Louis (Budé, 1956) · Ogle (1912)
Ogle (1912)
Greek line numbers are exact. The translations carry no Bekker numbers of their own, so those beside the English are aligned to the Greek: upright = fixed (anchored to this point in the text), italic grey = approximate (interpolated estimate).
Book 1,Chapter 1 (639a1–642b4)
639a
1 Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν
τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως
εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει
προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδείαν τινά. Πεπαιδευμένου γάρ
5 ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ
μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. Τοιοῦτον γὰρ δή τινα καὶ τὸν
ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἰόμεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ
δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. Πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων
ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικόν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα,
10 τὸν δὲ περί τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἄν τις
ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μόριον.
Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινας
ὑπάρχειν ὅρους τοιούτους πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέξεται τὸν
τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τἀληθές, εἴτε
15 οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως. Λέγω δ' οἷον πότερον δεῖ λαμβάνοντας
μίαν ἑκάστην οὐσίαν περὶ ταύτης διορίζειν καθ' αὑτήν, οἷον
περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως ἢ λέοντος ἢ βοὸς ἢ καί τινος ἄλλου
καθ' ἕκαστον προχειριζομένους, ἢ τὰ κοινῇ συμβεβηκότα πᾶσι
κατά τι κοινὸν ὑποθεμένους. Πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταὐτὰ
20 πολλοῖς γένεσιν ἑτέροις οὖσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ὕπνος, ἀναπνοή,
αὔξησις, φθίσις, θάνατος, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅσα τοιαῦτα τῶν
λειπομένων παθῶν τε καὶ διαθέσεων· ἄδηλον γὰρ καὶ ἀδιόριστόν
ἐστι λέγειν νῦν περὶ τούτων. Φανερὸν δ' ὅτι καὶ κατὰ
μέρος μὲν λέγοντες περὶ πολλῶν ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις ταὐτά·
25 καὶ γὰρ ἵπποις καὶ κυσὶ καὶ ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει τῶν εἰρημένων
ἕκαστον, ὥστε ἐὰν καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν συμβεβηκότων
λέγῃ τις, πολλάκις ἀναγκασθήσεται περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν,
ὅσα ταὐτὰ μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσι τῶν
ζῴων, αὐτὰ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἔχει διαφοράν. Ἕτερα δὲ ἴσως ἐστὶν
30 οἷς συμβαίνει τὴν μὲν κατηγορίαν ἔχειν τὴν αὐτήν, διαφέρειν
1EVERY systematic science, the humblest and the noblest alike, seems to admit of two distinct kinds of proficiency; one of which may be properly called scientific knowledge of the subject, while the other is a kind of educational acquaintance with it. For an educated man should be able to form a fair off-hand judgement as to the goodness or badness of the method used by a professor in his exposition. To 5be educated is in fact to be able to do this; and even the man of universal education we deem to be such in virtue of his having this ability. It will, however, of course, be understood that we only ascribe universal education to one who in his own individual person is thus critical in all or nearly all branches of knowledge, and not to one who has a like ability merely in some special subject. For it is possible for a man to have this competence in some one branch of knowledge without having it in all.
It 10is plain then that, as in other sciences, so in that which inquires into nature, there must be certain canons, by reference to which a hearer shall be able to criticize the method of a professed exposition, quite independently of the question whether the statements made be true or false. Ought we, for instance (to give an illustration of what I mean), to begin by discussing each separate species-man, lion, ox, and the like-taking each kind in hand independently of the rest, or ought we rather to deal 15first with the attributes which they have in common in virtue of some common element of their nature, and proceed from this as a basis for the consideration of them separately? For genera that are quite distinct yet oftentimes present many identical phenomena, sleep, for instance, respiration, growth, decay, death, and other similar affections and conditions, which may be passed over for the present, as we are not yet prepared to treat of them with clearness and precision. Now it is plain that if we deal 20with each species independently of the rest, we shall frequently be obliged to repeat the same statements over and over again; for horse and dog and man present, each and all, every one of the phenomena just enumerated. A discussion therefore of the attributes of each such species separately would necessarily involve frequent repetitions as to characters, themselves identical but recurring in animals specifically distinct. (Very possibly also there may be other characters which, though they present 25specific differences, yet come under one and the same category. For instance, flying, swimming, walking, creeping, are plainly specifically distinct, but yet are all forms of animal progression.) We must, then, have some clear understanding as to the manner in which our investigation is to be conducted; whether, I mean, we are first to deal with the common or generic characters, and afterwards to take into consideration special peculiarities; or whether we are to start straight off with the ultimate species.
It 10is plain then that, as in other sciences, so in that which inquires into nature, there must be certain canons, by reference to which a hearer shall be able to criticize the method of a professed exposition, quite independently of the question whether the statements made be true or false. Ought we, for instance (to give an illustration of what I mean), to begin by discussing each separate species-man, lion, ox, and the like-taking each kind in hand independently of the rest, or ought we rather to deal 15first with the attributes which they have in common in virtue of some common element of their nature, and proceed from this as a basis for the consideration of them separately? For genera that are quite distinct yet oftentimes present many identical phenomena, sleep, for instance, respiration, growth, decay, death, and other similar affections and conditions, which may be passed over for the present, as we are not yet prepared to treat of them with clearness and precision. Now it is plain that if we deal 20with each species independently of the rest, we shall frequently be obliged to repeat the same statements over and over again; for horse and dog and man present, each and all, every one of the phenomena just enumerated. A discussion therefore of the attributes of each such species separately would necessarily involve frequent repetitions as to characters, themselves identical but recurring in animals specifically distinct. (Very possibly also there may be other characters which, though they present 25specific differences, yet come under one and the same category. For instance, flying, swimming, walking, creeping, are plainly specifically distinct, but yet are all forms of animal progression.) We must, then, have some clear understanding as to the manner in which our investigation is to be conducted; whether, I mean, we are first to deal with the common or generic characters, and afterwards to take into consideration special peculiarities; or whether we are to start straight off with the ultimate species.
639b
1 δὲ τῇ κατ' εἶδος διαφορᾷ, οἷον ἡ τῶν ζῴων πορεία· οὐ γὰρ
φαίνεται μία τῷ εἴδει· διαφέρει γὰρ πτῆσις καὶ νεῦσις
καὶ βάδισις καὶ ἕρψις. Διὸ δεῖ μὴ διαλεληθέναι πῶς ἐπισκεπτέον,
λέγω δὲ πότερον κοινῇ κατὰ γένος πρῶτον, εἶτα
5 ὕστερον περὶ τῶν ἰδίων θεωρητέον, ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον εὐθύς. Νῦν
γὰρ οὐ διώρισται περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐδέ γε τὸ νῦν ῥηθησόμενον, οἷον
πότερον καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν
δεικνύουσιν, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τὰ φαινόμενα πρῶτον
τὰ περὶ τὰ ζῷα θεωρήσαντα καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον,
10 ἔπειθ' οὕτω λέγειν τὸ διὰ τί καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἢ ἄλλως πως.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πλείους ὁρῶμεν αἰτίας περὶ τὴν γένεσιν
τὴν φυσικήν, οἷον τήν τε οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὴν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς
κινήσεως, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων, ποία πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα
πέφυκεν. Φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη, ἣν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος· λόγος
15 γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δ' ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην
καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν. Ἢ γὰρ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῇ
αἰσθήσει ὁρισάμενος ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν, ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος
τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀποδιδόασι τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οὗ ποιοῦσιν
ἑκάστου, καὶ διότι ποιητέον οὕτως. Μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα
20 καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης.
Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν
ὁμοίως, εἰς ὃ πειρῶνται πάντες σχεδὸν τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγειν,
οὐ διελόμενοι ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Ὑπάρχει δὲ
τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, τὸ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐν
25 γενέσει πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς, οἷον οἰκίᾳ καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. Ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιάνδε τὴν ὕλην ὑπάρξαι,
εἰ ἔσται οἰκία ἢ ἄλλο τι τέλος· καὶ γενέσθαι τε καὶ
κινηθῆναι δεῖ τόδε πρῶτον, εἶτα τόδε, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον
ἐφεξῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα γίνεται ἕκαστον καὶ
30 ἔστιν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις. Ἀλλ' ὁ
1For as yet no definite rule has been laid down in this matter. So also there is a like uncertainty as to another point now to be mentioned. Ought the writer who deals with the works of nature to follow the plan adopted by the mathematicians in their astronomical demonstrations, and after considering the phenomena presented by animals, and their several parts, 5proceed subsequently to treat of the causes and the reason why; or ought he to follow some other method? And when these questions are answered, there yet remains another. The causes concerned in the generation of the works of nature are, as we see, more than one. There is the final cause and there is the motor cause. Now we must decide which of these two causes comes first, which second. Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call the 10final one. For this is the Reason, and the Reason forms the starting-point, alike in the works of art and in works of nature. For consider how the physician or how the builder sets about his work. He starts by forming for himself a definite picture, in the one case perceptible to mind, in the other to sense, of his end-the physician of health, the builder of a house-and this he holds forward as the reason and explanation of each subsequent step that he 15takes, and of his acting in this or that way as the case may be. Now in the works of nature the good end and the final cause is still more dominant than in works of art such as these, nor is necessity a factor with the same significance in them all; though almost all writers, while they try to refer their origin to this cause, do so without distinguishing the various senses in which the term necessity is used. For there is absolute necessity, 20manifested in eternal phenomena; and there is hypothetical necessity, manifested in everything that is generated by nature as in everything that is produced by art, be it a house or what it may. For if a house or other such final object is to be realized, it is necessary that such and such material shall exist; and it is necessary that first this then that shall be produced, and first this and then that set in motion, and so on in continuous succession, 25until the end and final result is reached, for the sake of which each prior thing is produced and exists. As with these productions of art, so also is it with the productions of nature. The mode of necessity, however, and the mode of ratiocination are different in natural science from what they are in the theoretical sciences; of which we have spoken elsewhere. For in the latter the starting-point is that which is; in the former that which is to be.
640a
1 τρόπος τῆς ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἕτερος ἐπί τε τῆς
φυσικῆς καὶ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Εἴρηται δ' ἐν ἑτέροις
περὶ τούτων. Ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὄν, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐσόμενον·
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοιόνδε ἐστὶν ἡ ὑγίεια ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀνάγκη
5 τόδ' εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπεὶ τόδ' ἐστὶν ἢ γέγονεν, ἐκεῖνο
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ἢ ἔσται. Οὐδ' ἔστιν εἰς ἀΐδιον συναρτῆσαι τῆς
τοιαύτης ἀποδείξεως τὴν ἀνάγκην, ὥστε εἰπεῖν, ἐπεὶ τόδε
ἐστίν, ὅτι τόδε ἐστίν. Διώρισται δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις,
καὶ ποίοις ὑπάρχει καὶ ποῖα ἀντιστρέφει καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν.
10 Δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι καὶ πότερον προσήκει λέγειν, ὥσπερ οἱ
πρότερον ἐποιοῦντο τὴν θεωρίαν, πῶς ἕκαστον γίγνεσθαι πέφυκε
μᾶλλον ἢ πῶς ἔστιν. Οὐ γάρ τι μικρὸν διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐκείνου.
Ἔοικε δ' ἐντεῦθεν ἀρκτέον εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν,
ὅτι πρῶτον τὰ φαινόμενα ληπτέον περὶ ἕκαστον γένος,
15 εἶθ' οὕτω τὰς αἰτίας τούτων λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως· μᾶλλον
γὰρ τάδε συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν, ἐπεὶ τοιόνδ'
ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας, ἢ τοιόνδ' ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία, ὅτι γίνεται
οὕτως. Ἡ γὰρ γένεσις ἕνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ
οὐσία ἕνεκα τῆς γενέσεως. Διόπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε
20 λέγων ὑπάρχειν πολλὰ τοῖς ζῴοις διὰ τὸ συμβῆναι
οὕτως ἐν τῇ γενέσει, οἷον καὶ τὴν ῥάχιν τοιαύτην ἔχειν, ὅτι
στραφέντος καταχθῆναι συνέβη, ἀγνοῶν πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι δεῖ
τὸ σπέρμα τὸ συνιστὰν ὑπάρχειν τοιαύτην ἔχον δύναμιν, εἶτα
ὅτι τὸ ποιῆσαν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν οὐ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ
25 καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ· γεννᾷ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον, ὥστε
διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖνον τοιόνδ' εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοιάδε συμβαίνει τῳδί.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτομάτως δοκούντων γίνεσθαι, καθάπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχναστῶν· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου
γίνεται ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ὑγίεια. Τῶν μὲν οὖν
30 προϋπάρχει τὸ ποιητικὸν ὅμοιον, οἷον ἀνδριαντοποιητική· οὐ
γὰρ γίνεται αὐτόματον. Ἡ δὲ τέχνη λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ὁ ἄνευ
τῆς ὕλης ἐστίν. Καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ <τέχνης τὰ ἀπὸ> τύχης ὁμοίως·
ὡς γὰρ ἡ τέχνη ἔχει, οὕτω γίνεται. Διὸ μάλιστα μὲν λεκτέον ὡς
ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται
35 εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν μορίων τούτων. Εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι ἐγγύτατα
τούτου, καὶ ἢ ὅλως (ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως) ἢ καλῶς γε
1For it is that which is yet to be-health, let us say, or a man-that, owing to its being of such and such characters, necessitates the pre-existence or previous production of this and that antecedent; and not this or that antecedent which, because it exists or has been generated, makes it necessary that health or a man is in, or shall come into, existence. Nor is it possible to track back the series of necessary antecedents to a 5starting-point, of which you can say that, existing itself from eternity, it has determined their existence as its consequent. These however again, are matters that have been dealt with in another treatise. There too it was stated in what cases absolute and hypothetical necessity exist; in what cases also the proposition expressing hypothetical necessity is simply convertible, and what cause it is that determines this convertibility.
Another matter which must not be passed over without consideration is, whether the proper subject of our 10exposition is that with which the ancient writers concerned themselves, namely, what is the process of formation of each animal; or whether it is not rather, what are the characters of a given creature when formed. For there is no small difference between these two views. The best course appears to be that we should follow the method already mentioned, and begin with the phenomena presented by each group of animals, and, when this is done, proceed afterwards to state the causes of those phenomena, and to deal with their evolution. For 15elsewhere, as for instance in house building, this is the true sequence. The plan of the house, or the house, has this and that form; and because it has this and that form, therefore is its construction carried out in this or that manner. For the process of evolution is for the sake of the thing finally evolved, and not this for the sake of the process. Empedocles, then, was in error when he said that many of the characters presented by animals were merely the results of incidental occurrences during their development; for instance, that 20the backbone was divided as it is into vertebrae, because it happened to be broken owing to the contorted position of the foetus in the womb. In so saying he overlooked the fact that propagation implies a creative seed endowed with certain formative properties. Secondly, he neglected another fact, namely, that the parent animal pre-exists, not only in idea, but actually in time. For man is generated from man; and thus it is the possession of certain characters by the parent that determines the development of like characters in the child. 25The same statement holds good also for the operations of art, and even for those which are apparently spontaneous. For the same result as is produced by art may occur spontaneously. Spontaneity, for instance, may bring about the restoration of health. The products of art, however, require the pre-existence of an efficient cause homogeneous with themselves, such as the statuary's art, which must necessarily precede the statue; for this cannot possibly be produced spontaneously. Art indeed consists in the conception of the result to be 30produced before its realization in the material. As with spontaneity, so with chance; for this also produces the same result as art, and by the same process.
The fittest mode, then, of treatment is to say, a man has such and such parts, because the conception of a man includes their presence, and because they are necessary conditions of his existence, or, if we cannot quite say this, which would be best of all, then the next thing to it, namely, that it is either quite impossible for him to exist without them, or, at any rate, that it 35is better for him that they should be there; and their existence involves the existence of other antecedents.
Another matter which must not be passed over without consideration is, whether the proper subject of our 10exposition is that with which the ancient writers concerned themselves, namely, what is the process of formation of each animal; or whether it is not rather, what are the characters of a given creature when formed. For there is no small difference between these two views. The best course appears to be that we should follow the method already mentioned, and begin with the phenomena presented by each group of animals, and, when this is done, proceed afterwards to state the causes of those phenomena, and to deal with their evolution. For 15elsewhere, as for instance in house building, this is the true sequence. The plan of the house, or the house, has this and that form; and because it has this and that form, therefore is its construction carried out in this or that manner. For the process of evolution is for the sake of the thing finally evolved, and not this for the sake of the process. Empedocles, then, was in error when he said that many of the characters presented by animals were merely the results of incidental occurrences during their development; for instance, that 20the backbone was divided as it is into vertebrae, because it happened to be broken owing to the contorted position of the foetus in the womb. In so saying he overlooked the fact that propagation implies a creative seed endowed with certain formative properties. Secondly, he neglected another fact, namely, that the parent animal pre-exists, not only in idea, but actually in time. For man is generated from man; and thus it is the possession of certain characters by the parent that determines the development of like characters in the child. 25The same statement holds good also for the operations of art, and even for those which are apparently spontaneous. For the same result as is produced by art may occur spontaneously. Spontaneity, for instance, may bring about the restoration of health. The products of art, however, require the pre-existence of an efficient cause homogeneous with themselves, such as the statuary's art, which must necessarily precede the statue; for this cannot possibly be produced spontaneously. Art indeed consists in the conception of the result to be 30produced before its realization in the material. As with spontaneity, so with chance; for this also produces the same result as art, and by the same process.
The fittest mode, then, of treatment is to say, a man has such and such parts, because the conception of a man includes their presence, and because they are necessary conditions of his existence, or, if we cannot quite say this, which would be best of all, then the next thing to it, namely, that it is either quite impossible for him to exist without them, or, at any rate, that it 35is better for him that they should be there; and their existence involves the existence of other antecedents.
640b
1 οὕτως. Ταῦτα δ' ἕπεται. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τὴν γένεσιν
ὡδὶ καὶ τοιαύτην συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον. Διὸ γίνεται πρῶτον
τῶν μορίων τόδε, εἶτα τόδε. Καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ὁμοίως ἐπὶ
πάντων τῶν φύσει συνισταμένων. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαῖοι καὶ πρῶτοι
5 φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ φύσεως περὶ τῆς ὑλικῆς ἀρχῆς
καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἐσκόπουν, τίς καὶ ποία τις, καὶ
πῶς ἐκ ταύτης γίνεται τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τίνος κινοῦντος, οἷον νείκους
ἢ φιλίας ἢ νοῦ ἢ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, τῆς δ' ὑποκειμένης ὕλης
τοιάνδε τινὰ φύσιν ἐχούσης ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἷον τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς
10 θερμήν, τῆς δὲ γῆς ψυχράν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν κούφην, τῆς δὲ
βαρεῖαν. Οὕτως γὰρ καὶ τὸν κόσμον γεννῶσιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
περὶ τὴν τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν γένεσιν λέγουσιν, οἷον ὅτι
ἐν τῷ σώματι ῥέοντος μὲν τοῦ ὕδατος κοιλίαν γενέσθαι καὶ
πᾶσαν ὑποδοχὴν τῆς τε τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ περιττώματος, τοῦ
15 δὲ πνεύματος διαπορευθέντος τοὺς μυκτῆρας ἀναρραγῆναι. Ὁ
δ' ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὕλη τῶν σωμάτων ἐστίν· ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων
γὰρ σωμάτων συνιστᾶσι τὴν φύσιν πάντες. Εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ
ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ ζῷα φύσει καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν, λεκτέον
ἂν περὶ σαρκὸς εἴη καὶ ὀστοῦ καὶ αἵματος καὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν
20 ἁπάντων. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, οἷον προςώπου,
χειρός, ποδός, ᾗ τε τοιοῦτον ἕκαστόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν καὶ
κατὰ ποίαν δύναμιν. Οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν τὸ ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν, οἷον
πυρὸς ἢ γῆς, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ περὶ κλίνης ἐλέγομεν ἤ τινος
ἄλλου τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπειρώμεθα μᾶλλον ἂν διορίζειν τὸ εἶδος
25 αὐτῆς ἢ τὴν ὕλην, οἷον τὸν χαλκὸν ἢ τὸ ξύλον· εἰ δὲ
μή, τήν γε τοῦ συνόλου· κλίνη γὰρ τόδε ἐν τῷδε ἢ τόδε τοιόνδε,
ὥστε κἂν περὶ τοῦ σχήματος εἴη λεκτέον, καὶ ποῖον
τὴν ἰδέαν. Ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς
ὑλικῆς φύσεως. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι
30 ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τε ζῴων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὀρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος
λέγοι· φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν. Φησὶ γοῦν
παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι οἷόν τι τὴν μορφήν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς
ὄντος αὐτοῦ τῷ τε σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι γνωρίμου. Καίτοι
καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν,
35 ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. Ἔτι δ' ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα
ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκῆν ἢ ξυλίνην, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως,
1Thus we should say, because man is an animal with such and such characters, therefore is the process of his development necessarily such as it is; and therefore is it accomplished in such and such an order, this part being formed first, that next, and so on in succession; and after a like fashion should we explain the evolution of all other works of nature.
Now that 5with which the ancient writers, who first philosophized about Nature, busied themselves, was the material principle and the material cause. They inquired what this is, and what its character; how the universe is generated out of it, and by what motor influence, whether, for instance, by antagonism or friendship, whether by intelligence or spontaneous action, the substratum of matter being assumed to have certain inseparable properties; fire, for instance, 10to have a hot nature, earth a cold one; the former to be light, the latter heavy. For even the genesis of the universe is thus explained by them. After a like fashion do they deal also with the development of plants and of animals. They say, for instance, that the water contained in the body causes by its currents the formation of the stomach and the other receptacles of food or of excretion; and that the breath by its passage breaks open the outlets 15of the nostrils; air and water being the materials of which bodies are made; for all represent nature as composed of such or similar substances.
But if men and animals and their several parts are natural phenomena, then the natural philosopher must take into consideration not merely the ultimate substances of which they are made, but also flesh, bone, blood, and all other homogeneous parts; not only these, but also the heterogeneous parts, such as face, 20hand, foot; and must examine how each of these comes to be what it is, and in virtue of what force. For to say what are the ultimate substances out of which an animal is formed, to state, for instance, that it is made of fire or earth, is no more sufficient than would be a similar account in the case of a couch or the like. For we should not be content with saying that the couch was made of bronze or wood or whatever it might be, but should try to describe 25its design or mode of composition in preference to the material; or, if we did deal with the material, it would at any rate be with the concretion of material and form. For a couch is such and such a form embodied in this or that matter, or such and such a matter with this or that form; so that its shape and structure must be included in our description. For the formal nature is of greater importance than the material nature.
Does, then, configuration 30and colour constitute the essence of the various animals and of their several parts? For if so, what Democritus says will be strictly correct. For such appears to have been his notion. At any rate he says that it is evident to every one what form it is that makes the man, seeing that he is recognizable by his shape and colour. And yet a dead body has exactly the same configuration as a living one; but for all that is not a man. So also no hand of bronze or 35wood or constituted in any but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than name.
Now that 5with which the ancient writers, who first philosophized about Nature, busied themselves, was the material principle and the material cause. They inquired what this is, and what its character; how the universe is generated out of it, and by what motor influence, whether, for instance, by antagonism or friendship, whether by intelligence or spontaneous action, the substratum of matter being assumed to have certain inseparable properties; fire, for instance, 10to have a hot nature, earth a cold one; the former to be light, the latter heavy. For even the genesis of the universe is thus explained by them. After a like fashion do they deal also with the development of plants and of animals. They say, for instance, that the water contained in the body causes by its currents the formation of the stomach and the other receptacles of food or of excretion; and that the breath by its passage breaks open the outlets 15of the nostrils; air and water being the materials of which bodies are made; for all represent nature as composed of such or similar substances.
But if men and animals and their several parts are natural phenomena, then the natural philosopher must take into consideration not merely the ultimate substances of which they are made, but also flesh, bone, blood, and all other homogeneous parts; not only these, but also the heterogeneous parts, such as face, 20hand, foot; and must examine how each of these comes to be what it is, and in virtue of what force. For to say what are the ultimate substances out of which an animal is formed, to state, for instance, that it is made of fire or earth, is no more sufficient than would be a similar account in the case of a couch or the like. For we should not be content with saying that the couch was made of bronze or wood or whatever it might be, but should try to describe 25its design or mode of composition in preference to the material; or, if we did deal with the material, it would at any rate be with the concretion of material and form. For a couch is such and such a form embodied in this or that matter, or such and such a matter with this or that form; so that its shape and structure must be included in our description. For the formal nature is of greater importance than the material nature.
Does, then, configuration 30and colour constitute the essence of the various animals and of their several parts? For if so, what Democritus says will be strictly correct. For such appears to have been his notion. At any rate he says that it is evident to every one what form it is that makes the man, seeing that he is recognizable by his shape and colour. And yet a dead body has exactly the same configuration as a living one; but for all that is not a man. So also no hand of bronze or 35wood or constituted in any but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than name.
641a
1 ὥσπερ τὸν γεγραμμένον ἰατρόν. Οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ποιεῖν
τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἔργον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αὐλοὶ λίθινοι τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργον,
οὐδ' ὁ γεγραμμένος ἰατρός. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν
τοῦ τεθνηκότος μορίων οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστί, λέγω δ'
5 οἷον ὀφθαλμός, χείρ. Λίαν οὖν ἁπλῶς εἴρηται, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τέκτων λέγοι περὶ χειρὸς ξυλίνης.
Οὕτως γὰρ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς αἰτίας
τοῦ σχήματος λέγουσιν· ὑπό τινων γὰρ ἐδημιουργήθησαν δυνάμεων.
Ἀλλ' ἴσως ὁ μὲν τέκτων ἐρεῖ πέλεκυν ἢ τρύπανον,
10 ὁ δ' ἀέρα καὶ γῆν, πλὴν βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν
ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου
τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγένετο τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον, ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν
ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτην, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, ἐρεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν,
ὅπως τοιόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ποτὲ τὴν μορφὴν γένηται. Δῆλον
15 τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσι, καὶ ὅτι λεκτέον ὡς τοιοῦτον τὸ
ζῷον, καὶ περὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ τί καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ τῶν μορίων
ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς κλίνης. Εἰ δὴ
τοῦτό ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς (ἀπελθούσης
γοῦν οὐκέτι ζῷόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν τὸ αὐτὸ
20 λείπεται, πλὴν τῷ σχήματι μόνον, καθάπερ τὰ μυθευόμενα
λιθοῦσθαι), εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως, τοῦ φυσικοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς
ἂν εἴη λέγειν καὶ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πάσης, κατ'
αὐτὸ τοῦτο καθ' ὃ τοιοῦτο τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή,
ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, καὶ περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ
25 τὴν τοιαύτην αὐτῆς οὐσίαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς φύσεως διχῶς
λεγομένης καὶ οὔσης τῆς μὲν ὡς ὕλης τῆς δ' ὡς
οὐσίας. Καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη καὶ ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος.
Τοιοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ζῴου ἤτοι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς.
Ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἂν λεκτέον εἴη τῷ περὶ φύσεως θεωρητικῷ
30 περὶ ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῆς ὕλης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἡ
ὕλη δι' ἐκείνην φύσις ἐστὶν ἤ περ ἀνάπαλιν. Καὶ γὰρ κλίνη καὶ
τρίπους τὸ ξύλον ἐστίν, ὅτι δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστιν. Ἀπορήσειε
δ' ἄν τις εἰς τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν ἐπιβλέψας, πότερον περὶ πάσης
ψυχῆς τῆς φυσικῆς ἐστι τὸ εἰπεῖν ἢ περί τινος. Εἰ
35 γὰρ περὶ πάσης, οὐδεμία λείπεται παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν
ἐπιστήμην φιλοσοφία. Ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν νοητῶν. Ὥστε περὶ
1For like a physician in a painting, or like a flute in a sculpture, in spite of its name it will be unable to do the office which that name implies. Precisely in the same way no part of a dead body, such I mean as its eye or its hand, is really an eye or a hand. To say, then, that shape and colour constitute the animal is an inadequate statement, and is much the same as if a woodcarver were to 5insist that the hand he had cut out was really a hand. Yet the physiologists, when they give an account of the development and causes of the animal form, speak very much like such a craftsman. What, however, I would ask, are the forces by which the hand or the body was fashioned into its shape? The woodcarver will perhaps say, by the axe or the auger; the physiologist, by air and by earth. Of these two answers the artificer's is the better, but it is nevertheless insufficient. For it is 10not enough for him to say that by the stroke of his tool this part was formed into a concavity, that into a flat surface; but he must state the reasons why he struck his blow in such a way as to effect this, and what his final object was; namely, that the piece of wood should develop eventually into this or that shape. It is plain, then, that the teaching of the old physiologists is inadequate, and that the true method is to state what the definitive characters are that distinguish the animal 15as a whole; to explain what it is both in substance and in form, and to deal after the same fashion with its several organs; in fact, to proceed in exactly the same way as we should do, were we giving a complete description of a couch.
If now this something that constitutes the form of the living being be the soul, or part of the soul, or something that without the soul cannot exist; as would seem to be the case, seeing at any rate that when the soul departs, what is left is no longer a 20living animal, and that none of the parts remain what they were before, excepting in mere configuration, like the animals that in the fable are turned into stone; if, I say, this be so, then it will come within the province of the natural philosopher to inform himself concerning the soul, and to treat of it, either in its entirety, or, at any rate, of that part of it which constitutes the essential character of an animal; and it will be his duty to say what this soul or this part of a soul 25is; and to discuss the attributes that attach to this essential character, especially as nature is spoken of in two senses, and the nature of a thing is either its matter or its essence; nature as essence including both the motor cause and the final cause. Now it is in the latter of these two senses that either the whole soul or some part of it constitutes the nature of an animal; and inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that enables matter to constitute the animal nature, much more 30than it is the presence of matter which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature is bound on every ground to treat of the soul rather than of the matter. For though the wood of which they are made constitutes the couch and the tripod, it only does so because it is capable of receiving such and such a form.
What has been said suggests the question, whether it is the whole soul or only some part of it, the consideration of which comes within the province of natural science. Now if it be 35of the whole soul that this should treat, then there is no place for any other philosophy beside it.
If now this something that constitutes the form of the living being be the soul, or part of the soul, or something that without the soul cannot exist; as would seem to be the case, seeing at any rate that when the soul departs, what is left is no longer a 20living animal, and that none of the parts remain what they were before, excepting in mere configuration, like the animals that in the fable are turned into stone; if, I say, this be so, then it will come within the province of the natural philosopher to inform himself concerning the soul, and to treat of it, either in its entirety, or, at any rate, of that part of it which constitutes the essential character of an animal; and it will be his duty to say what this soul or this part of a soul 25is; and to discuss the attributes that attach to this essential character, especially as nature is spoken of in two senses, and the nature of a thing is either its matter or its essence; nature as essence including both the motor cause and the final cause. Now it is in the latter of these two senses that either the whole soul or some part of it constitutes the nature of an animal; and inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that enables matter to constitute the animal nature, much more 30than it is the presence of matter which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature is bound on every ground to treat of the soul rather than of the matter. For though the wood of which they are made constitutes the couch and the tripod, it only does so because it is capable of receiving such and such a form.
What has been said suggests the question, whether it is the whole soul or only some part of it, the consideration of which comes within the province of natural science. Now if it be 35of the whole soul that this should treat, then there is no place for any other philosophy beside it.
641b
1 πάντων ἡ φυσικὴ γνῶσις ἂν εἴη· τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς περὶ νοῦ
καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ θεωρῆσαι, εἴπερ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ
θεωρία τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντων, καθάπερ καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεως
καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Ἢ οὐκ ἔστι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως
5 ἀρχή, οὐδὲ τὰ μόρια ἅπαντα, ἀλλ' αὐξήσεως μὲν
ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, ἀλλοιώσεως δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν,
φορᾶς δ' ἕτερόν τι καὶ οὐ τὸ νοητικόν· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἡ φορὰ
καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις τῶν ζῴων, διάνοια δ' οὐδενί. Δῆλον οὖν ὡς
οὐ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς λεκτέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις,
10 ἀλλά τι μόριον αὐτῆς ἓν ἢ καὶ πλείω. Ἔτι δὲ τῶν
ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως οὐδενὸς οἷόν τ' εἶναι τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρητικήν,
ἐπειδὴ ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ πάντα. Φαίνεται γάρ, ὥςπερ
ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς ἐστιν ἡ τέχνη, οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς
πράγμασιν ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοιαύτη, ἣν ἔχομεν
15 καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παντός. Διὸ μᾶλλον
εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ
γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ζῷα
τὰ θνητά· τὸ γοῦν τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον
φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς, τὸ δ' ἄλλοτ'
20 ἄλλως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε περὶ τὰ θνητὰ μᾶλλον. Οἱ δὲ τῶν
μὲν ζῴων ἕκαστον φύσει φασὶν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι, τὸν δ'
οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον συστῆναι, ἐν ᾧ
ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φαίνεται. Πανταχοῦ δὲ
λέγομεν τόδε τοῦδε ἕνεκα, ὅπου ἂν φαίνηται τέλος τι πρὸς
25 ὃ ἡ κίνησις περαίνει μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος. Ὥστε εἶναι φανερὸν
ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν. Οὐ γὰρ
δὴ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν ἐξ ἑκάστου γίνεται σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε
ἐκ τοῦδε, οὐδὲ σπέρμα τὸ τυχὸν ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος σώματος.
Ἀρχὴ ἄρα καὶ ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ σπέρμα. Φύσει
30 γὰρ ταῦτα· φύεται γοῦν ἐκ τούτου. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔτι τούτου
πρότερον τὸ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα· γένεσις μὲν γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα,
οὐσία δὲ τὸ τέλος. Ἀμφοῖν δ' ἔτι πρότερον, ἀφ' οὗ ἐστι τὸ
σπέρμα. Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα διχῶς, ἐξ οὗ τε καὶ οὗ· καὶ
γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ ἀπῆλθε, τούτου σπέρμα, οἷον ἵππου, καὶ τούτου
35 ὃ ἔσται ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οἷον ὀρέως, τρόπον δ' οὐ τὸν αὐτόν,
ἀλλ' ἑκατέρου τὸν εἰρημένον. Ἔτι δὲ δυνάμει τὸ σπέρμα·
1For as it belongs in all cases to one and the same science to deal with correlated subjects-one and the same science, for instance, deals with sensation and with the objects of sense-and as therefore the intelligent soul and the objects of intellect, being correlated, must belong to one and the same science, it follows that natural science will have to include the whole universe in its 5province. But perhaps it is not the whole soul, nor all its parts collectively, that constitutes the source of motion; but there may be one part, identical with that in plants, which is the source of growth, another, namely the sensory part, which is the source of change of quality, while still another, and this not the intellectual part, is the source of locomotion. I say not the intellectual part; for other animals than man have the power of locomotion, but in none but him is there 10intellect. Thus then it is plain that it is not of the whole soul that we have to treat. For it is not the whole soul that constitutes the animal nature, but only some part or parts of it. Moreover, it is impossible that any abstraction can form a subject of natural science, seeing that everything that Nature makes is means to an end. For just as human creations are the products of art, so living objects are manifest in the products of an analogous cause or principle, not external but internal, 15derived like the hot and the cold from the environing universe. And that the heaven, if it had an origin, was evolved and is maintained by such a cause, there is therefore even more reason to believe, than that mortal animals so originated. For order and definiteness are much more plainly manifest in the celestial bodies than in our own frame; while change and chance are characteristic of the perishable things of earth. Yet there are some who, while they allow that every animal 20exists and was generated by nature, nevertheless hold that the heaven was constructed to be what it is by chance and spontaneity; the heaven, in which not the faintest sign of haphazard or of disorder is discernible! Again, whenever there is plainly some final end, to which a motion tends should nothing stand in the way, we always say that such final end is the aim or purpose of the motion; and from this it is evident that there must be a something or other really existing, corresponding 25to what we call by the name of Nature. For a given germ does not give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each germ springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny. And thus it is the germ that is the ruling influence and fabricator of the offspring. For these it is by nature, the offspring being at any rate that which in nature will spring from it. At the same time the offspring is anterior to the germ; for germ and perfected progeny 30are related as the developmental process and the result. Anterior, however, to both germ and product is the organism from which the germ was derived. For every germ implies two organisms, the parent and the progeny. For germ or seed is both the seed of the organism from which it came, of the horse, for instance, from which it was derived, and the seed of the organism that will eventually arise from it, of the mule, for example, which is developed from the seed of the horse. The same 35seed then is the seed both of the horse and of the mule, though in different ways as here set forth.
642a
1 δύναμις δ' ὡς ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν, ἴσμεν. Εἰσὶν ἄρα δύ'
αἰτίαι αὗται, τό θ' οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πολλὰ
γὰρ γίνεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη. Ἴσως δ' ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε ποίαν
λέγουσιν ἀνάγκην οἱ λέγοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν μὲν γὰρ
5 δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν
τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. Ἔστι δ' ἔν γε τοῖς ἔχουσι γένεσιν ἡ
τρίτη· λέγομεν γὰρ τὴν τροφὴν ἀναγκαῖόν τι κατ' οὐδέτερον
τούτων τῶν τρόπων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἄνευ ταύτης εἶναι.
Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπεὶ δεῖ
10 σχίζειν τῷ πελέκει, ἀνάγκη σκληρὸν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ σκληρόν,
χαλκοῦν ἢ σιδηροῦν, οὕτως καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον (ἕνεκά
τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον), ἀνάγκη
ἄρα τοιονδὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιωνδί, εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται. Ὅτι
μὲν οὖν δύο τρόποι τῆς αἰτίας, καὶ δεῖ λέγοντας τυγχάνειν
15 μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, δῆλόν γε πειρᾶσθαι ποιεῖν,
καὶ ὅτι πάντες οἱ τοῦτο μὴ λέγοντες οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν περὶ
φύσεως λέγουσιν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ φύσις μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης.
Ἐνιαχοῦ δέ που αὐτῇ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς περιπίπτει, ἀγόμενος
ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀναγκάζεται
20 φάναι τὸν λόγον εἶναι, οἷον ὀστοῦν ἀποδιδοὺς τί
ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἕν τι τῶν στοιχείων λέγει αὐτὸ οὔτε δύο ἢ
τρία οὔτε πάντα, ἀλλὰ λόγον τῆς μίξεως αὐτῶν. Δῆλον
τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἡ σὰρξ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
τῶν τοιούτων μορίων ἕκαστον. Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐλθεῖν τοὺς προγενεστέρους
25 ἐπὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ
ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἥψατο μὲν Δημόκριτος
πρῶτος, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαίου δὲ τῇ φυσικῇ θεωρίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐκφερόμενος
ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο
μὲν ηὐξήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε, πρὸς δὲ
30 τὴν χρήσιμον ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες.
Δεικτέον δ' οὕτως, οἷον ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἡ ἀναπνοὴ τουδὶ
χάριν, τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται διὰ τάδε ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Ἡ δ' ἀνάγκη
ὁτὲ μὲν σημαίνει ὅτι εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ταῦτα
ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ἔχειν, ὁτὲ δ' ὅτι ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ πεφυκότα.
35 Τὸ θερμὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἐξιέναι καὶ πάλιν εἰσιέναι
ἀντικροῦον, τὸν δ' ἀέρα εἰσρεῖν. Τοῦτο δ' ἤδη ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν.
1Moreover, the seed is potentially that which will spring from it, and the relation of potentiality to actuality we know.
There are then two causes, namely, necessity and the final end. For many things are produced, simply as the results of necessity. It may, however, be asked, of what mode of necessity are we speaking when we say this. For it can be of neither of those two modes which 5are set forth in the philosophical treatises. There is, however, the third mode, in such things at any rate as are generated. For instance, we say that food is necessary; because an animal cannot possibly do without it. This third mode is what may be called hypothetical necessity. Here is another example of it. If a piece of wood is to be split with an axe, the axe must of necessity be hard; and, if hard, must of necessity be made of bronze or iron. Now exactly in the same way 10the body, which like the axe is an instrument-for both the body as a whole and its several parts individually have definite operations for which they are made-just in the same way, I say, the body, if it is to do its work, must of necessity be of such and such a character, and made of such and such materials.
It is plain then that there are two modes of causation, and that both of these must, so far as possible, be taken into account in explaining the works of nature, or that at 15any rate an attempt must be made to include them both; and that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about nature. For primary cause constitutes the nature of an animal much more than does its matter. There are indeed passages in which even Empedocles hits upon this, and following the guidance of fact, finds himself constrained to speak of the ratio (olugos) as constituting the essence and real nature of things. Such, for instance, is the case when he explains what is a 20bone. For he does not merely describe its material, and say it is this one element, or those two or three elements, or a compound of all the elements, but states the ratio (olugos) of their combination. As with a bone, so manifestly is it with the flesh and all other similar parts.
The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon this method of treatment was, that they were not in possession of the notion of essence, nor of any definition of substance. The first who came 25near it was Democritus, and he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science, but was merely brought to it, spite of himself, by constraint of facts. In the time of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. But at this period men gave up inquiring into the works of nature, and philosophers diverted their attention to political science and to the virtues which benefit mankind.
Of the method itself the following is an example. In dealing with respiration 30we must show that it takes place for such or such a final object; and we must also show that this and that part of the process is necessitated by this and that other stage of it. By necessity we shall sometimes mean hypothetical necessity, the necessity, that is, that the requisite antecedents shall be there, if the final end is to be reached; and sometimes absolute necessity, such necessity as that which connects substances and their inherent properties and characters. For the 35alternate discharge and re-entrance of heat and the inflow of air are necessary if we are to live.
There are then two causes, namely, necessity and the final end. For many things are produced, simply as the results of necessity. It may, however, be asked, of what mode of necessity are we speaking when we say this. For it can be of neither of those two modes which 5are set forth in the philosophical treatises. There is, however, the third mode, in such things at any rate as are generated. For instance, we say that food is necessary; because an animal cannot possibly do without it. This third mode is what may be called hypothetical necessity. Here is another example of it. If a piece of wood is to be split with an axe, the axe must of necessity be hard; and, if hard, must of necessity be made of bronze or iron. Now exactly in the same way 10the body, which like the axe is an instrument-for both the body as a whole and its several parts individually have definite operations for which they are made-just in the same way, I say, the body, if it is to do its work, must of necessity be of such and such a character, and made of such and such materials.
It is plain then that there are two modes of causation, and that both of these must, so far as possible, be taken into account in explaining the works of nature, or that at 15any rate an attempt must be made to include them both; and that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about nature. For primary cause constitutes the nature of an animal much more than does its matter. There are indeed passages in which even Empedocles hits upon this, and following the guidance of fact, finds himself constrained to speak of the ratio (olugos) as constituting the essence and real nature of things. Such, for instance, is the case when he explains what is a 20bone. For he does not merely describe its material, and say it is this one element, or those two or three elements, or a compound of all the elements, but states the ratio (olugos) of their combination. As with a bone, so manifestly is it with the flesh and all other similar parts.
The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon this method of treatment was, that they were not in possession of the notion of essence, nor of any definition of substance. The first who came 25near it was Democritus, and he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science, but was merely brought to it, spite of himself, by constraint of facts. In the time of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. But at this period men gave up inquiring into the works of nature, and philosophers diverted their attention to political science and to the virtues which benefit mankind.
Of the method itself the following is an example. In dealing with respiration 30we must show that it takes place for such or such a final object; and we must also show that this and that part of the process is necessitated by this and that other stage of it. By necessity we shall sometimes mean hypothetical necessity, the necessity, that is, that the requisite antecedents shall be there, if the final end is to be reached; and sometimes absolute necessity, such necessity as that which connects substances and their inherent properties and characters. For the 35alternate discharge and re-entrance of heat and the inflow of air are necessary if we are to live.
642b
1 Τοῦ ἐντὸς δὲ θερμοῦ ἀντικόπτοντος, ἐν τῇ ψύξει τοῦ
θύραθεν ἀέρος ἡ εἴσοδος. Ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος οὗτος ὁ τῆς
μεθόδου, καὶ περὶ ὧν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας, ταῦτα καὶ
τοιαῦτά ἐστιν.
1Here we have at once a necessity in the former of the two senses. But the alternation of heat and refrigeration produces of necessity an alternate admission and discharge of the outer air, and this is a necessity of the second kind.
In the foregoing we have an example of the method which we must adopt, and also an example of the kind of phenomena, 5the causes of which we have to investigate.
In the foregoing we have an example of the method which we must adopt, and also an example of the kind of phenomena, 5the causes of which we have to investigate.
Book 1,Chapter 2 (642b5–20)
5 Λαμβάνουσι δ' ἔνιοι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, διαιρούμενοι τὸ
γένος εἰς δύο διαφοράς. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, τῇ δὲ
ἀδύνατον. Ἐνίων γὰρ ἔσται διαφορὰ μία μόνη, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
περίεργα, οἷον ὑπόπουν, δίπουν, σχιζόπουν· αὕτη γὰρ
μόνη κυρία. Εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὸν πολλάκις ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν.
10 Ἔτι δὲ προσήκει μὴ διασπᾶν ἕκαστον γένος, οἷον τοὺς ὄρνιθας
τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇδε, τοὺς δ' ἐν ἄλλῃ διαιρέσει, καθάπερ ἔχουσιν
αἱ γεγραμμέναι διαιρέσεις· ἐκεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν μετὰ τῶν
ἐνύδρων συμβαίνει διῃρῆσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει. Ταύτῃ
μὲν οὖν τῇ ὁμοιότητι ὄρνις ὄνομα κεῖται, ἑτέρᾳ δ' ἰχθύς.
15 Ἄλλαι δ' εἰσὶν ἀνώνυμοι, οἷον τὸ ἔναιμον καὶ τὸ ἄναιμον·
ἐφ' ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τούτων οὐ κεῖται ἓν ὄνομα. Εἴπερ οὖν μηδὲν
τῶν ὁμογενῶν διασπαστέον, ἡ εἰς δύο διαίρεσις μάταιος ἂν
εἴη· οὕτως γὰρ διαιροῦντας ἀναγκαῖον χωρίζειν καὶ διασπᾶν·
τῶν πολυπόδων γάρ ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πεζοῖς τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς
20 ἐνύδροις.
Some writers propose to reach the definitions of the ultimate forms of animal life by bipartite division. But this method is often difficult, and often impracticable.
Sometimes the final differentia of the subdivision is sufficient by itself, and the antecedent differentiae are mere surplusage. Thus in the series Footed, Two-footed, Cleft-footed, the last term is all-expressive by itself, 10and to append the higher terms is only an idle iteration. Again it is not permissible to break up a natural group, Birds for instance, by putting its members under different bifurcations, as is done in the published dichotomies, where some birds are ranked with animals of the water, and others placed in a different class. The group Birds and the group Fishes happen to be named, while other natural groups have no popular names; 15for instance, the groups that we may call Sanguineous and Bloodless are not known popularly by any designations. If such natural groups are not to be broken up, the method of Dichotomy cannot be employed, for it necessarily involves such breaking up and dislocation. The group of the Many-footed, for instance, would, under this method, have to be dismembered, and some of its kinds distributed among land animals, others among water 20animals.
Sometimes the final differentia of the subdivision is sufficient by itself, and the antecedent differentiae are mere surplusage. Thus in the series Footed, Two-footed, Cleft-footed, the last term is all-expressive by itself, 10and to append the higher terms is only an idle iteration. Again it is not permissible to break up a natural group, Birds for instance, by putting its members under different bifurcations, as is done in the published dichotomies, where some birds are ranked with animals of the water, and others placed in a different class. The group Birds and the group Fishes happen to be named, while other natural groups have no popular names; 15for instance, the groups that we may call Sanguineous and Bloodless are not known popularly by any designations. If such natural groups are not to be broken up, the method of Dichotomy cannot be employed, for it necessarily involves such breaking up and dislocation. The group of the Many-footed, for instance, would, under this method, have to be dismembered, and some of its kinds distributed among land animals, others among water 20animals.
Book 1,Chapter 3 (642b21–644a11)
Ἔτι στερήσει μὲν ἀναγκαῖον διαιρεῖν, καὶ διαιροῦσιν οἱ
διχοτομοῦντες. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ στερήσεως ᾗ στέρησις· ἀδύνατον
γὰρ εἴδη εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον τῆς ἀποδίας ἢ τοῦ
ἀπτέρου ὥσπερ πτερώσεως καὶ ποδῶν. Δεῖ δὲ τῆς κοθόλου διαφορᾶς
25 εἴδη εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τί ἂν εἴη τῶν καθόλου
καὶ οὐ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον; Τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου
εἰσὶ καὶ ἔχουσιν εἴδη, οἷον πτερότης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄσχιστον
τὸ δ' ἐσχισμένον ἐστὶ πτερόν. Καὶ ποδότης ὡσαύτως ἡ μὲν
πολυσχιδής, ἡ δὲ δισχιδής, οἷον τὰ διχαλά, ἡ δ' ἀσχιδὴς
30 καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, οἷον τὰ μώνυχα. Χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν διαλαβεῖν
καὶ εἰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ὧν ἔστιν εἴδη, ὥσθ' ὁτιοῦν
ζῷον ἐν ταύταις ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ἐν πλείοσι ταὐτόν, οἷον
πτερωτὸν καὶ ἄπτερον (ἔστι γὰρ ἄμφω ταὐτόν, οἷον μύρμηξ
καὶ λαμπυρὶς καὶ ἕτερά τινα), πάντων δὲ χαλεπώτατον
35 ἢ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα. Ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τῶν καθ'
ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῶν διαφορῶν ἑκάστην, ὥστε καὶ τὴν
Again, privative terms inevitably form one branch of dichotomous division, as we see in the proposed dichotomies. But privative terms in their character of privatives admit of no subdivision. For there can be no specific forms of a negation, of Featherless for instance or of Footless, as there are of Feathered and of Footed. Yet a generic differentia must be subdivisible; for otherwise what is there that makes it generic rather 25than specific? There are to be found generic, that is specifically subdivisible, differentiae; Feathered for instance and Footed. For feathers are divisible into Barbed and Unbarbed, and feet into Manycleft, and Twocleft, like those of animals with bifid hoofs, and Uncleft or Undivided, like those of animals with solid hoofs. Now even with differentiae capable of this specific subdivision it is difficult enough so to make the 30classification, as that each animal shall be comprehended in some one subdivision and in not more than one; but far more difficult, nay impossible, is it to do this, if we start with a dichotomy into two contradictories. (Suppose for instance we start with the two contradictories, Feathered and Unfeathered; we shall find that the ant, the glow-worm, and some other animals fall under both divisions.) For each differentia must be presented 35by some species. There must be some species, therefore, under the privative heading.
643a
1 ἀντικειμένην. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσιν
ὑπάρχειν εἶδός τι τῆς οὐσίας ἄτομον καὶ ἕν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διαφορὰν
ἕξει (οἷον ὄρνις ἀνθρώπου· ἡ διποδία γὰρ ἄλλη καὶ διάφορος·
κἂν εἰ ἔναιμα, τὸ αἷμα διάφορον, ἢ οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας
5 τὸ αἷμα θετέον· εἰ δ' οὕτως ἐστίν, ἡ μία διαφορὰ δυσὶν ὑπάρξει)·
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον στέρησιν εἶναι διαφοράν.
Ἔσονται δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ ἴσαι τοῖς ἀτόμοις ζῴοις, εἴπερ
ἄτομά τε ταῦτα καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ ἄτομοι, κοινὴ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν.
Εἰ δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν † .... καὶ κοινήν, ἄτομον δέ,
10 δῆλον ὅτι κατά γε τὴν κοινὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, ἕτερα ὄντα
τῷ εἴδει ζῷα. Ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ ἴδιοι αἱ διαφοραὶ εἰς ἃς
ἅπαντα ἐμπίπτει τὰ ἄτομα, μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι κοινήν.
Εἰ δὲ μή, ἕτερα ὄντα εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν βαδιεῖται. Δεῖ δ' οὔτε
τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἄτομον εἰς ἑτέραν καὶ ἑτέραν ἰέναι διαφορὰν
15 τῶν διῃρημένων, οὔτ' εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ἕτερα, καὶ ἅπαντα εἰς
ταύτας. Φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὰ ἄτομα εἴδη
ὡς διαιροῦνται οἱ εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες τὰ ζῷα ἢ καὶ ἄλλο
ὁτιοῦν γένος. Καὶ γὰρ κατ' ἐκείνους ἀναγκαῖον ἴσας τὰς ἐςχάτας
εἶναι διαφορὰς τοῖς ζῴοις πᾶσι τοῖς ἀτόμοις τῷ
20 εἴδει. Ὄντος γὰρ τοῦδέ τινος γένους, οὗ διαφοραὶ πρῶται τὰ
λευκά, τούτων δ' ἑκατέρου ἄλλαι, καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὸ πρόσω
ἕως τῶν ἀτόμων, αἱ τελευταῖαι τέτταρες ἔσονται ἢ ἄλλο
τι πλῆθος τῶν ἀφ' ἑνὸς διπλασιαζομένων· τοσαῦτα δὲ καὶ
τὰ εἴδη. Ἔστι δ' ἡ διαφορὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. Οὔτε γὰρ
25 ἄνευ ὕλης οὐδὲν ζῴου μόριον, οὔτε μόνη ἡ ὕλη· οὐ γὰρ πάντως
ἔχον σῶμα ἔσται ζῷον, οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων οὐδέν, ὥσπερ πολλάκις
εἴρηται. Ἔτι διαιρεῖν χρὴ τοῖς ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ μὴ τοῖς
συμβεβηκόσι καθ' αὑτό, οἷον εἴ τις τὰ σχήματα διαιροίη,
ὅτι τὰ μὲν δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, τὰ δὲ πλείοσιν·
30 συμβεβηκὸς γάρ τι τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας
ἔχειν τὰς γωνίας. Ἔτι τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις διαιρεῖν. Διάφορα
γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τἀντικείμενα, οἷον λευκότης καὶ μελανία καὶ
εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης. Ἐὰν οὖν θάτερα διάφορα ᾖ, τῷ
ἀντικειμένῳ διαιρετέον καὶ μὴ τὸ μὲν νεύσει τὸ δὲ χρώματι,
35 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τά γ' ἔμψυχα τοῖς κοινοῖς ἔργοις τοῦ
σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ῥηθείσαις νῦν
1Now specifically distinct animals cannot present in their essence a common undifferentiated element, but any apparently common element must really be differentiated. (Bird and Man for instance are both Two-footed, but their two-footedness is diverse and differentiated. So any two sanguineous groups must have some difference in their blood, if their blood is part of 5their essence.) From this it follows that a privative term, being insusceptible of differentiation, cannot be a generic differentia; for, if it were, there would be a common undifferentiated element in two different groups.
Again, if the species are ultimate indivisible groups, that is, are groups with indivisible differentiae, and if no differentia be common to several groups, the number of differentiae must be equal to the number of species. If a differentia 10though not divisible could yet be common to several groups, then it is plain that in virtue of that common differentia specifically distinct animals would fall into the same division. It is necessary then, if the differentiae, under which are ranged all the ultimate and indivisible groups, are specific characters, that none of them shall be common; for otherwise, as already said, specifically distinct animals will come into one and the same division. But this 15would violate one of the requisite conditions, which are as follows. No ultimate group must be included in more than a single division; different groups must not be included in the same division; and every group must be found in some division. It is plain then that we cannot get at the ultimate specific forms of the animal, or any other, kingdom by bifurcate division. If we could, the number of ultimate differentiae would equal the number of ultimate animal 20forms. For assume an order of beings whose prime differentiae are White and Black. Each of these branches will bifurcate, and their branches again, and so on till we reach the ultimate differentiae, whose number will be four or some other power of two, and will also be the number of the ultimate species comprehended in the order.
(A species is constituted by the combination differentia and matter. For no part of an animal is purely material or purely immaterial; 25nor can a body, independently of its condition, constitute an animal or any of its parts, as has repeatedly been observed.)
Further, the differentiae must be elements of the essence, and not merely essential attributes. Thus if Figure is the term to be divided, it must not be divided into figures whose angles are equal to two right angles, and figures whose angles are together greater than two right angles. For it is only an attribute of a triangle and 30not part of its essence that its angles are equal to two right angles.
Again, the bifurcations must be opposites, like White and Black, Straight and Bent; and if we characterize one branch by either term, we must characterize the other by its opposite, and not, for example, characterize one branch by a colour, the other by a mode of progression, swimming for instance.
Furthermore, living beings cannot be divided by the functions common to body and soul, by 35Flying, for instance, and Walking, as we see them divided in the dichotomies already referred to.
Again, if the species are ultimate indivisible groups, that is, are groups with indivisible differentiae, and if no differentia be common to several groups, the number of differentiae must be equal to the number of species. If a differentia 10though not divisible could yet be common to several groups, then it is plain that in virtue of that common differentia specifically distinct animals would fall into the same division. It is necessary then, if the differentiae, under which are ranged all the ultimate and indivisible groups, are specific characters, that none of them shall be common; for otherwise, as already said, specifically distinct animals will come into one and the same division. But this 15would violate one of the requisite conditions, which are as follows. No ultimate group must be included in more than a single division; different groups must not be included in the same division; and every group must be found in some division. It is plain then that we cannot get at the ultimate specific forms of the animal, or any other, kingdom by bifurcate division. If we could, the number of ultimate differentiae would equal the number of ultimate animal 20forms. For assume an order of beings whose prime differentiae are White and Black. Each of these branches will bifurcate, and their branches again, and so on till we reach the ultimate differentiae, whose number will be four or some other power of two, and will also be the number of the ultimate species comprehended in the order.
(A species is constituted by the combination differentia and matter. For no part of an animal is purely material or purely immaterial; 25nor can a body, independently of its condition, constitute an animal or any of its parts, as has repeatedly been observed.)
Further, the differentiae must be elements of the essence, and not merely essential attributes. Thus if Figure is the term to be divided, it must not be divided into figures whose angles are equal to two right angles, and figures whose angles are together greater than two right angles. For it is only an attribute of a triangle and 30not part of its essence that its angles are equal to two right angles.
Again, the bifurcations must be opposites, like White and Black, Straight and Bent; and if we characterize one branch by either term, we must characterize the other by its opposite, and not, for example, characterize one branch by a colour, the other by a mode of progression, swimming for instance.
Furthermore, living beings cannot be divided by the functions common to body and soul, by 35Flying, for instance, and Walking, as we see them divided in the dichotomies already referred to.
643b
1 πορευτικὰ καὶ πτηνά· ἔστι γάρ τινα γένη οἷς ἄμφω
ὑπάρχει καὶ ἔστι πτηνὰ καὶ ἄπτερα, καθάπερ τὸ τῶν μυρμήκων
γένος. Καὶ τῷ ἀγρίῳ καὶ τῷ ἡμέρῳ διαιρεῖσθαι· ὡςαύτως
γὰρ ἂν δόξειε ταὐτὰ εἴδη διαιρεῖν. Πάντα γὰρ ὡς
5 εἰπεῖν, ὅσα ἥμερα καὶ ἄγρια τυγχάνει ὄντα, οἷον ἄνθρωποι,
ἵπποι, βόες, κύνες ἐν τῇ Ἰνδικῇ, ὕες, αἶγες, πρόβατα·
ὧν ἕκαστον, εἰ μὲν ὁμώνυμον, οὐ διῄρηται χωρίς, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα
ἓν εἴδει, οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι διαφορὰς τὸ ἄγριον καὶ τὸ ἥμερον.
Ὅλως δ' ὁποιονοῦν διαφορᾷ μιᾷ διαιροῦντι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
10 ἀναγκαῖον. Ἀλλὰ δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν κατὰ γένη τὰ
ζῷα, ὡς ὑφήγηνθ' οἱ πολλοὶ διορίσαντες ὄρνιθος γένος καὶ
ἰχθύος. Τούτων δ' ἕκαστον πολλαῖς ὥρισται διαφοραῖς, οὐ
κατὰ τὴν διχοτομίαν. Οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι τὸ παράπαν οὐκ
ἔστι λαβεῖν (τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ εἰς πλείους ἐμπίπτει διαιρέσεις
15 καὶ τὰ ἐναντία εἰς τὴν αὐτήν), ἢ μία μόνον διαφορὰ ἔσται,
καὶ αὕτη ἤτοι ἁπλῆ, ἢ ἐκ συμπλοκῆς τὸ τελευταῖον ἔσται
εἶδος. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ διαφορᾶς λαμβάνῃ τὴν διαφοράν, ἀναγκαῖον
ὥσπερ συνδέσμῳ τὸν λόγον ἕνα ποιοῦντας, οὕτω καὶ τὴν
διαίρεσιν συνεχῆ ποιεῖν. Λέγω δ' οἷον συμβαίνει τοῖς διαιρουμένοις
20 τὸ μὲν ἄπτερον τὸ δὲ πτερωτόν, πτερωτοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν
ἥμερον τὸ δ' ἄγριον, ἢ τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν· οὐ γὰρ
διαφορὰ τοῦ πτερωτοῦ τὸ ἥμερον οὐδὲ τὸ λευκόν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρας
ἀρχὴ διαφορᾶς, ἐκεῖ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Διὸ πολλαῖς
τὸ ἓν εὐθέως διαιρετέον, ὥσπερ λέγομεν. Καὶ γὰρ οὕτως μὲν
25 αἱ στερήσεις ποιήσουσι διαφοράν, ἐν δὲ τῇ διχοτομίᾳ οὐ
ποιήσουσιν. Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον εἰδῶν
λαμβάνειν οὐδὲν διαιροῦσι δίχα τὸ γένος, ὥσπερ τινὲς ᾠήθησαν,
καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ μίαν ὑπάρχειν
διαφορὰν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον διαιρετῶν, ἐάν τε ἁπλᾶ
30 λαμβάνῃ ἐάν τε συμπεπλεγμένα (λέγω δὲ ἁπλᾶ
μέν, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ διαφοράν, οἷον τὴν σχιζοποδίαν, συμπεπλεγμένα
δέ, ἐὰν ἔχῃ, οἷον τὸ πολυσχιδὲς πρὸς τὸ σχιζόπουν.
Τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ συνέχεια βούλεται τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους
κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν διαφορῶν ὡς ἕν τι τὸ πᾶν ὄν, ἀλλὰ
35 παρὰ τὴν λέξιν συμβαίνει δοκεῖν τὴν τελευταίαν μόνην εἶναι
διαφοράν, οἷον τὸ πολυσχιδὲς ἢ τὸ δίπουν· τὸ δ' ὑπόπουν
1For some groups, Ants for instance, fall under both divisions, some ants flying while others do not. Similarly as regards the division into Wild and Tame; for it also would involve the disruption of a species into different groups. For in almost all species in which some members are tame, there are other members that are wild. Such, for example, is the case 5with Men, Horses, Oxen, Dogs in India, Pigs, Goats, Sheep; groups which, if double, ought to have what they have not, namely, different appellations; and which, if single, prove that Wildness and Tameness do not amount to specific differences. And whatever single element we take as a basis of division the same difficulty will occur.
The method then that we must adopt is to attempt to recognize the natural groups, following the indications afforded by 10the instincts of mankind, which led them for instance to form the class of Birds and the class of Fishes, each of which groups combines a multitude of differentiae, and is not defined by a single one as in dichotomy. The method of dichotomy is either impossible (for it would put a single group under different divisions or contrary groups under the same division), or it only furnishes a single ultimate differentia for each species, which either alone 15or with its series of antecedents has to constitute the ultimate species.
If, again, a new differential character be introduced at any stage into the division, the necessary result is that the continuity of the division becomes merely a unity and continuity of agglomeration, like the unity and continuity of a series of sentences coupled together by conjunctive particles. For instance, suppose we have the bifurcation Feathered and Featherless, and 20then divide Feathered into Wild and Tame, or into White and Black. Tame and White are not a differentiation of Feathered, but are the commencement of an independent bifurcation, and are foreign to the series at the end of which they are introduced.
As we said then, we must define at the outset by multiplicity of differentiae. If we do so, privative terms will be available, which are unavailable to the dichotomist.
The impossibility of reaching the 25definition of any of the ultimate forms by dichotomy of the larger group, as some propose, is manifest also from the following considerations. It is impossible that a single differentia, either by itself or with its antecedents, shall express the whole essence of a species. (In saying a single differentia by itself I mean such an isolated differentia as Cleft-footed; in saying a single differentia with antecedent I mean, to give an instance, 30Manycleft-footed preceded by Cleft-footed. The very continuity of a series of successive differentiae in a division is intended to show that it is their combination that expresses the character of the resulting unit, or ultimate group. But one is misled by the usages of language into imagining that it is merely the final term of the series, Manycleft-footed for instance, that constitutes the whole differentia, and that the antecedent terms, Footed, 35Cleft-footed, are superfluous. Now it is evident that such a series cannot consist of many terms.
The method then that we must adopt is to attempt to recognize the natural groups, following the indications afforded by 10the instincts of mankind, which led them for instance to form the class of Birds and the class of Fishes, each of which groups combines a multitude of differentiae, and is not defined by a single one as in dichotomy. The method of dichotomy is either impossible (for it would put a single group under different divisions or contrary groups under the same division), or it only furnishes a single ultimate differentia for each species, which either alone 15or with its series of antecedents has to constitute the ultimate species.
If, again, a new differential character be introduced at any stage into the division, the necessary result is that the continuity of the division becomes merely a unity and continuity of agglomeration, like the unity and continuity of a series of sentences coupled together by conjunctive particles. For instance, suppose we have the bifurcation Feathered and Featherless, and 20then divide Feathered into Wild and Tame, or into White and Black. Tame and White are not a differentiation of Feathered, but are the commencement of an independent bifurcation, and are foreign to the series at the end of which they are introduced.
As we said then, we must define at the outset by multiplicity of differentiae. If we do so, privative terms will be available, which are unavailable to the dichotomist.
The impossibility of reaching the 25definition of any of the ultimate forms by dichotomy of the larger group, as some propose, is manifest also from the following considerations. It is impossible that a single differentia, either by itself or with its antecedents, shall express the whole essence of a species. (In saying a single differentia by itself I mean such an isolated differentia as Cleft-footed; in saying a single differentia with antecedent I mean, to give an instance, 30Manycleft-footed preceded by Cleft-footed. The very continuity of a series of successive differentiae in a division is intended to show that it is their combination that expresses the character of the resulting unit, or ultimate group. But one is misled by the usages of language into imagining that it is merely the final term of the series, Manycleft-footed for instance, that constitutes the whole differentia, and that the antecedent terms, Footed, 35Cleft-footed, are superfluous. Now it is evident that such a series cannot consist of many terms.
644a
1 καὶ πολύπουν περίεργα). Ὅτι δ' ἀδύνατον πλείους εἶναι
τοιαύτας, δῆλον· ἀεὶ γὰρ βαδίζων ἐπὶ τὴν ἐσχάτην διαφορὰν
ἀφικνεῖται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν τελευταίαν καὶ τὸ εἶδος. Αὕτη
δ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ σχιζόπουν μόνον, ἢ πᾶσα ἡ σύμπλεξις, ἐὰν
5 διαιρῆται ἄνθρωπον, οἷον εἴ τις συνθείη ὑπόπουν, δίπουν, σχιζόπουν.
Εἰ δ' ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος σχιζόπουν μόνον, οὕτως ἐγίγνετ'
ἂν αὕτη μία διαφορά. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη πολλὰς
εἶναι μὴ ὑπὸ μίαν διαίρεσιν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν πλείους γε τοῦ
αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπὸ μίαν διχοτομίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μίαν κατὰ
10 μίαν τελευτᾶν. Ὥστε ἀδύνατον ὁτιοῦν λαβεῖν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον
ζῴων δίχα διαιρουμένους.
1For if one divides and subdivides, one soon reaches the final differential term, but for all that will not have got to the ultimate division, that is, to the species.) No single differentia, I repeat, either by itself or with its antecedents, can possibly express the essence of a species. Suppose, for example, Man to be the animal to be defined; 5the single differentia will be Cleft-footed, either by itself or with its antecedents, Footed and Two-footed. Now if man was nothing more than a Cleft-footed animal, this single differentia would duly represent his essence. But seeing that this is not the case, more differentiae than this one will necessarily be required to define him; and these cannot come under one division; for each single branch of a dichotomy ends in a single 10differentia, and cannot possibly include several differentiae belonging to one and the same animal.
It is impossible then to reach any of the ultimate animal forms by dichotomous division.
It is impossible then to reach any of the ultimate animal forms by dichotomous division.
Book 1,Chapter 4 (644a12–644b21)
Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις διὰ τί οὐκ ἄνωθεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι ἐμπεριλαβόντες
ἅμα ἓν γένος ἄμφω προσηγόρευσαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι,
ὃ περιέχει τά τε ἔνυδρα καὶ τὰ πτηνὰ τῶν ζῴων. Ἔστι
15 γὰρ ἔνια πάθη κοινὰ καὶ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἅπασιν.
Ἀλλ' ὅμως ὀρθῶς διώρισται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. Ὅσα μὲν
γὰρ διαφέρει τῶν γενῶν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ
τὸ ἧττον, ταῦτα ὑπέζευκται ἑνὶ γένει, ὅσα δ' ἔχει τὸ ἀνάλογον,
χωρίς· λέγω δ' οἷον ὄρνις ὄρνιθος διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον
20 ἢ καθ' ὑπεροχήν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ μακρόπτερον τὸ δὲ βραχύπτερον),
ἰχθύες δ' ὄρνιθος τῷ ἀνάλογον (ὃ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ
πτερόν, θατέρῳ λεπίς). Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οὐ ῥᾴδιον·
τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ ζῷα ἀνάλογον ταὐτὸ πέπονθεν. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐσίαι
μέν εἰσι τὰ ἔσχατα εἴδη, ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀδιάφορα,
25 οἷον Σωκράτης, Κορίσκος, ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὰ καθόλου
ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον εἰπεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ταὐτὸν λέγειν, καθάπερ
εἴρηται. Τὰ δὲ καθόλου κοινά· τὰ γὰρ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχοντα
καθόλου λέγομεν. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει περὶ πότερα δεῖ
πραγματεύεσθαι. Ἧι μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἄτομον, κράτιστον,
30 εἴ τις δύναιτο περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ
εἴδει θεωρεῖν χωρίς, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω μὴ περὶ
ὄρνιθος· ἔχει γὰρ εἴδη τὸ γένος τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁτουοῦν
ὄρνιθος τῶν ἀτόμων, οἷον ἢ στρουθὸς ἢ γέρανος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον.
Ἧι δὲ συμβήσεται λέγειν πολλάκις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάθους διὰ
35 τὸ κοινῇ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν, ταύτῃ δ' ἐστὶν ὑπάτοπον καὶ
It deserves inquiry why a single name denoting a higher group was not invented by mankind, as an appellation to comprehend the two groups of Water animals and Winged animals. For even these have certain attributes in common. However, the present 15nomenclature is just. Groups that only differ in degree, and in the more or less of an identical element that they possess, are aggregated under a single class; groups whose attributes are not identical but analogous are separated. For instance, bird differs from bird by gradation, or by excess and defect; some birds have long feathers, others short ones, but all are feathered. Bird and Fish are more remote and only agree in having 20analogous organs; for what in the bird is feather, in the fish is scale. Such analogies can scarcely, however, serve universally as indications for the formation of groups, for almost all animals present analogies in their corresponding parts.
The individuals comprised within a species, such as Socrates and Coriscus, are the real existences; but inasmuch as these individuals possess one common specific form, it will suffice to state 25the universal attributes of the species, that is, the attributes common to all its individuals, once for all, as otherwise there will be endless reiteration, as has already been pointed out.
But as regards the larger groups-such as Birds-which comprehend many species, there may be a question. For on the one hand it may be urged that as the ultimate species represent the real existences, it will be well, if practicable, to examine 30these ultimate species separately, just as we examine the species Man separately; to examine, that is, not the whole class Birds collectively, but the Ostrich, the Crane, and the other indivisible groups or species belonging to the class.
On the other hand, however, this course would involve repeated mention of the same attribute, as the same attribute is common to many species, and so far would be somewhat irrational and tedious.
The individuals comprised within a species, such as Socrates and Coriscus, are the real existences; but inasmuch as these individuals possess one common specific form, it will suffice to state 25the universal attributes of the species, that is, the attributes common to all its individuals, once for all, as otherwise there will be endless reiteration, as has already been pointed out.
But as regards the larger groups-such as Birds-which comprehend many species, there may be a question. For on the one hand it may be urged that as the ultimate species represent the real existences, it will be well, if practicable, to examine 30these ultimate species separately, just as we examine the species Man separately; to examine, that is, not the whole class Birds collectively, but the Ostrich, the Crane, and the other indivisible groups or species belonging to the class.
On the other hand, however, this course would involve repeated mention of the same attribute, as the same attribute is common to many species, and so far would be somewhat irrational and tedious.
644b
1 μακρὸν τὸ περὶ ἑκάστου λέγειν χωρίς. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς
ἔχει τὰ μὲν κατὰ γένη κοινῇ λέγειν, ὅσα λέγεται καλῶς ὡρισμένων
τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἔχει τε μίαν φύσιν κοινὴν καὶ
εἴδη ἐν αὐτῷ μὴ πολὺ διεστῶτα, ὄρνις καὶ ἰχθῦς, καὶ εἴ τι
5 ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμον μέν, τῷ γένει δ' ὁμοίως περιέχει τὰ ἐν
αὐτῷ εἴδη· ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον περὶ ἀνθρώπου
καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. Σχεδὸν δὲ τοῖς σχήμασι
τῶν μορίων καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου, ἐὰν ὁμοιότητα ἔχωσιν,
ὥρισται τὰ γένη, οἷον τὸ τῶν ὀρνίθων γένος πρὸς αὐτὰ πέπονθε
10 καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τὰ μαλάκιά τε καὶ τὰ ὄστρεια.
Τὰ γὰρ μόρια διαφέρουσι τούτων οὐ τῇ ἀνάλογον ὁμοιότητι,
οἷον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἰχθύϊ πέπονθεν ὀστοῦν πρὸς ἄκανθαν,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς σωματικοῖς πάθεσιν, οἷον μεγέθει
μικρότητι, μαλακότητι σκληρότητι, λειότητι τραχύτητι
15 καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅλως δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Πῶς μὲν
οὖν ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ τὴν περὶ φύσεως μέθοδον, καὶ τίνα τρόπον
γίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ θεωρία περὶ αὐτῶν ὁδῷ καὶ ῥᾷστα, ἔτι δὲ
περὶ διαιρέσεως, τίνα τρόπον ἐνδέχεται μετιοῦσι λαμβάνειν
χρησίμως, καὶ διότι τὸ διχοτομεῖν τῇ μὲν ἀδύνατον τῇ δὲ
20 κενόν, εἴρηται. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς λέγωμεν,
ἀρχὴν τήνδε ποιησάμενοι.
1Perhaps, then, it will be best to treat generically the universal attributes of the groups that have a common nature and contain closely allied subordinate forms, whether they are groups recognized by a true instinct of mankind, such as Birds and Fishes, or groups not popularly known by a common appellation, 5but withal composed of closely allied subordinate groups; and only to deal individually with the attributes of a single species, when such species, man, for instance, and any other such, if such there be-stands apart from others, and does not constitute with them a larger natural group.
It is generally similarity in the shape of particular organs, or of the whole body, that has 10determined the formation of the larger groups. It is in virtue of such a similarity that Birds, Fishes, Cephalopoda, and Testacea have been made to form each a separate class. For within the limits of each such class, the parts do not differ in that they have no nearer resemblance than that of analogy-such as exists between the bone of man and the spine of fish-but differ merely in respect 15of such corporeal conditions as largeness smallness, softness hardness, smoothness roughness, and other similar oppositions, or, in one word, in respect of degree.
We have now touched upon the canons for criticizing the method of natural science, and have considered what is the most systematic and easy course of investigation; we have also dealt with division, and the mode of conducting 20it so as best to attain the ends of science, and have shown why dichotomy is either impracticable or inefficacious for its professed purposes.
Having laid this foundation, let us pass on to our next topic.
It is generally similarity in the shape of particular organs, or of the whole body, that has 10determined the formation of the larger groups. It is in virtue of such a similarity that Birds, Fishes, Cephalopoda, and Testacea have been made to form each a separate class. For within the limits of each such class, the parts do not differ in that they have no nearer resemblance than that of analogy-such as exists between the bone of man and the spine of fish-but differ merely in respect 15of such corporeal conditions as largeness smallness, softness hardness, smoothness roughness, and other similar oppositions, or, in one word, in respect of degree.
We have now touched upon the canons for criticizing the method of natural science, and have considered what is the most systematic and easy course of investigation; we have also dealt with division, and the mode of conducting 20it so as best to attain the ends of science, and have shown why dichotomy is either impracticable or inefficacious for its professed purposes.
Having laid this foundation, let us pass on to our next topic.
Book 1,Chapter 5 (644b22–646a4)
Τῶν οὐσιῶν ὅσαι φύσει συνεστᾶσι, τὰς μὲν ἀγενήτους
καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, τὰς δὲ μετέχειν
γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Συμβέβηκε δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας τιμίας
25 οὔσας καὶ θείας ἐλάττους ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ
γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι
ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς ἐστιν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν
αἴσθησιν), περὶ δὲ τῶν φθαρτῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ ζῴων εὐποροῦμεν
μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διὰ τὸ σύντροφον· πολλὰ
30 γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος λάβοι τις ἂν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων βουλόμενος
διαπονεῖν ἱκανῶς. Ἔχει δ' ἑκάτερα χάριν. Τῶν μὲν
γὰρ εἰ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμεθα, ὅμως διὰ τὴν τιμιότητα
τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἥδιον ἢ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ὥσπερ
καὶ τῶν ἐρωμένων τὸ τυχὸν καὶ μικρὸν μόριον κατιδεῖν ἥδιόν
35 ἐστιν ἢ πολλὰ ἕτερα καὶ μεγάλα δι' ἀκριβείας ἰδεῖν·
Of things constituted by nature some are ungenerated, imperishable, and eternal, while others are subject to generation and decay. The former are excellent beyond compare and 25divine, but less accessible to knowledge. The evidence that might throw light on them, and on the problems which we long to solve respecting them, is furnished but scantily by sensation; whereas respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant information, living as we do in their midst, and ample data may be collected concerning all their various kinds, if only we are willing 30to take sufficient pains. Both departments, however, have their special charm. The scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence, more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which we live; just as a half glimpse of persons that we love is more delightful than a leisurely view of other things, whatever their number and dimensions.
645a
1 τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ πλείω γνωρίζειν αὐτῶν λαμβάνει
τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχήν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ πλησιαίτερα
ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ τῆς φύσεως οἰκειότερα ἀντικαταλλάττεταί
τι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τὰ θεῖα φιλοσοφίαν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων
5 διήλθομεν λέγοντες τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν, λοιπὸν περὶ τῆς
ζωϊκῆς φύσεως εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν μήτε
ἀτιμότερον μήτε τιμιώτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις
αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως
ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις
10 τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις. Καὶ
γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν
θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν,
οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν
φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῷμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί
15 γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. Διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν
παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζῴων ἐπίσκεψιν. Ἐν πᾶσι
γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν· καὶ καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος
λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἐντυχεῖν
αὐτῷ, οἳ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερόμενον πρὸς
20 τῷ ἰπνῷ ἔστησαν (ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦντας·
εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεούς), οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ
ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον ὡς ἐν ἅπασιν
ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ τυχόντως
ἀλλ' ἕνεκά τινος ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα·
25 οὗ δ' ἕνεκα συνέστηκεν ἢ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν
εἴληφεν. Εἰ δέ τις τὴν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων θεωρίαν
ἄτιμον εἶναι νενόμικε, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἴεσθαι χρὴ καὶ
περὶ αὑτοῦ· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἄνευ πολλῆς δυσχερείας ἰδεῖν ἐξ ὧν
συνέστηκε τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, οἷον αἷμα, σάρκες, ὀστᾶ,
30 φλέβες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μόρια. Ὁμοίως τε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν
περὶ οὑτινοσοῦν τῶν μορίων ἢ τῶν σκευῶν διαλεγόμενον μὴ
περὶ τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μνήμην, μηδὲ ταύτης χάριν,
ἀλλὰ τῆς ὅλης μορφῆς, οἷον καὶ περὶ οἰκίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ
πλίνθων καὶ πηλοῦ καὶ ξύλων· καὶ τὸν περὶ φύσεως περὶ
35 τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ τούτων
ἃ μὴ συμβαίνει χωριζόμενά ποτε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν. Ἀναγκαῖον
1On the other hand, in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrial things has the advantage. Moreover, their greater nearness and affinity to us balances somewhat the loftier interest of the heavenly things that are the objects of the higher philosophy. Having already treated of 5the celestial world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we proceed to treat of animals, without omitting, to the best of our ability, any member of the kingdom, however ignoble. For if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet even these, by disclosing to intellectual perception the artistic spirit that designed them, give immense pleasure to all who can 10trace links of causation, and are inclined to philosophy. Indeed, it would be strange if mimic representations of them were attractive, because they disclose the mimetic skill of the painter or sculptor, and the original realities themselves were not more interesting, to all at any rate who have eyes to discern the reasons that determined their formation. We therefore 15must not recoil with childish aversion from the examination of the humbler animals. Every realm of nature is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to go in, reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in that kitchen divinities were present, 20so we should venture on the study of every kind of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something natural and something beautiful. Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in Nature's works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations and combinations is a form of the beautiful.
If any 25person thinks the examination of the rest of the animal kingdom an unworthy task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of man. For no one can look at the primordia of the human frame-blood, flesh, bones, vessels, and the like-without much repugnance. Moreover, when any one of the parts or structures, be it which it may, is under discussion, it must not be 30supposed that it is its material composition to which attention is being directed or which is the object of the discussion, but the relation of such part to the total form. Similarly, the true object of architecture is not bricks, mortar, or timber, but the house; and so the principal object of natural philosophy is not the material elements, but their composition, and 35the totality of the form, independently of which they have no existence.
If any 25person thinks the examination of the rest of the animal kingdom an unworthy task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of man. For no one can look at the primordia of the human frame-blood, flesh, bones, vessels, and the like-without much repugnance. Moreover, when any one of the parts or structures, be it which it may, is under discussion, it must not be 30supposed that it is its material composition to which attention is being directed or which is the object of the discussion, but the relation of such part to the total form. Similarly, the true object of architecture is not bricks, mortar, or timber, but the house; and so the principal object of natural philosophy is not the material elements, but their composition, and 35the totality of the form, independently of which they have no existence.
645b
1 δὲ πρῶτον τὰ συμβεβηκότα διελεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον γένος,
ὅσα καθ' αὑτὰ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, μετὰ δὲ
ταῦτα τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν πειρᾶσθαι διελεῖν. Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν
καὶ πρότερον ὅτι πολλὰ κοινὰ πολλοῖς ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων,
5 τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς, οἷον πόδες πτερὰ λεπίδες, καὶ πάθη δὴ
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τούτοις, τὰ δ' ἀνάλογον. Λέγω δ' ἀνάλογον,
ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει πλεύμων, τοῖς δὲ πλεύμων μὲν οὔ, ὃ
δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσι πλεύμονα, ἐκείνοις ἕτερον ἀντὶ τούτου· καὶ τοῖς
μὲν αἷμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν ἥνπερ
10 τοῖς ἐναίμοις τὸ αἷμα. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν χωρὶς περὶ ἑκάστων
τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἔμπροσθεν εἴπομεν ὅτι πολλάκις συμβήσεται
ταὐτὰ λέγειν, ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν περὶ πάντων τῶν
ὑπαρχόντων· ὑπάρχει δὲ πολλοῖς ταὐτά. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
ταύτῃ διωρίσθω. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον πᾶν ἕνεκά του, τῶν
15 δὲ τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἕκαστον ἕνεκά του, τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα πρᾶξίς
τις, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ σύνολον σῶμα συνέστηκε πράξεώς
τινος ἕνεκα πολυμεροῦς. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ πρίσις τοῦ πρίονος χάριν
γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ὁ πρίων τῆς πρίσεως· χρῆσις γάρ τις ἡ πρίσις
ἐστίν. Ὥστε καὶ τὸ σῶμά πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὰ
20 μόρια τῶν ἔργων πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον. Λεκτέον ἄρα
πρῶτον τὰς πράξεις τάς τε κοινὰς πάντων καὶ τὰς κατὰ
γένος καὶ τὰς κατ' εἶδος. Λέγω δὲ κοινὰς μὲν αἳ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχουσι
τοῖς ζῴοις, κατὰ γένος δέ, ὅσων παρ' ἄλληλα τὰς
διαφορὰς ὁρῶμεν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὔσας, οἷον ὄρνιθα λέγω
25 κατὰ γένος, ἄνθρωπον δὲ κατ' εἶδος, καὶ πᾶν ὃ κατὰ τὸν
καθόλου λόγον μηδεμίαν ἔχει διαφοράν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι
τὸ κοινὸν κατ' ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ'
εἶδος. Ὅσαι μὲν οὖν πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὧν
αἱ πράξεις τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διεστᾶσιν ὅνπερ αἱ πράξεις. Ὁμοίως
30 δὲ κἂν εἴ τινες πρότεραι καὶ τέλος ἑτέρων πράξεων
τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, τὸν αὐτὸν ἕξει τρόπον καὶ τῶν μορίων
ἕκαστον, ὧν αἱ πράξεις αἱ τοιαῦται· καὶ τρίτον, ὧν ὄντων
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. Λέγω δὲ πάθη καὶ πράξεις γένεσιν
αὔξησιν ὀχείαν ἐγρήγορσιν ὕπνον πορείαν, καὶ ὁπόσ'
35 ἄλλα τοιαῦτα τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχει· μόρια δὲ λέγω ῥῖνα
ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ τὸ σύνολον πρόσωπον, ὧν ἕκαστον καλεῖται
1The course of exposition must be first to state the attributes common to whole groups of animals, and then to attempt to give their explanation. Many groups, as already noticed, present common attributes, that is to say, in some cases absolutely identical affections, and absolutely 5identical organs,-feet, feathers, scales, and the like-while in other groups the affections and organs are only so far identical as that they are analogous. For instance, some groups have lungs, others have no lung, but an organ analogous to a lung in its place; some have blood, others have no blood, but a fluid analogous to blood, and with 10the same office. To treat of the common attributes in connexion with each individual group would involve, as already suggested, useless iteration. For many groups have common attributes. So much for this topic.
As every instrument and every bodily member subserves some partial end, that is to say, some special action, so the whole body must be 15destined to minister to some Plenary sphere of action. Thus the saw is made for sawing, for sawing is a function, and not sawing for the saw. Similarly, the body too must somehow or other be made for the soul, and each part of it for some subordinate function, to which it is adapted.
We have, then, first to describe the common functions, common, 20that is, to the whole animal kingdom, or to certain large groups, or to the members of a species. In other words, we have to describe the attributes common to all animals, or to assemblages, like the class of Birds, of closely allied groups differentiated by gradation, or to groups like Man not differentiated into subordinate groups. In the first 25case the common attributes may be called analogous, in the second generic, in the third specific.
When a function is ancillary to another, a like relation manifestly obtains between the organs which discharge these functions; and similarly, if one function is prior to and the end of another, their respective organs will stand to each other in the 30same relation. Thirdly, the existence of these parts involves that of other things as their necessary consequents.
Instances of what I mean by functions and affections are Reproduction, Growth, Copulation, Waking, Sleep, Locomotion, and other similar vital actions. Instances of what I mean by parts are Nose, Eye, Face, and other so-called members 35or limbs, and also the more elementary parts of which these are made.
As every instrument and every bodily member subserves some partial end, that is to say, some special action, so the whole body must be 15destined to minister to some Plenary sphere of action. Thus the saw is made for sawing, for sawing is a function, and not sawing for the saw. Similarly, the body too must somehow or other be made for the soul, and each part of it for some subordinate function, to which it is adapted.
We have, then, first to describe the common functions, common, 20that is, to the whole animal kingdom, or to certain large groups, or to the members of a species. In other words, we have to describe the attributes common to all animals, or to assemblages, like the class of Birds, of closely allied groups differentiated by gradation, or to groups like Man not differentiated into subordinate groups. In the first 25case the common attributes may be called analogous, in the second generic, in the third specific.
When a function is ancillary to another, a like relation manifestly obtains between the organs which discharge these functions; and similarly, if one function is prior to and the end of another, their respective organs will stand to each other in the 30same relation. Thirdly, the existence of these parts involves that of other things as their necessary consequents.
Instances of what I mean by functions and affections are Reproduction, Growth, Copulation, Waking, Sleep, Locomotion, and other similar vital actions. Instances of what I mean by parts are Nose, Eye, Face, and other so-called members 35or limbs, and also the more elementary parts of which these are made.
646a
1 μέλος. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ
τρόπου τῆς μεθόδου τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω· τὰς δ' αἰτίας πειραθῶμεν
εἰπεῖν περί τε τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀρξάμενοι
καθάπερ διωρίσαμεν, πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων.
1So much for the method to be pursued. Let us now try to set forth the causes of all vital phenomena, whether universal or particular, and in so doing let us follow that order of exposition which conforms, as we have indicated, to the order of nature.