected the women, who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly valued, especially if the citizen fall under the dominion of their wives, 25after the manner of most warlike races, except the Celts and a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and Aphrodite, 30for all warlike races are prone to the love either of men or of women. This was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness; many things were managed by their women. But what difference does it make whether women rule, or the rulers are ruled by women? The result is the same. 35Even in regard to courage, which is of no use in daily life, and is needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous. The evil showed itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the women other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy. 40This license of the Lacedaemonian women existed from the earliest times, and was only what might be expected.
Again, the license of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the happiness of the state. For, 15a husband and wife being each a part of every family, the state may be considered as about equally divided into men and women; and, therefore, in those states in which the condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no laws. And this is what has actually happened at Sparta; 20the legislator wanted to make the whole state hardy and temperate, and he has carried out his intention in the case of the men, but he has neglected the women, who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly valued, especially if the citizen fall under the dominion of their wives, 25after the manner of most warlike races, except the Celts and a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and Aphrodite, 30for all warlike races are prone to the love either of men or of women. This was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness; many things were managed by their women. But what difference does it make whether women rule, or the rulers are ruled by women? The result is the same. 35Even in regard to courage, which is of no use in daily life, and is needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous. The evil showed itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the women other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy. 40This license of the Lacedaemonian women existed from the earliest times, and was only what might be expected.
1270a
1 ἄνεσις. ἔξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας
ἀπεξενοῦντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τόν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους
πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσηνίους·
σχολάσαντες δὲ αὑτοὺς μὲν παρεῖχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προωδοπεποιημένους
5 διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει
μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναῖκάς φασι μὲν ἄγειν ἐπιχειρῆσαι
τὸν Λυκοῦργον ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουον,
ἀποστῆναι πάλιν. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὗται τῶν γενομένων,
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἁμαρτίας· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς
10 οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίνι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν,
ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον,
οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς
καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαί τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.
15 μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν
τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἄν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν
συμβέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμπαν
μικράν· διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἧκεν ἡ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ
διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ὠνεῖσθαι μὲν γάρ, ἢ
20 πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας,
διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις·
καίτοι ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως τε καὶ οὕτως.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν
πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων,
25 καὶ διὰ τὸ προῖκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν
μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. νῦν δ' ἔξεστι
δοῦναί τε τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὅτῳ ἂν βούληται, κἂν ἀποθάνῃ
μὴ διαθέμενος, ὃν ἂν καταλίπῃ κληρονόμον, οὗτος ᾧ ἂν
θέλῃ δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἱππεῖς
30 τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους, καὶ ὁπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ
χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν
δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην·
μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο
διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ' ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων
35 βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι
τότε ὀλιγανθρωπίαν, πολεμούντων πολὺν χρόνον, καί φασιν
εἶναί ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίους· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ', εἴτ'
ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα εἴτε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως
ὡμαλισμένης πληθύειν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντίος δὲ
40 καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.
1For, during the wars of the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from home, and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves into the legislator's hand, already prepared 5by the discipline of a soldier's life (in which there are many elements of virtue), to receive his enactments. But, when Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to bring the women under his laws, they resisted, and he gave up the attempt. These then are the causes of what then happened, and this defect in the constitution is clearly to be attributed to them. 10We are not, however, considering what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or wrong, and the disorder of the women, as I have already said, not only gives an air of indecorum to the constitution considered in itself, but tends in a measure to foster avarice.
15The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality of property. While some of the Spartan citizen have quite small properties, others have very large ones; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few. And this is due also to faulty laws; for, although 20the legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he allows anybody who likes to give or bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the same result. And nearly two-fifths of the whole country are held by women; this is owing to the number of heiresses 25and to the large dowries which are customary. It would surely have been better to have given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to his heir. Hence, although the country is able to 30maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens fell below 1000. The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property; for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of their ancient 35kings, they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property. 40Again, the law which relates to the procreation of children is adverse to the correction of this inequality.
15The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality of property. While some of the Spartan citizen have quite small properties, others have very large ones; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few. And this is due also to faulty laws; for, although 20the legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he allows anybody who likes to give or bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the same result. And nearly two-fifths of the whole country are held by women; this is owing to the number of heiresses 25and to the large dowries which are customary. It would surely have been better to have given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to his heir. Hence, although the country is able to 30maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens fell below 1000. The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property; for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of their ancient 35kings, they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property. 40Again, the law which relates to the procreation of children is adverse to the correction of this inequality.
1270b
1 βουλόμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς
Σπαρτιάτας, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι
παῖδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς
υἱοὺς ἄφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῆ πάντων. καίτοι
5 φανερὸν ὅτι πολλῶν γινομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διῃρημένης,
ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας. ἀλλὰ μὴν
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυρία
μὲν αὐτὴ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, γίνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ
δήμου παντός, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι σφόδρα
10 πένητες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἳ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὤνιοι ἦσαν.
ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐν
τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις· διαφθαρέντες γὰρ ἀργυρίῳ τινές, ὅσον ἐφ'
ἑαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν
εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον δημαγωγεῖν
15 αὐτοὺς ἠναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι
τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας
συνέβαινεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ ἀρχεῖον
τοῦτο—ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς
μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὥστ' εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ
20 τύχην τοῦτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν·
δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαι πάντα βούλεσθαι
τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταὐτά·
οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ
δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ διὰ τὴν γερουσίαν (ἆθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ
25 αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν), ὁ δὲ δῆμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν (καθίσταται
γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων)—ἀλλ' αἱρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν
εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἁπάντων μέν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὃν
νῦν (παιδαριώδης γάρ ἐστι λίαν). ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεών εἰσι μεγάλων
κύριοι, ὄντες οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οὐκ αὐτογνώμονας
30 βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς
νόμους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαιτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη
τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀνειμένη λίαν
ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν,
ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρᾳ τὸν νόμον
35 ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν. ἔχει
δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς.
ἐπιεικῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἱκανῶς πρὸς
ἀνδραγαθίαν τάχ' ἂν εἴπειέ τις συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει, καίτοι
τό γε διὰ βίου κυρίους εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφιςβητήσιμον
40 (ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας
1For the legislator, wanting to have as many Spartans as he could, encouraged the citizens to have large families; and there is a law at Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has four from all the burdens of the state. 5Yet it is obvious that, if there were many children, the land being distributed as it is, many of them must necessarily fall into poverty.
The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but the Ephors are chosen from the whole people, and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very 10poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so great and tyrannical is their power, that 15even the kings have been compelled to court them, so that, in this way as well together with the royal office, the whole constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to 20chance, has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained. This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire its permanence because they have due honor in their own persons; the nobles because they are represented in the council of elders (for the office of elder is a reward 25of virtue); and the people, because all are eligible to the Ephoralty. The election of Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not 30determine them merely on their own judgment, but according to written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution- they have a deal too much license; whereas, in the case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they 35run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures.
40Again, the council of elders is not free from defects.
The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but the Ephors are chosen from the whole people, and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very 10poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so great and tyrannical is their power, that 15even the kings have been compelled to court them, so that, in this way as well together with the royal office, the whole constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to 20chance, has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained. This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire its permanence because they have due honor in their own persons; the nobles because they are represented in the council of elders (for the office of elder is a reward 25of virtue); and the people, because all are eligible to the Ephoralty. The election of Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not 30determine them merely on their own judgment, but according to written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution- they have a deal too much license; whereas, in the case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they 35run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures.
40Again, the council of elders is not free from defects.
1271a
1 γῆρας)· τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν
νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ
ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι καὶ καταχαριζόμενοι
πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοινωνηκότες τῆς
5 ἀρχῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι·
νῦν δ' εἰσίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐθύνειν
τὰς ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λίαν τὸ δῶρον,
καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύνας.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων κατά τε
10 τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸν
ἀξιωθησόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον
καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς.
νῦν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης
φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας
15 τούτῳ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων· οὐδεὶς
γὰρ ἂν ἄρχειν αἰτήσαιτο μὴ φιλότιμος ὤν. καίτοι τῶν
γ' ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἑκουσίων τὰ πλεῖστα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν διὰ
φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ
δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν βέλτιόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν
20 ἢ μὴ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· ἀλλὰ μὴν βέλτιόν
γε μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον ἕκαστον
κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἴεται
δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς κἀγαθούς, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὡς οὐκ
οὖσιν ἱκανῶς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν· διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον συμπρεσβευτὰς
25 τοὺς ἐχθρούς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι
τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ συςσίτια
τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθέτηται τῷ καταστήσαντι
πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον,
καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λάκωσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ
30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλωμα
οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὐναντίον
τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν
εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεται δ'
ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν οὕτω νενομοθετημένον. μετέχειν μὲν
35 γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας
οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ
τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς· τῷ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ναυάρχους
νόμῳ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐπιτετιμήκασιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶντες.
στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αἴτιος· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν,
40 οὖσι στρατηγοῖς ἀιδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία
καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὡδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμήσειεν
It may be said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue; and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having them. But that judges of important causes should hold office for life is a disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. 1And when men have been educated in such a manner that even the legislator himself cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs. 5And therefore they ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be replied), 'All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors.' Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain that the control should be exercised in some other manner. Further, the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders 10is childish; and it is improper that the person to be elected should canvass for the office; the worthiest should be appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens ambitious, and 15he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders; for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice, almost more than any other passions, are the motives of crime.
Whether kings are 20or are not an advantage to states, I will consider at another time; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they are now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join 25enemies with them in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state.
Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called 'phiditia,' regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is expected 30to contribute, and some of them are too poor to afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular. 35For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.
The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are 40perpetual generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another king.
Whether kings are 20or are not an advantage to states, I will consider at another time; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they are now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join 25enemies with them in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state.
Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called 'phiditia,' regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is expected 30to contribute, and some of them are too poor to afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular. 35For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.
The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are 40perpetual generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another king.
1271b
1 ἄν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις ἐπιτετίμηκεν·
πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί,
τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιγαροῦν
ἐσῴζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες
5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν
ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ
ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον· νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τἀγαθὰ
τὰ περιμάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ
τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς
10 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ
κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ
τῆς πόλεως ἔστιν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένοις
πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν
εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰς
15 εἰσφοράς. ἀποβέβηκέ τε τοὐναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος·
τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς
δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων
πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ μάλιστ'
ἄν τις ἐπιτιμήσειεν.
1The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws, against the intention of the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only- the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war. So long as they were at war, therefore, their power was preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell 5for of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher than war. There is another error, equally great, into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods for which men contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, 10they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.
Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one another's contributions. 15The result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city poor, and his citizens greedy.
Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the principal defects.
Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one another's contributions. 15The result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city poor, and his citizens greedy.
Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the principal defects.
Book 2,Chapter 10 (1271b20–1272b23)
20 Ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μέν ἐστι ταύτης,
ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἧττον γλαφυρῶς.
καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ λέγεταί γε τὰ πλεῖστα μεμιμῆσθαι
τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἡ τῶν Λακώνων· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα
τῶν ἀρχαίων ἧττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ
25 γὰρ τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ
βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλεῖστον διατρῖψαι
χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν· ἄποικοι
γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακώνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ' οἱ
πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχουσαν
30 ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω
πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς
τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς·
πάσῃ γὰρ ἐπίκειται τῇ θαλάττῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων
35 ἱδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλατταν πάντων· ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν
τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρόν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπιον
τόπου καὶ Ῥόδου. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν κατέσχεν
ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς
δ' ᾤκισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν
40 ἐκεῖ περὶ Καμικόν. ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις
πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικήν. γεωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἵλωτες
The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, and 20in some few points is quite as good; but for the most part less perfect in form. The older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the later, and the Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a very great measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition, 25Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charillus, went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete. For the two countries are nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing 30among the inhabitants. Even to this day the Perioeci, or subject population of Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos is supposed to have enacted. The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well situated; it extends right across the sea, 35around which nearly all the Hellenes are settled; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others; at last he invaded Sicily, where he died 40near Camicus.
The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not 'phiditia' but 'andria'; and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals originally came from Crete.
The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not 'phiditia' but 'andria'; and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals originally came from Crete.
1272a
1 τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι, καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφοτέροις
ἔστιν, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια
ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεῖα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρῆτες, ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι
ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις. οἱ μὲν
5 γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ
καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν
οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέρουσιν,
οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρῆτες βουλήν, ἴσοι· βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον
μὲν ἦν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρῆτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ
10 κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν· ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέχουσι
πάντες, κυρία δ' οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ συνεπιψηφίσαι τὰ δόξαντα
τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συςσιτίων
ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσιν. ἐν μὲν
γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἕκαστος εἰσφέρει τὸ τεταγμένον,
15 εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας,
καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως·
ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων
δημοσίων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι,
τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοινὰς
20 λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι
πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας·
πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσιτίαν ὡς ὠφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφιλοσόφηκεν
ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναικῶν,
ἵνα μὴ πολυτεκνῶσι, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας
25 ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἧς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως, ἕτερος ἔσται
τοῦ διασκέψασθαι καιρός. ὅτι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλτιον
τέτακται τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν· τὰ
δὲ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων. ὃ μὲν γὰρ
ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις
30 (γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες), ὃ δ' ἐκεῖ συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν
πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθ' οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γάρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν
ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχων ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς
βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν· ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων
αἱροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέροντας
35 ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων, περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄν τις εἴπειε
λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γινομένων (τὸ
γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μεῖζόν ἐστι γέρας τῆς
ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν ἀλλ'
αὐτογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές). τὸ δ' ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα
40 τὸν δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς. οὐδὲν γὰρ
λῆμμα ἔστι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γ'
Further, the two constitutions are similar; 5for the office of the Ephors is the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and 10the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in the ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders and the Cosmi.
The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per head, 15or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth and cattle raised on the public lands, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the Gods and to 20the service of the state, and another to the common meals, so that men, women, and children are all supported out of a common stock. The legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating, which he conceives to be a gain; he likewise encourages the separation of men from women, lest they should have too many children, and 25the companionship of men with one another- whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt.
On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors, 30they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders 35out of those who have been Cosmi.
The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment, and dispensing with written law, is dangerous. 40It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not discontented at being excluded from it. 1For there is no profit to be made out of the office as out of the Ephoralty, since, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation.
The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per head, 15or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth and cattle raised on the public lands, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the Gods and to 20the service of the state, and another to the common meals, so that men, women, and children are all supported out of a common stock. The legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating, which he conceives to be a gain; he likewise encourages the separation of men from women, lest they should have too many children, and 25the companionship of men with one another- whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt.
On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors, 30they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders 35out of those who have been Cosmi.
The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment, and dispensing with written law, is dangerous. 40It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not discontented at being excluded from it. 1For there is no profit to be made out of the office as out of the Ephoralty, since, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation.
1272b
1 ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων. ἣν δὲ ποιοῦνται τῆς
ἁμαρτίας ταύτης ἰατρείαν, ἄτοπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ
δυναστευτική. πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς
κόσμους ἢ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν· ἔξεστι
5 δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταῦτα
δὴ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων
βούλησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανών. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον
τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἣν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις
ὅταν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δοῦναι· ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὡς ἔχει τι
10 πολιτείας ἡ τάξις, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία
μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς
φίλους ἀναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς
ἀλλήλους· καίτοι τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διά τινος χρόνου
μηκέτι πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν
15 κοινωνίαν; ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις,
τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων. ἀλλά, καθάπερ
εἴρηται, σῴζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον· ξενηλασίας γὰρ τὸ
πόρρω πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρησίν,
οἱ δ' εἵλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς
20 ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρῆτες, νεωστί τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς
διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποίηκε φανερὰν τὴν ἀσθένειαν
τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης εἰρήσθω τοσαῦθ'
ἡμῖν τῆς πολιτείας.
The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are allowed 5also to resign before their term of office has expired. Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very unsafe rule. Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not submit to justice. This shows that the Cretan government, although possessing some of 10the characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a close oligarchy.
The nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get together a party among the common people and their own friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this but the temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of 15society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation; distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of strangers; and 20the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of the government of Crete.
The nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get together a party among the common people and their own friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this but the temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of 15society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation; distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of strangers; and 20the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of the government of Crete.
Book 2,Chapter 11 (1272b24–1273b26)
Πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ
25 πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ' ἔνια παραπλησίως
τοῖς Λάκωσιν. αὗται γὰρ αἱ τρεῖς πολιτεῖαι ἀλλήλαις
τε σύνεγγύς πώς εἰσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρουσιν,
ἥ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτη τούτων
ἡ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ'
30 αὐτοῖς καλῶς· σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τὸν
δῆμον διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μήτε
στάσιν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, γεγενῆσθαι μήτε τύραννον.
ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ
μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατὸν
35 καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ
μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσί, ταύτην δ' αἱροῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν
ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον
τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσιν· καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασιλεῖς
μήτε καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι γένος μήτε τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν,
40 εἰ δέ τι διαφέρει, ἐκ τούτων αἱρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν.
μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστῶτες, ἂν εὐτελεῖς ὦσι
The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of government, 25which differs from that of any other state in several respects, though it is in some very like the Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states- the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian- nearly resemble one another, and are very different from any others. Many of the Carthaginian institutions are 30excellent The superiority of their constitution is proved by the fact that the common people remain loyal to the constitution the Carthaginians have never had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant.
Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following: The common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of the 35104 to the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit- this is an improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. 1Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family, nor that an ordinary one, 40but if there is some distinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed by senority- this is far better.
Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following: The common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of the 35104 to the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit- this is an improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. 1Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family, nor that an ordinary one, 40but if there is some distinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed by senority- this is far better.
1273a
1 μεγάλα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ἔβλαψαν ἤδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν
διὰ τὰς παρεκβάσεις κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις ὄντα ταῖς
εἰρημέναις πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας
5 καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὰ μὲν εἰς δῆμον ἐκκλίνει
μᾶλλον, τὰ δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προςάγειν
τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οἱ βασιλεῖς
κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἂν ὁμογνωμονῶσι πάντες, εἰ
δὲ μή, καὶ τούτων ὁ δῆμος. ἃ δ' ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν οὗτοι, οὐ
10 διακοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιδόασι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν,
ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς
εἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἔξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολιτείαις
οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὔσας πολλῶν
καὶ μεγάλων ὑφ' αὑτῶν αἱρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκατὸν
15 ταύτας αἱρεῖσθαι, τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας
πλείονα ἄρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες
ἄρχουσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ
μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον,
καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας
20 (καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι).
παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδονίων
μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατά τινα διάνοιαν ἣ
συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ
πλουτίνδην οἴονται δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας· ἀδύνατον
25 γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἴπερ οὖν
τὸ μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι πλουτίνδην ὀλιγαρχικὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
ἀριστοκρατικόν, αὕτη τις ἂν εἴη τάξις τρίτη, καθ' ἥνπερ
συντέτακται [καὶ] τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν·
αἱροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μάλιστα
30 τὰς μεγίστας, τούς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς.
δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἁμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι
τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὁρᾶν ἐστι
τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν
καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδ'
35 ἰδιωτεύοντες. εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν
σχολῆς, φαῦλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὠνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν,
τήν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν. ἔντιμον γὰρ ὁ νόμος
οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὴν πόλιν
ὅλην φιλοχρήματον. ὅ τι δ' ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ
40 κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολουθεῖν
τούτοις. ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην
Such officers have great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, 1do a great deal of harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon.
Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy 5and constitutional government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people 10is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistrates of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted, 15that they should choose the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office)- these are oligarchical features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates, 20and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of aristocracy. The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth: 25a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well- he has not the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates for their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly 30the highest of them- their kings and generals- with an eye both to merit and to wealth.
But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way; and to this his attention should be first directed. 35Even if you must have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever 40the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example; and, where virtue has not the first place, their aristocracy cannot be firmly established.
Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy 5and constitutional government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people 10is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistrates of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted, 15that they should choose the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office)- these are oligarchical features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates, 20and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of aristocracy. The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth: 25a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well- he has not the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates for their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly 30the highest of them- their kings and generals- with an eye both to merit and to wealth.
But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way; and to this his attention should be first directed. 35Even if you must have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever 40the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example; and, where virtue has not the first place, their aristocracy cannot be firmly established.
1273b
1 οὐχ οἷόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐθίζεσθαι
δ' εὔλογον κερδαίνειν τοὺς ὠνουμένους, ὅταν δαπανήσαντες
ἄρχωσιν· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὢν ἐπιεικὴς δὲ
βουλήσεται κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ' ὢν οὐ βουλήσεται δαπανήσας.
5 διὸ δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστ' ἀργεῖν, τούτους ἄρχειν.
βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν εὐπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης,
ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.
φαῦλον δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείους ἀρχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν
ἄρχειν· ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· ἓν γὰρ
10 ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἔργον ἄριστ' ἀποτελεῖται. δεῖ δ' ὅπως γίνηται τοῦθ'
ὁρᾶν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάττειν τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλεῖν
καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν. ὥσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ <ἡ> πόλις, πολιτικώτερον
πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικώτερον· κοινότερόν
τε γὰρ καθάπερ εἴπομεν καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται
15 τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θᾶττον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν
πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις
διὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι.
ὀλιγαρχικῆς δ' οὔσης τῆς πολιτείας ἄριστα <στάσιν> ἐκφεύγουσι
τῷ πλουτεῖν αἰεί τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος, ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ
20 τὰς πόλεις. τούτῳ γὰρ ἰῶνται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν πολιτείαν.
ἀλλὰ τουτί ἐστι τύχης ἔργον, δεῖ δὲ ἀστασιάστους
εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δέ, ἂν ἀτυχία γένηταί τις
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἔστι φάρμακον
διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων
25 πολιτείας καὶ Κρητικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἵπερ
δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσι, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.
Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will not. 5Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best. And even if the legislator does not care to protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for them when in office.
It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should hold many offices, which is a favorite practice among the Carthaginians, 10for one business is better done by one man. The legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance both with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I said, this arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is better 15and sooner performed. We have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all.
The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to 20their colonies. This is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. Accident favors them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of the subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods.
Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, 25Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.
It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should hold many offices, which is a favorite practice among the Carthaginians, 10for one business is better done by one man. The legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance both with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I said, this arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is better 15and sooner performed. We have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all.
The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to 20their colonies. This is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. Accident favors them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of the subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods.
Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, 25Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.
Book 2,Chapter 12 (1273b27–1274b28)
Τῶν δὲ ἀποφηναμένων τι περὶ πολιτείας ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ
ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ὡντινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν
ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον, περὶ ὧν εἴ τι ἀξιόλογον, εἴρηται
30 σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, ἔνιοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οἱ
μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οἱ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀθνείων τισί, πολιτευθέντες
αὐτοί· καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν νόμων ἐγένοντο δημιουργοὶ
μόνον, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἷον καὶ Λυκοῦργος καὶ
Σόλων· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν.
35 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων εἴρηται, Σόλωνα δ' ἔνιοι
μὲν οἴονται νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον· ὀλιγαρχίαν τε
γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὖσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν
δῆμον παῦσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστῆσαι τὴν πάτριον,
μείξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ
40 πάγῳ βουλὴν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς ἀριστοκρατικόν,
τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δημοτικόν. ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων
Of those who have treated of governments, some have never taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives in a private station; about most of them, what was worth telling has been already told. 30Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered; and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions; for example, Lycurgus and Solon did both. 35Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have already spoken. 1As to Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of the state.
1274a
1 ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τήν τε βουλὴν
καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστῆσαι,
τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονταί
τινες αὐτῷ· λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστήριον
5 πάντων, κληρωτὸν ὄν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἴσχυσεν, ὥσπερ
τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν
δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν
Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια
μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον
10 ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὔξων εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν.
φαίνεται δ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο
προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρχίας
γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη
καὶ δημαγωγοὺς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευομένων
15 τῶν ἐπιεικῶν), ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην
ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι
καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος
δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος), τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων
καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμνων
20 καὶ ζευγιτῶν καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης
ἱππάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον τὸ θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν.
νομοθέται δ' ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζεφυρίοις,
καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις καὶ
ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν
25 καὶ Σικελίαν. πειρῶνται δέ τινες καὶ συνάγειν ὡς Ὀνομακρίτου
μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνασθῆναι
δ' αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ, Λοκρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα,
κατὰ τέχνην μαντικήν· τούτου δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἑταῖρον,
Θάλητος δ' ἀκροατὴν Λυκοῦργον καὶ Ζάλευκον, Ζαλεύκου
30 δὲ Χαρώνδαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἀσκεπτότερον τῶν
χρόνων λέγοντες. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος νομοθέτης
Θηβαίοις. ἦν δ' ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν
Βακχιαδῶν, ἐραστὴς δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος
Ὀλυμπίασιν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος τὴν πόλιν ἔλιπε διαμισήσας τὸν
35 ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυόνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θήβας· κἀκεῖ
τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἔτι δεικνύουσι τοὺς
τάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλήλοις μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὄντας, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τὸν μὲν σύνοπτον τὸν δ' οὐ σύνοπτον·
μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφήν, τὸν μὲν
40 Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἄποπτος
ἔσται ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον ὅπως
According to their view, the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that 1the council and the elected magistracy existed before the time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of an the citizens, thus creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he is sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the law courts, 5which are elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-democratic element. When the law courts grew powerful, to please the people who were now playing the tyrant the old constitution was changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus; Pericles also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus 10every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now see. All this is true; it seems, however, to be the result of circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people, having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian War, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues, whom 15the better class opposed. 20Solon, himself, appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely necessary; for without it they would have been in a state 40of slavery and enmity to the government.
1274b
1 ἄποπτος. ᾤκησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ
τοῖς Θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης δ' αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περί
τ' ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὓς καλοῦσιν
ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικούς· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἰδίως ὑπ' ἐκείνου νενομοθετημένον,
5 ὅπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σῴζηται τῶν κλήρων. Χαρώνδου
δ' ἴδιον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρτυριῶν
(πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δ' ἀκριβείᾳ
τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.
Φαλέου δ' ἴδιον ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσις, Πλάτωνος δ' ἥ
10 τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ
τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος,
τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς
ἄσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνωνται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην,
ὡς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ
15 ἄχρηστον. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσί, πολιτείᾳ δ' ὑπαρχούσῃ
τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν· ἴδιον δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδὲν ἔστιν ὅ
τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιον, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας
μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς ἀλλ'
οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἄν
20 τι πταίσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ γὰρ
τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην
ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ
πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ῥηγῖνος
νομοθέτης Χαλκιδεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, οὗ τὰ περί τε τὰ φονικὰ
25 καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἐστίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἴδιόν γε οὐδὲν
αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἄν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας,
τάς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένας, ἔστω τεθεωρημένα
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
1All the magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the class called zeugitae, or from a third class of so-called 5knights or cavalry. The fourth class were laborers who had no share in any magistracy.
Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Catana, and for the 10other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. Some people attempt to make out that Onomacritus was the first person who had any special skill in legislation, and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived 15in the exercise of his prophetic art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is quite inconsistent with chronology.
There was also 20Philolaus, the Corinthian, who gave laws to the Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had 25conceived for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. The inhabitants still point out their tombs, whic
Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Catana, and for the 10other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. Some people attempt to make out that Onomacritus was the first person who had any special skill in legislation, and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived 15in the exercise of his prophetic art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is quite inconsistent with chronology.
There was also 20Philolaus, the Corinthian, who gave laws to the Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had 25conceived for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. The inhabitants still point out their tombs, whic