Joachim (Oxford, 1922) · Joachim (1922)
Joachim (1922)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 2,Chapter 1 (328b26–329b5)
328b
Περὶ μὲν οὖν μίξεως καὶ ἁφῆς καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ
πάσχειν εἴρηται πῶς ὑπάρχει τοῖς μεταβάλλουσι κατὰ φύσιν,
ἔτι δὲ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ἁπλῆς, τίνος καὶ
πῶς ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως
30 εἴρηται, τί τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ τίν' ἔχει διαφορὰν αὐτῶν.
Λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων.
Γένεσις μὲν γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ πάσαις ταῖς φύσει συνεστώσαις
οὐσίαις οὐκ ἄνευ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων. Τούτων
δὲ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην οἱ μέν φασιν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἀέρα
35 τιθέντες ἢ πῦρ ἤ τι μεταξὺ τούτων, σῶμά τε ὂν καὶ χωριστόν,
26We have explained under what conditions 'combination', 'contact', and 'action-passion' are attributable to the things which undergo natural change. Further, we have discussed 'unqualified' coming-to-be and passing-away, and explained under what conditions they are predicable, of what subject, and owing to what cause. Similarly, we have also discussed 'alteration', and 30explained what 'altering' is and how it differs from coming-to-be and passing-away. But we have still to investigate the so-called 'elements' of bodies.
35For the complex substances whose formation and maintenance are due to natural processes all presuppose the perceptible bodies as the condition of their coming-to-be and passing-away: but philosophers disagree in regard to the matter which underlies these perceptible bodies.
35For the complex substances whose formation and maintenance are due to natural processes all presuppose the perceptible bodies as the condition of their coming-to-be and passing-away: but philosophers disagree in regard to the matter which underlies these perceptible bodies.
329a
1 οἱ δὲ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἑνός, οἱ μὲν πῦρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ
δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ἀέρα τρίτον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τούτων τέταρτον,
ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· ἐξ ὧν συγκρινομένων καὶ διακρινομένων
ἢ ἀλλοιουμένων συμβαίνειν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν
5 τοῖς πράγμασιν. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα
καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ἔστω συνομολογούμενον, ἐξ ὧν μεταβαλλόντων
ἢ κατὰ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλην
μεταβολὴν συμβαίνει γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθοράν. Ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν
ποιοῦντες μίαν ὕλην παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, ταύτην δὲ σωματικὴν
10 καὶ χωριστήν, ἁμαρτάνουσιν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως
εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο αἰσθητῆς· ἢ γὰρ κοῦφον ἢ βαρὺ ἢ ψυχρὸν
ἢ θερμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦτο, ὃ λέγουσί
τινες εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν. Ὡς δ' ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραπται,
οὐδένα ἔχει διορισμόν· οὐ γὰρ εἴρηκε σαφῶς τὸ πανδεχές,
15 εἰ χωρίζεται τῶν στοιχείων. Οὐδὲ χρῆται οὐδέν, φήσας
εἶναι ὑποκείμενόν τι τοῖς καλουμένοις στοιχείοις πρότερον,
οἷον χρυσὸν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς χρυσοῖς. Καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο οὐ
καλῶς λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λεγόμενον, ἀλλ' ὧν μὲν
ἀλλοίωσις, ἐστὶν οὕτως, ὧν δὲ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀδύνατον
20 ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεσθαι ἐξ οὗ γέγονεν. Καίτοι γέ φησι
μακρῷ ἀληθέστατον εἶναι χρυσὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ
τῶν στοιχείων ὄντων στερεῶν μέχρι ἐπιπέδων ποιεῖται τὴν
ἀνάλυσιν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὴν τιθήνην καὶ τὴν ὕλην τὴν πρώτην
τὰ ἐπίπεδα εἶναι. Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν μὲν εἶναί τινα ὕλην
25 τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ χωριστὴν
ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἐναντιώσεως, ἐξ ἧς γίνεται τὰ καλούμενα
στοιχεῖα.
Διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑτέροις ἀκριβέστερον. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τὰ σώματα
30 τὰ πρῶτα, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην
οἰομένοις εἶναι τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἀχώριστον μέν, ὑποκειμένην
δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὕλη τῷ ψυχρῷ
οὔτε τοῦτο τῷ θερμῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφοῖν. Ὥστε
πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἀρχή, δεύτερον δ'
35 αἱ ἐναντιώσεις, λέγω δ' οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, τρίτον
δ' ἤδη πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ
μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, καὶ οὐχ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ
1Some maintain it is single, supposing it to be, e.g. Air or Fire, or an 'intermediate' between these two (but still a body with a separate existence). Others, on the contrary, postulate two or more materials-ascribing to their 'association' and 'dissociation', or to their 'alteration', the coming-to-be and passing-away 5of things. (Some, for instance, postulate Fire and Earth: some add Air, making three: and some, like Empedocles, reckon Water as well, thus postulating four.)
Now we may agree that the primary materials, whose change (whether it be 'association and dissociation' or a process of another kind) results in coming-to-be and passingaway, are rightly described as 'originative sources, i.e. elements'. But (i) those thinkers are in error who postulate, beside the bodies we have mentioned, a single matter-and that corporeal 10and separable matter. For this 'body' of theirs cannot possibly exist without a 'perceptible contrariety': this 'Boundless', which some thinkers identify with the 'original real', must be either light or heavy, either cold or hot. And (ii) what Plato has written in the Timaeus is not based on any precisely-articulated conception. For he has not stated clearly 15whether his 'Omnirecipient" exists in separation from the 'elements'; nor does he make any use of it. He says, indeed, that it is a substratum prior to the so-called 'elements'-underlying them, as gold underlies the things that are fashioned of gold. (And yet this comparison, if thus expressed, is itself open to criticism. Things which come-to-be and pass-away cannot 20be called by the name of the material out of which they have come-tobe: it is only the results of 'alteration' which retain the name of the substratum whose 'alterations' they are. However, he actually says' that the truest account is to affirm that each of them is "gold"'.) Nevertheless he carries his analysis of the 'elements'-solids though they are-back to 'planes', and it is impossible for 'the Nurse' (i.e. the primary matter) to be identical with 'the planes'.
Our own doctrine is that although there is a matter 25of the perceptible bodies (a matter out of which the so-called 'clements' come-to-be), it has no separate existence, but is always bound up with a contrariety. A more precise account of these presuppositions has been given in another work': we must, however, give a detailed explanation of the primary bodies as well, since they too are similarly derived from the matter. 30We must reckon as an 'originative source' and as 'primary' the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from, the contrary qualities: for the hot' is not matter for 'the cold' nor 'the cold' for 'the hot', but the substratum is matter for them both. We therefore have to recognize three 'originative sources': firstly that which potentially perceptible body, secondly 35the contrarieties (I mean, e.g. heat and cold), and thirdly Fire, Water, and the like.
Now we may agree that the primary materials, whose change (whether it be 'association and dissociation' or a process of another kind) results in coming-to-be and passingaway, are rightly described as 'originative sources, i.e. elements'. But (i) those thinkers are in error who postulate, beside the bodies we have mentioned, a single matter-and that corporeal 10and separable matter. For this 'body' of theirs cannot possibly exist without a 'perceptible contrariety': this 'Boundless', which some thinkers identify with the 'original real', must be either light or heavy, either cold or hot. And (ii) what Plato has written in the Timaeus is not based on any precisely-articulated conception. For he has not stated clearly 15whether his 'Omnirecipient" exists in separation from the 'elements'; nor does he make any use of it. He says, indeed, that it is a substratum prior to the so-called 'elements'-underlying them, as gold underlies the things that are fashioned of gold. (And yet this comparison, if thus expressed, is itself open to criticism. Things which come-to-be and pass-away cannot 20be called by the name of the material out of which they have come-tobe: it is only the results of 'alteration' which retain the name of the substratum whose 'alterations' they are. However, he actually says' that the truest account is to affirm that each of them is "gold"'.) Nevertheless he carries his analysis of the 'elements'-solids though they are-back to 'planes', and it is impossible for 'the Nurse' (i.e. the primary matter) to be identical with 'the planes'.
Our own doctrine is that although there is a matter 25of the perceptible bodies (a matter out of which the so-called 'clements' come-to-be), it has no separate existence, but is always bound up with a contrariety. A more precise account of these presuppositions has been given in another work': we must, however, give a detailed explanation of the primary bodies as well, since they too are similarly derived from the matter. 30We must reckon as an 'originative source' and as 'primary' the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from, the contrary qualities: for the hot' is not matter for 'the cold' nor 'the cold' for 'the hot', but the substratum is matter for them both. We therefore have to recognize three 'originative sources': firstly that which potentially perceptible body, secondly 35the contrarieties (I mean, e.g. heat and cold), and thirdly Fire, Water, and the like.
329b
1 ἕτεροι λέγουσιν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀλλοίωσις), αἱ δ' ἐναντιώσεις
οὐ μεταβάλλουσιν. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ὣς σώματος
ποίας καὶ πόσας λεκτέον ἀρχάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι
ὑποθέμενοι χρῶνται, καὶ οὐδὲν λέγουσι διὰ τί αὗται ἢ
5 τοσαῦται.
1Only 'thirdly', however: for these bodies change into one another (they are not immutable as Empedocles and other thinkers assert, since 'alteration' would then have been impossible), whereas the contrarieties do not change.
Nevertheless, even so the question remains: What sorts of contrarieties, and how many of them, are to be accounted 'originative sources' of body? For all the other thinkers assume and use them without explaining why they are these or 5why they are just so many.
Nevertheless, even so the question remains: What sorts of contrarieties, and how many of them, are to be accounted 'originative sources' of body? For all the other thinkers assume and use them without explaining why they are these or 5why they are just so many.
Book 2,Chapter 2 (329b6–330a29)
Ἐπεὶ οὖν ζητοῦμεν αἰσθητοῦ σώματος ἀρχάς, τοῦτο δ'
ἐστὶν ἁπτοῦ, ἁπτὸν δ' οὗ ἡ αἴσθησις ἁφή, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ
πᾶσαι αἱ ἐναντιώσεις σώματος εἴδη καὶ ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν,
ἀλλὰ μόνον αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν· κατ' ἐναντίωσίν τε γὰρ
10 διαφέρουσι, καὶ κατὰ ἁπτὴν ἐναντίωσιν. Διὸ οὔτε λευκότης
καὶ μελανία οὔτε γλυκύτης καὶ πικρότης, ὁμοίως δ' οὐδὲ
τῶν ἄλλων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐναντιώσεων οὐδὲν ποιεῖ στοιχεῖον.
Καίτοι πρότερον ὄψις ἁφῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρότερον.
Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι σώματος ἁπτοῦ πάθος ᾗ ἁπτόν, ἀλλὰ καθ'
15 ἕτερον, καὶ εἰ ἔτυχε τῇ φύσει πρότερον. Αὐτῶν δὴ
πρῶτον τῶν ἁπτῶν διαιρετέον ποῖαι πρῶται διαφοραὶ καὶ
ἐναντιώσεις. Εἰσὶ δ' ἐναντιώσεις κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν αἵδε,
θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, βαρὺ κοῦφον, σκληρὸν μαλακόν,
γλίσχρον κραῦρον, τραχὺ λεῖον, παχὺ λεπτόν. Τούτων δὲ
20 βαρὺ μὲν καὶ κοῦφον οὐ ποιητικὰ οὐδὲ παθητικά· οὐ
γὰρ τῷ ποιεῖν τε ἕτερον ἢ πάσχειν ὑφ' ἑτέρου λέγονται. Δεῖ
δὲ ποιητικὰ καὶ παθητικὰ εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ στοιχεῖα· μίγνυται
γὰρ καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα. Θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ
ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν τὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητικὰ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ
25 παθητικὰ λέγεται· θερμὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ συγκρῖνον τὰ ὁμογενῆ
(τὸ γὰρ διακρίνειν, ὅπερ φασὶ ποιεῖν τὸ πῦρ, συγκρίνειν
ἐστὶ τὰ ὁμόφυλα· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐξαιρεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια),
ψυχρὸν δὲ τὸ συνάγον καὶ συγκρῖνον ὁμοίως τά τε
συγγενῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὁμόφυλα, ὑγρὸν δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον οἰκείῳ
30 ὅρῳ εὐόριστον ὄν, ξηρὸν δὲ τὸ εὐόριστον μὲν οἰκείῳ
ὅρῳ, δυσόριστον δέ. Τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν καὶ παχὺ καὶ γλίσχρον καὶ
κραῦρον καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακὸν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ
ἐκ τούτων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀναπληστικόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑγροῦ διὰ
τὸ μὴ ὡρίσθαι μὲν εὐόριστον δ' εἶναι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ
6Since, then, we are looking for 'originative sources' of perceptible body; and since 'perceptible' is equivalent to 'tangible', and 'tangible' is that of which the perception is touch; it is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute 'forms' and 'originative sources' of body, but only those which correspond to touch. For it is in accordance with a contrariety-a contrariety, moreover, of tangible qualities-that the primary bodies 10are differentiated. That is why neither whiteness (and blackness), nor sweetness (and bitterness), nor (similarly) any quality belonging to the other perceptible contrarieties either, constitutes an 'element'. And yet vision is prior to touch, so that its object also is prior to the object of touch. The object of vision, however, is a quality of tangible body not qua tangible, but qua 15something else-qua something which may well be naturally prior to the object of touch.
Accordingly, we must segregate the tangible differences and contrarieties, and distinguish which amongst them are primary. Contrarieties correlative to touch are the following: hot-cold, dry-moist, heavy-light, hard-soft, viscous-brittle, rough-smooth, coarse-fine. Of these (i) 20heavy and light are neither active nor susceptible. Things are not called 'heavy' and 'light' because they act upon, or suffer action from, other things. But the 'elements' must be reciprocally active and susceptible, since they 'combine' and are transformed into one another. On the other hand (ii) hot and cold, and dry and moist, are terms, of which the first pair implies power to act and the second pair 25susceptibility. 'Hot' is that which 'associates' things of the same kind (for 'dissociating', which people attribute to Fire as its function, is 'associating' things of the same class, since its effect is to eliminate what is foreign), while 'cold' is that which brings together, i.e. 'associates', homogeneous and heterogeneous things alike. And moise is that which, being readily adaptable in shape, is not determinable by any 30limit of its own: while 'dry' is that which is readily determinable by its own limit, but not readily adaptable in shape.
From moist and dry are derived (iii) the fine and coarse, viscous and brittle, hard and soft, and the remaining tangible differences. For (a) since the moist has no determinate shape, but is readily adaptable and follows the outline of that which is in contact with it, it is characteristic of it to be 'such as to fill up'.
Accordingly, we must segregate the tangible differences and contrarieties, and distinguish which amongst them are primary. Contrarieties correlative to touch are the following: hot-cold, dry-moist, heavy-light, hard-soft, viscous-brittle, rough-smooth, coarse-fine. Of these (i) 20heavy and light are neither active nor susceptible. Things are not called 'heavy' and 'light' because they act upon, or suffer action from, other things. But the 'elements' must be reciprocally active and susceptible, since they 'combine' and are transformed into one another. On the other hand (ii) hot and cold, and dry and moist, are terms, of which the first pair implies power to act and the second pair 25susceptibility. 'Hot' is that which 'associates' things of the same kind (for 'dissociating', which people attribute to Fire as its function, is 'associating' things of the same class, since its effect is to eliminate what is foreign), while 'cold' is that which brings together, i.e. 'associates', homogeneous and heterogeneous things alike. And moise is that which, being readily adaptable in shape, is not determinable by any 30limit of its own: while 'dry' is that which is readily determinable by its own limit, but not readily adaptable in shape.
From moist and dry are derived (iii) the fine and coarse, viscous and brittle, hard and soft, and the remaining tangible differences. For (a) since the moist has no determinate shape, but is readily adaptable and follows the outline of that which is in contact with it, it is characteristic of it to be 'such as to fill up'.
330a
1 ἁπτομένῳ, τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν ἀναπληστικόν (λεπτομερὲς γάρ,
καὶ τὸ μικρομερὲς ἀναπληστικόν· ὅλον γὰρ ὅλου ἅπτεται· τὸ
δὲ λεπτὸν μάλιστα τοιοῦτον), φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν λεπτὸν
ἔσται τοῦ ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ παχὺ τοῦ ξηροῦ. Πάλιν δὲ τὸ μὲν γλίσχρον
5 τοῦ ὑγροῦ (τὸ γὰρ γλίσχρον ὑγρὸν πεπονθός τί ἐστιν,
οἷον τὸ ἔλαιον), τὸ δὲ κραῦρον τοῦ ξηροῦ· κραῦρον γὰρ τὸ
τελέως ξηρόν, ὥστε καὶ πεπηγέναι δι' ἔλλειψιν ὑγρότητος.
Ἔτι τὸ μὲν μαλακὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ (μαλακὸν γὰρ τὸ ὑπεῖκον
εἰς ἑαυτὸ καὶ μὴ μεθιστάμενον, ὅπερ ποιεῖ τὸ ὑγρόν·
10 διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ὑγρὸν μαλακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μαλακὸν τοῦ
ὑγροῦ), τὸ δὲ σκληρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ· σκληρὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ πεπηγός,
τὸ δὲ πεπηγὸς ξηρόν. Λέγεται δὲ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν πλεοναχῶς·
ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῷ ξηρῷ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ διερόν, καὶ
πάλιν τῷ ὑγρῷ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ πεπηγός· ἅπαντα δὲ
15 ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῶν πρώτως λεχθέντων.
Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀντίκειται τῷ διερῷ τὸ ξηρόν, καὶ διερὸν μέν ἐστι
τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτρίαν ὑγρότητα ἐπιπολῆς, βεβρεγμένον δὲ τὸ
εἰς βάθος, ξηρὸν δὲ τὸ ἐστερημένον ταύτης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ
μὲν διερὸν ἔσται τοῦ ὑγροῦ, τὸ δ' ἀντικείμενον ξηρὸν τοῦ πρώτως
20 ξηροῦ. Πάλιν δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ πεπηγὸς ὡσαύτως·
ὑγρὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἔχον οἰκείαν ὑγρότητα, βεβρεγμένον
δὲ τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτρίαν ὑγρότητα ἐν τῷ βάθει, πεπηγὸς δὲ
τὸ ἐστερημένον ταύτης. Ὥστε καὶ τούτων ἔσται τὸ μὲν ξηροῦ
τὸ δὲ ὑγροῦ. Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ
25 ἀνάγονται εἰς τὰς πρώτας τέτταρας. Αὗται δὲ οὐκέτι εἰς
ἐλάττους· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὅπερ ὑγρὸν ἢ ὅπερ ξηρόν, οὔτε
τὸ ὑγρὸν ὅπερ θερμὸν ἢ ὅπερ ψυχρόν, οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ
τὸ ξηρὸν οὔθ' ὑπ' ἄλληλ' οὔθ' ὑπὸ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν
εἰσιν ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τέτταρας εἶναι ταύτας.
1Now 'the fine' is 'such as to fill up'. For the fine' consists of subtle particles; but that which consists of small particles is 'such as to fill up', inasmuch as it is in contact whole with whole-and 'the fine' exhibits this character in a superlative degree. Hence it is evident that the fine derives from the moist, while the coarse derives from the dry. Again (b) the viscous' 5derives from the moist: for 'the viscous' (e.g. oil) is a 'moist' modified in a certain way. 'The brittle', on the other hand, derives from the dry: for 'brittle' is that which is completely dry-so completely, that its solidification has actually been due to failure of moisture. Further (c) 'the soft' derives from the moist. For 'soft' is that which yields to pressure by retiring into itself, though it does not yield by total displacement as the moist does-10which explains why the moist is not 'soft', although 'the soft' derives from the moist. 'The hard', on the other hand, derives from the dry: for 'hard' is that which is solidified, and the solidified is dry.
The terms 'dry' and 'moist' have more senses than one. For 'the damp', as well as the moist, is opposed to the dry: and again 'the solidified', as well as the dry, is opposed to the moist. But all these 15qualities derive from the dry and moist we mentioned first.' For (i) the dry is opposed to the damp: i.e. 'damp' is that which has foreign moisture on its surface ('sodden' being that which is penetrated to its core), while 'dry' is that which has lost foreign moisture. Hence it is evident that the damp will derive from the moist, and 'the dry' which is opposed to it will derive from the primary 20dry. Again (ii) the 'moist' and the solidified derive in the same way from the primary pair. For 'moist' is that which contains moisture of its-own deep within it ('sodden' being that which is deeply penetrated by foreign mosture), whereas 'solidigied' is that which has lost this inner moisture. Hence these too derive from the primary pair, the 'solidified' from the dry and the 'solidified' from the dry the 'liquefiable' from the moist.
It is clear, then, that all the other differences 25reduce to the first four, but that these admit of no further reduction. For the hot is not essentially moist or dry, nor the moist essentially hot or cold: nor are the cold and the dry derivative forms, either of one another or of the hot and the moist. Hence these must be four.
The terms 'dry' and 'moist' have more senses than one. For 'the damp', as well as the moist, is opposed to the dry: and again 'the solidified', as well as the dry, is opposed to the moist. But all these 15qualities derive from the dry and moist we mentioned first.' For (i) the dry is opposed to the damp: i.e. 'damp' is that which has foreign moisture on its surface ('sodden' being that which is penetrated to its core), while 'dry' is that which has lost foreign moisture. Hence it is evident that the damp will derive from the moist, and 'the dry' which is opposed to it will derive from the primary 20dry. Again (ii) the 'moist' and the solidified derive in the same way from the primary pair. For 'moist' is that which contains moisture of its-own deep within it ('sodden' being that which is deeply penetrated by foreign mosture), whereas 'solidigied' is that which has lost this inner moisture. Hence these too derive from the primary pair, the 'solidified' from the dry and the 'solidified' from the dry the 'liquefiable' from the moist.
It is clear, then, that all the other differences 25reduce to the first four, but that these admit of no further reduction. For the hot is not essentially moist or dry, nor the moist essentially hot or cold: nor are the cold and the dry derivative forms, either of one another or of the hot and the moist. Hence these must be four.
Book 2,Chapter 3 (330a30–331a6)
30 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα τὰ στοιχεῖα, τῶν δὲ τεττάρων ἓξ
αἱ συζεύξεις, τὰ δ' ἐναντία οὐ πέφυκε συνδυάζεσθαι (θερμὸν
γὰρ καὶ ψυχρὸν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάλιν ξηρὸν καὶ
ὑγρὸν ἀδύνατον), φανερὸν ὅτι τέτταρες ἔσονται αἱ τῶν στοιχείων
συζεύξεις, θερμοῦ καὶ ξηροῦ, καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, καὶ
30The elementary qualities are four, and any four terms can be combined in six couples. Contraries, however, refuse to be coupled: for it is impossible for the same thing to be hot and cold, or moist and dry. Hence it is evident that the 'couplings' of the elementary qualities will be four: hot with dry and moist with hot, and again cold with dry and cold with moist.
330b
1 πάλιν ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ. Καὶ ἠκολούθηκε
κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἁπλοῖς φαινομένοις σώμασι, πυρὶ
καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι καὶ γῇ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ θερμὸν καὶ
ξηρόν, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρόν (οἷον ἀτμὶς γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ),
5 τὸ δ' ὕδωρ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν,
ὥστ' εὐλόγως διανέμεσθαι τὰς διαφορὰς τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασι,
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἶναι κατὰ λόγον. Ἅπαντες
γὰρ οἱ τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες οἱ μὲν ἕν, οἱ
δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τρία, οἱ δὲ τέτταρα ποιοῦσιν. Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν
10 ἓν μόνον λέγουσιν, εἶτα πυκνώσει καὶ μανώσει τἆλλα γεννῶσι,
τούτοις συμβαίνει δύο ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, τό τε μανὸν
καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν· ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ
δημιουργοῦντα, τὸ δ' ἓν ὑπόκειται καθάπερ ὕλη. Οἱ δ' εὐθὺς
δύο ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὰ μεταξὺ
15 μίγματα ποιοῦσι τούτων, οἷον ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ. Ὡσαύτως δὲ
καὶ οἱ τρία λέγοντες, καθάπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν·
τὸ γὰρ μέσον μίγμα ποιεῖ. Καὶ σχεδὸν ταὐτὰ λέγουσιν οἵ
τε δύο καὶ οἱ τρία ποιοῦντες· πλὴν οἱ μὲν τέμνουσιν εἰς δύο
τὸ μέσον, οἱ δ' ἓν μόνον ποιοῦσιν. Ἔνιοι δ' εὐθὺς τέτταρα
20 λέγουσιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. Συνάγει δὲ καὶ οὗτος εἰς τὰ δύο·
τῷ γὰρ πυρὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἀντιτίθησιν. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ πῦρ
καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων ἁπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ μικτόν.
Τὰ δ' ἁπλᾶ τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι ταὐτά, οἷον εἴ τι
τῷ πυρὶ ὅμοιον, πυροειδές, οὐ πῦρ, καὶ τὸ τῷ ἀέρι ἀεροειδές·
25 ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἐστιν ὑπερβολὴ
θερμότητος, ὥσπερ καὶ κρύσταλλος ψυχρότητος· ἡ γὰρ
πῆξις καὶ ἡ ζέσις ὑπερβολαί τινές εἰσιν, ἡ μὲν ψυχρότητος,
ἡ δὲ θερμότητος. Εἰ οὖν ὁ κρύσταλλός ἐστι πῆξις ὑγροῦ
ψυχροῦ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἔσται ζέσις ξηροῦ θερμοῦ. Διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν
30 οὔτ' ἐκ κρυστάλλου γίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ πυρός. Ὄντων δὲ τεττάρων
τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων, ἑκάτερα τοῖν δυοῖν ἑκατέρου τῶν τόπων
ἐστίν· πῦρ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν ὅρον φερομένου,
γῆ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέσον. Καὶ ἄκρα μὲν καὶ εἰλικρινέστατα
πῦρ καὶ γῆ, μέσα δὲ καὶ μεμιγμένα μᾶλλον
1And these four couples have attached themselves to the apparently 'simple' bodies (Fire, Air, Water, and Earth) in a manner consonant with theory. For Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist (Air being a sort of aqueous vapour); 5and Water is cold and moist, while Earth is cold and dry. Thus the differences are reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, and the number of the latter is consonant with theory. For all who make the simple bodies 'elements' postulate either one, or two, or three, or four. Now (i) those who assert there is 10one only, and then generate everything else by condensation and rarefaction, are in effect making their 'originative sources' two, viz. the rare and the dense, or rather the hot and the cold: for it is these which are the moulding forces, while the 'one' underlies them as a 'matter'. But (ii) those who postulate two from the start-as Parmenides postulated Fire and Earth-make the intermediates (e.g. Air and Water) 15blends of these. The same course is followed (iii) by those who advocate three. (We may compare what Plato does in Me Divisions': for he makes 'the middle' a blend.) Indeed, there is practically no difference between those who postulate two and those who postulate three, except that the former split the middle 'element' into two, while the latter treat it as only one. But (iv) some 20advocate four from the start, e.g. Empedocles: yet he too draws them together so as to reduce them to the two, for he opposes all the others to Fire.
In fact, however, fire and air, and each of the bodies we have mentioned, are not simple, but blended. The 'simple' bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the 'simple' body corresponding to fire is 'such-as-fire, not fire: that which corresponds to air is 'such-as-air': 25and so on with the rest of them. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold. For freezing and boiling are excesses of heat and cold respectively. Assuming, therefore, that ice is a freezing of moist and cold, fire analogously will be a boiling of dry and hot: a fact, by the way, which explains why nothing 30comes-to-be either out of ice or out of fire.
The 'simple' bodies, since they are four, fall into two pairs which belong to the two regions, each to each: for Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the 'limit', while Earth and Water are forms of the body which moves towards the 'centre'. Fire and Earth, moreover, are extremes and purest: Water and Air, on the contrary are intermediates and more like blends.
In fact, however, fire and air, and each of the bodies we have mentioned, are not simple, but blended. The 'simple' bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the 'simple' body corresponding to fire is 'such-as-fire, not fire: that which corresponds to air is 'such-as-air': 25and so on with the rest of them. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold. For freezing and boiling are excesses of heat and cold respectively. Assuming, therefore, that ice is a freezing of moist and cold, fire analogously will be a boiling of dry and hot: a fact, by the way, which explains why nothing 30comes-to-be either out of ice or out of fire.
The 'simple' bodies, since they are four, fall into two pairs which belong to the two regions, each to each: for Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the 'limit', while Earth and Water are forms of the body which moves towards the 'centre'. Fire and Earth, moreover, are extremes and purest: Water and Air, on the contrary are intermediates and more like blends.
331a
1 ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ. Καὶ ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις ἐναντία· πυρὶ μὲν
γὰρ ἐναντίον ὕδωρ, ἀέρι δὲ γῆ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων
παθημάτων συνέστηκεν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς γε τέτταρα ὄντα
ἑνὸς ἕκαστόν ἐστι, γῆ μὲν ξηροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχροῦ, ὕδωρ δὲ
5 ψυχροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑγροῦ, ἀὴρ δ' ὑγροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ θερμοῦ,
πῦρ δὲ θερμοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ξηροῦ.
1And, further, the members of either pair are contrary to those of the other, Water being contrary to Fire and Earth to Air; for the qualities constituting Water and Earth are contrary to those that constitute Fire and Air. Nevertheless, since they are four, each of them is characterized par excellence a single quality: Earth by dry rather than by cold, Water by 5cold rather than by moist, Air by moist rather than by hot, and Fire by hot rather than by dry.
Book 2,Chapter 4 (331a7–332a2)
Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται πρότερον ὅτι τοῖς ἁπλοῖς σώμασιν
ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἡ γένεσις, ἅμα δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν
φαίνεται γινόμενα (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀλλοίωσις· κατὰ γὰρ τὰ
10 τῶν ἁπτῶν πάθη ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστιν), λεκτέον τίς ὁ τρόπος
τῆς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῆς, καὶ πότερον ἅπαν ἐξ ἅπαντος
γίνεσθαι δυνατὸν ἢ τὰ μὲν δυνατὸν τὰ δ' ἀδύνατον. Ὅτι
μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα πέφυκεν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλειν, φανερόν·
ἡ γὰρ γένεσις εἰς ἐναντία καὶ ἐξ ἐναντίων, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα
15 πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν πρὸς ἄλληλα διὰ τὸ τὰς διαφορὰς
ἐναντίας εἶναι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀμφότεραι ἐναντίαι,
οἷον πυρὶ καὶ ὕδατι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δ'
ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν), τοῖς δ' ἡ ἑτέρα μόνον, οἷον ἀέρι καὶ
ὕδατι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δὲ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν).
20 Ὥστε καθόλου μὲν φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γίνεσθαι
πέφυκεν, ἤδη δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν πῶς·
ἅπαντα μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται, διοίσει δὲ τῷ θᾶττον
καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ τῷ ῥᾷον καὶ χαλεπώτερον. Ὅσα μὲν
γὰρ ἔχει σύμβολα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ταχεῖα τούτων ἡ μετάβασις,
25 ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει, βραδεῖα, διὰ τὸ ῥᾷον εἶναι τὸ ἓν
ἢ τὰ πολλὰ μεταβάλλειν, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν ἔσται ἀὴρ
θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν θερμὸν καὶ ξηρόν,
τὸ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ὥστε ἂν κρατηθῇ τὸ ξηρὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ
ὑγροῦ, ἀὴρ ἔσται), πάλιν δὲ ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, ἐὰν κρατηθῇ
30 τὸ θερμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν θερμὸν
καὶ ὑγρόν, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ὥστε μεταβάλλοντος
τοῦ θερμοῦ ὕδωρ ἔσται). Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐξ
ὕδατος γῆ καὶ ἐκ γῆς πῦρ· ἔχει γὰρ ἄμφω πρὸς ἄμφω
σύμβολα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὕδωρ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ
35 ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ὥστε κρατηθέντος τοῦ ὑγροῦ γῆ
ἔσται. Καὶ πάλιν ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν πῦρ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμόν, ἡ δὲ
7It has been established before' that the coming-to-be of the 'simple' bodies is reciprocal. At the same time, it is manifest, even on the evidence of perception, that they do come-to-be: for otherwise there would not have been 'alteration, since 'alteration' is change in respect to the 10qualities of the objects of touch. Consequently, we must explain (i) what is the manner of their reciprocal transformation, and (ii) whether every one of them can come to-be out of every one-or whether some can do so, but not others.
Now it is evident that all of them are by nature such as to change into one another: for coming-to-be is a change into contraries and out of contraries, and the 'elements' 15all involve a contrariety in their mutual relations because their distinctive qualities are contrary. For in some of them both qualities are contrary-e.g. in Fire and Water, the first of these being dry and hot, and the second moist and cold: while in others one of the qualities (though only one) is contrary-e.g. in Air and Water, the first being moist and hot, and the second moist and cold. 20It is evident, therefore, if we consider them in general, that every one is by nature such as to come-to-be out of every one: and when we come to consider them severally, it is not difficult to see the manner in which their transformation is effected. For, though all will result from all, both the speed and the facility of their conversion will differ in degree.
Thus (i) the process of conversion will be quick between those which have interchangeable 'complementary factors', 25but slow between those which have none. The reason is that it is easier for a single thing to change than for many. Air, e.g. will result from Fire if a single quality changes: for Fire, as we saw, is hot and dry while Air is hot and moist, so that there will be Air if the dry be overcome by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air if 30the hot be overcome by the cold: for Air, as we saw, is hot and moist while Water is cold and moist, so that, if the hot changes, there will be Water. So too, in the same manner, Earth will result from Water and Fire from Earth, since the two 'elements' in both these couples have interchangeable 'complementary factors'. For Water is moist and cold while Earth is 35cold and dry-so that, if the moist be overcome, there will be Earth: and again, since Fire is dry and hot while Earth is cold and dry, Fire will result from Earth if the cold pass-away.
Now it is evident that all of them are by nature such as to change into one another: for coming-to-be is a change into contraries and out of contraries, and the 'elements' 15all involve a contrariety in their mutual relations because their distinctive qualities are contrary. For in some of them both qualities are contrary-e.g. in Fire and Water, the first of these being dry and hot, and the second moist and cold: while in others one of the qualities (though only one) is contrary-e.g. in Air and Water, the first being moist and hot, and the second moist and cold. 20It is evident, therefore, if we consider them in general, that every one is by nature such as to come-to-be out of every one: and when we come to consider them severally, it is not difficult to see the manner in which their transformation is effected. For, though all will result from all, both the speed and the facility of their conversion will differ in degree.
Thus (i) the process of conversion will be quick between those which have interchangeable 'complementary factors', 25but slow between those which have none. The reason is that it is easier for a single thing to change than for many. Air, e.g. will result from Fire if a single quality changes: for Fire, as we saw, is hot and dry while Air is hot and moist, so that there will be Air if the dry be overcome by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air if 30the hot be overcome by the cold: for Air, as we saw, is hot and moist while Water is cold and moist, so that, if the hot changes, there will be Water. So too, in the same manner, Earth will result from Water and Fire from Earth, since the two 'elements' in both these couples have interchangeable 'complementary factors'. For Water is moist and cold while Earth is 35cold and dry-so that, if the moist be overcome, there will be Earth: and again, since Fire is dry and hot while Earth is cold and dry, Fire will result from Earth if the cold pass-away.
331b
1 γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ἐὰν φθαρῇ τὸ ψυχρόν, πῦρ ἔσται
ἐκ γῆς. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι κύκλῳ τε ἔσται ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἁπλοῖς
σώμασι, καὶ ῥᾷστος οὗτος ὁ τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς διὰ τὸ
σύμβολα ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς. Ἐκ πυρὸς δὲ ὕδωρ καὶ
5 ἐξ ἀέρος γῆν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ γῆς ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ
ἐνδέχεται μὲν γίνεσθαι, χαλεπώτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ πλειόνων
εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ ἔσται ἐξ ὕδατος πῦρ,
φθαρῆναι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, καὶ πάλιν εἰ ἐκ
γῆς ἀήρ, φθαρῆναι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν. Ὡσαύτως
10 δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ, ἀνάγκη ἀμφότερα
μεταβάλλειν. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν χρονιωτέρα ἡ γένεσις·
ἐὰν δ' ἑκατέρου φθαρῇ θάτερον, ῥᾴων μέν, οὐκ εἰς ἄλληλα
δὲ ἡ μετάβασις, ἀλλ' ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν καὶ ὕδατος ἔσται γῆ
καὶ ἀήρ, ἐξ ἀέρος δὲ καὶ γῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ. Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ
15 τοῦ ὕδατος φθαρῇ τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν, ἀὴρ
ἔσται (λείπεται γὰρ τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δὲ τὸ ὑγρόν),
ὅταν δὲ τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δ' ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν, γῆ,
διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν. Ὡσαύτως
δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ
20 τοῦ ἀέρος φθαρῇ τὸ θερμὸν τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ξηρόν, ὕδωρ ἔσται
(λείπεται γὰρ τοῦ μὲν τὸ ὑγρὸν τῆς δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν), ὅταν
δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀέρος τὸ ὑγρὸν τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ψυχρόν, πῦρ, διὰ
τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τῆς δὲ τὸ ξηρόν, ἅπερ ἦν
πυρός. Ὁμολογουμένη δὲ καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς γένεσις.
25 Μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ πῦρ ἡ φλόξ, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καπνὸς
καιόμενος, ὁ δὲ καπνὸς ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται φθαρέντος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ θατέρου τῶν στοιχείων
γενέσθαι μετάβασιν εἰς οὐδὲν τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ
λείπεσθαι ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ τἀναντία. Ἐξ οὐδετέρων δὲ
30 ἐγχωρεῖ γίνεσθαι σῶμα, οἷον εἰ μὲν τοῦ πυρὸς φθαρείη τὸ
ξηρόν, τοῦ δ' ἀέρος τὸ ὑγρόν· λείπεται γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ
θερμόν· ἐὰν δ' ἐξ ἑκατέρου τὸ θερμόν, λείπεται τἀναντία,
ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐν ἅπασι
γὰρ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς ἐνυπάρχει τὸ μὲν ταὐτὸ τὸ δ' ἐναντίον.
35 Ὥσθ' ἅμα δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς ἓν μεταβαίνοντα
ἑνὸς φθαρέντος γίνεται, τὰ δ' ἐκ δυοῖν εἰς ἓν πλειόνων. Ὅτι
1It is evident, therefore, that the coming-to-be of the 'simple' bodies will be cyclical; and that this cyclical method of transformation is the easiest, because the consecutive 'clements' contain interchangeable 'complementary factors'. On the other hand (ii) the transformation of Fire into Water and 5of Air into Earth, and again of Water and Earth into Fire and Air respectively, though possible, is more difficult because it involves the change of more qualities. For if Fire is to result from Water, both the cold and the moist must pass-away: and again, both the cold and the dry must pass-away if Air is to result from Earth. So' too, 10if Water and Earth are to result from Fire and Air respectively-both qualities must change.
This second method of coming-to-be, then, takes a longer time. But (iii) if one quality in each of two 'elements' pass-away, the transformation, though easier, is not reciprocal. Still, from Fire plus Water there will result Earth and Air, and from Air plus Earth Fire and Water. For there will be Air, when 15the cold of the Water and the dry of the Fire have passed-away (since the hot of the latter and the moist of the former are left): whereas, when the hot of the Fire and the moist of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, owing to the survival of the dry of the Fire and the cold of the Water. So, too, in the same Way, Fire and Water will result from Air plus Earth. For there will be Water, when 20the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth have passed-away (since the moist of the former and the cold of the latter are left): whereas, when the moist of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, owing to the survival of the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth-qualities essentially constitutive of Fire. Moreover, this mode of Fire's coming-to-be is confirmed by perception. 25For flame is par excellence Fire: but flame is burning smoke, and smoke consists of Air and Earth.
No transformation, however, into any of the 'simple' bodies can result from the passingaway of one elementary quality in each of two 'elements' when they are taken in their consecutive order, because either identical or contrary qualities are left in the pair: but no 'simple' body can be formed either out of identical, or out of contrary, qualities. Thus no 'simple' body 30would result, if the dry of Fire and the moist of Air were to pass-away: for the hot is left in both. On the other hand, if the hot pass-away out both, the contraries-dry and moist-are left. A similar result will occur in all the others too: for all the consecutive 'elements' contain one identical, and one contrary, quality. 35Hence, too, it clearly follows that, when one of the consecutive 'elements' is transformed into one, the coming-to-be is effected by the passing-away of a single quality: whereas, when two of them are transformed into a third, more than one quality must have passedaway.
This second method of coming-to-be, then, takes a longer time. But (iii) if one quality in each of two 'elements' pass-away, the transformation, though easier, is not reciprocal. Still, from Fire plus Water there will result Earth and Air, and from Air plus Earth Fire and Water. For there will be Air, when 15the cold of the Water and the dry of the Fire have passed-away (since the hot of the latter and the moist of the former are left): whereas, when the hot of the Fire and the moist of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, owing to the survival of the dry of the Fire and the cold of the Water. So, too, in the same Way, Fire and Water will result from Air plus Earth. For there will be Water, when 20the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth have passed-away (since the moist of the former and the cold of the latter are left): whereas, when the moist of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, owing to the survival of the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth-qualities essentially constitutive of Fire. Moreover, this mode of Fire's coming-to-be is confirmed by perception. 25For flame is par excellence Fire: but flame is burning smoke, and smoke consists of Air and Earth.
No transformation, however, into any of the 'simple' bodies can result from the passingaway of one elementary quality in each of two 'elements' when they are taken in their consecutive order, because either identical or contrary qualities are left in the pair: but no 'simple' body can be formed either out of identical, or out of contrary, qualities. Thus no 'simple' body 30would result, if the dry of Fire and the moist of Air were to pass-away: for the hot is left in both. On the other hand, if the hot pass-away out both, the contraries-dry and moist-are left. A similar result will occur in all the others too: for all the consecutive 'elements' contain one identical, and one contrary, quality. 35Hence, too, it clearly follows that, when one of the consecutive 'elements' is transformed into one, the coming-to-be is effected by the passing-away of a single quality: whereas, when two of them are transformed into a third, more than one quality must have passedaway.
332a
1 μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα ἐκ παντὸς γίνεται, καὶ τίνα τρόπον εἰς
ἄλληλα μετάβασις γίνεται, εἴρηται.
1We have stated that all the 'elements' come-to-be out of any one of them; and we have explained the manner in which their mutual conversion takes place. Let us nevertheless supplement our theory by the following speculations concerning them.
Book 2,Chapter 5 (332a3–333a15)
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ ὧδε θεωρήσωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
Εἰ γάρ ἐστι τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων ὕλη, ὥσπερ καὶ δοκεῖ
5 ἐνίοις, ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι ἓν ἢ
δύο εἶναι ταῦτα ἢ πλείω. Ἓν μὲν δὴ πάντα οὐχ οἷόν τε,
οἷον ἀέρα πάντα ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ γῆν, εἴπερ ἡ μεταβολὴ
εἰς τἀναντία. Εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἀήρ, εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει, ἀλλοίωσις
ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐ γένεσις. Ἅμα δ' οὐδ' οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὥστε
10 ὕδωρ εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀέρα ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν. Ἔσται δή τις ἐναντίωσις
καὶ διαφορὰ ἧς ἕξει τι θάτερον μόριον, τὸ πῦρ οἷον
θερμότητα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔσται τό γε πῦρ ἀὴρ θερμός·
ἀλλοίωσίς τε γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. Ἅμα δὲ
πάλιν εἰ ἔσται ἐκ πυρὸς ἀήρ, τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβάλλοντος
15 ἔσται. Ὑπάρξει ἄρα τῷ ἀέρι τοῦτο, καὶ ἔσται
ὁ ἀὴρ ψυχρόν τι. Ὥστε ἀδύνατον τὸ πῦρ ἀέρα θερμὸν εἶναι·
ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἔσται. Ἄλλο τι
ἄρ' ἀμφότερα τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἄλλη τις ὕλη κοινή. Ὁ
δ' αὐτὸς λόγος περὶ ἁπάντων, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν τούτων ἐξ οὗ
20 τὰ πάντα. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἄλλο τί γε παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον μέσον
τι ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, ἀέρος μὲν
παχύτερον καὶ πυρός, τῶν δὲ λεπτότερον· ἔσται γὰρ ἀὴρ
καὶ πῦρ ἐκεῖνο μετ' ἐναντιότητος· ἀλλὰ στέρησις τὸ ἕτερον
τῶν ἐναντίων· ὥστ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μονοῦσθαι ἐκεῖνο οὐδέποτε,
25 ὥσπερ φασί τινες τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ περιέχον. Ὁμοίως ἄρα
ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἢ οὐδέν. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν αἰσθητόν γε πρότερον τούτων,
ταῦτα ἂν εἴη πάντα. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἢ ἀεὶ μένοντα
καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἰς ἄλληλα, ἢ μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ ἢ ἅπαντα,
ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὔ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων
30 ἔγραψεν. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μεταβάλλειν ἀνάγκη εἰς ἄλληλα,
δέδεικται πρότερον· ὅτι δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ταχέως ἄλλο
ἐξ ἄλλου, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔχοντα σύμβολον
θᾶττον γίνεται ἐξ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντα βραδύτερον.
Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἡ ἐναντιότης μία ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν μεταβάλλουσιν,
35 ἀνάγκη δύο εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη τὸ μέσον ἀναίσθητος οὖσα
3If Water, Air, and the like are a 'matter' of which the natural bodies consist, as 5some thinkers in fact believe, these 'clements' must be either one, or two, or more. Now they cannot all of them be one-they cannot, e.g. all be Air or Water or Fire or Earth-because 'Change is into contraries'. For if they all were Air, then (assuming Air to persist) there will be 'alteration' instead of coming-to-be. Besides, nobody supposes a single 'element' to persist, as the basis of all, in such a way that 10it is Water as well as Air (or any other 'element') at the same time. So there will be a certain contrariety, i.e. a differentiating quality: and the other member of this contrariety, e.g. heat, will belong to some other 'element', e.g. to Fire. But Fire will certainly not be 'hot Air'. For a change of that kind (a) is 'alteration', and (b) is not what is observed. Moreover (c) if Air is again to result out of the Fire, it will do so by the conversion of the hot into its contrary: 15this contrary, therefore, will belong to Air, and Air will be a cold something: hence it is impossible for Fire to be 'hot Air', since in that case the same thing will be simultaneously hot and cold. Both Fire and Air, therefore, will be something else which is the same; i.e. there will be some 'matter', other than either, common to both.
The same argument applies to all the 'elements', proving that there is no single one of them out of which they all originate. 20But neither is there, beside these four, some other body from which they originate-a something intermediate, e.g. between Air and Water (coarser than Air, but finer than Water), or between Air and Fire (coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the supposed 'intermediate' will be Air and Fire when a pair of contrasted qualities is added to it: but, since one of every two contrary qualities is a 'privation', the 'intermediate' never can exist-25as some thinkers assert the 'Boundless' or the 'Environing' exists-in isolation. It is, therefore, equally and indifferently any one of the 'elements', or else it is nothing.
Since, then, there is nothing-at least, nothing perceptible-prior to these, they must be all. That being so, either they must always persist and not be transformable into one another: or they must undergo transformation-either all of them, or some only (as Plato wrote in the Timacus).' 30Now it has been proved before that they must undergo reciprocal transformation. It has also been proved that the speed with which they come-to-be, one out of another, is not uniform-since the process of reciprocal transformation is relatively quick between the 'elements' with a 'complementary factor', but relatively slow between those which possess no such factor. Assuming, then, that the contrariety, in respect to which they are transformed, is one, 35the elements' will inevitably be two: for it is 'matter' that is the 'mean' between the two contraries, and matter is imperceptible and inseparable from them.
The same argument applies to all the 'elements', proving that there is no single one of them out of which they all originate. 20But neither is there, beside these four, some other body from which they originate-a something intermediate, e.g. between Air and Water (coarser than Air, but finer than Water), or between Air and Fire (coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the supposed 'intermediate' will be Air and Fire when a pair of contrasted qualities is added to it: but, since one of every two contrary qualities is a 'privation', the 'intermediate' never can exist-25as some thinkers assert the 'Boundless' or the 'Environing' exists-in isolation. It is, therefore, equally and indifferently any one of the 'elements', or else it is nothing.
Since, then, there is nothing-at least, nothing perceptible-prior to these, they must be all. That being so, either they must always persist and not be transformable into one another: or they must undergo transformation-either all of them, or some only (as Plato wrote in the Timacus).' 30Now it has been proved before that they must undergo reciprocal transformation. It has also been proved that the speed with which they come-to-be, one out of another, is not uniform-since the process of reciprocal transformation is relatively quick between the 'elements' with a 'complementary factor', but relatively slow between those which possess no such factor. Assuming, then, that the contrariety, in respect to which they are transformed, is one, 35the elements' will inevitably be two: for it is 'matter' that is the 'mean' between the two contraries, and matter is imperceptible and inseparable from them.
332b
1 καὶ ἀχώριστος. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω ὁρᾶται ὄντα, δύο ἂν εἶεν
αἱ ἐλάχισται. Δύο δ' οὐσῶν οὐχ οἷόν τε τρία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τέςσαρα,
ὥσπερ φαίνεται· τοσαῦται γὰρ αἱ συζυγίαι· ἓξ γὰρ
οὐσῶν τὰς δύο ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐναντίας εἶναι
5 ἀλλήλαις. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εἴρηται πρότερον. Ὅτι δ'
ἐπειδὴ μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀδύνατον ἀρχήν τινα
εἶναι αὐτῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ ἄκρῳ ἢ μέσῳ, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. Ἐπὶ
μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄκροις οὐκ ἔσται, ὅτι πῦρ ἔσται ἢ γῆ πάντα·
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος τῷ φάναι ἐκ πυρὸς ἢ γῆς εἶναι πάντα.
10 Ὅτι δ' οὐδὲ μέσον, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισιν ἀὴρ μὲν καὶ εἰς πῦρ
μεταβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ, ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ εἰς ἀέρα καὶ εἰς
γῆν· τὰ δ' ἔσχατα οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλληλα· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ στῆναι
καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον τοῦτο ἰέναι ἐπ' εὐθείας ἐφ' ἑκάτερα.
Ἄπειροι γὰρ ἐναντιότητες ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔσονται. Γῆ ἐφ' ᾧ
15 Γ, ὕδωρ ἐφ' ᾧ Υ, ἀὴρ ἐφ' ᾧ Α, πῦρ ἐφ' ᾧ Π. Εἰ δὴ τὸ
Α μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ Π καὶ Υ, ἐναντιότης ἔσται τῶν Α Π.
Ἔστω ταῦτα λευκότης καὶ μελανία. Πάλιν εἰ εἰς τὸ Υ τὸ
Α, ἔσται ἄλλη· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ Υ καὶ Π. Ἔστω δὲ ξηρότης
καὶ ὑγρότης, τὸ μὲν Ξ ξηρότης, τὸ δὲ Υ ὑγρότης.
20 Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν μένει τὸ λευκόν, ὑπάρξει τὸ ὕδωρ ὑγρὸν καὶ
λευκόν, εἰ δὲ μή, μέλαν ἔσται τὸ ὕδωρ· εἰς τἀναντία γὰρ
ἡ μεταβολή. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ.
Ἔστω δὴ τὸ πρῶτον. Ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τῷ Π τὸ Ξ ὑπάρξει
ἡ ξηρότης. Ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τῷ Π τῷ πυρὶ μεταβολὴ
25 εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ· ἐναντία γὰρ ὑπάρχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ τὸ
πρῶτον μέλαν ἦν, ἔπειτα δὲ ξηρόν, τὸ δ' ὕδωρ ὑγρόν,
ἔπειτα δὲ λευκόν. Φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἔσται
ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ ἐπί γε τούτων, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ Γ τῇ γῇ
ὑπάρξει τὰ λοιπά, καὶ δύο σύμβολα τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ
30 ὑγρόν· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ συνδεδύασταί πως. Ὅτι δ' εἰς ἄπειρον
οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἰέναι, ὅπερ μελλήσαντες δείξειν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔμπροσθεν
ἤλθομεν, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. Εἰ γὰρ πάλιν τὸ πῦρ,
ἐφ' ᾧ Π, εἰς ἄλλο μεταβαλεῖ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμψει, οἷον εἰς
τὸ Ψ, ἐναντιότης τις τῷ πυρὶ καὶ τῷ Ψ ἄλλη ὑπάρξει
35 τῶν εἰρημένων· οὐδενὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπόκειται τῶν Γ Υ Α Π
1Since, however, the 'elements' are seen to be more than two, the contrarieties must at the least be two. But the contrarieties being two, the 'elements' must be four (as they evidently are) and cannot be three: for the couplings' are four, since, though six are possible, the two in which the qualities are contrary 5to one another cannot occur.
These subjects have been discussed before:' but the following arguments will make it clear that, since the 'elements' are transformed into one another, it is impossible for any one of them-whether it be at the end or in the middle-to be an 'originative source' of the rest. There can be no such 'originative element' at the ends: for all of them would then be Fire or Earth, and this theory amounts to the assertion that all things are made of Fire or Earth. 10Nor can a 'middle-element' be such an originative source'-as some thinkers suppose that Air is transformed both into Fire and into Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while the 'end-elements' are not further transformed into one another. For the process must come to a stop, and cannot continue ad infinitum in a straight line in either direction, since otherwise an infinite number of contrarieties would attach to the single 'element'. Let 15E stand for Earth, W for Water, A for Air, and F for Fire. Then (i) since A is transformed into F and W, there will be a contrariety belonging to A F. Let these contraries be whiteness and blackness. Again (ii) since A is transformed into W, there will be another contrariety: for W is not the same as F. Let this second contrariety be dryness and moistness, D being dryness and M moistness. 20Now if, when A is transformed into W, the 'white' persists, Water will be moist and white: but if it does not persist, Water will be black since change is into contraries. Water, therefore, must be either white or black. Let it then be the first. On similar grounds, therefore, D (dryness) will also belong to F. Consequently F (Fire) as well as Air will be able to be transformed 25into Water: for it has qualities contrary to those of Water, since Fire was first taken to be black and then to be dry, while Water was moist and then showed itself white. Thus it is evident that all the 'elements' will be able to be transformed out of one another; and that, in the instances we have taken, E (Earth) also will contain the remaining two 'complementary factors', viz. the black and the 30moist (for these have not yet been coupled).
We have dealt with this last topic before the thesis we set out to prove. That thesis-viz. that the process cannot continue ad infinitum-will be clear from the following considerations. If Fire (which is represented by F) is not to revert, but is to be transformed in turn into some other 'element' (e.g. into Q), a new contrariety, other than 35those mentioned, will belong to Fire and Q: for it has been assumed that Q is not the same as any of the four, E W A and F. Let K, then, belong to F and Y to Q.
These subjects have been discussed before:' but the following arguments will make it clear that, since the 'elements' are transformed into one another, it is impossible for any one of them-whether it be at the end or in the middle-to be an 'originative source' of the rest. There can be no such 'originative element' at the ends: for all of them would then be Fire or Earth, and this theory amounts to the assertion that all things are made of Fire or Earth. 10Nor can a 'middle-element' be such an originative source'-as some thinkers suppose that Air is transformed both into Fire and into Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while the 'end-elements' are not further transformed into one another. For the process must come to a stop, and cannot continue ad infinitum in a straight line in either direction, since otherwise an infinite number of contrarieties would attach to the single 'element'. Let 15E stand for Earth, W for Water, A for Air, and F for Fire. Then (i) since A is transformed into F and W, there will be a contrariety belonging to A F. Let these contraries be whiteness and blackness. Again (ii) since A is transformed into W, there will be another contrariety: for W is not the same as F. Let this second contrariety be dryness and moistness, D being dryness and M moistness. 20Now if, when A is transformed into W, the 'white' persists, Water will be moist and white: but if it does not persist, Water will be black since change is into contraries. Water, therefore, must be either white or black. Let it then be the first. On similar grounds, therefore, D (dryness) will also belong to F. Consequently F (Fire) as well as Air will be able to be transformed 25into Water: for it has qualities contrary to those of Water, since Fire was first taken to be black and then to be dry, while Water was moist and then showed itself white. Thus it is evident that all the 'elements' will be able to be transformed out of one another; and that, in the instances we have taken, E (Earth) also will contain the remaining two 'complementary factors', viz. the black and the 30moist (for these have not yet been coupled).
We have dealt with this last topic before the thesis we set out to prove. That thesis-viz. that the process cannot continue ad infinitum-will be clear from the following considerations. If Fire (which is represented by F) is not to revert, but is to be transformed in turn into some other 'element' (e.g. into Q), a new contrariety, other than 35those mentioned, will belong to Fire and Q: for it has been assumed that Q is not the same as any of the four, E W A and F. Let K, then, belong to F and Y to Q.
333a
1 τὸ Ψ. Ἔστω δὴ τῷ μὲν Π τὸ Κ, τῷ δὲ Ψ τὸ Φ. Τὸ δὴ Κ
πᾶσιν ὑπάρξει τοῖς Γ Υ Α Π· μεταβάλλουσι γὰρ εἰς ἄλληλα.
Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν ἔστω μήπω δεδειγμένον· ἀλλ'
ἐκεῖνο δῆλον, ὅτι εἰ πάλιν τὸ Ψ εἰς ἄλλο, ἄλλη ἐναντιότης
5 καὶ τῷ Ψ ὑπάρξει καὶ τῷ πυρὶ τῷ Π. Ὁμοίως δ' ἀεὶ μετὰ
τοῦ προστιθεμένου ἐναντιότης τις ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὥστ'
εἰ ἄπειρα, καὶ ἐναντιότητες ἄπειροι τῷ ἑνὶ ὑπάρξουσιν. Εἰ δὲ
τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται οὔτε ὁρίσασθαι οὐδὲν οὔτε γενέσθαι· δεήσει
γάρ, εἰ ἄλλο ἔσται ἐξ ἄλλου, τοσαύτας διεξελθεῖν ἐναντιότητας,
10 καὶ ἔτι πλείους, ὥστ' εἰς ἔνια μὲν οὐδέποτ' ἔσται μεταβολή,
οἷον εἰ ἄπειρα τὰ μεταξύ· ἀνάγκη δ', εἴπερ ἄπειρα τὰ
στοιχεῖα· ἔτι δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς πῦρ, εἰ ἄπειροι αἱ ἐναντιότητες.
Γίνεται δὲ καὶ πάντα ἕν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πάσας
ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν κάτω τοῦ Π τὰς τῶν ἄνωθεν, τούτοις δὲ
15 τὰς τῶν κάτωθεν, ὥστε πάντα ἓν ἔσται.
1Then K will belong to all four, E W A and F: for they are transformed into one another. This last point, however, we may admit, has not yet been proved: but at any rate it is clear that if Q is to be transformed in turn into yet another 'element', yet another contrariety 5will belong not only to Q but also to F (Fire). And, similarly, every addition of a new 'element' will carry with it the attachment of a new contrariety to the preceding elements'. Consequently, if the 'elements' are infinitely many, there will also belong to the single 'element' an infinite number of contrarieties. But if that be so, it will be impossible to define any 'element': impossible also for any to come-to-be. For if one is to result from another, it will have to pass through such a vast number of contrarieties-10and indeed even more than any determinate number. Consequently (i) into some 'elements' transformation will never be effected-viz. if the intermediates are infinite in number, as they must be if the 'elements' are infinitely many: further (ii) there will not even be a transformation of Air into Fire, if the contrarieties are infinitely many: moreover (iii) all the 'elements' become one. For all the contrarieties of the 'elements' above F must belong to those below F, 15and vice versa: hence they will all be one.
Book 2,Chapter 6 (333a16–334a14)
Θαυμάσειε δ' ἄν τις τῶν λεγόντων πλείω ἑνὸς τὰ
στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων ὥστε μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα,
καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησι, πῶς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς
εἶναι συμβλητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα. Καίτοι λέγει οὕτω· «ταῦτα γὰρ
20 ἶσά τε πάντα». Εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀνάγκη ταὐτό τι
εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἅπασι τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ᾧ μετροῦνται, οἷον εἰ
ἐξ ὕδατος κοτύλης εἶεν ἀέρος δέκα· τὸ αὐτό τι ἦν ἄρα
ἄμφω, εἰ μετρεῖται τῷ αὐτῷ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτω κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν
συμβλητὰ ὡς ποσὸν ἐκ ποσοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅσον δύναται, οἷον
25 εἰ κοτύλη ὕδατος ἴσον δύναται ψύχειν καὶ δέκα ἀέρος,
καὶ οὕτως κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν οὐχ ᾗ ποσὸν συμβλητά, ἀλλ' ᾗ
δύναταί τι. Εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ μὴ τῷ τοῦ ποσοῦ μέτρῳ συμβάλλεσθαι
τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ὡς τόδε
λευκὸν τόδε θερμόν. Τὸ δ' ὡς τόδε σημαίνει ἐν μὲν ποιῷ τὸ
30 ὅμοιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ τὸ ἴσον. Ἄτοπον δὴ φαίνεται, εἰ τὰ
σώματα ἀμετάβλητα ὄντα μὴ ἀναλογίᾳ συμβλητά ἐστιν,
ἀλλὰ μέτρῳ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῷ εἶναι ἴσον θερμὸν ἢ
ὅμοιον πυρὸς τοσονδὶ καὶ ἀέρος πολλαπλάσιον· τὸ γὰρ
αὐτὸ πλεῖον τῷ ὁμογενὲς εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἕξει τὸν λόγον.
35 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αὔξησις ἂν εἴη κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλέα, ἀλλ' ἢ
16As for those who agree with Empedocles that the 'elements' of body are more than one, so that they are not transformed into one another-one may well wonder in what sense it is open to them to maintain that the 'elements' are comparable. Yet Empedocles says 'For these are all not only equal...'
If it is meant that they are comparable 20in their amount, all the 'comparables' must possess an identical something whereby they are measured. If, e.g. one pint of Water yields ten of Air, both are measured by the same unit; and therefore both were from the first an identical something. On the other hand, suppose (ii) they are not 'comparable in their amount' in the sense that so-much of the one yields so much of the other, but comparable in 'power of action 25(a pint of Water, e.g. having a power of cooling equal to that of ten pints of Air); even so, they are 'comparable in their amount', though not qua 'amount' but qua Iso-much power'. There is also (iii) a third possibility. Instead of comparing their powers by the measure of their amount, they might be compared as terms in a 'correspondence': e.g. 'as x is hot, so correspondingly y is white'. But 'correspondence', though it means equality in the quantum, means 30similarity in a quale. Thus it is manifestly absurd that the 'simple' bodies, though they are not transformable, are comparable not merely as 'corresponding', but by a measure of their powers; i.e. that so-much Fire is comparable with many times-that-amount of Air, as being 'equally' or 'similarly' hot. For the same thing, if it be greater in amount, will, since it belongs to the same kind, have its ratio correspondingly increased.
35A further objection to the theory of Empedocles is that it makes even growth impossible, unless it be increase by addition. For his Fire increases by Fire: 'And Earth increases its own frame and Ether increases Ether."
If it is meant that they are comparable 20in their amount, all the 'comparables' must possess an identical something whereby they are measured. If, e.g. one pint of Water yields ten of Air, both are measured by the same unit; and therefore both were from the first an identical something. On the other hand, suppose (ii) they are not 'comparable in their amount' in the sense that so-much of the one yields so much of the other, but comparable in 'power of action 25(a pint of Water, e.g. having a power of cooling equal to that of ten pints of Air); even so, they are 'comparable in their amount', though not qua 'amount' but qua Iso-much power'. There is also (iii) a third possibility. Instead of comparing their powers by the measure of their amount, they might be compared as terms in a 'correspondence': e.g. 'as x is hot, so correspondingly y is white'. But 'correspondence', though it means equality in the quantum, means 30similarity in a quale. Thus it is manifestly absurd that the 'simple' bodies, though they are not transformable, are comparable not merely as 'corresponding', but by a measure of their powers; i.e. that so-much Fire is comparable with many times-that-amount of Air, as being 'equally' or 'similarly' hot. For the same thing, if it be greater in amount, will, since it belongs to the same kind, have its ratio correspondingly increased.
35A further objection to the theory of Empedocles is that it makes even growth impossible, unless it be increase by addition. For his Fire increases by Fire: 'And Earth increases its own frame and Ether increases Ether."
333b
1 κατὰ πρόσθεσιν· πυρὶ γὰρ αὔξει τὸ πῦρ· «αὔξει δὲ χθὼν
μὲν σφέτερον δέμας, αἰθέρα δ' αἰθήρ». Ταῦτα δὲ προστίθεται·
δοκεῖ δ' οὐχ οὕτως αὔξεσθαι τὰ αὐξανόμενα. Πολὺ δὲ
χαλεπώτερον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ φύσιν. Τὰ
5 γὰρ γινόμενα φύσει πάντα γίνεται ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου
καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης. Τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου
ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πυροῦ πυρὸν
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐλαίαν; ἢ καὶ ἐὰν ὡδὶ συντεθῇ ὀστοῦν; οὐ γὰρ
10 ὅπως ἔτυχε συνελθόντων οὐδὲν γίνεται, καθ' ἃ ἐκεῖνός
φησιν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινί. Τί οὖν τούτων αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ
γε ἢ γῆ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος· συγκρίσεως
γὰρ <τὸ μέν>, τὸ δὲ διακρίσεως αἴτιον. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ
οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου, ἀλλ' οὐ «μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε
15 μιγέντων», ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνός φησιν. Τύχη δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀνομάζεται,
ἀλλ' οὐ λόγος· ἔστι γὰρ μιχθῆναι ὡς ἔτυχεν. Τῶν
δὴ φύσει ὄντων αἴτιον τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ἑκάστου φύσις
αὕτη, περὶ ἧς οὐδὲν λέγει. Οὐδὲν ἄρα περὶ φύσεως λέγει.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ τοῦτο καὶ ἀγαθόν· ὁ δὲ τὴν μίξιν μόνον
20 ἐπαινεῖ. Καίτοι τά γε στοιχεῖα διακρίνει οὐ τὸ νεῖκος,
ἀλλ' ἡ φιλία τὰ φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ· θεοὶ δὲ καὶ
ταῦτα. Ἔτι δὲ περὶ κινήσεως ἁπλῶς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν
εἰπεῖν διότι ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος κινεῖ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτ' ἦν φιλίᾳ
εἶναι τὸ κινήσει τοιᾳδί, νείκει δὲ τὸ τοιᾳδί. Ἔδει οὖν ἢ
25 ὁρίσασθαι ἢ ὑποθέσθαι ἢ ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ ἀκριβῶς ἢ μαλακῶς,
ἢ ἄλλως γέ πως. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ φαίνεται καὶ βίᾳ καὶ
παρὰ φύσιν κινούμενα τὰ σώματα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, οἷον τὸ
πῦρ ἄνω μὲν οὐ βίᾳ, κάτω δὲ βίᾳ, τῷ δὲ βίᾳ τὸ κατὰ
φύσιν ἐναντίον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ βίᾳ, ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν
30 κινεῖσθαι. Ταύτην οὖν ἡ φιλία κινεῖ; ἢ οὔ; τοὐναντίον γὰρ
τὴν γῆν ἄνω καὶ διακρίσει ἔοικεν, καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ νεῖκος
αἴτιον τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως ἢ ἡ φιλία. Ὥστε καὶ ὅλως
παρὰ φύσιν ἡ φιλία ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον. Ἁπλῶς δὲ εἰ μὴ ἡ
φιλία ἢ τὸ νεῖκος κινοῖ, αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων οὐδεμία κίνησίς
35 ἐστιν οὐδὲ μονή· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαίνεται κινούμενα·
1These, however, are cases of addition: but it is not by addition that growing things are believed to increase. And it is far more difficult for him to account for the coming-to-be which occurs in nature. 5For the things which come-to-be by natural process all exhibit, in their coming-to-be, a uniformity either absolute or highly regular: while any exceptions any results which are in accordance neither with the invariable nor with the general rule are products of chance and luck. Then what is the cause determining that man comes-to-be from man, that wheat (instead of an olive) comes-to-be from wheat, either invariably or generally? Are we to say 'Bone comes-to-be if the "elements" be put together in such-and such a manner'? For, according to his own estatements, 10nothing comes-to-be from their 'fortuitous consilience', but only from their 'consilience' in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of this proportional consilience? Presumably not Fire or Earth. But neither is it Love and Strife: for the former is a cause of 'association' only, and the latter only of 'dissociation'. No: the cause in question is the essential nature of each thing-not merely to quote his words) 'a mingling and a divorce 15of what has been mingled'. And chance, not proportion, 'is the name given to these occurrences': for things can be 'mingled' fortuitously.
The cause, therefore, of the coming-to-be of the things which owe their existence to nature is that they are in such-and-such a determinate condition: and it is this which constitutes, the 'nature' of each thing-a 'nature' about which he says nothing. What he says, therefore, is no explanation of 'nature'. Moreover, it is this which is both 'the excellence' of each thing and its 'good': whereas he 20assigns the whole credit to the 'mingling'. (And yet the 'elements' at all events are 'dissociated' not by Strife, but by Love: since the 'elements' are by nature prior to the Deity, and they too are Deities.)
Again, his account of motion is vague. For it is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving, unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. He ought, then, either 25to have defined or to have postulated these characteristic movements, or to have demonstrated them-whether strictly or laxly or in some other fashion. Moreover, since (a) the 'simple' bodies appear to move 'naturally' as well as by compulsion, i.e. in a manner contrary to nature (fire, e.g. appears to move upwards without compulsion, though it appears to move by compulsion downwards); and since (b) what is 'natural' is contrary to that which is due to compulsion, and movement by compulsion actually occurs; it follows that 'natural movement' can also 30occur in fact. Is this, then, the movement that Love sets going? No: for, on the contrary, the 'natural movement' moves Earth downwards and resembles 'dissociation', and Strife rather than Love is its cause-so that in general, too, Love rather than Strife would seem to be contrary to nature. And unless Love or Strife is actually setting them in motion, the 'simple' bodies themselves have absolutely no movement 35or rest. But this is paradoxical: and what is more, they do in fact obviously move.
The cause, therefore, of the coming-to-be of the things which owe their existence to nature is that they are in such-and-such a determinate condition: and it is this which constitutes, the 'nature' of each thing-a 'nature' about which he says nothing. What he says, therefore, is no explanation of 'nature'. Moreover, it is this which is both 'the excellence' of each thing and its 'good': whereas he 20assigns the whole credit to the 'mingling'. (And yet the 'elements' at all events are 'dissociated' not by Strife, but by Love: since the 'elements' are by nature prior to the Deity, and they too are Deities.)
Again, his account of motion is vague. For it is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things moving, unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. He ought, then, either 25to have defined or to have postulated these characteristic movements, or to have demonstrated them-whether strictly or laxly or in some other fashion. Moreover, since (a) the 'simple' bodies appear to move 'naturally' as well as by compulsion, i.e. in a manner contrary to nature (fire, e.g. appears to move upwards without compulsion, though it appears to move by compulsion downwards); and since (b) what is 'natural' is contrary to that which is due to compulsion, and movement by compulsion actually occurs; it follows that 'natural movement' can also 30occur in fact. Is this, then, the movement that Love sets going? No: for, on the contrary, the 'natural movement' moves Earth downwards and resembles 'dissociation', and Strife rather than Love is its cause-so that in general, too, Love rather than Strife would seem to be contrary to nature. And unless Love or Strife is actually setting them in motion, the 'simple' bodies themselves have absolutely no movement 35or rest. But this is paradoxical: and what is more, they do in fact obviously move.
334a
1 διέκρινε μὲν γὰρ τὸ νεῖκος, ἠνέχθη δ' ἄνω ὁ αἰθὴρ
οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μέν φησιν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τύχης
(«οὕτω γὰρ συνέκυρσε θέων τοτέ, πολλάκι δ' ἄλλως») ὁτὲ
δέ φησι πεφυκέναι τὸ πῦρ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ὁ δ' αἰθήρ, φησί,
5 »<δ' αὖ> μακρῇσι κατὰ χθόνα δύετο ῥίζαις». Ἅμα δὲ καὶ
τὸν κόσμον ὁμοίως ἔχειν φησὶν ἐπί τε τοῦ νείκους νῦν καὶ
πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας. Τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτον καὶ
αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, ἀλλά
τινος κινήσεως ταῦτα αἴτια· εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ἐκεῖνο ἀρχή·
10 ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἢ ἕν τι αὐτῶν· αἱ
γὰρ ἀλλοιώσεις αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς ἔσονται, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν
εἶναι καὶ πάλιν ἄμουσον, ἢ μνήμη ἢ λήθη; δῆλον γὰρ
ὅτι εἰ μὲν πῦρ ἡ ψυχή, τὰ πάθη ὑπάρξει αὐτῇ ὅσα πυρὶ
ᾗ πῦρ· εἰ δὲ μικτόν, τὰ σωματικά· τούτων δ' οὐδὲν σωματικόν.
1For though Strife 'dissociated', it was not by Strife that the 'Ether' was borne upwards. On the contrary, sometimes he attributes its movement to something like chance ('For thus, as it ran, it happened to meet them then, though often otherwise"), while at other times he says it is the nature of Fire to be borne upwards, but 'the Ether' (to quote his words) '5sank down upon the Earth with long roots'. With such statements, too, he combines the assertion that the Order of the World is the same now, in the reign of Strife, as it was formerly in the reign of Love. What, then, is the 'first mover' of the 'elements'? What causes their motion? Presumably not Love and Strife: on the contrary, these are causes of a particular motion, if at least we assume that 'first mover' to be an originative source'.
10An additional paradox is that the soul should consist of the 'elements', or that it should be one of them. How are the soul's 'alterations' to take Place? How, e.g. is the change from being musical to being unmusical, or how is memory or forgetting, to occur? For clearly, if the soul be Fire, only such modifications will happen to it as characterize Fire qua Fire: while if it be compounded out of the elements', only the corporeal modifications will occur in it. But the changes we have mentioned are none of them corporeal.
10An additional paradox is that the soul should consist of the 'elements', or that it should be one of them. How are the soul's 'alterations' to take Place? How, e.g. is the change from being musical to being unmusical, or how is memory or forgetting, to occur? For clearly, if the soul be Fire, only such modifications will happen to it as characterize Fire qua Fire: while if it be compounded out of the elements', only the corporeal modifications will occur in it. But the changes we have mentioned are none of them corporeal.
Book 2,Chapter 7 (334a15–334b29)
15 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἑτέρας ἔργον ἐστὶ θεωρίας.
Περὶ δὲ τῶν στοιχείων ἐξ ὧν τὰ σώματα συνέστηκεν,
ὅσοις μὲν δοκεῖ τι εἶναι κοινὸν ἢ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀνάγκη
εἰ θάτερον τούτων, καὶ θάτερον συμβαίνειν· ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ποιοῦσιν
ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν μηδ' ὡς ἐξ ἑκάστου, πλὴν ὡς ἐκ
20 τοίχου πλίνθους, ἄτοπον πῶς ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔσονται σάρκες καὶ
ὀστᾶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν. Ἔχει δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀπορίαν
καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων γεννῶσιν, τίνα τρόπον γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν
ἕτερόν τι παρ' αὐτά. Λέγω δ' οἷον ἔστιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ
καὶ ἐκ τούτου γίνεσθαι πῦρ· ἔστι γάρ τι κοινὸν ὑποκείμενον.
25 Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ σὰρξ ἐξ αὐτῶν γίνεται καὶ μυελός·
ταῦτα δὴ γίνεται πῶς; ἐκείνοις τε γὰρ τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τίς ἔσται τρόπος; ἀνάγκη γὰρ σύνθεσιν εἶναι
καθάπερ ἐξ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων τοῖχος· καὶ τὸ μίγμα δὲ
τοῦτο ἐκ σωζομένων μὲν ἔσται τῶν στοιχείων, κατὰ μικρὰ δὲ
30 παρ' ἄλληλα συγκειμένων. Οὕτω δὴ σὰρξ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἕκαστον. Συμβαίνει δὴ μὴ ἐξ ὁτουοῦν μέρους σαρκὸς γίνεσθαι
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὥσπερ ἐκ κηροῦ γένοιτ' ἂν ἐκ μὲν τουδὶ τοῦ
μέρους σφαῖρα, πυραμὶς δ' ἐξ ἄλλου τινός· ἀλλ' ἐνεδέχετό
γε ἐξ ἑκατέρου ἑκάτερον γενέσθαι. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τοῦτον γίνεται
35 τὸν τρόπον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐξ ὁτουοῦν ἄμφω· τοῖς δ' ἐκείνως
λέγουσιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ τοίχου λίθος καὶ πλίνθος,
15The discussion of these difficulties, however, is a task appropriate to a different investigation:' let us return to the 'elements' of which bodies are composed. The theories that 'there is something common to all the "elements"', and that they are reciprocally transformed', are so related that those who accept either are bound to accept the other as well. Those, on the other hand, who do not make their coming-to-be reciprocal-who refuse to suppose that any one of the 'elements' comes-to-be out of any other taken singly, except in the sense in which 20bricks come-to-be out of a wall-are faced with a paradox. How, on their theory, are flesh and bones or any of the other compounds to result from the 'elements' taken together?
Indeed, the point we have raised constitutes a problem even for those who generate the 'elements' out of one another. In what manner does anything other than, and beside, the 'elements' come-to-be out of them? Let me illustrate my meaning. Water can come-to-be out of Fire and Fire out of Water; for their substralum is something common to them both. 25But flesh too, presumably, and marrow come-to-be out of them. How, then, do such things come to-be? For (a) how is the manner of their coming-to-be to be conceived by those who maintain a theory like that of Empedocles? They must conceive it as composition-just as a wall comes-to-be out of bricks and stones: and the 'Mixture', of which they speak, will be composed of the 'elements', these being preserved in it unaltered but with their small particles 30juxtaposed each to each. That will be the manner, presumably, in which flesh and every other compound results from the 'elements'. Consequently, it follows that Fire and Water do not come-to-be 'out of any and every part of flesh'. For instance, although a sphere might come-to-be out of this part of a lump of wax and a pyramid out of some other part, it was nevertheless possible for either figure to have come-to-be out of either part indifferently: that is 35the manner of coming-to-be when 'both Fire and Water come-to-be out of any and every part of flesh'.
Indeed, the point we have raised constitutes a problem even for those who generate the 'elements' out of one another. In what manner does anything other than, and beside, the 'elements' come-to-be out of them? Let me illustrate my meaning. Water can come-to-be out of Fire and Fire out of Water; for their substralum is something common to them both. 25But flesh too, presumably, and marrow come-to-be out of them. How, then, do such things come to-be? For (a) how is the manner of their coming-to-be to be conceived by those who maintain a theory like that of Empedocles? They must conceive it as composition-just as a wall comes-to-be out of bricks and stones: and the 'Mixture', of which they speak, will be composed of the 'elements', these being preserved in it unaltered but with their small particles 30juxtaposed each to each. That will be the manner, presumably, in which flesh and every other compound results from the 'elements'. Consequently, it follows that Fire and Water do not come-to-be 'out of any and every part of flesh'. For instance, although a sphere might come-to-be out of this part of a lump of wax and a pyramid out of some other part, it was nevertheless possible for either figure to have come-to-be out of either part indifferently: that is 35the manner of coming-to-be when 'both Fire and Water come-to-be out of any and every part of flesh'.
334b
1 ἑκάτερον ἐξ ἄλλου τόπου καὶ μέρους. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τοῖς ποιοῦσι μίαν αὐτῶν ὕλην ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἔσται τι
ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οἷον ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ ἢ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς. Εἰ
γάρ ἐστιν ἡ σὰρξ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν καὶ μηδέτερον ἐκείνων, μηδ'
5 αὖ σύνθεσις σωζομένων, τί λείπεται πλὴν τὴν ὕλην εἶναι τὸ ἐξ
ἐκείνων; ἡ γὰρ θατέρου φθορὰ ἢ θάτερον ποεῖ ἢ τὴν ὕλην.
Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν,
ὅταν μὲν ἁπλῶς ᾖ θάτερον ἐντελεχείᾳ, δυνάμει θάτερον
ἔσται· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς μὲν θερμὸν ψυχρόν,
10 ὡς δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν διὰ τὸ μιγνύμενα φθείρειν τὰς
ὑπεροχὰς ἀλλήλων, τότε οὔθ' ἡ ὕλη ἔσται οὔτε ἐκείνων
τῶν ἐναντίων ἑκάτερον ἐντελεχείᾳ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ·
κατὰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ
τοὐναντίον, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον διπλασίως θερμὸν δυνάμει ἢ
15 ψυχρόν, ἢ τριπλασίως, ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον. Ἔσται
δὴ μιχθέντων τἆλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ
τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ἐκείνων δυνάμει πως ὄντων, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς
ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον· καὶ ἔστιν οὕτω μὲν μίξις,
ἐκείνως δὲ ὕλη τὸ γινόμενον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τἀναντία
20 κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις διορισμόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ
ἐνεργείᾳ θερμὸν δυνάμει ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ψυχρὸν
δυνάμει θερμόν, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ ἰσάζῃ, μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων. Καὶ πρῶτον οὕτω
τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ
25 τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γινομένου ψυχροῦ, τοῦ δὲ
ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ
οὐδέτερον, τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον. Ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιοῦσι
σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τἆλλα.
1Those, however, who maintain the theory in question, are not at liberty to conceive that 'both come-to-be out of flesh' in that manner, but only as a stone and a brick 'both come-to-be out of a wall'-viz. each out of a different place or part. Similarly (b) even for those who postulate a single matter of their 'elements' there is a certain difficulty in explaining how anything is to result from two of them taken together-e.g. from 'cold' and hot', or from Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and is neither of them, 5nor again is a 'composition' of them in which they are preserved unaltered, what alternative is left except to identify the resultant of the two 'elements' with their matter? For the passingaway of either 'element' produces either the other or the matter.
Perhaps we may suggest the following solution. (i) There are differences of degree in hot and cold. Although, therefore, when either is fully real without qualification, the other will exist potentially; yet, when neither exists in the full completeness of its being, but both by combining destroy one another's excesses so that there exist instead a hot which (for a 'hot') is cold 10and a cold which (for a 'cold') is hot; then what results from these two contraries will be neither their matter, nor either of them existing in its full reality without qualification. There will result instead an 'intermediate': and this 'intermediate', according as it is potentially more hot than cold or vice versa, will possess a power-of-heating that is double or 15triple its power-of-cooling, or otherwise related thereto in some similar ratio. Thus all the other bodies will result from the contraries, or rather from the 'elements', in so far as these have been 'combined': while the elements' will result from the contraries, in so far as these 'exist potentially' in a special sense-not as matter 'exists potentially', but in the sense explained above. And when a thing comes-to-be in this manner, the process is cobination'; whereas what comes-to-be in the other manner is matter. Moreover (ii) contraries also 'suffer action', 20in accordance with the disjunctively-articulated definition established in the early part of this work.' For the actually-hot is potentially-cold and the actually cold potentially-hot; so that hot and cold, unless they are equally balanced, are transformed into one another (and all the other contraries behave in a similar way). It is thus, then, that in the first place the 'elements' are transformed; and that (in the second place) out of the 'elements' there come-to-be flesh and bones and 25the like-the hot becoming cold and the cold becoming hot when they have been brought to the 'mean'. For at the 'mean' is neither hot nor cold. The 'mean', however, is of considerable extent and not indivisible. Similarly, it is qua reduced to a 'mean' condition that the dry and the moist, as well as the contraries we have used as examples, produce flesh and bone and the remaining compounds.
Perhaps we may suggest the following solution. (i) There are differences of degree in hot and cold. Although, therefore, when either is fully real without qualification, the other will exist potentially; yet, when neither exists in the full completeness of its being, but both by combining destroy one another's excesses so that there exist instead a hot which (for a 'hot') is cold 10and a cold which (for a 'cold') is hot; then what results from these two contraries will be neither their matter, nor either of them existing in its full reality without qualification. There will result instead an 'intermediate': and this 'intermediate', according as it is potentially more hot than cold or vice versa, will possess a power-of-heating that is double or 15triple its power-of-cooling, or otherwise related thereto in some similar ratio. Thus all the other bodies will result from the contraries, or rather from the 'elements', in so far as these have been 'combined': while the elements' will result from the contraries, in so far as these 'exist potentially' in a special sense-not as matter 'exists potentially', but in the sense explained above. And when a thing comes-to-be in this manner, the process is cobination'; whereas what comes-to-be in the other manner is matter. Moreover (ii) contraries also 'suffer action', 20in accordance with the disjunctively-articulated definition established in the early part of this work.' For the actually-hot is potentially-cold and the actually cold potentially-hot; so that hot and cold, unless they are equally balanced, are transformed into one another (and all the other contraries behave in a similar way). It is thus, then, that in the first place the 'elements' are transformed; and that (in the second place) out of the 'elements' there come-to-be flesh and bones and 25the like-the hot becoming cold and the cold becoming hot when they have been brought to the 'mean'. For at the 'mean' is neither hot nor cold. The 'mean', however, is of considerable extent and not indivisible. Similarly, it is qua reduced to a 'mean' condition that the dry and the moist, as well as the contraries we have used as examples, produce flesh and bone and the remaining compounds.
Book 2,Chapter 8 (334b30–335a23)
30 Ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ μικτὰ σώματα, ὅσα περὶ τὸν τοῦ
μέσου τόπον ἐστίν, ἐξ ἁπάντων σύγκειται τῶν ἁπλῶν. Γῆ μὲν
γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει πᾶσι διὰ τὸ ἕκαστον εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ
πλεῖστον ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ τόπῳ, ὕδωρ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεῖν μὲν
ὁρίζεσθαι τὸ σύνθετον, μόνον δ' εἶναι τῶν ἁπλῶν εὐόριστον τὸ
30All the compound bodies-all of which exist in the region belonging to the central body-are composed of all the 'simple' bodies. For they all contain Earth because every 'simple' body is to be found specially and most abundantly in its own place. And they all contain Water because (a) the compound must possess a definite outline and Water, alone of the 'simple' bodies, is readily adaptable in shape: moreover (b) Earth has no power of cohesion without the moist.
335a
1 ὕδωρ, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ μὴ δύνασθαι
συμμένειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ συνέχον· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαιρεθείη
τελέως ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸ ὑγρόν, διαπίπτοι ἄν. Γῆ μὲν οὖν καὶ ὕδωρ
διὰ ταύτας ἐνυπάρχει τὰς αἰτίας, ἀὴρ δὲ καὶ πῦρ, ὅτι
5 ἐναντία ἐστὶ γῇ καὶ ὕδατι· γῆ μὲν γὰρ ἀέρι, ὕδωρ δὲ πυρὶ
ἐναντίον ἐστίν, ὡς ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίαν εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ
οὖν αἱ γενέσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσίν, ἐνυπάρχει δὲ θάτερα
ἄκρα τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνάγκη καὶ θάτερον ἐνυπάρχειν, ὥστ' ἐν
ἅπαντι τῷ συνθέτῳ πάντα τὰ ἁπλᾶ ἐνέσται. Μαρτυρεῖν δ'
10 ἔοικε καὶ ἡ τροφὴ ἑκάστων· ἅπαντα μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τοῖς
αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὧνπέρ ἐστιν, ἅπαντα δὲ πλείοσι τρέφεται. Καὶ
γὰρ ἅπερ ἂν δόξειεν ἑνὶ μόνῳ τρέφεσθαι, τῷ ὕδατι τὰ φυτά,
πλείοσι τρέφεται· μέμικται γὰρ τῷ ὕδατι γῆ· διὸ καὶ
οἱ γεωργοὶ πειρῶνται μίξαντες ἄρδειν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ
15 μὲν τροφὴ τῆς ὕλης, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον συνειλημμένον τῇ
ὕλῃ ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, εὔλογον ἤδη τὸ μόνον τῶν
ἁπλῶν σωμάτων τρέφεσθαι τὸ πῦρ ἁπάντων ἐξ ἀλλήλων
γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πρότεροι λέγουσιν· μόνον γάρ ἐστι
καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ εἴδους τὸ πῦρ διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι φέρεσθαι
20 πρὸς τὸν ὅρον. Ἕκαστον δὲ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν
φέρεσθαι· ἡ δὲ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἁπάντων ἐν τοῖς ὅροις.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα τὰ σώματα ἐξ ἁπάντων συνέστηκε
τῶν ἁπλῶν, εἴρηται.
1On the contrary, the moist is what holds it together; for it would fall to pieces if the moist were eliminated from it completely.
They contain Earth and Water, then, for the reasons we have given: and they contain Air and Fire, because these 5are contrary to Earth and Water (Earth being contrary to Air and Water to Fire, in so far as one Substance can be 'contrary' to another). Now all compounds presuppose in their coming-to-be constituents which are contrary to one another: and in all compounds there is contained one set of the contrasted extremes. Hence the other set must be contained in them also, so that every compound will include all the 'simple' bodies.
10Additional evidence seems to be furnished by the food each compound takes. For all of them are fed by substances which are the same as their constituents, and all of them are fed by more substances than one. Indeed, even the plants, though it might be thought they are fed by one substance only, viz. by Water, are fed by more than one: for Earth has been mixed with the Water. That is why farmers too endeavour to mix before watering. 15Although food is akin to the matter, that which is fed is the 'figure'-i.e. the 'form' taken along with the matter. This fact enables us to understand why, whereas all the 'simple' bodies come-to-be out of one another, Fire is the only one of them which (as our predecessors also assert) 'is fed'. For Fire alone-or more than all the rest-is akin to the 'form' because it tends by nature to be borne 20towards the limit. Now each of them naturally tends to be borne towards its own place; but the 'figure'-i.e. the 'form'-Of them all is at the limits.
Thus we have explained that all the compound bodies are composed of all the 'simple' bodies.
They contain Earth and Water, then, for the reasons we have given: and they contain Air and Fire, because these 5are contrary to Earth and Water (Earth being contrary to Air and Water to Fire, in so far as one Substance can be 'contrary' to another). Now all compounds presuppose in their coming-to-be constituents which are contrary to one another: and in all compounds there is contained one set of the contrasted extremes. Hence the other set must be contained in them also, so that every compound will include all the 'simple' bodies.
10Additional evidence seems to be furnished by the food each compound takes. For all of them are fed by substances which are the same as their constituents, and all of them are fed by more substances than one. Indeed, even the plants, though it might be thought they are fed by one substance only, viz. by Water, are fed by more than one: for Earth has been mixed with the Water. That is why farmers too endeavour to mix before watering. 15Although food is akin to the matter, that which is fed is the 'figure'-i.e. the 'form' taken along with the matter. This fact enables us to understand why, whereas all the 'simple' bodies come-to-be out of one another, Fire is the only one of them which (as our predecessors also assert) 'is fed'. For Fire alone-or more than all the rest-is akin to the 'form' because it tends by nature to be borne 20towards the limit. Now each of them naturally tends to be borne towards its own place; but the 'figure'-i.e. the 'form'-Of them all is at the limits.
Thus we have explained that all the compound bodies are composed of all the 'simple' bodies.
Book 2,Chapter 9 (335a24–336a14)
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτά, καὶ ἡ γένεσις
25 τυγχάνει οὖσα ἐν τῷ περὶ τὸ μέσον τόπῳ, λεκτέον περὶ
πάσης γενέσεως ὁμοίως πόσαι τε καὶ τίνες αὐτῆς ἀρχαί·
ῥᾷον γὰρ οὕτω τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον θεωρήσομεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν
καθόλου λάβωμεν πρῶτον. Εἰσὶν οὖν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἴσαι καὶ
τῷ γένει αἱ αὐταὶ αἵπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀιδίοις τε καὶ πρώτοις· ἡ
30 μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ὕλη, ἡ δ' ὡς μορφή. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν τρίτην
ἔτι προσυπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἱκαναὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαι αἱ
δύο, καθάπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις. Ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλη τοῖς
γενητοῖς ἐστιν αἴτιον τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Τὰ μὲν
γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν, οἷον τὰ ἀίδια, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ
35 ἔστιν. Τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατον
24Since some things are such as to come-to-be and pass-away, and since coming-to-be 25in fact occurs in the region about the centre, we must explain the number and the nature of the 'originative sources' of all coming-to-be alike: for a grasp of the true theory of any universal facilitates the understanding of its specific forms.
The 'originative sources', then, of the things which come-to-be are equal in number to, and identical in kind with, those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. 30For there is one in the sense of 'matter', and a second in the sense of 'form': and, in addition, the third 'originative source' must be present as well. For the two first are not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than they are adequate to account for the primary things.
35Now cause, in the sense of material origin, for the things which are such as to come-to-be is 'that which can be-and-not-be': and this is identical with'that which can come-to-be-and-pass-away', since the latter, while it is at one time, at another time is not.
The 'originative sources', then, of the things which come-to-be are equal in number to, and identical in kind with, those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. 30For there is one in the sense of 'matter', and a second in the sense of 'form': and, in addition, the third 'originative source' must be present as well. For the two first are not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than they are adequate to account for the primary things.
35Now cause, in the sense of material origin, for the things which are such as to come-to-be is 'that which can be-and-not-be': and this is identical with'that which can come-to-be-and-pass-away', since the latter, while it is at one time, at another time is not.
335b
1 εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλως
ἔχειν. Ἔνια δὲ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι δυνατά, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ
γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτόν· ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι τοῦτο, ποτὲ δ' οὐκ
ἔστιν. Ὥστ' ἀνάγκη γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν περὶ τὸ δυνατὸν
5 εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Διὸ καὶ ὡς μὲν ὕλη τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αἴτιον τοῖς
γενητοῖς, ὡς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τοῦτο
δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας. Δεῖ δὲ προσεῖναι καὶ
τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ἅπαντες μὲν ὀνειρώττουσι, λέγει δ' οὐδείς,
ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἱκανὴν ᾠήθησαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι
10 τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ
γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν,
ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἴδη τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ
τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος,
γίνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάληψιν καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν
15 ἀποβολήν, ὥστ' εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, τὰ εἴδη οἴεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης
αἴτια εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Οἱ δ' αὐτὴν τὴν ὕλην·
ἀπὸ ταύτης γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν. Οὐδέτεροι δὲ λέγουσι καλῶς.
Εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτια τὰ εἴδη, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ γεννᾷ
συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δ' οὔ, ὄντων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν
20 ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν; ἔτι δ' ἐπ' ἐνίων θεωροῦμεν ἄλλο τὸ
αἴτιον ὄν· ὑγίειαν γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἐπιστήμην ὁ
ἐπιστήμων, οὔσης καὶ ὑγιείας αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν
μεθεκτικῶν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ δύναμιν
πραττομένων. Εἰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην τις φήσειε γεννᾶν διὰ
25 τὴν κίνησιν, φυσικώτερον μὲν ἂν λέγοι τῶν οὕτω λεγόντων·
τὸ γὰρ ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ τὸ μετασχηματίζον αἰτιώτερόν τε τοῦ
γεννᾶν, καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν εἰώθαμεν τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὁμοίως
ἔν τε τοῖς φύσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὃ ἂν ᾖ κινητικόν.
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν· τῆς μὲν γὰρ
30 ὕλης τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ
ποιεῖν ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τέχνῃ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει γινομένων· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ ὕδωρ ζῷον
ἐξ αὑτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον κλίνην, ἀλλ' ἡ τέχνη. Ὥστε καὶ οὗτοι
διὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς, καὶ ὅτι παραλείπουσι τὴν κυριωτέραν
35 αἰτίαν· ἐξαιροῦσι γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὴν μορφήν.
1(For whereas some things are of necessity, viz. the eternal things, others of necessity are not. And of these two sets of things, since they cannot diverge from the necessity of their nature, it is impossible for the first not to he and impossible for the second to he. Other things, however, can both be and not he.) Hence coming-to-be and passing-away must occur within the field of 'that which can 5be-and not-be'. This, therefore, is cause in the sense of material origin for the things which are such as to come-to-be; while cause, in the sense of their 'end', is their 'figure' or 'form'-and that is the formula expressing the essential nature of each of them.
But the third 'originative source' must be present as well-the cause vaguely dreamed of by all our predecessors, definitely stated by none of them. On the contrary (a) some amongst them thought 10the nature of 'the Forms' was adequate to account for coming-to-be. Thus Socrates in the Phaedo first blames everybody else for having given no explanation; and then lays it down; that 'some things are Forms, others Participants in the Forms', and that 'while a thing is said to "be" in virtue of the Form, it is said to "come-to-be" qua sharing in," to "pass-away" qua "15losing," the 'Form'. Hence he thinks that 'assuming the truth of these theses, the Forms must be causes both of coming-to-be and of passing-away'. On the other hand (b) there were others who thought 'the matter' was adequate by itself to account for coming-to-be, since 'the movement originates from the matter'.
Neither of these theories, however, is sound. For (a) if the Forms are causes, why is their generating activity intermittent instead of perpetual and continuous-since there 20always are Participants as well as Forms? Besides, in some instances we see that the cause is other than the Form. For it is the doctor who implants health and the man of science who implants science, although 'Health itself' and 'Science itself' are as well as the Participants: and the same principle applies to everything else that is produced in accordance with an art. On the other hand (b) to say that 'matter generates owing to 25its movement' would be, no doubt, more scientific than to make such statements as are made by the thinkers we have been criticizing. For what 'alters' and transfigures plays a greater part in bringing, things into being; and we are everywhere accustomed, in the products of nature and of art alike, to look upon that which can initiate movement as the producing cause. Nevertheless this second theory is not right either.
For, to begin with, it is characteristic of 30matter to suffer action, i.e. to be moved: but to move, i.e. to act, belongs to a different 'power'. This is obvious both in the things that come-to-be by art and in those that come to-be by nature. Water does not of itself produce out of itself an animal: and it is the art, not the wood, that makes a bed. 35Nor is this their only error.
But the third 'originative source' must be present as well-the cause vaguely dreamed of by all our predecessors, definitely stated by none of them. On the contrary (a) some amongst them thought 10the nature of 'the Forms' was adequate to account for coming-to-be. Thus Socrates in the Phaedo first blames everybody else for having given no explanation; and then lays it down; that 'some things are Forms, others Participants in the Forms', and that 'while a thing is said to "be" in virtue of the Form, it is said to "come-to-be" qua sharing in," to "pass-away" qua "15losing," the 'Form'. Hence he thinks that 'assuming the truth of these theses, the Forms must be causes both of coming-to-be and of passing-away'. On the other hand (b) there were others who thought 'the matter' was adequate by itself to account for coming-to-be, since 'the movement originates from the matter'.
Neither of these theories, however, is sound. For (a) if the Forms are causes, why is their generating activity intermittent instead of perpetual and continuous-since there 20always are Participants as well as Forms? Besides, in some instances we see that the cause is other than the Form. For it is the doctor who implants health and the man of science who implants science, although 'Health itself' and 'Science itself' are as well as the Participants: and the same principle applies to everything else that is produced in accordance with an art. On the other hand (b) to say that 'matter generates owing to 25its movement' would be, no doubt, more scientific than to make such statements as are made by the thinkers we have been criticizing. For what 'alters' and transfigures plays a greater part in bringing, things into being; and we are everywhere accustomed, in the products of nature and of art alike, to look upon that which can initiate movement as the producing cause. Nevertheless this second theory is not right either.
For, to begin with, it is characteristic of 30matter to suffer action, i.e. to be moved: but to move, i.e. to act, belongs to a different 'power'. This is obvious both in the things that come-to-be by art and in those that come to-be by nature. Water does not of itself produce out of itself an animal: and it is the art, not the wood, that makes a bed. 35Nor is this their only error.
336a
1 Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδιδόασι τοῖς σώμασι, δι' ἃς
γεννῶσι, λίαν ὀργανικῶς, ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος
αἰτίαν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφυκεν, ὥς φασι, τὸ μὲν θερμὸν
διακρίνειν τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν συνιστάναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον
5 τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκ τούτων λέγουσι καὶ
διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα τἆλλα γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι· φαίνεται
δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ κινούμενον καὶ πάσχον. Ἔτι δὲ
παραπλήσιον ποιοῦσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις τῷ πρίονι καὶ ἑκάστῳ
τῶν ὀργάνων ἀπονέμοι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων· ἀνάγκη
10 γὰρ πρίονος ὄντος διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ξέοντος λεαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Ὥστ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ
πῦρ, ἀλλὰ πῶς κινεῖ οὐχ ὁρῶσιν, ὅτι χεῖρον ἢ τὰ ὄργανα.
Ἡμῖν δὲ καθόλου τε πρότερον εἴρηται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων,
καὶ νῦν διώρισται περί τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς.
1They make a second mistake in omitting the more controlling cause: for they eliminate the essential nature, i.e. the 'form'. And what is more, since they remove the formal cause, they invest the forces they assign to the 'simple' bodies-the forces which enable these bodies to bring things into being-with too instrumental a character. For 'since' (as they say) 'it is the nature of the hot to dissociate, of the cold to bring together, and of each remaining contrary 5either to act or to suffer action', it is out of such materials and by their agency (so they maintain) that everything else comes-to-be and passes-away. Yet (a) it is evident that even Fire is itself moved, i.e. suffers action. Moreover (b) their procedure is virtually the same as if one were to treat the saw (and the various instruments of carpentry) as 'the cause' of the things that come-to-be: 10for the wood must be divided if a man saws, must become smooth if he planes, and so on with the remaining tools. Hence, however true it may be that Fire is active, i.e. sets things moving, there is a further point they fail to observe-viz. that Fire is inferior to the tools or instruments in the manner in which it sets things moving.
Book 2,Chapter 10 (336a15–337a33)
15 Ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν φορὰν κίνησις δέδεικται
ὅτι ἀίδιος, ἀνάγκη τούτων ὄντων καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι συνεχῶς· ἡ
γὰρ φορὰ ποιήσει τὴν γένεσιν ἐνδελεχῶς διὰ τὸ προσάγειν
καὶ ἀπάγειν τὸ γεννητικόν. Ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ πρότερον
καλῶς εἴρηται, τὸ πρώτην τῶν μεταβολῶν τὴν φορὰν
20 ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν γένεσιν εἰπεῖν· πολὺ γὰρ εὐλογώτερον τὸ
ὂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι γενέσεως αἴτιον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ
ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι. Τὸ μὲν οὖν φερόμενον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον
οὐκ ἔστιν· διὸ καὶ ἡ φορὰ προτέρα τῆς γενέσεως. Ἐπεὶ δ'
ὑπόκειται καὶ δέδεικται συνεχὴς οὖσα τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ
25 γένεσις καὶ φθορά, φαμὲν δ' αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῦ
γίνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι μιᾶς μὲν οὔσης τῆς φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
γίνεσθαι ἄμφω διὰ τὸ ἐναντία εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ
ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέφυκε ποιεῖν. Ὥστε ἤτοι
γένεσις ἀεὶ ἔσται ἢ φθορά. Δεῖ <δὴ> πλείους εἶναι τὰς
30 κινήσεις καὶ ἐναντίας, ἢ τῇ φορᾷ ἢ τῇ ἀνωμαλίᾳ· τῶν γὰρ
ἐναντίων τἀναντία αἴτια· διὸ καὶ οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ αἰτία
ἐστὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον·
ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχές ἐστι καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι δύο
κινήσεις· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἔσται συνεχὴς γένεσις καὶ
15As to our own theory-we have given a general account of the causes in an earlier work,' we have now explained and distinguished the 'matter' and the 'form'. Further, since the change which is motion has been proved' to be eternal, the continuity of the occurrence of coming-to-be follows necessarily from what we have established: for the eternal motion, by causing 'the generator' to approach and retire, will produce coming-to-be uninterruptedly. At the same time it is clear that we were right when, in an earlier work,' we called motion 20(not coming-to-be) 'the primary form of change'. For it is far more reasonable that what is should cause the coming-to-be of what is not, than that what is not should cause the being of what is. Now that which is being moved is, but that which is coming-to-be is not: hence, also, motion is prior to coming-to-be.
We have assumed, and have proved, that 25coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously; and we assert that motion causes coming-to-be. That being so, it is evident that, if the motion be single, both processes cannot occur since they are contrary to one another: for it is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, always produces the same effect, so that, from a single motion, either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. 30The movements must, on the contrary, be more than one, and they must be contrasted with one another either by the sense of their motion or by its irregularity: for contrary effects demand contraries as their causes.
This explains why it is not the primary motion that causes coming-to-be and passingaway, but the motion along the inclined circle: for this motion not only possesses the necessary continuity, but includes a duality of movements as well.
We have assumed, and have proved, that 25coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously; and we assert that motion causes coming-to-be. That being so, it is evident that, if the motion be single, both processes cannot occur since they are contrary to one another: for it is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, always produces the same effect, so that, from a single motion, either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. 30The movements must, on the contrary, be more than one, and they must be contrasted with one another either by the sense of their motion or by its irregularity: for contrary effects demand contraries as their causes.
This explains why it is not the primary motion that causes coming-to-be and passingaway, but the motion along the inclined circle: for this motion not only possesses the necessary continuity, but includes a duality of movements as well.
336b
1 φθορά, ἀεὶ μέν τι κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλείπωσιν αὗται
αἱ μεταβολαί, δύο δ', ὅπως μὴ θάτερον συμβαίνῃ μόνον. Τῆς
μὲν οὖν συνεχείας ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φορὰ αἰτία, τοῦ δὲ προσιέναι
καὶ ἀπιέναι ἡ ἔγκλισις· συμβαίνει γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν πόρρω γίνεσθαι
5 ὁτὲ δ' ἐγγύς. Ἀνίσου δὲ τοῦ διαστήματος ὄντος ἀνώμαλος
ἔσται ἡ κίνησις· ὥστ' εἰ τῷ προσιέναι καὶ ἐγγὺς εἶναι
γεννᾷ, τῷ ἀπιέναι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ πόρρω γίνεσθαι φθείρει,
καὶ εἰ τῷ πολλάκις προσελθεῖν γεννᾷ, καὶ τῷ πολλάκις
ἀπελθεῖν φθείρει· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία αἴτια. Καὶ ἐν
10 ἴσῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν. Διὸ
καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ οἱ βίοι ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσι καὶ τούτῳ
διορίζονται· πάντων γάρ ἐστι τάξις, καὶ πᾶς βίος καὶ χρόνος
μετρεῖται περιόδῳ, πλὴν οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ πάντες, ἀλλ' οἱ
μὲν ἐλάττονι οἱ δὲ πλείονι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐνιαυτός, τοῖς δὲ
15 μείζων, τοῖς δὲ ἐλάττων ἡ περίοδός ἐστι τὸ μέτρον.
Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν
λόγοις· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι προσιόντος μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου γένεσίς ἐστιν,
ἀπιόντος δὲ φθίσις, καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἑκάτερον· ἴσος γὰρ
ὁ χρόνος τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ φύσιν.
20 Ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ἐλάττονι φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὴν
πρὸς ἄλληλα σύγκρασιν· ἀνωμάλου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς ὕλης
καὶ οὐ πανταχοῦ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς γενέσεις
ἀνωμάλους εἶναι καὶ τὰς μὲν θάττους τὰς δὲ βραδυτέρας, ὥστε
συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν τούτων γένεσιν ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι φθοράν.
25 Ἀεὶ δ', ὥσπερ εἴρηται, συνεχὴς ἔσται ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορά,
καὶ οὐδέποτε ὑπολείψει δι' ἣν εἴπομεν αἰτίαν. Τοῦτο δ'
εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος
ὀρέγεσθαί φαμεν τὴν φύσιν, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ
εἶναι (τὸ δ' εἶναι ποσαχῶς λέγομεν ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται),
30 τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς
ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι, τῷ λειπομένῳ τρόπῳ συνεπλήρωσε τὸ
ὅλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
μάλιστα συνείροιτο τὸ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐγγύτατα εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας
τὸ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν. Τούτου δ' αἴτιον, ὥσπερ
1For if coming-to-be and passing-away are always to be continuous, there must be some body always being moved (in order that these changes may not fail) and moved with a duality of movements (in order that both changes, not one only, may result). Now the continuity of this movement is caused by the motion of the whole: but the approaching and retreating of the moving body are caused by the inclination. For the consequence of the inclination is that the body becomes alternately remote 5and near; and since its distance is thus unequal, its movement will be irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching and by its proximity, it-this very same body-destroys by retreating and becoming remote: and if it generates by many successive approaches, it also destroys by many successive retirements. For contrary effects demand contraries as their causes; and the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy 10equal periods of time. Hence, too, the times-i.e. the lives-of the several kinds of living things have a number by which they are distinguished: for there is an Order controlling all things, and every time (i.e. every life) is measured by a period. Not all of them, however, are measured by the same period, but some by a smaller and others by a greater one: for to some of them the period, which is their measure, is a year, while to some it is 15longer and to others shorter.
And there are facts of observation in manifest agreement with our theories. Thus we see that coming-to-be occurs as the sun approaches and decay as it retreats; and we see that the two processes occupy equal times. For the durations of the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be are equal. 20Nevertheless it Often happens that things pass-away in too short a time. This is due to the 'intermingling' by which the things that come-to-be and pass-away are implicated with one another. For their matter is 'irregular', i.e. is not everywhere the same: hence the processes by which they come-to-be must be 'irregular' too, i.e. some too quick and others too slow. Consequently the phenomenon in question occurs, because the 'irregular' coming-to-be of these things is the passing-away of other things.
25Coming-to-be and passing-away will, as we have said, always be continuous, and will never fail owing to the cause we stated. And this continuity has a sufficient reason on our theory. For in all things, as we affirm, Nature always strives after 'the better'. Now 'being' (we have explained elsewhere the exact variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better than 'not-being': 30but not all things can possess 'being', since they are too far removed from the 'originative source. 'God therefore adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because that 'coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually' is the closest approximation to eternal being.
The cause of this perpetuity of coming-to-be, as we have often said, is circular motion: for that is the only motion which is continuous.
And there are facts of observation in manifest agreement with our theories. Thus we see that coming-to-be occurs as the sun approaches and decay as it retreats; and we see that the two processes occupy equal times. For the durations of the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be are equal. 20Nevertheless it Often happens that things pass-away in too short a time. This is due to the 'intermingling' by which the things that come-to-be and pass-away are implicated with one another. For their matter is 'irregular', i.e. is not everywhere the same: hence the processes by which they come-to-be must be 'irregular' too, i.e. some too quick and others too slow. Consequently the phenomenon in question occurs, because the 'irregular' coming-to-be of these things is the passing-away of other things.
25Coming-to-be and passing-away will, as we have said, always be continuous, and will never fail owing to the cause we stated. And this continuity has a sufficient reason on our theory. For in all things, as we affirm, Nature always strives after 'the better'. Now 'being' (we have explained elsewhere the exact variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better than 'not-being': 30but not all things can possess 'being', since they are too far removed from the 'originative source. 'God therefore adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because that 'coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually' is the closest approximation to eternal being.
The cause of this perpetuity of coming-to-be, as we have often said, is circular motion: for that is the only motion which is continuous.
337a
1 εἴρηται πολλάκις, ἡ κύκλῳ φορά· μόνη γὰρ συνεχής. Διὸ
καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ
τὰς δυνάμεις, οἷον τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα, μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ
φοράν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ γένηται καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος
5 πῦρ καὶ πάλιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ, κύκλῳ φαμὲν περιεληλυθέναι
τὴν γένεσιν διὰ τὸ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν. Ὥστε καὶ
ἡ εὐθεῖα φορὰ μιμουμένη τὴν κύκλῳ συνεχής ἐστιν. Ἅμα δὲ
δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅ τινες ἀποροῦσιν, διὰ τί ἑκάστου τῶν σωμάτων
εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φερομένου χώραν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ
10 οὐ διεστᾶσι τὰ σώματα. Αἴτιον γὰρ τούτου ἐστὶν ἡ εἰς ἄλληλα
μετάβασις· εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἔμενεν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ καὶ
μὴ μετέβαλλεν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλησίον, ἤδη ἂν διεστήκεσαν.
Μεταβάλλει μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν φορὰν διπλῆν οὖσαν· διὰ δὲ τὸ
μεταβάλλειν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μένειν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ
15 χώρᾳ τεταγμένῃ. Διότι μὲν οὖν ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ
διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, καὶ τί τὸ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτόν, φανερὸν ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι τὸ κινοῦν εἰ κίνησις
ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις, καὶ εἰ ἀεί, ὅτι ἀεί
τι δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ εἰ συνεχής, ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ
20 ἀγένητον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, καὶ εἰ πλείους εἶεν αἱ κύκλῳ
κινήσεις, πλείους μέν, πάσας δέ πως εἶναι ταύτας ἀνάγκη
ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχήν· συνεχοῦς δ' ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ἀνάγκη τὴν
κίνησιν συνεχῆ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἀδύνατον χρόνον χωρὶς κινήσεως
εἶναι· συνεχοῦς ἄρα τινὸς ἀριθμὸς ὁ χρόνος, τῆς κύκλῳ ἄρα,
25 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγοις διωρίσθη. Συνεχὴς δ' ἡ
κίνησις πότερον τῷ τὸ κινούμενον συνεχὲς εἶναι ἢ τῷ τὸ ἐν ᾧ
κινεῖται, οἷον τὸν τόπον λέγω ἢ τὸ πάθος; δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τῷ
τὸ κινούμενον· πῶς γὰρ τὸ πάθος συνεχὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ τὸ
πρᾶγμα ᾧ συμβέβηκε συνεχὲς εἶναι; εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν ᾧ,
30 μόνῳ τοῦτο τῷ τόπῳ ὑπάρχει· μέγεθος γάρ τι ἔχει, τούτου
δὲ τὸ κύκλῳ μόνον συνεχές, ὥστε αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀεὶ συνεχές.
Τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶν ὃ ποιεῖ συνεχῆ κίνησιν, τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα
φερόμενον· ἡ δὲ κίνησις τὸν χρόνον.
1That, too, is why all the other things-the things, I mean, which are reciprocally transformed in virtue of their 'passions' and their 'powers of action' e.g. the 'simple' bodiesimitate circular motion. For when Water is transformed into Air, Air into 5Fire, and the Fire back into Water, we say the coming-to-be 'has completed the circle', because it reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating circular motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous.
These considerations serve at the same time to explain what is to some people a baffling problem-viz. why the 'simple' bodies, since each them is travelling towards its own place, 10have not become dissevered from one another in the infinite lapse of time. The reason is their reciprocal transformation. For, had each of them persisted in its own place instead of being transformed by its neighbour, they would have got dissevered long ago. They are transformed, however, owing to the motion with its dual character: and because they are transformed, none of them is able to persist in any 15place allotted to it by the Order.
It is clear from what has been said (i) that coming-to-be and passing-away actually occur, (ii) what causes them, and (iii) what subject undergoes them. But (a) if there is to be movement (as we have explained elsewhere, in an earlier work') there must be something which initiates it; if there is to be movement always, there must always be something which initiates it; if the movement is to be continuous, what initiates it must be single, unmoved, 20ungenerated, and incapable of 'alteration'; and if the circular movements are more than one, their initiating causes must all of them, in spite of their plurality, be in some way subordinated to a single 'originative source'. Further (b) since time is continuous, movement must be continuous, inasmuch as there can be no time without movement. Time, therefore, is a 'number' of some continuous movement-a 'number', therefore, of the circular movement, 25as was established in the discussions at the beginning. But (c) is movement continuous because of the continuity of that which is moved, or because that in which the movement occurs (I mean, e.g. the place or the quality) is continuous? The answer must clearly be 'because that which is moved is continuous'. (For how can the quality be continuous except in virtue of the continuity of the thing to which it belongs? But if the continuity of 'that in which' contributes to make the movement continuous, 30this is true only of 'the place in which'; for that has 'magnitude' in a sense.) But (d) amongst continuous bodies which are moved, only that which is moved in a circle is 'continuous' in such a way that it preserves its continuity with itself throughout the movement. The conclusion therefore is that this is what produces continuous movement, viz. the body which is being moved in a circle; and its movement makes time continuous.
These considerations serve at the same time to explain what is to some people a baffling problem-viz. why the 'simple' bodies, since each them is travelling towards its own place, 10have not become dissevered from one another in the infinite lapse of time. The reason is their reciprocal transformation. For, had each of them persisted in its own place instead of being transformed by its neighbour, they would have got dissevered long ago. They are transformed, however, owing to the motion with its dual character: and because they are transformed, none of them is able to persist in any 15place allotted to it by the Order.
It is clear from what has been said (i) that coming-to-be and passing-away actually occur, (ii) what causes them, and (iii) what subject undergoes them. But (a) if there is to be movement (as we have explained elsewhere, in an earlier work') there must be something which initiates it; if there is to be movement always, there must always be something which initiates it; if the movement is to be continuous, what initiates it must be single, unmoved, 20ungenerated, and incapable of 'alteration'; and if the circular movements are more than one, their initiating causes must all of them, in spite of their plurality, be in some way subordinated to a single 'originative source'. Further (b) since time is continuous, movement must be continuous, inasmuch as there can be no time without movement. Time, therefore, is a 'number' of some continuous movement-a 'number', therefore, of the circular movement, 25as was established in the discussions at the beginning. But (c) is movement continuous because of the continuity of that which is moved, or because that in which the movement occurs (I mean, e.g. the place or the quality) is continuous? The answer must clearly be 'because that which is moved is continuous'. (For how can the quality be continuous except in virtue of the continuity of the thing to which it belongs? But if the continuity of 'that in which' contributes to make the movement continuous, 30this is true only of 'the place in which'; for that has 'magnitude' in a sense.) But (d) amongst continuous bodies which are moved, only that which is moved in a circle is 'continuous' in such a way that it preserves its continuity with itself throughout the movement. The conclusion therefore is that this is what produces continuous movement, viz. the body which is being moved in a circle; and its movement makes time continuous.
Book 2,Chapter 11 (337a34–338b19)
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς συνεχῶς κινουμένοις κατὰ γένεσιν ἢ
35 ἀλλοίωσιν ἢ ὅλως μεταβολὴν ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἐφεξῆς ὂν καὶ
34Wherever there is continuity in any process (coming-to-be or 35'alteration' or any kind of change whatever) we observe consecutiveness', i.e. this coming-to-be after that without any interval.
337b
1 γινόμενον τόδε μετὰ τόδε ὥστε μὴ διαλείπειν, σκεπτέον
πότερον ἔστι τι ὃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐνδέχεται
μὴ γενέσθαι. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἔνια, δῆλον, καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ
ἔσται καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἕτερον διὰ τοῦτο· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς
5 εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔσται, δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναί ποτε ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἐστίν· ὃ δὲ
νῦν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι μέλλει, οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ γενέσθαι·
μέλλων γὰρ ἂν βαδίζειν τις οὐκ ἂν βαδίσειεν. Ὅλως δ',
ἐπεὶ ἐνδέχεται ἔνια τῶν ὄντων καὶ μὴ εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
τὰ γινόμενα οὕτως ἕξει, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτ' ἔσται.
10 Πότερον οὖν ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἔνια ἀναγκαῖον ἁπλῶς
γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατα μὴ
εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνατά, οὕτως καὶ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν; οἷον τροπὰς
ἆρα ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι;
Εἰ δὴ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔσται, οἷον
15 εἰ οἰκία, θεμέλιον, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πηλόν, ἆρ' οὖν καὶ εἰ θεμέλιος
γέγονεν, ἀνάγκη οἰκίαν γενέσθαι; ἢ οὐκέτι, εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖνο
ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι ἁπλῶς· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη καὶ θεμελίου
γενομένου γενέσθαι οἰκίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρότερον ἔχον
πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον, ὥστ' εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται, ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνο
20 πρότερον. Εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ
πρότερον ἀνάγκη· καὶ εἰ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τοίνυν
ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὑπέκειτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἐσόμενον. Ἐν οἷς ἄρα τὸ ὕστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν τούτοις
ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ προτέρου γενομένου ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι
25 τὸ ὕστερον. Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω, οὐκ
ἔσται ἀνάγκη τὸ ὕστερον τόδε γενέσθαι ἁπλῶς. Ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως·
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερον ἔμπροσθεν ἀνάγκη ἔσται, δι' ὃ
ἐκεῖνο ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι. Ὥστ' εἰ μή ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἀπείρου,
οὐδὲ πρῶτον ἔσται οὐδὲν δι' ὃ ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται γενέσθαι. Ἀλλὰ
30 μὴν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς πέρας ἔχουσι τοῦτ' ἔσται εἰπεῖν ἀληθῶς,
ὅτι ἁπλῶς ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, οἷον οἰκίαν, ὅταν θεμέλιος γένηται·
ὅταν γὰρ γένηται, εἰ μὴ ἀεὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, συμβήσεται
ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ ἀεὶ εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ δεῖ
τῇ γενέσει ἀεὶ εἶναι, εἰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις·
35 τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ ἅμα· ὃ γὰρ εἶναι ἀνάγκη
1Hence we must investigate whether, amongst the consecutive members, there is any whose future being is necessary; or whether, on the contrary, every one of them may fail to come-to-be. For that some of them may fail to occur, is clear. (a) We need only appeal to the distinction between the statements 'x will be' and 'x is about to which depends upon this fact. For if it be true 5to say of x that it 'will be', it must at some time be true to say of it that 'it is': whereas, though it be true to say of x now that 'it is about to occur', it is quite possible for it not to come-to-be-thus a man might not walk, though he is now 'about to' walk. And (b) since (to appeal to a general principle) amongst the things which 'are' some are capable also of 'not-being', it is clear that the same ambiguous character will attach to them no less when they are coming-to-be: in other words, their coming-to-be will not be necessary.
10Then are all the things that come-to-be of this contingent character? Or, on the contrary, is it absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? Is there, in fact, a distinction in the field of 'coming-to-be' corresponding to the distinction, within the field of 'being', between things that cannot possibly 'not-be' and things that can 'not-be'? For instance, is it necessary that solstices shall come-to-be, i.e. impossible that they should fail to be able to occur?
Assuming that the antecedent must have come-to-be if the consequent is to be (e.g. 15that foundations must have come-to-be if there is to be a house: clay, if there are to be foundations), is the converse also true? If foundations have come-to-be, must a house come-to-be? The answer seems to be that the necessary nexus no longer holds, unless it is 'necessary' for the consequent (as well as for the antecedent) to come-to-be-'necessary' absolutely. If that be the case, however, 'a house must come to-be if foundations have come-to-be', as well as vice versa. For the antecedent was assumed to be so related to the consequent that, if the latter is to be, the antecedent must have come-tobe 20before it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the consequent should come-to-be, the antecedent also must have come-to-be: and if the antecedent has come-to-be, then the consequent also must come-to-be-not, however, because of the antecedent, but because the future being of the consequent was assumed as necessary. Hence, in any sequence, when the being of the consequent is necessary, the nexus is reciprocal-in other words, when the antecedent has come-to-be 25the consequent must always come-to-be too.
Now (i) if the sequence of occurrences is to proceed ad infinitum 'downwards', the coming to-be of any determinate 'this' amongst the later members of the sequence will not be absolutely, but only conditionally, necessary. For it will always be necessary that some other member shall have come-to-be before 'this' as the presupposed condition of the necessity that 'this' should come-to-be: consequently, since what is 'infinite' has no 'originative source', neither will there be in the infinite sequence any 'primary' member which will make it 'necessary' for the remaining members to come-to-be.
30Nor again (ii) will it be possible to say with truth, even in regard to the members of a limited sequence, that it is 'absolutely necessary' for any one of them to come-to-be. We cannot truly say, e.g. that 'it is absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid': for (unless it is always necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that, when foundations have been laid, a thing, which need not always be, must always be. No: if its coming-to-be is to be 'necessary', it must be 'always' in its coming-to-be. 35For what is 'of necessity' coincides with what is 'always', since that which 'must be' cannot possibly 'not-be'.
10Then are all the things that come-to-be of this contingent character? Or, on the contrary, is it absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? Is there, in fact, a distinction in the field of 'coming-to-be' corresponding to the distinction, within the field of 'being', between things that cannot possibly 'not-be' and things that can 'not-be'? For instance, is it necessary that solstices shall come-to-be, i.e. impossible that they should fail to be able to occur?
Assuming that the antecedent must have come-to-be if the consequent is to be (e.g. 15that foundations must have come-to-be if there is to be a house: clay, if there are to be foundations), is the converse also true? If foundations have come-to-be, must a house come-to-be? The answer seems to be that the necessary nexus no longer holds, unless it is 'necessary' for the consequent (as well as for the antecedent) to come-to-be-'necessary' absolutely. If that be the case, however, 'a house must come to-be if foundations have come-to-be', as well as vice versa. For the antecedent was assumed to be so related to the consequent that, if the latter is to be, the antecedent must have come-tobe 20before it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the consequent should come-to-be, the antecedent also must have come-to-be: and if the antecedent has come-to-be, then the consequent also must come-to-be-not, however, because of the antecedent, but because the future being of the consequent was assumed as necessary. Hence, in any sequence, when the being of the consequent is necessary, the nexus is reciprocal-in other words, when the antecedent has come-to-be 25the consequent must always come-to-be too.
Now (i) if the sequence of occurrences is to proceed ad infinitum 'downwards', the coming to-be of any determinate 'this' amongst the later members of the sequence will not be absolutely, but only conditionally, necessary. For it will always be necessary that some other member shall have come-to-be before 'this' as the presupposed condition of the necessity that 'this' should come-to-be: consequently, since what is 'infinite' has no 'originative source', neither will there be in the infinite sequence any 'primary' member which will make it 'necessary' for the remaining members to come-to-be.
30Nor again (ii) will it be possible to say with truth, even in regard to the members of a limited sequence, that it is 'absolutely necessary' for any one of them to come-to-be. We cannot truly say, e.g. that 'it is absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid': for (unless it is always necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that, when foundations have been laid, a thing, which need not always be, must always be. No: if its coming-to-be is to be 'necessary', it must be 'always' in its coming-to-be. 35For what is 'of necessity' coincides with what is 'always', since that which 'must be' cannot possibly 'not-be'.
338a
1 οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ εἶναι· ὥστ' εἰ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀίδιόν
ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Καὶ εἰ ἡ γένεσις τοίνυν ἐξ
ἀνάγκης, ἀίδιος ἡ γένεσις τούτου, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
Εἰ ἄρα τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς ἡ γένεσις, ἀνάγκη ἀνακυκλεῖν
5 καὶ ἀνακάμπτειν. Ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἤτοι πέρας ἔχειν τὴν
γένεσιν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ μή, ἢ εἰς εὐθὺ ἢ κύκλῳ. Τούτων δ'
εἴπερ ἔσται ἀίδιος, οὐκ εἰς εὐθὺ οἷόν τε διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς εἶναι
ἀρχὴν μήτ' ἂν κάτω, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐσομένων λαμβανομένων,
μήτ' ἄνω, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν γενομένων· ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι ἀρχήν,
10 μὴ πεπερασμένης οὔσης, καὶ ἀίδιον εἶναι. Διὸ ἀνάγκη
κύκλῳ εἶναι. Ἀντιστρέφειν ἄρα ἀνάγκη ἔσται, οἷον εἰ τοδὶ ἐξ
ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἄρα· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ
ὕστερον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ δὴ συνεχῶς· οὐδὲν
γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρει λέγειν διὰ δύο ἢ πολλῶν. Ἐν τῇ κύκλῳ
15 ἄρα κινήσει καὶ γενέσει ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς· καὶ
εἴτε κύκλῳ, ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον γίνεσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ
ἀνάγκη, ἡ τούτων γένεσις κύκλῳ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ εὐλόγως,
ἐπεὶ ἀίδιος καὶ ἄλλως ἐφάνη ἡ κύκλῳ κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ
οὐρανοῦ, ὅτι ταῦτα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται καὶ ἔσται, ὅσαι
1Hence a thing is eternal if its 'being' is necessary: and if it is eternal, its 'being' is necessary. And if, therefore, the 'coming-to-be' of a thing is necessary, its 'coming-to-be' is eternal; and if eternal, necessary.
It follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must be cyclical-5i.e. must return upon itself. For coming to-be must either be limited or not limited: and if not limited, it must be either rectilinear or cyclical. But the first of these last two alternatives is impossible if coming-to-be is to be eternal, because there could not be any 'originative source' whatever in an infinite rectilinear sequence, whether its members be taken 'downwards' (as future events) or 'upwards' (as past events). Yet coming-to-be must have an 'originative source' 10(if it is to be necessary and therefore eternal), nor can it be eternal if it is limited. Consequently it must be cyclical. Hence the nexus must be reciprocal. By this I mean that the necessary occurrence of 'this' involves the necessary occurrence of its antecedent: and conversely that, given the antecedent, it is also necessary for the consequent to come-to-be. And this reciprocal nexus will hold continuously throughout the sequence: for it makes no difference whether the reciprocal nexus, of which we are speaking, is mediated by two, or by many, members.
It is in circular 15movement, therefore, and in cyclical coming-to-be that the 'absolutely necessary' is to be found. In other words, if the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical, it is 'necessary' that each of them is coming-to-be and has come-to-be: and if the coming-to-be of any things is 'necessary', their coming-to-be is cyclical.
The result we have reached is logically concordant with the eternity of circular motion, i.e. the eternity of the revolution of the heavens (a fact which approved itself on other and independent evidence),' since precisely those movements which belong to, and depend upon, this eternal revolution 'come-to-be' of necessity, and of necessity 'will be'.
It follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must be cyclical-5i.e. must return upon itself. For coming to-be must either be limited or not limited: and if not limited, it must be either rectilinear or cyclical. But the first of these last two alternatives is impossible if coming-to-be is to be eternal, because there could not be any 'originative source' whatever in an infinite rectilinear sequence, whether its members be taken 'downwards' (as future events) or 'upwards' (as past events). Yet coming-to-be must have an 'originative source' 10(if it is to be necessary and therefore eternal), nor can it be eternal if it is limited. Consequently it must be cyclical. Hence the nexus must be reciprocal. By this I mean that the necessary occurrence of 'this' involves the necessary occurrence of its antecedent: and conversely that, given the antecedent, it is also necessary for the consequent to come-to-be. And this reciprocal nexus will hold continuously throughout the sequence: for it makes no difference whether the reciprocal nexus, of which we are speaking, is mediated by two, or by many, members.
It is in circular 15movement, therefore, and in cyclical coming-to-be that the 'absolutely necessary' is to be found. In other words, if the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical, it is 'necessary' that each of them is coming-to-be and has come-to-be: and if the coming-to-be of any things is 'necessary', their coming-to-be is cyclical.
The result we have reached is logically concordant with the eternity of circular motion, i.e. the eternity of the revolution of the heavens (a fact which approved itself on other and independent evidence),' since precisely those movements which belong to, and depend upon, this eternal revolution 'come-to-be' of necessity, and of necessity 'will be'.
338b
1 ταύτης κινήσεις καὶ ὅσαι διὰ ταύτην· εἰ γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ
κινούμενον ἀεί τι κινεῖ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων κύκλῳ εἶναι τὴν
κίνησιν, οἷον τῆς ἄνω φορᾶς οὔσης κύκλῳ ὁ ἥλιος ὡδί, ἐπεὶ
δ' οὕτως, αἱ ὧραι διὰ τοῦτο κύκλῳ γίνονται καὶ ἀνακάμπτουσιν,
5 τούτων δ' οὕτω γινομένων πάλιν τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων.
Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, οἷον ὕδατα καὶ ἀὴρ
κύκλῳ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰ μὲν νέφος ἔσται, δεῖ ὗσαι, καὶ εἰ
ὕσει γε, δεῖ καὶ νέφος εἶναι, ἄνθρωποι δὲ καὶ ζῷα οὐκ
ἀνακάμπτουσιν εἰς αὑτοὺς ὥστε πάλιν γίνεσθαι τὸν αὐτόν· οὐ
10 γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὁ πατὴρ ἐγένετο, σὲ γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' εἰ σύ,
ἐκεῖνον. Εἰς εὐθὺ δὲ ἔοικεν εἶναι αὕτη ἡ γένεσις. Ἀρχὴ δὲ
τῆς σκέψεως πάλιν αὕτη, πότερον ὁμοίως ἅπαντα ἀνακάμπτει
ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμῷ τὰ δὲ εἴδει μόνον.
Ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἄφθαρτος ἡ οὐσία ἡ κινουμένη, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ
15 ἀριθμῷ ταὐτὰ ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ κινουμένῳ),
ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἀλλὰ φθαρτή, ἀνάγκη τῷ εἴδει, ἀριθμῷ δὲ
μὴ ἀνακάμπτειν. Διὸ ὕδωρ ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ἀὴρ ἐξ ὕδατος εἴδει
ὁ αὐτός, οὐκ ἀριθμῷ. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλ' οὐχ
ὧν ἡ οὐσία γίνεται οὖσα τοιαύτη οἵα ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι.
1For since the revolving body is always setting something else in motion, the movement of the things it moves must also be circular. Thus, from the being of the 'upper revolution' it follows that the sun revolves in this determinate manner; and since the sun revolves thus, the seasons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle, i.e. return upon themselves; 5and since they come-to-be cyclically, so in their turn do the things whose coming-to-be the seasons initiate.
Then why do some things manifestly come to-be in this cyclical fashion (as, e.g. showers and air, so that it must rain if there is to be a cloud and, conversely, there must be a cloud if it is to rain), while men and animals do not 'return upon themselves' so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time (10for though your coming-to-be presupposes your father's, his coming-to-be does not presuppose yours)? Why, on the contrary, does this coming-to-be seem to constitute a rectilinear sequence?
In discussing this new problem, we must begin by inquiring whether all things 'return upon themselves' in a uniform manner; or whether, on the contrary, though in some sequences what recurs is numerically the same, in other sequences it is the same only in species. In consequence of this distinction, it is evident that those things, whose 'substance'-that which is undergoing the process-is imperishable, 15will be numerically, as well as specifically, the same in their recurrence: for the character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it. Those things, on the other hand, whose 'substance' is perish, able (not imperishable) must 'return upon themselves' in the sense that what recurs, though specifically the same, is not the same numerically. That why, when Water comes-to-be from Air and Air from Water, the Air is the same 'specifically', not 'numerically': and if these too recur numerically the same, at any rate this does not happen with things whose 'substance' comes-to-be-whose 'substance' is such that it is essentially capable of not-being.
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Then why do some things manifestly come to-be in this cyclical fashion (as, e.g. showers and air, so that it must rain if there is to be a cloud and, conversely, there must be a cloud if it is to rain), while men and animals do not 'return upon themselves' so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time (10for though your coming-to-be presupposes your father's, his coming-to-be does not presuppose yours)? Why, on the contrary, does this coming-to-be seem to constitute a rectilinear sequence?
In discussing this new problem, we must begin by inquiring whether all things 'return upon themselves' in a uniform manner; or whether, on the contrary, though in some sequences what recurs is numerically the same, in other sequences it is the same only in species. In consequence of this distinction, it is evident that those things, whose 'substance'-that which is undergoing the process-is imperishable, 15will be numerically, as well as specifically, the same in their recurrence: for the character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it. Those things, on the other hand, whose 'substance' is perish, able (not imperishable) must 'return upon themselves' in the sense that what recurs, though specifically the same, is not the same numerically. That why, when Water comes-to-be from Air and Air from Water, the Air is the same 'specifically', not 'numerically': and if these too recur numerically the same, at any rate this does not happen with things whose 'substance' comes-to-be-whose 'substance' is such that it is essentially capable of not-being.
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