Ross (OCT, 1957) · Jowett (1885)
Jowett (1885)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 1,Chapter 1 (1252a1–23)
1252a
1 Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ
πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ
εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον
ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ
5 καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας
περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις
καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν
καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν
αὐτὸν οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλήθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι
10 διαφέρειν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἴδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν
ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἔτι
πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν
μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν· καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ
βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκῃ, βασιλικόν, ὅταν
15 δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος
ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικόν· ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ)·
δῆλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην
μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον
μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα
20 μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται
σκοποῦντες ὀψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν
ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ
ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.
1Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, 5which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they 10differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, 15according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least 20parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they 10differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, 15according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least 20parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.
Book 1,Chapter 2 (1252a24–1253a39)
Εἰ δή τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειεν,
25 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω
θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ
ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς
γεννήσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι,
30 οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ
ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ
διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ
δυνάμενον [ταῦτα] τῷ σώματι πονεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει
δοῦλον· διὸ δεσπότῃ καὶ δούλῳ ταὐτὸ συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, 25will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them 30an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest.
1252b
1 οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις
ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν,
πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα
τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἑνὶ
5 δουλεῦον)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν
αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν,
ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διό
φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ "βαρβάρων δ' Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός",
ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων
10 τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος
εἶπε ποιήσας "οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα"·
ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησίν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν
οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν
οἶκός ἐστιν, οὓς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης
15 δὲ ὁ Κρὴς ὁμοκάπους· ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία
πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δὲ
κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι, οὓς καλοῦσί
τινες ὁμογάλακτας, παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας.
διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ
20 ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον· πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία
βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι, διὰ
τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος "θεμιστεύει
δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων". σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω
τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ
25 βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ δὲ τὸ
ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν
οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. ἡ δ' ἐκ
πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἤδη πάσης ἔχουσα
πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν τοῦ
30 ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἔστιν,
εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων,
ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως
τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ
ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον·
Now nature 1has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. 5But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say, "It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians; " as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of these 10two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says, "First house and wife and an ox for the plough, " for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides 15the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, 20as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says:
"Each one gives law to his children and to his wives. " For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods 25have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs 30of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family.
Out of these 10two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says, "First house and wife and an ox for the plough, " for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides 15the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, 20as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says:
"Each one gives law to his children and to his wives. " For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods 25have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs 30of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family.
1253a
1 ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν
φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος
φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ
τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος· ὥσπερ
5 καὶ ὁ ὑφ' Ὁμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς "ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος"·
ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ
ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον,
δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον
10 δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ
λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει
ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ
ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν
ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ
15 τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ
καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν
ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ
πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστιν.
20 τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου
γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως,
ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν λιθίνην (διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται
τοιαύτη), πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε
μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα.
25 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος,
δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως
τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος
κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος
πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν
30 πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας
μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθεὶς βέλτιστον
τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθεὶς νόμου καὶ
δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα
ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ
35 ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τἀναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον
καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια
καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ
δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ
δικαίου κρίσις.
Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and 1to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the 5"Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, " whom Homer denounces- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and 10man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and 15inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, 20since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the same name. 25The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in 30all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and 35virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the 5"Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, " whom Homer denounces- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and 10man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and 15inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, 20since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the same name. 25The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in 30all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and 35virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
Book 1,Chapter 3 (1253b1–22)
1253b
1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν,
ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται
πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία
συνέστηκεν· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἐπεὶ
5 δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἕκαστον ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ
καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος, καὶ πόσις
καὶ ἄλοχος, καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν ἂν τούτων
σκεπτέον εἴη τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ
δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς
10 σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ
ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). ἔστωσαν δὴ αὗται <αἱ> τρεῖς ἃς εἴπομεν.
ἔστι δέ τι μέρος ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία,
τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως δ' ἔχει, θεωρητέον·
λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς. πρῶτον δὲ
15 περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπωμεν, ἵνα τά τε πρὸς τὴν
ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἴδωμεν, κἂν εἴ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ
αὐτῶν δυναίμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβανομένων.
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία,
καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βασιλική,
20 καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενοι· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν
τὸ δεσπόζειν (νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλεύθερον,
φύσει δ' οὐθὲν διαφέρειν)· διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον
γάρ.
1Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state we must speak of the management of the household. The parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. 5Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be: I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage relation (the conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), 10and thirdly, the procreative relation (this also has no proper name). And there is another element of a household, the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.
15Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, 20as I was saying at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.
15Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, 20as I was saying at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.
Book 1,Chapter 4 (1253b23–1254a16)
Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ
μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον
25 καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὴ ταῖς ὡρισμέναις τέχναις
ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει
ἀποτελεσθήσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ. τῶν
δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ
ὁ μὲν οἴαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῳρεὺς ἔμψυχον· ὁ
30 γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἴδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν)· οὕτω καὶ
τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωήν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος
ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον, καὶ ὥσπερ
ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὑπηρέτης. εἰ γὰρ ἠδύνατο
ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀποτελεῖν
35 τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον, <καὶ> ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἢ τοὺς
τοῦ Ἡφαίστου τρίποδας, οὕς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θεῖον
δύεσθαι ἀγῶνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον αὐταὶ καὶ τὰ
πλῆκτρα ἐκιθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν
Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can 25live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; 30for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence of all other instruments. For if every instrument could accomplish 35its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, "of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods; " if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves.
1254a
1 ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δούλων. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα
ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ
μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἕτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἡ χρῆσις μόνον.
5 ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἴδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις,
καὶ δέονται ἀμφότεραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν
αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις, ἐστιν·
διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. τὸ δὲ
κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ
10 μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἄλλου· ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον,
ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλός
ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ
δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὑτοῦ φύσει
15 ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἄνθρωπος ὤν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἄλλου
δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὃς ἂν κτῆμα ᾖ ἄνθρωπος ὤν, κτῆμα δὲ
ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν.
Here, however, another distinction must be drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use. 5Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not 10only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own 15but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.
Book 1,Chapter 5 (1254a17–1255a2)
Πότερον δ' ἔστι τις φύσει
τοιοῦτος ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν τινι δουλεύειν
ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστί, μετὰ ταῦτα
20 σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ
τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι
οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστί,
καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι
τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἴδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ
25 ἀρχομένων ἔστιν (καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ τῶν βελτιόνων
ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελούμενον
ὑπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων βέλτιον ἔργον· ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει
τὸ δ' ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον)· ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων
συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἕν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ
30 διῃρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον,
καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς
ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις
ἀρχή, οἷον ἁρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας
ἐστὶ σκέψεως· τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς
35 καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον.
δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον
τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα
διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄνθρωπον
θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ
But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?
20There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.
And there are many kinds both of rulers and 25subjects (and that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects- for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or 30discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul 35and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. 1But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted.
20There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.
And there are many kinds both of rulers and 25subjects (and that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects- for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or 30discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul 35and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. 1But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted.
1254b
1 μοχθηρῶς ἐχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα
τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν. ἔστι
δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῴῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ δεσποτικὴν
ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος
5 ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πολιτικὴν
ἢ βασιλικήν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν
καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς,
καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ
λόγον ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἴσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν.
10 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὡσαύτως· τὰ
μὲν γὰρ ἥμερα τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίω τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις δὲ
πᾶσι βέλτιον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας
οὕτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν
κρεῖττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον. τὸν
15 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων.
ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος
καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσων
ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν
βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μέν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν
20 ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι
γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου
ἐστίν), καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ
μὴ ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγῳ [αἰσθανόμενα] ἀλλὰ
παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν·
25 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ'
ἀμφοῖν, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῴων.
βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα
ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ
πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς
30 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν
βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διῃρημένος εἴς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν
χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικήν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοὐναντίον,
τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς
ψυχάς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὡς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιντο διάφοροι
35 τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους
πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.
εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ
τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν
τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος. ὅτι μὲν
And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or 1corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul 5rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. 10The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; 15this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors 20that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; 25for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless for 30such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens- that some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another 35in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen.
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors 20that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; 25for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless for 30such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens- that some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another 35in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen.
1255a
1 τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερόν,
οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν.
1It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.
Book 1,Chapter 6 (1255a3–1255b15)
Ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τἀναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγουσιν
ὀρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν
5 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ
δουλεύων· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν ἐν ᾗ τὰ κατὰ
πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναί φασιν. τοῦτο δὴ
τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γράφονται
παρανόμων, ὡς δεινὸν <ὂν> εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου
10 καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἔσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον
τὸ βιασθέν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ τοῖς δ' ἐκείνως, καὶ
τῶν σοφῶν. αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ
ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα
χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ
15 ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ὥστε δοκεῖν
μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον
εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν ἄνοια
δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν
κρείττονα ἄρχειν)· ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων
20 οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἅτεροι λόγοι, ὡς
οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. ὅλως
δ' ἀντεχόμενοί τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος
δίκαιόν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν,
ἅμα δ' οὔ φασιν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν
25 εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς
ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς
εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν
συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται
λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν,
30 οὐθὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὅπερ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν
πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δ' οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
περὶ εὐγενείας· αὑτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ' αὑτοῖς εὐγενεῖς
ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἴκοι μόνον,
35 ὡς ὄν τι τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς εὐγενὲς καὶ ἐλεύθερον τὸ δ'
οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησὶ
"θείων δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἔκγονον ῥιζωμάτων
τίς ἂν προσειπεῖν ἀξιώσειεν λάτριν;"
ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθενὶ ἀλλ' ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διορίζουσι
40 τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον, καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς
But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. 5There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention- the law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and 10is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as follows: in some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of exercising force; 15and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out separately, 20the other views have no force or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of 25the war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, 30they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, 35thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:
"Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods? " What does this mean but that they distinguish 40freedom and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil?
"Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods? " What does this mean but that they distinguish 40freedom and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil?
1255b
1 δυσγενεῖς. ἀξιοῦσι γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον καὶ
ἐκ θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίον, οὕτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν.
ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι
δύναται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις,
5 καὶ οὐκ <ἀεί> εἰσιν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι, δῆλον,
καὶ ὅτι ἔν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὧν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ
δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν [καὶ δίκαιον], καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν
ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δ' ἄρχειν ἣν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν, ὥστε
καὶ δεσπόζειν, τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ
10 γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ, καὶ σώματι καὶ
ψυχῇ, ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχόν τι
τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος· διὸ καὶ συμφέρον
ἐστί τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς
φύσει τούτων ἠξιωμένοις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον,
15 ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τοὐναντίον).
They think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, 5and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; 10for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, 15but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true.
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, 5and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; 10for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, 15but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true.
Book 1,Chapter 7 (1255b16–40)
Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία
καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινές
φασιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δούλων ἐστίν, καὶ
ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος),
20 ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπότης
οὐ λέγεται κατ' ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδ' εἶναι,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος. ἐπιστήμη δ' ἂν
εἴη καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλική, δουλικὴ μὲν οἵαν περ ὁ ἐν
Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευεν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθὸν
25 ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παῖδας· εἴη δ'
ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον τῶν τοιούτων μάθησις, οἷον ὀψοποιικὴ
καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακονίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα
ἑτέρων τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγκαιότερα, καὶ
κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν "δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου".
30 αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦται πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι·
δεσποτικὴ δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ χρηστικὴ δούλων. ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης
οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι
δούλοις. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ
σεμνόν· ἃ γὰρ τὸν δοῦλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκεῖνον δεῖ
35 ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ ὅσοις ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοὺς
κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπός <τις> λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμήν, αὐτοὶ
δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ ἑτέρα ἀμφοτέρων
τούτων, οἷον ἡ δικαία, πολεμική τις οὖσα ἢ θηρευτική.
περὶ μὲν οὖν δούλου καὶ δεσπότου τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν
40 τρόπον.
The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the same with each other. For there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: 20whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals. The master is not called a master because he has science, but because he is of a certain character, and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master and science for the slave. The science of the slave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made money by 25instructing slaves in their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge may be carried further, so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some duties are of the more necessary, others of the more honorable sort; as the proverb says, 'slave before slave, master before master.' 30But all such branches of knowledge are servile. There is likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need only 35know how to order that which the slave must know how to execute. Hence those who are in a position which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war. 1Enough of the distinction between master and slave.
Book 1,Chapter 8 (1256a1–1256b39)
1256a
1 Ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν
κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος
τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν
ἄν τις πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστιν
5 ἢ μέρος τι, ἢ ὑπηρετική, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον ὡς ἡ
κερκιδοποιικὴ τῇ ὑφαντικῇ ἢ ὡς ἡ χαλκουργικὴ τῇ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ
(οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὄργανα
παρέχει, ἡ δὲ τὴν ὕλην· λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον
ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντῃ μὲν ἔρια
10 ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν). ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ
τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι,
τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι· τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησομένη
τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν;)· πότερον δὲ
μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστί τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν·
15 εἰ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ
κτῆσις ἔσται, ἥ γε κτῆσις πολλὰ περιείληφε μέρη καὶ ὁ
πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς χρηματιστικῆς
ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν
ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτῆσις; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς,
20 διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ
τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζῴων.
τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν,
ὁποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν
25 ζῳοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι,
ὥστε πρὸς τὰς ῥᾳστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἡ φύσις τοὺς
βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταὐτὸ ἑκάστῳ ἡδὺ κατὰ φύσιν
ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἑτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζῳοφάγων καὶ τῶν
καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστᾶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ
30 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι.
οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσίν (ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέρων
τροφὴ ζῴων ἄνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζουσιν· ἀναγκαίου
δ' ὄντος μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήνεσι διὰ τὰς νομὰς καὶ
αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν
35 γεωργοῦντες)· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἑτέρας,
οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἁλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας
καὶ ἕλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προςοικοῦσιν,
οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον
γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῇ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρπῶν.
40 οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδόν εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον
ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ καπηλείας
1Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of getting wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether the art of getting wealth is the same with the art of managing a household 5or a part of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in the way that the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by material I mean the substratum out of which any work is made; thus wool is the material of the weaver, 10bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the art of household management is not identical with the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the other provides. For the art which uses household stores can be no other than the art of household management. There is, however, a doubt whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household management or a distinct art. 15If the getter of wealth has to consider whence wealth and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of property and riches, then are husbandry, and the care and provision of food in general, parts of the wealth-getting art or distinct arts? Again, there are many sorts of food, and therefore 20there are many kinds of lives both of animals and men; they must all have food, and the differences in their food have made differences in their ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the way which is best adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are 25carnivorous or herbivorous or omnivorous: and their habits are determined for them by nature in such a manner that they may obtain with greater facility the food of their choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them; and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ among themselves. 30In the lives of men too there is a great difference. The laziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their subsistence without trouble from tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them, 35cultivating a sort of living farm. Others support themselves by hunting, which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. 40The greater number obtain a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil.
1256b
1 πορίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικὸς λῃστρικὸς ἁλιευτικὸς
θηρευτικὸς γεωργικός. οἱ δὲ καὶ μιγνύντες ἐκ τούτων
ἡδέως ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον, ᾗ
τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἷον οἱ μὲν
5 νομαδικὸν ἅμα καὶ λῃστρικόν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικὸν καὶ θηρευτικόν·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους· ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεία
συναναγκάζῃ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη
κτῆσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν,
ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν.
10 καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκτίκτει
τῶν ζῴων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὥσθ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις
οὗ ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὑτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα
σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ᾠοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζῳοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις
ἔχει τροφὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος
15 φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον
τά τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα
τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δ' ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ
τά γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἕνεκεν, ἵνα
20 καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ
φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.
διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ
μέρος αὐτῆς), ᾗ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρός τε τὰ θηρία καὶ
25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς
φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος
κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν, ὅτι δεῖ
ἤτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ ὧν ἔστι θησαυρισμὸς
χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ χρησίμων
30 εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὅ γ' ἀληθινὸς
πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως
αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων
φησὶ ποιήσας "πλούτου δ' οὐθὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι
κεῖται". κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις·
35 οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστι τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει
οὔτε μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πλῆθός ἐστιν οἰκονομικῶν
καὶ πολιτικῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ
κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι'
ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον.
Such are the modes of subsistence which prevail among those whose industry springs up of itself, 1and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail trade- there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus 5the life of a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up. 10For some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much food as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves, 15which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of 20clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, 25and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.
Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to life, and useful 30for the community of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that "No bound to riches has been fixed for man. " But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; 35for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of acquisition which is practiced by managers of households and by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.
Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to life, and useful 30for the community of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that "No bound to riches has been fixed for man. " But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; 35for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of acquisition which is practiced by managers of households and by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.
Book 1,Chapter 9 (1256b40–1258a18)
40 Ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ
δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικήν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ
There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly called an art of 40wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the notion that riches and property have no limit.
1257a
1 πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως· ἣν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν
αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν·
ἔστι δ' οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ'
ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπειρίας
5 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς
τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἑκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσίς
ἐστιν, ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ'
αὑτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ' οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος,
οἷον ὑποδήματος ἥ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμφότεραι
10 γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος
τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς
χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ᾗ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν
χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονε. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ
15 μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ
κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν
ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς
χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική· ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον
ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν). ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ
20 κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἔργον
αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλειόνων τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν
πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρων· ὧν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι
τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν
25 βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγήν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ
χρήσιμα πρὸς αὑτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλέον δ' οὐθέν,
οἷον οἶνον πρὸς σῖτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ
οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστιν εἶδος οὐδέν
30 (εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἦν)· ἐκ
μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ' ἐκείνη κατὰ λόγον. ξενικωτέρας γὰρ
γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς <ἦσαν> καὶ
ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη
χρῆσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν
35 ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο
πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων
αὐτὸ ὂν εἶχε τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἷον
σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
ἁπλῶς ὁρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον
40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων, ἵνα ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως
αὑτούς· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτὴρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημεῖον. πορισθέντος
Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though they are not very different, neither are they the same. The kind already described is given by nature, the other is gained by experience and art.
Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations:
Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both 10are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for 15the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first 20community, indeed, which is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but it begins to be useful when the society increases. For the members of the family originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practiced among 25barbarous nations who exchange with one another the necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for 5example, in exchange for coin, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but 30is needed for the satisfaction of men's natural wants. The other or more complex form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of the simpler. When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and 35hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in process of time 40they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.
1When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of necessary articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely, retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made.
Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations:
Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both 10are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for 15the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first 20community, indeed, which is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but it begins to be useful when the society increases. For the members of the family originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practiced among 25barbarous nations who exchange with one another the necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for 5example, in exchange for coin, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but 30is needed for the satisfaction of men's natural wants. The other or more complex form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of the simpler. When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and 35hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in process of time 40they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.
1When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of necessary articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely, retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made.
1257b
1 οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς
θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον ἁπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη
τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον
5 ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ
νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πόθεν
ἔσται πλῆθος χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ γάρ ἐστι πλούτου
καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νομίσματος
πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν
10 καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὁτὲ δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ
νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων
τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐθενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς
οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις
ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον
15 εἶναι πλοῦτον οὗ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν
Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς
πάντων αὐτῷ γιγνομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ
ζητοῦσιν ἕτερόν τι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν, ὀρθῶς
ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ
20 κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ δὲ καπηλικὴ
ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως, ἀλλὰ διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς.
καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ
νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστιν. καὶ ἄπειρος
δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος, ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.
25 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστι, καὶ
ἑκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἄπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ
ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον
(πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς
χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
30 πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς αὖ χρηματιστικῆς
ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον.
διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρας,
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον τοὐναντίον· πάντες
γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον αὔξουσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα.
35 αἴτιον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις,
τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὖσα, ἑκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς
ἐστι κτήσεως χρῆσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν
ἕτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὔξησις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τισι τοῦτ' εἶναι
τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἢ σῴζειν οἰόμενοι
40 δεῖν ἢ αὔξειν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἄπειρον. αἴτιον
δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ
5Originating in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting wealth 10and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food. But how can that 15be wealth of which a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold?
Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing; 20in their true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of exchange and the measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth getting. 25As in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is 30riches of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its business. And, therefore, in one point of view, all riches must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find the opposite to be the case; for all getters of wealth increase their hoard of coin without limit. 35The source of the confusion is the near connection between the two kinds of wealth-getting; in either, the instrument is the same, although the use is different, and so they pass into one another; for each is a use of the same property, but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to 40increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. 1The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit.
Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing; 20in their true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of exchange and the measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth getting. 25As in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is 30riches of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its business. And, therefore, in one point of view, all riches must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find the opposite to be the case; for all getters of wealth increase their hoard of coin without limit. 35The source of the confusion is the near connection between the two kinds of wealth-getting; in either, the instrument is the same, although the use is different, and so they pass into one another; for each is a use of the same property, but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to 40increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. 1The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit.
1258a
1 μὴ τὸ εὖ ζῆν· εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὔσης,
καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ
ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς
ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν,
5 πᾶσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ
ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερβολῇ
γὰρ οὔσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς
ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητοῦσιν· κἂν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς
δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶνται,
10 ἑκάστῃ χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρείας
γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς
καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ
πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὡς τοῦτο τέλος ὄν, πρὸς δὲ
τὸ τέλος ἅπαντα δέον ἀπαντᾶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ
15 ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τίς, καὶ δι' αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν
χρείᾳ ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι
ἑτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ περὶ τὴν
τροφήν, οὐχ ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἄπειρος ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα ὅρον.
Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, 5they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth, they try other arts, 10using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this the aim of the general's or of the physician's art; but the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute.
Thus, then, we have considered 15the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.
Thus, then, we have considered 15the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.
Book 1,Chapter 10 (1258a19–1258b8)
Δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ
20 οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστιν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ
δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ
ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται
αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ <πρὸς> τροφὴν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ
θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι), ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα διαθεῖναι
25 προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς ἔρια
ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνῶναι δὲ τὸ ποῖον
χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον, ἢ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπιτήδειον. καὶ γὰρ
ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τί ἡ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς
οἰκονομίας, ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ οὐ μόριον· καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς
30 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὥσπερ ζῆν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ περὶ
ὑγιείας ἰδεῖν, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἰατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ
τῶν χρημάτων ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ἀλλὰ
τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ
35 φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον τροφὴν τῷ
γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφὴ τὸ
λειπόμενόν ἐστι. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ
πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων. διπλῆς δ' οὔσης
αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλικῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς,
40 καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινουμένης, τῆς
And we have found the answer to our original question, Whether the art of getting wealth is the business of 20the manager of a household and of the statesman or not their business? viz., that wealth is presupposed by them. For as political science does not make men, but takes them from nature and uses them, so too nature provides them with earth or sea or the like as a source of food. At this stage 25begins the duty of the manager of a household, who has to order the things which nature supplies; he may be compared to the weaver who has not to make but to use wool, and to know, too, what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and unserviceable. Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the art of getting wealth is a part of the management of a household and the art of medicine not; for surely the members of 30a household must have health just as they must have life or any other necessary. The answer is that as from one point of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state have to consider about health, from another point of view not they but the physician; so in one way the art of household management, in another way the subordinate art, has to consider about wealth. But, strictly speaking, as I have already said, 35the means of life must be provided beforehand by nature; for the business of nature is to furnish food to that which is born, and the food of the offspring is always what remains over of that from which it is produced. 1Wherefore the art of getting wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.
1258b
1 δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν
ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολοστατικὴ
διὰ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν
καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη. μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν,
5 ὁ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον (ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα τοῦτ' εἴληφεν·
ὅμοια γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννῶσιν αὐτά ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ
τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος)· ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ
φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστιν.
There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, 1while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, 5but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of an modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.
Book 1,Chapter 11 (1258b9–1259a36)
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανῶς, τὰ
10 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν
μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλευθέραν ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.
ἔστι δὲ χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα· τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα
ἔμπειρον εἶναι, ποῖα λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον
ἵππων κτῆσις ποία τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
15 τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων (δεῖ γὰρ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλά
τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν ποίοις τόποις·
ἄλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ χώραις), εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας,
καὶ ταύτης ἤδη ψιλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελιττουργίας,
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀφ'
20 ὅσων ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοηθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς
ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρώτης, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς
μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία
φορτηγία παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἑτέρων τῷ
τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν),
25 δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία (ταύτης
δ' ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνιτῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων
καὶ τῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων)· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς
μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς
κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς
30 καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γιγνομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ,
οἷον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ
ἤδη περιείληφε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἴδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευομένων
ἔστιν. περὶ ἑκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται
καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν
35 πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ
τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης,
βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα,
δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται
δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἐνίοις
40 γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χαρητίδῃ τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ
Enough has been said about the theory of wealth-getting; 10we will now proceed to the practical part. The discussion of such matters is not unworthy of philosophy, but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal and irksome. The useful parts of wealth-getting are, first, the knowledge of livestock- which are most profitable, and where, and how- as, for example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or 15any other animals are most likely to give a return. A man ought to know which of these pay better than others, and which pay best in particular places, for some do better in one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry, which may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and of fish, or fowl, or of any animals 20which may be useful to man. These are the divisions of the true or proper art of wealth-getting and come first. Of the other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important division is commerce (of which there are three kinds- the provision of a ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure for sale- these again differing as they are safer or more profitable), 25the second is usury, the third, service for hire- of this, one kind is employed in the mechanical arts, the other in unskilled and bodily labor. There is still a third sort of wealth getting intermediate between this and the first or natural mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned with exchange, viz., the industries that make their profit from the earth, 30and from things growing from the earth which, although they bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable; for example, the cutting of timber and all mining. The art of mining, by which minerals are obtained, itself has many branches, for there are various kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the several divisions of wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute consideration of them might be useful 35in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length now.
40Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least element of chance; they are the meanest in which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile in which there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least need of excellence.
40Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least element of chance; they are the meanest in which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile in which there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least need of excellence.
1259a
1 Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ
πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα
μὲν ἐκ τούτων θεωρείτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα
σποράδην, δι' ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματιζόμενοι,
5 δεῖ συλλέγειν. πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῖς
τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικήν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου·
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ
μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι
ὄν. ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς
10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν
φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος
εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι τῶν
ἐλαιουργίων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου μισθωσάμενον
ἅτ' οὐθενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς
15 ἧκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα ὃν
τρόπον ἠβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδεῖξαι
ὅτι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ'
οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον
τὸν τρόπον ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ
20 εἴπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, ἐάν τις δύνηται
μονοπωλίαν αὑτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔνιαι
τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορῶσι χρημάτων· μονοπωλίαν
γὰρ τῶν ὠνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δέ τις τεθέντος
παρ' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπρίατο πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ
25 τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπορίων
οἱ ἔμποροι, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν
τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις
ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ
μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἔτι
30 μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὑρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ
πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὅραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο
ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι
μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς.
πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων
35 πόρων, ὥσπερ οἰκίᾳ, μᾶλλον δέ· διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολιτεύονται
τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον.
Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons; for example, by Chares the Parian, 1and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have treated of other branches; any one who cares for such matters may refer to their writings. It would be well also 5to collect the scattered stories of the ways in which individuals have succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is useful to persons who value the art of getting wealth. There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which involves a principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on account of his reputation for wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show 10that philosophy was of no use. According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time 15came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. He is supposed to have given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as 20I was saying, his device for getting wealth is of universal application, and is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often practiced by cities when they are want of money; they make a monopoly of provisions.
There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him, bought up an the iron from 25the iron mines; afterwards, when the merchants from their various markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and without much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but that he must not 30remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered a way of making money which was injurious to his own interests. He made the same discovery as Thales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as well ought to know these things; for a state is often as much in want of money and of such 35devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely to finance.
There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him, bought up an the iron from 25the iron mines; afterwards, when the merchants from their various markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and without much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but that he must not 30remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered a way of making money which was injurious to his own interests. He made the same discovery as Thales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as well ought to know these things; for a state is often as much in want of money and of such 35devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely to finance.
Book 1,Chapter 12 (1259a37–1259b17)
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἓν μὲν δεσποτική,
περὶ ἧς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἓν δὲ πατρική, τρίτον δὲ
γαμική (καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχει καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων
40 μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ
Of household management we have seen that there are three parts- one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, 40but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule.
1259b
1 γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τό τε γὰρ
ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μή που συνέστηκε
παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεωτέρου
καὶ ἀτελοῦς)—ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς
5 πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἴσου
γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὅμως
δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχῃ τὸ δ' ἄρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι
καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἄμασις
εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτῆρος λόγον· τὸ δ' ἄρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς
10 τὸ θῆλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ
βασιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ
κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ
καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν "πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν
τε θεῶν τε" τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἁπάντων. φύσει γὰρ
15 τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν·
ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεννήσας
πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.
For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But in 5most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male 10to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and men,' because he is the king of them all. For 15a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.
Book 1,Chapter 13 (1259b18–1260b24)
Φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας
περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτῆσιν, καὶ
20 περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν καλοῦμεν
πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων. πρῶτον μὲν
οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετή τις
δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα
τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ <ἑκάστη>
25 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς
σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας (ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως· εἴτε
γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων
ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον). σχεδὸν δὲ
ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός,
30 πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι
σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἔστι καὶ ἀκόλαστος
καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὔ; καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον
περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ
ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας,
35 διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι
καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν·
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει, τὸ
δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μή,
θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος,
40 πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθήσεται
Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and 20to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities- whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, 25and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and children, 30whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or note So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally required in both, 35why should one of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, 40how can he rule well? 1If the subject, how can he obey well?
1260a
1 καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει
τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν
ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφοράς, ὥσπερ καὶ
τῶν φύσει ἀρχόντων. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται <τὰ> περὶ τὴν
5 ψυχήν· ἐν ταύτῃ γάρ ἐστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ'
ἀρχόμενον, ὧν ἑτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον
ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα
καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου
10 ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός, καὶ πᾶσιν
ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν,
τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μέν,
ἀλλ' ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς
15 ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον <ἱκανὸν> ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ
ἔργον· διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν
ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ
λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει
20 αὐτοῖς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων
πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός,
οὐδ' ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ'
ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ δ' ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ
περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον
25 ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς
ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἤ τι
τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες
τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένων. διὸ δεῖ,
ὥσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς εἴρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν
30 περὶ πάντων· "γυναικὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει", ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ
οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι τούτου μὲν καὶ
ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος
καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην. ἔθεμεν
δὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε δῆλον
35 ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε
δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων. ἀπορήσειε
δ' ἄν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές, ἆρα καὶ τοὺς
τεχνίτας δεήσει ἔχειν ἀρετήν· πολλάκις γὰρ δι' ἀκολασίαν
ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἢ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖστον; ὁ μὲν γὰρ
40 δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει
ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας· ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης
1If he be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of 5the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which 10the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in an of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the 15moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper 20to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we 25look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. 30All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women, "Silence is a woman's glory, " but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously 35require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self control? 40But is there not a great difference in the two cases?
1260b
1 ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος
τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐθείς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ
δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ' οὐ <τὸν> τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν
5 ἔργων [δεσποτικήν]. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους
ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον
γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ
δ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ
10 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας,
τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστι, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν
τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον
ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως,
ταῦτα δ' οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν
15 ἀρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν
καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς
τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ <τὸ> τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους
καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ
μὲν γὰρ γυναῖκες ἥμισυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων οἱ
20 κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστ', ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων
διώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς τέλος
ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν,
καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναμένων περὶ τῆς
πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης.
For the slave shares in his master's life; the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic 1has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in his 5duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.
So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, 10their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to 15the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children 20grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.
Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.
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So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, 10their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to 15the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children 20grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.
Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.
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