Ross (OCT, 1953) · Ross (1924)
Ross (1924)

Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).

Book 12,Chapter 1 (1069a18–1069b6)
1069a
Περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ
καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν,
20 ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος· καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, κἂν οὕτως πρῶτον
ἡ οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ ποιόν, εἶτα τὸ ποσόν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδ' ὄντα
ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ποιότητες καὶ κινήσεις, ἢ
καὶ τὸ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ· λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ
ταῦτα, οἷον ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν. ἔτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν.
25 μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἔργῳ· τῆς γὰρ οὐσίας ἐζήτουν
ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἴτια. οἱ μὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ καθόλου
οὐσίας μᾶλλον τιθέασιν (τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἅ φασιν
ἀρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν)· οἱ
δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ
30 κοινόν, σῶμα. οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθητή—ἧς ἡ
μὲν ἀΐδιος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ
φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα [ἡ δ' ἀΐδιος]—ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα
λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην
φασί τινες εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες,
35 οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά,
οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων. ἐκεῖναι μὲν δὴ φυσικῆς
" "The subject of our inquiry is substance; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe is of 20the nature of a whole, substance is its first part; and if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession, on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity. At the same time these latter are not even being in the full sense, but are qualities and movements of it,-or else even the not-white and the not-straight would be 25being; at least we say even these are, e.g. 'there is a not-white'. Further, none of the categories other than substance can exist apart. And the early philosophers also in practice testify to the primacy of substance; for it was of substance that they sought the principles and elements and causes. The thinkers of the present day tend to rank universals as substances 30(for genera are universals, and these they tend to describe as principles and substances, owing to the abstract nature of their inquiry); but the thinkers of old ranked particular things as substances, e.g. fire and earth, not what is common to both, body.
"There are three kinds of substance-one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and 35another is perishable; the latter is recognized by all men, and includes e.g.
1069b
1 (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), αὕτη δὲ ἑτέρας, εἰ μηδεμία
αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή.
Ἡ δ' αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή. εἰ δ' ἡ μεταβολὴ
ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ
5 πάντων (οὐ λευκὸν γὰρ ἡ φωνή) ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου,
ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ
γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει.
1plants and animals), of which we must grasp the elements, whether one or many; and another that is immovable, and this certain thinkers assert to be capable of existing apart, some dividing it into two, others identifying the Forms and the objects of mathematics, and others positing, of these two, only the objects of mathematics. The former two kinds of substance are the subject of 5physics (for they imply movement); but the third kind belongs to another science, if there is no principle common to it and to the other kinds.
Book 12,Chapter 2 (1069b7–34)
ἔτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ'
ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει· ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία,
ἡ ὕλη. εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί
10 ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ πόσον ἢ ποῦ, καὶ γένεσις μὲν ἡ ἁπλῆ
καὶ φθορὰ ἡ κατὰ <τὸ> τόδε, αὔξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ κατὰ
τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος, φορὰ δὲ ἡ
κατὰ τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον αἱ
μεταβολαί. ἀνάγκη δὴ μεταβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην
15 ἄμφω· ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει
ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν (οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ δυνάμει εἰς
τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λευκόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως),
ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι
ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεται πάντα, δυνάμει
20 μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι
τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἕν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ "ὁμοῦ πάντα"—καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους
τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός
φησιν—"ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὔ"· ὥστε
τῆς ὕλης ἂν εἶεν ἡμμένοι· πάντα δ' ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα μεταβάλλει,
25 ἀλλ' ἑτέραν· καὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων ὅσα μὴ γενητὰ
κινητὰ δὲ φορᾷ, ἀλλ' οὐ γενητὴν ἀλλὰ ποθὲν ποί. ἀπορήσειε
δ' ἄν τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις· τριχῶς γὰρ
τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δή τι ἔστι δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος
ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου· οὐδ' ἱκανὸν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα
30 χρήματα· διαφέρει γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο
ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕν; ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἷς, ὥστ' εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη μία,
ἐκεῖνο ἐγένετο ἐνεργείᾳ οὗ ἡ ὕλη ἦν δυνάμει. τρία δὴ τὰ
αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἧς τὸ
μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη.
" "Sensible substance is changeable. Now if change proceeds from opposites or from intermediates, and not from all opposites (for the voice is not-white, (but it does not therefore change to white)), but from the contrary, there must be something underlying which changes into the contrary state; for the contraries do not change. Further, 10something persists, but the contrary does not persist; there is, then, some third thing besides the contraries, viz. the matter. Now since changes are of four kinds-either in respect of the 'what' or of the quality or of the quantity or of the place, and change in respect of 'thisness' is simple generation and destruction, and change in quantity is increase and diminution, and change in respect of an affection is alteration, and change of place is motion, changes will be from 15given states into those contrary to them in these several respects. The matter, then, which changes must be capable of both states. And since that which 'is' has two senses, we must say that everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually, e.g. from potentially white to actually white, and similarly in the case of increase and diminution. Therefore not only can a thing come to be, incidentally, out of that which is not, but also all things come to be 20out of that which is, but is potentially, and is not actually. And this is the 'One' of Anaxagoras; for instead of 'all things were together'-and the 'Mixture' of Empedocles and Anaximander and the account given by Democritus-it is better to say 'all things were together potentially but not actually'. Therefore these thinkers seem to have had some notion of matter. Now all things that change have matter, but different matter; and of eternal things those which are not generable 25but are movable in space have matter-not matter for generation, however, but for motion from one place to another.
"One might raise the question from what sort of non-being generation proceeds; for 'non-being' has three senses. If, then, one form of non-being exists potentially, still it is not by virtue of a potentiality for any and every thing, but different things come from different things; nor is it satisfactory to say that 'all things were together'; for they differ in their 30matter, since otherwise why did an infinity of things come to be, and not one thing? For 'reason' is one, so that if matter also were one, that must have come to be in actuality which the matter was in potency. The causes and the principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter.
Book 12,Chapter 3 (1069b35–1070a30)
35 Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος,
λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό
" "Note, next, that neither the matter nor the form comes to be-and I mean the last matter 35and form. For everything that changes is something and is changed by something and into something.
1070a
1 τινος καὶ εἴς τι· ὑφ' οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος· ὃ δέ, ἡ
ὕλη· εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον
ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον
ἢ ὁ χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι. —μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ἑκάστη
5 ἐκ συνωνύμου γίγνεται οὐσία (τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ
τὰ ἄλλα). ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ
αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις
ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ), αἱ δὲ
λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων. οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη
10 τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει,
ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ
ἕξις τις εἰς ἥν· ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα,
οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι
οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος, εἰ
15 μὴ ἡ τέχνη (οὐδ' ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τούτων, ἀλλ' ἄλλον
τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία τε ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης καὶ
ὑγίεια καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ τέχνην), ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει·
διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα
φύσει, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη ἄλλα τούτων *οἷον πῦρ σὰρξ κεφαλή·
20 ἅπαντα γὰρ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ' οὐσίας ἡ τελευταία*.
τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ'
ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα. ὅτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τότε καὶ
ἡ ὑγίεια ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας ἅμα καὶ
ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα (εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον·
25 ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ
πᾶσα ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως). φανερὸν
δὴ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ διά γε ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας· ἄνθρωπος
γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν τινά· ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγιείας
30 ἐστίν.
1That by which it is changed is the immediate mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into which it is changed, the form. The process, then, will go on to infinity, if not only the bronze comes to be round but also the round or the bronze comes to be; therefore there must be a stop.
"Note, next, that each substance comes into being out of 5something that shares its name. (Natural objects and other things both rank as substances.) For things come into being either by art or by nature or by luck or by spontaneity. Now art is a principle of movement in something other than the thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself (for man begets man), and the other causes are privations of these two.
"There are three kinds of substance-the matter, which is a 'this' in 10appearance (for all things that are characterized by contact and not, by organic unity are matter and substratum, e.g. fire, flesh, head; for these are all matter, and the last matter is the matter of that which is in the full sense substance); the nature, which is a 'this' or positive state towards which movement takes place; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, e.g. Socrates or Callias. Now in 15some cases the 'this' does not exist apart from the composite substance, e.g. the form of house does not so exist, unless the art of building exists apart (nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in another way that the house apart from its matter, and health, and all ideals of art, exist and do not exist); but if the 'this' exists apart from the concrete thing, it is only in the case of natural objects. And 20so Plato was not far wrong when he said that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural object (if there are Forms distinct from the things of this earth). The moving causes exist as things preceding the effects, but causes in the sense of definitions are simultaneous with their effects. For when a man is healthy, then health also exists; and the shape of a bronze sphere exists at the same time as the bronze sphere. (But 25we must examine whether any form also survives afterwards. For in some cases there is nothing to prevent this; e.g. the soul may be of this sort-not all soul but the reason; for presumably it is impossible that all soul should survive.) Evidently then there is no necessity, on this ground at least, for the existence of the Ideas. For man is begotten by man, a given man by an individual father; and similarly in the arts; for the medical 30art is the formal cause of health.
Book 12,Chapter 4 (1070a31–1070b35)
Τὰ δ' αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι
δ' ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ
πάντων. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον ἕτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ
ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρός τι, καὶ καθ'
35 ἑκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον εἰ ταὐτὰ
πάντων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι.
" "The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all. For one might raise the question whether the principles and elements are different or the same for substances and for relative terms, and similarly in the case of each of the categories. But it would be paradoxical if they were the 35same for all. For then from the same elements will proceed relative terms and substances.
1070b
1 τί οὖν τοῦτ' ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα
οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν
στοιχεῖον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρός τι,
οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας. ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται πάντων
5 εἶναι ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷόν τ' εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων
τῷ ἐκ στοιχείων συγκειμένῳ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον τῷ ΒΑ τὸ Β ἢ Α
(οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἕν·
ὑπάρχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ τῶν συνθέτων). οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἔσται
αὐτῶν οὔτ' οὐσία οὔτε πρός τι· ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα
10 πάντων ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα. —ἢ ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι
δ' ὡς οὔ, οἷον ἴσως τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων ὡς μὲν εἶδος τὸ
θερμὸν καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἡ στέρησις, ὕλη δὲ τὸ
δυνάμει ταῦτα πρῶτον καθ' αὑτό, οὐσίαι δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ
τὰ ἐκ τούτων, ὧν ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα, ἢ εἴ τι ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ
15 γίγνεται ἕν, οἷον σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν· ἕτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐκείνων
εἶναι τὸ γενόμενον. τούτων μὲν οὖν ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαί
(ἄλλων δ' ἄλλα), πάντων δὲ οὕτω μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνάλογον
δέ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος
καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη. ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τούτων ἕτερον περὶ
20 ἕκαστον γένος ἐστίν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι λευκὸν μέλαν ἐπιφάνεια·
φῶς σκότος ἀήρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ.
ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
ἐκτὸς οἷον τὸ κινοῦν, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον,
αἴτια δ' ἄμφω, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δ'
25 ὡς κινοῦν ἢ ἱστὰν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὐσία, ὥστε στοιχεῖα μὲν
κατ' ἀναλογίαν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες· ἄλλο
δ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὡς κινοῦν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ.
ὑγίεια, νόσος, σῶμα· τὸ κινοῦν ἰατρική. εἶδος, ἀταξία
τοιαδί, πλίνθοι· τὸ κινοῦν οἰκοδομική [καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται
30 ἡ ἀρχή]. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς
ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ
ἐναντίον, τρόπον τινὰ τρία αἴτια ἂν εἴη, ὡδὶ δὲ τέτταρα.
ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἡ ἰατρική, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἡ οἰκοδομική,
καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ· ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς
35 πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα.
1What then will this common element be? For (1) (a) there is nothing common to and distinct from substance and the other categories, viz. those which are predicated; but an element is prior to the things of which it is an element. But again (b) substance is not an element in relative terms, nor is any of these an element in substance. 5Further, (2) how can all things have the same elements? For none of the elements can be the same as that which is composed of elements, e.g. b or a cannot be the same as ba. (None, therefore, of the intelligibles, e.g. being or unity, is an element; for these are predicable of each of the compounds as well.) None of the elements, then, will be either a substance or a relative term; but it must be one or other. All 10things, then, have not the same elements.
"Or, as we are wont to put it, in a sense they have and in a sense they have not; e.g. perhaps the elements of perceptible bodies are, as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, which is the privation; and, as matter, that which directly and of itself potentially has these attributes; and substances comprise both these and the things composed of these, of which these are 15the principles, or any unity which is produced out of the hot and the cold, e.g. flesh or bone; for the product must be different from the elements. These things then have the same elements and principles (though specifically different things have specifically different elements); but all things have not the same elements in this sense, but only analogically; i.e. one might say that there are three principles-the form, 20the privation, and the matter. But each of these is different for each class; e.g. in colour they are white, black, and surface, and in day and night they are light, darkness, and air.
"Since not only the elements present in a thing are causes, but also something external, i.e. the moving cause, clearly while 'principle' and 'element' are different both are causes, and 'principle' is divided into these two kinds; 25and that which acts as producing movement or rest is a principle and a substance. Therefore analogically there are three elements, and four causes and principles; but the elements are different in different things, and the proximate moving cause is different for different things. Health, disease, body; the moving cause is the medical art. Form, disorder of a particular kind, bricks; the moving cause is the building art. 30And since the moving cause in the case of natural things is-for man, for instance, man, and in the products of thought the form or its contrary, there will be in a sense three causes, while in a sense there are four. For the medical art is in some sense health, and the building art is the form of the house, and man begets man; further, besides these there is that which as first of all things moves all things.
Book 12,Chapter 5 (1070b36–1071b2)
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ τὰ δ' οὐ χωριστά, οὐσίαι
" 35"Some things can exist apart and some cannot, and it is the former that are substances.
1071a
1 ἐκεῖνα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων αἴτια ταὐτά, ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν
ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις. ἔπειτα ἔσται ταῦτα
ψυχὴ ἴσως καὶ σῶμα, ἢ νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ σῶμα. —ἔτι
δ' ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἷον ἐνέργεια
5 καὶ δύναμις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ
ἄλλως. ἐν ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστιν
ὁτὲ δὲ δυνάμει, οἷον οἶνος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ἄνθρωπος (πίπτει δὲ
καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ εἰρημένα αἴτια· ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
εἶδος, ἐὰν ᾖ χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν στέρησις δέ, οἷον
10 σκότος ἢ κάμνον, δυνάμει δὲ ἡ ὕλη· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ
δυνάμενον γίγνεσθαι ἄμφω)· ἄλλως δ' ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει
διαφέρει ὧν μὴ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη, ὧν <ἐνίων> οὐκ ἔστι τὸ
αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου αἴτιον τά τε στοιχεῖα,
πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι
15 ἄλλο ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ
λοξὸς κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὔτ' εἶδος οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε
ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα. ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅτι τὰ μὲν καθόλου
ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, τὰ δ' οὔ. πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ
ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει. ἐκεῖνα μὲν
20 οὖν τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν
καθ' ἕκαστον· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου, ἀλλ'
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ Πηλεὺς Ἀχιλλέως σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ,
καὶ τοδὶ τὸ Β τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ ἁπλῶς
ΒΑ. ἔπειτα, εἰ δὴ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων
25 αἴτια καὶ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῶν μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει,
χρωμάτων ψόφων οὐσιῶν ποσότητος, πλὴν τῷ ἀνάλογον·
καὶ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴδει ἕτερα, οὐκ εἴδει ἀλλ' ὅτι
τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἄλλο, ἥ τε σὴ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινῆσαν
καὶ ἡ ἐμή, τῷ καθόλου δὲ λόγῳ ταὐτά. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν
30 τίνες ἀρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πρός τι καὶ ποιῶν,
πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς γε λεγομένων
ἔστιν ἑκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δὲ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα,
πλὴν ὡδὶ καὶ πάντων, ὡδὶ μὲν ταὐτὰ ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι
ὕλη, εἶδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ ὡδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν
35 αἴτια ὡς αἴτια πάντων, ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων· ἔτι
τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχείᾳ· ὡδὶ δὲ ἕτερα πρῶτα ὅσα τὰ
ἐναντία ἃ μήτε ὡς γένη λέγεται μήτε πολλαχῶς λέγεται·
1And therefore all things have the same causes, because, without substances, modifications and movements do not exist. Further, these causes will probably be soul and body, or reason and desire and body.
"And in yet another way, analogically identical things are principles, i.e. actuality and potency; but these also are not only different for different things but also apply in different 5ways to them. For in some cases the same thing exists at one time actually and at another potentially, e.g. wine or flesh or man does so. (And these too fall under the above-named causes. For the form exists actually, if it can exist apart, and so does the complex of form and matter, and the privation, e.g. darkness or disease; but the matter exists potentially; for this is that which can become qualified either by the form or by the privation.) But the distinction of actuality and 10potentiality applies in another way to cases where the matter of cause and of effect is not the same, in some of which cases the form is not the same but different; e.g. the cause of man is (1) the elements in man (viz. fire and earth as matter, and the peculiar form), and further (2) something else outside, i.e. the father, and (3) besides these the sun and its oblique course, which are neither matter nor form nor privation of man nor of the same species with him, but moving causes.
"Further, 15one must observe that some causes can be expressed in universal terms, and some cannot. The proximate principles of all things are the 'this' which is proximate in actuality, and another which is proximate in potentiality. The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist. For it is the individual that is the originative principle of the individuals. For while man is the originative principle of man universally, there is no universal man, but Peleus is the originative 20principle of Achilles, and your father of you, and this particular b of this particular ba, though b in general is the originative principle of ba taken without qualification.
"Further, if the causes of substances are the causes of all things, yet different things have different causes and elements, as was said; the causes of things that are not in the same class, e.g. of colours and sounds, of substances and quantities, are different except in an analogical sense; and those of things 25in the same species are different, not in species, but in the sense that the causes of different individuals are different, your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine, while in their universal definition they are the same. And if we inquire what are the principles or elements of substances and relations and qualities-whether they are the same or different-clearly when the names of the causes are used in several senses the causes of each are the same, but when the 30senses are distinguished the causes are not the same but different, except that in the following senses the causes of all are the same. They are (1) the same or analogous in this sense, that matter, form, privation, and the moving cause are common to all things; and (2) the causes of substances may be treated as causes of all things in this sense, that when substances are removed all things are removed; further, (3) that which is first in respect of complete reality is the cause of 35all things. But in another sense there are different first causes, viz. all the contraries which are neither generic nor ambiguous terms; and, further, the matters of different things are different.
1071b
1 καὶ ἔτι αἱ ὗλαι. τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς ἕτεραι, εἴρηται.
1We have stated, then, what are the principles of sensible things and how many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense different.
Book 12,Chapter 6 (1071b3–1072a18)
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία
δ' ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιόν
5 τινα οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον. αἵ τε γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων,
καὶ εἰ πᾶσαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον
κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν), οὐδὲ χρόνον.
οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου·
καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος·
10 ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος. κίνησις δ' οὐκ
ἔστι συνεχὴς ἀλλ' ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ
τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ
ἐνεργεῖν. οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ' ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν ἀϊδίους,
15 ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἴδη, εἰ μή τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ
μεταβάλλειν· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐσία
παρὰ τὰ εἴδη· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις. ἔτι
οὐδ' εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ' οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται
κίνησις ἀΐδιος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι. δεῖ
20 ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια. ἔτι τοίνυν
ταύτας δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἄνευ ὕλης· ἀϊδίους γὰρ δεῖ,
εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀΐδιον. ἐνέργεια ἄρα. καίτοι ἀπορία·
δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργοῦν πᾶν δύνασθαι τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον
οὐ πᾶν ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε πρότερον εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν.
25 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, οὐθὲν ἔσται τῶν ὄντων· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
δύνασθαι μὲν εἶναι μήπω δ' εἶναι. καίτοι εἰ ὡς λέγουσιν
οἱ θεολόγοι οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς γεννῶντες, ἢ ὡς οἱ φυσικοὶ
ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματά φασι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. πῶς γὰρ
κινηθήσεται, εἰ μὴ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ τι αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε
30 ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπιμήνια
οὐδ' ἡ γῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ἡ γονή. διὸ
ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων·
ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί φασι κίνησιν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί καὶ τίνα οὐ λέγουσιν,
οὐδ', <εἰ> ὡδὶ <ἢ> ὡδί, τὴν αἰτίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς
35 ἔτυχε κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἕσπερ νῦν φύσει μὲν
ὡδί, βίᾳ δὲ ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ὡδί. (εἶτα ποία πρώτη;
διαφέρει γὰρ ἀμήχανον ὅσον). ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί
" "Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them physical and one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. 5For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible. But it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time should. For there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which time is; for time is either the same thing as 10movement or an attribute of movement. And there is no continuous movement except movement in place, and of this only that which is circular is continuous.
"But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on them, but is not actually doing so, there will not necessarily be movement; for that which has a potency need not exercise it. Nothing, then, is gained even if we suppose eternal substances, as the believers 15in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can cause change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another substance besides the Forms enough; for if it is not to act, there will be no movement. Further even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may possibly not be. There must, then, be such a principle, 20whose very essence is actuality. Further, then, these substances must be without matter; for they must be eternal, if anything is eternal. Therefore they must be actuality.
"Yet there is a difficulty; for it is thought that everything that acts is able to act, but that not everything that is able to act acts, so that the potency is prior. But if this is so, nothing that is need be; for it is possible for all things to be capable 25of existing but not yet to exist.
"Yet if we follow the theologians who generate the world from night, or the natural philosophers who say that 'all things were together', the same impossible result ensues. For how will there be movement, if there is no actually existing cause? Wood will surely not move itself-the carpenter's art must act on it; nor will the menstrual blood nor the earth set themselves in motion, but the seeds 30must act on the earth and the semen on the menstrual blood.
"This is why some suppose eternal actuality-e.g. Leucippus and Plato; for they say there is always movement. But why and what this movement is they do say, nor, if the world moves in this way or that, do they tell us the cause of its doing so. Now nothing is moved at random, but there must always be something present to move it; e.g. as a matter of fact a thing moves 35in one way by nature, and in another by force or through the influence of reason or something else. (Further, what sort of movement is primary? This makes a vast difference.)
1072a
1 γε οἷόν τε λέγειν ἣν οἴεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ
ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή,
ὡς φησίν. τὸ μὲν δὴ δύναμιν οἴεσθαι ἐνεργείας πρότερον
ἔστι μὲν ὡς καλῶς ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ (εἴρηται δὲ πῶς)· ὅτι δ'
5 ἐνέργεια πρότερον, μαρτυρεῖ Ἀναξαγόρας (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια)
καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ λέγοντες
κίνησιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ Λεύκιππος· ὥστ' οὐκ ἦν ἄπειρον
χρόνον χάος ἢ νύξ, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἢ περιόδῳ ἢ ἄλλως,
εἴπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως. εἰ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ
10 ἀεὶ περιόδῳ, δεῖ τι ἀεὶ μένειν ὡσαύτως ἐνεργοῦν. εἰ δὲ
μέλλει γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ εἶναι, ἄλλο δεῖ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦν
ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὡδὶ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ
ἐνεργεῖν ὡδὶ δὲ κατ' ἄλλο· ἤτοι ἄρα καθ' ἕτερον ἢ κατὰ
τὸ πρῶτον. ἀνάγκη δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο
15 αὐτῷ τε αἴτιον κἀκείνῳ. οὐκοῦν βέλτιον τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ
γὰρ αἴτιον ἦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως· τοῦ δ' ἄλλως ἕτερον,
τοῦ δ' ἀεὶ ἄλλως ἄμφω δηλονότι. οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ ἔχουσιν
αἱ κινήσεις. τί οὖν ἄλλας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀρχάς;
1But again for Plato, at least, it is not permissible to name here that which he sometimes supposes to be the source of movement-that which moves itself; for the soul is later, and coeval with the heavens, according to his account. To suppose potency prior to actuality, then, is in a sense right, and in a sense not; and we have specified these senses. That 5actuality is prior is testified by Anaxagoras (for his 'reason' is actuality) and by Empedocles in his doctrine of love and strife, and by those who say that there is always movement, e.g. Leucippus. Therefore chaos or night did not exist for an infinite time, but the same things have always existed (either passing through a cycle of changes or obeying some other law), since actuality is prior to potency. If, then, there is a constant cycle, something 10must always remain, acting in the same way. And if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else which is always acting in different ways. This must, then, act in one way in virtue of itself, and in another in virtue of something else-either of a third agent, therefore, or of the first. Now it must be in virtue of the first. For otherwise this again causes the motion both of the second agent and of the third. Therefore 15it is better to say 'the first'. For it was the cause of eternal uniformity; and something else is the cause of variety, and evidently both together are the cause of eternal variety. This, accordingly, is the character which the motions actually exhibit. What need then is there to seek for other principles?
Book 12,Chapter 7 (1072a19–1073a13)
Ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτω τ' ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ἐκ νυκτὸς
20 ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, λύοιτ' ἂν
ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη
δ' ἡ κύκλῳ (καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργῳ δῆλον),
ὥστ' ἀΐδιος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός. ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ
κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν [καὶ] μέσον, †τοίνυν†
25 ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια
οὖσα. κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα.
τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ
τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὂν καλόν·
ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα·
30 ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις. νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ
ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ' αὑτήν· καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη,
καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ
τὸ ἁπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν μέτρον σημαίνει, τὸ
δὲ ἁπλοῦν πὼς ἔχον αὐτό). ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ
35 τὸ δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ· καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον
" "Since (1) this is a possible account of the matter, and (2) if it were not true, the world would have proceeded out of night and 'all things 20together' and out of non-being, these difficulties may be taken as solved. There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it. And since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, 25substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by the object of thought, and 30one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for 'one' means a measure, but 'simple' means that the thing itself has a certain nature.) But the beautiful, also, and that which is in itself desirable are in the same column; and the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best.
1072b
1 ἀεὶ ἢ ἀνάλογον τὸ πρῶτον. ὅτι δ' ἔστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τοῖς
ἀκινήτοις, ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ· ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα <καὶ>
τινός, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστι. κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον,
κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ
5 ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ' εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ᾗ κινεῖται
ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ
εἰ μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν,
ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ
γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ· ταύτην
10 δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ᾗ ἀνάγκῃ,
καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς,
τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ,
τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. —ἐκ τοιαύτης
ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγὴ δ'
15 ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο·
ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου
(καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες
δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ' αὑτὴν
τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. αὑτὸν
20 δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ
γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν.
τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ
ἔχων, ὥστ' ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν,
καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει,
25 ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι
θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ
γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ
καθ' αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν
θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς
30 καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. ὅσοι δὲ
ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος
τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ
τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ
δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται.
35 τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ
1"That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not. The final cause, then, produces 5motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved. Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is. Therefore if its actuality is the primary form of spatial motion, then in so far as it is subject to change, in this respect it is capable of being otherwise,-in place, even if not in substance. But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can 10in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover produces. The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses-that which is necessary perforce because 15it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way.
"On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are 20waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its 25objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which 30we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.
1073a
1 πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἷον πρότερον
ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου
γενόμενον ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν
οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν,
5 φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος
οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ' ἀμερὴς
καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ'
ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον· ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος
ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ
10 ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δ' ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον
μέγεθος)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον·
πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δῆλα διότι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.
1"Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beginning, because the beginnings both of plants and of animals are causes, but beauty and completeness are in the effects of these, are wrong in their opinion. For the seed comes from other individuals which are prior and 5complete, and the first thing is not seed but the complete being; e.g. we must say that before the seed there is a man,-not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes.
"It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and 10indivisible (for it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place.
Book 12,Chapter 8 (1073a14–1074b14)
Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους,
15 καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰς
τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν
ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ἰδέας ὑπόληψις
οὐδεμίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ἰδίαν (ἀριθμοὺς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς
ἰδέας οἱ λέγοντες ἰδέας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς
20 περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν ὁτὲ δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὡρισμένων·
δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν,
οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς)· ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ τῶν
ὑποκειμένων καὶ διωρισμένων λεκτέον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ
τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ
25 συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν·
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη ὑπό τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ
πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' αὑτό, καὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον κίνησιν
ὑπὸ ἀϊδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ' ἑνός, ὁρῶμεν
δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ἁπλῆν φοράν, ἣν κινεῖν φαμὲν
30 τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἄλλας φορὰς οὔσας
τὰς τῶν πλανήτων ἀϊδίους (ἀΐδιον γὰρ καὶ ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ
σῶμα· δέδεικται δ' ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη
καὶ τούτων ἑκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ' ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ'
αὑτὴν καὶ ἀϊδίου οὐσίας. ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρων φύσις ἀΐδιος
35 οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ τὸ κινοῦν ἀΐδιον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου,
καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερὸν
τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τήν τε
φύσιν ἀϊδίους καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ' αὑτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους
15" "It is clear, then, why these things are as they are. But we must not ignore the question whether we have to suppose one such substance or more than one, and if the latter, how many; we must also mention, regarding the opinions expressed by others, that they have said nothing about the number of the substances that can even be clearly stated. For the theory of Ideas has no special discussion of the subject; for those 20who speak of Ideas say the Ideas are numbers, and they speak of numbers now as unlimited, now as limited by the number 10; but as for the reason why there should be just so many numbers, nothing is said with any demonstrative exactness. We however must discuss the subject, starting from the presuppositions and distinctions we have mentioned. The first principle or primary being is not movable either in itself or 25accidentally, but produces the primary eternal and single movement. But since that which is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover must be in itself unmovable, and eternal movement must be produced by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing, and since we see that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say the first and unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial 30movements-those of the planets-which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting; we have proved these points in the physical treatises), each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal. For the nature of the stars is eternal just because it is a certain kind of substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and that which is 35prior to a substance must be a substance. Evidently, then, there must be substances which are of the same number as the movements of the stars, and in their nature eternal, and in themselves unmovable, and without magnitude, for the reason before mentioned.
1073b
1 διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. —ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι,
καὶ τούτων τις πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν
ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρων, φανερόν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν
φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν μαθηματικῶν
5 ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας· αὕτη γὰρ περὶ
οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀϊδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ'
ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας, οἷον ἥ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ
τὴν γεωμετρίαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείους τῶν φερομένων αἱ φοραί,
φανερὸν τοῖς καὶ μετρίως ἡμμένοις (πλείους γὰρ ἕκαστον
10 φέρεται μιᾶς τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων)· πόσαι δ' αὗται
τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, νῦν μὲν ἡμεῖς ἃ λέγουσι τῶν μαθηματικῶν
τινὲς ἐννοίας χάριν λέγομεν, ὅπως ᾖ τι τῇ διανοίᾳ
πλῆθος ὡρισμένον ὑπολαβεῖν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὰ μὲν ζητοῦντας
αὐτοὺς δεῖ τὰ δὲ πυνθανομένους παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων,
15 ἄν τι φαίνηται παρὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα τοῖς ταῦτα πραγματευομένοις,
φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.
—Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἑκατέρου τὴν
φορὰν ἐν τρισὶν ἐτίθετ' εἶναι σφαίραις, ὧν τὴν μὲν πρώτην
τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἄστρων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν κατὰ τὸν
20 διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων, τὴν δὲ τρίτην κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον
ἐν τῷ πλάτει τῶν ζῳδίων (ἐν μείζονι δὲ πλάτει λελοξῶσθαι
καθ' ὃν ἡ σελήνη φέρεται ἢ καθ' ὃν ὁ ἥλιος), τῶν
δὲ πλανωμένων ἄστρων ἐν τέτταρσιν ἑκάστου σφαίραις, καὶ
τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν πρώτην καὶ δευτέραν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι
25 ἐκείναις (τήν τε γὰρ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν ἁπάσας φέρουσαν
εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ ταύτῃ τεταγμένην καὶ κατὰ τὸν διὰ
μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων τὴν φορὰν ἔχουσαν κοινὴν ἁπασῶν εἶναι),
τῆς δὲ τρίτης ἁπάντων τοὺς πόλους ἐν τῷ διὰ μέσων τῶν
ζῳδίων εἶναι, τῆς δὲ τετάρτης τὴν φορὰν κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον
30 πρὸς τὸν μέσον ταύτης· εἶναι δὲ τῆς τρίτης σφαίρας
τοὺς πόλους τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἰδίους, τοὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης
καὶ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ τοὺς αὐτούς· Κάλλιππος δὲ τὴν μὲν θέσιν
τῶν σφαιρῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐτίθετο Εὐδόξῳ [τοῦτ' ἔστι τῶν ἀποστημάτων
τὴν τάξιν], τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῷ μὲν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ
35 τῷ τοῦ Κρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ ἀπεδίδου, τῷ δ' ἡλίῳ καὶ τῇ
σελήνῃ δύο ᾤετο ἔτι προσθετέας εἶναι σφαίρας, τὰ φαινόμενα
εἰ μέλλει τις ἀποδώσειν, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τῶν πλανήτων
ἑκάστῳ μίαν. ἀναγκαῖον δέ, εἰ μέλλουσι συντεθεῖσαι
1That the movers are substances, then, and that one of these is first and another second according to the same order as the movements of the stars, is evident. But in the number of the movements we reach a problem which must be treated from the standpoint of that one of the 5mathematical sciences which is most akin to philosophy-viz. of astronomy; for this science speculates about substance which is perceptible but eternal, but the other mathematical sciences, i.e. arithmetic and geometry, treat of no substance. That the movements are more numerous than the bodies that are moved is evident to those who have given even 10moderate attention to the matter; for each of the planets has more than one movement. But as to the actual number of these movements, we now-to give some notion of the subject-quote what some of the mathematicians say, that our thought may have some definite number to grasp; but, for the rest, we must partly investigate for ourselves, Partly 15learn from other investigators, and if those who study this subject form an opinion contrary to what we have now stated, we must esteem both parties indeed, but follow the more accurate.
"Eudoxus supposed that the motion of the sun or of the moon involves, in either case, three spheres, of which the first is the sphere of the fixed stars, and the 20second moves in the circle which runs along the middle of the zodiac, and the third in the circle which is inclined across the breadth of the zodiac; but the circle in which the moon moves is inclined at a greater angle than that in which the sun moves. And the motion of the planets involves, in each case, four spheres, and of these also the 25first and second are the same as the first two mentioned above (for the sphere of the fixed stars is that which moves all the other spheres, and that which is placed beneath this and has its movement in the circle which bisects the zodiac is common to all), but the poles of the third sphere of each planet are in the circle which bisects the 30zodiac, and the motion of the fourth sphere is in the circle which is inclined at an angle to the equator of the third sphere; and the poles of the third sphere are different for each of the other planets, but those of Venus and Mercury are the same.
"Callippus made the position of the spheres the same as Eudoxus did, but while he assigned the same 35number as Eudoxus did to Jupiter and to Saturn, he thought two more spheres should be added to the sun and two to the moon, if one is to explain the observed facts; and one more to each of the other planets.
1074a
1 πᾶσαι τὰ φαινόμενα ἀποδώσειν, καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων
ἑτέρας σφαίρας μιᾷ ἐλάττονας εἶναι τὰς ἀνελιττούσας
καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθιστάσας τῇ θέσει τὴν πρώτην
σφαῖραν ἀεὶ τοῦ ὑποκάτω τεταγμένου ἄστρου· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως
5 ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῶν πλανήτων φορὰν ἅπαντα ποιεῖσθαι.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν αἷς μὲν αὐτὰ φέρεται σφαίραις αἱ μὲν ὀκτὼ
αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσίν εἰσιν, τούτων δὲ μόνας οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι
ἐν αἷς τὸ κατωτάτω τεταγμένον φέρεται, αἱ μὲν
τὰς τῶν πρώτων δύο ἀνελίττουσαι ἓξ ἔσονται, αἱ δὲ τὰς
10 τῶν ὕστερον τεττάρων ἑκκαίδεκα· ὁ δὴ ἁπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν
τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν ταύτας πεντήκοντά τε
καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθείη
τις ἃς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἑπτά
τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. —τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω
15 τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους
[καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς] τοσαύτας εὔλογον ὑπολαβεῖν (τὸ γὰρ
ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν)· εἰ δὲ μηδεμίαν
οἷόν τ' εἶναι φορὰν μὴ συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἄστρου φοράν,
ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν φύσιν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀπαθῆ καὶ καθ'
20 αὑτὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου τετυχηκυῖαν τέλος εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν, οὐδεμία
ἂν εἴη παρὰ ταύτας ἑτέρα φύσις, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη
τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν. εἴτε γὰρ εἰσὶν ἕτεραι, κινοῖεν
ἂν ὡς τέλος οὖσαι φορᾶς· ἀλλὰ εἶναί γε ἄλλας φορὰς
ἀδύνατον παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. τοῦτο δὲ εὔλογον ἐκ τῶν
25 φερομένων ὑπολαβεῖν. εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φέρον τοῦ φερομένου
χάριν πέφυκε καὶ φορὰ πᾶσα φερομένου τινός ἐστιν, οὐδεμία
φορὰ αὑτῆς ἂν ἕνεκα εἴη οὐδ' ἄλλης φορᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῶν
ἄστρων ἕνεκα. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται φορὰ φορᾶς ἕνεκα, καὶ ἐκείνην
ἑτέρου δεήσει χάριν εἶναι· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷόν τε εἰς ἄπειρον,
30 τέλος ἔσται πάσης φορᾶς τῶν φερομένων τι θείων σωμάτων
κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. ὅτι δὲ εἷς οὐρανός, φανερόν. εἰ
γὰρ πλείους οὐρανοὶ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ἔσται εἴδει μία ἡ περὶ
ἕκαστον ἀρχή, ἀριθμῷ δέ γε πολλαί. ἀλλ' ὅσα ἀριθμῷ
πολλά, ὕλην ἔχει (εἷς γὰρ λόγος καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πολλῶν,
35 οἷον ἀνθρώπου, Σωκράτης δὲ εἷς)· τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει
ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον· ἐντελέχεια γάρ. ἓν ἄρα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ
ἀριθμῷ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον ὄν· καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα
ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς· εἷς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος. παραδέδοται
1"But it is necessary, if all the spheres combined are to explain the observed facts, that for each of the planets there should be other spheres (one fewer than those hitherto assigned) which counteract those already mentioned and bring back to the same position the outermost sphere of the star which in each case is situated 5below the star in question; for only thus can all the forces at work produce the observed motion of the planets. Since, then, the spheres involved in the movement of the planets themselves are--eight for Saturn and Jupiter and twenty-five for the others, and of these only those involved in the movement of the lowest-situated planet need not be counteracted the spheres which counteract those of the 10outermost two planets will be six in number, and the spheres which counteract those of the next four planets will be sixteen; therefore the number of all the spheres--both those which move the planets and those which counteract these--will be fifty-five. And if one were not to add to the moon and to the sun the movements we mentioned, the whole set of spheres will be forty-seven in number.
"Let this, then, 15be taken as the number of the spheres, so that the unmovable substances and principles also may probably be taken as just so many; the assertion of necessity must be left to more powerful thinkers. But if there can be no spatial movement which does not conduce to the moving of a star, and if further every being and every substance which is immune from change and in virtue of itself has attained to the 20best must be considered an end, there can be no other being apart from these we have named, but this must be the number of the substances. For if there are others, they will cause change as being a final cause of movement; but there cannot he other movements besides those mentioned. And it is reasonable to infer this from a consideration of the bodies that are moved; for if everything that moves is for 25the sake of that which is moved, and every movement belongs to something that is moved, no movement can be for the sake of itself or of another movement, but all the movements must be for the sake of the stars. For if there is to be a movement for the sake of a movement, this latter also will have to be for the sake of something else; so that since there cannot be an infinite regress, the end of every 30movement will be one of the divine bodies which move through the heaven.
"(Evidently there is but one heaven. For if there are many heavens as there are many men, the moving principles, of which each heaven will have one, will be one in form but in number many. But all things that are many in number have matter; for one and the same definition, e.g. that of man, applies to many things, while Socrates is one. 35But the primary essence has not matter; for it is complete reality. So the unmovable first mover is one both in definition and in number; so too, therefore, is that which is moved always and continuously; therefore there is one heaven alone.)
1074b
1 δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μύθου σχήματι
καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν
οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ
μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ
5 πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς
τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁμοίους τισὶ
λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς
εἰρημένοις, ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον,
ὅτι θεοὺς ᾤοντο τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρῆσθαι
10 νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς
τὸ δυνατὸν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν
φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα
περισεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. ἡ μὲν οὖν πάτριος δόξα καὶ
ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερὰ μόνον.
1Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they 5say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone-that they thought the first substances to be gods, one must regard this as an inspired utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as 10possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure. Only thus far, then, is the opinion of our ancestors and of our earliest predecessors clear to us.
Book 12,Chapter 9 (1074b15–1075a10)
15 Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ μὲν
γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δ' ἔχων τοιοῦτος
ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν
εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων· εἴτε
νοεῖ, τούτου δ' ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ
20 οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη· διὰ
γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἡ
οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησίς ἐστι, τί νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἢ
ἕτερόν τι· καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἢ ἄλλο. πότερον
οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν;
25 ἢ καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων; δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι
τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει· εἰς
χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ κίνησίς τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον
ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως· ἔπειτα δῆλον
30 ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον
νοοῦντι, ὥστ' εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια κρεῖττον
ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἡ νόησις. αὑτὸν ἄρα
νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.
35 φαίνεται δ' ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ
ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὑτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο
τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει;
οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ. ἢ ἐπ'
" "The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems; for while thought is held to be the most divine of things observed by us, the question how it must be situated in order to have that character 15involves difficulties. For if it thinks of nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (since that which is its substance is not the act of thinking, but a potency) it cannot be the best substance; for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it. Further, whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act of thinking, what does 20it think of? Either of itself or of something else; and if of something else, either of the same thing always or of something different. Does it matter, then, or not, whether it thinks of the good or of any chance thing? Are there not some things about which it is incredible that it should think? Evidently, then, it thinks of that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, 25and this would be already a movement. First, then, if 'thought' is not the act of thinking but a potency, it would be reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought of. For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing in the world, so that if this ought to 30be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.
"But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only 35by the way. Further, if thinking and being thought of are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For to he an act of thinking and to he an object of thought are not the same thing. We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object.
1075a
1 ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ
ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ
λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου
καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ
5 νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία. ἔτι δὴ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον
τὸ νοούμενον· μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. ἢ
ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην—ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς
ἢ ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ
ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὂν ἄλλο τι)—
10 οὕτως δ' ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα;
1In the productive sciences it is the substance or essence of the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences the definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be 5one with the object of its thought.
"A further question is left-whether the object of the divine thought is composite; for if it were, thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole. We answer that everything which has not matter is indivisible-as human thought, or rather the thought of composite beings, is in a certain period of time (for it does not possess the good at this moment or at that, but its best, being something different 10from it, is attained only in a whole period of time), so throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for its object.
Book 12,Chapter 10 (1075a11–1076a4)
Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ
ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ
καθ' αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα;
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον
15 οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν.
πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ
καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ
πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν
ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις
20 ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα
τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς
τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου
ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. λέγω δ' οἷον εἴς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι
ἀνάγκη ἅπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν ὧν κοινωνεῖ
25 ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον. —ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ
ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι, καὶ ποῖα οἱ χαριεστέρως λέγοντες,
καὶ ἐπὶ ποίων ἐλάχισται ἀπορίαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.
πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίων ποιοῦσι πάντα. οὔτε δὲ τὸ πάντα οὔτε
τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίων ὀρθῶς, οὔτ' ἐν ὅσοις τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει, πῶς
30 ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔσται, οὐ λέγουσιν· ἀπαθῆ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία
ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν δὲ λύεται τοῦτο εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτον τι
εἶναι. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ
τὸ ἄνισον τῷ ἴσῳ ἢ τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ πολλά. λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡ μία οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον. ἔτι
35 ἅπαντα τοῦ φαύλου μεθέξει ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν
αὐτὸ θάτερον τῶν στοιχείων. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι οὐδ' ἀρχὰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ τὸ κακόν· καίτοι ἐν ἅπασι μάλιστα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχή.
οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς ὅτι ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ
" "We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good, and the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter; for he does not 15depend on the order but it depends on him. And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike,-both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end, but it is as in a house, where the freemen are least at liberty to act at random, but all things or most things are already ordained for them, while the slaves and the animals 20do little for the common good, and for the most part live at random; for this is the sort of principle that constitutes the nature of each. I mean, for instance, that all must at least come to be dissolved into their elements, and there are other functions similarly in which all share for the good of the whole.
"We must not fail to observe how many impossible or paradoxical results confront those who hold different views from our own, and what are 25the views of the subtler thinkers, and which views are attended by fewest difficulties. All make all things out of contraries. But neither 'all things' nor 'out of contraries' is right; nor do these thinkers tell us how all the things in which the contraries are present can be made out of the contraries; for contraries are not affected by one another. Now for us this difficulty is solved naturally by the fact that there is a third element. These thinkers 30however make one of the two contraries matter; this is done for instance by those who make the unequal matter for the equal, or the many matter for the one. But this also is refuted in the same way; for the one matter which underlies any pair of contraries is contrary to nothing. Further, all things, except the one, will, on the view we are criticizing, partake of evil; for the bad itself is one of the two elements. But the other school does not 35treat the good and the bad even as principles; yet in all things the good is in the highest degree a principle. The school we first mentioned is right in saying that it is a principle, but how the good is a principle they do not say-whether as end or as mover or as form.
1075b
1 οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινῆσαν ἢ ὡς εἶδος. ἀτόπως
δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
αὕτη δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινοῦσα (συνάγει γάρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη·
μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος. εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν
5 καὶ ὡς ὕλῃ ἀρχῇ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινοῦντι, ἀλλὰ τό γ' εἶναι οὐ
ταὐτό. κατὰ πότερον οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον
εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις.
Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ.
ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν·
10 ἡ γὰρ ἰατρική ἐστί πως ἡ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ
ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ' οἱ
τἀναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίσῃ
τις. καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ' ἄφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει·
πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι οἱ
15 μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα· οἱ δ' ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο
ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἓν πάντα ποιοῦσιν. —ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις
καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως, οὐδεὶς λέγει. καὶ τοῖς δύο ἀρχὰς
ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ
εἴδη ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα· διὰ τί γὰρ μετέσχεν ἢ
20 μετέχει; καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιμιωτάτῃ
ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῖν δ' οὔ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν
ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ οὐδέν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην ἔχει,
καὶ δυνάμει ταῦτα ἔστιν· ἡ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον,
τῷ δὲ πρώτῳ ἐναντίον οὐδέν. εἴ τε μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ
25 αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ
τὰ οὐράνια, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις
καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν. εἰ δ' ἔσται τὰ εἴδη· ἢ <οἱ> ἀριθμοί,
οὐδενὸς αἴτια· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτι κινήσεώς γε. ἔτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ
ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ ποιήσει
30 συνεχές, οὔτε ὡς κινοῦν οὔτε ὡς εἶδος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γ'
ἔσται τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν; ἐνδέχοιτο
γὰρ ἂν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὕστερόν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως.
οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδια τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ' ἔστιν· ἀναιρετέον ἄρα
τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ' εἴρηται πῶς. ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἓν ἢ ἡ
35 ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα,
οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς· οὐδ' ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπῃ,
ὡς τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν
μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς
1"Empedocles also has a paradoxical view; for he identifies the good with love, but this is a principle both as mover (for it brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of the mixture). Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being, at least, of the two is not 5the same. In which respect then is love a principle? It is paradoxical also that strife should be imperishable; the nature of his 'evil' is just strife.
"Anaxagoras makes the good a motive principle; for his 'reason' moves things. But it moves them for an end, which must be something other than it, except according to our way of stating the case; for, on our view, the medical art is in a sense health. It 10is paradoxical also not to suppose a contrary to the good, i.e. to reason. But all who speak of the contraries make no use of the contraries, unless we bring their views into shape. And why some things are perishable and others imperishable, no one tells us; for they make all existing things out of the same principles. Further, some make existing things out of the nonexistent; and others to avoid the 15necessity of this make all things one.
"Further, why should there always be becoming, and what is the cause of becoming?-this no one tells us. And those who suppose two principles must suppose another, a superior principle, and so must those who believe in the Forms; for why did things come to participate, or why do they participate, in the Forms? And all other thinkers are confronted by the necessary consequence 20that there is something contrary to Wisdom, i.e. to the highest knowledge; but we are not. For there is nothing contrary to that which is primary; for all contraries have matter, and things that have matter exist only potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to any knowledge leads to an object contrary to the object of the knowledge; but what is primary has no contrary.
"Again, if besides sensible 25things no others exist, there will be no first principle, no order, no becoming, no heavenly bodies, but each principle will have a principle before it, as in the accounts of the theologians and all the natural philosophers. But if the Forms or the numbers are to exist, they will be causes of nothing; or if not that, at least not of movement. Further, how is extension, i.e. a continuum, to be produced 30out of unextended parts? For number will not, either as mover or as form, produce a continuum. But again there cannot be any contrary that is also essentially a productive or moving principle; for it would be possible for it not to be. Or at least its action would be posterior to its potency. The world, then, would not be eternal. But it is; one of these premisses, then, must be denied. And we have said 35how this must be done. Further, in virtue of what the numbers, or the soul and the body, or in general the form and the thing, are one-of this no one tells us anything; nor can any one tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover makes them one.
1076a
1 ἑκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν
(οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα)
καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς· τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι
κακῶς. "οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω."
1And those who say mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance of the universe a mere series of episodes (for one substance has no influence on another by its existence or nonexistence), and they give us many governing principles; but the world refuses to be governed badly. " "'The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be.'
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