Ross (OCT, 1958) · Pickard-Cambridge (1928)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 5,Chapter 1 (128b14–129a35)
128b
Πότερον δ' ἴδιον ἢ οὐκ ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ εἰρημένον, διὰ τῶνδε
15 σκεπτέον.
Ἀποδίδοται [δὲ] τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀεί, ἢ πρὸς
ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ, οἷον καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον ἥμερον
φύσει, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ οἷον ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα, ὅτι τὸ
μὲν προστακτικὸν τὸ δ' ὑπηρετικόν ἐστιν, ἀεὶ δὲ οἷον θεοῦ τὸ
20 ζῷον ἀθάνατον, ποτὲ δ' οἷον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ περιπατεῖν
ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ.
Ἔστι δὲ τοῦ πρὸς ἕτερον ἰδίου ἀποδιδομένου ἢ δύο προβλήματα
ἢ τέτταρα. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀποδῷ τοῦ δ'
ἀρνήσηται ταὐτὸ τοῦτο, δύο μόνον προβλήματα γίνονται, καθάπερ
25 τὸ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς ἵππον ἴδιον ὅτι δίπουν ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ
ὅτι ἅνθρωπος οὐ δίπουν ἐστὶν ἐπιχειροίη τις ἄν, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἵππος
δίπουν· ἀμφοτέρως δ' ἂν κινοῖτο τὸ ἴδιον. ἐὰν δ' ἑκατέρου
ἑκάτερον ἀποδῷ καὶ ἑκατέρου ἀπαρνηθῇ, τέτταρα προβλήματα
ἔσται, καθάπερ τὸ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον πρὸς ἵππον,
30 ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίπουν τὸ δὲ τετράπουν ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἅνθρωπος
οὐ δίπουν καὶ ὅτι τετράπουν πέφυκεν ἔστιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, καὶ
ὅτι ὁ ἵππος δίπουν καὶ ὅτι οὐ τετράπουν οἷόν τ' ἐπιχειρεῖν.
ὅπως δ' οὖν δειχθέντος ἀναιρεῖται τὸ κείμενον.
Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ ἴδιον ὃ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἀποδίδοται
35 καὶ παντὸς χωρίζει, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον θνητὸν
ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν· τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον ὃ μὴ ἀπὸ παντὸς
ἀλλ' ἀπό τινος τακτοῦ διορίζει, καθάπερ ἀρετῆς πρὸς
ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐν πλείοσι, τὸ δ' ἐν λογιστικῷ μόνον
καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι λογιστικὸν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. τὸ δ' ἀεὶ ὃ
The question whether the attribute stated is or is not a property, should be examined 15by the following methods:
Any 'property' rendered is always either essential and permanent or relative and temporary: e.g. it is an 'essential property' of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal': a 'relative property' is one like that of the soul in relation to the body, viz. that the one is fitted to command, and the other to obey: a 'permanent property' is one like the property which belongs to God, 20of being an 'immortal living being': a 'temporary property' is one like the property which belongs to any particular man of walking in the gymnasium.
[The rendering of a property 'relatively' gives rise either to two problems or to four. For if he at the same time render this property of one thing and deny it of another, only two problems arise, as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man, in 25relation to a horse, to be a biped. For one might try both to show that a man is not a biped, and also that a horse is a biped: in both ways the property would be upset. If on the other hand he render one apiece of two attributes to each of two things, and deny it in each case of the other, there will then be four problems; as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man in relation to a horse 30for the former to be a biped and the latter a quadruped. For then it is possible to try to show both that a man is not naturally a biped, and that he is a quadruped, and also that the horse both is a biped, and is not a quadruped. If you show any of these at all, the intended attribute is demolished.]
An 'essential' property is one which is rendered of a thing in comparison with everything else and distinguishes 35the said thing from everything else, as does 'a mortal living being capable of receiving knowledge' in the case of man. A 'relative' property is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but only from a particular definite thing, as does the property which virtue possesses, in comparison with knowledge, viz.
Any 'property' rendered is always either essential and permanent or relative and temporary: e.g. it is an 'essential property' of man to be 'by nature a civilized animal': a 'relative property' is one like that of the soul in relation to the body, viz. that the one is fitted to command, and the other to obey: a 'permanent property' is one like the property which belongs to God, 20of being an 'immortal living being': a 'temporary property' is one like the property which belongs to any particular man of walking in the gymnasium.
[The rendering of a property 'relatively' gives rise either to two problems or to four. For if he at the same time render this property of one thing and deny it of another, only two problems arise, as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man, in 25relation to a horse, to be a biped. For one might try both to show that a man is not a biped, and also that a horse is a biped: in both ways the property would be upset. If on the other hand he render one apiece of two attributes to each of two things, and deny it in each case of the other, there will then be four problems; as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man in relation to a horse 30for the former to be a biped and the latter a quadruped. For then it is possible to try to show both that a man is not naturally a biped, and that he is a quadruped, and also that the horse both is a biped, and is not a quadruped. If you show any of these at all, the intended attribute is demolished.]
An 'essential' property is one which is rendered of a thing in comparison with everything else and distinguishes 35the said thing from everything else, as does 'a mortal living being capable of receiving knowledge' in the case of man. A 'relative' property is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but only from a particular definite thing, as does the property which virtue possesses, in comparison with knowledge, viz.
129a
1 κατὰ πάντα χρόνον ἀληθεύεται καὶ μηδέποτ' ἀπολείπεται,
καθάπερ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συγκείμενον,
τὸ δὲ ποτὲ ὃ κατά τινα χρόνον ἀληθεύεται καὶ μὴ ἐξ
ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ παρέπεται, καθάπερ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ περιπατεῖν
5 ἐν ἀγορᾷ.
Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο ἴδιον ἀποδοῦναι τὸ διαφορὰν εἰπεῖν
ἢ ἐν ἅπασι καὶ ἀεί, ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
πλείστοις. οἷον ἐν ἅπασι μὲν καὶ ἀεὶ καθάπερ τὸ ἀνθρώπου
ἴδιον πρὸς ἵππον ὅτι δίπουν· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ
10 πᾶς ἐστι δίπους, ἵππος δ' οὐδείς ἐστι δίπους οὐδέποτε. ὡς ἐπὶ
τὸ πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καθάπερ τὸ λογιστικοῦ ἴδιον
πρὸς ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν τὸ τὸ μὲν προστάττειν τὸ
δ' ὑπηρετεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λογιστικὸν πάντοτε προστάττει,
ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ προστάττεται, οὔτε τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν
15 ἀεὶ προστάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστάττει ποτέ, ὅταν
ᾖ μοχθηρὰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
Τῶν δ' ἰδίων ἐστὶ λογικὰ μάλιστα τά τε καθ' αὑτὰ
καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον ἰδίου
πλείω προβλήματά ἐστι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον·
20 ἢ γὰρ δύο ἢ τέτταρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνονται τὰ προβλήματα.
πλείους οὖν οἱ λόγοι γίνονται πρὸς ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ
καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ πρὸς πολλὰ ἔστιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἢ πρὸς πλείους χρόνους
παρατηρεῖν, τὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ πρὸς πολλά (πρὸς ἕκαστον
γὰρ τῶν ὄντων δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ τὸ ἴδιον, ὥστ' εἰ μὴ
25 πρὸς ἅπαντα χωρίζεται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον
τὸ ἴδιον), τὸ δ' ἀεὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς χρόνους παρατηρεῖν· κἂν εἰ γὰρ
μὴ ὑπάρχει κἂν εἰ μὴ ὑπῆρξε κἂν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρξει, οὐκ
ἔσται ἴδιον. τὸ δὲ ποτὲ πρὸς τὸν νῦν μόνον χρόνον ἐπισκοποῦμεν·
οὔκουν εἰσὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὸ πολλοί· λογικὸν
30 δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστι πρόβλημα πρὸς ὃ λόγοι γένοιντ' ἂν καὶ
συχνοὶ καὶ καλοί.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἕτερον ἴδιον ῥηθὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς
τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον ἐστίν, εἰ τῷ μὲν συμβέβηκε τῷ
δὲ μὴ συμβέβηκεν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ
35 διὰ τῶνδε θεωρητέον.
1that the former is naturally produced in more than one faculty, whereas the latter is produced in that of reason alone, and in those who have a reasoning faculty. A 'permanent' property is one which is true at every time, and never fails, like being' compounded of soul and body', in the case of a living creature. A 'temporary' 5property is one which is true at some particular time, and does not of necessity always follow; as, of some particular man, that he walks in the market-place.
To render a property 'relatively' to something else means to state the difference between them as it is found either universally and always, or generally and in most cases: thus a difference that is found universally and always, is one such as 10man possesses in comparison with a horse, viz. being a biped: for a man is always and in every case a biped, whereas a horse is never a biped at any time. On the other hand, a difference that is found generally and in most cases, is one such as the faculty of reason possesses in comparison with that of desire and spirit, in that the former commands, while the latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does 15not always command, but sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and spirit always under command, but also on occasion assumes the command, whenever the soul of a man is vicious.
Of 'properties' the most 'arguable' are the essential and permanent and the relative. For a relative property gives rise, as we said before, to several questions: for of necessity the questions arising are either two 20or four, or that arguments in regard to these are several. An essential and a permanent property you can discuss in relation to many things, or can observe in relation to many periods of time: if essential', discuss it in comparison with many things: for the property ought to belong to its subject in comparison with every single thing that is, so that if the subject be not distinguished by it in comparison 25with everything else, the property could not have been rendered correctly. So a permanent property you should observe in relation to many periods of time; for if it does not or did not, or is not going to, belong, it will not be a property. On the other hand, about a temporary property we do not inquire further than in regard to the time called 'the present'; and so arguments in regard to it are not 30many; whereas an arguable' question is one in regard to which it is possible for arguments both numerous and good to arise.
The so-called 'relative' property, then, should be examined by means of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident, to see whether it belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand, permanent and essential properties should be considered by the following methods.
To render a property 'relatively' to something else means to state the difference between them as it is found either universally and always, or generally and in most cases: thus a difference that is found universally and always, is one such as 10man possesses in comparison with a horse, viz. being a biped: for a man is always and in every case a biped, whereas a horse is never a biped at any time. On the other hand, a difference that is found generally and in most cases, is one such as the faculty of reason possesses in comparison with that of desire and spirit, in that the former commands, while the latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does 15not always command, but sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and spirit always under command, but also on occasion assumes the command, whenever the soul of a man is vicious.
Of 'properties' the most 'arguable' are the essential and permanent and the relative. For a relative property gives rise, as we said before, to several questions: for of necessity the questions arising are either two 20or four, or that arguments in regard to these are several. An essential and a permanent property you can discuss in relation to many things, or can observe in relation to many periods of time: if essential', discuss it in comparison with many things: for the property ought to belong to its subject in comparison with every single thing that is, so that if the subject be not distinguished by it in comparison 25with everything else, the property could not have been rendered correctly. So a permanent property you should observe in relation to many periods of time; for if it does not or did not, or is not going to, belong, it will not be a property. On the other hand, about a temporary property we do not inquire further than in regard to the time called 'the present'; and so arguments in regard to it are not 30many; whereas an arguable' question is one in regard to which it is possible for arguments both numerous and good to arise.
The so-called 'relative' property, then, should be examined by means of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident, to see whether it belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand, permanent and essential properties should be considered by the following methods.
Book 5,Chapter 2 (129b1–130b37)
129b
1 Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καλῶς.
τοῦ δὲ μὴ καλῶς ἢ καλῶς ἐστιν ἓν μέν, εἰ μὴ διὰ
γνωριμωτέρων ἢ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων κεῖται τὸ ἴδιον, ἀνασκευάζοντα
μὲν εἰ μὴ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ διὰ
5 γνωριμωτέρων. τοῦ δὲ μὴ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν εἰ
ὅλως ἀγνωστότερόν ἐστι τὸ ἴδιον ὃ ἀποδίδωσι τούτου οὗ τὸ ἴδιον
εἴρηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. γνώσεως γὰρ
ἕνεκα τὸ ἴδιον ποιούμεθα· διὰ γνωριμωτέρων οὖν ἀποδοτέον·
οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται κατανοεῖν ἱκανῶς μᾶλλον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς
10 πυρὸς ἴδιον εἶναι τὸ ὁμοιότατον ψυχῇ ἀγνωστοτέρῳ κέχρηται
τοῦ πυρὸς τῇ ψυχῇ (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἴσμεν τί ἐστι πῦρ ἢ
ψυχή), οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον ἴδιον πυρὸς τὸ ὁμοιότατον
ψυχῇ. τὸ δ' εἰ μὴ γνωριμώτερόν ἐστι τόδε τῷδ' ὑπάρχον.
δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μόνον εἶναι γνωριμώτερον τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ
15 καὶ ὅτι τῷδ' ὑπάρχει γνωριμώτερον· ὁ μὴ γὰρ εἰδὼς
εἰ τῷδ' ὑπάρχει οὐδ' εἰ τῷδε ὑπάρχει μόνῳ γνωριεῖ,
ὥσθ' ὁποτέρου τούτων συμβάντος ἀσαφὲς γίνεται τὸ ἴδιον.
οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς πυρὸς ἴδιον τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ψυχὴ πέφυκεν
εἶναι ἀγνωστοτέρῳ κέχρηται τοῦ πυρὸς τῷ εἰ ἐν τούτῳ ὑπάρχει
20 ψυχὴ καὶ εἰ ἐν πρώτῳ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον
ἴδιον πυρὸς τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ψυχὴ πέφυκεν εἶναι. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων κεῖται τὸ ἴδιον, καὶ
εἰ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν τρόπων. ἔσται γὰρ
καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον· τῶν γὰρ κατασκευαστικῶν
25 τόπων τοῦ καλῶς οἱ μὲν κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον, οἱ δ' ἁπλῶς
δείξουσιν ὅτι καλῶς. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἴσθησιν
ἔχειν διὰ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ γνωριμώτερον ἀποδέδωκε
τὸ ἴδιον καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν τρόπων, εἴη ἂν καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον
κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἴσθησιν ἔχειν.
30 Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἴ τι τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν
ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ ἀποδεδομένων πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, ἢ καὶ ὅλος
ὁ λόγος πλείω σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ
ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πλείω σημαίνει, ἓν μὲν τὸ
αἴσθησιν ἔχειν ἓν δὲ τὸ αἰσθήσει χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ
35 ζῴου ἴδιον καλῶς κείμενον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκός. διὰ τοῦτο
1First, see whether the property has or has not been rendered correctly. Of a rendering being incorrect or correct, one test is to see whether the terms in which the property is stated are not or are more intelligible-for destructive purposes, whether they are not so, and for constructive purposes, whether they are so. Of the terms not being more intelligible, 5one test is to see whether the property which he renders is altogether more unintelligible than the subject whose property he has stated: for, if so, the property will not have been stated correctly. For the object of getting a property constituted is to be intelligible: the terms therefore in which it is rendered should be more intelligible: for in that case it will be possible to conceive it more adequately, e.g. any one who has stated 10that it is a property of 'fire' to 'bear a very close resemblance to the soul', uses the term 'soul', which is less intelligible than 'fire'-for we know better what fire is than what soul is-, and therefore a 'very close resemblance to the soul' could not be correctly stated to be a property of fire. Another test is to see whether the attribution of A (property) to B (subject) fails to be more intelligible. For not only should the property 15be more intelligible than its subject, but also it should be something whose attribution to the particular subject is a more intelligible attribution. For he who does not know whether it is an attribute of the particular subject at all, will not know either whether it belongs to it alone, so that whichever of these results happens, its character as a property becomes obscure. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of fire to be 20'the primary element wherein the soul is naturally found', has introduced a subject which is less intelligible than 'fire', viz. whether the soul is found in it, and whether it is found there primarily; and therefore to be 'the primary element in which the soul is naturally found' could not be correctly stated to be a property of 'fire'. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether the terms in which the property is stated are 25more intelligible, and if they are more intelligible in each of the aforesaid ways. For then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect: for of constructive arguments, showing the correctness of a rendering, some will show the correctness merely in this respect, while others will show it without qualification. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that the 'possession of sensation' is a property of 'animal' has both used more 30intelligible terms and has rendered the property more intelligible in each of the aforesaid senses; so that to 'possess sensation' would in this respect have been correctly rendered as a property of 'animal'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether any of the terms rendered in the property is used in more than one sense, or whether the whole expression too signifies more than one thing. For then the property will not have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether any of the terms rendered in the property is used in more than one sense, or whether the whole expression too signifies more than one thing. For then the property will not have been correctly stated.
130a
1 δ' οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν οὔτ' ὀνόματι πλεοναχῶς λεγομένῳ οὔτε
λόγῳ τῷ τὸ ἴδιον σημαίνοντι, διότι τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον
ἀσαφὲς ποιεῖ τὸ ῥηθέν, ἀποροῦντος τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐπιχειρεῖν
πότερον λέγει τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων· τὸ γὰρ
5 ἴδιον τοῦ μαθεῖν χάριν ἀποδίδοται. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναγκαῖόν
ἐστιν ἔλεγχόν τινα γίνεσθαι τοῖς οὕτως ἀποδιδοῦσι τὸ
ἴδιον, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ διαφωνοῦντός τις ποιῇ τὸν συλλογισμὸν
τοῦ πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μὴ πλείω
σημαίνει μήτε τῶν ὀνομάτων μηδὲν μήθ' ὅλος ὁ λόγος·
10 ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ οὔτε
τὸ σῶμα πολλὰ δηλοῖ οὔτε τὸ εὐκινητότατον εἰς τὸν ἄνω
τόπον οὔτε τὸ σύνολον τὸ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέμενον, εἴη ἂν καλῶς
κείμενον κατὰ τοῦτο πυρὸς ἴδιον σῶμα τὸ εὐκινητότατον
εἰς τὸν ἄνω τόπον.
15 Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται τοῦτο
οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδίδωσι, μὴ διώρισται δὲ τὸ τίνος αὐτῶν
ἴδιον τίθησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον. δι'
ἃς δ' αἰτίας, οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων·
τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν. οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
20 τοῦτο πολλὰ σημαίνει (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν
αὐτό, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμῃ χρῆσθαι αὐτό, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν
αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμῃ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῦ), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι
τοῦτο καλῶς ἴδιον ἀποδεδομένον, μὴ διορισθέντος τοῦ τίνος
τίθησιν αὐτῶν τὸ ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μὴ λέγεται
25 πολλαχῶς τοῦτο οὗ τὸ ἴδιον τίθησιν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἓν καὶ ἁπλοῦν·
ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ
ἄνθρωπος μοναχῶς λέγεται ἕν, εἴη ἂν καλῶς κείμενον κατὰ
τοῦτο ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ζῷον ἥμερον φύσει.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ πλεονάκις εἴρηται τὸ
30 αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ· πολλάκις γὰρ λανθάνουσι τοῦτο ποιοῦντες
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅροις. οὐκ ἔσται δὲ
καλῶς κείμενον τὸ τοῦτο πεπονθὸς ἴδιον· ταράττει γὰρ τὸν
ἀκούοντα πλεονάκις λεχθέν. ἀσαφὲς οὖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι,
καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀδολεσχεῖν δοκοῦσιν. ἔσται δὲ συμπῖπτον
35 τὸ πλεονάκις εἰπεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ δύο τρόπους· καθ'
ἕνα μέν, ὅταν ὀνομάσῃ πλεονάκις τὸ αὐτό, καθάπερ εἴ τις
ἴδιον ἀποδοίη πυρὸς σῶμα τὸ λεπτότατον τῶν σωμάτων
(οὗτος γὰρ πλεονάκις εἴρηκε τὸ "σῶμα")· δεύτερον δ', ἄν τις
μεταλαμβάνῃ τοὺς λόγους ἀντὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, καθάπερ εἴ
1Thus (e.g.) seeing that to 'being natural sentient' signifies more than one thing, viz. (1) to possess sensation, (2) to use one's sensation, being naturally sentient' could not be a correct statement of a property of 'animal'. The reason why the term you use, or the whole expression signifying the property, should not bear more than one meaning is this, that an expression 5bearing more than one meaning makes the object described obscure, because the man who is about to attempt an argument is in doubt which of the various senses the expression bears: and this will not do, for the object of rendering the property is that he may understand. Moreover, in addition to this, it is inevitable that those who render a property after this fashion should be somehow refuted whenever any one addresses his syllogism to that one of the term's several 10meanings which does not agree. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether both all the terms and also the expression as a whole avoid bearing more than one sense: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 'body' does not bear several meanings, nor quickest to move upwards in space', nor yet the whole expression made by putting them together, it would be correct in this respect to say that it is a 15property of fire to be the 'body quickest to move upwards in space'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the term of which he renders the property is used in more than one sense, and no distinction has been drawn as to which of them it is whose property he is stating: for then the property will not have been correctly rendered. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has been said above: for the same results are bound to follow. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 20'the knowledge of this' signifies many things for it means (1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of its knowledge by it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4) the use of knowledge about it-no property of the 'knowledge of this' could be rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these it is whose property he is rendering. For constructive purposes, a man should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids bearing 25many senses and is one and simple: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 'man' is used in a single sense, 'naturally civilized animal' would be correctly stated as a property of man.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term has been repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected in rendering 'properties' also, just as they do in their 'definitions' as well: but a property to which 30this has happened will not have been correctly stated: for the repetition of it confuses the hearer; thus inevitably the meaning becomes obscure, and further, such people are thought to babble. Repetition of the same term is likely to happen in two ways; one is, when a man repeatedly uses the same word, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of fire, 'the body which is the most rarefied of bodies' (for he has repeated the word 'body'); the second 35is, if a man replaces words by their definitions, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of earth, 'the substance which is by its nature most easily of all bodies borne downwards in space', and were then to substitute 'substances of such and such a kind' for the word 'bodies': for 'body' and 'a substance of such and such a kind' mean one and the same thing.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the term of which he renders the property is used in more than one sense, and no distinction has been drawn as to which of them it is whose property he is stating: for then the property will not have been correctly rendered. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has been said above: for the same results are bound to follow. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 20'the knowledge of this' signifies many things for it means (1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of its knowledge by it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4) the use of knowledge about it-no property of the 'knowledge of this' could be rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these it is whose property he is rendering. For constructive purposes, a man should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids bearing 25many senses and is one and simple: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 'man' is used in a single sense, 'naturally civilized animal' would be correctly stated as a property of man.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term has been repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected in rendering 'properties' also, just as they do in their 'definitions' as well: but a property to which 30this has happened will not have been correctly stated: for the repetition of it confuses the hearer; thus inevitably the meaning becomes obscure, and further, such people are thought to babble. Repetition of the same term is likely to happen in two ways; one is, when a man repeatedly uses the same word, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of fire, 'the body which is the most rarefied of bodies' (for he has repeated the word 'body'); the second 35is, if a man replaces words by their definitions, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of earth, 'the substance which is by its nature most easily of all bodies borne downwards in space', and were then to substitute 'substances of such and such a kind' for the word 'bodies': for 'body' and 'a substance of such and such a kind' mean one and the same thing.
130b
1 τις ἀποδοίη γῆς ἴδιον "οὐσία ἡ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν φερομένη
τῶν σωμάτων εἰς τὸν κάτω τόπον", ἔπειτα μεταλάβοι
ἀντὶ τῶν "σωμάτων" τὸ "οὐσιῶν τοιωνδί"· ἓν γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι
σῶμα καὶ οὐσία τοιαδί· ἔσται γὰρ οὗτος τὸ "οὐσία" πλεονάκις
5 εἰρηκώς. ὥστ' οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον τῶν ἰδίων. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ μηδενὶ χρῆται πλεονάκις ὀνόματι τῷ
αὐτῷ· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον.
οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν οὐ
κέχρηται τῷ αὐτῷ πλεονάκις ὀνόματι, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο
10 καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἴδιον.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τοιοῦτόν τι ἀποδέδωκεν
ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ ὃ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει. ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ἔσται τὸ μὴ
χωρίζον ἀπό τινων· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις λεγόμενον χωρίζειν
δεῖ, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὅροις. οὔκουν ἔσται καλῶς
15 κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον ὑπόληψιν
ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου ἓν οὖσαν τοιούτῳ τινὶ κέχρηται ἐν τῷ
ἰδίῳ, τῷ ἑνί, ὃ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον
τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μηδενὶ κέχρηται
κοινῷ ἀλλ' ἀπό τινος χωρίζοντι· ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς
20 κείμενον κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ
ψυχὴν ἔχειν οὐδενὶ κέχρηται κοινῷ, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς
κείμενον ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ πλείω ἴδια ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ
αὐτοῦ, μὴ διορίσας ὅτι πλείω τίθησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς
25 κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. καθάπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ὅροις δεῖ παρὰ
τὸν δηλοῦντα λόγον τὴν οὐσίαν προσκεῖσθαί τι πλέον, οὕτως
οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις παρὰ τὸν ποιοῦντα λόγον ἴδιον τὸ ῥηθὲν
οὐδὲν προσαποδοτέον· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον. οἷον
ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἴδιον πυρὸς σῶμα τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ κουφότατον
30 πλείω ἀποδέδωκεν ἴδια (ἑκάτερον γὰρ κατὰ μόνου τοῦ
πυρὸς ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον ἴδιον
πυρὸς σῶμα τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ κουφότατον. κατασκευάζοντα
δ' εἰ μὴ πλείω τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἴδια ἀποδέδωκεν ἀλλ'
ἕν· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ
35 ὁ εἴπας ὑγροῦ ἴδιον σῶμα τὸ εἰς ἅπαν σχῆμα ἀγόμενον ἓν
ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον ἀλλ' οὐ πλείω, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς
κείμενον τὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ ἴδιον.
1For he will have repeated the word 'substance', and accordingly neither of the properties would be correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids ever repeating the same term; for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) seeing that he who has stated 'animal 5capable of acquiring knowledge' as a property of man has avoided repeating the same term several times, the property would in this respect have been correctly rendered of man.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in the property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one which does not distinguish its subject from other things is useless, and it is the business of the language Of 'properties', 10as also of the language of definitions, to distinguish. In the case contemplated, therefore, the property will not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be a 'conception incontrovertible by argument, because of its unity', has used in the property a term of that kind, viz. 'unity', which is a universal attribute; and therefore the property of knowledge 15could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided all terms that are common to everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from something: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a property of a 'living creature' to 'have a soul' has used no term that is common to 20everything, it would in this respect have been correctly stated to be a property of a 'living creature' to 'have a soul'.
Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he is stating more than one: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For just as in the case of definitions too there should be no further addition beside 25the expression which shows the essence, so too in the case of properties nothing further should be rendered beside the expression that constitutes the property mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of fire to be 'the most rarefied and lightest body' has rendered more than one property (for each term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it could 30not be a correctly stated property of fire to be 'the most rarefied and lightest body'. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the same thing, and has rendered one only: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a liquid to be a 'body adaptable to every shape' has 35rendered as its property a single character and not several, and so the property of 'liquid' would in this respect have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in the property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one which does not distinguish its subject from other things is useless, and it is the business of the language Of 'properties', 10as also of the language of definitions, to distinguish. In the case contemplated, therefore, the property will not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be a 'conception incontrovertible by argument, because of its unity', has used in the property a term of that kind, viz. 'unity', which is a universal attribute; and therefore the property of knowledge 15could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided all terms that are common to everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from something: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a property of a 'living creature' to 'have a soul' has used no term that is common to 20everything, it would in this respect have been correctly stated to be a property of a 'living creature' to 'have a soul'.
Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he is stating more than one: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For just as in the case of definitions too there should be no further addition beside 25the expression which shows the essence, so too in the case of properties nothing further should be rendered beside the expression that constitutes the property mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of fire to be 'the most rarefied and lightest body' has rendered more than one property (for each term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it could 30not be a correctly stated property of fire to be 'the most rarefied and lightest body'. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the same thing, and has rendered one only: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a liquid to be a 'body adaptable to every shape' has 35rendered as its property a single character and not several, and so the property of 'liquid' would in this respect have been correctly stated.
Book 5,Chapter 3 (130b38–132a21)
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ αὐτῷ προσκέχρηται οὗ
τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδίδωσιν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινι· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed either the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of its species: for then the property will not have been correctly stated.
131a
1 κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. τοῦ γὰρ μαθεῖν χάριν ἀποδίδοται τὸ ἴδιον·
αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν αὑτῷ ὁμοίως ἄγνωστόν ἐστι, τὸ δέ τι τῶν αὐτοῦ
ὕστερον· οὔκουν ἐστὶ γνωριμώτερον. ὥστ' οὐ γίνεται διὰ τούτων
μᾶλλόν τι μαθεῖν, οἷον· ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ζῴου ἴδιον οὐσίαν ἧς εἶδός
5 ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος τινὶ προσκέχρηται τῶν τούτου, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μήτε αὐτῷ
μήτε τῶν αὐτοῦ μηδενὶ κέχρηται· ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο
κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς
καὶ σώματος συγκείμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε τῶν αὐτοῦ οὐδενὶ
10 προσκέχρηται, εἴη ἂν καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποδεδομένον τὸ
τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκεπτέον ἐστὶ
τῶν μὴ ποιούντων ἢ ποιούντων γνωριμώτερον, ἀνασκευάζοντα
μὲν εἴ τινι προσκέχρηται ἢ ἀντικειμένῳ ἢ ὅλως ἅμα τῇ
15 φύσει ἢ ὑστέρῳ τινί· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀντικείμενον ἅμα τῇ φύσει· τὸ δ' ἅμα τῇ
φύσει καὶ τὸ ὕστερον οὐ ποιεῖ γνωριμώτερον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας
ἀγαθοῦ ἴδιον "ὃ κακῷ μάλιστ' ἀντίκειται" τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ
προσκέχρηται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καλῶς
20 ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μηδενὶ προςκέχρηται
μήτ' ἀντικειμένῳ μήτε ὅλως ἅμα τῇ φύσει μήθ'
ὑστέρῳ· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον.
οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον ὑπόληψιν τὴν πιστοτάτην οὐδενὶ
προσκέχρηται οὔτ' ἀντικειμένῳ οὔθ' ἅμα τῇ φύσει οὔθ'
25 ὑστέρῳ, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
ἴδιον.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀεὶ παρεπόμενον
ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὃ γίνεταί ποτε μὴ ἴδιον· οὐ
γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς εἰρημένον τὸ ἴδιον. οὔτε γὰρ ἐφ' ᾧ καταλαμβάνομεν
30 ὑπάρχον αὐτό, κατὰ τούτου καὶ τοὔνομα ἐξ
ἀνάγκης ἀληθεύεται, οὔτ' ἐφ' ᾧ καταλαμβάνεται μὴ ὑπάρχον,
κατὰ τούτου ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ ῥηθήσεται τοὔνομα,
πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' ὅτε ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον ἔσται φανερὸν εἰ
ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον ἀπολείπειν. οὔκουν ἔσται σαφὲς
35 τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ κινεῖσθαί ποτε
καὶ ἑστάναι τοιοῦτον ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον ὃ οὐ γίνεταί ποτε
ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ ὂν ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν· ἔσται γὰρ
1For the object of rendering the property is that people may understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it was to start with, while any one of its species is posterior to it, and so is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to understand anything further by the use of these terms. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is property of 5'animal' to be 'the substance to which "man" belongs as a species' has employed one of its species, and therefore the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids introducing either the subject itself or any of its species: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a living creature to be 'compounded of soul 10and body' has avoided introducing among the rest either the subject itself or any of its species, and therefore in this respect the property of a 'living creature' would have been correctly rendered.
You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything either opposite to the subject or, in general, anything simultaneous by nature 15with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is a property of good to be 'the most direct opposite of evil', has employed the opposite of good, and so the property of good could not have been correctly rendered. For 20constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or, in general, simultaneous by nature with the subject, or posterior to it: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be 'the most convincing conception' has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior to, the 25subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as property something that does not always follow the subject but sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not have been correctly described. For there is no necessity either that the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which we find such an attribute belonging; nor yet that 30the name of the subject will be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is found not to belong. Moreover, in addition to this, even after he has rendered the property it will not be clear whether it belongs, seeing that it is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so the property will not be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of animal 'sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still' rendered the kind of property which sometimes 35is not a property, and so the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered something that of necessity must always be a property: for then the property will have been in this respect correctly stated.
You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything either opposite to the subject or, in general, anything simultaneous by nature 15with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is a property of good to be 'the most direct opposite of evil', has employed the opposite of good, and so the property of good could not have been correctly rendered. For 20constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or, in general, simultaneous by nature with the subject, or posterior to it: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be 'the most convincing conception' has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior to, the 25subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as property something that does not always follow the subject but sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not have been correctly described. For there is no necessity either that the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which we find such an attribute belonging; nor yet that 30the name of the subject will be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is found not to belong. Moreover, in addition to this, even after he has rendered the property it will not be clear whether it belongs, seeing that it is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so the property will not be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of animal 'sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still' rendered the kind of property which sometimes 35is not a property, and so the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered something that of necessity must always be a property: for then the property will have been in this respect correctly stated.
131b
1 καλῶς κείμενον κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἀρετῆς
ἴδιον "ὃ τὸν ἔχοντα ποιεῖ σπουδαῖον" τὸ ἀεὶ παρεπόμενον ἴδιον
ἀποδέδωκεν, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ τῆς
ἀρετῆς ἴδιον.
5 Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ νῦν ἴδιον ἀποδιδοὺς
μὴ διωρίσατο ὅτι τὸ νῦν ἴδιον ἀποδίδωσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς
κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γινόμενον
ἅπαν διορισμοῦ προσδεῖται· εἰώθασι δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολὺ πάντες τὸ ἀεὶ παρακολουθοῦν ἴδιον ἀποδιδόναι. δεύτερον
10 δὲ ἄδηλός ἐστιν ὁ μὴ διορισάμενος εἰ τὸ νῦν ἴδιον ἐβούλετο
θεῖναι· οὔκουν δοτέον ἐστὶν ἐπιτιμήσεως σκῆψιν. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ
θέμενος τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ καθῆσθαι μετά τινος τὸ
νῦν ἴδιον τίθησιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδεδωκώς,
εἴπερ μὴ διορισάμενος εἶπεν. κατασκευάζοντα δ' εἰ τὸ νῦν
15 ἴδιον ἀποδιδοὺς διορισάμενος ἔθηκεν ὅτι τὸ νῦν ἴδιον τίθησιν·
ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κείμενον κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ
εἴπας τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ περιπατεῖν νῦν διαστειλάμενος
ἔθηκε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἂν εἴη κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τοιοῦτο ἀποδέδωκε τὸ
20 ἴδιον, ὃ φανερὸν μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλως ὑπάρχον ἢ αἰσθήσει· οὐ
γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν
ἔξω γινόμενον τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἄδηλον γίνεται· ἀφανὲς γάρ
ἐστιν εἰ ἔτι ὑπάρχει, διὰ τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνον γνωρίζεσθαι.
ἔσται δ' ἀληθὲς τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ παρακολουθούντων.
25 οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θέμενος ἡλίου ἴδιον ἄστρον φερόμενον
ὑπὲρ γῆς τὸ λαμπρότατον τοιούτῳ κέχρηται ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ, τῷ
ὑπὲρ γῆς φέρεσθαι, ὃ τῇ αἰσθήσει γνωρίζεται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
καλῶς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀποδεδομένον ἴδιον· ἄδηλον γὰρ ἔσται,
ὅταν δύῃ ὁ ἥλιος, εἰ φέρεται ὑπὲρ γῆς, διὰ τὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν
30 τότε ἀπολείπειν ἡμᾶς. κατασκευάζοντα δ' εἰ τοιοῦτον
ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον ὃ μὴ τῇ αἰσθήσει φανερόν ἐστιν ἢ ὃ αἰσθητὸν
ὂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχον δῆλόν ἐστιν· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ
τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θέμενος ἐπιφανείας
ἴδιον "ὃ πρῶτον κέχρωσται" αἰσθητῷ μέν τινι προσκέχρηται
35 τῷ κεχρῶσθαι, τοιούτῳ δ' ὃ φανερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχον ἀεί, εἴη ἂν
κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸν ὅρον ὡς ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν·
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ
1Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of virtue to be 'what makes its possessor good' has rendered as property something that always follows, and so the property of virtue would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite 5proviso that it is the property of the present time which he is rendering: for else the property will not have been correctly stated. For in the first place, any unusual procedure always needs a definite proviso: and it is the usual procedure for everybody to render as property some attribute that always follows. In the second place, a man who omits to provide definitely whether it was the property of the present time which he intended to state, is 10obscure: and one should not give any occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated it as the property of a particular man 'to be sitting with a particular man', states the property of the present time, and so he cannot have rendered the property correctly, seeing that he has described it without any definite proviso. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, in rendering the property of the present time, he has, in 15stating it, made a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time that he is stating: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of a particular man 'to be walking now', has made this distinction in his statement, and so the property would have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered a property of the kind whose 20appropriateness is not obvious except by sensation: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For every sensible attribute, once it is taken beyond the sphere of sensation, becomes uncertain. For it is not clear whether it still belongs, because it is evidenced only by sensation. This principle will be true in the case of any attributes that do not always and necessarily follow. Thus (e.g.) any one who has stated that it is a property of 25the sun to be 'the brightest star that moves over the earth', has used in describing the property an expression of that kind, viz. 'to move over the earth', which is evidenced by sensation; and so the sun's property could not have been correctly rendered: for it will be uncertain, whenever the sun sets, whether it continues to move over the earth, because sensation then fails us. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered 30the property of a kind that is not obvious to sensation, or, if it be sensible, must clearly belong of necessity: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface to be 'the primary thing that is coloured', has introduced amongst the rest a sensible quality, 'to be coloured', but still a quality such as manifestly always belongs, and so the property of 'surface' 35would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the definition as a property: for then the property will not have been correctly stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its essence. Thus (e.g.)
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite 5proviso that it is the property of the present time which he is rendering: for else the property will not have been correctly stated. For in the first place, any unusual procedure always needs a definite proviso: and it is the usual procedure for everybody to render as property some attribute that always follows. In the second place, a man who omits to provide definitely whether it was the property of the present time which he intended to state, is 10obscure: and one should not give any occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated it as the property of a particular man 'to be sitting with a particular man', states the property of the present time, and so he cannot have rendered the property correctly, seeing that he has described it without any definite proviso. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, in rendering the property of the present time, he has, in 15stating it, made a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time that he is stating: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of a particular man 'to be walking now', has made this distinction in his statement, and so the property would have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered a property of the kind whose 20appropriateness is not obvious except by sensation: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For every sensible attribute, once it is taken beyond the sphere of sensation, becomes uncertain. For it is not clear whether it still belongs, because it is evidenced only by sensation. This principle will be true in the case of any attributes that do not always and necessarily follow. Thus (e.g.) any one who has stated that it is a property of 25the sun to be 'the brightest star that moves over the earth', has used in describing the property an expression of that kind, viz. 'to move over the earth', which is evidenced by sensation; and so the sun's property could not have been correctly rendered: for it will be uncertain, whenever the sun sets, whether it continues to move over the earth, because sensation then fails us. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered 30the property of a kind that is not obvious to sensation, or, if it be sensible, must clearly belong of necessity: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface to be 'the primary thing that is coloured', has introduced amongst the rest a sensible quality, 'to be coloured', but still a quality such as manifestly always belongs, and so the property of 'surface' 35would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the definition as a property: for then the property will not have been correctly stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its essence. Thus (e.g.)
132a
1 δηλοῦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀνθρώπου
ἴδιον ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαῖνον ἀποδέδωκε
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον καλῶς
ἀποδεδομένον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ἀντικατηγορούμενον μὲν
5 ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, μὴ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δὲ δηλοῦν· ἔσται γὰρ
κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς
ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ζῷον ἥμερον φύσει ἀντικατηγορούμενον μὲν
ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, οὐ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δὲ δηλοῦν, εἴη ἂν κατὰ
τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
10 Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ μὴ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστιν θεὶς
ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον. δεῖ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν
ὅρων, τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδίδοσθαι γένος, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἤδη προςάπτεσθαι
τὰ λοιπὰ καὶ χωρίζειν. ὥστε τὸ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον κείμενον ἴδιον οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον. οἷον
15 ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν οὐκ ἔθηκεν εἰς τὸ τί
ἐστι τὸ ζῷον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον τὸ τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον.
κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἴ τις εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι θεὶς οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδίδωσι
τὰ λοιπὰ προσάπτει· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς
ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον
20 ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι θεὶς ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον,
εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
1a man who has said that it is the property of man to be 'a walking, biped animal' has rendered a property of man so as to signify his essence, and so the property of man could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property which he has rendered forms a predicate convertible with its subject, without, however, 5signifying its essence: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that it is a property of man to be a 'naturally civilized animal' has rendered the property so as to be convertible with its subject, without, however, showing its essence, and so the property of man' would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the property without 10having placed the subject within its essence. For of properties, as also of definitions, the first term to be rendered should be the genus, and then the rest of it should be appended immediately afterwards, and should distinguish its subject from other things. Hence a property which is not stated in this way could not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a living creature to 'have a soul' has not placed 15'living creature' within its essence, and so the property of a living creature could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether a man first places within its essence the subject whose property he is rendering, and then appends the rest: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that is a property of man to be an 'animal capable of receiving knowledge', 20has rendered the property after placing the subject within its essence, and so the property of 'man' would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the property without 10having placed the subject within its essence. For of properties, as also of definitions, the first term to be rendered should be the genus, and then the rest of it should be appended immediately afterwards, and should distinguish its subject from other things. Hence a property which is not stated in this way could not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a living creature to 'have a soul' has not placed 15'living creature' within its essence, and so the property of a living creature could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether a man first places within its essence the subject whose property he is rendering, and then appends the rest: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that is a property of man to be an 'animal capable of receiving knowledge', 20has rendered the property after placing the subject within its essence, and so the property of 'man' would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Book 5,Chapter 4 (132a22–134a4)
Πότερον μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἢ οὐ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ
ἴδιον, διὰ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. πότερον δ' ἴδιόν ἐστιν ὅλως τὸ εἰρημένον
ἢ οὐκ ἴδιον, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. οἱ γὰρ ἁπλῶς κατασκευάζοντες
25 τὸ ἴδιον ὅτι καλῶς κεῖται τόποι οἱ αὐτοὶ
ἔσονται τοῖς ἴδιον ὅλως ποιοῦσιν· ἐν ἐκείνοις οὖν ῥηθήσονται.
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀνασκευάζοντα ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἕκαστον
οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν, οἷον εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰ μὴ
κατὰ τοῦτο ἀληθεύεται, ἢ εἰ μή ἐστιν ἴδιον ἑκάστου αὐτῶν
30 κατ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ
κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ κατὰ τοῦ γεωμετρικοῦ οὐκ ἀληθεύεται
τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον εἶναι ὑπὸ λόγου (ἀπατᾶται γὰρ ὁ
γεωμετρικὸς ἐν τῷ ψευδογραφεῖσθαι), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος
ἴδιον τὸ μὴ ἀπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ λόγου. κατασκευάζοντα
35 δ' εἰ κατὰ παντὸς ἀληθεύεται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' ἀληθεύεται
ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ
The inquiry, then, whether the property has been correctly rendered or no, should be made by these means. The question, on the other hand, whether what is stated is or is not a property at all, you should examine from the following points of view. For the commonplace arguments which establish absolutely that 25the property is accurately stated will be the same as those that constitute it a property at all: accordingly they will be described in the course of them.
Firstly, then, for destructive purposes, take a look at each subject of which he has rendered the property, and see (e.g.) if it fails to belong to any of them at all, or to be true of them in that particular respect, or to be a property of each of them in respect of that character of which he has 30rendered the property: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not true of the geometrician that he 'cannot be deceived by an argument' (for a geometrician is deceived when his figure is misdrawn), it could not be a property of the man of science that he is not deceived by an argument. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property rendered be true of every instance, and true 35in that particular respect: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property.
Firstly, then, for destructive purposes, take a look at each subject of which he has rendered the property, and see (e.g.) if it fails to belong to any of them at all, or to be true of them in that particular respect, or to be a property of each of them in respect of that character of which he has 30rendered the property: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not true of the geometrician that he 'cannot be deceived by an argument' (for a geometrician is deceived when his figure is misdrawn), it could not be a property of the man of science that he is not deceived by an argument. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property rendered be true of every instance, and true 35in that particular respect: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property.
132b
1 ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀληθεύεται
καὶ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, εἴη ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης
δεκτικόν. [ἔστι δ' ὁ τόπος οὗτος ἀνασκευάζοντι μέν, εἰ μὴ καθ'
οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθεύεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος,
5 καὶ τοὔνομα ἀληθεύεται· κατασκευάζοντι δέ, εἰ καθ'
οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ λόγος, καὶ εἰ καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα
κατηγορεῖται.]
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ μὴ καθ' οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ
ὁ λόγος, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα λέγεται·
10 οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον ἴδιον εἶναι. οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν
ζῷον ἐπιστήμης μετέχον ἀληθεύεται κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος
οὐ κατηγορεῖται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ζῷον
ἐπιστήμης μετέχον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος,
καὶ τοὔνομα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ καθ' οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ λόγος
15 κατηγορεῖται· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
οἷον ἐπεὶ καθ' οὗ τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ζῷον ἀληθεύεται, καὶ
καθ' οὗ τὸ ζῷον, τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἴη ἂν τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν
τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἴδιον
20 ἀποδέδωκε τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ λεγομένου· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον
τὸ κείμενον ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀποδοὺς ἴδιον τοῦ λεπτομερεστάτου
σώματος τὸ πῦρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀποδέδωκε τοῦ κατηγορουμένου
ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ πῦρ σώματος τοῦ λεπτομερεστάτου
ἴδιον. διὰ τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῦ ἐν τῷ
25 ὑποκειμένῳ ἴδιον, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἔσται καὶ διαφόρων
τῷ εἴδει ἴδιον. τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ πλείω τινὰ διάφορα τῷ εἴδει
ὑπάρχει κατὰ μόνου λεγόμενα, ὧν ἔσται πάντων ἴδιον τὸ
ὑποκείμενον, ἐάν τις οὕτω τιθῆται τὸ ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα
δ' εἰ τὸ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἀποδέδωκεν ἴδιον τοῦ ὑποκειμένου·
30 ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον, ἐάνπερ κατὰ μόνων
κατηγορῆται ὧν εἴρηται [τὸ] ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας γῆς
ἴδιον σῶμα τὸ βαρύτατον τῷ εἴδει τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀπέδωκε
τὸ ἴδιον κατὰ μόνου λεγόμενον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ὡς τὸ ἴδιον
κατηγορεῖται, εἴη ἂν τὸ τῆς γῆς ἴδιον ὀρθῶς κείμενον.
35 Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀποδέδωκε
τὸ ἴδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον. τὸ γὰρ
1Thus, for example, in as much as the description 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' is true of every man, and true of him qua man, it would be a property of man to be 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge'. commonplace rule means-for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to be true of that of which the name is true; and if 5the name fails to be true of that of which the description is true: for constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the description too is predicated of that of which the name is predicated, and if the name too is predicated of that of which the description is predicated.]
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name fails to apply to that to which the 10description applies: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the description 'a living being that partakes of knowledge' is true of God, while 'man' is not predicated of God, to be a living being that partakes of knowledge' could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the name as well be predicated of that of which the description is predicated, and if 15the description as well be predicated of that of which the name is predicated. For then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the predicate 'living creature' is true of that of which 'having a soul' is true, and 'having a soul' is true of that of which the predicate 'living creature' is true; and so 'having a soul would be a property of 'living creature'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered 20a subject as a property of that which is described as 'in the subject': for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has rendered 'fire' as the property of 'the body with the most rarefied particles', has rendered the subject as the property of its predicate, 'fire' could not be a property of 'the body with the most rarefied particles'. The reason why the subject will not be a 25property of that which is found in the subject is this, that then the same thing will be the property of a number of things that are specifically different. For the same thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates that belong to it alone, and the subject will be a property of all of these, if any one states the property in this way. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has rendered what is found in 30the subject as a property of the subject: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property, if it be predicated only of the things of which it has been stated to be the property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that it is a property of 'earth' to be 'specifically the heaviest body' has rendered of the subject as its property something that is said of the thing in question alone, and is said of it in the manner in which 35a property is predicated, and so the property of earth would have been rightly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name fails to apply to that to which the 10description applies: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the description 'a living being that partakes of knowledge' is true of God, while 'man' is not predicated of God, to be a living being that partakes of knowledge' could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the name as well be predicated of that of which the description is predicated, and if 15the description as well be predicated of that of which the name is predicated. For then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the predicate 'living creature' is true of that of which 'having a soul' is true, and 'having a soul' is true of that of which the predicate 'living creature' is true; and so 'having a soul would be a property of 'living creature'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered 20a subject as a property of that which is described as 'in the subject': for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has rendered 'fire' as the property of 'the body with the most rarefied particles', has rendered the subject as the property of its predicate, 'fire' could not be a property of 'the body with the most rarefied particles'. The reason why the subject will not be a 25property of that which is found in the subject is this, that then the same thing will be the property of a number of things that are specifically different. For the same thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates that belong to it alone, and the subject will be a property of all of these, if any one states the property in this way. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has rendered what is found in 30the subject as a property of the subject: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property, if it be predicated only of the things of which it has been stated to be the property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that it is a property of 'earth' to be 'specifically the heaviest body' has rendered of the subject as its property something that is said of the thing in question alone, and is said of it in the manner in which 35a property is predicated, and so the property of earth would have been rightly stated.
133a
1 κατὰ μέθεξιν ὑπάρχον εἰς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι συμβάλλεται·
εἴη δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο διαφορά τις κατά τινος ἑνὸς εἴδους λεγομένη.
οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ πεζὸν δίπουν
κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον
5 τὸ πεζὸν δίπουν. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μὴ κατὰ μέθεξιν
ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον μηδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλοῦν, ἀντικατηγορουμένου
τοῦ πράγματος· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι
ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκὸς οὔτε
κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀποδέδωκεν ἴδιον οὔτε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλοῦν, ἀντικατηγορουμένου
10 τοῦ πράγματος, εἴη ἂν ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
πεφυκός.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν
τὸ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ἢ ὕστερον ἢ πρότερον ἢ [οὗ] τοὔνομα· οὐ
γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον, ἢ οὐδέποτε ἢ οὐκ ἀεί.
15 οἷον ἐπεὶ ἐνδέχεται καὶ πρότερόν τινι ὑπάρξαι καὶ ὕστερον
τοῦ βαδίζειν διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὸ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ
βαδίζειν διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον, ἢ οὐδέποτ' ἢ οὐκ
ἀεί. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ἅμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει,
μήτε ὅρος ὂν μήτε διαφορά· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ
20 εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν ἅμα ἐξ
ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε διαφορὰ ὂν
οὔθ' ὅρος, εἴη ἂν τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
ἴδιον.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν, ᾗ ταὐτά
25 ἐστι, μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἴδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον
εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι διωκτοῦ τὸ φαίνεσθαί τισιν ἀγαθὸν
ἴδιον, οὐδ' ἂν αἱρετοῦ εἴη ἴδιον τὸ φαίνεσθαί τισιν ἀγαθόν·
ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ τὸ αἱρετόν. κατασκευάζοντα
δ' εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ᾗ ταὐτό ἐστι, ταὐτὸ ἴδιον· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον
30 τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ἀνθρώπου, ᾗ ἄνθρωπός
ἐστι, λέγεται ἴδιον τὸ τριμερῆ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, καὶ βροτοῦ, ᾗ
βροτός ἐστιν, εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τὸ τριμερῆ ψυχὴν ἔχειν. χρήσιμος
δ' ὁ τόπος οὗτος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τοῖς γὰρ αὐτοῖς,
ᾗ ταὐτά ἐστι, ταὐτὰ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
35 Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ εἴδει μὴ
ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ τῷ εἴδει [τὸ] ἴδιόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ εἰρημένου ἔσται
1Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered the property as partaken of: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. For an attribute of which the subject partakes is a constituent part of its essence: and an attribute of that kind would be a differentia applying to some one species. E.g. inasmuch as he who 5has said that 'walking on two feet' is property of man has rendered the property as partaken of, 'walking on two feet' could not be a property of 'man'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property as partaken of, or as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who 10has stated that to be 'naturally sentient' is a property of 'animal' has rendered the property neither as partaken of nor as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it; and so to be 'naturally sentient' would be a property of 'animal'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property cannot possibly belong simultaneously, but must belong either as posterior or as prior to the attribute 15described in the name: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property either never, or not always. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is possible for the attribute 'walking through the market-place' to belong to an object as prior and as posterior to the attribute 'man', 'walking through the market-place' could not be a property of 'man' either never, or not always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see 20if it always and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being either a definition or a differentia: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the attribute 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' always and of necessity belongs simultaneously with the attribute 'man', and is neither differentia nor definition of its subject, and so 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' would 25be a property of 'man'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails to be a property of things that are the same as the subject, so far as they are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property of a 'proper object of pursuit' to 'appear good to certain persons', it could not be a property of the 'desirable' either to 'appear good 30to certain persons': for 'proper object of pursuit' and 'desirable' mean the same. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the same thing be a property of something that is the same as the subject, in so far as it is the same. For then is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is called a property of a man, in so far as he is a man, 'to have a tripartite soul', it would 35also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a mortal, to have a tripartite soul.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property cannot possibly belong simultaneously, but must belong either as posterior or as prior to the attribute 15described in the name: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property either never, or not always. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is possible for the attribute 'walking through the market-place' to belong to an object as prior and as posterior to the attribute 'man', 'walking through the market-place' could not be a property of 'man' either never, or not always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see 20if it always and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being either a definition or a differentia: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the attribute 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' always and of necessity belongs simultaneously with the attribute 'man', and is neither differentia nor definition of its subject, and so 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' would 25be a property of 'man'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails to be a property of things that are the same as the subject, so far as they are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property of a 'proper object of pursuit' to 'appear good to certain persons', it could not be a property of the 'desirable' either to 'appear good 30to certain persons': for 'proper object of pursuit' and 'desirable' mean the same. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the same thing be a property of something that is the same as the subject, in so far as it is the same. For then is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is called a property of a man, in so far as he is a man, 'to have a tripartite soul', it would 35also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a mortal, to have a tripartite soul.
133b
1 ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ εἴδει
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἵππου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἑστάναι
ὑφ' αὑτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑφ'
αὑτοῦ· ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἴδει τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἑστάναι
5 ὑφ' αὑτοῦ, ᾗ ζῷον <δ'> ἐστὶν ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν συμβέβηκεν.
κατασκευάζοντα δ' εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ τῷ εἴδει τὸ
ἴδιον· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ
ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ εἶναι πεζὸν δίπουν, καὶ ὄρνιθος ἂν εἴη
ἴδιον τὸ εἶναι πτηνὸν δίπουν· ἑκάτερον γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶ ταὐτὸν
10 τῷ εἴδει, ᾗ τὰ μὲν ὡς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἐστὶν εἴδη, ὑπὸ
τὸ ζῷον ὄντα, τὰ δὲ ὡς γένους διαφοραί, τοῦ ζῴου. οὗτος δ' ὁ
τόπος ψευδής ἐστιν ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῶν λεχθέντων ἑνί
τινι μόνῳ ὑπάρχῃ εἴδει, τὸ δ' ἕτερον πολλοῖς, καθάπερ τὸ
πεζὸν τετράπουν.
15 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον πολλαχῶς λέγεται,
ἔργον ἐστὶ σοφιστικῶς λαμβάνοντι ἑνὸς ἀποδοῦναι καὶ μόνου
τινὸς τὸ ἴδιον· τὸ γὰρ ὑπάρχον τινὶ ᾧ συμβέβηκέ τι καὶ
τῷ συμβεβηκότι ὑπάρξει λαμβανομένῳ μετὰ τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν.
οἷον τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
20 ὑπάρξει, ἂν ᾖ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος· καὶ τὸ λευκῷ δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ
ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρξει. διαβάλλοι δ' ἄν τις τὰ
πολλὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλο μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ
ποιῶν ἄλλο δὲ μετὰ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οἷον ἄλλο μὲν
ἄνθρωπον εἶναι λέγων ἄλλο δὲ λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔτι δὲ
25 ἕτερον ποιῶν τὴν ἕξιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν λεγόμενον. τὸ
γὰρ τῇ ἕξει ὑπάρχον καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν λεγομένῳ ὑπάρξει,
καὶ τὸ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν λεγομένῳ ὑπάρχον καὶ
τῇ ἕξει ὑπάρξει. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ ἐπιστήμων κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην
λέγεται διακεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον τὸ ἀμετάπειστον
30 ὑπὸ λόγου· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἔσται ἀμετάπειστος
ὑπὸ λόγου. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ ῥητέον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερον
ἁπλῶς τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς μετὰ τοῦ ᾧ
συμβέβηκε λαμβανόμενον, ἀλλ' ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἕτερον
εἶναι αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι· οὐ ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τε τὸ
35 εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ λευκῷ.
ἔτι δὲ θεωρητέον ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰς πτώσεις, λέγοντα ὅτι
1This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the same attributes ought either to belong or not belong to the same things, in so far as they are the same.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in kind as the alleged property: for then neither 5will what is stated to be the property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a property of a horse to stand by its own initiative, it could not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for to stand and to move by his own initiative are the same in kind, because they belong to each of them in so far as each is an 'animal'. For constructive purposes, on the 10other hand, see if of things that are the same in kind as the subject the property that is the same as the alleged property is always true: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) since it is a property of man to be a 'walking biped,' it would also be a property of a bird to be a 'flying biped': for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as the one pair have the sameness of species that fall under 15the same genus, being under the genus 'animal', while the other pair have that of differentiae of the genus, viz. of 'animal'. This commonplace rule is deceptive whenever one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many, as does 'walking quadruped'.
Inasmuch as 'same' and 'different' are terms used in several senses, it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs to one 20thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute that belongs to 'man' will belong also to 'white man', if there be a white man, and one that belongs to 'white man' will belong also to 'man'. One might, then, bring captious criticism against the majority of properties, by representing the subject as 25being one thing in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident, saying, for example, that 'man' is one thing, and white man' another, and moreover by representing as different a certain state and what is called after that state. For an attribute that belongs to the state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state: e.g. inasmuch as the 30condition of the scientist is called after his science, it could not be a property of 'science' that it is 'incontrovertible by argument'; for then the scientist also will be incontrovertible by argument. For constructive purposes, however, you should say that the subject of an accident is not absolutely different from the accident taken along with its subject; though it is called 'another' thing because the mode of being of the two is different: 35for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and for a white man to be a white man.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in kind as the alleged property: for then neither 5will what is stated to be the property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a property of a horse to stand by its own initiative, it could not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for to stand and to move by his own initiative are the same in kind, because they belong to each of them in so far as each is an 'animal'. For constructive purposes, on the 10other hand, see if of things that are the same in kind as the subject the property that is the same as the alleged property is always true: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) since it is a property of man to be a 'walking biped,' it would also be a property of a bird to be a 'flying biped': for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as the one pair have the sameness of species that fall under 15the same genus, being under the genus 'animal', while the other pair have that of differentiae of the genus, viz. of 'animal'. This commonplace rule is deceptive whenever one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many, as does 'walking quadruped'.
Inasmuch as 'same' and 'different' are terms used in several senses, it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs to one 20thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute that belongs to 'man' will belong also to 'white man', if there be a white man, and one that belongs to 'white man' will belong also to 'man'. One might, then, bring captious criticism against the majority of properties, by representing the subject as 25being one thing in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident, saying, for example, that 'man' is one thing, and white man' another, and moreover by representing as different a certain state and what is called after that state. For an attribute that belongs to the state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state: e.g. inasmuch as the 30condition of the scientist is called after his science, it could not be a property of 'science' that it is 'incontrovertible by argument'; for then the scientist also will be incontrovertible by argument. For constructive purposes, however, you should say that the subject of an accident is not absolutely different from the accident taken along with its subject; though it is called 'another' thing because the mode of being of the two is different: 35for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and for a white man to be a white man.
134a
1 οὔθ' ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου ἀλλ' ὁ
ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου, οὔθ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἀμετάπειστον
ὑπὸ λόγου ἀλλ' ἡ ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν
πάντα ἐνιστάμενον πάντως ἀντιτακτέον ἐστίν.
1Moreover, you should take a look along at the inflections, and say that the description of the man of science is wrong: one should say not 'it' but 'he is incontrovertible by argument'; while the description of Science is wrong too: one should say not 'it' but 'she is incontrovertible by argument'. For against an objector who sticks at nothing the defence should stick at 5nothing.
Book 5,Chapter 5 (134a5–135b6)
5 Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον βουλόμενος
ἀποδοῦναι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τίθησι τῇ λέξει ὥστε
τὸ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχον σημαίνειν· δόξειε γὰρ ἂν κινεῖσθαι τὸ κείμενον
εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ δίπουν
βούλεται μὲν τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον ἀποδιδόναι, σημαίνει δὲ
10 τῇ λέξει τὸ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ δίπουν·
οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ἄνθρωπός ἐστι δύο πόδας ἔχων. κατασκευάζοντα
δ' εἰ βούλεται τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον ἴδιον ἀποδιδόναι
καὶ τῇ λέξει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ κινήσεται
κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ἀποδιδοὺς
15 τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν καὶ βούλεται καὶ τῇ
λέξει σημαίνει τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν κινοῖτο κατὰ
τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ὂν ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν.
Ἔτι ὅσα λέγεται ὡς κατ' ἄλλο τι πρῶτον ἢ ὡς
πρῶτον αὐτό, ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀποδοῦναι τῶν τοιούτων τὸ ἴδιον·
20 ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἴδιον ἀποδῷς, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ
πρώτου ἀληθεύσεται· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ πρώτου θῇς, καὶ τοῦ κατ'
ἄλλο κατηγορηθήσεται. οἷον ἐὰν μέν τις ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον
ἀποδῷ τὸ κεχρῶσθαι, καὶ κατὰ σώματος ἀληθεύσεται τὸ
κεχρῶσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ σώματος, καὶ κατ' ἐπιφανείας κατηγορηθήσεται.
25 ὥστε οὐ καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα ἀληθεύσεται.
Συμβαίνει δ' ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ἰδίων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαί
τινα ἁμαρτίαν παρὰ τὸ μὴ διορίζεσθαι πῶς καὶ
τίνων τίθησι τὸ ἴδιον. ἅπνατες γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποδιδόναι
[τὸ] ἴδιον ἢ τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δίπουν,
30 ἢ τὸ ὑπάρχον, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς τὸ τέτταρας
δακτύλους ἔχειν, ἢ εἴδει, καθάπερ πυρὸς τὸ λεπτομερέστατον,
ἢ ἁπλῶς, καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο,
καθάπερ ψυχῆς τὸ φρόνιμον, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον, καθάπερ
λογιστικοῦ τὸ φρόνιμον, ἢ ὡς τῷ ἔχειν, καθάπερ ἐπιστήμονος
35 τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἢ
τῷ ἔχειν τι ἔσται ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου), ἢ τῷ ἔχεσθαι,
Next, for destructive purposes, see if, while intending to render an attribute that naturally belongs, he states it in his language in such a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs: for then it would be generally agreed that what has been stated to be a property is upset. Thus (e.g.) the man who has said that 'biped' is a property of man intends to render the attribute that naturally belongs, but his expression actually indicates one that invariably 10belongs: accordingly, 'biped' could not be a property of man: for not every man is possessed of two feet. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he intends to render the property that naturally belongs, and indicates it in that way in his language: for then the property will not be upset in this respect. Thus (e.g.) he who renders as a property of 'man' the phrase 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' both intends, and by his language indicates, 15the property that belongs by nature, and so 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' would not be upset or shown in that respect not to be a property of man.
Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a job to render the property of such things. For if you render a property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something else, then it will be true of its primary subject 20as well; whereas if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if any one renders , coloured' as the property of 'surface', 'coloured' will be true of body as well; whereas if he render it of 'body', it will be predicated also of 'surface'. Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the description is true.
In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some 25error is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either naturally, as 'biped' belongs to 'man', or actually, as 'having four fingers' belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as 'consisting of most rarefied particles' belongs to 'fire', or absolutely, as 'life' to 'living being', or one that belongs to a thing 30only as called after something else, as 'wisdom' to the 'soul', or on the other hand primarily, as 'wisdom' to the 'rational faculty', or because the thing is in a certain state, as 'incontrovertible by argument' belongs to a 'scientist' (for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be 'incontrovertible by argument'), or because it is the state possessed by something, as 'incontrovertible by argument' belongs to 'science', or because it is 35partaken of, as 'sensation' belongs to 'animal' (for other things as well have sensation, e.g.
Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a job to render the property of such things. For if you render a property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something else, then it will be true of its primary subject 20as well; whereas if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if any one renders , coloured' as the property of 'surface', 'coloured' will be true of body as well; whereas if he render it of 'body', it will be predicated also of 'surface'. Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the description is true.
In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some 25error is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either naturally, as 'biped' belongs to 'man', or actually, as 'having four fingers' belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as 'consisting of most rarefied particles' belongs to 'fire', or absolutely, as 'life' to 'living being', or one that belongs to a thing 30only as called after something else, as 'wisdom' to the 'soul', or on the other hand primarily, as 'wisdom' to the 'rational faculty', or because the thing is in a certain state, as 'incontrovertible by argument' belongs to a 'scientist' (for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be 'incontrovertible by argument'), or because it is the state possessed by something, as 'incontrovertible by argument' belongs to 'science', or because it is 35partaken of, as 'sensation' belongs to 'animal' (for other things as well have sensation, e.g.
134b
1 καθάπερ ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἢ τῷ μετέχεσθαι,
καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι (αἰσθάνεται μὲν γὰρ
καὶ ἄλλο τι, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' <ὡς> μετέχον ἤδη τοῦτο αἰσθάνεται),
ἢ τῷ μετέχειν, καθάπερ τοῦ τινὸς ζῴου τὸ ζῆν.
5 μὴ προσθεὶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φύσει ἁμαρτάνει, διότι ἐνδέχεται
τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνῳ ᾧ φύσει ὑπάρχει,
καθάπερ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ δύο πόδας ἔχειν. μὴ διορίσας δ' ὅτι
τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀποδίδωσιν, διότι οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτον οἷον ὑπάρχειν
ἐκείνῳ, καθάπερ τὸ τέτταρας δακτύλους ἔχειν τὸν
10 ἄνθρωπον. μὴ δηλώσας δὲ ὅτι ὡς πρῶτον ἢ ὡς κατ' ἄλλο
τίθησιν, διότι οὐ καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα ἀληθεύσεται,
καθάπερ τὸ κεχρῶσθαι, εἴτε τῆς ἐπιφανείας εἴτε τοῦ σώματος
ἀποδοθὲν ἴδιον. μὴ προείπας δὲ ὅτι ἢ τῷ ἔχειν
ἢ τῷ ἔχεσθαι τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκε, διότι οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον·
15 ὑπάρξει γάρ, ἐὰν μὲν τῷ ἔχεσθαι ἀποδιδῷ τὸ ἴδιον, τῷ
ἔχοντι, ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἔχειν, τῷ ἐχομένῳ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀμετάπειστον
ὑπὸ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἢ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος τεθὲν
ἴδιον. μὴ προσσημήνας δὲ τῷ μετέχειν ἢ τῷ μετέχεσθαι,
διότι καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶν ὑπάρξει τὸ ἴδιον· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τῷ
20 μετέχεσθαι ἀποδῷ, τοῖς μετέχουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τῷ μετέχειν,
τοῖς μετεχομένοις, καθάπερ εἰ τοῦ τινὸς ζῴου ἢ τοῦ ζῴου τιθείη
τὸ ζῆν ἴδιον. μὴ διαστείλας δὲ τὸ τῷ εἴδει, διότι ἑνὶ
μόνῳ ὑπάρξει τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦτο ὄντων οὗ τὸ ἴδιον τίθησι· τὸ
γὰρ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἑνὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει, καθάπερ τοῦ πυρὸς
25 τὸ κουφότατον. ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τὸ τῷ εἴδει προσθεὶς διήμαρτεν.
δεήσει γὰρ ἓν εἶδος εἶναι τῶν λεχθέντων, ὅταν τὸ τῷ εἴδει
προστεθῇ· τοῦτο δ' ἐπ' ἐνίων οὐ συμπίπτει, καθάπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ
τοῦ πυρός. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἓν εἶδος τοῦ πυρός· ἕτερον γάρ ἐστι
τῷ εἴδει ἄνθραξ καὶ φλὸξ καὶ φῶς, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πῦρ
30 ὄν. διὰ τοῦτο δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὅταν τὸ τῷ εἴδει προστεθῇ, ἕτερον εἶναι
εἶδος τοῦ λεχθέντος, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δ' ἧττον
ὑπάρξει τὸ λεχθὲν ἴδιον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ λεπτομερέστατον·
λεπτομερέστερον γάρ ἐστι τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἄνθρακος
καὶ τῆς φλογός. τοῦτο δ' οὐ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ὅταν μὴ καὶ τὸ
35 ὄνομα μᾶλλον κατηγορῆται καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος μᾶλλον ἀληθεύεται·
εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται, καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος μᾶλλον, καὶ
1man, but they have it because they already partake of 'animal'), or because it partakes of something else, as 'life' belongs to a particular kind of 'living being'. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has failed to add the word 'naturally', because what belongs naturally may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as (e.g.) it 5belongs to a man to have two feet: so too he errs if he does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually belongs, because one day that attribute will not be what it now is, e.g. the man's possession of four fingers. So he errs if he has not shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily, or that he calls it so after something else, because then its name too will not be true of that of which the description 10is true, as is the case with 'coloured', whether rendered as a property of 'surface' or of 'body'. So he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has rendered a property to a thing either because that thing possesses a state, or because it is a state possessed by something; because then it will not be a property. For, supposing he renders the property to something as being a state possessed, it will belong to what possesses that 15state; while supposing he renders it to what possesses the state, it will belong to the state possessed, as did 'incontrovertible by argument' when stated as a property of 'science' or of the 'scientist'. So he errs if he has not indicated beforehand that the property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken of by, something; because then the property will belong to certain other things as well. For if he renders it 20because its subject is partaken of, it will belong to the things which partake of it; whereas if he renders it because its subject partakes of something else, it will belong to the things partaken of, as (e.g.) if he were to state 'life' to be a property of a 'particular kind of living being', or just of 'living being. So he errs if he has not expressly distinguished the property that belongs specifically, because then it will belong 25only to one of the things that fall under the term of which he states the property: for the superlative belongs only to one of them, e.g. 'lightest' as applied to 'fire'. Sometimes, too, a man may even add the word 'specifically', and still make a mistake. For the things in question should all be of one species, whenever the word 'specifically' is added: and in some cases this does not occur, as it does not, in fact, in the case of 30fire. For fire is not all of one species; for live coals and flame and light are each of them 'fire', but are of different species. The reason why, whenever 'specifically' is added, there should not be any species other than the one mentioned, is this, that if there be, then the property in question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in a less degree, as happens with 'consisting of most rarefied particles' in the 35case of fire: for 'light' consists of more rarefied particles than live coals and flame.
135a
1 τοὔνομα μᾶλλον. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ταὐτὸν εἶναι συμβήσεται
τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα ὄντος ἐν τῷ
ἁπλῶς τοιούτῳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔχει τὸ λεπτομερέστατον·
καὶ γὰρ τοῦ φωτὸς ἔσται ταὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴδιον· λεπτομερέστατον
5 γάρ ἐστι τὸ φῶς. ἄλλου μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἀποδιδόντος
τὸ ἴδιον ἐπιχειρητέον· αὐτῷ δ' οὐ δοτέον ἐστὶ ταύτην τὴν ἔνστασιν,
ἀλλ' εὐθὺς τιθεμένῳ τὸ ἴδιον διοριστέον ὃν τρόπον τίθησι
τὸ ἴδιον.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἴδιον ἔθηκεν·
10 οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον. αὐτὸ γὰρ αὑτῷ
πᾶν τὸ εἶναι δηλοῖ· τὸ δὲ τὸ εἶναι δηλοῦν οὐκ ἴδιον ἀλλ' ὅρος
ἐστίν. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας καλοῦ τὸ πρέπον ἴδιον εἶναι αὐτὸ
ἑαυτοῦ ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκε (ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον),
οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρέπον τοῦ καλοῦ ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ
15 μὴ αὐτὸ μὲν αὑτοῦ ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν, ἀντικατηγορούμενον δ'
ἔθηκεν· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ
ὁ θεὶς ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ οὐσία ἔμψυχος οὐκ αὐτὸ μὲν αὑτοῦ ἴδιον
ἔθηκεν, ἀντικατηγορούμενον δ' ἀποδέδωκεν, εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τοῦ
ζῴου τὸ οὐσία ἔμψυχος.
20 Ἔπειτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν σκεπτέον ἐστίν, ἀνασκευάζοντα
μὲν εἰ τὸ τοῦ συνόλου ἴδιον μὴ ἀληθεύεται κατὰ τοῦ
μέρους, ἢ εἰ τὸ τοῦ μέρους μὴ λέγεται κατὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος·
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον ἴδιον εἶναι. συμβαίνει δ' ἐπ'
ἐνίων τοῦτο γίνεσθαι· ἀποδοίη γὰρ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν
25 ἴδιον ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σύμπαν βλέψας, ἐνίοτε δ' ἐπὶ
τὸ κατὰ μέρος λεγόμενον αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἐπιστήσας. ἔσται δ'
οὐδέτερον ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδομένον. οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ σύμπαντος,
ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας θαλάττης ἴδιον τὸ πλεῖστον ὕδωρ ἁλμυρὸν
ὁμοιομεροῦς μέν τινος ἔθηκε τὸ ἴδιον, τοιοῦτον δ' ἀποδέδωκε ὃ
30 οὐκ ἀληθεύεται κατὰ τοῦ μέρους (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τὶς θάλαττα
τὸ πλεῖστον ὕδωρ ἁλμυρόν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς θαλάττης ἴδιον
τὸ πλεῖστον ὕδωρ ἁλμυρόν. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ μέρους, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ
θεὶς ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστὸν ὁμοιομεροῦς μέν τινος εἴρηκε
τὸ ἴδιον, τοιοῦτον δ' ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀέρος ἀληθεύεται,
35 κατὰ δὲ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐ λέγεται (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ
σύμπας ἀναπνευστός), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν.
1And this should not happen unless the name too be predicated in a greater degree of that of which the description is truer; otherwise the rule that where the description is truer the name too should be truer is not fulfilled. Moreover, in addition to this, the same attribute will be the property both of the term which has it absolutely and of that element therein 5which has it in the highest degree, as is the condition of the property 'consisting of most rarefied particles' in the case of 'fire': for this same attribute will be the property of 'light' as well: for it is 'light' that 'consists of the most rarefied particles'. If, then, any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it; for oneself, one should not give occasion for this objection, but should define in what manner one states the property 10at the actual time of making the statement.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing as a property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For a thing itself always shows its own essence, and what shows the essence is not a property but a definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that 'becoming' is a property of 'beautiful' has rendered the term as a property of itself (for 'beautiful' and 'becoming' 15are the same); and so 'becoming' could not be a property of 'beautiful'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a thing as a property of itself, but has yet stated a convertible predicate: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus he who has stated 'animate substance' as a property of 'living-creature' has not stated 'living-creature' as a property of itself, but has rendered a convertible 20predicate, so that 'animate substance' would be a property of 'living-creature'.
Next, in the case of things consisting of like parts, you should look and see, for destructive purposes, if the property of the whole be not true of the part, or if that of the part be not predicated of the whole: for then what has been stated to be the property will not be a property. In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes in rendering a property in the 25case of things that consist of like parts a man may have his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may address himself to what is predicated of the part: and then in neither case will it have been rightly rendered. Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the 'sea' to be 'the largest volume of salt water', has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but has rendered an attribute of such a 30kind as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not 'the largest volume of salt water'); and so the largest volume of salt water' could not be a property of the 'sea'. Now take one referring to the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of 'air' to be 'breathable' has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true of some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for 35the whole of the air is not breathable); and so 'breathable' could not be a property of 'air'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing as a property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For a thing itself always shows its own essence, and what shows the essence is not a property but a definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that 'becoming' is a property of 'beautiful' has rendered the term as a property of itself (for 'beautiful' and 'becoming' 15are the same); and so 'becoming' could not be a property of 'beautiful'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a thing as a property of itself, but has yet stated a convertible predicate: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus he who has stated 'animate substance' as a property of 'living-creature' has not stated 'living-creature' as a property of itself, but has rendered a convertible 20predicate, so that 'animate substance' would be a property of 'living-creature'.
Next, in the case of things consisting of like parts, you should look and see, for destructive purposes, if the property of the whole be not true of the part, or if that of the part be not predicated of the whole: for then what has been stated to be the property will not be a property. In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes in rendering a property in the 25case of things that consist of like parts a man may have his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may address himself to what is predicated of the part: and then in neither case will it have been rightly rendered. Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the 'sea' to be 'the largest volume of salt water', has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but has rendered an attribute of such a 30kind as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not 'the largest volume of salt water'); and so the largest volume of salt water' could not be a property of the 'sea'. Now take one referring to the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of 'air' to be 'breathable' has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true of some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for 35the whole of the air is not breathable); and so 'breathable' could not be a property of 'air'.
135b
1 κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ἀληθεύεται μὲν καθ' ἑκάστου τῶν
ὁμοιομερῶν, ἔστι δ' ἴδιον αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ σύμπαν· ἔσται
γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ἀληθεύεται
κατὰ πάσης γῆς τὸ κάτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, ἔστι
5 δὲ τοῦτο ἴδιον καὶ τῆς τινὸς γῆς κατὰ τὸ γῆν εἶναι, εἴη ἂν τῆς
γῆς ἴδιον τὸ κάτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.
1For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, while it is true of each of the things with similar parts, it is on the other hand a property of them taken as a collective whole: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) while it is true of earth everywhere that it naturally falls downwards, it is a property of the various particular pieces of earth taken as 'the Earth', so that it 5would be a property of 'earth' 'naturally to fall downwards'.
Book 5,Chapter 6 (135b7–136b14)
Ἔπειτ' ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων σκεπτέον ἐστί, πρῶτον μὲν
ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τοῦ ἐναντίου μὴ ἔστι
τὸ ἐναντίον ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔσται τὸ ἐναντίον ἴδιον.
10 οἷον ἐπεὶ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνῃ μὲν ἀδικία, τῷ βελτίστῳ
δὲ τὸ χείριστον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἴδιον τὸ βέλτιστον,
οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀδικίας ἴδιον τὸ χείριστον. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον ἴδιόν ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ
ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον ἴδιον ἔσται. οἷον ἐπεὶ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ἀγαθῷ
15 μὲν κακόν, αἱρετῷ δὲ φευκτόν, ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴδιον
τὸ αἱρετόν, εἴη ἂν κακοῦ ἴδιον τὸ φευκτόν.
Δεύτερον δ' ἐκ τῶν πρός τι, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ
πρός τι τοῦ πρός τι μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πρός τι τοῦ
πρός τι ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ λέγεται διπλάσιον μὲν πρὸς
20 ἥμισυ, ὑπερέχον δὲ πρὸς ὑπερεχόμενον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦ διπλασίου
τὸ ὑπερέχον ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἡμίσεος τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον
ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τοῦ πρός τι τὸ πρὸς
τί ἐστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρός τι τὸ πρός τι ἔσται ἴδιον.
οἷον ἐπεὶ λέγεται τὸ μὲν διπλάσιον πρὸς τὸ ἥμισυ, τὸ δὲ
25 δύο πρὸς ἓν πρὸς τὸ ἓν πρὸς δύο, ἔστι δὲ τοῦ διπλασίου ἴδιον τὸ
ὡς δύο πρὸς ἕν, εἴη ἂν τοῦ ἡμίσεος ἴδιον τὸ ὡς ἓν πρὸς δύο.
Τρίτον δ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τῆς ἕξεως τὸ καθ' ἕξιν
λεγόμενον μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς στερήσεως τὸ κατὰ
στέρησιν λεγόμενον ἔσται ἴδιον. κἂν εἰ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως τὸ
30 κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενον μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον, οὐδὲ τῆς ἕξεως τὸ
κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν λεγόμενον ἴδιον ἔσται· οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐ λέγεται
τῆς κωφότητος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναισθησίαν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν τῆς ἀκούσεως
εἴη ἴδιον τὸ αἴσθησιν εἶναι. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τὸ
καθ' ἕξιν λεγόμενόν ἐστι τῆς ἕξεως ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τῆς στερήσεως
35 τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενον ἔσται ἴδιον. κἂν εἰ τῆς στερήσεως
τὸ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενόν ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ τῆς ἕξεως
Next, look from the point of view of the respective opposites, and first (a) from that of the contraries, and see, for destructive purposes, if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a property of the contrary subject. For then neither will the contrary of the first be a property of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as injustice is contrary to justice, and the lowest evil to the highest good, but 'to be the highest good' is not a property of 'justice', therefore 10'to be the lowest evil' could not be a property of 'injustice'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the contrary is the property of the contrary: for then also the contrary of the first will be the property of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as evil is contrary to good, and objectionable to desirable, and 'desirable' is a property of 'good', 'objectionable' would be a property of 'evil'.
Secondly (h) look from the point of view of relative opposites and see, for destructive purposes, if the correlative of the 15term rendered fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject: for then neither will the correlative of the first be a property of the correlative of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'double' is relative to 'half', and 'in excess' to 'exceeded', while 'in excess' is not a property of 'double', exceeded' could not be a property of 'half'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the correlative of the alleged property is a property of the subject's correlative: for then also the correlative of the first will be a property 20of the correlative of the second: e.g. inasmuch as 'double' is relative to 'half', and the proportion 1:2 is relative to the proportion 2:1, while it is a property of 'double' to be 'in the proportion of 2 to 1', it would be a property of 'half' to be 'in the proportion of 1 to 2'.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the given state (Y): for then neither will the attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y). Also 25if, on the other hand, an attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be not a property of the given privation (of Y), neither will the attribute described in terms of the state (X) be a property of the state (Y). Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not predicated as a property of 'deafness' to be a 'lack of sensation', neither could it be a property of 'hearing' to be a 'sensation'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) is a property of the given state (Y): for then also 30the attribute that is described in terms of the privation (of X) will be a property of the privation (of Y). Also, if an attribute described in terms of a privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y), then also the attribute that is described in terms of the state (X) will be a property of the state (Y). Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to see' is a property of 'sight', inasmuch as we have sight, 'failure to see' would be a property of 'blindness', inasmuch as we have not got the sight we should naturally have.
Next, look from the point of 35view of positive and negative terms; and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken by themselves.
Secondly (h) look from the point of view of relative opposites and see, for destructive purposes, if the correlative of the 15term rendered fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject: for then neither will the correlative of the first be a property of the correlative of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'double' is relative to 'half', and 'in excess' to 'exceeded', while 'in excess' is not a property of 'double', exceeded' could not be a property of 'half'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the correlative of the alleged property is a property of the subject's correlative: for then also the correlative of the first will be a property 20of the correlative of the second: e.g. inasmuch as 'double' is relative to 'half', and the proportion 1:2 is relative to the proportion 2:1, while it is a property of 'double' to be 'in the proportion of 2 to 1', it would be a property of 'half' to be 'in the proportion of 1 to 2'.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the given state (Y): for then neither will the attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y). Also 25if, on the other hand, an attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be not a property of the given privation (of Y), neither will the attribute described in terms of the state (X) be a property of the state (Y). Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not predicated as a property of 'deafness' to be a 'lack of sensation', neither could it be a property of 'hearing' to be a 'sensation'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) is a property of the given state (Y): for then also 30the attribute that is described in terms of the privation (of X) will be a property of the privation (of Y). Also, if an attribute described in terms of a privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y), then also the attribute that is described in terms of the state (X) will be a property of the state (Y). Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to see' is a property of 'sight', inasmuch as we have sight, 'failure to see' would be a property of 'blindness', inasmuch as we have not got the sight we should naturally have.
Next, look from the point of 35view of positive and negative terms; and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken by themselves.
136a
1 τὸ καθ' ἕξιν λεγόμενον ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ τῆς ὄψεώς
ἐστιν ἴδιον τὸ βλέπειν, καθὸ ἔχομεν ὄψιν, εἴη ἂν τῆς τυφλότητος
ἴδιον τὸ μὴ βλέπειν, καθὸ οὐκ ἔχομεν ὄψιν πεφυκότες
ἔχειν.
5 Ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν φάσεων καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων, πρῶτον
μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν κατηγορουμένων. ἔστι δ' ὁ τόπος οὗτος
χρήσιμος ἀνασκευάζοντι μόνον. οἷον εἰ ἡ φάσις ἢ τὸ κατὰ
τὴν φάσιν λεγόμενον αὐτοῦ ἴδιόν ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ
ἀπόφασις οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόφασιν λεγόμενον ἴδιον. κἂν
10 εἰ δ' ἡ ἀπόφασις ἢ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόφασιν λεγόμενόν ἐστιν
αὐτοῦ ἴδιον, οὐκ ἔσται ἡ φάσις οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν φάσιν λεγόμενον
ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ τοῦ ζῴου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἔμψυχον, οὐκ
ἂν εἴη τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ οὐκ ἔμψυχον.
Δεύτερον δ' ἐκ τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἢ μὴ κατηγορουμένων
15 καὶ ἐξ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἢ μὴ κατηγορεῖται, ἀνασκευάζοντα
μὲν εἰ ἡ φάσις τῆς φάσεως μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον·
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόφασις τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἔσται ἴδιον. κἂν εἰ δ'
ἡ ἀπόφασις τῆς ἀποφάσεως μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον, οὐδ' ἡ φάσις
τῆς φάσεως ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον
20 τὸ ζῷον, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρώπου εἴη ἴδιον τὸ μὴ ζῷον· κἂν
εἰ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρώπου φαίνεται μὴ ἴδιον τὸ μὴ ζῷον, οὐδὲ
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ ζῷον. κατασκευάζοντα δ' εἰ τῆς
φάσεως ἡ φάσις ἐστὶν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἡ ἀπόφασις
ἔσται ἴδιον. κἂν εἰ δὲ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἡ ἀπόφασίς
25 ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ ἡ φάσις τῆς φάσεως ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ
τοῦ μὴ ζῴου ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ζῆν, εἴη ἂν τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ
ζῆν· κἂν εἰ δὲ τοῦ ζῴου φαίνεται ἴδιον τὸ ζῆν, καὶ τοῦ μὴ
ζῴου φανεῖται ἴδιον τὸ μὴ ζῆν.
Τρίτον δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ἀνασκευάζοντα
30 μὲν εἰ τὸ ἀποδεδομένον ἴδιον τῆς φάσεώς ἐστιν ἴδιον· οὐ γὰρ
ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἴδιον. κἂν εἰ δὲ τῆς ἀποφάσεώς
ἐστιν ἴδιον τὸ ἀποδοθέν, οὐκ ἔσται τῆς φάσεως ἴδιον.
οἷον ἐπεὶ τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ἔμψυχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ μὴ ζῴου
ἴδιον τὸ ἔμψυχον. κατασκευάζοντα δέ, εἰ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν μὴ ἔστι
35 τῆς φάσεως ἴδιον, εἴη ἂν τῆς ἀποφάσεως. οὗτος δ' ὁ τόπος
ψευδής ἐστιν· φάσις γὰρ ἀποφάσεως καὶ ἀπόφασις φάσεως
οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον. φάσις μὲν γὰρ ἀποφάσει οὐδ' ὅλως ὑπάρχει,
1This common-place rule is useful only for a destructive purpose. Thus (e.g.) see if the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject: for then the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject. Also if, on the other hand, the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject, then the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it will 5not be a property of the subject: e.g. inasmuch as 'animate' is a property of 'living creature', 'inanimate' could not be a property of 'living creature'.
Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates, positive or negative, and their respective subjects; and see, for destructive purposes, if the positive term falls to be a property of the positive subject: for then neither will the negative term be a property of the negative subject. Also, if the negative term fails to be a property of the negative subject, neither will the positive term be a property of the 10positive subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'animal' is not a property of 'man', neither could 'not-animal' be a property of 'not-man'. Also if 'not-animal' seems not to be a property of 'not-man', neither will 'animal' be a property of 'man'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the positive term is a property of the positive subject: for then the negative term will be a property of the negative subject as well. Also if the negative term be a property of the negative subject, the positive will be a property of the positive as well. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a 15property of 'not-living being' 'not to live', it would be a property of 'living being' 'to live': also if it seems to be a property of 'living being' 'to live', it will also seem to be a property of 'not-living being' 'not to live'.
Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by themselves, and see, for destructive purposes, if the property rendered is a property of the positive subject: for then the same term will not be a property of the negative subject as well. Also, if the term rendered be a property of the negative subject, it will not be a property of the 20positive. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'animate' is a property of 'living creature', 'animate' could not be a property of 'not-living creature'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, if the term rendered fails to be a property of the affirmative subject it would be a property of the negative. This commonplace rule is, however, deceptive: for a positive term is not a property of a negative, or a negative of a positive. For a positive term does not belong at all to a negative, while a negative term, though it belongs to a positive, does not belong as a property.
Next, look from 25the point of view of the coordinate members of a division, and see, for destructive purposes, if none of the co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of any of the remaining set of co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then neither will the term stated be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'sensible living being' is not a property of any of the other living beings, 'intelligible living being' could not be a property of God. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if some one 30or other of the remaining co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of each of these co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then the remaining one too will be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of 'wisdom' to be essentially 'the natural virtue of the rational faculty', then, taking each of the other virtues as well in this way, it would be a property of 'temperance' to be essentially 'the natural virtue of the faculty of desire'.
Next, look from the point of 35view of the inflexions, and see, for destructive purposes, if the inflexion of the property rendered fails to be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then neither will the other inflexion be a property of the other inflexion.
Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates, positive or negative, and their respective subjects; and see, for destructive purposes, if the positive term falls to be a property of the positive subject: for then neither will the negative term be a property of the negative subject. Also, if the negative term fails to be a property of the negative subject, neither will the positive term be a property of the 10positive subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'animal' is not a property of 'man', neither could 'not-animal' be a property of 'not-man'. Also if 'not-animal' seems not to be a property of 'not-man', neither will 'animal' be a property of 'man'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the positive term is a property of the positive subject: for then the negative term will be a property of the negative subject as well. Also if the negative term be a property of the negative subject, the positive will be a property of the positive as well. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a 15property of 'not-living being' 'not to live', it would be a property of 'living being' 'to live': also if it seems to be a property of 'living being' 'to live', it will also seem to be a property of 'not-living being' 'not to live'.
Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by themselves, and see, for destructive purposes, if the property rendered is a property of the positive subject: for then the same term will not be a property of the negative subject as well. Also, if the term rendered be a property of the negative subject, it will not be a property of the 20positive. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'animate' is a property of 'living creature', 'animate' could not be a property of 'not-living creature'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, if the term rendered fails to be a property of the affirmative subject it would be a property of the negative. This commonplace rule is, however, deceptive: for a positive term is not a property of a negative, or a negative of a positive. For a positive term does not belong at all to a negative, while a negative term, though it belongs to a positive, does not belong as a property.
Next, look from 25the point of view of the coordinate members of a division, and see, for destructive purposes, if none of the co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of any of the remaining set of co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then neither will the term stated be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'sensible living being' is not a property of any of the other living beings, 'intelligible living being' could not be a property of God. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if some one 30or other of the remaining co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of each of these co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then the remaining one too will be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of 'wisdom' to be essentially 'the natural virtue of the rational faculty', then, taking each of the other virtues as well in this way, it would be a property of 'temperance' to be essentially 'the natural virtue of the faculty of desire'.
Next, look from the point of 35view of the inflexions, and see, for destructive purposes, if the inflexion of the property rendered fails to be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then neither will the other inflexion be a property of the other inflexion.
136b
1 ἀπόφασις δὲ φάσει ὑπάρχει μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἴδιον δὲ
ὑπάρχει.
Ἔπειτα δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀντιδιῃρημένων, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν
εἰ τῶν ἀντιδιῃρημένων μηδὲν μηδενὸς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀντιδιῃρημένων
5 ἐστὶν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ κείμενον ἔσται ἴδιον τούτου οὗ
κεῖται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ζῷον αἰσθητὸν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων
ζῴων ἐστὶν ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ζῷον νοητὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ἴδιον.
κατασκευάζοντα δ' εἰ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἀντιδιῃρημένων ὁτιοῦν
ἐστιν ἴδιον τούτων ἑκάστου τῶν ἀντιδιῃρημένων· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
10 λοιπὸν ἔσται τούτου ἴδιον οὗ κεῖται μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ
φρονήσεώς ἐστιν ἴδιον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ πεφυκέναι λογιστικοῦ
ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἑκάστης λαμβανομένης,
εἴη ἂν σωφροσύνης ἴδιον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ πεφυκέναι
ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἀρετὴν εἶναι.
1Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'beautifully' is not a property of 'justly', neither could 'beautiful' be a property of 'just'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the property rendered is a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then also the other inflexion will be a property of the other inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch 5as 'walking biped' is a property of man, it would also be any one's property 'as a man' to be described 'as a walking biped'. Not only in the case of the actual term mentioned should one look at the inflexions, but also in the case of its opposites, just as has been laid down in the case of the former commonplace rules as well.' Thus, for destructive purposes, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property rendered fails to be the 10property of the inflexion of the opposite of the subject: for then neither will the inflexion of the other opposite be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'well' is not a property of 'justly', neither could 'badly' be a property of 'unjustly'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property originally suggested is a property of the inflexion of the 15opposite of the original subject: for then also the inflexion of the other opposite will be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'best' is a property of 'the good', 'worst' also will be a property of 'the evil'.
Book 5,Chapter 7 (136b15–137b13)
15 Ἔπειτ' ἐκ τῶν πτώσεων, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ ἡ πτῶσις
τῆς πτώσεως μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πτῶσις τῆς πτώσεως
ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ δικαίως ἴδιον τὸ καλῶς,
οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ δικαίου εἴη ἴδιον τὸ καλόν. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ
ἡ πτῶσις τῆς πτώσεώς ἐστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ πτῶσις τῆς
20 πτώσεως ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ πεζὸν
δίπουν, καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τὸ πεζῷ δίποδι λέγεσθαι.
οὐ μόνον δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἰρημένου κατὰ τὰς πτώσεις
ἐστὶ σκεπτέον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, καθάπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προτέρων τόπων εἴρηται, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν
25 εἰ ἡ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου πτῶσις μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ ἀντικειμένου
πτώσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου πτῶσις ἔσται ἴδιον τῆς
τοῦ ἀντικειμένου πτώσεως. οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ δικαίως ἴδιον
τὸ ἀγαθῶς, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἀδίκως εἴη ἴδιον τὸ κακῶς. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ ἡ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου πτῶσίς ἐστιν ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ
30 ἀντικειμένου πτώσεως· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου πτῶσις ἔσται
ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ ἀντικειμένου πτώσεως. οἷον ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστιν
ἴδιον τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ χείριστον.
Ἔπειτ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἐχόντων, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν
εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως ἔχον τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ
35 τὸ ὁμοίως ἔχον τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως
ἔχει ὁ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν οἰκίαν καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς πρὸς
τὸ ποιεῖν ὑγίειαν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἰατροῦ ἴδιον τὸ ποιεῖν ὑγίειαν,
Next, look from the point of view of things that are in a like relation, and see, for destructive purposes, if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered fails to be a property of what 20is in a relation like that of the subject: for then neither will what is in a relation like that of the first be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of the builder towards the production of a house is like that of the doctor towards the production of health, and it is not a property of a doctor to produce health, it could not be a property of a builder to produce a house. For 25constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered is a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then also what is in a relation like that of the first will be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of a doctor towards the possession of ability to produce health is like that of a trainer towards the possession 30of ability to produce vigour, and it is a property of a trainer to possess the ability to produce vigour, it would be a property of a doctor to possess the ability to produce health.
Next look from the point of view of things that are identically related, and see, for destructive purposes, if the predicate that is identically related towards two subjects fails to be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the 35subject in question; for then neither will the predicate that is identically related to both subjects be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the first.
Next look from the point of view of things that are identically related, and see, for destructive purposes, if the predicate that is identically related towards two subjects fails to be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the 35subject in question; for then neither will the predicate that is identically related to both subjects be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the first.
137a
1 οὐκ ἂν εἴη οἰκοδόμου ἴδιον τὸ ποιεῖν οἰκίαν. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως ἔχον τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντός ἐστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ
τὸ ὁμοίως ἔχον τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως
ἔχει ἰατρός τε πρὸς τὸ ποιητικὸς ὑγιείας εἶναι καὶ γυμναστὴς
5 πρὸς τὸ ποιητικὸς εὐεξίας, ἔστι δ' ἴδιον γυμναστοῦ τὸ ποιητικὸν
εἶναι εὐεξίας, εἴη ἂν ἴδιον ἰατροῦ τὸ ποιητικὸν εἶναι
ὑγιείας.
Ἔπειτ' ἐκ τῶν ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ
τὸ ὡσαύτως ἔχον τοῦ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ
10 γὰρ τὸ ὡσαύτως ἔχον τοῦ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος ἔσται ἴδιον. εἰ
δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος τὸ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἴδιον, τούτου
οὐκ ἔσται ἴδιον οὗ κεῖται εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει
φρόνησις πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τῷ ἐπιστήμη ἑκατέρου
αὐτῶν εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἴδιον φρονήσεως τὸ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι
15 καλοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον φρονήσεως τὸ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι αἰσχροῦ.
[εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἴδιον φρονήσεως τὸ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι καλοῦ,
οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι αἰσχροῦ· ἀδύνατον
γὰρ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἴδιον.] κατασκευάζοντι δὲ οὐδὲν
οὗτος ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ χρήσιμος· τὸ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἓν πρὸς
20 πλείω συγκρίνεται.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγόμενον
μὴ ἔστι τοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγομένου ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ
φθείρεσθαι τοῦ κατὰ τὸ φθείρεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοῦ κατὰ
τὸ γίνεσθαι λεγομένου, ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου
25 ἴδιον τὸ εἶναι ζῷον, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον γίνεσθαι εἴη ἴδιον
τὸ γίνεσθαι ζῷον, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον φθείρεσθαι εἴη ἴδιον
τὸ φθείρεσθαι ζῷον. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον ἐστὶ καὶ
ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φθείρεσθαι
πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι, καθάπερ εἴρηται
30 νῦν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τεταγμένου ἐστὶ τὸ
κατ' αὐτὸ τεταγμένον ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι
λεγομένου ἔσται τὸ κατὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι λεγόμενον ἴδιον, καὶ τοῦ
κατὰ τὸ φθείρεσθαι τὸ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποδιδόμενον. οἷον ἐπεὶ
35 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ εἶναι βροτόν, καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἄνθρωπον
εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τὸ γίνεσθαι βροτόν, καὶ τοῦ φθείρεσθαι
ἄνθρωπον τὸ φθείρεσθαι βροτόν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον
1If, on the other hand, the predicate which is identically related to two subjects is the property of the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question, then it will not be a property of that of which it has been stated to be a property. (e.g.) inasmuch as prudence is 5identically related to both the noble and the base, since it is knowledge of each of them, and it is not a property of prudence to be knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property of prudence to be knowledge of the base. If, on the other hand, it is a property of prudence to be the knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property of it to be the knowledge 10of the base.] For it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one subject. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use: for what is 'identically related' is a single predicate in process of comparison with more than one subject.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the predicate qualified by the verb 15'to be' fails to be a property of the subject qualified by the verb 'to be': for then neither will the destruction of the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb 'to be destroyed', nor will the 'becoming'the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb 'to become'. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is not a property of 'man' to be an animal, 20neither could it be a property of becoming a man to become an animal; nor could the destruction of an animal be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from 'becoming' to 'being' and 'being destroyed', and from 'being destroyed' to 'being' and to 'becoming' exactly as they have just been given from 'being' to 'becoming' 25and 'being destroyed'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the subject set down as qualified by the verb 'to be' has the predicate set down as so qualified, as its property: for then also the subject qualified by the very 'to become' will have the predicate qualified by 'to become' as its property, and the subject qualified by the verb to 30be destroyed' will have as its property the predicate rendered with this qualification. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is a property of man to be a mortal, it would be a property of becoming a man to become a mortal, and the destruction of a mortal would be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from 'becoming' 35and 'being destroyed' both to 'being' and to the conclusions that follow from them, exactly as was directed also for the purpose of destruction.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the predicate qualified by the verb 15'to be' fails to be a property of the subject qualified by the verb 'to be': for then neither will the destruction of the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb 'to be destroyed', nor will the 'becoming'the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb 'to become'. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is not a property of 'man' to be an animal, 20neither could it be a property of becoming a man to become an animal; nor could the destruction of an animal be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from 'becoming' to 'being' and 'being destroyed', and from 'being destroyed' to 'being' and to 'becoming' exactly as they have just been given from 'being' to 'becoming' 25and 'being destroyed'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the subject set down as qualified by the verb 'to be' has the predicate set down as so qualified, as its property: for then also the subject qualified by the very 'to become' will have the predicate qualified by 'to become' as its property, and the subject qualified by the verb to 30be destroyed' will have as its property the predicate rendered with this qualification. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is a property of man to be a mortal, it would be a property of becoming a man to become a mortal, and the destruction of a mortal would be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from 'becoming' 35and 'being destroyed' both to 'being' and to the conclusions that follow from them, exactly as was directed also for the purpose of destruction.
137b
1 ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ
πρὸς †τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν†, καθάπερ καὶ ἀνασκευάζοντι εἴρηται.
Ἔπειτ' ἐπιβλέπειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ κειμένου, ἀνασκευάζοντα
μὲν εἰ τῇ ἰδέᾳ μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰ μὴ κατὰ τοῦτο
5 καθ' ὃ λέγεται τοῦτο οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀπεδόθη· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον
τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον· οἷον ἐπεὶ αὐτοανθρώπῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει
τὸ ἠρεμεῖν ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἰδέα, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου
ἴδιον τὸ ἠρεμεῖν. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τῇ ἰδέᾳ
ὑπάρχει καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει ᾗ λέγεται κατ' αὐτοῦ
10 ἐκεῖνο οὗ κεῖται μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον
μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ αὐτοζῴῳ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς
καὶ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι, καὶ ᾗ ζῷον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει τοῦτο,
εἴη ἂν ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι.
1Next take a look at the 'idea' of the subject stated, and see, for destructive purposes, if the suggested property fails to belong to the 'idea' in question, or fails to belong to it in virtue of that character which causes it to bear the description of which the property was rendered: for then what has been stated to be a property will 5not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'being motionless' does not belong to 'man-himself' qua 'man', but qua 'idea', it could not be a property of 'man' to be motionless. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the property in question belongs to the idea, and belongs to it in that respect in virtue of which there is predicated of it that character of which the predicate in question has been stated not 10to be a property: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it belongs to 'living-creature-itself' to be compounded of soul and body, and further this belongs to it qua 'living-creature', it would be a property of 'living-creature' to be compounded of soul and body.
Book 5,Chapter 8 (137b14–138b26)
Ἔπειτα ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, πρῶτον μὲν ἀνασκευάζοντα
15 εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον τοῦ μᾶλλον μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ
γὰρ τὸ ἧττον τοῦ ἧττον ἔσται ἴδιον, οὐδὲ τὸ ἥκιστα τοῦ ἥκιστα,
οὐδὲ τὸ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα, οὐδὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἁπλῶς. οἷον
ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μᾶλλον κεχρῶσθαι τοῦ μᾶλλον σώματος
ἴδιον, οὐδὲ τὸ ἧττον κεχρῶσθαι τοῦ ἧττον σώματος εἴη ἂν
20 ἴδιον, οὐδὲ τὸ κεχρῶσθαι σώματος ὅλως. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον τοῦ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἧττον τοῦ
ἧττον ἔσται ἴδιον, καὶ τὸ ἥκιστα τοῦ ἥκιστα, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα
τοῦ μάλιστα, καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἁπλῶς. οἷον ἐπεὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον
ζῶντος τὸ μᾶλλον αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ τοῦ ἧττον
25 ζῶντος τὸ ἧττον αἰσθάνεσθαι εἴη ἂν ἴδιον, καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα
δὴ τὸ μάλιστα, καὶ τοῦ ἥκιστα τὸ ἥκιστα, καὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς τὸ
ἁπλῶς.
Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἁπλῶς δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα σκεπτέον ἐστίν, ἀνασκευάζοντα
μὲν εἰ τὸ ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἁπλῶς μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ
30 γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον τοῦ μᾶλλον, οὐδὲ τὸ ἧττον τοῦ ἧττον, οὐδὲ τὸ
μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα, οὐδὲ τὸ ἥκιστα τοῦ ἥκιστα ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον
ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σπουδαῖον ἴδιον, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ μᾶλλον
ἀνθρώπου τὸ μᾶλλον σπουδαῖον ἴδιον εἴη. κατασκευάζοντα
δὲ εἰ τὸ ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἐστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
35 μᾶλλον τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τοῦ ἧττον καὶ τὸ ἥκιστα τοῦ
ἥκιστα καὶ τὸ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ τοῦ
πυρός ἐστιν ἴδιον τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον
Next look from the point of view of greater and less degrees, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see 15if what is more-P fails to be a property of what is more-S: for then neither will what is less-P be a property of what is less-S, nor least-P of least-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as being more highly coloured is not a property of what is more a body, neither could being less highly coloured be a property of what is less a body, nor being coloured be a property of body at all. 20For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is more-P is a property of what is more-S: for then also what is less-P will be a property of what is less S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S, and P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a higher degree of sensation is a property of a higher degree of life, a lower degree of sensation also would be a property of a lower degree of life, and the 25highest of the highest and the lowest of the lowest degree, and sensation simply of life simply.
Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication to the same qualified types of predication, and see, for destructive purposes, if P simply fails to be a property of S simply; for then neither will more-P be a property of more-S, nor less-P of less-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor least-P of least-S. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch 30as 'virtuous' is not a property of 'man', neither could 'more virtuous' be a property of what is 'more human'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if P simply is a property of S simply: for then more P also will be a property of more-S, and less-P of less-S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S. Thus (e.g.) a tendency to move upwards by nature is a property of fire, and so also a greater tendency 35to move upwards by nature would be a property of what is more fiery. In the same way too one should look at all these matters from the point of view of the others as well.
Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication to the same qualified types of predication, and see, for destructive purposes, if P simply fails to be a property of S simply; for then neither will more-P be a property of more-S, nor less-P of less-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor least-P of least-S. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch 30as 'virtuous' is not a property of 'man', neither could 'more virtuous' be a property of what is 'more human'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if P simply is a property of S simply: for then more P also will be a property of more-S, and less-P of less-S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S. Thus (e.g.) a tendency to move upwards by nature is a property of fire, and so also a greater tendency 35to move upwards by nature would be a property of what is more fiery. In the same way too one should look at all these matters from the point of view of the others as well.
138a
1 πυρὸς εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τὸ μᾶλλον ἄνω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον σκεπτέον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων
πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα.
Δεύτερον δ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον οὗ μᾶλλον
5 μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἧττον οὗ ἧττον ἔσται ἴδιον.
οἷον ἐπεὶ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἴδιον ζῴου τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ ἀνθρώπου
τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν
εἴη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ἐπίστασθαι. κατασκευάζοντα δ' εἰ τὸ
ἧττον οὗ ἧττόν ἐστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον οὗ μᾶλλον
10 ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ἧττόν ἐστιν ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἥμερον φύσει
ἢ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν, ἔστι δ' ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ἥμερον φύσει,
εἴη ἂν ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ζῆν.
Τρίτον δ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ οὗ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἴδιον
μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗ ἧττόν ἐστιν ἴδιον, ἔσται τούτου ἴδιον.
15 εἰ δ' ἐκείνου ἐστὶν ἴδιον, οὐκ ἔσται τούτου ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ κεχρῶσθαι
μᾶλλον τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἢ τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἴδιον,
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ σώματος ἴδιον
τὸ κεχρῶσθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
τοῦ σώματος ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντι δὲ ὁ τόπος οὗτος οὐκ ἔστι
20 χρήσιμος· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸ πλειόνων ἴδιον εἶναι.
Τέταρτον δ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ
ἴδιον μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἧττον αὐτοῦ ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον.
οἷον ἐπεὶ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἢ τὸ μεριστόν,
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ
25 ζῴου τὸ μεριστὸν ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τὸ ἧττον αὐτοῦ
ὂν ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ ὂν ἴδιον ἔσται
ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ἧττόν ἐστιν ἴδιον ζῴου τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ ζῆν,
ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον, εἴη ἂν τοῦ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν
ἴδιον.
30 Ἔπειτ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ὑπαρχόντων, πρῶτον μὲν ἀνασκευάζοντα
εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον τούτου οὗ ὁμοίως
ἐστὶν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον τούτου οὗ
ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον ἐπιθυμητικοῦ
τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ λογιστικοῦ τὸ λογίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἴδιον
35 ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον λογιστικοῦ τὸ λογίζεσθαι.
κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιόν ἐστι τούτου
ἴδιον οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν
1Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if the more likely property fails to be a property of the more likely subject: for then neither will the less likely property be a property of the less likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'perceiving' is more likely to be a property of 'animal' than 'knowing' of 'man', and 'perceiving' is not a property of 5'animal', 'knowing' could not be a property of 'man'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the less likely property is a property of the less likely subject; for then too the more likely property will be a property of the more likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to be naturally civilized' is less likely to be a property of man than 'to live' of an animal, and it is a property of man to be naturally civilized, it would 10be a property of animal to live.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if the predicate fails to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is less likely to be a property: while if it is a property of the former, it will not be a property of the latter. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to be coloured' is more likely to be a property of a 'surface' than of a 15'body', and it is not a property of a surface, 'to be coloured' could not be a property of 'body'; while if it is a property of a 'surface', it could not be a property of a 'body'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is not of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one thing.
Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes, see if what is more likely to be a property of a given 20subject fails to be its property: for then neither will what is less likely to be a property of it be its property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'sensible' is more likely than 'divisible' to be a property of 'animal', and 'sensible' is not a property of animal, 'divisible' could not be a property of animal. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is less likely to be a property of it is a property; for then what is more likely to 25be a property of it will be a property as well. Thus, for example, inasmuch as 'sensation' is less likely to be a property of 'animal' than life', and 'sensation' is a property of animal, 'life' would be a property of animal.
Next, look from the point of view of the attributes that belong in a like manner, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a 30property: for then neither will that which is as much a property as it be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'desiring' is as much a property of the faculty of desire as reasoning' is a property of the faculty of reason, and desiring is not a property of the faculty of desire, reasoning could not be a property of the faculty of reason. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much 35a property is a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then also what is as much a property as it will be a property of that of which it is as much a property.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if the predicate fails to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is less likely to be a property: while if it is a property of the former, it will not be a property of the latter. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to be coloured' is more likely to be a property of a 'surface' than of a 15'body', and it is not a property of a surface, 'to be coloured' could not be a property of 'body'; while if it is a property of a 'surface', it could not be a property of a 'body'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is not of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one thing.
Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes, see if what is more likely to be a property of a given 20subject fails to be its property: for then neither will what is less likely to be a property of it be its property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'sensible' is more likely than 'divisible' to be a property of 'animal', and 'sensible' is not a property of animal, 'divisible' could not be a property of animal. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is less likely to be a property of it is a property; for then what is more likely to 25be a property of it will be a property as well. Thus, for example, inasmuch as 'sensation' is less likely to be a property of 'animal' than life', and 'sensation' is a property of animal, 'life' would be a property of animal.
Next, look from the point of view of the attributes that belong in a like manner, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a 30property: for then neither will that which is as much a property as it be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'desiring' is as much a property of the faculty of desire as reasoning' is a property of the faculty of reason, and desiring is not a property of the faculty of desire, reasoning could not be a property of the faculty of reason. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much 35a property is a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then also what is as much a property as it will be a property of that of which it is as much a property.
138b
1 ἴδιον τούτου ἴδιον οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν
ἴδιον λογιστικοῦ τὸ πρῶτον φρόνιμον καὶ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τὸ
πρῶτον σῶφρον, ἔστι δὲ [τοῦ] λογιστικοῦ ἴδιον τὸ πρῶτον
φρόνιμον, εἴη ἂν ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἴδιον τὸ πρῶτον σῶφρον.
5
Δεύτερον δ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον
μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον
αὐτοῦ. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ
ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ὁρᾶν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου
10 ἴδιον τὸ ἀκούειν. κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως
αὐτοῦ ὂν ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίως αὐτοῦ ὂν ἴδιον
ἔσται ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς
ἐπιθυμητικὸν εἶναι πρῶτον καὶ λογιστικὸν πρῶτον, ἔστι δὲ
ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς εἶναι ἐπιθυμητικὸν πρῶτον, εἴη ἂν
15 ἴδιον ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς εἶναι λογιστικὸν πρῶτον.
Τρίτον δ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον
μὴ ἔστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον. εἰ
δ' ἐκείνου ἐστὶν ἴδιον, οὐκ ἔσται θατέρου ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως
ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ καίειν φλογὸς καὶ ἄνθρακος, οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἴδιον
20 φλογὸς τὸ καίειν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον ἄνθρακος τὸ καίειν. εἰ δ'
ἐστὶ φλογὸς ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄνθρακος ἴδιον. κατασκευάζοντι
δὲ οὐδὲν οὗτος ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ χρήσιμος.
Διαφέρει δ' ὁ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἐχόντων τοῦ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως
ὑπαρχόντων, ὅτι τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀναλογίαν λαμβάνεται, οὐκ
25 ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τι θεωρούμενον, τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τι
συγκρίνεται.
1Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is as much a property of 'the faculty of reason' to be 'the primary seat of wisdom' as it is of 'the faculty of desire' to be 'the primary seat of temperance', and it is a property of the faculty of reason to be the primary seat of wisdom, it would be a property of the faculty of desire to be the primary seat of 5temperance.
Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither will what is as much a property be a property of it. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'seeing' is as much a property of man as 'hearing', and 'seeing' is not a property of man, 'hearing' could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property 10of it is its property: for then what is as much a property of it as the former will be its property as well. Thus (e.g.) it is as much a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires as of a part that reasons, and it is a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires, and so it be a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that reasons.
Thirdly (c) for 15destructive purposes, see if it fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is as much a property as of the former, while if it be a property of the former, it will not be a property of the other. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to burn' is as much a property of 'flame' as of 'live coals', and 'to burn' is not a property of flame, 'to burn' could not 20be a property of live coals: while if it is a property of flame, it could not be a property of live coals. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use.
The rule based on things that are in a like relation' differs from the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner,' because the former point is secured by analogy, not from reflection on the belonging of any attribute, while the 25latter is judged by a comparison based on the fact that an attribute belongs.
Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither will what is as much a property be a property of it. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'seeing' is as much a property of man as 'hearing', and 'seeing' is not a property of man, 'hearing' could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property 10of it is its property: for then what is as much a property of it as the former will be its property as well. Thus (e.g.) it is as much a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires as of a part that reasons, and it is a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires, and so it be a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that reasons.
Thirdly (c) for 15destructive purposes, see if it fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is as much a property as of the former, while if it be a property of the former, it will not be a property of the other. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to burn' is as much a property of 'flame' as of 'live coals', and 'to burn' is not a property of flame, 'to burn' could not 20be a property of live coals: while if it is a property of flame, it could not be a property of live coals. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use.
The rule based on things that are in a like relation' differs from the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner,' because the former point is secured by analogy, not from reflection on the belonging of any attribute, while the 25latter is judged by a comparison based on the fact that an attribute belongs.
Book 5,Chapter 9 (138b27–139a20)
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ, δυνάμει τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδιδούς,
καὶ πρὸς μὴ ὂν ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον τῇ δυνάμει, μὴ ἐνδεχομένης
τῆς δυνάμεως ὑπάρχειν τῷ μὴ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται
30 ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ
ἀναπνευστὸν τῇ δυνάμει μὲν ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον
οἷον ἀναπνεῖσθαι ἀναπνευστόν ἐστιν), ἀποδέδωκε δὲ καὶ πρὸς
τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ ἴδιον (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος ζῴου οἷον ἀναπνεῖν
πέφυκε τὸν ἀέρα ἐνδέχεται ἀέρα εἶναι· οὐ μέντοι μὴ ὄντος
35 ζῴου δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀναπνεῖν· ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀέρος ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ
τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀναπνεῖσθαι τότε ὅτε ζῷον οὐκ ἔσται τοιοῦτον
οἷον ἀναπνεῖν), οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially, he has also through that potentiality rendered the property relatively to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question cannot belong to what does not exist: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that 30'breathable' is a property of 'air' has, on the one hand, rendered the property potentially (for that is 'breathable' which is such as can be breathed), and on the other hand has also rendered the property relatively to what does not exist:-for while air may exist, even though there exist no animal so constituted as to breathe the air, it is not possible to breathe it if no animal exist: so that it will not, either, be a 35property of air to be such as can be breathed at a time when there exists no animal such as to breathe it and so it follows that 'breathable' could not be a property of air.
139a
1 κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τῇ δυνάμει ἀποδιδοὺς τὸ ἴδιον
ἢ πρὸς ὂν ἀποδίδωσι τὸ ἴδιον ἢ πρὸς μὴ ὄν, ἐνδεχομένης τῆς
δυνάμεως τῷ μὴ ὄντι ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον
μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀποδιδοὺς ἴδιον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ δυνατὸν
5 παθεῖν ἢ ποιῆσαι, δυνάμει ἀποδιδοὺς τὸ ἴδιον, πρὸς
ὂν ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον (ὅτε γὰρ ὄν ἐστι, καὶ δυνατὸν παθεῖν τι
ἢ ποιῆσαι ἔσται)—ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ δυνατὸν παθεῖν
ἢ ποιῆσαι.
Ἔπειτ' ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ ὑπερβολὴν τέθεικε τὸ ἴδιον·
10 οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον. συμβαίνει γὰρ
τοῖς οὕτως ἀποδιδοῦσι τὸ ἴδιον μή, καθ' οὗ ὁ λόγος, τοὔνομα
ἀληθεύεσθαι· φθαρέντος γὰρ τοῦ πράγματος οὐδὲν ἧττον
ἔσται ὁ λόγος· τῶν γὰρ ὄντων τινὶ μάλιστα ὑπάρξει. οἷον
εἴ τις ἀποδοίη τοῦ πυρὸς ἴδιον σῶμα τὸ κουφότατον· φθαρέντος
15 γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔσται τι τῶν σωμάτων ὃ κουφότατον
ἔσται. ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ πυρὸς ἴδιον σῶμα τὸ κουφότατον.
κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μὴ ὑπερβολὴν τέθεικε τὸ ἴδιον· ἔσται
γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἀνθρώπου
ἴδιον ζῷον ἥμερον φύσει οὐχ ὑπερβολῇ ἀποδέδωκε
20 τὸ ἴδιον, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
1For constructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially he renders the property either relatively to something that exists, or to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question can belong to what does not exist: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus e.g.) he who renders it as a property of 'being' to be 'capable of 5being acted upon or of acting', in rendering the property potentially, has rendered the property relatively to something that exists: for when 'being' exists, it will also be capable of being acted upon or of acting in a certain way: so that to be 'capable of being acted upon or of acting' would be a property of 'being'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated the property in the superlative: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For 10people who render the property in that way find that of the object of which the description is true, the name is not true as well: for though the object perish the description will continue in being none the less; for it belongs most nearly to something that is in being. An example would be supposing any one were to render 'the lightest body' as a property of 'fire': for, though fire perish, there eh re will still be some form of body that is the lightest, so that 'the lightest body' 15could not be a property of fire. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property in the superlative: for then the property will in this respect have been property of man has not rendered the property correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he in the superlative, the property would in who states 'a naturally civilized animal' as a this respect have been correctly stated.
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Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated the property in the superlative: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For 10people who render the property in that way find that of the object of which the description is true, the name is not true as well: for though the object perish the description will continue in being none the less; for it belongs most nearly to something that is in being. An example would be supposing any one were to render 'the lightest body' as a property of 'fire': for, though fire perish, there eh re will still be some form of body that is the lightest, so that 'the lightest body' 15could not be a property of fire. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property in the superlative: for then the property will in this respect have been property of man has not rendered the property correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he in the superlative, the property would in who states 'a naturally civilized animal' as a this respect have been correctly stated.
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