Ross (OCT, 1958) · Pickard-Cambridge (1928)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 6,Chapter 1 (139a24–139b18)
139a
Τῆς δὲ περὶ τοὺς ὅρους πραγματείας μέρη πέντε ἔστιν·
25 ἢ γὰρ ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, καθ' οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ
τὸν λόγον (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμὸν κατὰ παντὸς
ἀνθρώπου ἀληθεύεσθαι), ἢ ὅτι ὄντος γένους οὐκ ἔθηκεν εἰς τὸ
γένος, ἢ οὐκ εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον γένος ἔθηκεν (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ὁριζόμενον
εἰς τὸ γένος θέντα τὰς διαφορὰς προσάπτειν· μάλιστα γὰρ
30 τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ τὸ γένος δοκεῖ τὴν τοῦ ὁριζομένου οὐσίαν
σημαίνειν), ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἴδιος ὁ λόγος (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἴδιον
εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται), ἢ εἰ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα
πεποιηκὼς μὴ ὥρισται μηδ' εἴρηκε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ
ὁριζομένῳ. λοιπὸν δὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, εἰ ὥρισται μέν, μὴ
35 καλῶς δ' ὥρισται.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἀληθεύεται, καθ' οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ
λόγος, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον· καὶ
γὰρ ἐκεῖ· πότερον ἀληθὲς ἢ οὐκ ἀληθὲς πᾶσα ἡ σκέψις
The discussion of Definitions falls into five parts. For you have to show either 25(1) that it is not true at all to apply the expression as well to that to which the term is applied (for the definition of Man ought to be true of every man); or (2) that though the object has a genus, he has failed to put the object defined into the genus, or to put it into the appropriate genus (for the framer of a definition should first place the object in its genus, and then append its differences: for of 30all the elements of the definition the genus is usually supposed to be the principal mark of the essence of what is defined): or (3) that the expression is not peculiar to the object (for, as we said above as well, a definition ought to be peculiar): or else (4) see if, though he has observed all the aforesaid cautions, he has yet failed to define the object, that is, to express its essence. (5) It remains, apart 35from the foregoing, to see if he has defined it, but defined it incorrectly.
Whether, then, the expression be not also true of that of which the term is true you should proceed to examine according to the commonplace rules that relate to Accident.
Whether, then, the expression be not also true of that of which the term is true you should proceed to examine according to the commonplace rules that relate to Accident.
139b
1 γίνεται. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ὑπάρχει τὸ συμβεβηκὸς διαλεγώμεθα,
ὅτι ἀληθὲς λέγομεν· ὅταν δ' ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει,
ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ γένει ἔθηκεν, ἢ εἰ μὴ
ἴδιος ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς λόγος, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον
5 ῥηθέντων τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον.
Λοιπὸν δ', εἰ μὴ ὥρισται ἢ εἰ μὴ καλῶς ὥρισται, πῶς
μετιτέον εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπισκεπτέον εἰ μὴ καλῶς
ὥρισται. ῥᾷον γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ποιῆσαι ἢ καλῶς ποιῆσαι· δῆλον
οὖν ὅτι ἡ ἁμαρτία περὶ τοῦτο πλείων, ἐπειδὴ ἐργωδέστερον·
10 ὥσθ' ἡ ἐπιχείρησις ῥᾴων ἡ περὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἡ περὶ ἐκεῖνο γίνεται.
Ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μέρη δύο· ἓν μὲν τὸ ἀσαφεῖ
τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ κεχρῆσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ὁριζόμενον ὡς ἐνδέχεται
σαφεστάτῃ τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ κεχρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ γνωρίσαι χάριν
15 ἀποδίδοται ὁ ὁρισμός), δεύτερον δ' εἰ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εἴρηκε
τὸν λόγον τοῦ δέοντος· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ προσκείμενον ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ
περίεργον. πάλιν δ' ἑκάτερον τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς πλείω
μέρη διείληπται.
1For there too the question is always 'Is so and so true or untrue?': for whenever we argue that an accident belongs, we declare it to be true, while whenever we argue that it does not belong, we declare it to be untrue. If, again, he has failed to place the object in the appropriate genus, or if the expression 5be not peculiar to the object, we must go on to examine the case according to the commonplace rules that relate to genus and property.
It remains, then, to prescribe how to investigate whether the object has been either not defined at all, or else defined incorrectly. First, then, we must proceed to examine if it has been defined incorrectly: for with anything it is easier to do it than 10to do it correctly. Clearly, then, more mistakes are made in the latter task on account of its greater difficulty. Accordingly the attack becomes easier in the latter case than in the former.
Incorrectness falls into two branches: (1) first, the use of obscure language (for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest possible, seeing that the whole purpose of rendering it is 15to make something known); (secondly, if the expression used be longer than is necessary: for all additional matter in a definition is superfluous. Again, each of the aforesaid branches is divided into a number of others.
It remains, then, to prescribe how to investigate whether the object has been either not defined at all, or else defined incorrectly. First, then, we must proceed to examine if it has been defined incorrectly: for with anything it is easier to do it than 10to do it correctly. Clearly, then, more mistakes are made in the latter task on account of its greater difficulty. Accordingly the attack becomes easier in the latter case than in the former.
Incorrectness falls into two branches: (1) first, the use of obscure language (for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest possible, seeing that the whole purpose of rendering it is 15to make something known); (secondly, if the expression used be longer than is necessary: for all additional matter in a definition is superfluous. Again, each of the aforesaid branches is divided into a number of others.
Book 6,Chapter 2 (139b19–140a22)
Εἷς μὲν οὖν τόπος τοῦ ἀσαφῶς, εἰ ὁμώνυμόν ἐστί τινι
20 τὸ εἰρημένον, οἷον ὅτι ἡ γένεσις ἀγωγὴ εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἡ
ὑγίεια συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν· ὁμώνυμος γὰρ ἡ
ἀγωγὴ καὶ ἡ συμμετρία. ἄδηλον οὖν ὁπότερον βούλεται λέγειν
τῶν δηλουμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ὁριζομένου πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου μὴ διελὼν εἶπεν·
25 ἄδηλον γὰρ ὁποτέρου τὸν ὅρον ἀποδέδωκεν, ἐνδέχεταί τε
συκοφαντεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττοντος τοῦ λόγου ἐπὶ πάντα ὧν
τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδέδωκεν. μάλιστα δ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ τοιοῦτον
ποιεῖν λανθανούσης τῆς ὁμωνυμίας. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καί, διελόμενον
αὐτὸν ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ ἀποδοθέν,
30 συλλογισμὸν ποιῆσαι· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδένα τῶν τρόπων
ἱκανῶς εἴρηται, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ὡρισμένος εἴη κατὰ τρόπον.
Ἄλλος, εἰ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηκεν, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην
ἀμετάπτωτον ἢ τὴν γῆν τιθήνην ἢ τὴν σωφροσύνην
συμφωνίαν· πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον.
35 ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν μεταφορὰν εἰπόντα συκοφαντεῖν
ὡς κυρίως εἰρηκότα· οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος,
οἷον ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης· πᾶσα γὰρ συμφωνία ἐν φθόγγοις.
ἔτι εἰ γένος ἡ συμφωνία τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐν δύο γένεσιν
One commonplace rule, then, in regard to obscurity is, See if the meaning intended by the definition involves an ambiguity with any other, e.g. 'Becoming is a passage 20into being', or 'Health is the balance of hot and cold elements'. Here 'passage' and 'balance' are ambiguous terms: it is accordingly not clear which of the several possible senses of the term he intends to convey. Likewise also, if the term defined be used in different senses and he has spoken without distinguishing between them: for then it is not clear to which of them the definition 25rendered applies, and one can then bring a captious objection on the ground that the definition does not apply to all the things whose definition he has rendered: and this kind of thing is particularly easy in the case where the definer does not see the ambiguity of his terms. Or, again, the questioner may himself distinguish the various senses of the term rendered in the definition, and 30then institute his argument against each: for if the expression used be not adequate to the subject in any of its senses, it is clear that he cannot have defined it in any sense aright.
Another rule is, See if he has used a metaphorical expression, as, for instance, if he has defined knowledge as 'unsupplantable', or the earth as a 'nurse', or temperance as a 'harmony'. For a metaphorical 35expression is always obscure. It is possible, also, to argue sophistically against the user of a metaphorical expression as though he had used it in its literal sense: for the definition stated will not apply to the term defined, e.g.
Another rule is, See if he has used a metaphorical expression, as, for instance, if he has defined knowledge as 'unsupplantable', or the earth as a 'nurse', or temperance as a 'harmony'. For a metaphorical 35expression is always obscure. It is possible, also, to argue sophistically against the user of a metaphorical expression as though he had used it in its literal sense: for the definition stated will not apply to the term defined, e.g.
140a
1 ἔσται ταὐτὸν οὐ περιέχουσιν ἄλληλα· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ συμφωνία
τὴν ἀρετὴν οὔθ' ἡ ἀρετὴ τὴν συμφωνίαν περιέχει.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ κειμένοις ὀνόμασι χρῆται, οἷον Πλάτων
ὀφρυόσκιον τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἢ τὸ φαλάγγιον σηψιδακές, ἢ
5 τὸν μυελὸν ὀστεογενές· πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός.
Ἔνια δ' οὔτε καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν οὔτε κατὰ μεταφορὰν
οὔτε κυρίως εἴρηται, οἷον ὁ νόμος μέτρον ἢ εἰκὼν τῶν φύσει
δικαίων. ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα χείρω τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἡ μὲν
γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ πως γνώριμον τὸ σημαινόμενον διὰ
10 τὴν ὁμοιότητα (πάντες γὰρ οἱ μεταφέροντες κατά τινα ὁμοιότητα
μεταφέρουσιν), τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ ποιεῖ γνώριμον· οὔτε γὰρ
ὁμοιότης ὑπάρχει καθ' ἣν μέτρον ἢ εἰκὼν ὁ νόμος ἐστίν,
οὔτε εἴωθε λέγεσθαι. ὥστε εἰ μὲν κυρίως μέτρον ἢ
εἰκόνα τὸν νόμον φησὶν εἶναι, ψεύδεται (εἰκὼν γάρ ἐστιν οὗ
15 ἡ γένεσις διὰ μιμήσεως· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῷ νόμῳ)·
εἰ δὲ μὴ κυρίως, δῆλον ὅτι ἀσαφῶς εἴρηκε καὶ χεῖρον
ὁτουοῦν τῶν κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγομένων.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ δῆλος ὁ τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγος ἐκ τοῦ λεχθέντος·
οἱ γὰρ καλῶς ἀποδιδόμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους προσσημαίνουσιν.
20 ἢ εἰ καθ' αὑτὸν λεχθεὶς μὴ φανερὸς εἴη τίνος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός,
ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων γραφέων, εἰ μή τις
ἐπέγραψεν, οὐκ ἐγνωρίζετο τί ἐστιν ἕκαστον.
1in the case of temperance: for harmony is always found between notes. Moreover, if harmony be the genus of temperance, then the same object will occur in two genera of which neither contains the other: for harmony does not contain virtue, nor virtue harmony. Again, see if he uses terms that are unfamiliar, as when Plato describes 5the eye as 'brow-shaded', or a certain spider as poison-fanged', or the marrow as 'boneformed'. For an unusual phrase is always obscure.
Sometimes a phrase is used neither ambiguously, nor yet metaphorically, nor yet literally, as when the law is said to be the 'measure' or 'image' of the things that are by nature just. Such phrases are worse than metaphor; for the latter does make its meaning to some extent 10clear because of the likeness involved; for those who use metaphors do so always in view of some likeness: whereas this kind of phrase makes nothing clear; for there is no likeness to justify the description 'measure' or 'image', as applied to the law, nor is the law ordinarily so called in a literal sense. So then, if a man says that the law is literally a 'measure' or an 'image', he speaks falsely: for an image 15is something produced by imitation, and this is not found in the case of the law. If, on the other hand, he does not mean the term literally, it is clear that he has used an unclear expression, and one that is worse than any sort of metaphorical expression.
Moreover, see if from the expression used the definition of the contrary be not clear; for definitions that have been correctly rendered also indicate their 20contraries as well. Or, again, see if, when it is merely stated by itself, it is not evident what it defines: just as in the works of the old painters, unless there were an inscription, the figures used to be unrecognizable.
Sometimes a phrase is used neither ambiguously, nor yet metaphorically, nor yet literally, as when the law is said to be the 'measure' or 'image' of the things that are by nature just. Such phrases are worse than metaphor; for the latter does make its meaning to some extent 10clear because of the likeness involved; for those who use metaphors do so always in view of some likeness: whereas this kind of phrase makes nothing clear; for there is no likeness to justify the description 'measure' or 'image', as applied to the law, nor is the law ordinarily so called in a literal sense. So then, if a man says that the law is literally a 'measure' or an 'image', he speaks falsely: for an image 15is something produced by imitation, and this is not found in the case of the law. If, on the other hand, he does not mean the term literally, it is clear that he has used an unclear expression, and one that is worse than any sort of metaphorical expression.
Moreover, see if from the expression used the definition of the contrary be not clear; for definitions that have been correctly rendered also indicate their 20contraries as well. Or, again, see if, when it is merely stated by itself, it is not evident what it defines: just as in the works of the old painters, unless there were an inscription, the figures used to be unrecognizable.
Book 6,Chapter 3 (140a23–141a22)
Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ σαφῶς, ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον.
εἰ δ' ἐπὶ πλεῖον εἴρηκε τὸν ὅρον, πρῶτον μὲν σκοπεῖν
25 εἴ τινι κέχρηται ὃ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅλως τοῖς οὖσιν
ἢ τοῖς ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ γένος τῷ ὁριζομένῳ· ἐπὶ πλεῖον γὰρ εἰρῆσθαι
ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν γένος ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων
χωρίζειν, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
γένει. τὸ μὲν οὖν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον ἁπλῶς ἀπ' οὐδενὸς χωρίζει·
30 τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ γένος πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον οὐ χωρίζει
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, ὥστε μάταιον τὸ τοιοῦτον
προσκείμενον.
Ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ἴδιον τὸ προσκείμενον, ἀφαιρεθέντος δὲ
τούτου καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς λόγος ἴδιός ἐστι καὶ δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν.
35 οἷον ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν προςτεθὲν
περίεργον· καὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθέντος τούτου ὁ λοιπὸς λόγος
ἴδιος καὶ δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν. ἁπλῶς δ' εἰπεῖν ἅπαν
If, then, the definition be not clear, you should proceed to examine on lines such as these. If, on the other hand, he has phrased the definition redundantly, first of all look and see whether 25he has used any attribute that belongs universally, either to real objects in general, or to all that fall under the same genus as the object defined: for the mention of this is sure to be redundant. For the genus ought to divide the object from things in general, and the differentia from any of the things contained in the same genus. Now any term that belongs to everything separates off the given object from 30absolutely nothing, while any that belongs to all the things that fall under the same genus does not separate it off from the things contained in the same genus. Any addition, then, of that kind will be pointless.
Or see if, though the additional matter may be peculiar to the given term, yet even when it is struck out the rest of the expression too is peculiar and makes clear the essence of the term. Thus, in the 35definition of man, the addition 'capable of receiving knowledge' is superfluous; for strike it out, and still the expression is peculiar and makes clear his essence.
Or see if, though the additional matter may be peculiar to the given term, yet even when it is struck out the rest of the expression too is peculiar and makes clear the essence of the term. Thus, in the 35definition of man, the addition 'capable of receiving knowledge' is superfluous; for strike it out, and still the expression is peculiar and makes clear his essence.
140b
1 περίεργον οὗ ἀφαιρεθέντος τὸ λοιπὸν δῆλον ποιεῖ τὸ ὁριζόμενον.
τοιοῦτος δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος, εἴπερ "ἀριθμὸς αὐτὸς
αὑτὸν κινῶν" ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν ψυχή, καθάπερ
Πλάτων ὥρισται. ἢ ἴδιον μέν ἐστι τὸ εἰρημένον, οὐ δηλοῖ
5 δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ. ποτέρως μὲν οὖν
ἔχει, χαλεπὸν διασαφῆσαι· χρηστέον δ' ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν
τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον· οἷον ὅτι ὁ τοῦ φλέγματος ὅρος
"ὑγρὸν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τροφῆς ἄπεπτον". ἓν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ
πολλά, ὥστε περίεργον τὸ ἄπεπτον προσκείμενον· καὶ γὰρ
10 τούτου ἀφαιρεθέντος ὁ λοιπὸς ἔσται ἴδιος λόγος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται
ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο τι πρῶτον εἶναι.
ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς πρῶτον ἀπὸ τροφῆς τὸ φλέγμα ἀλλὰ τῶν
ἀπέπτων πρῶτον, ὥστε προσθετέον τὸ "ἄπεπτον" (ἐκείνως μὲν
γὰρ ῥηθέντος οὐκ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος, εἴπερ μὴ πάντων πρῶτόν
15 ἐστιν);
Ἔτι εἴ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς
ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ εἶδος· ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος χεῖρον ὥρισται τῶν χρωμένων
ὃ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν. ἐκείνως μὲν γάρ, ἂν ὁ
λοιπὸς ἴδιος ᾖ λόγος, καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἴδιος ἔσται· ἁπλῶς γὰρ
20 πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ὁτουοῦν προστεθέντος ἀληθοῦς ὅλος ὁ λόγος ἴδιος
γίνεται. εἰ δέ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ὑπὸ
ταὐτὸ εἶδος, ἀδύνατον ὅλον τὸν λόγον ἴδιον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἀντικατηγορηθήσεται
τοῦ πράγματος. οἷον "ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν
τετράπηχυ"· ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος οὐκ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ
25 πράγματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ ταὐτὸν εἶδος
τὸ τετράπηχυ.
Πάλιν εἰ ταὐτὸν πλεονάκις εἴρηκεν, οἷον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
ὄρεξιν ἡδέος εἰπών· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ
τὸ ταὐτὸν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἡδέος ἔσται. γίνεται οὖν ὅρος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας
30 ὄρεξις ἡδέος ἡδέος· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἐπιθυμίαν εἰπεῖν
ἢ ὄρεξιν ἡδέος, ὥσθ' ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἡδέος ἔσται. ἢ τοῦτο
μὲν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δίπουν ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ
τὸ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δίπουν ἔσται, ἔστι δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν, ὥστε ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν δίπουν ἔσται,
35 ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἄτοπόν τι συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ζῴου
πεζοῦ τὸ δίπουν κατηγορεῖται (οὕτω μὲν γὰρ δὶς ἂν περὶ τοῦ
αὐτοῦ τὸ δίπουν κατηγοροῖτο), ἀλλὰ περὶ ζῴου πεζοῦ δίποδος
1Speaking generally, everything is superfluous upon whose removal the remainder still makes the term that is being defined clear. Such, for instance, would also be the definition of the soul, assuming it to be stated as a 'self-moving number'; for the soul is just 'the self-moving', as Plato defined it. Or perhaps the 5expression used, though appropriate, yet does not declare the essence, if the word 'number' be eliminated. Which of the two is the real state of the case it is difficult to determine clearly: the right way to treat the matter in all cases is to be guided by convenience. Thus (e.g.) it is said that the definition of phlegm is the 'undigested moisture that comes first off food'. Here the addition of 10the word 'undigested' is superfluous, seeing that 'the first' is one and not many, so that even when undigested' is left out the definition will still be peculiar to the subject: for it is impossible that both phlegm and also something else should both be the first to arise from the food. Or perhaps the phlegm is not absolutely the first thing to come off the food, but only the first of the 15undigested matters, so that the addition 'undigested' is required; for stated the other way the definition would not be true unless the phlegm comes first of all.
Moreover, see if anything contained in the definition fails to apply to everything that falls under the same species: for this sort of definition is worse than those which include an attribute belonging to all things universally. For in that 20case, if the remainder of the expression be peculiar, the whole too will be peculiar: for absolutely always, if to something peculiar anything whatever that is true be added, the whole too becomes peculiar. Whereas if any part of the expression do not apply to everything that falls under the same species, it is impossible that the expression as a whole should be peculiar: for it will not be predicated 25convertibly with the object; e.g. 'a walking biped animal six feet high': for an expression of that kind is not predicated convertibly with the term, because the attribute 'six feet high' does not belong to everything that falls under the same species.
Again, see if he has said the same thing more than once, saying (e.g.) 'desire' is a 'conation for the pleasant'. For 'desire' is always 'for 30the pleasant', so that what is the same as desire will also be 'for the pleasant'. Accordingly our definition of desire becomes 'conation-for-the-pleasant': for the word 'desire' is the exact equivalent of the words 'conation for-the-pleasant', so that both alike will be 'for the pleasant'. Or perhaps there is no absurdity in this; for consider this instance:-Man is a biped': therefore, what is 35the same as man is a biped: but 'a walking biped animal' is the same as man, and therefore walking biped animal is a biped'. But this involves no real absurdity.
Moreover, see if anything contained in the definition fails to apply to everything that falls under the same species: for this sort of definition is worse than those which include an attribute belonging to all things universally. For in that 20case, if the remainder of the expression be peculiar, the whole too will be peculiar: for absolutely always, if to something peculiar anything whatever that is true be added, the whole too becomes peculiar. Whereas if any part of the expression do not apply to everything that falls under the same species, it is impossible that the expression as a whole should be peculiar: for it will not be predicated 25convertibly with the object; e.g. 'a walking biped animal six feet high': for an expression of that kind is not predicated convertibly with the term, because the attribute 'six feet high' does not belong to everything that falls under the same species.
Again, see if he has said the same thing more than once, saying (e.g.) 'desire' is a 'conation for the pleasant'. For 'desire' is always 'for 30the pleasant', so that what is the same as desire will also be 'for the pleasant'. Accordingly our definition of desire becomes 'conation-for-the-pleasant': for the word 'desire' is the exact equivalent of the words 'conation for-the-pleasant', so that both alike will be 'for the pleasant'. Or perhaps there is no absurdity in this; for consider this instance:-Man is a biped': therefore, what is 35the same as man is a biped: but 'a walking biped animal' is the same as man, and therefore walking biped animal is a biped'. But this involves no real absurdity.
141a
1 τὸ δίπουν λέγεται, ὥστε ἅπαξ μόνον τὸ δίπουν κατηγορεῖται.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τῆς
ὀρέξεως τὸ ἡδέος εἶναι κατηγορεῖται ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος,
ὥστε ἅπαξ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ κατηγορία γίνεται. οὐκ
5 ἔστι δὲ τὸ δὶς φθέγξασθαι ταὐτὸν ὄνομα τῶν ἀτόπων, ἀλλὰ
τὸ πλεονάκις περί τινος τὸ αὐτὸ κατηγορῆσαι, ὡς Ξενοκράτης
τὴν φρόνησιν ὁριστικὴν καὶ θεωρητικὴν τῶν ὄντων
φησὶν εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ ὁριστικὴ θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε δὶς τὸ
αὐτὸ λέγει, προσθεὶς πάλιν καὶ θεωρητικήν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
10 ὅσοι τὴν κατάψυξιν στέρησιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν θερμοῦ φασιν
εἶναι· πᾶσα γὰρ στέρησίς ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχοντος,
ὥστε περίεργον τὸ προσθεῖναι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν
ἦν εἰπεῖν στέρησιν θερμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτὴ ἡ στέρησις γνώριμον
ποιεῖ ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται.
15 Πάλιν εἰ τοῦ καθόλου εἰρημένου προσθείη καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους,
οἷον εἰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν ἐλάττωσιν τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ δικαίων·
τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συμφέρον τι, ὥστε περιέχεται ἐν τῷ
συμφέροντι. περιττὸν οὖν τὸ δίκαιον· καθόλου γὰρ εἴπας ἐπὶ
μέρους προσέθηκεν. καὶ εἰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην τῶν ὑγιεινῶν
20 ζῴῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ τὸν νόμον εἰκόνα τῶν φύσει καλῶν καὶ
δικαίων· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον καλόν τι, ὥστε πλεονάκις τὸ αὐτὸ
λέγει.
1For 'biped' is not a predicate of 'walking animal': if it were, then we should certainly have 'biped' predicated twice of the same thing; but as a matter of fact the subject said to be a biped is'a walking biped animal', so that the word 'biped' is only used as a predicate once. Likewise also in the case of 'desire' as well: for it is not 5'conation' that is said to be 'for the pleasant', but rather the whole idea, so that there too the predication is only made once. Absurdity results, not when the same word is uttered twice, but when the same thing is more than once predicated of a subject; e.g. if he says, like Xenocrates, that wisdom defines and contemplates reality:' for definition is a certain type of contemplation, so that by adding the words 'and 10contemplates' over again he says the same thing twice over. Likewise, too, those fail who say that 'cooling' is 'the privation of natural heat'. For all privation is a privation of some natural attribute, so that the addition of the word 'natural' is superfluous: it would have been enough to say 'privation of heat', for the word 'privation' shows of itself that the heat meant is natural heat.
Again, see if a universal have been 15mentioned and then a particular case of it be added as well, e.g. 'Equity is a remission of what is expedient and just'; for what is just is a branch of what is expedient and is therefore included in the latter term: its mention is therefore redundant, an addition of the particular after the universal has been already stated. So also, if he defines 'medicine' as 'knowledge of what makes for health in animals and men', or 'the 20law' as 'the image of what is by nature noble and just'; for what is just is a branch of what is noble, so that he says the same thing more than once.
Again, see if a universal have been 15mentioned and then a particular case of it be added as well, e.g. 'Equity is a remission of what is expedient and just'; for what is just is a branch of what is expedient and is therefore included in the latter term: its mention is therefore redundant, an addition of the particular after the universal has been already stated. So also, if he defines 'medicine' as 'knowledge of what makes for health in animals and men', or 'the 20law' as 'the image of what is by nature noble and just'; for what is just is a branch of what is noble, so that he says the same thing more than once.
Book 6,Chapter 4 (141a23–142b19)
Πότερον μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἢ οὐ καλῶς, διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν
τοιούτων ἐπισκεπτέον· πότερον δ' ὥρισται καὶ εἴρηκε τὸ τί ἦν
25 εἶναι ἢ οὐχί, ἐκ τῶνδε.
Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ μὴ διὰ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων πεποίηται
τὸν ὁρισμόν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ ὅρος ἀποδίδοται τοῦ γνωρίσαι
χάριν τὸ λεχθέν, γνωρίζομεν δ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων
ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς
30 ἀποδείξεσιν (οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ μάθησις ἔχει),
φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ μὴ διὰ τοιούτων ὁριζόμενος οὐχ ὥρισται. εἰ δὲ
μή, πλείους ἔσονται τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁρισμοί· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ
ὁ διὰ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων βέλτιον ὥρισται, ὥστε ἀμφότεροι
ἂν εἴησαν ὅροι τοῦ αὐτοῦ. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ δοκεῖ·
35 ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἕν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστίν. ὥστ' εἰ πλείους
ἔσονται τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁρισμοί, ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῷ ὁριζομένῳ τὸ
εἶναι ὅπερ καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν ὁρισμῶν δηλοῦται. ταῦτα δ'
Whether, then, a man defines a thing correctly or incorrectly you should proceed to examine on these and similar lines. But whether he has mentioned and defined its essence or no, should be examined as follows: First of all, see if he has failed to make the definition through 25terms that are prior and more intelligible. For the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known the term stated, and we make things known by taking not any random terms, but such as are prior and more intelligible, as is done in demonstrations (for so it is with all teaching and learning); accordingly, it is clear that a man who does not define through terms of this kind has not defined at all. Otherwise, there 30will be more than one definition of the same thing: for clearly he who defines through terms that are prior and more intelligible has also framed a definition, and a better one, so that both would then be definitions of the same object. This sort of view, however, does not generally find acceptance: for of each real object the essence is single: if, then, there are to be a number of definitions of the same thing, the essence 35of the object will be the same as it is represented to be in each of the definitions, and these representations are not the same, inasmuch as the definitions are different.
141b
1 οὐ ταὐτά ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ ὁρισμοὶ ἕτεροι. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐχ
ὥρισται ὁ μὴ διὰ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων ὁρισάμενος.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων εἰρῆσθαι τὸν ὅρον διχῶς
ἔστιν ἐκλαβεῖν· ἢ γὰρ εἰ ἁπλῶς ἐξ ἀγνωστοτέρων ἢ
5 ἡμῖν ἀγνωστοτέρων· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως. ἁπλῶς μὲν
οὖν γνωριμώτερον τὸ πρότερον τοῦ ὑστέρου, οἷον στιγμὴ γραμμῆς
καὶ γραμμὴ ἐπιπέδου καὶ ἐπίπεδον στερεοῦ, καθάπερ
καὶ μονὰς ἀριθμοῦ· πρότερον γὰρ καὶ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στοιχεῖον συλλαβῆς. ἡμῖν δ' ἀνάπαλιν
10 ἐνίοτε συμβαίνει· μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ στερεὸν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν
πίπτει, τὸ δ' ἐπίπεδον μᾶλλον τῆς γραμμῆς, γραμμὴ δὲ
σημείου μᾶλλον. οἱ πολλοὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα προγνωρίζουσιν·
τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς τυχούσης, τὰ δ' ἀκριβοῦς καὶ περιττῆς διανοίας
καταμαθεῖν ἐστιν.
15 Ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῶν προτέρων τὰ ὕστερα
πειρᾶσθαι γνωρίζειν· ἐπιστημονικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτόν
ἐστιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδυνατοῦντας γνωρίζειν διὰ
τῶν τοιούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διὰ τῶν ἐκείνοις γνωρίμων ποιεῖσθαι
τὸν λόγον. εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ὁρισμῶν ὅ τε τῆς
20 στιγμῆς καὶ ὁ τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου· πάντες γὰρ
διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων τὰ πρότερα δηλοῦσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γραμμῆς,
τὸ δ' ἐπιπέδου, τὸ δὲ στερεοῦ φασι πέρας εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ
λανθάνειν ὅτι τοὺς οὕτως ὁριζομένους οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ τί ἦν
εἶναι τῷ ὁριζομένῳ δηλοῦν, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν τε
25 γνωριμώτερον ὂν καὶ ἁπλῶς γνωριμώτερον, εἴπερ δεῖ μὲν διὰ
τοῦ γένους καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν ὁρίζεσθαι τὸν καλῶς ὁριζόμενον,
ταῦτα δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων τοῦ
εἴδους ἐστίν. συναναιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ γένος καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τὸ εἶδος,
ὥστε πρότερα ταῦτα τοῦ εἴδους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ γνωριμώτερα· τοῦ
30 μὲν γὰρ εἴδους γνωριζομένου ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γένος καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν
γνωρίζεσθαι (ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γνωρίζων καὶ ζῷον καὶ
πεζὸν γνωρίζει), τοῦ δὲ γένους ἢ τῆς διαφορᾶς γνωριζομένης
οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ εἶδος γνωρίζεσθαι, ὥστε ἀγνωστότερον τὸ
εἶδος. ἔτι τοῖς κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοὺς τοιούτους ὁρισμοὺς φάσκουσιν
35 εἶναι, τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ γνωρίμων, πολλοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ
συμβήσεται λέγειν ὁρισμοὺς εἶναι· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις καὶ οὐ
ταὐτὰ πᾶσι τυγχάνει γνωριμώτερα ὄντα, ὥστε πρὸς ἕκαστον
1Clearly, then, any one who has not defined a thing through terms that are prior and more intelligible has not defined it at all.
The statement that a definition has not been made through more intelligible terms may be understood in two senses, either supposing that its terms are absolutely less intelligible, 5or supposing that they are less intelligible to us: for either sense is possible. Thus absolutely the prior is more intelligible than the posterior, a point, for instance, than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid; just as also a unit is more intelligible than a number; for it is the prius and starting-point of all number. Likewise, also, a letter is more intelligible 10than a syllable. Whereas to us it sometimes happens that the converse is the case: for the solid falls under perception most of all-more than a plane-and a plane more than a line, and a line more than a point; for most people learn things like the former earlier than the latter; for any ordinary intelligence can grasp them, whereas the others require an exact and exceptional 15understanding.
Absolutely, then, it is better to try to make what is posterior known through what is prior, inasmuch as such a way of procedure is more scientific. Of course, in dealing with persons who cannot recognize things through terms of that kind, it may perhaps be necessary to frame the expression through terms that are intelligible to them. Among definitions of this kind are 20those of a point, a line, and a plane, all of which explain the prior by the posterior; for they say that a point is the limit of a line, a line of a plane, a plane of a solid. One must, however, not fail to observe that those who define in this way cannot show the essential nature of the term they define, unless it so happens that the same thing is more intelligible both to us and also 25absolutely, since a correct definition must define a thing through its genus and its differentiae, and these belong to the order of things which are absolutely more intelligible than, and prior to, the species. For annul the genus and differentia, and the species too is annulled, so that these are prior to the species. They are also more intelligible; for if the species be known, 30the genus and differentia must of necessity be known as well (for any one who knows what a man is knows also what 'animal' and 'walking' are), whereas if the genus or the differentia be known it does not follow of necessity that the species is known as well: thus the species is less intelligible. Moreover, those who say that such definitions, viz. those which proceed from what is 35intelligible to this, that, or the other man, are really and truly definitions, will have to say that there are several definitions of one and the same thing.
The statement that a definition has not been made through more intelligible terms may be understood in two senses, either supposing that its terms are absolutely less intelligible, 5or supposing that they are less intelligible to us: for either sense is possible. Thus absolutely the prior is more intelligible than the posterior, a point, for instance, than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid; just as also a unit is more intelligible than a number; for it is the prius and starting-point of all number. Likewise, also, a letter is more intelligible 10than a syllable. Whereas to us it sometimes happens that the converse is the case: for the solid falls under perception most of all-more than a plane-and a plane more than a line, and a line more than a point; for most people learn things like the former earlier than the latter; for any ordinary intelligence can grasp them, whereas the others require an exact and exceptional 15understanding.
Absolutely, then, it is better to try to make what is posterior known through what is prior, inasmuch as such a way of procedure is more scientific. Of course, in dealing with persons who cannot recognize things through terms of that kind, it may perhaps be necessary to frame the expression through terms that are intelligible to them. Among definitions of this kind are 20those of a point, a line, and a plane, all of which explain the prior by the posterior; for they say that a point is the limit of a line, a line of a plane, a plane of a solid. One must, however, not fail to observe that those who define in this way cannot show the essential nature of the term they define, unless it so happens that the same thing is more intelligible both to us and also 25absolutely, since a correct definition must define a thing through its genus and its differentiae, and these belong to the order of things which are absolutely more intelligible than, and prior to, the species. For annul the genus and differentia, and the species too is annulled, so that these are prior to the species. They are also more intelligible; for if the species be known, 30the genus and differentia must of necessity be known as well (for any one who knows what a man is knows also what 'animal' and 'walking' are), whereas if the genus or the differentia be known it does not follow of necessity that the species is known as well: thus the species is less intelligible. Moreover, those who say that such definitions, viz. those which proceed from what is 35intelligible to this, that, or the other man, are really and truly definitions, will have to say that there are several definitions of one and the same thing.
142a
1 ἕτερος ἂν εἴη ὁρισμὸς ἀποδοτέος, εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ γνωριμωτέρων
τὸν ὁρισμὸν ποιεῖσθαι χρή. ἔτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἄλλοτ'
ἄλλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ αἰσθητά,
ἀκριβεστέροις δὲ γενομένοις ἀνάπαλιν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν
5 ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁρισμὸς ἀποδοτέος τοῖς διὰ τῶν ἑκάστοις
γνωριμωτέρων τὸν ὁρισμὸν φάσκουσιν ἀποδοτέον εἶναι. δῆλον
οὖν ὅτι οὐχ ὁριστέον διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἁπλῶς
γνωριμωτέρων· μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁρισμὸς
ἀεὶ γίνοιτο. ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς γνώριμον οὐ τὸ πᾶσι
10 γνώριμόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῖς εὖ διακειμένοις τὴν διάνοιαν,
καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς ὑγιεινὸν τὸ τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσι τὸ σῶμα.
δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστα τῶν τοιούτων ἐξακριβοῦν, χρῆσθαι δὲ διαλεγομένους
πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. μάλιστα δ' ὁμολογουμένως
ἀναιρεῖν ἐνδέχεται τὸν ὁρισμόν, ἐὰν μήτ' ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶς
15 γνωριμωτέρων μήτ' ἐκ τῶν ἡμῖν τυγχάνῃ τὸν λόγον πεποιημένος.
Εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τοῦ μὴ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ διὰ
τῶν ὑστέρων τὰ πρότερα δηλοῦν, καθάπερ πρότερον εἴπαμεν·
ἄλλος δὲ εἰ τοῦ ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ καὶ τοῦ ὡρισμένου διὰ τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ
20 τοῦ ἐν κινήσει ἀποδέδοται ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν· πρότερον γὰρ τὸ μένον
καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ ἐν κινήσει ὄντος.
Τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐκ προτέρων τρεῖς εἰσι τρόποι· πρῶτος μέν, εἰ
διὰ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὥρισται, οἷον διὰ τοῦ κακοῦ
τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὰ ἀντικείμενα. ἐνίοις δὲ
25 καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀμφοτέρων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὥστ' οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον
τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι ἔνια
ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι ἄλλως, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον ἄνευ τοῦ
ἡμίσεος, καὶ ὅσα καθ' αὑτὰ πρός τι λέγεται. πᾶσι γὰρ
τοῖς τοιούτοις ταὐτὸν τὸ εἶναι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ὥστ'
30 ἀδύνατον ἄνευ θατέρου θάτερον γνωρίζειν· διόπερ ἀναγκαῖον
ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου λόγῳ συμπεριειλῆφθαι καὶ θάτερον. γνωρίζειν
μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, χρῆσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς ὡς
ἂν δοκῇ συμφέρειν.
Ἄλλος, εἰ αὐτῷ κέχρηται τῷ ὁριζομένῳ. λανθάνει δ'
35 ὅταν μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ ὁριζομένου ὀνόματι χρήσηται, οἷον εἰ
1For, as it happens, different things are more intelligible to different people, not the same things to all; and so a different definition would have to be rendered to each several person, if the definition is to be constructed from what is more intelligible to particular individuals. Moreover, to the same people 5different things are more intelligible at different times; first of all the objects of sense; then, as they become more sharpwitted, the converse; so that those who hold that a definition ought to be rendered through what is more intelligible to particular individuals would not have to render the same definition at all times even to the same person. It is clear, then, that the right way to define is 10not through terms of that kind, but through what is absolutely more intelligible: for only in this way could the definition come always to be one and the same. Perhaps, also, what is absolutely intelligible is what is intelligible, not to all, but to those who are in a sound state of understanding, just as what is absolutely healthy is what is healthy to those in a sound state of body. All such 15points as this ought to be made very precise, and made use of in the course of discussion as occasion requires. The demolition of a definition will most surely win a general approval if the definer happens to have framed his expression neither from what is absolutely more intelligible nor yet from what is so to us.
One form, then, of the failure to work through more intelligible terms is the exhibition 20of the prior through the posterior, as we remarked before.' Another form occurs if we find that the definition has been rendered of what is at rest and definite through what is indefinite and in motion: for what is still and definite is prior to what is indefinite and in motion.
Of the failure to use terms that are prior there are three forms:
(1) The first is when an opposite has been defined 25through its opposite, e.g.i. good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature. Some people think, also, that both are objects of the same science, so that the one is not even more intelligible than the other. One must, however, observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other way, e.g. the double without the half, and all the terms that are essentially 30relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain relation to something, so that it is impossible to understand the one term without the other, and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too must be embraced. One ought to learn up all such points as these, and use them as occasion may seem to require.
(2) Another is-if he has used the term defined itself.
One form, then, of the failure to work through more intelligible terms is the exhibition 20of the prior through the posterior, as we remarked before.' Another form occurs if we find that the definition has been rendered of what is at rest and definite through what is indefinite and in motion: for what is still and definite is prior to what is indefinite and in motion.
Of the failure to use terms that are prior there are three forms:
(1) The first is when an opposite has been defined 25through its opposite, e.g.i. good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature. Some people think, also, that both are objects of the same science, so that the one is not even more intelligible than the other. One must, however, observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other way, e.g. the double without the half, and all the terms that are essentially 30relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain relation to something, so that it is impossible to understand the one term without the other, and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too must be embraced. One ought to learn up all such points as these, and use them as occasion may seem to require.
(2) Another is-if he has used the term defined itself.
142b
1 τὸν ἥλιον ἄστρον ἡμεροφανὲς ὡρίσατο· ὁ γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ χρώμενος
ἡλίῳ χρῆται. δεῖ δ', ὅπως φωραθῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, μεταλαμβάνειν
ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τὸν λόγον, οἷον ὅτι ἡμέρα ἡλίου
φορὰ ὑπὲρ γῆς ἐστιν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τὴν φορὰν ἡλίου ὑπὲρ
5 γῆς εἰρηκὼς τὸν ἥλιον εἴρηκεν, ὥστε χρῆται τῷ ἡλίῳ ὁ τῇ
ἡμέρᾳ χρησάμενος.
Πάλιν εἰ τῷ ἀντιδιῃρημένῳ τὸ ἀντιδιῃρημένον ὥρισται,
οἷον περιττὸν τὸ μονάδι μεῖζον ἀρτίου. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φύσει
τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα· τὸ δὲ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον
10 ἀντιδιῄρηται· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀριθμοῦ διαφοραί.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ ἐπάνω ὥρισται,
οἷον ἄρτιον ἀριθμὸν τὸν δίχα διαιρούμενον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕξιν
ἀρετῆς· τό τε γὰρ δίχα ἀπὸ τῶν δύο εἴληπται, ἀρτίων ὄντων,
καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀγαθόν τί ἐστιν, ὥσθ' ὑποκάτω ταῦτα
15 ἐκείνων ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν τῷ ὑποκάτω χρώμενον καὶ
αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι. ὅ τε γὰρ τῇ ἀρετῇ χρώμενος χρῆται τῷ
ἀγαθῷ, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθόν τι ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ τῷ
δίχα χρώμενος τῷ ἀρτίῳ χρῆται, ἐπειδὴ εἰς δύο διῃρῆσθαι
σημαίνει τὸ δίχα διῃρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ δύο ἄρτιά ἐστιν.
1This passes unobserved when the actual name of the object is not used, e.g. supposing any one had defined the sun as a star that appears by day'. For in bringing in 'day' he brings in the sun. To detect errors of this sort, exchange the word for its definition, e.g. the definition of 'day' as the 'passage of the sun over the earth'. 5Clearly, whoever has said 'the passage of the sun over the earth' has said 'the sun', so that in bringing in the 'day' he has brought in the sun.
(3) Again, see if he has defined one coordinate member of a division by another, e.g. 'an odd number' as 'that which is greater by one than an even number'. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived from the same genus are simultaneous by nature and 10'odd' and 'even' are such terms: for both are differentiae of number.
Likewise also, see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate term, e.g. 'An "even number" is "a number divisible into halves"', or '"the good" is a "state of virtue" '. For 'half' is derived from 'two', and 'two' is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good, so that the latter terms are subordinate to the former. Moreover, in 15using the subordinate term one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term 'virtue' employs the term 'good', seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise, also, whoever employs the term 'half' employs the term 'even', for to be 'divided in half' means to be divided into two, and two is even.
(3) Again, see if he has defined one coordinate member of a division by another, e.g. 'an odd number' as 'that which is greater by one than an even number'. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived from the same genus are simultaneous by nature and 10'odd' and 'even' are such terms: for both are differentiae of number.
Likewise also, see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate term, e.g. 'An "even number" is "a number divisible into halves"', or '"the good" is a "state of virtue" '. For 'half' is derived from 'two', and 'two' is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good, so that the latter terms are subordinate to the former. Moreover, in 15using the subordinate term one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term 'virtue' employs the term 'good', seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise, also, whoever employs the term 'half' employs the term 'even', for to be 'divided in half' means to be divided into two, and two is even.
Book 6,Chapter 5 (142b20–143a28)
20 Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἰπεῖν εἷς ἐστι τόπος τὸ μὴ διὰ προτέρων
καὶ γνωριμωτέρων πεποιῆσθαι τὸν λόγον, μέρη δ' αὐτοῦ τὰ
εἰρημένα. δεύτερος δὲ εἰ ἐν γένει τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος μὴ κεῖται
ἐν γένει. ἐν ἅπασι δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁμάρτημα ἔστιν ἐν οἷς οὐ
πρόκειται τοῦ λόγου τὸ τί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τοῦ σώματος ὁρισμὸς
25 "τὸ ἔχον τρεῖς διαστάσεις", ἢ εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁρίσαιτο τὸ
ἐπιστάμενον ἀριθμεῖν. οὐ γὰρ εἴρηται τί ὂν τρεῖς ἔχει διαστάσεις,
ἢ τί ὂν ἐπίσταται ἀριθμεῖν· τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί
ἐστι σημαίνειν, καὶ πρῶτον ὑποτίθεται τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ
λεγομένων.
30 Ἔτι εἰ πρὸς πλείω λεγομένου τοῦ ὁριζομένου μὴ πρὸς
πάντα ἀποδέδωκεν, οἷον εἰ τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ
γράψαι τὸ ὑπαγορευθέν· προσδεῖται γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι.
οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον <ὁ> τοῦ γράψαι ἢ <ὁ> τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι
ἀποδοὺς ὥρισται, ὥστ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἄμφω ταῦτ' εἰπών,
35 ἐπειδὴ πλείους οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταὐτοῦ ὁρισμοὺς εἶναι. ἐπ' ἐνίων
Generally speaking, then, one commonplace rule relates to the failure to frame the expression 20by means of terms that are prior and more intelligible: and of this the subdivisions are those specified above. A second is, see whether, though the object is in a genus, it has not been placed in a genus. This sort of error is always found where the essence of the object does not stand first in the expression, e.g. the definition of 'body' as 'that which has three dimensions', or the definition of 'man', supposing 25any one to give it, as 'that which knows how to count': for it is not stated what it is that has three dimensions, or what it is that knows how to count: whereas the genus is meant to indicate just this, and is submitted first of the terms in the definition.
Moreover, see if, while the term to be defined is used in relation to many things, he has failed to render it in relation to all of them; as (e.g.) if 30he define 'grammar' as the 'knowledge how to write from dictation': for he ought also to say that it is a knowledge how to read as well. For in rendering it as 'knowledge of writing' has no more defined it than by rendering it as 'knowledge of reading': neither in fact has succeeded, but only he who mentions both these things, since it is impossible that there should be more than one definition of the same thing.
Moreover, see if, while the term to be defined is used in relation to many things, he has failed to render it in relation to all of them; as (e.g.) if 30he define 'grammar' as the 'knowledge how to write from dictation': for he ought also to say that it is a knowledge how to read as well. For in rendering it as 'knowledge of writing' has no more defined it than by rendering it as 'knowledge of reading': neither in fact has succeeded, but only he who mentions both these things, since it is impossible that there should be more than one definition of the same thing.
143a
1 μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἔχει καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἐπ' ἐνίων δ' οὔ,
οἷον ἐφ' ὅσων μὴ καθ' αὑτὸ πρὸς ἄμφω λέγεται, καθάπερ ἡ
ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ νόσον ποιῆσαι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ καθ'
αὑτὴν λέγεται, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἁπλῶς γὰρ ἀλλότριον
5 τῆς ἰατρικῆς τὸ νόσον ποιεῖν. ὥστ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὥρισται
ὁ πρὸς ἄμφω ἀποδοὺς τοῦ πρὸς θάτερον, ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ
χεῖρον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁστισοῦν δυνατός ἐστι νόσον
ποιῆσαι.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον
10 ἀποδέδωκε, πλειόνων ὄντων πρὸς ἃ λέγεται τὸ ὁριζόμενον·
πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δύναμις τοῦ βελτίστου δοκεῖ εἶναι.
Πάλιν εἰ μὴ κεῖται ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ γένει τὸ λεχθέν,
σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ γένη στοιχείων, καθάπερ πρότερον
εἴρηται.
15 Ἔτι εἰ ὑπερβαίνων λέγει τὰ γένη, οἷον τὴν δικαιοσύνην
ἕξιν ἰσότητος ποιητικὴν ἢ διανεμητικὴν τοῦ ἴσου· ὑπερβαίνει
γὰρ ὁ οὕτως ὁριζόμενος τὴν ἀρετήν. ἀπολιπὼν οὖν τὸ τῆς
δικαιοσύνης γένος οὐ λέγει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἑκάστῳ
μετὰ τοῦ γένους. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν τῷ μὴ εἰς τὸ ἐγγυτάτω
20 γένος θεῖναι· ὁ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐγγυτάτω θεὶς πάντα
τὰ ἐπάνω εἴρηκεν, ἐπειδὴ πάντα τὰ ἐπάνω γένη τῶν ὑποκάτω
κατηγορεῖται. ὥστ' ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐγγυτάτω γένος θετέον, ἢ
πάσας τὰς διαφορὰς τῷ ἐπάνω γένει προσαπτέον δι' ὧν
ὁρίζεται τὸ ἐγγυτάτω γένος· οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη παραλελοιπώς,
25 ἀλλ' ἀντ' ὀνόματος λόγῳ εἰρηκὼς ἂν εἴη τὸ ὑποκάτω
γένος. ὁ δ' αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ ἐπάνω γένος εἴπας οὐ λέγει
καὶ τὸ ὑποκάτω γένος· ὁ γὰρ φυτὸν εἴπας οὐ λέγει
δένδρον.
1It is only, however, in some cases that what has been said corresponds to the actual state of things: in some it does not, e.g. all those terms which are not used essentially in relation to both things: as medicine is said to deal with the production of disease and health; for it is said essentially to do the latter, 5but the former only by accident: for it is absolutely alien to medicine to produce disease. Here, then, the man who renders medicine as relative to both of these things has not defined it any better than he who mentions the one only. In fact he has done it perhaps worse, for any one else besides the doctor is capable of producing disease.
Moreover, in a case where the term to be defined is used 10in relation to several things, see if he has rendered it as relative to the worse rather than to the better; for every form of knowledge and potentiality is generally thought to be relative to the best.
Again, if the thing in question be not placed in its own proper genus, one must examine it according to the elementary rules in regard to genera, as has been said before.'
Moreover, see if he uses 15language which transgresses the genera of the things he defines, defining, e.g. justice as a 'state that produces equality' or 'distributes what is equal': for by defining it so he passes outside the sphere of virtue, and so by leaving out the genus of justice he fails to express its essence: for the essence of a thing must in each case bring in its genus. It is the same thing if the object be 20not put into its nearest genus; for the man who puts it into the nearest one has stated all the higher genera, seeing that all the higher genera are predicated of the lower. Either, then, it ought to be put into its nearest genus, or else to the higher genus all the differentiae ought to be appended whereby the nearest genus is defined. For then he would not have left out anything: but would 25merely have mentioned the subordinate genus by an expression instead of by name. On the other hand, he who mentions merely the higher genus by itself, does not state the subordinate genus as well: in saying 'plant' a man does not specify 'a tree'.
Moreover, in a case where the term to be defined is used 10in relation to several things, see if he has rendered it as relative to the worse rather than to the better; for every form of knowledge and potentiality is generally thought to be relative to the best.
Again, if the thing in question be not placed in its own proper genus, one must examine it according to the elementary rules in regard to genera, as has been said before.'
Moreover, see if he uses 15language which transgresses the genera of the things he defines, defining, e.g. justice as a 'state that produces equality' or 'distributes what is equal': for by defining it so he passes outside the sphere of virtue, and so by leaving out the genus of justice he fails to express its essence: for the essence of a thing must in each case bring in its genus. It is the same thing if the object be 20not put into its nearest genus; for the man who puts it into the nearest one has stated all the higher genera, seeing that all the higher genera are predicated of the lower. Either, then, it ought to be put into its nearest genus, or else to the higher genus all the differentiae ought to be appended whereby the nearest genus is defined. For then he would not have left out anything: but would 25merely have mentioned the subordinate genus by an expression instead of by name. On the other hand, he who mentions merely the higher genus by itself, does not state the subordinate genus as well: in saying 'plant' a man does not specify 'a tree'.
Book 6,Chapter 6 (143a29–145b33)
Πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν διαφορῶν ὁμοίως σκεπτέον εἰ καὶ τὰς
30 διαφορὰς εἶπε τὰς τοῦ γένους. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταῖς τοῦ πράγματος
ἰδίαις ὥρισται διαφοραῖς, ἢ καὶ παντελῶς τι τοιοῦτον εἴρηκεν
ὃ μηδενὸς ἐνδέχεται διαφορὰν εἶναι, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ἢ τὴν
οὐσίαν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ὥρισται· οὐδενὸς γὰρ διαφοραὶ τὰ εἰρημένα.
ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἀντιδιῃρημένον τι τῇ εἰρημένῃ διαφορᾷ.
35 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ εἰρημένη τοῦ
γένους διαφορά· πᾶν γὰρ γένος ταῖς ἀντιδιῃρημέναις διαφοραῖς
Again, in regard to the differentiae, we must examine in like manner whether the differentiae, too, that he has stated be those of the genus. For if a 30man has not defined the object by the differentiae peculiar to it, or has mentioned something such as is utterly incapable of being a differentia of anything, e.g. 'animal' or 'substance', clearly he has not defined it at all: for the aforesaid terms do not differentiate anything at all. Further, we must see whether the differentia stated possesses anything that is co-ordinate with it in a division; 35for, if not, clearly the one stated could not be a differentia of the genus.
143b
1 διαιρεῖται, καθάπερ τὸ ζῷον τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ πτηνῷ
καὶ <τῷ> ἐνύδρῳ [καὶ τῷ δίποδι]. ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ἀντιδιῃρημένη
διαφορά, μὴ ἀληθεύεται δὲ κατὰ τοῦ γένους. δῆλον γὰρ
ὅτι οὐδετέρα ἂν εἴη τοῦ γένους διαφορά· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀντιδιῃρημέναι
5 διαφοραὶ ἀληθεύονται κατὰ τοῦ οἰκείου γένους.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἀληθεύεται μέν, μὴ ποιεῖ δὲ προστιθεμένη
τῷ γένει εἶδος. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὕτη εἰδοποιὸς
διαφορὰ τοῦ γένους· πᾶσα γὰρ εἰδοποιὸς διαφορὰ
μετὰ τοῦ γένους εἶδος ποιεῖ. εἰ δ' αὕτη μὴ ἔστι διαφορά, οὐδ'
10 ἡ λεχθεῖσα, ἐπεὶ ταύτῃ ἀντιδιῄρηται.
Ἔτι ἐὰν ἀποφάσει διαιρῇ τὸ γένος, καθάπερ οἱ τὴν
γραμμὴν ὁριζόμενοι μῆκος ἀπλατὲς εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο
σημαίνει ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει πλάτος. συμβήσεται οὖν τὸ γένος
μετέχειν τοῦ εἴδους· πᾶν γὰρ μῆκος ἢ ἀπλατὲς ἢ πλάτος
15 ἔχον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ κατὰ παντὸς ἢ ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις
ἀληθεύεται, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γένος τῆς γραμμῆς, μῆκος ὄν,
ἢ ἀπλατὲς ἢ πλάτος ἔχον ἔσται. μῆκος δ' ἀπλατὲς εἴδους
ἐστὶ λόγος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μῆκος πλάτος ἔχον. τὸ γὰρ
ἀπλατὲς καὶ τὸ πλάτος ἔχον διαφοραί εἰσιν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς
20 καὶ τοῦ γένους ὁ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ λόγος, ὥστε τὸ γένος
ἐπιδέχοιτ' ἂν τὸν τοῦ εἴδους λόγον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν τῆς
διαφορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἑτέρα τῶν εἰρημένων διαφορῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
κατηγορεῖται τοῦ γένους. ἔστι δ' ὁ εἰρημένος τόπος
χρήσιμος πρὸς τοὺς τιθεμένους ἰδέας εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτὸ
25 μῆκος, πῶς κατηγορηθήσεται κατὰ τοῦ γένους ὅτι πλάτος
ἔχον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπλατές ἐστιν; δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ παντὸς μήκους τὸ
ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθεύεσθαι, εἴπερ κατὰ τοῦ γένους ἀληθεύεσθαι
μέλλει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ συμβαίνει· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀπλατῆ καὶ
πλάτος ἔχοντα μήκη. ὥστε πρὸς ἐκείνους μόνους χρήσιμος ὁ
30 τόπος οἳ πᾶν γένος ἓν ἀριθμῷ φασιν εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν
οἱ τὰς ἰδέας τιθέμενοι· αὐτὸ γὰρ μῆκος καὶ αὐτὸ ζῷον
γένος φασὶν εἶναι.
Ἴσως δ' ἐπ' ἐνίων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἀποφάσει χρῆσθαι
τὸν ὁριζόμενον, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν στερήσεων· τυφλὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ
35 μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν ἀποφάσει
διελεῖν τὸ γένος ἢ τοιαύτῃ καταφάσει ᾗ ἀπόφασιν
1For a genus is always divided by differentiae that are co-ordinate members of a division, as, for instance, by the terms 'walking', 'flying', 'aquatic', and 'biped'. Or see if, though the contrasted differentia exists, it yet is not true of the genus, for then, clearly, neither of them could be a 5differentia of the genus; for differentiae that are co-ordinates in a division with the differentia of a thing are all true of the genus to which the thing belongs. Likewise, also, see if, though it be true, yet the addition of it to the genus fails to make a species. For then, clearly, this could not be a specific differentia of the genus: for a specific differentia, if added 10to the genus, always makes a species. If, however, this be no true differentia, no more is the one adduced, seeing that it is a co-ordinate member of a division with this.
Moreover, see if he divides the genus by a negation, as those do who define line as 'length without breadth': for this means simply that it has not any breadth. The genus will then be found to partake of 15its own species: for, since of everything either an affirmation or its negation is true, length must always either lack breadth or possess it, so that 'length' as well, i.e. the genus of 'line', will be either with or without breadth. But 'length without breadth' is the definition of a species, as also is 'length with breadth': for 'without breadth' and 'with breadth' are 20differentiae, and the genus and differentia constitute the definition of the species. Hence the genus would admit of the definition of its species. Likewise, also, it will admit of the definition of the differentia, seeing that one or the other of the aforesaid differentiae is of necessity predicated of the genus. The usefulness of this principle is found in meeting those 25who assert the existence of 'Ideas': for if absolute length exist, how will it be predicable of the genus that it has breadth or that it lacks it? For one assertion or the other will have to be true of 'length' universally, if it is to be true of the genus at all: and this is contrary to the fact: for there exist both lengths which have, and lengths which have not, breadth. 30Hence the only people against whom the rule can be employed are those who assert that a genus is always numerically one; and this is what is done by those who assert the real existence of the 'Ideas'; for they allege that absolute length and absolute animal are the genus.
It may be that in some cases the definer is obliged to employ a negation as well, e.g. in defining 35privations. For 'blind' means a thing which cannot see when its nature is to see.
Moreover, see if he divides the genus by a negation, as those do who define line as 'length without breadth': for this means simply that it has not any breadth. The genus will then be found to partake of 15its own species: for, since of everything either an affirmation or its negation is true, length must always either lack breadth or possess it, so that 'length' as well, i.e. the genus of 'line', will be either with or without breadth. But 'length without breadth' is the definition of a species, as also is 'length with breadth': for 'without breadth' and 'with breadth' are 20differentiae, and the genus and differentia constitute the definition of the species. Hence the genus would admit of the definition of its species. Likewise, also, it will admit of the definition of the differentia, seeing that one or the other of the aforesaid differentiae is of necessity predicated of the genus. The usefulness of this principle is found in meeting those 25who assert the existence of 'Ideas': for if absolute length exist, how will it be predicable of the genus that it has breadth or that it lacks it? For one assertion or the other will have to be true of 'length' universally, if it is to be true of the genus at all: and this is contrary to the fact: for there exist both lengths which have, and lengths which have not, breadth. 30Hence the only people against whom the rule can be employed are those who assert that a genus is always numerically one; and this is what is done by those who assert the real existence of the 'Ideas'; for they allege that absolute length and absolute animal are the genus.
It may be that in some cases the definer is obliged to employ a negation as well, e.g. in defining 35privations. For 'blind' means a thing which cannot see when its nature is to see.
144a
1 ἀναγκαῖον ἀντιδιαιρεῖσθαι, οἷον εἰ μῆκος πλάτος ἔχον ὥρισται·
τῷ γὰρ πλάτος ἔχοντι τὸ μὴ ἔχον πλάτος ἀντιδιῄρηται,
ἄλλο δ' οὐδέν, ὥστε ἀποφάσει πάλιν διαιρεῖται
τὸ γένος.
5 Πάλιν εἰ τὸ εἶδος ὡς διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκε, καθάπερ οἱ
τὸν προπηλακισμὸν ὕβριν μετὰ χλευασίας ὁριζόμενοι· ἡ
γὰρ χλευασία ὕβρις τις, ὥστ' οὐ διαφορὰ ἀλλ' εἶδος ἡ
χλευασία.
Ἔτι εἰ τὸ γένος ὡς διαφορὰν εἴρηκεν, οἷον τὴν ἀρετὴν
10 ἕξιν ἀγαθὴν ἢ σπουδαίαν· γένος γὰρ τἀγαθὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς
ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ γένος τἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ διαφορά, εἴπερ ἀληθὲς
ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸν ἐν δύο γένεσιν εἶναι μὴ περιέχουσιν
ἄλληλα. οὔτε γὰρ τἀγαθὸν τὴν ἕξιν περιέχει οὔθ' ἡ
ἕξις τἀγαθόν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσα ἕξις ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν
15 ἕξις, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένη ἀμφότερα. εἰ οὖν ἡ ἕξις τῆς ἀρετῆς
γένος, δῆλον ὅτι τἀγαθὸν οὐ γένος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον διαφορά.
ἔτι ἡ μὲν ἕξις τί ἐστι σημαίνει ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν οὐ
τί ἐστιν ἀλλὰ ποῖον· δοκεῖ δ' ἡ διαφορὰ ποιόν τι σημαίνειν.
20 Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιόν τι ἀλλὰ τόδε τι σημαίνει ἡ
ἀποδοθεῖσα διαφορά· δοκεῖ γὰρ ποιόν τι πᾶσα διαφορὰ
δηλοῦν.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει τῷ
ὁριζομένῳ ἡ διαφορά. οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ τῶν κατὰ
25 συμβεβηκὸς ὑπαρχόντων ἐστί, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ γένος·
οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ
ὑπάρχειν.
Ἔτι εἰ κατηγορεῖται τοῦ γένους ἡ διαφορὰ ἢ τὸ εἶδος
ἢ τῶν κάτωθέν τι τοῦ εἴδους, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὡρισμένος· οὐδὲν γὰρ
30 τῶν εἰρημένων ἐνδέχεται τοῦ γένους κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ
γένος ἐπὶ πλεῖστον πάντων λέγεται. πάλιν εἰ κατηγορεῖται
τὸ γένος τῆς διαφορᾶς· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ
καθ' ὧν ἡ διαφορά, τὸ γένος δοκεῖ κατηγορεῖσθαι, οἷον τὸ
ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ βοὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πεζῶν
35 ζῴων, οὐ κατ' αὐτῆς τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους λεγομένης.
εἰ γὰρ καθ' ἑκάστης τῶν διαφορῶν τὸ ζῷον κατηγορηθήσεται,
πολλὰ ζῷα τοῦ εἴδους ἂν κατηγοροῖτο· αἱ
1There is no difference between dividing the genus by a negation, and dividing it by such an affirmation as is bound to have a negation as its co-ordinate in a division, e.g. supposing he had defined something as 'length possessed of breadth'; for co-ordinate in the division with that which is possessed of 5breadth is that which possesses no breadth and that only, so that again the genus is divided by a negation.
Again, see if he rendered the species as a differentia, as do those who define 'contumely' as 'insolence accompanied by jeering'; for jeering is a kind of insolence, i.e. it is a species and not a differentia.
Moreover, see if he has stated the genus as the differentia, e.g. 10'Virtue is a good or noble state: for 'good' is the genus of 'virtue'. Or possibly 'good' here is not the genus but the differentia, on the principle that the same thing cannot be in two genera of which neither contains the other: for 'good' does not include 'state', nor vice versa: for not every state is good nor every good a 'state'. Both, then, could not be genera, and consequently, 15if 'state' is the genus of virtue, clearly 'good' cannot be its genus: it must rather be the differentia'. Moreover, 'a state' indicates the essence of virtue, whereas 'good' indicates not the essence but a quality: and to indicate a quality is generally held to be the function of the differentia. See, further, whether the differentia rendered indicates an individual rather than 20a quality: for the general view is that the differentia always expresses a quality.
Look and see, further, whether the differentia belongs only by accident to the object defined. For the differentia is never an accidental attribute, any more than the genus is: for the differentia of a thing cannot both belong and not belong to it.
Moreover, if either the differentia or the species, 25or any of the things which are under the species, is predicable of the genus, then he could not have defined the term. For none of the aforesaid can possibly be predicated of the genus, seeing that the genus is the term with the widest range of all. Again, see if the genus be predicated of the differentia; for the general view is that the genus is predicated, not of the differentia, 30but of the objects of which the differentia is predicated. Animal (e.g.) is predicated of 'man' or 'ox' or other walking animals, not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species. For if 'animal' is to be predicated of each of its differentiae, then 'animal' would be predicated of the species several times over; for the differentiae are predicates of the 35species. Moreover, the differentiae will be all either species or individuals, if they are animals; for every animal is either a species or an individual.
Again, see if he rendered the species as a differentia, as do those who define 'contumely' as 'insolence accompanied by jeering'; for jeering is a kind of insolence, i.e. it is a species and not a differentia.
Moreover, see if he has stated the genus as the differentia, e.g. 10'Virtue is a good or noble state: for 'good' is the genus of 'virtue'. Or possibly 'good' here is not the genus but the differentia, on the principle that the same thing cannot be in two genera of which neither contains the other: for 'good' does not include 'state', nor vice versa: for not every state is good nor every good a 'state'. Both, then, could not be genera, and consequently, 15if 'state' is the genus of virtue, clearly 'good' cannot be its genus: it must rather be the differentia'. Moreover, 'a state' indicates the essence of virtue, whereas 'good' indicates not the essence but a quality: and to indicate a quality is generally held to be the function of the differentia. See, further, whether the differentia rendered indicates an individual rather than 20a quality: for the general view is that the differentia always expresses a quality.
Look and see, further, whether the differentia belongs only by accident to the object defined. For the differentia is never an accidental attribute, any more than the genus is: for the differentia of a thing cannot both belong and not belong to it.
Moreover, if either the differentia or the species, 25or any of the things which are under the species, is predicable of the genus, then he could not have defined the term. For none of the aforesaid can possibly be predicated of the genus, seeing that the genus is the term with the widest range of all. Again, see if the genus be predicated of the differentia; for the general view is that the genus is predicated, not of the differentia, 30but of the objects of which the differentia is predicated. Animal (e.g.) is predicated of 'man' or 'ox' or other walking animals, not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species. For if 'animal' is to be predicated of each of its differentiae, then 'animal' would be predicated of the species several times over; for the differentiae are predicates of the 35species. Moreover, the differentiae will be all either species or individuals, if they are animals; for every animal is either a species or an individual.
144b
1 γὰρ διαφοραὶ τοῦ εἴδους κατηγοροῦνται. ἔτι αἱ διαφοραὶ πᾶσαι
ἢ εἴδη ἢ ἄτομα ἔσονται, εἴπερ ζῷα· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ζῴων
ἢ εἶδός ἐστιν ἢ ἄτομον.
Ὁμοίως δὲ σκεπτέον καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τῶν ὑποκάτω
5 τι τοῦ εἴδους τῆς διαφορᾶς κατηγορεῖται· ἀδύνατον γάρ,
ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ πλέον ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν εἰδῶν λέγεται. ἔτι συμβήσεται
τὴν διαφορὰν εἶδος εἶναι, εἴπερ κατηγορεῖταί τι
αὐτῆς τῶν εἰδῶν· εἰ γὰρ κατηγορηθήσεται ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι
ἡ διαφορὰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. πάλιν εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἡ διαφορὰ
10 τοῦ εἴδους· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ γένους ὕστερον, τοῦ δ' εἴδους πρότερον
τὴν διαφορὰν δεῖ εἶναι.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἑτέρου γένους ἡ ῥηθεῖσα διαφορὰ μὴ
περιεχομένου μηδὲ περιέχοντος· οὐ δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ διαφορὰ
δύο γενῶν εἶναι μὴ περιεχόντων ἄλληλα. εἰ δὲ μή,
15 συμβήσεται καὶ εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν δύο γένεσιν εἶναι μὴ περιέχουσιν
ἄλληλα. ἐπιφέρει γὰρ ἑκάστη τῶν διαφορῶν τὸ
οἰκεῖον γένος, καθάπερ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν τὸ ζῷον συνεπιφέρει.
ὥστε καθ' οὗ ἡ διαφορά, καὶ τῶν γενῶν ἑκάτερον·
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἐν δύο γένεσιν οὐ περιέχουσιν
20 ἄλληλα. ἢ οὐκ ἀδύνατον τὴν αὐτὴν διαφορὰν δύο γενῶν
εἶναι μὴ περιεχόντων ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον "μηδ' ἄμφω
ὑπὸ ταὐτὸν ὄντων". τὸ γὰρ πεζὸν ζῷον καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν
ζῷον γένη ἐστὶν οὐ περιέχοντα ἄλληλα, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων
αὐτῶν ἐστι τὸ δίπουν διαφορά. ὥστε προσθετέον ὅτι μηδ' ὑπὸ
25 ταὐτὸν ὄντων ἄμφω· ταῦτα γὰρ ἄμφω ὑπὸ τὸ ζῷόν ἐστιν.
δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὴν διαφορὰν πᾶν οἰκεῖον
ἐπιφέρειν γένος, ἐπειδὴ ἐνδέχεται τὴν αὐτὴν δύο γενῶν εἶναι
μὴ περιεχόντων ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἕτερον μόνον ἀνάγκη
συνεπιφέρειν καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω τούτου πάντα, καθάπερ τὸ
30 δίπουν τὸ πτηνὸν ἢ τὸ πεζὸν συνεπιφέρει ζῷον.
Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ἔν τινι διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκεν οὐσίας·
οὐ δοκεῖ γὰρ διαφέρειν οὐσία οὐσίας τῷ ποὺ εἶναι. διὸ
καὶ τοῖς τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ διαιροῦσι τὸ ζῷον ἐπιτιμῶσιν
ὡς τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον ποὺ σημαῖνον. ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν
35 τούτων οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔν τινι οὐδὲ ποὺ σημαίνει
τὸ ἔνυδρον, ἀλλὰ ποιόν τι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἐν τῷ ξηρῷ,
ὁμοίως ἔνυδρον· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ χερσαῖον, κἂν ἐν ὑγρῷ, χερσαῖον
1Likewise you must inquire also if the species or any of the objects that come under it is predicated of the differentia: for this is impossible, seeing that the differentia is a term with a wider range than the various species. Moreover, if any of the species be predicated of it, the result will be that 5the differentia is a species: if, for instance, 'man' be predicated, the differentia is clearly the human race. Again, see if the differentia fails to be prior to the species: for the differentia ought to be posterior to the genus, but prior to the species.
Look and see also if the differentia mentioned belongs to a different genus, neither contained in nor containing the genus in 10question. For the general view is that the same differentia cannot be used of two non-subaltern genera. Else the result will be that the same species as well will be in two non-subaltern genera: for each of the differentiae imports its own genus, e.g. 'walking' and 'biped' import with them the genus 'animal'. If, then, each of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia 15is true, it clearly follows that the species must be in two non-subaltern genera. Or perhaps it is not impossible for the same differentia to be used of two non-subaltern genera, and we ought to add the words 'except they both be subordinate members of the same genus'. Thus 'walking animal' and 'flying animal' are non-subaltern genera, and 'biped' is the differentia of both. 20The words 'except they both be subordinate members of the same genus' ought therefore to be added; for both these are subordinate to 'animal'. From this possibility, that the same differentia may be used of two non-subaltern genera, it is clear also that there is no necessity for the differentia to carry with it the whole of the genus to which it belongs, but only the one or the 25other of its limbs together with the genera that are higher than this, as 'biped' carries with it either 'flying' or 'walking animal'.
See, too, if he has rendered 'existence in' something as the differentia of a thing's essence: for the general view is that locality cannot differentiate between one essence and another. Hence, too, people condemn those who divide animals by means of 30the terms 'walking' and 'aquatic', on the ground that 'walking' and 'aquatic' indicate mere locality. Or possibly in this case the censure is undeserved; for 'aquatic' does not mean 'in' anything; nor does it denote a locality, but a certain quality: for even if the thing be on the dry land, still it is aquatic: and likewise a land-animal, even though it be in the water, will 35still be a and not an aquatic-animal. But all the same, if ever the differentia does denote existence in something, clearly he will have made a bad mistake.
Look and see also if the differentia mentioned belongs to a different genus, neither contained in nor containing the genus in 10question. For the general view is that the same differentia cannot be used of two non-subaltern genera. Else the result will be that the same species as well will be in two non-subaltern genera: for each of the differentiae imports its own genus, e.g. 'walking' and 'biped' import with them the genus 'animal'. If, then, each of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia 15is true, it clearly follows that the species must be in two non-subaltern genera. Or perhaps it is not impossible for the same differentia to be used of two non-subaltern genera, and we ought to add the words 'except they both be subordinate members of the same genus'. Thus 'walking animal' and 'flying animal' are non-subaltern genera, and 'biped' is the differentia of both. 20The words 'except they both be subordinate members of the same genus' ought therefore to be added; for both these are subordinate to 'animal'. From this possibility, that the same differentia may be used of two non-subaltern genera, it is clear also that there is no necessity for the differentia to carry with it the whole of the genus to which it belongs, but only the one or the 25other of its limbs together with the genera that are higher than this, as 'biped' carries with it either 'flying' or 'walking animal'.
See, too, if he has rendered 'existence in' something as the differentia of a thing's essence: for the general view is that locality cannot differentiate between one essence and another. Hence, too, people condemn those who divide animals by means of 30the terms 'walking' and 'aquatic', on the ground that 'walking' and 'aquatic' indicate mere locality. Or possibly in this case the censure is undeserved; for 'aquatic' does not mean 'in' anything; nor does it denote a locality, but a certain quality: for even if the thing be on the dry land, still it is aquatic: and likewise a land-animal, even though it be in the water, will 35still be a and not an aquatic-animal. But all the same, if ever the differentia does denote existence in something, clearly he will have made a bad mistake.
145a
1 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔνυδρον ἔσται. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐάν ποτε σημαίνῃ
τὸ ἔν τινι ἡ διαφορά, δῆλον ὅτι διημαρτηκὼς ἔσται.
Πάλιν εἰ τὸ πάθος διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκεν· πᾶν γὰρ
πάθος μᾶλλον γινόμενον ἐξίστησι τῆς οὐσίας, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ
5 οὐ τοιοῦτον· μᾶλλον γὰρ σῴζειν δοκεῖ ἡ διαφορὰ οὗ ἐστι
διαφορά, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς οἰκείας διαφορᾶς
ἕκαστον· πεζοῦ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος.
ἁπλῶς δ' εἰπεῖν, καθ' ὅσα ἀλλοιοῦται τὸ ἔχον, οὐδὲν τούτων
διαφορὰ ἐκείνου· ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον γινόμενα
10 ἐξίστησι τῆς οὐσίας. ὥστ' εἴ τινα τοιαύτην διαφορὰν ἀποδέδωκεν,
ἡμάρτηκεν· ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλοιούμεθα κατὰ τὰς
διαφοράς.
Καὶ εἴ τινος τῶν πρός τι μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο τὴν διαφορὰν
ἀποδέδωκεν· τῶν γὰρ πρός τι καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ πρός
15 τι, καθάπερ καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὴ
καὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται· ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων πρός τι
σημαίνει· θεωρητικὴ γὰρ τινὸς καὶ ποιητικὴ τινὸς καὶ
πρακτικὴ τινός.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον τῶν πρός
20 τι ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ ὁριζόμενος. ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν
[ἕκαστον τῶν πρός τι] μόνον ἔστι χρῆσθαι, πρὸς ἄλλο δ'
οὐδέν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον τῇ ὄψει πρὸς τὸ ἰδεῖν
μόνον, τῇ δὲ στλεγγίδι κἂν ἀρύσειέ τις. ἀλλ' ὅμως εἴ
τις ὁρίσαιτο τὴν στλεγγίδα ὄργανον πρὸς τὸ ἀρύειν, ἡμάρτηκεν·
25 οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο πέφυκεν. ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν
"ἐφ' ὃ ἂν χρήσαιτο ὁ φρόνιμος ᾗ φρόνιμος καὶ ἡ
περὶ ἕκαστον οἰκεία ἐπιστήμη".
Ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦ πρώτου ἀποδέδωκεν, ὅταν τυγχάνῃ πρὸς
πλείω λεγόμενον, οἷον τὴν φρόνησιν ἀρετὴν ἀνθρώπου ἢ ψυχῆς
30 καὶ μὴ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. πρώτου γὰρ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἀρετὴ
ἡ φρόνησις· κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος
φρονεῖν λέγεται.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ δεκτικόν ἐστιν οὗ εἴρηται τὸ ὡρισμένον πάθος
ἢ [ἡ] διάθεσις ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο, ἡμάρτηκεν· πᾶσα γὰρ διάθεσις
35 καὶ πᾶν πάθος ἐν ἐκείνῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι οὗ ἐστι διάθεσις
ἢ πάθος, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ, διάθεσις οὖσα
ψυχῆς. ἐνίοτε δὲ διαμαρτάνουσιν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, οἷον ὅσοι
1Again, see if he has rendered an affection as the differentia: for every affection, if intensified, subverts the essence of the thing, while the differentia is not of that kind: for the differentia is generally considered rather to preserve that which it differentiates; and it is absolutely impossible for a thing to 5exist without its own special differentia: for if there be no 'walking', there will be no 'man'. In fact, we may lay down absolutely that a thing cannot have as its differentia anything in respect of which it is subject to alteration: for all things of that kind, if intensified, destroy its essence. If, then, a man has rendered any differentia of this kind, he has made a mistake: for we undergo 10absolutely no alteration in respect of our differentiae.
Again, see if he has failed to render the differentia of a relative term relatively to something else; for the differentiae of relative terms are themselves relative, as in the case also of knowledge. This is classed as speculative, practical and productive; and each of these denotes a relation: for it speculates upon something, and 15produces something and does something.
Look and see also if the definer renders each relative term relatively to its natural purpose: for while in some cases the particular relative term can be used in relation to its natural purpose only and to nothing else, some can be used in relation to something else as well. Thus sight can only be used for seeing, but a strigil can also be used to dip up 20water. Still, if any one were to define a strigil as an instrument for dipping water, he has made a mistake: for that is not its natural function. The definition of a thing's natural function is 'that for which it would be used by the prudent man, acting as such, and by the science that deals specially with that thing'.
Or see if, whenever a term happens to be used in a number of relations, he 25has failed to introduce it in its primary relation: e.g. by defining 'wisdom' as the virtue of 'man' or of the 'soul,' rather than of the 'reasoning faculty': for 'wisdom' is the virtue primarily of the reasoning faculty: for it is in virtue of this that both the man and his soul are said to be wise.
Moreover, if the thing of which the term defined has been stated to be an affection or disposition, 30or whatever it may be, be unable to admit it, the definer has made a mistake. For every disposition and every affection is formed naturally in that of which it is an affection or disposition, as knowledge, too, is formed in the soul, being a disposition of soul. Sometimes, however, people make bad mistakes in matters of this sort, e.g. all those who say that 'sleep' is a 'failure of sensation', 35or that 'perplexity' is a state of 'equality between contrary reasonings', or that 'pain' is a 'violent disruption of parts that are naturally conjoined'.
Again, see if he has failed to render the differentia of a relative term relatively to something else; for the differentiae of relative terms are themselves relative, as in the case also of knowledge. This is classed as speculative, practical and productive; and each of these denotes a relation: for it speculates upon something, and 15produces something and does something.
Look and see also if the definer renders each relative term relatively to its natural purpose: for while in some cases the particular relative term can be used in relation to its natural purpose only and to nothing else, some can be used in relation to something else as well. Thus sight can only be used for seeing, but a strigil can also be used to dip up 20water. Still, if any one were to define a strigil as an instrument for dipping water, he has made a mistake: for that is not its natural function. The definition of a thing's natural function is 'that for which it would be used by the prudent man, acting as such, and by the science that deals specially with that thing'.
Or see if, whenever a term happens to be used in a number of relations, he 25has failed to introduce it in its primary relation: e.g. by defining 'wisdom' as the virtue of 'man' or of the 'soul,' rather than of the 'reasoning faculty': for 'wisdom' is the virtue primarily of the reasoning faculty: for it is in virtue of this that both the man and his soul are said to be wise.
Moreover, if the thing of which the term defined has been stated to be an affection or disposition, 30or whatever it may be, be unable to admit it, the definer has made a mistake. For every disposition and every affection is formed naturally in that of which it is an affection or disposition, as knowledge, too, is formed in the soul, being a disposition of soul. Sometimes, however, people make bad mistakes in matters of this sort, e.g. all those who say that 'sleep' is a 'failure of sensation', 35or that 'perplexity' is a state of 'equality between contrary reasonings', or that 'pain' is a 'violent disruption of parts that are naturally conjoined'.
145b
1 λέγουσιν ὅτι ὁ ὕπνος ἐστὶν ἀδυναμία αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἡ ἀπορία
ἰσότης ἐναντίων λογισμῶν, καὶ ἡ ἀλγηδὼν διάστασις τῶν
συμφύτων μερῶν μετὰ βίας. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ὕπνος ὑπάρχει
τῇ αἰσθήσει (ἔδει δ', εἴπερ ἀδυναμία αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν)· ὁμοίως
5 δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἀπορία ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐναντίοις λογισμοῖς, οὐδ' ἡ
ἀλγηδὼν τοῖς συμφύτοις μέρεσιν· ἀλγήσει γὰρ τὰ ἄψυχα,
εἴπερ ἀλγηδὼν αὐτοῖς παρέσται. τοιοῦτος δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς
ὑγιείας ὁρισμός, εἴπερ "συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν" ἐστιν·
ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν τὰ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά. ἡ γὰρ ἑκάστου
10 συμμετρία ἐν ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχει ὧν ἐστι συμμετρία, ὥσθ' ἡ
ὑγίεια ὑπάρχοι ἂν αὐτοῖς. ἔτι τὸ ποιούμενον εἰς τὸ ποιητικὸν
ἢ ἀνάπαλιν συμβαίνει τιθέναι τοῖς οὕτως ὁριζομένοις. οὐ
γάρ ἐστιν ἀλγηδὼν ἡ διάστασις τῶν συμφύτων μερῶν, ἀλλὰ
ποιητικὸν ἀλγηδόνος· οὐδ' ἡ ἀδυναμία τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὕπνος,
15 ἀλλὰ ποιητικὸν θάτερον θατέρου· ἤτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν
ὑπνώσσομεν ἢ διὰ τὸν ὕπνον ἀδυνατοῦμεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τῆς ἀπορίας δόξειεν ἂν ποιητικὸν εἶναι ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων ἰσότης
λογισμῶν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐπ' ἀμφότερα λογιζομένοις ἡμῖν
ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνηται καθ' ἑκάτερον γίνεσθαι, ἀποροῦμεν
20 ὁπότερον πράξωμεν.
Ἔτι κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους πάντας ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴ που διαφωνεῖ,
οἷον εἰ τὸ ἀθάνατον ὡρίσατο ζῷον ἄφθαρτον νῦν
εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ νῦν ἄφθαρτον ζῷον νῦν ἀθάνατον ἔσται. ἢ ἐπὶ
μὲν τούτου οὐ συμβαίνει· ἀμφίβολον γὰρ τὸ νῦν ἄφθαρτον
25 εἶναι· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἔφθαρται νῦν σημαίνει, ἢ ὅτι οὐ δύναται
φθαρῆναι νῦν, ἢ ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι νῦν οἷον μηδέποτε
φθαρῆναι. ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄφθαρτον νῦν ἐστι ζῷον, τοῦτο
λέγομεν, ὅτι νῦν τοιοῦτόν ἐστι ζῷον οἷον μηδέποτε φθαρῆναι·
τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν, ὥστ' οὐ συμβαίνει νῦν
30 αὐτὸ ἀθάνατον εἶναι. ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἂν συμβαίνῃ τὸ μὲν κατὰ
τὸν λόγον ἀποδοθὲν ὑπάρχειν νῦν ἢ πρότερον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ
τοὔνομα μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν. χρηστέον οὖν τῷ
τόπῳ καθάπερ εἴρηται.
1For sleep is not an attribute of sensation, whereas it ought to be, if it is a failure of sensation. Likewise, perplexity is not an attribute of opposite reasonings, nor pain of parts naturally conjoined: for then inanimate things will be in pain, since pain will be present in them. Similar in 5character, too, is the definition of 'health', say, as a 'balance of hot and cold elements': for then health will be necessarily exhibited by the hot and cold elements: for balance of anything is an attribute inherent in those things of which it is the balance, so that health would be an attribute of them. Moreover, people who define in this way put effect for cause, 10or cause for effect. For the disruption of parts naturally conjoined is not pain, but only a cause of pain: nor again is a failure of sensation sleep, but the one is the cause of the other: for either we go to sleep because sensation fails, or sensation fails because we go to sleep. Likewise also an equality between contrary reasonings would be generally considered to 15be a cause of perplexity: for it is when we reflect on both sides of a question and find everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which of the two we are to do.
Moreover, with regard to all periods of time look and see whether there be any discrepancy between the differentia and the thing defined: e.g. supposing the 'immortal' to be 20defined as a 'living thing immune at present from destruction'. For a living thing that is immune 'at present' from destruction will be immortal 'at present'. Possibly, indeed, in this case this result does not follow, owing to the ambiguity of the words 'immune at present from destruction': for it may mean either that the thing has not been destroyed at present, or that 25it cannot be destroyed at present, or that at present it is such that it never can be destroyed. Whenever, then, we say that a living thing is at present immune from destruction, we mean that it is at present a living thing of such a kind as never to be destroyed: and this is equivalent to saying that it is immortal, so that it is not meant that it is immortal only 30at present. Still, if ever it does happen that what has been rendered according to the definition belongs in the present only or past, whereas what is meant by the word does not so belong, then the two could not be the same. So, then, this commonplace rule ought to be followed, as we have said.
Moreover, with regard to all periods of time look and see whether there be any discrepancy between the differentia and the thing defined: e.g. supposing the 'immortal' to be 20defined as a 'living thing immune at present from destruction'. For a living thing that is immune 'at present' from destruction will be immortal 'at present'. Possibly, indeed, in this case this result does not follow, owing to the ambiguity of the words 'immune at present from destruction': for it may mean either that the thing has not been destroyed at present, or that 25it cannot be destroyed at present, or that at present it is such that it never can be destroyed. Whenever, then, we say that a living thing is at present immune from destruction, we mean that it is at present a living thing of such a kind as never to be destroyed: and this is equivalent to saying that it is immortal, so that it is not meant that it is immortal only 30at present. Still, if ever it does happen that what has been rendered according to the definition belongs in the present only or past, whereas what is meant by the word does not so belong, then the two could not be the same. So, then, this commonplace rule ought to be followed, as we have said.
Book 6,Chapter 7 (145b34–146a35)
Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ καθ' ἕτερόν τι μᾶλλον λέγεται
35 τὸ ὁρισθὲν ἢ κατὰ τὸν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον, οἷον εἰ ἡ δικαιοσύνη
δύναμις τοῦ ἴσου διανεμητική. δίκαιος γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ
προαιρούμενος τὸ ἴσον διανεῖμαι τοῦ δυναμένου, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη
You should look and see also whether the term being defined is applied in 35consideration of something other than the definition rendered. Suppose (e.g.) a definition of 'justice' as the 'ability to distribute what is equal'.
146a
1 ἡ δικαιοσύνη δύναμις τοῦ ἴσου διανεμητική· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιος
εἴη ἂν μάλιστα ὁ δυνάμενος μάλιστα τὸ ἴσον διανεῖμαι.
Ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν πρᾶγμα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ
κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοθὲν μὴ δέχεται, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν τὸ μὲν
5 κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοθὲν δέχεται, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα μή· δεῖ
γὰρ ἢ ἀμφότερα δέχεσθαι ἢ μηδέτερον, εἴπερ δὴ ταὐτόν ἐστι
τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοθὲν τῷ πράγματι. ἔτι εἰ δέχεται
μὲν ἀμφότερα τὸ μᾶλλον, μὴ ἅμα δὲ τὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἀμφότερα
λαμβάνει, οἷον εἰ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιθυμία συνουσίας ἐστίν·
10 ὁ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐρῶν οὐ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖ τῆς συνουσίας, ὥστ'
οὐχ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεται· ἔδει δέ γε,
εἴπερ ταὐτὸν ἦν.
Ἔτι εἰ, δύο τινῶν προτεθέντων, καθ' οὗ τὸ πρᾶγμα
μᾶλλον λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἧττον λέγεται, οἷον
15 εἰ τὸ πῦρ ἐστι σῶμα τὸ λεπτομερέστατον. πῦρ μὲν γὰρ
μᾶλλον ἡ φλόξ ἐστι τοῦ φωτός, σῶμα δὲ τὸ λεπτομερέστατον
ἧττον ἡ φλὸξ τοῦ φωτός· ἔδει δ' ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον
τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ταὐτὰ ἦν. πάλιν εἰ τὸ μὲν
ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχει τοῖς προτεθεῖσι, τὸ δ' ἕτερον
20 μὴ ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέροις ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ μᾶλλον.
Ἔτι ἐὰν πρὸς δύο τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδῷ καθ' ἑκάτερον,
οἷον τὸ καλὸν τὸ δι' ὄψεως ἢ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδύ, καὶ τὸ
ὂν τὸ δυνατὸν παθεῖν ἢ ποιῆσαι· ἅμα γὰρ ταὐτὸν καλόν
τε καὶ οὐ καλὸν ἔσται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄν. τὸ
25 γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ ταὐτὸν τῷ καλῷ ἔσται, ὥστε τὸ μὴ
ἡδὺ δι' ἀκοῆς τῷ μὴ καλῷ ταὐτόν· τοῖς γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ
τὰ ἀντικείμενα τὰ αὐτά· ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν καλῷ τὸ οὐ
καλόν, τῷ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδεῖ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς οὐχ ἡδύ. δῆλον
οὖν ὅτι ταὐτὸν τὸ οὐχ ἡδὺ δι' ἀκοῆς τῷ οὐ καλῷ. εἰ οὖν τί
30 ἐστι δι' ὄψεως μὲν ἡδὺ δι' ἀκοῆς δὲ μή, καλόν τε καὶ οὐ
καλὸν ἔσται. ὁμοίως δὲ δείξομεν καὶ ὅτι ταὐτὸν ὄν τε
καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν.
Ἔτι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὁρισμοῖς ἀποδιδομένων λόγους
35 ἀντὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιοῦντα σκοπεῖν εἴ τι διαφωνεῖ.
1This would not be right, for 'just' describes rather the man who chooses, than the man who is able to distribute what is equal: so that justice could not be an ability to distribute what is equal: for then also the most just man would be the man with the most ability to distribute what is equal.
Moreover, see if the thing admits 5of degrees, whereas what is rendered according to the definition does not, or, vice versa, what is rendered according to the definition admits of degrees while the thing does not. For either both must admit them or else neither, if indeed what is rendered according to the definition is the same as the thing. Moreover, see if, while both of them admit of degrees, they yet do not both become greater together: e.g. 10suppose sexual love to be the desire for intercourse: for he who is more intensely in love has not a more intense desire for intercourse, so that both do not become intensified at once: they certainly should, however, had they been the same thing.
Moreover, suppose two things to be before you, see if the term to be defined applies more particularly to the one to which the content of the definition is less 15applicable. Take, for instance, the definition of 'fire' as the 'body that consists of the most rarefied particles'. For 'fire' denotes flame rather than light, but flame is less the body that consists of the most rarefied particles than is light: whereas both ought to be more applicable to the same thing, if they had been the same. Again, see if the one expression applies alike to both the objects before you, while 20the other does not apply to both alike, but more particularly to one of them.
Moreover, see if he renders the definition relative to two things taken separately: thus, the beautiful' is 'what is pleasant to the eyes or to the ears": or 'the real' is 'what is capable of being acted upon or of acting'. For then the same thing will be both beautiful and not beautiful, and likewise will be both real and not real. 25For 'pleasant to the ears' will be the same as 'beautiful', so that 'not pleasant to the ears' will be the same as 'not beautiful': for of identical things the opposites, too, are identical, and the opposite of 'beautiful' is 'not beautiful', while of 'pleasant to the ears' the opposite is not pleasant to the cars': clearly, then, 'not pleasant to the ears' is the same thing as 'not beautiful'. If, therefore, 30something be pleasant to the eyes but not to the ears, it will be both beautiful and not beautiful. In like manner we shall show also that the same thing is both real and unreal.
Moreover, of both genera and differentiae and all the other terms rendered in definitions you should frame definitions in lieu of the terms, and then see if there be any discrepancy between them.
Moreover, see if the thing admits 5of degrees, whereas what is rendered according to the definition does not, or, vice versa, what is rendered according to the definition admits of degrees while the thing does not. For either both must admit them or else neither, if indeed what is rendered according to the definition is the same as the thing. Moreover, see if, while both of them admit of degrees, they yet do not both become greater together: e.g. 10suppose sexual love to be the desire for intercourse: for he who is more intensely in love has not a more intense desire for intercourse, so that both do not become intensified at once: they certainly should, however, had they been the same thing.
Moreover, suppose two things to be before you, see if the term to be defined applies more particularly to the one to which the content of the definition is less 15applicable. Take, for instance, the definition of 'fire' as the 'body that consists of the most rarefied particles'. For 'fire' denotes flame rather than light, but flame is less the body that consists of the most rarefied particles than is light: whereas both ought to be more applicable to the same thing, if they had been the same. Again, see if the one expression applies alike to both the objects before you, while 20the other does not apply to both alike, but more particularly to one of them.
Moreover, see if he renders the definition relative to two things taken separately: thus, the beautiful' is 'what is pleasant to the eyes or to the ears": or 'the real' is 'what is capable of being acted upon or of acting'. For then the same thing will be both beautiful and not beautiful, and likewise will be both real and not real. 25For 'pleasant to the ears' will be the same as 'beautiful', so that 'not pleasant to the ears' will be the same as 'not beautiful': for of identical things the opposites, too, are identical, and the opposite of 'beautiful' is 'not beautiful', while of 'pleasant to the ears' the opposite is not pleasant to the cars': clearly, then, 'not pleasant to the ears' is the same thing as 'not beautiful'. If, therefore, 30something be pleasant to the eyes but not to the ears, it will be both beautiful and not beautiful. In like manner we shall show also that the same thing is both real and unreal.
Moreover, of both genera and differentiae and all the other terms rendered in definitions you should frame definitions in lieu of the terms, and then see if there be any discrepancy between them.
Book 6,Chapter 8 (146a36–147a11)
Ἐὰν δ' ᾖ πρός τι τὸ ὁριζόμενον ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ ἢ κατὰ
τὸ γένος, σκοπεῖν εἰ μὴ εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται
If the term defined be relative, either in 35itself or in respect of its genus, see whether the definition fails to mention that to which the term, either in itself or in respect of its genus, is relative, e.g.
146b
1 ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ κατὰ τὸ γένος, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὡρίσατο
ὑπόληψιν ἀμετάπειστον, ἢ τὴν βούλησιν ὄρεξιν ἄλυπον·
παντὸς γὰρ τοῦ πρός τι ἡ οὐσία πρὸς ἕτερον, ἐπειδὴ ταὐτὸν
ἦν ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρός τι τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν.
5 ἔδει οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἰπεῖν ὑπόληψιν ἐπιστητοῦ καὶ τὴν βούλησιν
ὄρεξιν ἀγαθοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὴν γραμματικὴν
ὡρίσατο ἐπιστήμην γραμμάτων· ἔδει γὰρ ἢ πρὸς ὃ αὐτὸ
λέγεται, ἢ πρὸς ὃ τὸ γένος, ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ ἀποδίδοσθαι.
ἢ εἰ πρός τι εἰρημένον μὴ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀποδέδοται·
10 τέλος δ' ἐν ἑκάστῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἢ οὗ χάριν τἆλλα.
ῥητέον δὴ ἢ τὸ βέλτιστον ἢ τὸ ἔσχατον, οἷον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν οὐχ
ἡδέος ἀλλ' ἡδονῆς· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ αἱρούμεθα.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ γένεσίς ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἀποδέδωκεν, ἢ
ἐνέργεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τέλος· μᾶλλον γὰρ τὸ ἐνηργηκέναι
15 καὶ γεγενῆσθαι τέλος ἢ τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν.
(ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀληθὲς τὸ τοιοῦτον· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ
πλεῖστοι ἥδεσθαι μᾶλλον βούλονται ἢ πεπαῦσθαι ἡδόμενοι,
ὥστε τὸ ἐνεργεῖν μᾶλλον τέλος ἂν ποιοῖντο τοῦ ἐνηργηκέναι.)
20 Πάλιν ἐπ' ἐνίων εἰ μὴ διώρικε τὸ πόσου ἢ ποίου ἢ ποῦ
ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, οἷον φιλότιμος ὁ ποίας καὶ
ὁ πόσης ὀρεγόμενος τιμῆς· πάντες γὰρ ὀρέγονται τιμῆς,
ὥστ' οὐκ ἀπόχρη φιλότιμον εἰπεῖν τὸν ὀρεγόμενον τιμῆς,
ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τὰς εἰρημένας διαφοράς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
25 φιλοχρήματος ὁ πόσων ὀρεγόμενος χρημάτων, ἢ ἀκρατὴς
ὁ περὶ ποίας ἡδονάς· οὐ γὰρ ὁ ὑφ' οἱασποτοῦν ἡδονῆς κρατούμενος
ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, ἀλλ' ὁ ὑπὸ τινός. ἢ πάλιν, ὡς
ὁρίζονται τὴν νύκτα σκιὰν γῆς, ἢ τὸν σεισμὸν κίνησιν γῆς,
ἢ τὸ νέφος πύκνωσιν ἀέρος, ἢ τὸ πνεῦμα κίνησιν ἀέρος·
30 προσθετέον γὰρ πόσου καὶ ποίου καὶ ποῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος. ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων· ἀπολείπων γὰρ διαφορὰν
ἡντινοῦν οὐ λέγει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐνδεὲς
ἐπιχειρεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν γῆς κινηθείσης οὐδ' ὁποσησοῦν σεισμὸς
ἔσται, ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἀέρος ὁπωσοῦν οὐδ' ὁποσουοῦν κινηθέντος
35 πνεῦμα.
Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων εἰ μὴ πρόσκειται τὸ φαινόμενον,
καὶ ἐφ' ὅσων ἄλλων ἁρμόττει, οἷον ὅτι ἡ βούλησις
1if he has defined 'knowledge' as an 'incontrovertible conception' or 'wishing' as 'painless conation'. For of everything relative the essence is relative to something else, seeing that the being of every relative term is identical with being in a certain relation to something. He ought, therefore, to have said 5that knowledge is 'conception of a knowable' and that wishing is 'conation for a good'. Likewise, also, if he has defined 'grammar' as 'knowledge of letters': whereas in the definition there ought to be rendered either the thing to which the term itself is relative, or that, whatever it is, to which its genus is relative. Or see if a relative term has been described not in relation to its 10end, the end in anything being whatever is best in it or gives its purpose to the rest. Certainly it is what is best or final that should be stated, e.g. that desire is not for the pleasant but for pleasure: for this is our purpose in choosing what is pleasant as well.
Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered the term be a process or an activity: for nothing of that 15kind is an end, for the completion of the activity or process is the end rather than the process or activity itself. Or perhaps this rule is not true in all cases, for almost everybody prefers the present experience of pleasure to its cessation, so that they would count the activity as the end rather than its completion.
Again see in some cases if he has failed to distinguish the quantity 20or quality or place or other differentiae of an object; e.g. the quality and quantity of the honour the striving for which makes a man ambitious: for all men strive for honour, so that it is not enough to define the ambitious man as him who strives for honour, but the aforesaid differentiae must be added. Likewise, also, in defining the covetous man the quantity of money he aims at, or 25in the case of the incontinent man the quality of the pleasures, should be stated. For it is not the man who gives way to any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent, but only he who gives way to a certain kind of pleasure. Or again, people sometimes define night as a 'shadow on the earth', or an earthquake as a movement of the earth', or a cloud as 'condensation of the air', 30or a wind as a 'movement of the air'; whereas they ought to specify as well quantity, quality, place, and cause. Likewise, also, in other cases of the kind: for by omitting any differentiae whatever he fails to state the essence of the term. One should always attack deficiency. For a movement of the earth does not constitute an earthquake, nor a movement of the air a wind, irrespective of 35its manner and the amount involved.
Moreover, in the case of conations, and in any other cases where it applies, see if the word 'apparent' is left out, e.g.
Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered the term be a process or an activity: for nothing of that 15kind is an end, for the completion of the activity or process is the end rather than the process or activity itself. Or perhaps this rule is not true in all cases, for almost everybody prefers the present experience of pleasure to its cessation, so that they would count the activity as the end rather than its completion.
Again see in some cases if he has failed to distinguish the quantity 20or quality or place or other differentiae of an object; e.g. the quality and quantity of the honour the striving for which makes a man ambitious: for all men strive for honour, so that it is not enough to define the ambitious man as him who strives for honour, but the aforesaid differentiae must be added. Likewise, also, in defining the covetous man the quantity of money he aims at, or 25in the case of the incontinent man the quality of the pleasures, should be stated. For it is not the man who gives way to any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent, but only he who gives way to a certain kind of pleasure. Or again, people sometimes define night as a 'shadow on the earth', or an earthquake as a movement of the earth', or a cloud as 'condensation of the air', 30or a wind as a 'movement of the air'; whereas they ought to specify as well quantity, quality, place, and cause. Likewise, also, in other cases of the kind: for by omitting any differentiae whatever he fails to state the essence of the term. One should always attack deficiency. For a movement of the earth does not constitute an earthquake, nor a movement of the air a wind, irrespective of 35its manner and the amount involved.
Moreover, in the case of conations, and in any other cases where it applies, see if the word 'apparent' is left out, e.g.
147a
1 ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις ἡδέος, ἀλλὰ μὴ φαινομένου
ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδέος. πολλάκις γὰρ λανθάνει τοὺς ὀρεγομένους
ὅ τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ ἐστιν, ὥστ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθὸν
ἢ ἡδὺ εἶναι ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον μόνον. ἔδει οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὴν
5 ἀπόδοσιν ποιήσασθαι. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ προσαποδῷ τὸ εἰρημένον, ἐπὶ
τὰ εἴδη ἀκτέον τὸν τιθέμενον ἰδέας εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἰδέα
φαινομένου οὐδενός, τὸ δ' εἶδος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι,
οἷον αὐτὴ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ ἡδέος καὶ αὐτὴ βούλησις
αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔσται οὖν φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ οὐδὲ φαινομένου
10 ἡδέος· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν
ἢ ἡδύ.
1'wishing is a conation after the good', or 'desire is a conation after the pleasant'-instead of saying 'the apparently good', or 'pleasant'. For often those who exhibit the conation do not perceive what is good or pleasant, so that their aim need not be really good or pleasant, but only apparently so. They ought, therefore, to have rendered 5the definition also accordingly. On the other hand, any one who maintains the existence of Ideas ought to be brought face to face with his Ideas, even though he does render the word in question: for there can be no Idea of anything merely apparent: the general view is that an Idea is always spoken of in relation to an Idea: thus absolute desire is for the absolutely pleasant, and absolute wishing is for the absolutely 10good; they therefore cannot be for an apparent good or an apparently pleasant: for the existence of an absolutely-apparently-good or pleasant would be an absurdity.
Book 6,Chapter 9 (147a12–148a9)
Ἔτι ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ τῆς ἕξεως ὁ ὁρισμός, σκοπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ
ἔχοντος, ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ ἔχοντος, ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων· οἷον εἰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὅπερ ὠφέλιμον,
15 καὶ ὁ ἡδόμενος ὡφελούμενος. καθόλου δ' εἰπεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
ὁρισμοῖς τρόπον τινὰ πλείω ἑνὸς συμβαίνει τὸν ὁριζόμενον
ὁρίζεσθαι. ὁ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενος τρόπον τινὰ
καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ὁρίζεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστῆμον καὶ
τὸ ἀνεπιστῆμον, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ
20 πρώτου δήλου γενομένου τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δῆλα γίνεται.
σκεπτέον οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μή τι διαφωνῇ,
στοιχείοις χρώμενον τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τῶν συστοίχων.
Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι σκοπεῖν εἰ πρὸς ὃ τὸ γένος ἀποδίδοται,
τὸ εἶδος πρὸς ἐκεῖνό τι ἀποδίδοται. οἷον εἰ ἡ ὑπόληψις
25 πρὸς τὸ ὑποληπτόν, ἡ τὶς ὑπόληψις πρὸς τὸ τὶ ὑποληπτόν,
καὶ εἰ τὸ πολλαπλάσιον πρὸς τὸ πολλοστημόριον, τὸ τὶ πολλαπλάσιον
πρὸς τὸ τὶ πολλοστημόριον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἀποδέδοται,
δῆλον ὅτι ἡμάρτηται.
Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου ὁ ἀντικείμενος λόγος,
30 οἷον τοῦ ἡμίσεος ὁ ἀντικείμενος τῷ τοῦ διπλασίου· εἰ γὰρ διπλάσιον
τὸ ἴσῳ ὑπερέχον, ἥμισυ τὸ ἴσῳ ὑπερεχόμενον. καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων δ' ὡσαύτως· ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγος
ἔσται κατὰ μίαν τινὰ συμπλοκὴν τῶν ἐναντίων. οἷον εἰ
ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ, βλαβερὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν κακοῦ
35 ἢ τὸ φθαρτικὸν ἀγαθοῦ· θάτερον γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἐναντίον
Moreover, if the definition be of the state of anything, look at what is in the state, while if it be of what is in the state, look at the state: and likewise also in other cases of the kind. Thus if the pleasant be identical with the beneficial, then, too, the 15man who is pleased is benefited. Speaking generally, in definitions of this sort it happens that what the definer defines is in a sense more than one thing: for in defining knowledge, a man in a sense defines ignorance as well, and likewise also what has knowledge and what lacks it, and what it is to know and to be ignorant. For if the first be made clear, the others become in a certain sense clear as well. We have, then, 20to be on our guard in all such cases against discrepancy, using the elementary principles drawn from consideration of contraries and of coordinates.
Moreover, in the case of relative terms, see if the species is rendered as relative to a species of that to which the genus is rendered as relative, e.g. supposing belief to be relative to some object of belief, see whether a particular belief is made relative to some particular 25object of belief: and, if a multiple be relative to a fraction, see whether a particular multiple be made relative to a particular fraction. For if it be not so rendered, clearly a mistake has been made.
See, also, if the opposite of the term has the opposite definition, whether (e.g.) the definition of 'half' is the opposite of that of 'double': for if 'double' is 'that which exceeds another by an equal amount to that 30other', 'half' is 'that which is exceeded by an amount equal to itself'. In the same way, too, with contraries. For to the contrary term will apply the definition that is contrary in some one of the ways in which contraries are conjoined. Thus (e.g.) if 'useful'='productive of good', 'injurious'=productive of evil' or 'destructive of good', for one or the other of thee is bound to be contrary to the term originally used.
Moreover, in the case of relative terms, see if the species is rendered as relative to a species of that to which the genus is rendered as relative, e.g. supposing belief to be relative to some object of belief, see whether a particular belief is made relative to some particular 25object of belief: and, if a multiple be relative to a fraction, see whether a particular multiple be made relative to a particular fraction. For if it be not so rendered, clearly a mistake has been made.
See, also, if the opposite of the term has the opposite definition, whether (e.g.) the definition of 'half' is the opposite of that of 'double': for if 'double' is 'that which exceeds another by an equal amount to that 30other', 'half' is 'that which is exceeded by an amount equal to itself'. In the same way, too, with contraries. For to the contrary term will apply the definition that is contrary in some one of the ways in which contraries are conjoined. Thus (e.g.) if 'useful'='productive of good', 'injurious'=productive of evil' or 'destructive of good', for one or the other of thee is bound to be contrary to the term originally used.
147b
1 εἶναι τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ῥηθέντι. εἰ οὖν μηδέτερον ἐναντίον τῷ
ἐξ ἀρχῆς ῥηθέντι, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδέτερος ἂν εἴη τῶν ὕστερον
ἀποδοθέντων τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγος, ὥστ' οὐδ' ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀποδοθεὶς
ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδοται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνια τῶν ἐναντίων στερήσει
5 θατέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ ἀνισότης στέρησις ἰσότητος δοκεῖ εἶναι
(ἄνισα γὰρ τὰ μὴ ἴσα λέγεται), δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μὲν κατὰ
στέρησιν λεγόμενον ἐναντίον ἀναγκαῖον ὁρίζεσθαι διὰ θατέρου,
τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν οὐκέτι διὰ τοῦ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγομένου· συμβαίνοι
γὰρ ἂν ἑκάτερον δι' ἑκατέρου γνωρίζεσθαι. ἐπισκεπτέον
10 οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν, οἷον εἴ τις ὁρίσαιτο
τὴν ἰσότητα τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνισότητι· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ
κατὰ στέρησιν λεγομένου ὁρίζεται. ἔτι τὸν οὕτως ὁριζόμενον
ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ τῷ ὁριζομένῳ χρῆσθαι. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο,
ἐὰν μεταληφθῇ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ὁ λόγος· εἰπεῖν γὰρ ἢ
15 ἀνισότητα οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ στέρησιν ἰσότητος. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἰσότης
τὸ ἐναντίον στερήσει ἰσότητος, ὥστ' αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη κεχρημένος.
ἂν δὲ μηδέτερον τῶν ἐναντίων κατὰ στέρησιν λέγηται,
ἀποδοθῇ δ' ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως, οἷον ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐναντίον κακῷ,
δῆλον ὅτι κακὸν τὸ ἐναντίον ἀγαθῷ ἔσται· τῶν γὰρ οὕτως
20 ἐναντίων ὁμοίως ὁ λόγος ἀποδοτέος. ὥστε πάλιν αὐτῷ τῷ
ὁριζομένῳ συμβαίνει χρῆσθαι· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοῦ
κακοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν. ὥστ' εἰ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ κακῷ ἐναντίον,
τὸ δὲ κακὸν οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ τὸ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐναντίον,
ἔσται ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐναντίῳ. δῆλον οὖν
25 ὅτι αὐτῷ κέχρηται.
Ἔτι εἰ τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενον ἀποδιδοὺς μὴ ἀποδέδωκεν
οὗ ἐστι στέρησις, οἷον τῆς ἕξεως ἢ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἢ ὁτουοῦν
ἐστιν ἡ στέρησις. καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι προςέθηκεν,
ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. οἷον εἰ τὴν
30 ἄγνοιαν εἰπὼν στέρησιν μὴ ἐπιστήμης στέρησιν εἶπεν, ἢ μὴ
προσέθηκεν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, ἢ προσθεὶς μὴ ἐν ᾧ
πρώτῳ ἀπέδωκεν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ
ἢ ψυχῇ· ἐὰν γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τούτων μὴ ποιήσῃ, ἡμάρτηκεν.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὴν τυφλότητα μὴ ὄψεως στέρησιν
35 ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ εἶπεν· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν καλῶς ἀποδιδόντα τὸ
1Suppose, then, neither of these things to be the contrary of the term originally used, then clearly neither of the definitions rendered later could be the definition of the contrary of the term originally defined: and therefore the definition originally rendered of the original term has not been rightly rendered either. Seeing, moreover, 5that of contraries, the one is sometimes a word forced to denote the privation of the other, as (e.g.) inequality is generally held to be the privation of equality (for 'unequal' merely describes things that are not equal'), it is therefore clear that that contrary whose form denotes the privation must of necessity be defined through the other; whereas the other cannot then be defined through the one whose form denotes the 10privation; for else we should find that each is being interpreted by the other. We must in the case of contrary terms keep an eye on this mistake, e.g. supposing any one were to define equality as the contrary of inequality: for then he is defining it through the term which denotes privation of it. Moreover, a man who so defines is bound to use in his definition the very term he is defining; and this becomes clear, if for the 15word we substitute its definition. For to say 'inequality' is the same as to say 'privation of equality'. Therefore equality so defined will be 'the contrary of the privation of equality', so that he would have used the very word to be defined. Suppose, however, that neither of the contraries be so formed as to denote privation, but yet the definition of it be rendered in a manner like the above, e.g. suppose 'good' to be 20defined as 'the contrary of evil', then, since it is clear that 'evil' too will be 'the contrary of good' (for the definition of things that are contrary in this must be rendered in a like manner), the result again is that he uses the very term being defined: for 'good' is inherent in the definition of 'evil'. If, then, 'good' be the contrary of evil, and evil be nothing other than the 'contrary of good', then 'good' will be 25the 'contrary of the contrary of good'. Clearly, then, he has used the very word to be defined.
Moreover, see if in rendering a term formed to denote privation, he has failed to render the term of which it is the privation, e.g. the state, or contrary, or whatever it may be whose privation it is: also if he has omitted to add either any term at all in which the privation is naturally formed, or else that in which it is 30naturally formed primarily, e.g. whether in defining 'ignorance' a privation he has failed to say that it is the privation of 'knowledge'; or has failed to add in what it is naturally formed, or, though he has added this, has failed to render the thing in which it is primarily formed, placing it (e.g.) in 'man' or in 'the soul', and not in the 'reasoning faculty': for if in any of these respects he fails, he has made a mistake.
Moreover, see if in rendering a term formed to denote privation, he has failed to render the term of which it is the privation, e.g. the state, or contrary, or whatever it may be whose privation it is: also if he has omitted to add either any term at all in which the privation is naturally formed, or else that in which it is 30naturally formed primarily, e.g. whether in defining 'ignorance' a privation he has failed to say that it is the privation of 'knowledge'; or has failed to add in what it is naturally formed, or, though he has added this, has failed to render the thing in which it is primarily formed, placing it (e.g.) in 'man' or in 'the soul', and not in the 'reasoning faculty': for if in any of these respects he fails, he has made a mistake.
148a
1 τί ἐστι καὶ τίνος ἐστὶν ἡ στέρησις ἀποδιδόναι καὶ τί ἐστι τὸ
ἐστερημένον.
Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ λεγομένου κατὰ στέρησιν στερήσει
ὡρίσατο, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγνοίας δόξειεν ἂν ὑπάρχειν ἡ
5 τοιαύτη ἁμαρτία τοῖς μὴ κατ' ἀπόφασιν τὴν ἄγνοιαν λέγουσιν.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον ἐπιστήμην οὐ δοκεῖ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον τὸ διηπατημένον· διὸ οὔτε τὰ ἄψυχα οὔτε τὰ παιδία
φαμὲν ἀγνοεῖν. ὥστ' οὐ κατὰ στέρησιν ἐπιστήμης ἡ ἄγνοια
λέγεται.
1Likewise, also, if he has failed to say that 'blindness' is the 'privation of sight in an eye': for a proper rendering of its essence must state both of what it is the privation and what it is that is deprived.
Examine further whether he has defined by the expression 'a privation' a term that is not used to denote a 5privation: thus a mistake of this sort also would be generally thought to be incurred in the case of 'error' by any one who is not using it as a merely negative term. For what is generally thought to be in error is not that which has no knowledge, but rather that which has been deceived, and for this reason we do not talk of inanimate things or of children as 'erring'. 'Error', then, is not 10used to denote a mere privation of knowledge.
Examine further whether he has defined by the expression 'a privation' a term that is not used to denote a 5privation: thus a mistake of this sort also would be generally thought to be incurred in the case of 'error' by any one who is not using it as a merely negative term. For what is generally thought to be in error is not that which has no knowledge, but rather that which has been deceived, and for this reason we do not talk of inanimate things or of children as 'erring'. 'Error', then, is not 10used to denote a mere privation of knowledge.
Book 6,Chapter 10 (148a10–148b22)
10 Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεων αἱ ὅμοιαι τοῦ
λόγου πτώσεις ἐφαρμόττουσιν· οἷον εἰ ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιητικὸν
ὑγιείας, ὠφελίμως τὸ ποιητικῶς ὑγιείας καὶ ὠφεληκὸς τὸ
πεποιηκὸς ὑγίειαν.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδέαν εἰ ἐφαρμόσει ὁ λεχθεὶς
15 ὅρος. ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ οὐ συμβαίνει, οἷον ὡς Πλάτων ὁρίζεται,
τὸ θνητὸν προσάπτων ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων ὁρισμοῖς· ἡ γὰρ
ἰδέα οὐκ ἔσται θνητή, οἷον αὐτοάνθρωπος, ὥστ' οὐκ ἐφαρμόσει
ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδέαν. ἁπλῶς δ' ἐν οἷς πρόσκειται τὸ
ποιητικὸν ἢ παθητικόν, ἀνάγκη διαφωνεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδέας τὸν
20 ὅρον· ἀπαθεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀκίνητοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι αἱ ἰδέαι τοῖς λέγουσιν
ἰδέας εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτους καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι
χρήσιμοι.
Ἔτι εἰ τῶν καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν λεγομένων ἕνα λόγον ἁπάντων
κοινὸν ἀποδέδωκεν· συνώνυμα γὰρ ὧν εἷς ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα
25 λόγος· ὥστ' οὐδενὸς τῶν ὑπὸ τοὔνομα ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς
ὅρος, εἰ δὴ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ ὁμώνυμον ἐφαρμόττει. πέπονθε
δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Διονυσίου τῆς ζωῆς ὅρος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ "κίνησις
γένους θρεπτοῦ σύμφυτος παρακολουθοῦσα"· οὐδὲν γὰρ
μᾶλλον τοῦτο τοῖς ζῴοις ἢ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει. ἡ δὲ ζωὴ
30 οὐ καθ' ἓν εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα μὲν τοῖς ζῴοις
ἑτέρα δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. ἐνδέχεται μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ
προαίρεσιν οὕτως ἀποδοῦναι τὸν ὅρον ὡς συνωνύμου καὶ καθ'
ἓν εἶδος πάσης τῆς ζωῆς λεγομένης. οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ
συνορῶντα τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ θατέρου βουλόμενον τὸν ὁρισμὸν
35 ἀποδοῦναι λαθεῖν μὴ ἴδιον ἀλλὰ κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν λόγον
ἀποδόντα. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ ὁποτερωσοῦν πεποίηκεν,
ἡμάρτηκεν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνια λανθάνει τῶν ὁμωνύμων, ἐρωτῶντι
Moreover, see whether the like inflexions in the definition apply to the like inflexions of the term; e.g. if 'beneficial' means 'productive of health', does 'beneficially' mean productively of health' and a 'benefactor' a 'producer of health'?
Look too and see whether the definition given will apply to the Idea as well. For in some cases it will not 15do so; e.g. in the Platonic definition where he adds the word 'mortal' in his definitions of living creatures: for the Idea (e.g. the absolute Man) is not mortal, so that the definition will not fit the Idea. So always wherever the words 'capable of acting on' or 'capable of being acted upon' are added, the definition and the Idea are absolutely bound to be discrepant: for those who assert the 20existence of Ideas hold that they are incapable of being acted upon, or of motion. In dealing with these people even arguments of this kind are useful.
Further, see if he has rendered a single common definition of terms that are used ambiguously. For terms whose definition corresponding their common name is one and the same, are synonymous; if, then, the definition applies in a like manner to 25the whole range of the ambiguous term, it is not true of any one of the objects described by the term. This is, moreover, what happens to Dionysius' definition of 'life' when stated as 'a movement of a creature sustained by nutriment, congenitally present with it': for this is found in plants as much as in animals, whereas 'life' is generally understood to mean not one kind of thing only, but 30to be one thing in animals and another in plants. It is possible to hold the view that life is a synonymous term and is always used to describe one thing only, and therefore to render the definition in this way on purpose: or it may quite well happen that a man may see the ambiguous character of the word, and wish to render the definition of the one sense only, and yet fail to see that he has 35rendered a definition common to both senses instead of one peculiar to the sense he intends. In either case, whichever course he pursues, he is equally at fault.
Look too and see whether the definition given will apply to the Idea as well. For in some cases it will not 15do so; e.g. in the Platonic definition where he adds the word 'mortal' in his definitions of living creatures: for the Idea (e.g. the absolute Man) is not mortal, so that the definition will not fit the Idea. So always wherever the words 'capable of acting on' or 'capable of being acted upon' are added, the definition and the Idea are absolutely bound to be discrepant: for those who assert the 20existence of Ideas hold that they are incapable of being acted upon, or of motion. In dealing with these people even arguments of this kind are useful.
Further, see if he has rendered a single common definition of terms that are used ambiguously. For terms whose definition corresponding their common name is one and the same, are synonymous; if, then, the definition applies in a like manner to 25the whole range of the ambiguous term, it is not true of any one of the objects described by the term. This is, moreover, what happens to Dionysius' definition of 'life' when stated as 'a movement of a creature sustained by nutriment, congenitally present with it': for this is found in plants as much as in animals, whereas 'life' is generally understood to mean not one kind of thing only, but 30to be one thing in animals and another in plants. It is possible to hold the view that life is a synonymous term and is always used to describe one thing only, and therefore to render the definition in this way on purpose: or it may quite well happen that a man may see the ambiguous character of the word, and wish to render the definition of the one sense only, and yet fail to see that he has 35rendered a definition common to both senses instead of one peculiar to the sense he intends. In either case, whichever course he pursues, he is equally at fault.
148b
1 μὲν ὡς συνωνύμοις χρηστέον (οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει ὁ θατέρου
ὅρος ἐπὶ θάτερον, ὥστε δόξει οὐχ ὡρίσθαι κατὰ τρόπον·
δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ συνώνυμον ἐφαρμόττειν), αὐτῷ δ' ἀποκρινομένῳ
διαιρετέον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιοι τῶν ἀποκρινομένων τὸ μὲν
5 συνώνυμον ὁμώνυμόν φασιν εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ἐφαρμόττῃ ἐπὶ
πᾶν ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς λόγος, τὸ δ' ὁμώνυμον συνώνυμον ἐὰν
ἐπ' ἄμφω ἐφαρμόττῃ, προδιομολογητέον ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων
ἢ προσυλλογιστέον ὅτι ὁμώνυμον ἢ συνώνυμον, ὁπότερον
ἂν ᾖ· μᾶλλον γὰρ συγχωροῦσιν οὐ προορῶντες τὸ συμβησόμενον.
10 ἂν δὲ μὴ γενομένης ὁμολογίας φῇ τις τὸ συνώνυμον
ὁμώνυμον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐφαρμόττειν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο
τὸν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον, σκοπεῖν εἰ ὁ τούτου λόγος ἐφαρμόττει
καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπά· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι συνώνυμον ἂν εἴη τοῖς
λοιποῖς. εἰ δὲ μή, πλείους ἔσονται ὁρισμοὶ τῶν λοιπῶν· δύο
15 γὰρ [οἱ] κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγοι ἐφαρμόττουσιν ἐπ' αὐτά, ὅ τε
πρότερον ἀποδοθεὶς καὶ ὁ ὕστερον. πάλιν εἴ τις, ὁρισάμενός
τι τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων, καὶ τοῦ λόγου μὴ ἐφαρμόττοντος
ἐπὶ πάντα, ὅτι μὲν ὁμώνυμον μὴ λέγοι, τὸ δ' ὄνομα
μὴ φαίη ἐπὶ πάντα ἐφαρμόττειν, ὅτι οὐδ' ὁ λόγος, ῥητέον
20 πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅτι τῇ μὲν ὀνομασίᾳ δεῖ χρῆσθαι τῇ παραδεδομένῃ
καὶ παρεπομένῃ καὶ μὴ κινεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔνια
δ' οὐ λεκτέον ὁμοίως τοῖς πολλοῖς.
1Since ambiguous terms sometimes pass unobserved, it is best in questioning to treat such terms as though they were synonymous (for the definition of the one sense will not apply to the other, so that the answerer will be generally thought not to have defined it correctly, for to a synonymous term the definition should apply in its full range), whereas in answering you 5should yourself distinguish between the senses. Further, as some answerers call 'ambiguous' what is really synonymous, whenever the definition rendered fails to apply universally, and, vice versa, call synonymous what is really ambiguous supposing their definition applies to both senses of the term, one should secure a preliminary admission on such points, or else prove beforehand that so-and-so is ambiguous or synonymous, as the case may be: for people are more 10ready to agree when they do not foresee what the consequence will be. If, however, no admission has been made, and the man asserts that what is really synonymous is ambiguous because the definition he has rendered will not apply to the second sense as well, see if the definition of this second meaning applies also to the other meanings: for if so, this meaning must clearly be synonymous with those others. Otherwise, there will be more than one definition of those 15other meanings, for there are applicable to them two distinct definitions in explanation of the term, viz. the one previously rendered and also the later one. Again, if any one were to define a term used in several senses, and, finding that his definition does not apply to them all, were to contend not that the term is ambiguous, but that even the term does not properly apply to all those senses, just because his definition will not do so either, then one may 20retort to such a man that though in some things one must not use the language of the people, yet in a question of terminology one is bound to employ the received and traditional usage and not to upset matters of that sort.
Book 6,Chapter 11 (148b23–149a28)
Ἐὰν δὲ τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων τινὸς ἀποδοθῇ ὅρος, σκοπεῖν,
ἀφαιροῦντα τὸν θατέρου τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων λόγον,
25 εἰ καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς τοῦ λοιποῦ· εἰ γὰρ μή, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ὁ
ὅλος τοῦ ὅλου. οἷον εἰ ὁρίσαιτο γραμμὴν πεπερασμένην εὐθεῖαν
"πέρας ἐπιπέδου ἔχοντος πέρατα, οὗ τὸ μέσον ἐπιπροςθεῖ
τοῖς πέρασιν", εἰ τῆς πεπερασμένης γραμμῆς ὁ λόγος
ἐστὶ "πέρας ἐπιπέδου ἔχοντος πέρατα", τοῦ εὐθέος δεῖ εἶναι τὸ
30 λοιπόν, "οὗ τὸ μέσον ἐπιπροσθεῖ τοῖς πέρασιν". ἀλλ' ἡ ἄπειρος
οὔτε μέσον οὔτε πέρατα ἔχει, εὐθεῖα δ' ἐστίν, ὥστ' οὐκ ἔστιν
ὁ λοιπὸς τοῦ λοιποῦ λόγος.
Ἔτι εἰ συνθέτου ὄντος τοῦ ὁριζομένου ἰσόκωλος ὁ λόγος
ἀπεδόθη τῷ ὁριζομένῳ. ἰσόκωλος δὲ λέγεται ὁ λόγος εἶναι,
35 ὅταν ὅσαπερ ἂν ᾖ τὰ συγκείμενα, τοσαῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ᾖ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν τοῖς
τοιούτοις μεταλλαγὴν γίνεσθαι, ἢ πάντων ἢ τινῶν, ἐπειδὴ
Suppose now that a definition has been rendered of some complex term, take away the definition of one of the elements in the complex, and see if also the rest of the definition defines the rest of it: if not, it is clear that neither does the 25whole definition define the whole complex. Suppose, e.g. that some one has defined a 'finite straight line' as 'the limit of a finite plane, such that its centre is in a line with its extremes'; if now the definition of a finite line' be the 'limit of a finite plane', the rest (viz. 'such that its centre is in a line with its extremes') ought to be a definition of straight'. But an infinite straight line has neither centre nor extremes and yet is straight so 30that this remainder does not define the remainder of the term.
Moreover, if the term defined be a compound notion, see if the definition rendered be equimembral with the term defined. A definition is said to be equimembral with the term defined when the number of the elements compounded in the latter is the same as the number of nouns and verbs in the definition. For the exchange in such cases is bound to be merely one of term for term, in the case of some if not 35of all, seeing that there are no more terms used now than formerly; whereas in a definition terms ought to be rendered by phrases, if possible in every case, or if not, in the majority.
Moreover, if the term defined be a compound notion, see if the definition rendered be equimembral with the term defined. A definition is said to be equimembral with the term defined when the number of the elements compounded in the latter is the same as the number of nouns and verbs in the definition. For the exchange in such cases is bound to be merely one of term for term, in the case of some if not 35of all, seeing that there are no more terms used now than formerly; whereas in a definition terms ought to be rendered by phrases, if possible in every case, or if not, in the majority.
149a
1 οὐδὲν πλείω νῦν ἢ πρότερον ὀνόματα εἴρηται. δεῖ δὲ τὸν ὁριζόμενον
λόγον ἀντὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποδοῦναι, μάλιστα μὲν πάντων,
εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν πλείστων. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν ὁ
τοὔνομα μεταλαβὼν ὡρισμένος ἂν εἴη, οἷον ἀντὶ λωπίου ἱμάτιον.
5 Ἔτι δὲ μείζων ἁμαρτία, εἰ καὶ ἀγνωστοτέρων ὀνομάτων
τὴν μετάληψιν ἐποιήσατο, οἷον ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου λευκοῦ
βροτὸν ἀργόν· οὔτε γὰρ ὥρισται ἧττόν τε σαφὲς οὕτω ῥηθέν.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ μεταλλαγῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰ οὐ
ταὐτὸν ἔτι σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ τὴν θεωρητικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὑπόληψιν
10 θεωρητικὴν εἰπών. ἡ γὰρ ὑπόληψις τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ οὐ ταὐτόν·
ἔδει δέ γε, εἴπερ μέλλει καὶ τὸ ὅλον ταὐτὸν εἶναι. τὸ
μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸν κοινὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λόγοις ἐστί,
τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν διάφορον.
Ἔτι εἰ θατέρου τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν μετάληψιν ποιούμενος
15 μὴ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀλλὰ τοῦ γένους τὴν μεταλλαγὴν ἐποιήσατο,
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρτίως ῥηθέντος. ἀγνωστότερον γὰρ ἡ
θεωρητικὴ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένος, τὸ δὲ διαφορά,
πάντων δὲ γνωριμώτατον τὸ γένος. ὥστ' οὐ τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ
τῆς διαφορᾶς ἔδει τὴν μετάληψιν ποιήσασθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἀγνωστότερόν
20 ἐστιν. (ἢ τοῦτο μὲν γελοῖον τὸ ἐπιτίμημα· οὐδὲν γὰρ
κωλύει τὴν μὲν διαφορὰν τῷ γνωριμωτάτῳ ὀνόματι εἰρῆσθαι,
τὸ δὲ γένος μή. οὕτω δ' ἐχόντων δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ γένους
καὶ οὐ τῆς διαφορᾶς κατὰ τοὔνομα τὴν μετάληψιν ποιητέον.)
εἰ δὲ μὴ ὄνομα ἀντ' ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ λόγον ἀντ' ὀνόματος
25 μεταλαμβάνει, δῆλον ὅτι τῆς διαφορᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ
τοῦ γένους ὁρισμὸν ἀποδοτέον, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ γνωρίσαι χάριν ὁ
ὁρισμὸς ἀποδίδοται· ἧττον γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ γένους γνώριμον.
1For at that rate, simple objects too could be defined by merely calling them by a different name, e.g. 'cloak' instead of 'doublet'.
The mistake is even worse, if actually a less well known term be substituted, e.g. 'pellucid mortal' for 'white man': for it is no definition, and moreover is less intelligible when put in 5that form.
Look and see also whether, in the exchange of words, the sense fails still to be the same. Take, for instance, the explanation of 'speculative knowledge' as 'speculative conception': for conception is not the same as knowledge-as it certainly ought to be if the whole is to be the same too: for though the word 'speculative' is common to both expressions, yet the remainder is different.
Moreover, 10see if in replacing one of the terms by something else he has exchanged the genus and not the differentia, as in the example just given: for 'speculative' is a less familiar term than knowledge; for the one is the genus and the other the differentia, and the genus is always the most familiar term of all; so that it is not this, but the differentia, that ought to have been changed, seeing that it 15is the less familiar. It might be held that this criticism is ridiculous: because there is no reason why the most familiar term should not describe the differentia, and not the genus; in which case, clearly, the term to be altered would also be that denoting the genus and not the differentia. If, however, a man is substituting for a term not merely another term but a phrase, clearly it is of the 20differentia rather than of the genus that a definition should be rendered, seeing that the object of rendering the definition is to make the subject familiar; for the differentia is less familiar than the genus.
If he has rendered the definition of the differentia, see whether the definition rendered is common to it and something else as well: e.g. whenever he says that an odd number is a 'number with a 25middle', further definition is required of how it has a middle: for the word 'number' is common to both expressions, and it is the word 'odd' for which the phrase has been substituted. Now both a line and a body have a middle, yet they are not 'odd'; so that this could not be a definition of 'odd'. If, on the other hand, the phrase 'with a middle' be used in several senses, the sense here intended 30requires to be defined. So that this will either discredit the definition or prove that it is no definition at all.
The mistake is even worse, if actually a less well known term be substituted, e.g. 'pellucid mortal' for 'white man': for it is no definition, and moreover is less intelligible when put in 5that form.
Look and see also whether, in the exchange of words, the sense fails still to be the same. Take, for instance, the explanation of 'speculative knowledge' as 'speculative conception': for conception is not the same as knowledge-as it certainly ought to be if the whole is to be the same too: for though the word 'speculative' is common to both expressions, yet the remainder is different.
Moreover, 10see if in replacing one of the terms by something else he has exchanged the genus and not the differentia, as in the example just given: for 'speculative' is a less familiar term than knowledge; for the one is the genus and the other the differentia, and the genus is always the most familiar term of all; so that it is not this, but the differentia, that ought to have been changed, seeing that it 15is the less familiar. It might be held that this criticism is ridiculous: because there is no reason why the most familiar term should not describe the differentia, and not the genus; in which case, clearly, the term to be altered would also be that denoting the genus and not the differentia. If, however, a man is substituting for a term not merely another term but a phrase, clearly it is of the 20differentia rather than of the genus that a definition should be rendered, seeing that the object of rendering the definition is to make the subject familiar; for the differentia is less familiar than the genus.
If he has rendered the definition of the differentia, see whether the definition rendered is common to it and something else as well: e.g. whenever he says that an odd number is a 'number with a 25middle', further definition is required of how it has a middle: for the word 'number' is common to both expressions, and it is the word 'odd' for which the phrase has been substituted. Now both a line and a body have a middle, yet they are not 'odd'; so that this could not be a definition of 'odd'. If, on the other hand, the phrase 'with a middle' be used in several senses, the sense here intended 30requires to be defined. So that this will either discredit the definition or prove that it is no definition at all.
Book 6,Chapter 12 (149a29–149b39)
Εἰ δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς τὸν ὅρον ἀποδέδωκε, σκοπεῖν εἰ καὶ
30 ἄλλου τινὸς κοινὸς ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς ὁρισμός. οἷον ὅταν τὸν περιττὸν
ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸν μέσον ἔχοντα εἴπῃ, ἐπιδιοριστέον τὸ πῶς μέσον
ἔχοντα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς κοινὸς ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς
λόγοις ὑπάρχει, τοῦ δὲ περιττοῦ μετείληπται ὁ λόγος· ἔχει
δὲ καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σῶμα μέσον, οὐ περιττὰ ὄντα. ὥστ' οὐκ
35 ἂν εἴη ὁρισμὸς οὗτος τοῦ περιττοῦ. εἰ δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται
τὸ μέσον ἔχον, διοριστέον τὸ πῶς μέσον ἔχον. ὥστ' ἢ ἐπιτίμησις
ἔσται, ἢ συλλογισμὸς ὅτι οὐχ ὥρισται.
Πάλιν εἰ οὗ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἀποδίδωσι τῶν ὄντων ἐστί,
τὸ δ' ὑπὸ τὸν λόγον μὴ τῶν ὄντων, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν ὡρίσατο
Again, see if the term of which he renders the definition is a reality, whereas what is contained in the definition is not, e.g. Suppose 'white' to be defined as 'colour mingled with fire': for what is bodiless cannot be mingled with body, so that 'colour' 'mingled with fire' could not exist, 35whereas 'white' does exist.
Moreover, those who in the case of relative terms do not distinguish to what the object is related, but have described it only so as to include it among too large a number of things, are wrong either wholly or in part; e.g. suppose some one to have defined 'medicine' as a science of Reality'.
Moreover, those who in the case of relative terms do not distinguish to what the object is related, but have described it only so as to include it among too large a number of things, are wrong either wholly or in part; e.g. suppose some one to have defined 'medicine' as a science of Reality'.
149b
1 χρῶμα πυρὶ μεμειγμένον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ ἀσώματον
σώματι μεμεῖχθαι, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρῶμα πυρὶ μεμειγμένον·
λευκὸν δ' ἔστιν.
Ἔτι ὅσοι μὴ διαιροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πρός τι πρὸς ὃ λέγεται,
5 ἀλλ' ἐν πλείοσι περιλαβόντες εἶπαν, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐπί τι ψεύδονται,
οἷον εἴ τις ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὄντος εἶπεν. εἰ μὲν
γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ὄντων ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον ὅτι ὅλως
ἔψευσται, εἰ δὲ τινὸς μὲν τινὸς δὲ μή, ἐπί τι ἔψευσται· δεῖ
γὰρ παντός, εἴπερ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος
10 εἶναι λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει τῶν πρός τι·
πᾶν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν πρὸς ἐπιστήμην λέγεται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπειδὴ ἀντιστρέφει πάντα τὰ πρός τι. ἔτι
εἴπερ ὁ μὴ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὴν ἀπόδοσιν
ποιούμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποδίδωσιν, οὐ πρὸς ἓν ἀλλὰ πρὸς
15 πλείω ἕκαστον ἂν τῶν πρός τι λέγοιτο. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ
αὐτὸ καὶ ὂν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πρὸς ὁποιονοῦν
τούτων ἀποδοὺς ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη ἀποδούς, εἴπερ ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
ἀποδιδοὺς ὀρθῶς ἀποδίδωσιν. ἔτι δ' ἀδύνατον τὸν
τοιοῦτον λόγον ἴδιον τοῦ ἀποδοθέντος εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἰατρικὴ
20 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἱ πολλαὶ πρὸς ὂν
λέγονται, ὥσθ' ἑκάστη ὄντος ἐπιστήμη ἔσται. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁ
τοιοῦτος οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης ὁρισμός· ἴδιον γὰρ καὶ οὐ κοινὸν
δεῖ τὸν ὁρισμὸν εἶναι.
Ἐνίοτε δ' ὁρίζονται οὐ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα
25 εὖ ἔχον ἢ τετελεσμένον. τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ ὁ τοῦ
κλέπτου ὅρος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ ῥήτωρ μὲν ὁ δυνάμενος τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ
πιθανὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπων, κλέπτης δ' ὁ
λάθρᾳ λαμβάνων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν
ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς κλέπτης ἔσται. οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρᾳ
30 λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρᾳ λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν.
Πάλιν εἰ τὸ δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὡς ποιητικὸν ἢ πρακτικὸν
ἢ ὁπωσοῦν δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν ἀποδέδωκεν, οἷον τὴν δικαιοσύνην
νόμων σῳστικὴν εἰπὼν ἢ τὴν σοφίαν ποιητικὴν εὐδαιμονίας·
τὸ γὰρ ποιητικὸν ἢ σῳστικὸν τῶν δι' ἄλλο αἱρετῶν.
35 ἢ οὐδὲν μὲν κωλύει τὸ δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ δι' ἄλλο εἶναι
αἱρετόν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡμάρτηκεν ὁ οὕτως ὁρισάμενος
τὸ δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν· ἑκάστου γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ
μάλιστα, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν εἶναι τοῦ δι' ἕτερον,
ὥστε τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἔδει μᾶλλον σημαίνειν.
1For if medicine be not a science of anything that is real, the definition is clearly altogether false; while if it be a science of some real thing, but not of another, it is partly false; for it ought to hold of all reality, if it is said to be of Reality essentially and 5not accidentally: as is the case with other relative terms: for every object of knowledge is a term relative to knowledge: likewise, also, with other relative terms, inasmuch as all such are convertible. Moreover, if the right way to render account of a thing be to render it as it is not in itself but accidentally, then each and every relative 10term would be used in relation not to one thing but to a number of things. For there is no reason why the same thing should not be both real and white and good, so that it would be a correct rendering to render the object in relation to any one whatsoever of these, if to render what it is accidentally be a correct way to render it. It is, 15moreover, impossible that a definition of this sort should be peculiar to the term rendered: for not only but the majority of the other sciences too, have for their object some real thing, so that each will be a science of reality. Clearly, then, such a definition does not define any science at all; for a definition ought to be peculiar to 20its own term, not general.
Sometimes, again, people define not the thing but only the thing in a good or perfect condition. Such is the definition of a rhetorician as 'one who can always see what will persuade in the given circumstances, and omit nothing'; or of a thief, as 'one who pilfers in secret': for clearly, if they each do this, then 25the one will be a good rhetorician, and the other a good thief: whereas it is not the actual pilfering in secret, but the wish to do it, that constitutes the thief.
Again, see if he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake as desirable for what it produces or does, or as in any way desirable because of something else, e.g. by saying 30that justice is 'what preserves the laws' or that wisdom is 'what produces happiness'; for what produces or preserves something else is one of the things desirable for something else. It might be said that it is possible for what is desirable in itself to be desirable for something else as well: but still to define what is desirable in itself 35in such a way is none the less wrong: for the essence contains par excellence what is best in anything, and it is better for a thing to be desirable in itself than to be desirable for something else, so that this is rather what the definition too ought to have indicated.
Sometimes, again, people define not the thing but only the thing in a good or perfect condition. Such is the definition of a rhetorician as 'one who can always see what will persuade in the given circumstances, and omit nothing'; or of a thief, as 'one who pilfers in secret': for clearly, if they each do this, then 25the one will be a good rhetorician, and the other a good thief: whereas it is not the actual pilfering in secret, but the wish to do it, that constitutes the thief.
Again, see if he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake as desirable for what it produces or does, or as in any way desirable because of something else, e.g. by saying 30that justice is 'what preserves the laws' or that wisdom is 'what produces happiness'; for what produces or preserves something else is one of the things desirable for something else. It might be said that it is possible for what is desirable in itself to be desirable for something else as well: but still to define what is desirable in itself 35in such a way is none the less wrong: for the essence contains par excellence what is best in anything, and it is better for a thing to be desirable in itself than to be desirable for something else, so that this is rather what the definition too ought to have indicated.
Book 6,Chapter 13 (150a1–151a19)
150a
1 Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τινος ὁρισμὸν ἀποδιδοὺς τάδε ἢ τὸ
ἐκ τούτων ἢ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε ὡρίσατο. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τάδε,
συμβήσεται ἀμφοῖν καὶ μηδετέρῳ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον εἰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην
σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν ὡρίσατο· δύο γὰρ ὄντων
5 ἐὰν ἑκάτερος θάτερον ἔχῃ, ἀμφότεροι δίκαιοι ἔσονται καὶ
οὐδέτερος, ἐπεὶ ἀμφότεροι μὲν ἔχουσι δικαιοσύνην, ἑκάτερος
δ' οὐκ ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μήπω τὸ εἰρημένον σφόδρα ἄτοπον
διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων συμβαίνειν τὸ τοιοῦτον (οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει
ἀμφοτέρους ἔχειν μνᾶν μηδετέρου ἔχοντος), ἀλλ' οὖν τό
10 γε τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς παντελῶς ἄτοπον ἂν δόξειεν
εἶναι. συμβήσεται δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν σωφροσύνην
καὶ δειλίαν ἔχῃ, ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ
δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ἕξουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη σωφροσύνη
καὶ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἡ ἀδικία δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία ἔσται.
15 ὅλως τε ὅσα ἔστιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὰ μέρη καὶ
τὸ ὅλον, πάντα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον· ἔοικε γὰρ
ὁ οὕτως ὁριζόμενος τὰ μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι.
μάλιστα δ' οἰκεῖοι γίνονται οἱ λόγοι ἐφ' ὅσων κατάδηλός
ἐστιν ἡ τῶν μερῶν σύνθεσις, καθάπερ ἐπ' οἰκίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
20 τῶν τοιούτων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν μερῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν κωλύει
τὸ ὅλον μὴ εἶναι, ὥστ' οὐ ταὐτὸν τὰ μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ.
Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ
ὁριζόμενον, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ μὴ πέφυκεν ἓν γίνεσθαι
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔνια γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα
25 ὥστε μηδὲν ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι, οἷον γραμμὴ καὶ ἀριθμός.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ὡρισμένον ἐν ἑνί τινι πέφυκε τῷ πρώτῳ γίνεσθαι,
ἐξ ὧν δ' ἔφησεν αὐτὸ εἶναι μὴ ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ
ἀλλ' ἑκάτερον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτων
ἐκεῖνο· ἐν οἷς γὰρ τὰ μέρη, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν,
30 ὥστ' οὐκ ἐν ἑνὶ τὸ ὅλον πρώτῳ ἀλλ' ἐν πλείοσιν. εἰ
δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν ἑνί τινι πρώτῳ, σκοπεῖν εἰ
μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὰ
μέρη. πάλιν εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ συμφθείρεται τὰ μέρη· ἀνάπαλιν
γὰρ δεῖ συμβαίνειν, τῶν μερῶν φθαρέντων φθείρεσθαι τὸ
35 ὅλον, τοῦ δ' ὅλου φθαρέντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ μέρη
ἐφθάρθαι. ἢ εἰ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καλόν, τὰ δὲ μηδέτερα,
ἢ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά, τὸ δ' ὅλον μηδέτερον·
οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ μηδετέρων δυνατὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν τι ἢ κακὸν
1See also whether in defining anything a man has defined it as an 'A and B', or as a 'product of A and B' or as an 'A+B'. If he defines it as and B', the definition will be true of both and yet of neither of them; suppose, e.g. justice to be defined as 'temperance and courage.' For if of two persons each has 5one of the two only, both and yet neither will be just: for both together have justice, and yet each singly fails to have it. Even if the situation here described does not so far appear very absurd because of the occurrence of this kind of thing in other cases also (for it is quite possible for two men to have a mina between them, though neither of them has it by himself), yet least 10that they should have contrary attributes surely seems quite absurd; and yet this will follow if the one be temperate and yet a coward, and the other, though brave, be a profligate; for then both will exhibit both justice and injustice: for if justice be temperance and bravery, then injustice will be cowardice and profligacy. In general, too, all the ways of showing that the whole is 15not the same as the sum of its parts are useful in meeting the type just described; for a man who defines in this way seems to assert that the parts are the same as the whole. The arguments are particularly appropriate in cases where the process of putting the parts together is obvious, as in a house and other things of that sort: for there, clearly, you may have the parts and yet 20not have the whole, so that parts and whole cannot be the same.
If, however, he has said that the term being defined is not 'A and B' but the 'product of A and B', look and see in the first place if A and B cannot in the nature of things have a single product: for some things are so related to one another that nothing can come of them, e.g. a line and a number. Moreover, see if the term 25that has been defined is in the nature of things found primarily in some single subject, whereas the things which he has said produce it are not found primarily in any single subject, but each in a separate one. If so, clearly that term could not be the product of these things: for the whole is bound to be in the same things wherein its parts are, so that the whole will then be found 30primarily not in one subject only, but in a number of them. If, on the other hand, both parts and whole are found primarily in some single subject, see if that medium is not the same, but one thing in the case of the whole and another in that of the parts. Again, see whether the parts perish together with the whole: for it ought to happen, vice versa, that the whole perishes when 35the parts perish; when the whole perishes, there is no necessity that the parts should perish too. Or again, see if the whole be good or evil, and the parts neither, or, vice versa, if the parts be good or evil and the whole neither.
If, however, he has said that the term being defined is not 'A and B' but the 'product of A and B', look and see in the first place if A and B cannot in the nature of things have a single product: for some things are so related to one another that nothing can come of them, e.g. a line and a number. Moreover, see if the term 25that has been defined is in the nature of things found primarily in some single subject, whereas the things which he has said produce it are not found primarily in any single subject, but each in a separate one. If so, clearly that term could not be the product of these things: for the whole is bound to be in the same things wherein its parts are, so that the whole will then be found 30primarily not in one subject only, but in a number of them. If, on the other hand, both parts and whole are found primarily in some single subject, see if that medium is not the same, but one thing in the case of the whole and another in that of the parts. Again, see whether the parts perish together with the whole: for it ought to happen, vice versa, that the whole perishes when 35the parts perish; when the whole perishes, there is no necessity that the parts should perish too. Or again, see if the whole be good or evil, and the parts neither, or, vice versa, if the parts be good or evil and the whole neither.
150b
1 γενέσθαι, οὔτ' ἐκ κακῶν ἢ ἀγαθῶν μηδέτερον. ἢ εἰ μᾶλλον
μὲν θάτερον ἀγαθὸν ἢ θάτερον κακόν, τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων μὴ
μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, οἷον εἰ ἡ ἀναίδεια ἐξ ἀνδρείας καὶ
ψευδοῦς δόξης· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἀνδρεία ἢ κακὸν ἡ
5 ψευδὴς δόξα. ἔδει οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ μᾶλλον,
καὶ εἶναι ἢ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἢ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν.
ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ ἑκάτερον ᾖ καθ' αὑτὸ
ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ποιητικῶν καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, μειχθέντα δέ, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ἑκάτερον μὲν
10 ἀγαθόν, μειχθέντα δὲ κακὸν ἢ οὐδέτερον. μάλιστα δὲ καταφανὲς
τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσωδῶν· ἔνια γὰρ
τῶν φαρμάκων οὕτως ἔχει ὥσθ' ἑκάτερον μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθόν,
ἐὰν δ' ἄμφω δοθῇ μειχθέντα, κακόν.
Πάλιν εἰ ἐκ βελτίονος καὶ χείρονος ὂν μὴ ἔστι τὸ ὅλον
15 τοῦ μὲν βελτίονος χεῖρον, τοῦ δὲ χείρονος βέλτιον. (ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτ'
ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ καθ' αὑτὰ ᾖ τὰ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἀγαθά,
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸ ὅλον μὴ γίνεσθαι ἀγαθόν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἀρτίως ῥηθέντων.)
Ἔτι εἰ συνώνυμον τὸ ὅλον θατέρῳ· οὐ δεῖ γάρ, καθάπερ
20 οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν συλλαβῶν· οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἐξ ὧν
σύγκειται ἡ συλλαβὴ συνώνυμός ἐστιν.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ εἴρηκε τὸν τρόπον τῆς συνθέσεως· οὐ γὰρ
αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ γνωρίσαι τὸ εἰπεῖν ἐκ τούτων. οὐ γὰρ τὸ
ἐκ τούτων ἀλλὰ τὸ οὕτως ἐκ τούτων ἑκάστου τῶν συνθέτων ἡ
25 οὐσία, καθάπερ ἐπ' οἰκίας· οὐ γάρ, ἂν ὁπωσοῦν συντεθῇ ταῦτα,
οἰκία ἐστίν.
Εἰ δὲ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε ἀποδέδωκε, πρῶτον μὲν ῥητέον
ὅτι τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε ἢ τοῖσδε ταὐτὸν ἢ τῷ ἐκ τῶνδε· ὁ γὰρ
λέγων μέλι μεθ' ὕδατος ἤτοι μέλι καὶ ὕδωρ λέγει ἢ τὸ
30 ἐκ μέλιτος καὶ ὕδατος. ὥστ' ἐὰν ὁποτερῳοῦν τῶν εἰρημένων
ταὐτὸν ὁμολογήσῃ εἶναι τὸ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε, ταὐτὰ ἁρμόσει
λέγειν ἅπερ πρὸς ἑκάτερον τούτων ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται. ἔτι
διελόμενον ὁσαχῶς λέγεται ἕτερον μεθ' ἑτέρου σκοπεῖν εἰ
μηδαμῶς τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε. οἷον εἰ λέγεται ἕτερον μεθ' ἑτέρου
35 ἢ ὡς ἔν τινι ταὐτῷ δεκτικῷ, καθάπερ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ
ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐν ψυχῇ, ἢ ἐν τόπῳ τῷ αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ τῷ αὐτῷ,
μηδαμῶς δ' ἀληθὲς τὸ εἰρημένον ἐπὶ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς ὁρισμός, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῶς τόδε μετὰ
1For it is impossible either for a neutral thing to produce something good or bad, or for things good or bad to produce a neutral thing. Or again, see if the one thing is more distinctly good than the other is evil, and yet the product be no more good than evil, e.g. suppose shamelessness be defined as 'the product of 5courage and false opinion': here the goodness of courage exceeds the evil of false opinion; accordingly the product of these ought to have corresponded to this excess, and to be either good without qualification, or at least more good than evil. Or it may be that this does not necessarily follow, unless each be in itself good or bad; for many things that are productive are not good in themselves, but only 10in combination; or, per contra, they are good taken singly, and bad or neutral in combination. What has just been said is most clearly illustrated in the case of things that make for health or sickness; for some drugs are such that each taken alone is good, but if they are both administered in a mixture, bad.
Again, see whether the whole, as produced from a better and worse, fails to be worse than the 15better and better than the worse element. This again, however, need not necessarily be the case, unless the elements compounded be in themselves good; if they are not, the whole may very well not be good, as in the cases just instanced.
Moreover, see if the whole be synonymous with one of the elements: for it ought not to be, any more than in the case of syllables: for the syllable is not synonymous 20with any of the letters of which it is made up.
Moreover, see if he has failed to state the manner of their composition: for the mere mention of its elements is not enough to make the thing intelligible. For the essence of any compound thing is not merely that it is a product of so-and-so, but that it is a product of them compounded in such and such a way, just as in the case of a house: for here the 25materials do not make a house irrespective of the way they are put together.
If a man has defined an object as 'A+B', the first thing to be said is that 'A+B' means the same either as 'A and B', or as the 'product of A and B.' for 'honey+water' means either the honey and the water, or the 'drink made of honey and water'. If, then, he admits that 'A+B' is + B' is the same as either of these two things, 30the same criticisms will apply as have already been given for meeting each of them. Moreover, distinguish between the different senses in which one thing may be said to be '+' another, and see if there is none of them in which A could be said to exist '+ B.' Thus e.g. supposing the expression to mean that they exist either in some identical thing capable of containing them (as e.g. justice and courage 35are found in the soul), or else in the same place or in the same time, and if this be in no way true of the A and B in question, clearly the definition rendered could not hold of anything, as there is no possible way in which A can exist B'.
Again, see whether the whole, as produced from a better and worse, fails to be worse than the 15better and better than the worse element. This again, however, need not necessarily be the case, unless the elements compounded be in themselves good; if they are not, the whole may very well not be good, as in the cases just instanced.
Moreover, see if the whole be synonymous with one of the elements: for it ought not to be, any more than in the case of syllables: for the syllable is not synonymous 20with any of the letters of which it is made up.
Moreover, see if he has failed to state the manner of their composition: for the mere mention of its elements is not enough to make the thing intelligible. For the essence of any compound thing is not merely that it is a product of so-and-so, but that it is a product of them compounded in such and such a way, just as in the case of a house: for here the 25materials do not make a house irrespective of the way they are put together.
If a man has defined an object as 'A+B', the first thing to be said is that 'A+B' means the same either as 'A and B', or as the 'product of A and B.' for 'honey+water' means either the honey and the water, or the 'drink made of honey and water'. If, then, he admits that 'A+B' is + B' is the same as either of these two things, 30the same criticisms will apply as have already been given for meeting each of them. Moreover, distinguish between the different senses in which one thing may be said to be '+' another, and see if there is none of them in which A could be said to exist '+ B.' Thus e.g. supposing the expression to mean that they exist either in some identical thing capable of containing them (as e.g. justice and courage 35are found in the soul), or else in the same place or in the same time, and if this be in no way true of the A and B in question, clearly the definition rendered could not hold of anything, as there is no possible way in which A can exist B'.
151a
1 τοῦδέ ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ τῶν διαιρεθέντων ἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν ταὐτῷ χρόνῳ
ἑκάτερον ὑπάρχειν, σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐνδέχεται μὴ πρὸς ταὐτὸν
λέγεσθαι ἑκάτερον. οἷον εἰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ὡρίσατο τόλμαν μετὰ
διανοίας ὀρθῆς· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τόλμαν μὲν ἔχειν τοῦ ἀποστερεῖν,
5 ὀρθὴν δὲ διάνοιαν περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινά, ἀλλ' οὔπω ἀνδρεῖος
ὁ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε ἔχων. ἔτι εἰ
καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν ἄμφω λέγεται, οἷον πρὸς τὰ ἰατρικά·
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ τόλμαν καὶ ὀρθὴν διάνοιαν ἔχειν πρὸς
τὰ ἰατρικά· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδ' οὕτως ἀνδρεῖος ὁ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε
10 ἔχων. οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον δεῖ λέγεσθαι
οὔτε πρὸς ταὐτὸν τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας τέλος,
οἷον πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους ἢ εἴ τι μᾶλλον τούτου
τέλος.
Ἔνια δὲ τῶν οὕτως ἀποδιδομένων οὐδαμῶς ὑπὸ τὴν εἰρημένην
15 πίπτει διαίρεσιν, οἷον εἰ ἡ ὀργὴ λύπη μεθ' ὑπολήψεως
τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι. ὅτι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν τὴν τοιαύτην
ἡ λύπη γίνεται, τοῦτο βούλεται δηλοῦν· τὸ δὲ διὰ τόδε
γίνεσθαί τι οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτὸ τῷ μετὰ τούτου τόδ' εἶναι κατ'
οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων.
1If, however, among the various senses above distinguished, it be true that A and B are each found in the same time as the other, look and see if possibly the two are not used in the same relation. Thus e.g. suppose courage to have been defined as 'daring with right reasoning': here it is possible that the person exhibits 5daring in robbery, and right reasoning in regard to the means of health: but he may have 'the former quality+the latter' at the same time, and not as yet be courageous! Moreover, even though both be used in the same relation as well, e.g. in relation to medical treatment (for a man may exhibit both daring and right reasoning in respect of medical treatment), still, none the less, not even this 10combination of 'the one+the other 'makes him 'courageous'. For the two must not relate to any casual object that is the same, any more than each to a different object; rather, they must relate to the function of courage, e.g. meeting the perils of war, or whatever is more properly speaking its function than this.
Some definitions rendered in this form fail to come under the aforesaid division at all, 15e.g. a definition of anger as 'pain with a consciousness of being slighted'. For what this means to say is that it is because of a consciousness of this sort that the pain occurs; but to occur 'because of' a thing is not the same as to occur '+ a thing' in any of its aforesaid senses.
Some definitions rendered in this form fail to come under the aforesaid division at all, 15e.g. a definition of anger as 'pain with a consciousness of being slighted'. For what this means to say is that it is because of a consciousness of this sort that the pain occurs; but to occur 'because of' a thing is not the same as to occur '+ a thing' in any of its aforesaid senses.
Book 6,Chapter 14 (151a20–151b24)
20 Πάλιν εἰ τὴν τούτων σύνθεσιν εἴρηκε τὸ ὅλον, οἷον τῆς
ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος σύνθεσιν ζῷον, πρῶτον μὲν σκοπεῖν
εἰ μὴ εἴρηκε ποία σύνθεσις, καθάπερ εἰ σάρκα ὁριζόμενος
ἢ ὀστοῦν τὴν πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ ἀέρος εἶπε σύνθεσιν. οὐ
γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ σύνθεσιν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις προςδιοριστέον·
25 οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν συντεθέντων τούτων σὰρξ γίνεται,
ἀλλ' οὑτωσὶ μὲν συντεθέντων σάρξ, οὑτωσὶ δ' ὀστοῦν. ἔοικε δ'
οὐδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν συνθέσει ταὐτὸν οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων·
συνθέσει μὲν γὰρ πάσῃ διάλυσις ἐναντίον, τῶν δ' εἰρημένων
οὐδετέρῳ οὐδέν. ἔτι εἰ ὁμοίως πιθανὸν πᾶν τὸ σύνθετον σύνθεσιν
30 εἶναι ἢ μηδέν, τῶν δὲ ζῴων ἕκαστον σύνθετον ὂν μὴ ἔστι σύνθεσις,
οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν τῶν συνθέτων σύνθεσις ἂν εἴη.
Πάλιν εἰ ὁμοίως ἔν τινι πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν τἀναντία,
ὥρισται δὲ διὰ θατέρου, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ὥρισται. εἰ δὲ μή,
πλείους τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμβήσεται ὁρισμοὺς εἶναι· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον
35 ὁ διὰ τούτου ἢ ὁ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὁρισάμενος εἴρηκεν, ἐπεὶ
ὁμοίως ἀμφότερα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ; τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ
Again, if he have described the whole compounded as the 'composition' of these things (e.g. 'a living creature' 20as a 'composition of soul and body'), first of all see whether he has omitted to state the kind of composition, as (e.g.) in a definition of 'flesh' or 'bone' as the 'composition of fire, earth, and air'. For it is not enough to say it is a composition, but you should also go on to define the kind of composition: for these things do not form flesh irrespective of the manner of their composition, but 25when compounded in one way they form flesh, when in another, bone. It appears, moreover, that neither of the aforesaid substances is the same as a 'composition' at all: for a composition always has a decomposition as its contrary, whereas neither of the aforesaid has any contrary. Moreover, if it is equally probable that every compound is a composition or else that none is, and every kind of living 30creature, though a compound, is never a composition, then no other compound could be a composition either.
Again, if in the nature of a thing two contraries are equally liable to occur, and the thing has been defined through the one, clearly it has not been defined; else there will be more than one definition of the same thing; for how is it any more a definition to define it through this one than 35through the other, seeing that both alike are naturally liable to occur in it?
Again, if in the nature of a thing two contraries are equally liable to occur, and the thing has been defined through the one, clearly it has not been defined; else there will be more than one definition of the same thing; for how is it any more a definition to define it through this one than 35through the other, seeing that both alike are naturally liable to occur in it?
151b
1 τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος, εἰ ἔστιν "οὐσία ἐπιστήμης δεκτική"· ὁμοίως
γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοίας ἐστὶ δεκτική.
Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς ὅλον ἔχῃ τις ἐπιχειρεῖν τὸν
ὁρισμὸν διὰ τὸ μὴ γνώριμον εἶναι τὸ ὅλον, πρὸς τῶν μερῶν
5 τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐὰν ᾖ γνώριμον καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον
φαίνηται· τοῦ γὰρ μέρους ἀναιρεθέντος καὶ ὁ πᾶς ὁρισμὸς
ἀναιρεῖται. ὅσοι τ' ἀσαφεῖς τῶν ὁρισμῶν, συνδιορθώσαντα
καὶ συσχηματίσαντα πρὸς τὸ δηλοῦν τι καὶ ἔχειν ἐπιχείρημα
οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ ἢ
10 δέχεσθαι τὸ ἐκλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος ἢ αὐτὸν
διασαφῆσαι τί ποτε τυγχάνει τὸ δηλούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου.
ἔτι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις νόμον εἰώθασιν ἐπεισφέρειν,
κἂν ᾖ βελτίων ὁ ἐπεισφερόμενος, ἀναιροῦσι τὸν ἔμπροσθεν,
οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρισμῶν ποιητέον καὶ αὐτὸν ὁρισμὸν ἕτερον
15 οἰστέον· ἐὰν γὰρ φαίνηται βελτίων καὶ μᾶλλον δηλῶν τὸ
ὁριζόμενον, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνῃρημένος ἔσται ὁ κείμενος, ἐπειδὴ
οὐκ εἰσὶ πλείους τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁρισμοί.
Πρὸς ἅπαντας δὲ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον στοιχεῖον
τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εὐστόχως ὁρίσασθαι τὸ προκείμενον ἢ καλῶς
20 εἰρημένον ὅρον ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὥσπερ πρὸς παράδειγμα
θεώμενον τό τ' ἐλλεῖπον ὧν προσῆκεν ἔχειν τὸν
ὁρισμὸν καὶ τὸ προσκείμενον περιέργως καθορᾶν ὥστε μᾶλλον
ἐπιχειρημάτων εὐπορεῖν.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
1Such is the definition of the soul, if defined as a substance capable of receiving knowledge: for it has a like capacity for receiving ignorance.
Also, even when one cannot attack the definition as a whole for lack of acquaintance with the whole, one should attack some part of it, if one knows that part and sees 5it to be incorrectly rendered: for if the part be demolished, so too is the whole definition. Where, again, a definition is obscure, one should first of all correct and reshape it in order to make some part of it clear and get a handle for attack, and then proceed to examine it. For the answerer is bound either to accept the sense as taken by the questioner, or else himself to explain 10clearly whatever it is that his definition means. Moreover, just as in the assemblies the ordinary practice is to move an emendation of the existing law and, if the emendation is better, they repeal the existing law, so one ought to do in the case of definitions as well: one ought oneself to propose a second definition: for if it is seen to be better, and more indicative of the object defined, 15clearly the definition already laid down will have been demolished, on the principle that there cannot be more than one definition of the same thing.
In combating definitions it is always one of the chief elementary principles to take by oneself a happy shot at a definition of the object before one, or to adopt some correctly expressed definition. For one is bound, with the model (as it 20were) before one's eyes, to discern both any shortcoming in any features that the definition ought to have, and also any superfluous addition, so that one is better supplied with lines of attack.
As to definitions, then, let so much suffice.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Also, even when one cannot attack the definition as a whole for lack of acquaintance with the whole, one should attack some part of it, if one knows that part and sees 5it to be incorrectly rendered: for if the part be demolished, so too is the whole definition. Where, again, a definition is obscure, one should first of all correct and reshape it in order to make some part of it clear and get a handle for attack, and then proceed to examine it. For the answerer is bound either to accept the sense as taken by the questioner, or else himself to explain 10clearly whatever it is that his definition means. Moreover, just as in the assemblies the ordinary practice is to move an emendation of the existing law and, if the emendation is better, they repeal the existing law, so one ought to do in the case of definitions as well: one ought oneself to propose a second definition: for if it is seen to be better, and more indicative of the object defined, 15clearly the definition already laid down will have been demolished, on the principle that there cannot be more than one definition of the same thing.
In combating definitions it is always one of the chief elementary principles to take by oneself a happy shot at a definition of the object before one, or to adopt some correctly expressed definition. For one is bound, with the model (as it 20were) before one's eyes, to discern both any shortcoming in any features that the definition ought to have, and also any superfluous addition, so that one is better supplied with lines of attack.
As to definitions, then, let so much suffice.
----------------------------------------------------------------------