Ross (OCT, 1958) · Pickard-Cambridge (1928)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 1,Chapter 1 (100a18–101a24)
100a
Ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν ἀφ' ἧς
δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος
20 ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μηθὲν
ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον. πρῶτον οὖν ῥητέον τί ἐστι συλλογισμὸς καὶ
τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί, ὅπως ληφθῇ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός·
τοῦτον γὰρ ζητοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην πραγματείαν.
25 Ἔστι δὴ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν
τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων.
ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων
ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾖ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἃ διά τινων πρώτων καὶ
ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν, διαλεκτικὸς
30 δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος. ἔστι
Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem 20propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. First, then, we must say what reasoning is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us.
Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something 25other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a 'demonstration', when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted.
Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something 25other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a 'demonstration', when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted.
100b
δὲ ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ μὴ δι' ἑτέρων ἀλλὰ δι' αὑτῶν
ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν (οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς
20 ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, ἀλλ' ἑκάστην τῶν ἀρχῶν
αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι πιστήν), ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν
ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ
τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. ἐριστικὸς
δ' ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων
25 δέ, καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἢ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων φαινόμενος·
οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἔνδοξον καὶ ἔστιν ἔνδοξον. οὐθὲν γὰρ
τῶν λεγομένων ἐνδόξων ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν,
καθάπερ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων ἀρχὰς συμβέβηκεν
ἔχειν· παραχρῆμα γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς
30 καὶ μικρὰ συνορᾶν δυναμένοις κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ
Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any 20further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are 'generally accepted' which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers-i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again (c), reasoning is 'contentious' if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are not really such, or again if it 25merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension.
101a
1 ψεύδους ἐστὶ φύσις. ὁ μὲν οὖν πρότερος τῶν ῥηθέντων ἐριστικῶν
συλλογισμῶν καὶ συλλογισμὸς λεγέσθω, ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς
ἐριστικὸς μὲν συλλογισμός, συλλογισμὸς δ' οὔ, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεται
μὲν συλλογίζεσθαι, συλλογίζεται δ' οὔ.
5 Ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἅπαντας συλλογισμοὺς
οἱ ἐκ τῶν περί τινας ἐπιστήμας οἰκείων γινόμενοι παραλογισμοί,
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς γεωμετρίας καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ συγγενῶν
συμβέβηκεν ἔχειν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ τρόπος οὗτος διαφέρειν
τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογισμῶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων
10 συλλογίζεται ὁ ψευδογραφῶν οὔτ' ἐξ ἐνδόξων. εἰς γὰρ
τὸν ὅρον οὐκ ἐμπίπτει· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ πᾶσι δοκοῦντα λαμβάνει
οὔτε τὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οὔτε τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις οὔτε
πᾶσιν οὔτε τοῖς πλείστοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐνδοξοτάτοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν
οἰκείων μὲν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ λημμάτων οὐκ ἀληθῶν δὲ τὸν συλλογισμὸν
15 ποιεῖται. τῷ γὰρ ἢ τὰ ἡμικύκλια περιγράφειν
μὴ ὡς δεῖ ἢ γραμμάς τινας ἄγειν μὴ ὡς ἂν ἀχθείησαν
τὸν παραλογισμὸν ποιεῖται.
Εἴδη μὲν οὖν τῶν συλλογισμῶν ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν
ἔστω τὰ εἰρημένα. καθόλου δ' εἰπεῖν περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων
20 καὶ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν
διωρίσθω, διότι περὶ οὐδενὸς αὐτῶν τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον ἀποδοῦναι
προαιρούμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅσον τύπῳ περὶ αὐτῶν βουλόμεθα
διελθεῖν, παντελῶς ἱκανὸν ἡγούμενοι κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην
μέθοδον τὸ δύνασθαι γνωρίζειν ὁπωσοῦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν.
1So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called 'reasoning' as well, but the other should be called 'contentious reasoning', but not 'reasoning', since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further (d), besides all the 5reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true 10and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by every one or by the majority or by philosophers-that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them-but he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions which, though appropriate to the science 15in question, are not true; for he effects his mis-reasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning. In general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which we shall 20discuss later, we may remark that that amount of distinction between them may serve, because it is not our purpose to give the exact definition of any of them; we merely want to describe them in outline; we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way.
The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning. In general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which we shall 20discuss later, we may remark that that amount of distinction between them may serve, because it is not our purpose to give the exact definition of any of them; we merely want to describe them in outline; we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way.
Book 1,Chapter 2 (101a25–101b4)
25 Ἑπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰπεῖν πρὸς πόσα
τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμος ἡ πραγματεία. ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία,
πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν
ἐπιστήμας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος,
ἐξ αὐτῶν καταφανές ἐστι· μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ῥᾷον περὶ
30 τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν δυνησόμεθα· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις,
διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηριθμημένοι δόξας οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων
ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς
αὐτούς, μεταβιβάζοντες ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν
ἡμῖν· πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι
35 δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα
τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα
τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην. ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων
τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον
εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἁπάντων
25Next in order after the foregoing, we must say for how many and for what purposes the treatise is useful. They are three-intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences. That it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. The possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue about the subject 30proposed. For purposes of casual encounters, it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground not of other people's convictions but of their own, while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. For the study of the philosophical sciences it is 35useful, because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences.
101b
1 εἰσί, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν
διελθεῖν. τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς
ἐστιν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων
ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.
1For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: 5for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.
Book 1,Chapter 3 (101b5–10)
5 Ἕξομεν δὲ τελέως τὴν μέθοδον ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων·
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν ἃ προαιρούμεθα.
οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει οὔθ' ὁ ἰατρικὸς
ὑγιάσει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παραλίπῃ,
10 ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν.
We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine and faculties of that kind: this means the doing of that which we choose with the materials that are available. For it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to 10persuade, or the doctor to heal; still, if he omits none of the available means, we shall say that his grasp of the science is adequate.
Book 1,Chapter 4 (101b11–36)
Πρῶτον οὖν θεωρητέον ἐκ τίνων ἡ μέθοδος. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν
πρὸς πόσα καὶ ποῖα καὶ ἐκ τίνων οἱ λόγοι, καὶ πῶς
τούτων εὐπορήσομεν, ἔχοιμεν ἂν ἱκανῶς τὸ προκείμενον. ἔστι
δ' ἀριθμῷ ἴσα καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐξ ὧν τε οἱ λόγοι καὶ περὶ ὧν
15 οἱ συλλογισμοί. γίνονται μὲν γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων·
περὶ ὧν δὲ οἱ συλλογισμοί, τὰ προβλήματά ἐστι.
πᾶσα δὲ πρότασις καὶ πᾶν πρόβλημα ἢ ἴδιον ἢ γένος ἢ
συμβεβηκὸς δηλοῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὴν διαφορὰν ὡς οὖσαν γενικὴν
ὁμοῦ τῷ γένει τακτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι
20 σημαίνει, τὸ δ' οὐ σημαίνει, διῃρήσθω τὸ ἴδιον εἰς ἄμφω
τὰ προειρημένα μέρη, καὶ καλείσθω τὸ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι
σημαῖνον ὅρος, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν περὶ αὐτῶν
ἀποδοθεῖσαν ὀνομασίαν προσαγορευέσθω ἴδιον. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι κατὰ τὴν νῦν διαίρεσιν τέτταρα τὰ πάντα
25 συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, ἢ ὅρον ἢ ἴδιον ἢ γένος ἢ συμβεβηκός.
μηδεὶς δ' ἡμᾶς ὑπολάβῃ λέγειν ὡς ἕκαστον τούτων καθ'
αὑτὸ λεγόμενον πρότασις ἢ πρόβλημά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἀπὸ
τούτων καὶ τὰ προβλήματα καὶ αἱ προτάσεις γίνονται. διαφέρει
δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα καὶ ἡ πρότασις τῷ τρόπῳ. οὕτω μὲν
30 γὰρ ῥηθέντος, "ἆρά γε τὸ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν ὁρισμός ἐστιν
ἀνθρώπου;" καὶ "ἆρά γε τὸ ζῷον γένος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου;", πρότασις
γίνεται· ἐὰν δὲ "πότερον τὸ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν ὁρισμός
ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου ἢ οὔ;", πρόβλημα γίνεται· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστ' εἰκότως ἴσα τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὰ προβλήματα
35 καὶ αἱ προτάσεις εἰσίν· ἀπὸ πάσης γὰρ προτάσεως
πρόβλημα ποιήσεις μεταβάλλων τῷ τρόπῳ.
First, then, we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. Now if we were to grasp (a) with reference to how many, and what kind of, things arguments take place, and with what materials they start, and (h) how we are to become well supplied with these, we should have sufficiently 15won our goal. Now the materials with which arguments start are equal in number, and are identical, with the subjects on which reasonings take place. For arguments start with 'propositions', while the subjects on which reasonings take place are 'problems'. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident-for the differentia too, applying as it does to a class (or genus), 20should be ranked together with the genus. Since, however, of what is peculiar to anything part signifies its essence, while part does not, let us divide the 'peculiar' into both the aforesaid parts, and call that part which indicates the essence a 'definition', while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally current about these things, and speak of it as a 'property'. What we have said, 25then, makes it clear that according to our present division, the elements turn out to be four, all told, namely either property or definition or genus or accident. Do not let any one suppose us to mean that each of these enunciated by itself constitutes a proposition or problem, but only that it is from these that both problems and propositions are formed. The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference 30in the turn of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, "'An animal that walks on two feet" is the definition of man, is it not?' or '"Animal" is the genus of man, is it not?' the result is a proposition: but if thus, 'Is "an animal that walks on two feet" a definition of man or no?' [or 'Is "animal" his genus or no?'] the result is a problem. Similarly too in other cases. Naturally, then, problems and 35propositions are equal in number: for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of the phrase.
Book 1,Chapter 5 (101b37–102b26)
Λεκτέον δὲ τί ὅρος, τί ἴδιον, τί γένος, τί συμβεβηκός.
ἔστι δ' ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων, ἀποδίδοται
We must now say what are 'definition', 'property', 'genus', and 'accident'. A 'definition' is a phrase signifying a thing's essence.
102a
1 δὲ ἢ λόγος ἀντ' ὀνόματος ἢ λόγος ἀντὶ λόγου· δυνατὸν
γὰρ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ λόγου τινὰ σημαινομένων ὁρίσασθαι. ὅσοι
δ' ὁπωσοῦν ὀνόματι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιοῦνται, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ
ἀποδιδόασιν οὗτοι τὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμόν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶς
5 ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν. ὁρικὸν μέντοι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον θετέον,
οἷον ὅτι <τὸ> καλόν ἐστι τὸ πρέπον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πότερον
ταὐτὸν αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοὺς
ὁρισμοὺς πότερον ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον ἡ πλείστη γίνεται διατριβή.
ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁρικὰ πάντα λεγέσθω τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν
10 ὄντα μέθοδον τοῖς ὁρισμοῖς. ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα
τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, δῆλον ἐξ αὐτῶν. δυνάμενοι γὰρ ὅτι ταὐτὸν
καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον διαλέγεσθαι, τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
ὁρισμοὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν εὐπορήσομεν· δείξαντες γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν
ἐστιν ἀνῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα τὸν ὁρισμόν. οὐ μὴν ἀντιστρέφει γε
15 τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσαι τὸν ὁρισμὸν
τὸ δεῖξαι ταὐτὸν ὄν. πρὸς μέντοι τὸ ἀνασκευάσαι αὔταρκες
τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν.
Ἴδιον δ' ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, μόνῳ δ'
ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος. οἷον ἴδιον
20 ἀνθρώπου τὸ γραμματικῆς εἶναι δεκτικόν· εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπός
ἐστι, γραμματικῆς δεκτικός ἐστι, καὶ εἰ γραμματικῆς δεκτικός
ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἴδιον λέγει τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον
ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ καθεύδειν ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐδ'
ἂν τύχῃ κατά τινα χρόνον μόνῳ ὑπάρχον. εἰ δ' ἄρα τι
25 καὶ λέγοιτο τῶν τοιούτων ἴδιον, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ ποτὲ ἢ
πρός τι ἴδιον ῥηθήσεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δεξιῶν εἶναι ποτὲ
ἴδιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δίπουν πρός τι ἴδιον τυγχάνει λεγόμενον,
οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς ἵππον καὶ κύνα. ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων
ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν οὐθὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
30 ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τι καθεύδει, ἄνθρωπον εἶναι.
Γένος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ
εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι δὲ κατηγορεῖσθαι
τὰ τοιαῦτα λεγέσθω ὅσα ἁρμόττει ἀποδοῦναι ἐρωτηθέντα
τί ἐστι τὸ προκείμενον· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
35 ἁρμόττει, ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐστιν, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ζῷον. γενικὸν δὲ
καὶ τὸ πότερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ·
καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον πίπτει τῷ γένει.
διαλεχθέντες γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ζῷον γένος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τοῦ βοός, διειλεγμένοι ἐσόμεθα ὅτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
1It is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a term, or of a phrase in lieu of another phrase; for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well. People whose rendering consists of a term only, try it as they may, clearly do not render the definition of the thing in 5question, because a definition is always a phrase of a certain kind. One may, however, use the word 'definitory' also of such a remark as 'The "becoming" is "beautiful"', and likewise also of the question, 'Are sensation and knowledge the same or different?', for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with questions of sameness and difference. In a word we may call 'definitory' 10everything that falls under the same branch of inquiry as definitions; and that all the above-mentioned examples are of this character is clear on the face of them. For if we are able to argue that two things are the same or are different, we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument with lines of attack upon their definitions as well: for when we have shown 15that they are not the same we shall have demolished the definition. Observe, please, that the converse of this last statement does not hold: for to show that they are the same is not enough to establish a definition. To show, however, that they are not the same is enough of itself to overthrow it.
A 'property' is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet 20belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a property of man to-be-capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he be capable of learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls anything a 'property' which may possibly belong to something else, e.g. 'sleep' in the case of man, even though at a 25certain time it may happen to belong to him alone. That is to say, if any such thing were actually to be called a property, it will be called not a 'property' absolutely, but a 'temporary' or a 'relative' property: for 'being on the right hand side' is a temporary property, while 'two-footed' is in point of fact ascribed as a property in certain relations; e.g. it is a property 30of man relatively to a horse and a dog. That nothing which may belong to anything else than A is a convertible predicate of A is clear: for it does not necessarily follow that if something is asleep it is a man.
A 'genus' is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. We should treat as predicates in the category of 35essence all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question, 'What is the object before you?'; as, for example, in the case of man, if asked that question, it is appropriate to say 'He is an animal'. The question, 'Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a different one?'
A 'property' is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet 20belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a property of man to-be-capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he be capable of learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls anything a 'property' which may possibly belong to something else, e.g. 'sleep' in the case of man, even though at a 25certain time it may happen to belong to him alone. That is to say, if any such thing were actually to be called a property, it will be called not a 'property' absolutely, but a 'temporary' or a 'relative' property: for 'being on the right hand side' is a temporary property, while 'two-footed' is in point of fact ascribed as a property in certain relations; e.g. it is a property 30of man relatively to a horse and a dog. That nothing which may belong to anything else than A is a convertible predicate of A is clear: for it does not necessarily follow that if something is asleep it is a man.
A 'genus' is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. We should treat as predicates in the category of 35essence all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question, 'What is the object before you?'; as, for example, in the case of man, if asked that question, it is appropriate to say 'He is an animal'. The question, 'Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a different one?'
102b
1 γένει· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἑτέρου δείξωμεν ὅτι γένος ἐστί, τοῦ
δὲ ἑτέρου ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, διειλεγμένοι ἐσόμεθα ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ γένει ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδὲν μὲν τούτων ἐστί, μήτε
5 ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι,
καὶ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ὁτῳοῦν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ
ὑπάρχειν· οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῷ
αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· τὸ γὰρ
αὐτὸ οὐθὲν κωλύει ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸν ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι.
10 ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὁρισμῶν ὁ δεύτερος βελτίων·
τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρώτου ῥηθέντος ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει τις συνήσειν,
προειδέναι τί ἐστιν ὅρος καὶ ἴδιον καὶ γένος· ὁ δὲ
δεύτερος αὐτοτελής ἐστι πρὸς τὸ γνωρίζειν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ
λεγόμενον καθ' αὑτό. προσκείθωσαν δὲ τῷ συμβεβηκότι
15 καὶ αἱ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίσεις ὁπωσοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος
λεγόμεναι, οἷον πότερον τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ συμφέρον
αἱρετώτερον, καὶ πότερον ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὁ κατ' ἀπόλαυσιν
ἡδίων βίος, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο παραπλησίως τυγχάνει τούτοις
λεγόμενον· ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον
20 τὸ κατηγορούμενον συμβέβηκεν ἡ ζήτησις γίνεται. δῆλον
δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει ποτὲ καὶ
πρός τι ἴδιον γίνεσθαι· οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι, συμβεβηκὸς ὄν,
ὅταν τις μόνος καθῆται, τότε ἴδιον ἔσται, μὴ μόνου δὲ καθημένου
πρὸς τοὺς μὴ καθημένους ἴδιον. ὥστε καὶ πρός τι καὶ
25 ποτὲ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἴδιον γίνεσθαι. ἁπλῶς δ'
ἴδιον οὐκ ἔσται.
1is also a 'generic' question; for a question of that kind as well falls under the same branch of inquiry as the genus: for having argued that 'animal' is the genus of man, and likewise also of ox, we shall have argued that they are in the same genus; whereas if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other, we shall have argued that 5these things are not in the same genus.
An 'accident' is (i) something which, though it is none of the foregoing-i.e. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs to the thing: (something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the 'sitting posture' may belong or not belong to some self-same thing. Likewise also 'whiteness', for there is nothing to prevent the same thing 10being at one time white, and at another not white. Of the definitions of accident the second is the better: for if he adopts the first, any one is bound, if he is to understand it, to know already what 'definition' and 'genus' and 'property' are, whereas the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential meaning of the term in question. To Accident are to be attached also all comparisons of things together, when expressed in 15language that is drawn in any kind of way from what happens (accidit) to be true of them; such as, for example, the question, 'Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?' and 'Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?', and any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. For in all such cases the question is 'to which of the two does the predicate in question happen (accidit) to belong 20more closely?' It is clear on the face of it that there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a temporary or relative property. Thus the sitting posture is an accident, but will be a temporary property, whenever a man is the only person sitting, while if he be not the only one sitting, it is still a property relatively to those who are not sitting. So then, there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming both a relative 25and a temporary property; but a property absolutely it will never be.
An 'accident' is (i) something which, though it is none of the foregoing-i.e. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs to the thing: (something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the 'sitting posture' may belong or not belong to some self-same thing. Likewise also 'whiteness', for there is nothing to prevent the same thing 10being at one time white, and at another not white. Of the definitions of accident the second is the better: for if he adopts the first, any one is bound, if he is to understand it, to know already what 'definition' and 'genus' and 'property' are, whereas the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential meaning of the term in question. To Accident are to be attached also all comparisons of things together, when expressed in 15language that is drawn in any kind of way from what happens (accidit) to be true of them; such as, for example, the question, 'Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?' and 'Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?', and any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. For in all such cases the question is 'to which of the two does the predicate in question happen (accidit) to belong 20more closely?' It is clear on the face of it that there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a temporary or relative property. Thus the sitting posture is an accident, but will be a temporary property, whenever a man is the only person sitting, while if he be not the only one sitting, it is still a property relatively to those who are not sitting. So then, there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming both a relative 25and a temporary property; but a property absolutely it will never be.
Book 1,Chapter 6 (102b27–103a5)
Μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ
γένος καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς πάντα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἁρμόσει
λέγεσθαι. δείξαντες γὰρ ὅτι οὐ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει τῷ
30 ὑπὸ τὸν ὁρισμόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰδίου, ἢ ὅτι οὐ γένος τὸ
ἀποδοθὲν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ, ἢ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ
λόγῳ ῥηθέντων, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἂν ῥηθείη,
ἀνῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα τὸν ὁρισμόν· ὥστε κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν
ἀποδοθέντα λόγον ἅπαντ' ἂν εἴη τρόπον τινὰ ὁρικὰ τὰ κατηριθμημένα.
35 ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο μίαν ἐπὶ πάντων καθόλου
μέθοδον ζητητέον· οὔτε γὰρ ῥᾴδιον εὑρεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἴ θ' εὑρεθείη,
παντελῶς ἀσαφὴς καὶ δύσχρηστος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν
προκειμένην πραγματείαν. ἰδίας δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν διορισθέντων
γενῶν ἀποδοθείσης μεθόδου ῥᾷον ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον
We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism of a 'property' and 'genus' and 'accident' will be applicable to 'definitions' as well. For when we have shown that the attribute in question fails to belong only to the term defined, as we do also in the case of a property, or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus, or that any 30of the things mentioned in the phrase used does not belong, as would be remarked also in the case of an accident, we shall have demolished the definition; so that, to use the phrase previously employed,' all the points we have enumerated might in a certain sense be called 'definitory'. But we must not on this account expect to find a single line of inquiry which will apply universally to them all: for this is not an easy thing to find, 35and, even were one found, it would be very obscure indeed, and of little service for the treatise before us. Rather, a special plan of inquiry must be laid down for each of the classes we have distinguished, and then, starting from the rules that are appropriate in each case, it will probably be easier to make our way right through the task before us.
103a
1 οἰκείων ἡ διέξοδος τοῦ προκειμένου γίνοιτ' ἄν. ὥστε τύπῳ μέν,
καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διαιρετέον, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὰ
μάλισθ' ἑκάστοις οἰκεῖα προσαπτέον, ὁρικά τε καὶ γενικὰ
προσαγορεύοντας αὐτά. σχεδὸν δὲ προσῆπται τὰ ῥηθέντα
5 πρὸς ἑκάστοις.
1So then, as was said before,' we must outline a division of our subject, and other questions we must relegate each to the particular branch to which it most naturally belongs, speaking of them as 'definitory' and 'generic' questions. The questions I mean have practically been already assigned to their several branches.
Book 1,Chapter 7 (103a6–39)
Πρῶτον δὲ πάντων περὶ ταὐτοῦ διοριστέον ποσαχῶς λέγεται.
δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ ταὐτὸν ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν τριχῇ διαιρεῖσθαι.
ἢ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει τὸ ταὐτὸν εἰώθαμεν προςαγορεύειν·
ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ὀνόματα πλείω τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα
10 ἕν, οἷον λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον· εἴδει δὲ ὅσα πλείω ὄντα
ἀδιάφορα κατὰ τὸ εἶδός ἐστι, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ
καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τῷ εἴδει λέγεται ταὐτὰ
ὅσα ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ εἶδός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γένει ταὐτὰ ὅσα
ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ γένος ἐστίν, οἷον ἵππος ἀνθρώπῳ. δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ
15 ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς κρήνης ὕδωρ ταὐτὸν λεγόμενον ἔχειν τινὰ
διαφορὰν παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
τοιοῦτόν γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τετάχθω τοῖς καθ' ἓν εἶδος ὁπωσοῦν
λεγομένοις· ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα συγγενῆ καὶ παραπλήσια
ἀλλήλοις ἔοικεν εἶναι. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ ὕδωρ παντὶ
20 ταὐτὸν τῷ εἴδει λέγεται διὰ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ὁμοιότητα· τὸ
δ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς κρήνης ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ διαφέρει ἀλλ' ἢ
τῷ σφοδροτέραν εἶναι τὴν ὁμοιότητα, διὸ οὐ χωρίζομεν αὐτὸ
τῶν καθ' ἓν εἶδος ὁπωσοῦν λεγομένων. μάλιστα δ' ὁμολογουμένως
τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ταὐτὸν παρὰ πᾶσι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.
25 εἴωθε δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδίδοσθαι πλεοναχῶς· κυριώτατα μὲν
καὶ πρώτως ὅταν ὀνόματι ἢ ὅρῳ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἀποδοθῇ, καθάπερ
ἱμάτιον λωπίῳ καὶ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν ἀνθρώπῳ· δεύτερον
δ' ὅταν τῷ ἰδίῳ, καθάπερ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν ἀνθρώπῳ
καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἄνω φερόμενον πυρί· τρίτον δ' ὅταν ἀπὸ
30 τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οἷον τὸ καθήμενον ἢ τὸ μουσικὸν Σωκράτει·
πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ βούλεται σημαίνειν.
ὅτι δ' ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν ἐστιν, ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων
τὰς προσηγορίας μάλιστ' ἄν τις καταμάθοι· πολλάκις γάρ,
ἐπιτάσσοντες ὀνόματι καλέσαι τινὰ τῶν καθημένων, μεταβάλλομεν
35 ὅταν τύχῃ μὴ συνιεὶς ᾧ τὴν πρόσταξιν ποιούμεθα,
ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον συνήσοντος,
καὶ κελεύομεν τὸν καθήμενον ἢ διαλεγόμενον καλέσαι πρὸς
ἡμᾶς, δῆλον ὡς ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντες κατά τε τοὔνομα
καὶ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς σημαίνειν.
First of all we must 5define the number of senses borne by the term 'Sameness'. Sameness would be generally regarded as falling, roughly speaking, into three divisions. We generally apply the term numerically or specifically or generically-numerically in cases where there is more than one name but only one thing, e.g. 'doublet' and 'cloak'; specifically, where there is more than one thing, but they present no differences in respect of their 10species, as one man and another, or one horse and another: for things like this that fall under the same species are said to be 'specifically the same'. Similarly, too, those things are called generically the same which fall under the same genus, such as a horse and a man. It might appear that the sense in which water from the same spring is called 'the same water' is somehow different and unlike the senses mentioned above: 15but really such a case as this ought to be ranked in the same class with the things that in one way or another are called 'the same' in view of unity of species. For all such things seem to be of one family and to resemble one another. For the reaon why all water is said to be specifically the same as all other water is because of a certain likeness it bears to it, and the only difference in the case of water drawn from 20the same spring is this, that the likeness is more emphatic: that is why we do not distinguish it from the things that in one way or another are called 'the same' in view of unity of species. It is generally supposed that the term 'the same' is most used in a sense agreed on by every one when applied to what is numerically one. But even so, it is apt to be rendered in more than one sense; its most literal and primary use is 25found whenever the sameness is rendered in reference to an alternative name or definition, as when a cloak is said to be the same as a doublet, or an animal that walks on two feet is said to be the same as a man: a second sense is when it is rendered in reference to a property, as when what can acquire knowledge is called the same as a man, and what naturally travels upward the same as fire: while a third use is found when 30it is rendered in reference to some term drawn from Accident, as when the creature who is sitting, or who is musical, is called the same as Socrates. For all these uses mean to signify numerical unity. That what I have just said is true may be best seen where one form of appellation is substituted for another. For often when we give the order to call one of the people who are sitting down, indicating him by name, we 35change our description, whenever the person to whom we give the order happens not to understand us; he will, we think, understand better from some accidental feature; so we bid him call to us 'the man who is sitting' or 'who is conversing over there'-clearly supposing ourselves to be indicating the same object by its name and by its accident.
Book 1,Chapter 8 (103b1–19)
103b
1 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τριχῇ διῃρήσθω.
ὅτι δ' ἐκ τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων οἱ λόγοι καὶ διὰ τούτων
καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα, μία μὲν πίστις ἡ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς· εἰ
γάρ τις ἐπισκοποίη ἑκάστην τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προβλημάτων,
5 φαίνοιτ' ἂν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅρου ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ἢ ἀπὸ
τοῦ γένους ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος γεγενημένη. ἄλλη δὲ
πίστις ἡ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶν τὶ περί τινος
κατηγορούμενον ἤτοι ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ πράγματος ἢ μή.
καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, ὅρος ἢ ἴδιον ἂν εἴη (εἰ μὲν γὰρ
10 σημαίνει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὅρος, εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει, ἴδιον·
τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἴδιον, τὸ ἀντικατηγορούμενον μὲν μὴ σημαῖνον
δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος,
ἤτοι τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων
ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ. καὶ εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων, γένος
15 ἢ διαφορὰ ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν
ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων ἐστί,
δῆλον ὅτι συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη· τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς ἐλέγετο
ὃ μήτε ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος ἐστίν, ὑπάρχει δὲ
τῷ πράγματι.
1Of 'sameness' then, as has been said,' three senses are to be distinguished. Now one way to confirm that the elements mentioned above are those out of which and through which and to which arguments proceed, is by induction: for if any one were to survey propositions and problems one by one, it would be seen 5that each was formed either from the definition of something or from its property or from its genus or from its accident. Another way to confirm it is through reasoning. For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is convertible, it would be its definition or property, for if it signifies the essence, it is the definition; 10if not, it is a property: for this was what a property is, viz. what is predicated convertibly, but does not signify the essence. If, on the other hand, it is not predicated convertibly of the thing, it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the definition of the subject: and if it be one of those terms, then it will be the genus or the differentia, inasmuch as the definition 15consists of genus and differentiae; whereas, if it be not one of those terms, clearly it would be an accident, for accident was said' to be what belongs as an attribute to a subject without being either its definition or its genus or a property.
Book 1,Chapter 9 (103b20–104a2)
20 Μετὰ τοίνυν ταῦτα δεῖ διορίσασθαι τὰ γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν,
ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχουσιν αἱ ῥηθεῖσαι τέτταρες. ἔστι δὲ
ταῦτα τὸν ἀριθμὸν δέκα, τί ἐστι, ποσόν, ποιόν, πρός τι,
ποῦ, ποτέ, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν. ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ
συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν
25 μιᾷ τούτων τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἔσται· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ διὰ τούτων
προτάσεις ἢ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ
κατηγοριῶν σημαίνουσιν. δῆλον δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι ὁ τὸ τί ἐστι
σημαίνων ὁτὲ μὲν οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ὁτὲ δὲ ποσόν, ὁτὲ δὲ ποιόν, ὁτὲ
δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ κατηγοριῶν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκειμένου ἀνθρώπου
30 φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἢ ζῷον, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ
οὐσίαν σημαίνει· ὅταν δὲ χρώματος λευκοῦ ἐκκειμένου φῇ τὸ
ἐκκείμενον λευκὸν εἶναι ἢ χρῶμα, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ ποιὸν
σημαίνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν πηχυαίου μεγέθους ἐκκειμένου
φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον πηχυαῖον εἶναι μέγεθος, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ
35 ποσὸν σημαίνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἕκαστον
γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐάν τε αὐτὸ περὶ αὑτοῦ λέγηται ἐάν τε
τὸ γένος περὶ τούτου, τί ἐστι σημαίνει· ὅταν δὲ περὶ ἑτέρου, οὐ
τί ἐστι σημαίνει ἀλλὰ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων
κατηγοριῶν. ὥστε περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἐξ ὧν,
Next, then, we must distinguish between the classes of predicates in which the four orders in question are found. These are ten in number: 20Essence, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity, Passivity. For the accident and genus and property and definition of anything will always be in one of these categories: for all the propositions found through these signify either something's essence or its quality or quantity or some one of the other types of predicate. It is clear, too, on the face of 25it that the man who signifies something's essence signifies sometimes a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes some one of the other types of predicate. For when man is set before him and he says that what is set there is 'a man' or 'an animal', he states its essence and signifies a substance; but when a white colour is set before him and he says that what is set there is 'white' or 30is 'a colour', he states its essence and signifies a quality. Likewise, also, if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he says that what is set there is a magnitude of a cubit, he will be describing its essence and signifying a quantity. Likewise, also, in the other cases: for each of these kinds of predicate, if either it be asserted of itself, or its genus be asserted of it, 35signifies an essence: if, on the other hand, one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind, it does not signify an essence, but a quantity or a quality or one of the other kinds of predicate. Such, then, and so many, are the subjects on which arguments take place, and the materials with which they start.
104a
1 ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστι· πῶς δὲ ληψόμεθα καὶ δι' ὧν
εὐπορήσομεν, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον.
1How we are to acquire them, and by what means we are to become well supplied with them, falls next to be told.
Book 1,Chapter 10 (104a3–37)
Πρῶτον τοίνυν διωρίσθω τί ἐστι πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ
καὶ τί πρόβλημα διαλεκτικόν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν πρότασιν οὐδὲ
5 πᾶν πρόβλημα διαλεκτικὸν θετέον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν προτείνειε
νοῦν ἔχων τὸ μηδενὶ δοκοῦν οὐδὲ προβάλοι τὸ πᾶσι φανερὸν
ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τὰ
δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν θείη. ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος
ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις
10 ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις, μὴ παράδοξος·
θείη γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ
ἐναντίον ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις ᾖ. εἰσὶ δὲ προτάσεις διαλεκτικαὶ
καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ὅμοια, καὶ τἀναντία τοῖς
δοκοῦσιν ἐνδόξοις εἶναι, κατ' ἀντίφασιν προτεινόμενα, καὶ ὅσαι
15 δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ τὰς εὑρημένας. εἰ γὰρ ἔνδοξον τὸ
τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιστήμην, καὶ τὸ αἴσθησιν τὴν
αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων ἔνδοξον ἂν φανείη· καὶ εἰ μίαν
ἀριθμῷ γραμματικὴν εἶναι, καὶ αὐλητικὴν μίαν, εἰ δὲ
πλείους γραμματικάς, καὶ αὐλητικὰς πλείους· πάντα γὰρ
20 ὅμοια καὶ συγγενῆ ταῦτ' ἔοικεν εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ
τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ἐναντία, κατ' ἀντίφασιν προτεινόμενα, ἔνδοξα
φανεῖται· εἰ γὰρ ἔνδοξον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ
ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἔνδοξον. ἔστι δ' ἐναντίον μὲν ὅτι δεῖ
κακῶς ποιεῖν τοὺς φίλους, κατ' ἀντίφασιν δὲ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κακῶς
25 ποιεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ δεῖ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς
ἐχθροὺς οὐ δεῖ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κατ' ἀντίφασιν τῶν ἐναντίων·
τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς εὖ ποιεῖν. ὡσαύτως
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔνδοξον δὲ ἐν παραβολῇ φανεῖται
καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου· οἷον εἰ τοὺς φίλους δεῖ εὖ
30 ποιεῖν, καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δεῖ κακῶς. φανείη δ' ἂν καὶ ἐναντίον
τὸ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς· πότερον
δὲ καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχει ἢ οὔ, ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν
ἐναντίων λεγομένοις ῥηθήσεται. δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι
κατὰ τέχνας εἰσί, διαλεκτικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσί· θείη γὰρ ἄν
35 τις τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐπεσκεμμένοις, οἷον περὶ
μὲν τῶν ἐν ἰατρικῇ ὡς ὁ ἰατρός, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ
ὡς ὁ γεωμετρικός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
First, then, a definition must be given of a 'dialectical proposition' and a 'dialectical problem'. For it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be set down as dialectical: for no one in his senses would make a proposition 5of what no one holds, nor yet make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people: for the latter admits of no doubt, while to the former no one would assent. Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers, i.e. either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these, provided it be not contrary to the general opinion; for a man would probably assent 10to the view of the philosophers, if it be not contrary to the opinions of most men. Dialectical propositions also include views which are like those generally accepted; also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted, and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts. Thus, supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries is the same, it might 15probably pass for a general opinion also that the perception of contraries is the same: also, supposing it to be a general opinion that there is but one single science of grammar, it might pass for a general opinion that there is but one science of flute-playing as well, whereas, if it be a general opinion that there is more than one science of grammar, it might pass for a general opinion that there is more than one science of flute-playing 20as well: for all these seem to be alike and akin. Likewise, also, propositions contradicting the contraries of general opinions will pass as general opinions: for if it be a general opinion that one ought to do good to one's friends, it will also be a general opinion that one ought not to do them harm. Here, that one ought to do harm to one's friends is contrary to the general view, and that one ought not to do them harm is the contradictory 25of that contrary. Likewise also, if one ought to do good to one's friends, one ought not to do good to one's enemies: this too is the contradictory of the view contrary to the general view; the contrary being that one ought to do good to one's enemies. Likewise, also, in other cases. Also, on comparison, it will look like a general opinion that the contrary predicate belongs to the contrary subject: e.g. if one ought to do good to 30one's friends, one ought also to do evil to one's enemies. it might appear also as if doing good to one's friends were a contrary to doing evil to one's enemies: but whether this is or is not so in reality as well will be stated in the course of the discussion upon contraries. Clearly also, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical propositions; for people are likely to assent to the views held by those who have made 35a study of these things, e.g. on a question of medicine they will agree with the doctor, and on a question of geometry with the geometrician; and likewise also in other cases.
Book 1,Chapter 11 (104b1–105a9)
104b
1 Πρόβλημα δ' ἐστὶ διαλεκτικὸν θεώρημα τὸ συντεῖνον ἢ
πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καὶ γνῶσιν, ἢ
αὐτὸ ἢ ὡς συνεργὸν πρός τι ἕτερον τῶν τοιούτων, περὶ οὗ ἢ
οὐδετέρως δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἐναντίως [οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἢ] οἱ
5 σοφοὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ ἑκάτεροι αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς. ἔνια μὲν γὰρ
τῶν προβλημάτων χρήσιμον εἰδέναι πρὸς τὸ ἑλέσθαι ἢ φυγεῖν,
οἷον πότερον ἡ ἡδονὴ αἱρετὸν ἢ οὔ· ἔνια δὲ πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι
μόνον, οἷον πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀίδιος ἢ οὔ. ἔνια δὲ αὐτὰ
μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων, συνεργὰ δέ ἐστι πρός
10 τινα τῶν τοιούτων· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα
γνωρίζειν, ἑτέρων δ' ἕνεκα, ὅπως διὰ τούτων ἄλλο
τι γνωρίσωμεν. ἔστι δὲ προβλήματα καὶ ὧν ἐναντίοι εἰσὶ
συλλογισμοί (ἀπορίαν γὰρ ἔχει πότερον οὕτως ἔχει ἢ οὐχ
οὕτως, διὰ τὸ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι λόγους πιθανούς), καὶ περὶ
15 ὧν λόγον μὴ ἔχομεν, ὄντων μεγάλων, χαλεπὸν οἰόμενοι εἶναι
τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδοῦναι, οἷον πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀίδιος ἢ οὔ·
καὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζητήσειεν ἄν τις.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν προβλήματα καὶ αἱ προτάσεις καθάπερ
εἴρηται διωρίσθω. θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν
20 γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν,
καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης, ἢ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, καθ'
Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι ἓν τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ Μέλισσός φησιν (τὸ
γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηναμένου φροντίζειν
εὔηθες)· ἢ περὶ ὧν λόγον ἔχομεν ἐναντίον ταῖς δόξαις,
25 οἷον ὅτι οὐ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἤτοι γενόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀίδιον, καθάπερ
οἱ σοφισταί φασιν· μουσικὸν γὰρ ὄντα γραμματικὸν εἶναι
οὔτε γενόμενον οὔτε ἀίδιον ὄντα· τοῦτο γάρ, εἰ καί τινι μὴ δοκεῖ,
δόξειεν ἂν διὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν.
Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ θέσις πρόβλημα· οὐ πᾶν δὲ πρόβλημα
30 θέσις, ἐπειδὴ ἔνια τῶν προβλημάτων τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ
περὶ ὧν οὐδετέρως δοξάζομεν. ὅτι δέ ἐστι καὶ ἡ θέσις πρόβλημα,
δῆλον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἢ τοὺς πολλοὺς
τοῖς σοφοῖς περὶ τὴν θέσιν ἀμφισβητεῖν ἢ ὁποτερουσοῦν
ἑαυτοῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὑπόληψίς τις παράδοξος ἡ θέσις ἐστίν. σχεδὸν
35 δὲ νῦν πάντα τὰ διαλεκτικὰ προβλήματα θέσεις καλοῦνται.
διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ὁπωσοῦν λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὀνοματοποιῆσαι
βουλόμενοι διείλομεν οὕτως αὐτά, ἀλλ' ἵνα
1A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. It must, moreover, be something on which either people hold no opinion either way, or the masses hold 5a contrary opinion to the philosophers, or the philosophers to the masses, or each of them among themselves. For some problems it is useful to know with a view to choice or avoidance, e.g. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not, while some it is useful to know merely with a view to knowledge, e.g. whether the universe is eternal or not: others, again, are not useful in and by 10themselves for either of these purposes, but yet help us in regard to some such problems; for there are many things which we do not wish to know in and by themselves, but for the sake of other things, in order that through them we may come to know something else. Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict (the difficulty then being whether so-and so is so 15or not, there being convincing arguments for both views); others also in regard to which we have no argument because they are so vast, and we find it difficult to give our reasons, e.g. the question whether the universe is eternal or no: for into questions of that kind too it is possible to inquire.
Problems, then, and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid. A 'thesis' is a 20supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion; e.g. the view that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said; or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion; or that Being is one, as Melissus says: for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men's usual opinions would be silly. Or it may be a view about which 25we have a reasoned theory contrary to men's usual opinions, e.g. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal: for a musician who is a grammarian 'is' so without ever having 'come to be' so, or being so eternally. For even if a man does not accept this view, he might do so on the ground that it is reasonable.
Now a 30'thesis' also is a problem, though a problem is not always a thesis, inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way. That a thesis, however, also forms a problem, is clear: for it follows of necessity from what has been said that either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis, or that the one or the other class disagree among 35themselves, seeing that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion. Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called 'theses'.
Problems, then, and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid. A 'thesis' is a 20supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion; e.g. the view that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said; or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion; or that Being is one, as Melissus says: for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men's usual opinions would be silly. Or it may be a view about which 25we have a reasoned theory contrary to men's usual opinions, e.g. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal: for a musician who is a grammarian 'is' so without ever having 'come to be' so, or being so eternally. For even if a man does not accept this view, he might do so on the ground that it is reasonable.
Now a 30'thesis' also is a problem, though a problem is not always a thesis, inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way. That a thesis, however, also forms a problem, is clear: for it follows of necessity from what has been said that either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis, or that the one or the other class disagree among 35themselves, seeing that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion. Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called 'theses'.
105a
1 μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς τίνες αὐτῶν τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι διαφοραί.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν,
ἀλλ' ἣν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις τῶν λόγου δεομένων καὶ μὴ
5 κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες "πότερον δεῖ
τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὔ" κολάσεως δέονται,
οἱ δὲ "πότερον ἡ χιὼν λευκὴ ἢ οὔ" αἰσθήσεως. οὐδὲ δὴ
ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδ' ὧν λίαν πόρρω· τὰ μὲν γὰρ
οὐκ ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τὰ δὲ πλείω ἢ κατὰ γυμναστικήν.
1But it should make no difference whichever description is used; for our object in thus distinguishing them has not been to create a terminology, but to recognize what differences happen to be found between them.
Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle 5one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods and love one's parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. The subjects should not border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration, nor yet be too far removed from it: 10for the former cases admit of no doubt, while the latter involve difficulties too great for the art of the trainer.
Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle 5one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods and love one's parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. The subjects should not border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration, nor yet be too far removed from it: 10for the former cases admit of no doubt, while the latter involve difficulties too great for the art of the trainer.
Book 1,Chapter 12 (105a10–19)
10 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων χρὴ διελέσθαι πόσα τῶν λόγων
εἴδη τῶν διαλεκτικῶν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δὲ
συλλογισμός. καὶ συλλογισμὸς μὲν τί ἐστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον.
ἐπαγωγὴ δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου
ἔφοδος· οἷον εἰ ἔστι κυβερνήτης ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κράτιστος,
15 καὶ ἡνίοχος, καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἕκαστον ἄριστος.
ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον
καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς
κοινόν, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς
ἐνεργέστερον.
Having drawn these definitions, we must distinguish how many species there are of dialectical arguments. There is on the one hand Induction, on the other Reasoning. Now what reasoning is has been said before: induction is a passage from individuals to universals, 15e.g. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. Induction is the more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men, though reasoning is more forcible and effective 20against contradictious people.
Book 1,Chapter 13 (105a20–33)
20 Τὰ μὲν οὖν γένη περὶ ὧν τε οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἐξ ὧν
καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται διωρίσθω. τὰ δ' ὄργανα δι'
ὧν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐστὶ τέτταρα, ἓν μὲν
τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται
δύνασθαι διελεῖν, τρίτον <δὲ> τὸ τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν, τέταρτον
25 δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις. ἔστι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ
τρία τούτων προτάσεις· ἔστι γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν
ποιῆσαι πρότασιν, οἷον ὅτι αἱρετόν ἐστι τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ
ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, καὶ ὅτι διαφέρει αἴσθησις ἐπιστήμης
τῷ τὴν μὲν ἀποβαλόντα δυνατὸν εἶναι πάλιν λαβεῖν,
30 τὴν δ' ἀδύνατον, καὶ ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν πρὸς ὑγίειαν
καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν πρὸς εὐεξίαν. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρώτη
πρότασις ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλαχῶς λεγομένου, ἡ δὲ δευτέρα ἀπὸ
τῶν διαφορῶν, ἡ δὲ τρίτη ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων.
The classes, then, of things about which, and of things out of which, arguments are constructed, are to be distinguished in the way we have said before. The means whereby we are to become well supplied with reasonings are four: (1) the securing of propositions; (2) the power to distinguish in how many senses particular expression is used; (3) 25the discovery of the differences of things; (4) the investigation of likeness. The last three, as well, are in a certain sense propositions: for it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to each of them, e.g. (1) 'The desirable may mean either the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient'; and (2) Sensation differs from knowledge in that the latter may be recovered 30again after it has been lost, while the former cannot'; and (3) The relation of the healthy to health is like that of the vigorous to vigour'. The first proposition depends upon the use of one term in several senses, the second upon the differences of things, the third upon their likenesses.
Book 1,Chapter 14 (105a34–105b37)
Τὰς μὲν οὖν προτάσεις ἐκλεκτέον ὁσαχῶς διωρίσθη
35 περὶ προτάσεως, ἢ τὰς πάντων δόξας προχειριζόμενον ἢ
τὰς τῶν πλείστων ἢ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν, καὶ τούτων ἢ πάντων
ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἢ τῶν γνωριμωτάτων, ἢ τὰς <μὴ> ἐναντίας ταῖς
Propositions should be selected in a number of ways corresponding to the number 35of distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition: thus one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men or by the philosophers, i.e.
105b
1 φαινομέναις, καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσίν. δεῖ δὲ προτείνειν
καὶ τὰς ἐναντίας ταῖς φαινομέναις ἐνδόξοις κατ' ἀντίφασιν,
καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν
αὐτὰς ἐν τῷ ἐκλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὰς οὔσας ἐνδόξους ἀλλὰ
5 καὶ τὰς ὁμοίας ταύταις, οἷον ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ αἴσθησις
(καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), καὶ ὅτι ὁρῶμεν εἰσδεχόμενοί
τι, οὐκ ἐκπέμποντες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων
οὕτως· ἀκούομέν τε γὰρ εἰσδεχόμενοί τι, οὐκ ἐκπέμποντες,
καὶ γευόμεθα ὡσαύτως· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
10 ἄλλων. ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων φαίνεται, ληπτέον
ὡς ἀρχὴν καὶ δοκοῦσαν θέσιν· τιθέασι γὰρ οἱ μὴ συνορῶντες
ἐπὶ τίνος οὐχ οὕτως. ἐκλέγειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν
γεγραμμένων λόγων, τὰς δὲ διαγραφὰς ποιεῖσθαι περὶ
ἑκάστου γένους ὑποτιθέντας χωρίς, οἷον περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ περὶ
15 ζῴου, καὶ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ παντός, ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ τί ἐστιν.
παρασημαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἑκάστων δόξας, οἷον ὅτι Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
τέτταρα ἔφησε τῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα εἶναι· θείη
γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ ὑπό τινος εἰρημένον ἐνδόξου.
Ἔστι δ' ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν
20 προβλημάτων μέρη τρία· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν,
αἱ δὲ φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαί. ἠθικαὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ τοιαῦται,
οἷον πότερον δεῖ τοῖς γονεῦσι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς νόμοις
πειθαρχεῖν, ἐὰν διαφωνῶσιν· λογικαὶ δὲ οἷον πότερον τῶν
ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὔ· φυσικαὶ δὲ οἷον πότερον
25 ὁ κόσμος ἀίδιος ἢ οὔ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ προβλήματα. ποῖαι
δ' ἕκασται τῶν προειρημένων, ὁρισμῷ μὲν οὐκ εὐπετὲς ἀποδοῦναι
περὶ αὐτῶν· τῇ δὲ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς συνηθείᾳ πειρατέον
γνωρίζειν ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα παραδείγματα
ἐπισκοποῦντα.
30 Πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ' ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν
πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν. ληπτέον δ' ὅτι
μάλιστα καθόλου πάσας τὰς προτάσεις, καὶ τὴν μίαν πολλὰς
ποιητέον, οἷον ὅτι τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη,
εἶθ' ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρός τι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
35 καὶ ταύτας πάλιν διαιρετέον, ἕως ἂν ἐνδέχηται διαιρεῖν,
οἷον ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος,
καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
1by all, or most, or the most notable of them; or opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held; and, again, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts. We must make propositions also of the contradictories of opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held, as was laid down before. It 5is useful also to make them by selecting not only those opinions that actually are accepted, but also those that are like these, e.g. 'The perception of contraries is the same'-the knowledge of them being so-and 'we see by admission of something into ourselves, not by an emission'; for so it is, too, in the case of the other senses; for in hearing we admit something into ourselves; we do 10not emit; and we taste in the same way. Likewise also in the other cases. Moreover, all statements that seem to be true in all or in most cases, should be taken as a principle or accepted position; for they are posited by those who do not also see what exception there may be. We should select also from the written handbooks of argument, and should draw up sketch-lists of them upon each several 15kind of subject, putting them down under separate headings, e.g. 'On Good', or 'On Life'-and that 'On Good' should deal with every form of good, beginning with the category of essence. In the margin, too, one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers, e.g. 'Empedocles said that the elements of bodies were four': for any one might assent to the saying of some generally accepted 20authority.
Of propositions and problems there are-to comprehend the matter in outline-three divisions: for some are ethical propositions, some are on natural philosophy, while some are logical. Propositions such as the following are ethical, e.g. 'Ought one rather to obey one's parents or the laws, if they disagree?'; such as this are logical, e.g. 'Is the knowledge of opposites the same 25or not?'; while such as this are on natural philosophy, e.g. 'Is the universe eternal or not?' Likewise also with problems. The nature of each of the aforesaid kinds of proposition is not easily rendered in a definition, but we have to try to recognize each of them by means of the familiarity attained through induction, examining them in the light of the illustrations given above.
For purposes 30of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion. All propositions should be taken in their most universal form; then, the one should be made into many. E.g. 'The knowledge of opposites is the same'; next, 'The knowledge of contraries is the same', and that 'of relative terms'. In the same way these two should 35again be divided, as long as division is possible, e.g. the knowledge of 'good and evil', of 'white and black', or 'cold and hot'. Likewise also in other cases.
Of propositions and problems there are-to comprehend the matter in outline-three divisions: for some are ethical propositions, some are on natural philosophy, while some are logical. Propositions such as the following are ethical, e.g. 'Ought one rather to obey one's parents or the laws, if they disagree?'; such as this are logical, e.g. 'Is the knowledge of opposites the same 25or not?'; while such as this are on natural philosophy, e.g. 'Is the universe eternal or not?' Likewise also with problems. The nature of each of the aforesaid kinds of proposition is not easily rendered in a definition, but we have to try to recognize each of them by means of the familiarity attained through induction, examining them in the light of the illustrations given above.
For purposes 30of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion. All propositions should be taken in their most universal form; then, the one should be made into many. E.g. 'The knowledge of opposites is the same'; next, 'The knowledge of contraries is the same', and that 'of relative terms'. In the same way these two should 35again be divided, as long as division is possible, e.g. the knowledge of 'good and evil', of 'white and black', or 'cold and hot'. Likewise also in other cases.
Book 1,Chapter 15 (106a1–107b37)
106a
1 Περὶ μὲν οὖν προτάσεως ἱκανὰ τὰ προειρημένα. τὸ
δὲ ποσαχῶς, πραγματευτέον μὴ μόνον ὅσα λέγεται καθ'
ἕτερον τρόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν πειρατέον ἀποδιδόναι,
οἷον μὴ μόνον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καθ' ἕτερον μὲν τρόπον
5 λέγεται δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ καὶ ὑγιεινὸν
καθ' ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτὰ ποιά τινα εἶναι,
τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιητικά τινος καὶ οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ ποιά τινα
εἶναι. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Πότερον δὲ πολλαχῶς ἢ μοναχῶς τῷ εἴδει λέγεται,
10 διὰ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου σκοπεῖν εἰ
πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἐάν τε τῷ εἴδει ἐάν τε τῷ ὀνόματι
διαφωνῇ. ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἕτερά ἐστιν· οἷον
τῷ ὀξεῖ ἐν φωνῇ μὲν ἐναντίον τὸ βαρύ, ἐν ὄγκῳ δὲ τὸ
ἀμβλύ. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ὀξεῖ πολλαχῶς λέγεται.
15 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ὀξύ· καθ' ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἐκείνων
ἕτερον ἔσται τὸ ἐναντίον. οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὀξὺ τῷ ἀμβλεῖ
καὶ τῷ βαρεῖ ἔσται ἐναντίον· ἑκατέρῳ δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ ἐναντίον.
πάλιν τῷ βαρεῖ ἐν φωνῇ μὲν τὸ ὀξὺ ἐναντίον, ἐν ὄγκῳ δὲ
τὸ κοῦφον· ὥστε πολλαχῶς τὸ βαρὺ λέγεται, ἐπειδὴ καὶ
20 τὸ ἐναντίον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῷ καλῷ τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῴου
τὸ αἰσχρόν, τῷ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας τὸ μοχθηρόν, ὥστε ὁμώνυμον
τὸ καλόν.
Ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὀνόμασιν οὐδαμῶς διαφωνεῖ, τῷ
δ' εἴδει κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐθέως ἡ διαφορά ἐστιν, οἷον
25 ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος. φωνὴ γὰρ λευκὴ καὶ μέλαινα
λέγεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ χρῶμα. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲν
διαφωνεῖ· τῷ δ' εἴδει κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐθέως ἡ διαφορά·
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τό τε χρῶμα λευκὸν λέγεται καὶ ἡ
φωνή. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως· τῶν γὰρ
30 αὐτῶν τῷ εἴδει ἡ αὐτὴ αἴσθησις· τὸ δὲ λευκὸν τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς
φωνῆς καὶ τοῦ χρώματος οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ αἰσθήσει κρίνομεν, ἀλλὰ
τὸ μὲν ὄψει τὸ δ' ἀκοῇ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ
ἐν χυμοῖς καὶ ἐν ὄγκοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἁφῇ, τὸ δὲ γεύσει.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα διαφωνεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν οὔτ'
35 ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἀμβλὺ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑκατέρῳ.
Ἔτι εἰ τῷ μὲν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον τῷ δ' ἁπλῶς μηδέν·
οἷον τῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν ἡδονῇ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ διψῆν λύπη
ἐναντίον, τῇ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ὅτι ἡ διάμετρος τῇ πλευρᾷ
1On the formation, then, of propositions, the above remarks are enough. As regards the number of senses a term bears, we must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses, but we must also try to render their definitions; e.g. we must not merely say that justice and courage are called 'good' in 5one sense, and that what conduces to vigour and what conduces to health are called so in another, but also that the former are so called because of a certain intrinsic quality they themselves have, the latter because they are productive of a certain result and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves. Similarly also in other cases.
Whether a term bears a number of specific 10meanings or one only, may be considered by the following means. First, look and see if its contrary bears a number of meanings, whether the discrepancy between them be one of kind or one of names. For in some cases a difference is at once displayed even in the names; e.g. the contrary of 'sharp' in the case of a note is 'flat', while in the case of a solid edge it is 'dull'. Clearly, 15then, the contrary of 'sharp' bears several meanings, and if so, also does 'sharp'; for corresponding to each of the former terms the meaning of its contrary will be different. For 'sharp' will not be the same when contrary to 'dull' and to 'flat', though 'sharp' is the contrary of each. Again Barhu ('flat', 'heavy') in the case of a note has 'sharp' as its contrary, but in the 20case of a solid mass 'light', so that Barhu is used with a number of meanings, inasmuch as its contrary also is so used. Likewise, also, 'fine' as applied to a picture has 'ugly' as its contrary, but, as applied to a house, 'ramshackle'; so that 'fine' is an ambiguous term.
In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names used, but a difference of kind between the meanings 25is at once obvious: e.g. in the case of 'clear' and 'obscure': for sound is called 'clear' and 'obscure', just as 'colour' is too. As regards the names, then, there is no discrepancy, but the difference in kind between the meanings is at once obvious: for colour is not called 'clear' in a like sense to sound. This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are the same 30in kind we have the same sensation, whereas we do not judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and of colour, but in the latter case we judge by sight, in the former by hearing. Likewise also with 'sharp' and 'dull' in regard to flavours and solid edges: here in the latter case we judge by touch, but in the former by taste. For here again there is no discrepancy in 35the names used, in the case either of the original terms or of their contraries: for the contrary also of sharp in either sense is 'dull'.
Moreover, see if one sense of a term has a contrary, while another has absolutely none; e.g.
Whether a term bears a number of specific 10meanings or one only, may be considered by the following means. First, look and see if its contrary bears a number of meanings, whether the discrepancy between them be one of kind or one of names. For in some cases a difference is at once displayed even in the names; e.g. the contrary of 'sharp' in the case of a note is 'flat', while in the case of a solid edge it is 'dull'. Clearly, 15then, the contrary of 'sharp' bears several meanings, and if so, also does 'sharp'; for corresponding to each of the former terms the meaning of its contrary will be different. For 'sharp' will not be the same when contrary to 'dull' and to 'flat', though 'sharp' is the contrary of each. Again Barhu ('flat', 'heavy') in the case of a note has 'sharp' as its contrary, but in the 20case of a solid mass 'light', so that Barhu is used with a number of meanings, inasmuch as its contrary also is so used. Likewise, also, 'fine' as applied to a picture has 'ugly' as its contrary, but, as applied to a house, 'ramshackle'; so that 'fine' is an ambiguous term.
In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names used, but a difference of kind between the meanings 25is at once obvious: e.g. in the case of 'clear' and 'obscure': for sound is called 'clear' and 'obscure', just as 'colour' is too. As regards the names, then, there is no discrepancy, but the difference in kind between the meanings is at once obvious: for colour is not called 'clear' in a like sense to sound. This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are the same 30in kind we have the same sensation, whereas we do not judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and of colour, but in the latter case we judge by sight, in the former by hearing. Likewise also with 'sharp' and 'dull' in regard to flavours and solid edges: here in the latter case we judge by touch, but in the former by taste. For here again there is no discrepancy in 35the names used, in the case either of the original terms or of their contraries: for the contrary also of sharp in either sense is 'dull'.
Moreover, see if one sense of a term has a contrary, while another has absolutely none; e.g.
106b
1 ἀσύμμετρος οὐδέν, ὥστε πλεοναχῶς ἡ ἡδονὴ λέγεται. καὶ
τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ
κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖν
ὁμώνυμον. ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἔστι τι
5 ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν δὲ μηδέν, ἢ εἰ ἀμφοῖν μὲν ἔστι <τι>, μὴ ταὐτὸν
δέ· οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος ἐν χρώμασι μὲν τὸ φαιόν,
ἐν φωνῇ δ' οὐδέν, ἢ εἰ ἄρα, τὸ σομφόν, καθάπερ τινές φασι
σομφὴν φωνὴν ἀνὰ μέσον εἶναι· ὥσθ' ὁμώνυμον τὸ λευκόν,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μέλαν. ἔτι εἰ τῶν μὲν πλείω τὰ ἀνὰ
10 μέσον, τῶν δὲ ἕν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος· ἐπὶ
μὲν γὰρ τῶν χρωμάτων πολλὰ τὰ ἀνὰ μέσον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς
φωνῆς ἕν, τὸ σομφόν.
Πάλιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κατ' ἀντίφασιν ἀντικειμένου σκοπεῖν εἰ
πλεοναχῶς λέγεται· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ
15 τὸ τούτῳ ἀντικείμενον πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται. οἷον τὸ μὴ βλέπειν
πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, ἓν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, ἓν δὲ
τὸ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ ὄψει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο πλεοναχῶς, ἀναγκαῖον
καὶ τὸ βλέπειν πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι· ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τῷ μὴ
βλέπειν ἀντικείσεταί τι, οἷον τῷ μὲν μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν τὸ
20 ἔχειν, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ ὄψει τὸ ἐνεργεῖν.
Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν λεγομένων ἐπισκοπεῖν·
εἰ γὰρ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ λοιπόν.
οἷον εἰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, κατά τε
τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι πλεοναχῶς
25 ῥηθήσεται, κατά τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα. ὅτι
δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντίκειται τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, δῆλον,
ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἑκατέραν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἔχειν τὰ ζῷα,
καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα.
Ἔτι δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πτώσεων ἐπισκεπτέον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ δικαίως
30 πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται·
καθ' ἑκάτερον γὰρ τῶν δικαίως ἔστι δίκαιον· οἷον
εἰ τὸ δικαίως λέγεται τό τε κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην κρῖναι
καὶ τὸ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ὡσαύτως δὲ
καὶ εἰ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν πλεοναχῶς, καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινῶς πλεοναχῶς
35 ῥηθήσεται· οἷον εἰ ὑγιεινὸν τὸ μὲν ὑγιείας ποιητικὸν τὸ δὲ
φυλακτικὸν τὸ δὲ σημαντικόν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινῶς ἢ ποιητικῶς
ἢ φυλακτικῶς ἢ σημαντικῶς ῥηθήσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ
1the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none, so that 'pleasure' is used in more than one sense. To 'love' also, used of the frame of mind, has to 'hate' as its contrary, while as used of the physical activity 5(kissing) it has none: clearly, therefore, to 'love' is an ambiguous term. Further, see in regard to their intermediates, if some meanings and their contraries have an intermediate, others have none, or if both have one but not the same one, e.g. 'clear' and 'obscure' in the case of colours have 'grey' as an intermediate, whereas in the case of sound they have none, or, if they have, it is 10'harsh', as some people say that a harsh sound is intermediate. 'Clear', then, is an ambiguous term, and likewise also 'obscure'. See, moreover, if some of them have more than one intermediate, while others have but one, as is the case with 'clear' and 'obscure', for in the case of colours there are numbers of intermediates, whereas in regard to sound there is but one, viz. 'harsh'.
Again, in 15the case of the contradictory opposite, look and see if it bears more than one meaning. For if this bears more than one meaning, then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning; e.g. 'to fail to see' a phrase with more than one meaning, viz. (1) to fail to possess the power of sight, (2) to fail to put that power to active use. But if this has more than one meaning, it follows 20necessarily that 'to see' also has more than one meaning: for there will be an opposite to each sense of 'to fail to see'; e.g. the opposite of 'not to possess the power of sight' is to possess it, while of 'not to put the power of sight to active use', the opposite is to put it to active use.
Moreover, examine the case of terms that denote the privation or presence of a certain state: for 25if the one term bears more than one meaning, then so will the remaining term: e.g. if 'to have sense' be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body, then 'to be wanting in sense' too will be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body. That the opposition between the terms now in question depends upon the privation or presence of a 30certain state is clear, since animals naturally possess each kind of 'sense', both as applied to the soul and as applied to the body.
Moreover, examine the inflected forms. For if 'justly' has more than one meaning, then 'just', also, will be used with more than one meaning; for there will be a meaning of 'just' to each of the meanings of 'justly'; e.g. if the word 'justly' be used of judging 35according to one's own opinion, and also of judging as one ought, then 'just' also will be used in like manner. In the same way also, if 'healthy' has more than one meaning, then 'healthily' also will be used with more than one meaning: e.g.
Again, in 15the case of the contradictory opposite, look and see if it bears more than one meaning. For if this bears more than one meaning, then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning; e.g. 'to fail to see' a phrase with more than one meaning, viz. (1) to fail to possess the power of sight, (2) to fail to put that power to active use. But if this has more than one meaning, it follows 20necessarily that 'to see' also has more than one meaning: for there will be an opposite to each sense of 'to fail to see'; e.g. the opposite of 'not to possess the power of sight' is to possess it, while of 'not to put the power of sight to active use', the opposite is to put it to active use.
Moreover, examine the case of terms that denote the privation or presence of a certain state: for 25if the one term bears more than one meaning, then so will the remaining term: e.g. if 'to have sense' be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body, then 'to be wanting in sense' too will be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body. That the opposition between the terms now in question depends upon the privation or presence of a 30certain state is clear, since animals naturally possess each kind of 'sense', both as applied to the soul and as applied to the body.
Moreover, examine the inflected forms. For if 'justly' has more than one meaning, then 'just', also, will be used with more than one meaning; for there will be a meaning of 'just' to each of the meanings of 'justly'; e.g. if the word 'justly' be used of judging 35according to one's own opinion, and also of judging as one ought, then 'just' also will be used in like manner. In the same way also, if 'healthy' has more than one meaning, then 'healthily' also will be used with more than one meaning: e.g.
107a
1 ἡ πτῶσις ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται, καὶ εἰ ἡ
πτῶσις, καὶ αὐτό.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν κατὰ τοὔνομα κατηγοριῶν,
εἰ ταὐτά ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτά, δῆλον
5 ὅτι ὁμώνυμον τὸ λεγόμενον. οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἐδέσματι
μὲν τὸ ποιητικὸν ἡδονῆς, ἐν ἰατρικῇ δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας,
ἐπὶ δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ ποιὰν εἶναι, οἷον σώφρονα ἢ ἀνδρείαν
ἢ δικαίαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ
τὸ ποτέ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἀγαθόν· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ λέγεται
10 τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ. πολλάκις δὲ τὸ ποσόν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ
μετρίου· λέγεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἀγαθόν. ὥστε ὁμώνυμον
τὸ ἀγαθόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ σώματος
μὲν χρῶμα, ἐπὶ δὲ φωνῆς τὸ εὐήκοον. παραπλησίως δὲ
καὶ τὸ ὀξύ· οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεται·
15 φωνὴ μὲν γὰρ ὀξεῖα ἡ ταχεῖα, καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ κατὰ
τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἁρμονικοί, γωνία δ' ὀξεῖα ἡ ἐλάσσων ὀρθῆς,
μάχαιρα δὲ ἡ ὀξυγώνιος.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα, εἰ
ἕτερα καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα. οἷον ὄνος τό τε ζῷον καὶ τὸ
20 σκεῦος· ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος αὐτῶν· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ζῷον ποιόν τι ῥηθήσεται, τὸ δὲ σκεῦος ποιόν τι. ἐὰν
δὲ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τὰ γένη ᾖ, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέρους τοὺς λόγους
εἶναι. οἷον τοῦ κόρακος τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον γένος ἐστίν·
ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν τὸν κόρακα ὄρνεον εἶναι, καὶ ζῷον ποιόν
25 τί φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥστ' ἀμφότερα τὰ γένη περὶ αὐτοῦ
κατηγορεῖται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅταν ζῷον πτηνὸν δίπουν τὸν
κόρακα λέγωμεν, ὄρνεόν φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι· καὶ οὕτως οὖν
ἀμφότερα τὰ γένη κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ κόρακος, καὶ ὁ
λόγος αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα γενῶν οὐ συμβαίνει
30 τοῦτο· οὔτε γὰρ ὅταν σκεῦος λέγωμεν, ζῷον λέγομεν,
οὔθ' ὅταν ζῷον, σκεῦος.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ προκειμένου εἰ ἕτερα τὰ
γένη καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου· εἰ
γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον πολλαχῶς λέγεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ
35 προκείμενον.
Χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἐπιβλέπειν τὸν
τοῦ συντιθεμένου γιγνόμενον, οἷον λευκοῦ σώματος καὶ λευκῆς
φωνῆς· ἀφαιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον δεῖ
λείπεσθαι. τοῦτο δ' οὐ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων, οἷον
1if 'healthy' describes both what produces health and what preserves health and what betokens health, then 'healthily' also will be used to mean 'in such a way as to produce' or 'preserve' or 'betoken' health. Likewise also in other cases, whenever the original term bears more than one meaning, the inflexion also that 5is formed from it will be used with more than one meaning, and vice versa.
Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term, and see if they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the same, then clearly the term is ambiguous: e.g. 'good' in the case of food means 'productive of pleasure', and in the case of medicine 'productive of health', whereas as applied to the soul 10it means to be of a certain quality, e.g. temperate or courageous or just: and likewise also, as applied to 'man'. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time, as (e.g.) the good that happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called good. Often it signifies what is of certain quantity, e.g. as applied to the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. 15So then the term 'good' is ambiguous. In the same way also 'clear', as applied to a body, signifies a colour, but in regard to a note it denotes what is 'easy to hear'. 'Sharp', too, is in a closely similar case: for the same term does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a sharp note is a swift note, as the mathematical theorists of harmony tell us, whereas a sharp (acute) 20angle is one that is less than a right angle, while a sharp dagger is one containing a sharp angle (point).
Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term, and see if they are different without being subaltern, as (e.g.) 'donkey', which denotes both the animal and the engine. For the definition of them that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be declared to be 25an animal of a certain kind, and the other to be an engine of a certain kind. If, however, the genera be subaltern, there is no necessity for the definitions to be different. Thus (e.g.) 'animal' is the genus of 'raven', and so is 'bird'. Whenever therefore we say that the raven is a bird, we also say that it is a certain kind of animal, so that both the genera are predicated of it. Likewise 30also whenever we call the raven a 'flying biped animal', we declare it to be a bird: in this way, then, as well, both the genera are predicated of raven, and also their definition. But in the case of genera that are not subaltern this does not happen, for whenever we call a thing an 'engine', we do not call it an animal, nor vice versa.
Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before 35you are different without being subaltern, but also in the case of its contrary: for if its contrary bears several senses, clearly the term before you does so as well.
It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use of the term in combination, e.g. of a 'clear (lit. white) body' of a 'clear note'.
Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term, and see if they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the same, then clearly the term is ambiguous: e.g. 'good' in the case of food means 'productive of pleasure', and in the case of medicine 'productive of health', whereas as applied to the soul 10it means to be of a certain quality, e.g. temperate or courageous or just: and likewise also, as applied to 'man'. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time, as (e.g.) the good that happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called good. Often it signifies what is of certain quantity, e.g. as applied to the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. 15So then the term 'good' is ambiguous. In the same way also 'clear', as applied to a body, signifies a colour, but in regard to a note it denotes what is 'easy to hear'. 'Sharp', too, is in a closely similar case: for the same term does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a sharp note is a swift note, as the mathematical theorists of harmony tell us, whereas a sharp (acute) 20angle is one that is less than a right angle, while a sharp dagger is one containing a sharp angle (point).
Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term, and see if they are different without being subaltern, as (e.g.) 'donkey', which denotes both the animal and the engine. For the definition of them that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be declared to be 25an animal of a certain kind, and the other to be an engine of a certain kind. If, however, the genera be subaltern, there is no necessity for the definitions to be different. Thus (e.g.) 'animal' is the genus of 'raven', and so is 'bird'. Whenever therefore we say that the raven is a bird, we also say that it is a certain kind of animal, so that both the genera are predicated of it. Likewise 30also whenever we call the raven a 'flying biped animal', we declare it to be a bird: in this way, then, as well, both the genera are predicated of raven, and also their definition. But in the case of genera that are not subaltern this does not happen, for whenever we call a thing an 'engine', we do not call it an animal, nor vice versa.
Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before 35you are different without being subaltern, but also in the case of its contrary: for if its contrary bears several senses, clearly the term before you does so as well.
It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use of the term in combination, e.g. of a 'clear (lit. white) body' of a 'clear note'.
107b
1 ἐπὶ τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται σῶμα τοιόνδε
χρῶμα ἔχον, τὸ δὲ φωνὴ εὐήκοος. ἀφαιρεθέντος οὖν τοῦ
σώματος καὶ τῆς φωνῆς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ λειπόμενον·
ἔδει δέ γε, εἴπερ συνώνυμον ἦν τὸ λευκὸν τὸ ἐφ' ἑκατέρου
5 λεγόμενον.
Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς λόγοις λανθάνει παρακολουθοῦν
τὸ ὁμώνυμον· διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων σκεπτέον.
οἷον ἐάν τις τὸ σημαντικὸν καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας τὸ συμμέτρως
ἔχον πρὸς ὑγίειαν φῇ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀποστατέον ἀλλ'
10 ἐπισκεπτέον τί τὸ συμμέτρως καθ' ἑκατέρου εἴρηκεν, οἷον εἰ
τὸ μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὥστε ποιεῖν ὑγίειαν, τὸ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον
οἷον σημαίνειν ποία τις ἡ ἕξις.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ συμβλητὰ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ ὁμοίως,
οἷον λευκὴ φωνὴ καὶ λευκὸν ἱμάτιον, καὶ ὀξὺς χυμὸς καὶ
15 ὀξεῖα φωνή· ταῦτα γὰρ οὔθ' ὁμοίως λέγεται λευκὰ ἢ ὀξέα,
οὔτε μᾶλλον θάτερον. ὥσθ' ὁμώνυμον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ὀξύ.
τὸ γὰρ συνώνυμον πᾶν συμβλητόν· ἢ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥηθήσεται
ἢ μᾶλλον θάτερον.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων γενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα ἕτεραι
20 τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, οἷον ζῴου καὶ ἐπιστήμης
(ἕτεραι γὰρ τούτων αἱ διαφοραί), σκοπεῖν εἰ τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ
αὐτὸ ὄνομα ἑτέρων γενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα διαφοραί
εἰσιν, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ φωνῆς καὶ ὄγκου· διαφέρει γὰρ φωνὴ
φωνῆς τῷ ὀξεῖα εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὄγκος ὄγκου. ὥστε
25 ὁμώνυμον τὸ ὀξύ· ἑτέρων γὰρ γενῶν καὶ οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλληλα
διαφοραί εἰσιν.
Πάλιν εἰ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα ἕτεραι αἱ
διαφοραί, οἷον χρώματος τοῦ τε ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τοῦ
ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διακριτικὸν
30 καὶ συγκριτικὸν ὄψεως, τοῦ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν μελῶν οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ
διαφοραί. ὥστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ χρῶμα· τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν αἱ
αὐταὶ διαφοραί.
Ἔτι ἐπεὶ τὸ εἶδος οὐδενός ἐστι διαφορά, σκοπεῖν τῶν
ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἰ τὸ μὲν εἶδός ἐστι τὸ δὲ διαφορά·
35 οἷον τὸ λευκὸν τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος εἶδος χρώματος,
τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς διαφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ φωνὴ φωνῆς
τῷ λευκὴ εἶναι.
1For then if what is peculiar in each case be abstracted, the same expression ought to remain over. This does not happen in the case of ambiguous terms, e.g. in the cases just mentioned. For the former will be body possessing such and such a colour', while the latter will be 'a note easy to hear'. Abstract, 5then, 'a body 'and' a note', and the remainder in each case is not the same. It should, however, have been had the meaning of 'clear' in each case been synonymous.
Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares, and for this reason the definitions also should be examined. If (e.g.) any one describes what betokens and what produces health as 'related commensurably 10to health', we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term 'commensurably' in each case, e.g. if in the latter case it means that 'it is of the right amount to produce health', whereas in the for it means that 'it is such as to betoken what kind of state prevails'.
Moreover, see if the terms cannot be compared as 'more or less' or as 'in like manner', as 15is the case (e.g.) with a 'clear' (lit. white) sound and a 'clear' garment, and a 'sharp' flavour and a 'sharp' note. For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp 'in a like degree', nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the other. 'Clear', then, and 'sharp' are ambiguous. For synonyms are always comparable; for they will always be used either in like manner, 20or else in a greater degree in one case.
Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern the differentiae also are different in kind, e.g. those of 'animal' and 'knowledge' (for the differentiae of these are different), look and see if the meanings comprised under the same term are differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern, as e.g. 'sharp' is of 25a 'note' and a 'solid'. For being 'sharp' differentiates note from note, and likewise also one solid from another. 'Sharp', then, is an ambiguous term: for it forms differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern.
Again, see if the actual meanings included under the same term themselves have different differentiae, e.g. 'colour' in bodies and 'colour' in tunes: for 30the differentiae of 'colour' in bodies are 'sight-piercing' and 'sight compressing', whereas 'colour' in melodies has not the same differentiae. Colour, then, is an ambiguous term; for things that are the same have the same differentiae.
Moreover, since the species is never the differentia of anything, look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be a species and 35another a differentia, as (e.g.) clear' (lit. white) as applied to a body is a species of colour, whereas in the case of a note it is a differentia; for one note is differentiated from another by being 'clear'.
Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares, and for this reason the definitions also should be examined. If (e.g.) any one describes what betokens and what produces health as 'related commensurably 10to health', we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term 'commensurably' in each case, e.g. if in the latter case it means that 'it is of the right amount to produce health', whereas in the for it means that 'it is such as to betoken what kind of state prevails'.
Moreover, see if the terms cannot be compared as 'more or less' or as 'in like manner', as 15is the case (e.g.) with a 'clear' (lit. white) sound and a 'clear' garment, and a 'sharp' flavour and a 'sharp' note. For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp 'in a like degree', nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the other. 'Clear', then, and 'sharp' are ambiguous. For synonyms are always comparable; for they will always be used either in like manner, 20or else in a greater degree in one case.
Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern the differentiae also are different in kind, e.g. those of 'animal' and 'knowledge' (for the differentiae of these are different), look and see if the meanings comprised under the same term are differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern, as e.g. 'sharp' is of 25a 'note' and a 'solid'. For being 'sharp' differentiates note from note, and likewise also one solid from another. 'Sharp', then, is an ambiguous term: for it forms differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern.
Again, see if the actual meanings included under the same term themselves have different differentiae, e.g. 'colour' in bodies and 'colour' in tunes: for 30the differentiae of 'colour' in bodies are 'sight-piercing' and 'sight compressing', whereas 'colour' in melodies has not the same differentiae. Colour, then, is an ambiguous term; for things that are the same have the same differentiae.
Moreover, since the species is never the differentia of anything, look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be a species and 35another a differentia, as (e.g.) clear' (lit. white) as applied to a body is a species of colour, whereas in the case of a note it is a differentia; for one note is differentiated from another by being 'clear'.
Book 1,Chapter 16 (107b38–108a6)
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πολλαχῶς διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
σκεπτέον. τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς γένεσι
The presence, then, of a number of meanings in a term may be investigated by these and like means.
108a
1 πρὸς ἄλληλα θεωρητέον, οἷον τίνι διαφέρει δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρείας
καὶ φρόνησις σωφροσύνης (ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντα ἐκ
τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἐστίν), καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν μὴ
πολὺ λίαν διεστηκότων, οἷον τίνι αἴσθησις ἐπιστήμης· ἐπὶ
5 μὲν γὰρ τῶν πολὺ διεστηκότων κατάδηλοι παντελῶς αἱ
διαφοραί.
1The differences which things present to each other should be examined within the same genera, e.g. 'Wherein does justice differ from courage, and wisdom from temperance?'-for all these belong to the same genus; and also from one genus to another, provided they be not very much too far apart, e.g. 'Wherein 5does sensation differ from knowledge?: for in the case of genera that are very far apart, the differences are entirely obvious.
Book 1,Chapter 17 (108a7–17)
Τὴν δὲ ὁμοιότητα σκεπτέον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐν ἑτέροις γένεσιν,
ὡς ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερόν τι, οὕτως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο
(οἷον ὡς ἐπιστήμη πρὸς ἐπιστητόν, οὕτως αἴσθησις πρὸς αἰσθητόν),
10 καὶ ὡς ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινί, οὕτως ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ
(οἷον ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ὡς γαλήνη
ἐν θαλάσσῃ, νηνεμία ἐν ἀέρι). μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πολὺ διεστῶσι
γυμνάζεσθαι δεῖ· ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δυνησόμεθα
τὰ ὅμοια συνορᾶν. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
15 γένει ὄντα, εἴ τι ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει ταὐτόν, οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ
καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ κυνί· ᾗ γὰρ ὑπάρχει τι αὐτοῖς ταὐτόν,
ταύτῃ ὅμοιά ἐστιν.
Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things belonging to different genera, the formulae being 'A:B = C:D' (e.g. as knowledge stands to the object of knowledge, so is sensation related to the object of sensation), and 'As A is in B, so is C 10in D' (e.g. as sight is in the eye, so is reason in the soul, and as is a calm in the sea, so is windlessness in the air). Practice is more especially needed in regard to terms that are far apart; for in the case of the rest, we shall be more easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness. We should also look at things which belong to the same genus, to see if any identical 15attribute belongs to them all, e.g. to a man and a horse and a dog; for in so far as they have any identical attribute, in so far they are alike.
Book 1,Chapter 18 (108a18–108b33)
Χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ μὲν ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἐπεσκέφθαι
πρός τε τὸ σαφές (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἄν τις εἰδείη τί τίθησιν,
20 ἐμφανισθέντος ποσαχῶς λέγεται) καὶ πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι
κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ ὄνομα τοὺς συλλογισμούς·
ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος ποσαχῶς λέγεται, ἐνδέχεται μὴ
ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν τόν τε ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα φέρειν
τὴν διάνοιαν· ἐμφανισθέντος δὲ ποσαχῶς λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ
25 τί φέρων τίθησι, γελοῖος ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁ ἐρωτῶν, εἰ μὴ
πρὸς τοῦτο τὸν λόγον ποιοῖτο. χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ
παραλογισθῆναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ παραλογίσασθαι. εἰδότες γὰρ
ποσαχῶς λέγεται οὐ μὴ παραλογισθῶμεν, ἀλλ' εἰδήσομεν
ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ποιῆται ὁ ἐρωτῶν· αὐτοί τε
30 ἐρωτῶντες δυνησόμεθα παραλογίσασθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ
εἰδὼς ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐπὶ
πάντων δυνατόν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ᾖ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων
τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ. ἔστι δὲ οὐκ οἰκεῖος ὁ τρόπος
οὗτος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· διὸ παντελῶς εὐλαβητέον τοῖς
35 διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ πρὸς τοὔνομα διαλέγεσθαι,
ἐὰν μή τις ἄλλως ἐξαδυνατῇ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου διαλέγεσθαι.
Τὸ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν χρήσιμον πρός τε τοὺς
συλλογισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ πρὸς τὸ γνωρίζειν
It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term both for clearness' sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts, if it bas been made clear to him how many meanings it may have), and also with a view to 20ensuring that our reasonings shall be in accordance with the actual facts and not addressed merely to the term used. For as long as it is not clear in how many senses a term is used, it is possible that the answerer and the questioner are not directing their minds upon the same thing: whereas when once it has been made clear how many meanings there are, and also upon which of them 25the former directs his mind when he makes his assertion, the questioner would then look ridiculous if he failed to address his argument to this. It helps us also both to avoid being misled and to mislead by false reasoning: for if we know the number of meanings of a term, we shall certainly never be misled by false reasoning, but shall know if the questioner fails to address his 30argument to the same point; and when we ourselves put the questions we shall be able to mislead him, if our answerer happens not to know the number of meanings of our terms. This, however, is not possible in all cases, but only when of the many senses some are true and others are false. This manner of argument, however, does not belong properly to dialectic; dialecticians should 35therefore by all means beware of this kind of verbal discussion, unless any one is absolutely unable to discuss the subject before him in any other way.
The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings about sameness and difference, and also in recognizing what any particular thing is.
The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings about sameness and difference, and also in recognizing what any particular thing is.
108b
1 τί ἕκαστόν ἐστιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς τοὺς
περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου χρήσιμον, δῆλον (εὑρόντες γὰρ διαφορὰν
τῶν προκειμένων ὁποιανοῦν δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ
ταὐτόν)· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνωρίζειν τί ἐστι, διότι τὸν ἴδιον τῆς
5 οὐσίας ἑκάστου λόγον ταῖς περὶ ἕκαστον οἰκείαις διαφοραῖς
χωρίζειν εἰώθαμεν.
Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρία χρήσιμος πρός τε τοὺς ἐπακτικοὺς
λόγους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογισμοὺς καὶ
πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὁρισμῶν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐπακτικοὺς
10 λόγους, διότι τῇ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ
καθόλου ἀξιοῦμεν ἐπάγειν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐπάγειν μὴ εἰδότας
τὰ ὅμοια. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογισμούς,
διότι ἔνδοξόν ἐστιν, ὥς ποτε ἐφ' ἑνὸς τῶν ὁμοίων ἔχει, οὕτως
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. ὥστε πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὐπορῶμεν
15 διαλέγεσθαι, προδιομολογησόμεθα, ὥς ποτε ἐπὶ τούτων ἔχει,
οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προκειμένου ἔχειν, δείξαντες δὲ ἐκεῖνο καὶ
τὸ προκείμενον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθα· ὑποθέμενοι
γάρ, ὥς ποτε ἐπὶ τούτων ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προκειμένου
ἔχειν, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πεποιήμεθα. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν
20 ὁρισμῶν ἀπόδοσιν, διότι δυνάμενοι συνορᾶν τί ἐν ἑκάστῳ ταὐτόν
οὐκ ἀπορήσομεν εἰς τί δεῖ γένος ὁριζομένους τὸ προκείμενον
τιθέναι· τῶν γὰρ κοινῶν τὸ μάλιστα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον
γένος ἂν εἴη. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολὺ διεστῶσι
χρήσιμος πρὸς τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρία, οἷον ὅτι ταὐτὸν
25 γαλήνη μὲν ἐν θαλάσσῃ, νηνεμία δ' ἐν ἀέρι (ἑκάτερον
γὰρ ἡσυχία), καὶ στιγμὴ ἐν γραμμῇ καὶ μονὰς ἐν ἀριθμῷ
(ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἀρχή). ὥστε τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάντων γένος
ἀποδιδόντες δόξομεν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὁρίζεσθαι. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ
οἱ ὁριζόμενοι οὕτως εἰώθασιν ἀποδιδόναι· τήν τε γὰρ μονάδα
30 ἀρχὴν ἀριθμοῦ φασιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν στιγμὴν ἀρχὴν γραμμῆς.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων γένος τιθέασιν.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄργανα δι' ὧν οἱ συλλογισμοὶ ταῦτ' ἐστίν·
οἱ δὲ τόποι πρὸς οὓς χρήσιμα τὰ λεχθέντα οἵδε εἰσίν.
1That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference is clear: for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever between the objects before us, we shall already have shown that they are not the same: while it helps us in recognizing what a thing is, because we usually distinguish the expression that is proper to the 5essence of each particular thing by means of the differentiae that are proper to it.
The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive arguments and to hypothetical reasonings, and also with a view to the rendering of definitions. It is useful for inductive arguments, because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence: for 10it is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. It is useful for hypothetical reasonings because it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one is true also of the rest. If, then, with regard to any of them we are well supplied with matter for a discussion, we shall secure a preliminary admission that however it is in these cases, so it is also in the case before us: then when we 15have shown the former we shall have shown, on the strength of the hypothesis, the matter before us as well: for we have first made the hypothesis that however it is in these cases, so it is also in the case before us, and have then proved the point as regards these cases. It is useful for the rendering of definitions because, if we are able to see in one glance what is the same in each individual case of it, we shall 20be at no loss into what genus we ought to put the object before us when we define it: for of the common predicates that which is most definitely in the category of essence is likely to be the genus. Likewise, also, in the case of objects widely divergent, the examination of likeness is useful for purposes of definition, e.g. the sameness of a calm at sea, and windlessness in the air (each being a form of rest), and of 25a point on a line and the unit in number-each being a starting point. If, then, we render as the genus what is common to all the cases, we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately. Definition-mongers too nearly always render them in this way: they declare the unit to be the startingpoint of number, and the point the startingpoint of a line. It is clear, then, that they place them in that which is common to 30both as their genus.
The means, then, whereby reasonings are effected, are these: the commonplace rules, for the observance of which the aforesaid means are useful, are as follows.
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The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive arguments and to hypothetical reasonings, and also with a view to the rendering of definitions. It is useful for inductive arguments, because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence: for 10it is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. It is useful for hypothetical reasonings because it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one is true also of the rest. If, then, with regard to any of them we are well supplied with matter for a discussion, we shall secure a preliminary admission that however it is in these cases, so it is also in the case before us: then when we 15have shown the former we shall have shown, on the strength of the hypothesis, the matter before us as well: for we have first made the hypothesis that however it is in these cases, so it is also in the case before us, and have then proved the point as regards these cases. It is useful for the rendering of definitions because, if we are able to see in one glance what is the same in each individual case of it, we shall 20be at no loss into what genus we ought to put the object before us when we define it: for of the common predicates that which is most definitely in the category of essence is likely to be the genus. Likewise, also, in the case of objects widely divergent, the examination of likeness is useful for purposes of definition, e.g. the sameness of a calm at sea, and windlessness in the air (each being a form of rest), and of 25a point on a line and the unit in number-each being a starting point. If, then, we render as the genus what is common to all the cases, we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately. Definition-mongers too nearly always render them in this way: they declare the unit to be the startingpoint of number, and the point the startingpoint of a line. It is clear, then, that they place them in that which is common to 30both as their genus.
The means, then, whereby reasonings are effected, are these: the commonplace rules, for the observance of which the aforesaid means are useful, are as follows.
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