Bekker (Berlin, 1831) · Loveday & Forster (1913)
Loveday & Forster (1913)
Chapter 1 (974a1–975a17)
974a
1 ΠΕΡΙ ΞΕΝΟΦΑΝΟΥΣ.
Ἀΐδιον εἶναί φησιν εἴ τί ἐστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι
μηδὲν ἐκ μηδενός. εἴτε γὰρ ἅπαντα γέγονεν εἴτε μὴ
πάντα ἀΐδι' ἀμφοτέρως. ἐξ οὐδενὸς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἂν γινόμενα.
5 ἁπάντων τε γὰρ γινομένων οὐδὲν προϋπάρχειν· εἴτ' ὄντων
τινῶν ἀεὶ ἕτερα προσγίνοιτο, πλέον ἂν καὶ μεῖζον τὸ ἓν
γεγονέναι. ᾧ δὴ πλέον καὶ μεῖζον, τοῦτο γενέσθαι ἂν ἐξ
οὐδενός· τῷ γὰρ ἐλάττονι τὸ πλέον, ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ
τὸ μεῖζον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν. ἀΐδιον δὲ ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναι, ὅτι
10 οὐκ ἔχει ἀρχὴν ὅθεν ἐγένετο, οὐδὲ τελευτὴν εἰς ὃ γινόμενον
ἐτελεύτησέ ποτε· πᾶν δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον ὂν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ
πλέον ἢ δύο εἴη, πέρατ' ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα. ἓν
δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι πάντα· εἰ γὰρ ἀνόμοια πλείω ὄντα, οὐκ
ἂν ἔτι ἓν θεῖναι ἀλλὰ πολλά. ἀΐδιον δὲ ὂν μέτριόν τε
15 καὶ ὅμοιον πάντῃ ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸ ἕν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν κινηθῆναι
μὴ ἔς τι ὑποχωρῆσαν. ὑποχωρῆσαι δὲ ἀνάγκην εἶναι
ἤτοι εἰς πλῆρες ἰὸν ἢ κενόν. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι
τὸ πλῆρες, τὸ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι οὐδὲν [ἢ] τὸ κενόν. τοιοῦτο
δὲ ὂν τὸ ἓν ἀνώδυνόν τε καὶ ἀνάλγητον ὑγιές τε καὶ ἄνοσον
20 εἶναι, οὔτε μετακοσμούμενον θέσει, οὔτε ἑτεροιούμενον εἴδει,
οὔτε μιγνύμενον ἄλλῳ. κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πολλά τε
τὸ ἓν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τεκνοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ ὂν φθείρεσθαι
ἀναγκάζεσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ
εἰ τὸ μεμῖχθαί τι ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων λέγοιτο, καὶ εἴη πολλὰ
25 κινούμενα εἰς ἄλληλα τὰ πράγματα, καὶ ἡ μῖξις ἡ ὡς ἐν
ἑνὶ σύνθεσις εἴη τῶν πλειόνων, ἢ τῇ ἀπαλλάξει οἷον ἐπιπρόσθησις
γίνοιτο τῶν μιχθέντων, ἐκείνους μὲν ἂν δι' ἀλλήλων
χωριζόντων εἶναι τὰ μιχθέντα, ἐπιπροσθήσεως δ' οὔσης
ἐν τῇ τρίψει γίνεσθαι ἂν ἕκαστον φανερόν, ἀφαιρουμένων
1MELISSUS says that, if anything is, it is eternal, since it is impossible that anything can come into being from nothing. For suppose that either all things or some things have come into being, in either case they must be eternal; for otherwise, in coming into being, they would do so out of nothing. For if all things come into being, then nothing can pre-exist; whilst if some things were ever and others 5are added, that which is must have become more and greater, and that by which it is more and greater must have arisen out of nothing; for the more is not originally existent in the less, nor the greater in the smaller.
Being, since it is eternal, is unlimited; for it has no beginning from which it has come into being, and no end in which, when it comes into being, it can ever terminate.
Being all and unlimited it is one; for if it were two more, these would be reciprocal limits.
Being one it must be similar 10throughout;? for if it were dissimilar, it would be several and therefore no longer one but many.
Being eternal and unlimited and alike throughout, the One is without motion; for it could not move without passing somewhere else, and it can only pass either into that which is full or into that which is empty; but of these the former could not admit it, while the latter is nothing at all.
Such being the nature of the One, it is unaffected by grief and pain, and is healthy and free from disease, and cannot 15change either by transposition or by change of form® or by mixture with anything else; for under all these circumstances the One becomes many, and Not-being is necessarily generated and Being destroyed; but these are impossibilities. For, indeed, if it were maintained that any One is the result of a mixture of several constituents— suppose, that is, that things were many and moved into one another, and that their mixture were either by way of the composition of the many in one, or, being due to the 20constituents fitting in with one another, resulted in their covering one another from view—then in the former case the constituents mixed would be easily discernible, being distinct;1 whilst, if they covered one another,? rubbing would reveal each constituent, the successive layers being uncovered as the upper layers were removed.3 Now neither of these things happens.. But according to Melissus it is only in these ways that a Many could both ‘ be and also appear to us; and since these ways are imἿ possible, that 25which is cannot be manifold, and the belief > that it is manifold is erroneous, like many other fancies ἢ which are due to the senses; but argument does not prove either that things come into being or that what is, is many, but that it is one and eternal and unlimited and similar throughout, Now surely one ought firstly to begin by taking not any and every opinion, but those which are most indisputable.
Being, since it is eternal, is unlimited; for it has no beginning from which it has come into being, and no end in which, when it comes into being, it can ever terminate.
Being all and unlimited it is one; for if it were two more, these would be reciprocal limits.
Being one it must be similar 10throughout;? for if it were dissimilar, it would be several and therefore no longer one but many.
Being eternal and unlimited and alike throughout, the One is without motion; for it could not move without passing somewhere else, and it can only pass either into that which is full or into that which is empty; but of these the former could not admit it, while the latter is nothing at all.
Such being the nature of the One, it is unaffected by grief and pain, and is healthy and free from disease, and cannot 15change either by transposition or by change of form® or by mixture with anything else; for under all these circumstances the One becomes many, and Not-being is necessarily generated and Being destroyed; but these are impossibilities. For, indeed, if it were maintained that any One is the result of a mixture of several constituents— suppose, that is, that things were many and moved into one another, and that their mixture were either by way of the composition of the many in one, or, being due to the 20constituents fitting in with one another, resulted in their covering one another from view—then in the former case the constituents mixed would be easily discernible, being distinct;1 whilst, if they covered one another,? rubbing would reveal each constituent, the successive layers being uncovered as the upper layers were removed.3 Now neither of these things happens.. But according to Melissus it is only in these ways that a Many could both ‘ be and also appear to us; and since these ways are imἿ possible, that 25which is cannot be manifold, and the belief > that it is manifold is erroneous, like many other fancies ἢ which are due to the senses; but argument does not prove either that things come into being or that what is, is many, but that it is one and eternal and unlimited and similar throughout, Now surely one ought firstly to begin by taking not any and every opinion, but those which are most indisputable.
974b
1 τῶν πρώτων τὰ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεθέντα τῶν μιχθέντων· ὧν
οὐδέτερον συμβαίνειν. διὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον κἂν εἶναι
πολλὰ κἂν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ φαίνεσθαι μόνως. ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ οὐχ
οἷόν θ' οὕτως, οὐδὲ πολλὰ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ
5 ταῦτα δοκεῖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν
αἴσθησιν φαντάζεσθαι ἅπασαν. λόγον δ' οὔτ' ἀναιρεῖ τὰ
αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι, οὔτε πολλὰ εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ
ἄπειρον καὶ πάντῃ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ. ἆρ' οὖν δεῖ πρῶτον
μὲν μὴ πᾶσαν λαβόντα δόξαν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μάλιστα
10 ὂν βέβαιον. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δοκοῦντα μὴ ὀρθῶς
ὑπολαμβάνεται, οὐθὲν ἴσως προσήκει οὐδὲ τούτῳ προχρῆσθαι
τῷ δόγματι, οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὐδὲν γένοιτο ἐκ μηδενός.
μία γάρ τίς ἐστι δόξα καὶ αὕτη τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν, ἣν ἐκ τοῦ
αἰσθάνεσθαί πως ἐπὶ πολλῶν ὄντες ὑπειλήφαμεν. εἰ δὲ
15 μὴ πάντα ἡμῖν ψευδῆ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀλλὰ τινές εἰσι
καὶ τούτων ὀρθαὶ ὑπολήψεις ἢ ἐπιδεῖξαι τὰς τοιαύτας ποιότητας
μάλιστα δοκούσας ὀρθάς, ταύτας ληπτέον, ἃς ἀεὶ βεβαιοτέρας
εἶναι δεῖ ἢ αἳ μέλλουσιν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν λόγων
δειχθήσεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ εἶεν δύο δόξαι ὑπεναντίαι ἀλλήλαις,
20 ὥσπερ οἴεται, εἰ μὴ πολλὰ γενέσθαι φησίν, ἀνάγκη
εἶναι ἐκ μὴ ὄντων. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ οἷόν τε, οὐκ εἶναι τὰ
ὄντα πολλά. γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν ὄν, ὅτι ἔστιν ἄπειρον εἶναι.
εἰ δ' οὕτως, καὶ ἕν. ὁμοίως μὲν δὴ ἡμῖν ὁ ἀμφοτέρων π
οὐδὲν μᾶλλόν τι ἕν, ἢ ὅτι πολλὰ δείκνυται. εἰ δὲ βέβαιος
25 μᾶλλον ἡ ἑτέρα, ἀπὸ ταύτης ξυμπερανθέντα μᾶλλον δέδεικται.
τυγχανόμενα δέ, ἔχοντος ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπολήψεις
ταύτας, καὶ κινούμενα μέν ἐστι τὰ ὄντα. ἀμφοῖν
δὲ πιστὴ μᾶλλον αὕτη, καὶ θᾶττον ἂν προεῖντο πάντες
ταύτην ἐκείνης τὴν δόξαν. ὥστ' εἰ καὶ συμβαίνει ἐναντίας
1If, then, all our opinions are incorrectly conceived, it is perhaps quite wrong to adopt this doctrine too, that nothing can ever come into being out of nothing; for this is but a single opinion and an incorrect one too, which we somehow all of us® have often been led to conceive from our sense-perceptions. But if not all that appears to us is false, and some conceptions even of objects of sense are correct, either one 5ought to demonstrate the nature of such a correct conception and then adopt it, or else demonstrate and adopt those which appear most likely to be correct; and these must always be more indisputable than the Sekehusions which are apt to follow from the arguments of Melissus. For Supposing that we really had to do with two contrary opinions, as Melissus thinks (his arguments show that he thinks so, viz. if there is a Many, it must needs arise from what is not; and if the consequent is impossible, what is, is not many; for, being 10ungenerated, anything which is, is unlimited, and therefore one), supposing this so, still, if we ae both propositions equally, unity is no more proved than multiplicity, and it is only if one proposition is more indisputable than the other, that the conclusions following from it are better proved. Now, a matter of fact, we do entertain both these conceptions, namely, that nothing can come to be out of nothing, and also that existents are many and are in motion; and of the two the latter is more generally credited, and every one 15would more readily give up the former opinion than this, Now if it were the case that the two propositions are contrary to one another, and it were impossible that at the same time nothing should come to be out of Not-being, and there should be a multiplicity of things,1 each of these views would refute the other. But why should his premisses be correct? Some one else might assert the exact opposite, For he has not argued his case either by showing that it is a correct opinion from which he starts, by taking a more certain 20opinion than that with which his proof is concerned. For it is usually considered more likely that Being arises out of Not-being than that there is not a multiplicity of things; it is confidently asserted about existents that things which do not exist come into being, nay, often have come into being out of non-existents, and those who have asserted this are no ordinary men, but some of those who are looked upon as sages. To begin with, Hesiod says:
First of all in the world was Chaos born, and thereafter Broad-bosomed earth arose, 25firm seat of all things forever, And Love that shineth bright amid the host of Immortals?
All other things, he says, came into being from these, but these came into being out of nothing. Secondly, there are many who say that nothing is but all things become, declaring that whatever becomes does not arise from existents; for, if what becomes arose from existents, then their statement that all things become would be false.
First of all in the world was Chaos born, and thereafter Broad-bosomed earth arose, 25firm seat of all things forever, And Love that shineth bright amid the host of Immortals?
All other things, he says, came into being from these, but these came into being out of nothing. Secondly, there are many who say that nothing is but all things become, declaring that whatever becomes does not arise from existents; for, if what becomes arose from existents, then their statement that all things become would be false.
975a
1 εἶναι τὰς φάσεις, καὶ ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαί τε ἐκ μὴ ὄντος
καὶ μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ἐλέγχοιτο μὲν ἂν
ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τί μᾶλλον οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι; ἴσως
τε κἂν φαίη τις τούτοις τἀναντία. οὔτε γὰρ δείξας ὅτι
5 ὀρθὴ δόξα ἀφ' ἧς ἄρχεται, οὔτε μᾶλλον βέβαιον ἢ περὶ
ἧς δείκνυσι λαβών, διελέχθη. μᾶλλον γὰρ λαμβάνεται
εἰκὸς εἶναι γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἢ μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι. λέγεταί
τε καὶ σφόδρα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαί τε τὰ μὴ
ὄντα, καὶ μὴ γεγονέναι πολλὰ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι
10 οἱ τυγχάνοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δοξάντων εἶναι σοφῶν τινὲς
εἰρήκασιν. αὐτίκα δ' Ἡσίοδος "πρῶτον μὲν πάντων" φησὶ
"χάος ἐγένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος
ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί, ἠδ' ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν."
τὰ δ' ἄλλα φησὶ γενέσθαι, ταῦτα δ' ἐξ οὐδενός. πολλοὶ
15 δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι εἶναι μὲν οὐδέν φασι, γίγνεσθαι δὲ πάντα,
λέγοντες ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν
δῆλον, ὅτι ἐνίοις γε δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἂν γενέσθαι.
1So much, therefore, is clear, that there are some people of the opinion that becoming even out of non-existents is possible, But had we not better leave aside the possibility or impossibility of his conclusions, and confine ourselves to what may very well be a distinct problem—namely, Whether these conclusions follow 5from the premisses which he takes, or other conclusions might logically be derived from these premisses? And first of all, granted his first assumption, that nothing can come to be from Not-being, does it necessarily follow that all things are ungenerated? Or is there no reason why one thing should not have come to be out of another, and so on in an endless series? Or may it not go on in a 10circular process, in such a way that one thing has come to be out of another, there thus being always something in existence, and all things having come to be out of one another an endless number of times? In that case, although it be agreed that nothing can come to be out of Not-being, everything may very well have come to be. (And none of the attributes which are attached to the One prevents our 15calling existents unlimited in Melissus’s sense of the word. For he himself attributes to the unlimited that it actually is, and is synonymous with, all. And even if existents are not unlimited, there is no reason why they should not come to be by the circular process.’). Further, if all things come to be and nothing is, as some declare, how can they be eternal? Yet he certainly argues though 20the existence of something were real and agreed.
For, he says, if a thing has not come to be but is, it must be eternal, as though Being were necessarily inherent in
For, he says, if a thing has not come to be but is, it must be eternal, as though Being were necessarily inherent in
Chapter 2 (975a18–977a13)
Ἀλλ' ἄρα εἰ μὲν δυνατά ἐστιν ἢ ἀδύνατα ἃ λέγει,
ἐατέον. τὸ δὲ πότερον συμπεραίνεται αὐτὸ ἐξ ὧν λαμβάνει,
20 ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἱκανῶς σκέψασθαι·
ἕτερον γὰρ ἄν τι τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐκείνου εἴη. καὶ πρῶτον τεθέντος,
ὃ πρῶτον λαμβάνει, μηδὲν γενέσθαι ἂν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἆρα
ἀνάγκη ἀγέννητα πάντα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει γεγονέναι
ἕτερα ἐξ ἑτέρων, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι; ἢ καὶ ἀνακάμπτει
25 κύκλῳ, ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου γεγονέναι, ἀεί
τε οὕτως ὄντος τινός, καὶ ἀπειράκις ἑκάστου γεγενημένου ἐξ
ἀλλήλων. ὥστε οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοιτο ἅπαντα γεγονέναι, κειμένου
τοῦ μηδὲν γενέσθαι ἂν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, καὶ ἄπειρα
ὄντα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον προσαγορεῦσαι οὐδὲν κωλύει τῶν τῷ
30 ἑνὶ ἑπομένων ὀνομάτων. ἅπαντα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι
καὶ ἐκεῖνος τῷ ἀπείρῳ προσάπτει. οὐδέν τε κωλύει, καὶ μὴ
ἀπείρων ὄντων, κύκλῳ αὐτῶν εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν. ἔτι εἰ
ἅπαντα γίγνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέν, ὥς τινες λέγουσιν, πῶς ἓν
ἀΐδια εἴη; ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν εἶναι ἕν τι ὡς ὄντος καὶ
35 κειμένου διαλέγεται. εἰ γάρ, φησί, μὴ ἐγένετο, ἔστω δὲ
ἀΐδια, ὡς δέον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν. ἔτι εἰ
καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μήτε τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι μήτε
ἀπολέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅμως τί κωλύει τὰ μὲν γενόμενα
αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀΐδια, ὡς καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει;
things. Moreover, however impossible it may be for Notbeing to come to be, or for Being to be destroyed, yet what prevents some existing things from having come to be and others from being eternal, as Empedocles also affirms? For 25after admitting all this, namely, that° Out of that which is not can nothing come into being; And whatsoever exists, no art nor device can destroy it; For it will always abide, where’er ’tis implanted, for ever,!
he yet declares that of existents some are eternal, namely, fire, water, earth, and air, but that the rest of things come to be and have come to be out of these. For in his opinion there 30is no other process whereby existents can come to be, Save the mingling of things and exchanging of things that are mingled; This in the speech of men is called the work of Begetting.2 But he denies that the Being of the eternal things and of what really is, is the result of a process of coming to be; for this he considers impossible. For he says:
How could aught bring increase to the All and 35whence have arisen? 3. But the Many come to be by the mixture and composition of fire and the other elements, and perish again when those elements are exchanged and separated; that is, by mixture and separation many things are at any time, but. by nature there are only four‘ apart from the Causes,° or else only one.
he yet declares that of existents some are eternal, namely, fire, water, earth, and air, but that the rest of things come to be and have come to be out of these. For in his opinion there 30is no other process whereby existents can come to be, Save the mingling of things and exchanging of things that are mingled; This in the speech of men is called the work of Begetting.2 But he denies that the Being of the eternal things and of what really is, is the result of a process of coming to be; for this he considers impossible. For he says:
How could aught bring increase to the All and 35whence have arisen? 3. But the Many come to be by the mixture and composition of fire and the other elements, and perish again when those elements are exchanged and separated; that is, by mixture and separation many things are at any time, but. by nature there are only four‘ apart from the Causes,° or else only one.
975b
1 ἅπαντα γὰρ κἀκεῖνος ταὐτὰ ὁμολογήσας, ὅτι ἔκ τε μὴ
ὄντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι, τό τε ὂν ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀνήνυστον
καὶ ἄπρηκτον, ἀεὶ γὰρ θήσεσθαι ὅπῃ κέ τις αἰὲν
ἐρείδῃ, ὅμως τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια εἶναί φησι, πῦρ
5 καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα γίνεσθαί τε καὶ
γεγονέναι ἐκ τούτων. οὐδεμία γὰρ ἑτέρα, ὡς οἴεται, γένεσίς
ἐστι τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξίς τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων
ἐστίν· φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν. τὴν
δὲ γένεσιν προσιοῦσαν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις καὶ τῷ ὅτι γίνεσθαι λέγει,
10 ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον ᾤετο. πῶς γάρ, φήσει,
καὶ ἔπαρξις ἴετο, παντί τε καὶ ποθὲν ἐλθόν; ἀλλὰ μισγομένων
τε καὶ συντιθεμένων πυρὸς καὶ τῶν μετὰ πυρὸς
γίγνεσθαι τὰ πολλά, διαλλαττομένων τε καὶ διακρινομένων
φθείρεσθαι πάλιν, καὶ εἶναι τῇ μὲν μίξει πολλά τε
15 καὶ τῇ διακρίσει, τῇ δὲ φύσει τέτταρ' ἄνευ τῶν αἰτίων, ἢ
ἕν· ἢ εἰ καὶ ἄπειρα εὐθὺς εἴη ταῦτα, ἐξ ὧν συντιθεμένων
γίγνεται, διακρινομένων δὲ φθείρεται, ὡς καὶ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν
φασί τινες λέγειν ἐξ ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀπείρων τὰ γινόμενα
γίνεσθαι. κἂν οὕτως, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀΐδια πάντα, ἀλλὰ
20 καὶ γιγνόμενα ἄττα καὶ γενόμενά τ' ἐξ ὄντων καὶ φθειρόμενα
εἰς οὐσίας τινὰς ἄλλας. ἔτι οὐδὲν κωλύει μίαν τινὰ
οὐσίαν τὸ πᾶν μορφήν, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ ὁ
Ἀναξιμένης λέγουσιν, ὁ μὲν ὕδωρ εἶναι φάμενος τὸ πᾶν,
ὁ δέ, ὁ Ἀναξιμένης, ἀέρα, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι οὕτως εἶναι τὸ
25 πᾶν ἓν ἠξιώκασιν. τοῦτο ἤδη σχήμασί τε καὶ πλήθεσι καὶ
ὀλιγότητι, καὶ τῷ μανὸν ἢ πυκνὸν γίνεσθαι, πολλὰ καὶ
ἄπειρα ὄντα τε καὶ γιγνόμενα ἀπεργάζεται τὸ ὅλον. φησὶ
δὲ καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ τὸν ἀέρα ἕκαστόν τε
τῶν πολλῶν, τοῦτο ὄν, ῥυθμῷ διαφέρειν. τί δὴ κωλύει καὶ
30 οὕτως τὰ πολλὰ γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐξ ὄντος
ἀεὶ ἐς ὂν μεταβάλλοντος ταῖς εἰρημέναις διαφοραῖς τοῦ
ἑνός, καὶ οὐδὲν οὔτε πλέονος οὔτε ἐλάττονος γιγνομένου τοῦ
ὅλου; ἔτι τί κωλύει ποτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἄλλων τὰ σώματα γίγνεσθαί
τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι πάλιν; εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτά τις
35 συγχωροίη, καὶ εἴη τι καὶ ἀγένητον, τί μᾶλλον ἄπειρον
δείκνυται; ἄπειρον γὰρ εἶναί φησιν, εἰ ἔστι μέν, μὴ
γεγονέναι. πέρατα γὰρ εἶναι τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχήν τε
καὶ τελευτήν. καίτοι τί κωλύει ἀγένητον ὂν ἔχειν πέρας
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων; εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀρχὴν ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ ταύτην
1Or again if these elements out of the composition of which things come to be, and by the dissolution of which they are destroyed, were from the first unlimited— which is what some affirm that Anaxagoras’ means when he says that things which come to be do so out of things that are ever-existent and unlimited—even so not all things 5would be eternal, but there would be some things coming to be and having come to be from things that are, and passing by destruction into other modes of Being. Furthermore, there is no reason why one form should not constitute the All (as Anaximander + and Anaximenes say, the former declaring that the All is water, while Anaximenes says that it is air, and as others say who have contended along these lines 10that the All is one), and why this, by assuming various shapes and greater or less bulk—that is, by coming to be in a rare or dense state—should not make up the many unlimited objects which exist and come to be and compose the whole. Again, Democritus declares that water and air and each of the many things that exist are essentially ‘ the same, but differ in their rhythm.?, Why should not the many come to be 15and be destroyed even in this way, the One changing continually from Being to Being by the abovementioned differences, and the whole becoming not a whit either greater or less? Furthermore, why should not bodies from time to time come to be from other bodies and be dispersed into bodies, and thus by dissolution the processes of generation and decay always balance one another? But if one were to make these 20concessions and allow that Being both exists and is ungenerated, how is its unlimitedness thereby more clearly demonstrated? For Melissus declares it to be unlimited, if it exists but has not come to be; for the beginning and end of the process of coming to be are, he says, limits. Yet what in his argument prevents a thing which is ungenerated from having a limit? For if a thing has come to be, he contends that 25it has as a beginning that from which it began coming to be. Now why should it not have a beginning, even if it has not come to be—not, however, one from which it has come to be, but some other—and why should not existents, though eternal, be limited in relation to one another? Again, why should not the whole, being ungenerated, be unlimited, but the things which come to be within it be limited by having a 30beginning and end of coming to be? Again, as Parmenides says, what prevents the All, though it be one and ungenerated, from being nevertheless limited and, to use his words, Like to the mass of a sphere on all sides carefully rounded, Everywhere equally far from the midst; for Fate hath That neither here nor there should it either be greater smaller?
Now, if it has a centre and extremities,-it has a limit though 35it is ungenerated; since if it be one and a body, as Melissus himself asserts, it has parts of its own as well, and these all alike. For when he says that the All is similar, he does not use the term of similarity to something else (this is just the point that Anaxagoras raises in disproving that the unlimited is similar, i.e.
Now, if it has a centre and extremities,-it has a limit though 35it is ungenerated; since if it be one and a body, as Melissus himself asserts, it has parts of its own as well, and these all alike. For when he says that the All is similar, he does not use the term of similarity to something else (this is just the point that Anaxagoras raises in disproving that the unlimited is similar, i.e.
976a
1 ὅθεν γίγνοιτο, εἰ γιγνόμενα. τί δὴ κωλύει, καὶ εἰ μὴ
ἐγένετο, ἔχειν ἀρχήν; οὐ μέντοι γε ἐξ ἧς γε ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἑτέραν, καὶ εἶναι περαίνοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀΐδια ὄντα.
ἔτι τί κωλύει τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀγέννητον ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναι, τὰ
5 δ' ἐν αὐτῷ γιγνόμενα πεπεράνθαι, ἔχοντ' ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν
γενέσεως; ἔτι καὶ ὡς ὁ Παρμενίδης φησί, τί κωλύει
καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἓν ὂν καὶ ἀγένητον ὅμως πεπεράνθαι, καὶ
εἶναι πάντοθεν ἐγκύκλου σφαίρας ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, μέσσοθεν
ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι βαιότερον
10 εἶναι μέχρι ὄν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ. ἔχον δὲ μέσον καὶ
ἔσχατα, πέρας ἔχει ἀγέννητον ὄν, ἐπεὶ εἰ καί, ὡς αὐτὸς
λέγει, ἕν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο σῶμα, ἔχει ἄλλα ἑαυτοῦ μέρη, εἰ
τάδε ὅμοια πάντα. καὶ γὰρ ὅμοιον οὕτω λέγει τὸ πᾶν
εἶναι οὐ... ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὃ περανθῆναι ὁρᾷς, ἐλέγχει εἴ τι ὅμοιον
15 τὸ ἄπειρον. τό γε ὅμοιον ἑτέρῳ ὅμοιον, ὥστε δύο ἢ πλείω
ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ἓν οὐδ' ἄπειρον εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς
αὐτὸ λέγει, καὶ φησὶν αὐτὸ ὅμοιον εἶναι πᾶν, ὅτι ὁμοιομερὲς
ὕδωρ ὂν ἅπαν ἢ γῆ ἢ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο. δῆλος
γὰρ οὗτος ἀξιῶν εἶναι ἓν τῶν διμερῶν ἕκαστον σῶμα ὄν,
20 οὐκ ἄπειρόν ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ἄπειρον, ὥστε ταῦτα περαίνει
πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀγέννητα ὄντα. ἔτι εἰ ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἄπειρόν
ἐστι, πῶς ἂν εἴη ἓν σῶμα ὄν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνομοίων
ἀμερῶν εἴη, πολλά, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἀξιοῖ. εἰ δὲ
ἅπαν ὕδωρ ἢ ἅπαν γῆ ἢ ὅ τι δὴ τὸ ὂν τοῦτ' ἐστί, πολλὰ
25 ἂν ἔχοι μέρη, ὡς καὶ Ζήνων ἐπιχειρεῖ ὂν δεικνύναι τὸ
οὕτως ὂν ἕν. εἴη οὖν ἂν καὶ πλείονα αὐτοῦ μέρη ἐλαττόνων
τε καὶ μικροτέρων, ἀλλά τε πάντῃ ἂν ταύτῃ ἀλλοῖον εἴη
οὐδενὸς προσγιγνομένου σώματος οὐδ' ἀπογιγνομένου. εἰ δὲ
μήτε σῶμα μήτε πλάτος μήτε μῆκος ἔχον μηδέν, πῶς ἂν
30 ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη; τί κωλύει πολλὰ καὶ ἐνάριθμα τοιαῦτα
εἶναι; τί κωλύει καὶ πλείω ὄντα ἑνὸς μεγέθει ἄπειρα εἶναι;
ὡς καὶ Ξενοφάνης ἄπειρον τό τε βάθος τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ
ἀέρος φησὶν εἶναι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· ἐπιτιμᾷ
γὰρ ὡς λεγόντων τινῶν τοιαῦτα ἀδύνατα εἶναι, οὕτως ἐχόντων
35 ξυμβαίνειν αὐτά, εἴπερ ἀπείρονα γῆς τε βάθη καὶ
δαψιλὸς αἰθήρ, ὃς διὰ πολλῶν δὴ βροτέων ῥηθέντα ματαίως
ἐκκέχυται στομάτων, ὀλίγον τοῦ παντὸς ἰδόντων. ἔτι
ὂν ἓν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ πάντῃ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν
1that what is similar is similar to something else, so that being two or more it would no longer be one, nor yet unlimited), but perhaps he means similar in relation to itself—in other words, that it is composed of similar parts, being all water or earth or something else of the kind. For he clearly 5holds that in this case Being would be one; but each of the parts being a body is not unlimited (for it is the whole which is unlimited), and therefore they are limited in relation to one another, although they are ungenerated.
Further, if Being is both eternal and unlimited, how could it be one, being a body? For if it were composed of dissimilar parts, it would be many. 10Melissus himself contends that it would then be many. But if it is all water or all earth, or whatever this Being is, it would have many parts (as Zeno, too, attempts to prove of that which is one in this sense); its parts would then be a manifold, being some of them smaller and less than others; so that in this way it would vary throughout without any body being added 15to it or taken away from it. But if it has no body or width length, how could the One be unlimited? Or why should there not be many, nay innumerable, existents of this kind? Further, if there are more existents than one, why should they not be unlimited in size, just as Xenophanes asserts that the depth both of the earth and of the air is unlimited ἢ Empedocles shows that 20Xenophanes held this view; for, as though certain people urged such views, he makes the criticism that, if this is the nature of earth and air,! it is impossible for them ever to meet, If the depths of the earth are unbounded and ample the ether, As the words that come forth from the lips of mortals unnumbered, Empty and meaningless, say; they have seen of the whole but 25a little.?
Further, if Being is one, there is nothing absurd in supposing that it is not similar everywhere. For if the All is water or fire or something of that kind, there is no reason why we should not suppose several kinds of this one Being, each kind individually similar to itself For there is no dense, as long as the rarity does not involve a void. For in the rare 30there is nota void isolated in particular parts in such a way that of the whole part is dense and part empty (rarity then meaning that the whole is like this); but rarity is produced when the whole is uniformly full, but uniformly less full than in the dense.
But suppose Being exists and is ungenerated, and suppose it were granted that for this reason it is unlimited, and 35that more than one thing cannot be unlimited, and it must therefore be said to be one, and it is impossible for it to be dissimilar—how can he say that the whole is without motion, if the void cannot exist καὶ ὅ ἐχόντων, Sc.
Further, if Being is both eternal and unlimited, how could it be one, being a body? For if it were composed of dissimilar parts, it would be many. 10Melissus himself contends that it would then be many. But if it is all water or all earth, or whatever this Being is, it would have many parts (as Zeno, too, attempts to prove of that which is one in this sense); its parts would then be a manifold, being some of them smaller and less than others; so that in this way it would vary throughout without any body being added 15to it or taken away from it. But if it has no body or width length, how could the One be unlimited? Or why should there not be many, nay innumerable, existents of this kind? Further, if there are more existents than one, why should they not be unlimited in size, just as Xenophanes asserts that the depth both of the earth and of the air is unlimited ἢ Empedocles shows that 20Xenophanes held this view; for, as though certain people urged such views, he makes the criticism that, if this is the nature of earth and air,! it is impossible for them ever to meet, If the depths of the earth are unbounded and ample the ether, As the words that come forth from the lips of mortals unnumbered, Empty and meaningless, say; they have seen of the whole but 25a little.?
Further, if Being is one, there is nothing absurd in supposing that it is not similar everywhere. For if the All is water or fire or something of that kind, there is no reason why we should not suppose several kinds of this one Being, each kind individually similar to itself For there is no dense, as long as the rarity does not involve a void. For in the rare 30there is nota void isolated in particular parts in such a way that of the whole part is dense and part empty (rarity then meaning that the whole is like this); but rarity is produced when the whole is uniformly full, but uniformly less full than in the dense.
But suppose Being exists and is ungenerated, and suppose it were granted that for this reason it is unlimited, and 35that more than one thing cannot be unlimited, and it must therefore be said to be one, and it is impossible for it to be dissimilar—how can he say that the whole is without motion, if the void cannot exist καὶ ὅ ἐχόντων, Sc.
976b
1 ὕδωρ ἅπαν ἢ πῦρ ἢ ὅ τι δὴ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲν κωλύει
πλείω εἰπεῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, εἰ δὴ δι' ἕκαστον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ
ἑαυτῷ. καὶ γὰρ μανόν, τὸ δὲ πυκνὸν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντος ἐν
τῷ μανῷ κενοῦ. οὐδὲν κωλύειν γάρ, τῷ μανῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔν
5 τισι μέρεσι χωρὶς ἀποκεκριμένον τὸ κενόν, ὡς τὸ τοῦ ὅλου,
τὸ μὲν εἶναι πυκνόν, καὶ τουτὶ δέ ἐστι μανὸν τὸ πᾶν οὕτως
ἔχον· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἅπαν πλῆρες ὄν, ὁμοίως ἧττον πλῆρές
ἐστι τοῦ πυκνοῦ. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀγέννητόν ἐστιν, καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο δοθείη ἄπειρον εἶναι, καὶ μηδὲ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλο καὶ
10 ἄλλο ἄπειρον εἶναι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἤδη προσαγορευτέον
καὶ ἀδύνατον· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἄπειρον ὅσον ἦ τὸ
κενὸν μὴ ὅλον ἂν οἷόν τε εἶναι; ἀκίνητον δ' εἶναι φησίν,
εἰ κενὸν μή ἐστιν· ἅπαντα γὰρ κινεῖσθαι τῷ ἀλλάττειν
τόπον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο πολλοῖς οὐ συνδοκεῖ, ἀλλ'
15 εἶναί τι κενόν, οὐ μέντοι τοῦτό γέ τι σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οἷον
καὶ ὁ Ἡσίοδος ἐν τῇ γενέσει πρῶτον τὸ χάος φησὶ γενέσθαι,
ὡς δὲ χώραν πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὖσιν. τοιοῦτον δέ
τι καὶ τὸ κενὸν οἷον ἀγγεῖόν τι ἀνὰ μέσον εἶναι ζητοῦμεν.
ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ εἰ μή ἐστι κενόν, μηδέ τι ἧσσον ἂν κινοῖτο,
20 ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ πραγματευθείς, καὶ οὐ
μόνον ἀποχρῆσαν αὐτῷ ἀποφήνασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅμως
κινεῖσθαί φησι τὰ ὄντα, οὐκ ὄντος κενοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἀεί φησι συγκινούμενα τὸν
ἅπαντα ἐνδελεχῶς χρόνον, οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγων ὡς τοῦ παντός,
25 οὐδὲ κενεόν. πόθεν οὖν τί κ' ἐπέλθοι; ὅταν δὲ εἰς μίαν μορφὴν
συγκριθῇ, ὡς ἓν εἶναι, οὐδέν φησι τό γε κενεὸν πέλει
οὐδὲ περισσόν. τί γὰρ κωλύει εἰς ἄλληλα φέρεσθαι καὶ
περιίστασθαι ἅμα ὁτουοῦν εἰς ἄλλο, καὶ τούτου εἰς ἕτερον, καὶ
εἰς τὸ πρῶτον, ἄλλου μεταβάλλοντος ἀεί. ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἐν
30 τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος τοῦ πράγματος τόπῳ τοῦ εἴδους μεταβολήν,
ἣν ἀλλοίωσιν οἵ τ' ἄλλοι κἀκεῖνος λέγει, [οὐδὲν] ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτῷ κωλύει κινεῖσθαι τὰ πράγματα, ὅταν
ἐκ λευκοῦ μέλαν ἢ ἐκ πικροῦ γένηται γλυκύ. οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ
μὴ εἶναι κενὸν ἢ μὴ δέχεσθαι τὸ πλῆρες ἀλλοιοῦσθαι κωλύει.
35 ὥστε οὔτε ἅπαντα ἀΐδια οὔθ' ἓν οὔτ' ἄπειρον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἀλλ'
ἄπειρα πολλά. οὔτε ἕν θ' ὅμοιον, οὔτ' ἀκίνητον, οὔτ' εἰ ἓν οὔτ'
εἰ πόλλ' ἄττα. τούτων δὲ κειμένων καὶ μετακοσμεῖσθαι καὶ
ἑτεροιοῦσθαι τὰ ὄντα οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐκ τῶν ὑπ' ἐκείνῳ εἰρημένων,
1γῆς καὶ ἀέρος (Mullach).
Now Melissus declares that. Being is without motion, if a void does not exist; for everything moves by changing its place. In the first place, then, this does not agree with the opinion of many, which is that a void does exist, yet it is not a body, 5but is of the nature of the Chaos, as Hesiod describes it first coming into being in the birth of things, considering space to be ἃ prime necessity for things which exist; and the void is, as it were, a vessel in which we expect to find an interior space But even if there is no void, why should Being be less likely to move? For Anaxagoras, who 10devoted his attention to this subject, and for whom it was not enough merely to declare that a void does not exist, declares that things which are, are in motion, although there is no void. Similarly Empedocles says that they are ever in motion continually all through the period of aggregation, but that there is no void; for Nought of the 15whole can be void; whence then could any be added? 3.
while when all has been aggregated into a single form, so as to be one, Emptiness there is none, nor aught that is overflowing.’
For why should not things assume one another’s position and go through a circle of simultaneous movements, one thing taking the place of another, and that the place 20of something else, and something else the first position? And what is there in what he has said that precludes a movement taking place in things, consisting in a change of form in an object which remains in the same position (what he, like every one else, terms ‘ alteration.’), as, for example, when white turns into black, or bitter into 25sweet? For the non-existence of a void and the inability of that which is full to receive any addition does not at all preclude ’ the possibility of alteration.
Thus neither are all things necessarily eternal nor is Being necessarily unlimited (but many things are unlimited), nor is it one, nor homogeneous, nor unmoved, whether it be one or 30whether it be many. If this is admitted, there would be nothing in what he has said to prevent existents from being either transposed or altered; if Being is one, the movement is of the whole, which differs in density and rarity, and alters without the addition or abstraction of any body; while, if there is a multiplicity of existents, their 35movement is due to their mutual mixture and segregation. For it is not likely that the process of mixture is either a placing of elements one above another,? or a putting of them together, such as he supposes,?
Now Melissus declares that. Being is without motion, if a void does not exist; for everything moves by changing its place. In the first place, then, this does not agree with the opinion of many, which is that a void does exist, yet it is not a body, 5but is of the nature of the Chaos, as Hesiod describes it first coming into being in the birth of things, considering space to be ἃ prime necessity for things which exist; and the void is, as it were, a vessel in which we expect to find an interior space But even if there is no void, why should Being be less likely to move? For Anaxagoras, who 10devoted his attention to this subject, and for whom it was not enough merely to declare that a void does not exist, declares that things which are, are in motion, although there is no void. Similarly Empedocles says that they are ever in motion continually all through the period of aggregation, but that there is no void; for Nought of the 15whole can be void; whence then could any be added? 3.
while when all has been aggregated into a single form, so as to be one, Emptiness there is none, nor aught that is overflowing.’
For why should not things assume one another’s position and go through a circle of simultaneous movements, one thing taking the place of another, and that the place 20of something else, and something else the first position? And what is there in what he has said that precludes a movement taking place in things, consisting in a change of form in an object which remains in the same position (what he, like every one else, terms ‘ alteration.’), as, for example, when white turns into black, or bitter into 25sweet? For the non-existence of a void and the inability of that which is full to receive any addition does not at all preclude ’ the possibility of alteration.
Thus neither are all things necessarily eternal nor is Being necessarily unlimited (but many things are unlimited), nor is it one, nor homogeneous, nor unmoved, whether it be one or 30whether it be many. If this is admitted, there would be nothing in what he has said to prevent existents from being either transposed or altered; if Being is one, the movement is of the whole, which differs in density and rarity, and alters without the addition or abstraction of any body; while, if there is a multiplicity of existents, their 35movement is due to their mutual mixture and segregation. For it is not likely that the process of mixture is either a placing of elements one above another,? or a putting of them together, such as he supposes,?
977a
1 καὶ ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς κινήσεως οὔσης, καὶ πλήθει καὶ
ὀλιγότητι διαφέροντος, καὶ ἀλλοιουμένου οὐδενὸς προσγιγνομένου.
εἰ δ' ἄρα τινός, οὐ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ εἰ πολλὰ συμμισγομένων
καὶ συνδιακρινομένων ἀλλήλοις. τὴν γὰρ μῖξιν οὔτ' ἐπιπρόσθεσιν
5 τοιαύτην εἶναι οὔτε σύνθεσιν εἰκὸς οἵαν λέγειν. ὥστε ἢ
χωρὶς εὐθὺς εἶναι, ἢ καὶ ἀποστρεφθέντος ἐπίπροσθεν ἕτερα ἑτέρων
φέρεσθαι χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οὕτω συγκεῖσθαι
ταχθέντα ὥστε ὁτιοῦν μιγνυμένου παρ' ὁτιοῦν ᾧ μίγνυσθαι μέρος,
οὕτως ὡς μὴ ἀναληφθῆναι συγκείμενα, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένα,
10 μηδ' ὁποιαοῦν αὐτῷ μέρη. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα τὸ ἐλάχιστον,
ἅπαν ἅπαντι μέρος μέμικται ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ὅλον.
ΠΕΡΙ ΖΗΝΩΝΟΣ.
1by which either they are immediately distinct, or else they appear each distinct from one another, if the layers above one another are successively rubbed away; but they are so arranged in their mixture, that any part of that which is mixed comes into such a relation to any part of that with which it is mixed, that even the smallest 5particles would be found not merely placed together but mixed. For since there is no smallest body,® every part is mixed with every other part, just as the whole is mixed.
XENOPHANES declares that if anything. is, it cannot3 possibly have come into being, and he argues this with reference to God. For that which has come into being must necessarily have done so either from that which is similar or from that which is 10dissimilar; and neither alternative is possible. For it is no more possible for like to have been begotten by like than for like to have begotten like (for at any rate when similars are equal, all the same
XENOPHANES declares that if anything. is, it cannot3 possibly have come into being, and he argues this with reference to God. For that which has come into being must necessarily have done so either from that which is similar or from that which is 10dissimilar; and neither alternative is possible. For it is no more possible for like to have been begotten by like than for like to have begotten like (for at any rate when similars are equal, all the same
Chapter 3 (977a14–977b20)
Ἀδύνατόν φησιν εἶναι, εἴ τι ἔστι, γενέσθαι, τοῦτο λέγων
15 ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἤτοι ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ ἐξ ἀνομοίων
γενέσθαι τὸ γενόμενον. δυνατὸν δὲ οὐδέτερον. οὔτε γὰρ
ὅμοιον ὑφ' ὁμοίου προσήκειν τεκνωθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ τεκνῶσαι
(ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἅπαντα τοῖς γε ἴσοις ἢ ὁμοίοις ὑπάρχειν πρὸς
ἄλληλα) οὔτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνομοίου τὸ ἀνόμοιον γενέσθαι. εἰ γὰρ
20 γίγνοιτο ἐξ ἀσθενεστέρου τὸ ἰσχυρότερον ἢ ἐξ ἐλάττονος τὸ
μεῖζον ἢ ἐκ χείρονος τὸ κρεῖττον, ἢ τοὐναντίον τὰ χείρω ἐκ
τῶν κρειττόνων, τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἐξ ὄντος ἂν γενέσθαι· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
ἀΐδιον μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν θεόν. εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς
ἁπάντων κράτιστον, ἕνα φησὶν αὐτὸν προσήκειν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ
25 δύο ἢ ἔτι πλείους εἶεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κράτιστον καὶ βέλτιστον αὐτὸν
εἶναι πάντων. ἕκαστος γὰρ ἂν θεὸς τῶν πολλῶν ὅμοιος ὢν
τοιοῦτος εἴη. τοῦτο γὰρ θεὸν καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν εἶναι, κρατεῖν,
ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι, καὶ πάντα κρατεῖσθαι εἶναι. ὥστε
καθὸ μὴ κρείττων, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκ εἶναι θεόν. πλειόνων
30 οὖν ὄντων, εἰ μὲν εἶεν τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων κρείττους τὰ δὲ
ἥττους, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι θεούς· πεφυκέναι γὰρ θεὸν μὴ κρατεῖσθαι.
ἴσων δὲ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν θεὸν φύσιν δεῖν εἶναι
κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ ἴσον οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ ἴσου.
ὥστ' εἴπερ εἴη τε καὶ τοιοῦτον εἴη θεός, ἕνα μόνον εἶναι τὸν
35 θεόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ πάντα δύνασθαι ἂν ἃ βούλοιτο. οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι πλειόνων ὄντων ἕνα εἶναι μόνον. ἕνα δ'
ὄντα ὅμοιον εἶναι πάντῃ, ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν, τάς τε ἄλλας
αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντα πάντῃ. εἰ γὰρ μή, κρατεῖν ἂν καὶ κρατεῖσθαι
ὑπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ μέρη θεοῦ ὄντα· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
qualities inhere in each and in a similar way in their relations to one another), nor could unlike have come into ° being from unlike. For if the stronger could come into being from the weaker, or the greater from the less, 15or the better from the worse, or reversely worse things from better, then Not-being could come to be from Being, or Being from Not-being; which is impossible. Accordingly for these reasons God is eternal.
Now if God is supreme over all, Xenophanes declares that it follows that he must be one. For if there were two more gods, he would no longer be supreme and the best of all; for then each of the many gods would likewise 20be supreme. For what God and God’s power means is that he is supreme and never inferior, and that he possesses supremacy over all. So far then as he is not superior, he isnot God. Now if there were several gods, supposing they 3° ‘were superior to one another in some respects and inferior in others, they would not be gods; for it is the nature of the divine not to be inferior. But supposing they were equal, they 25would not possess God’s nature, for God must be supreme; whereas that which is equal is neither better nor worse than that to which it is equal. So that if God be, and be of this nature, God is one and one only. For otherwise he could not even do whatsoever he wished; for if there were more gods than one, he could not do so; therefore he is One only.
Being one he is similar in every part, seeing and hearing and possessing 30the other senses in every part of him, For otherwise the parts of God would be superior and inferior to one another; which is impossible.
Being similar in every part, he is spherical; for he is” not of a certain nature in one part and not in another, but in every part. ἐν Being eternal and one and similar and spherical, he is neither unlimited nor limited. For Not-being is unlimited; for it has neither middle nor 35beginning and end, nor any other parts, and such is the nature of the unlimited. But Being could not be of the same nature as Not-being. On the other hand, if things weré several, mutual limitation would occur. But the One has no likeness either. to Not- * being or to the Many; for that which is one has nothing in which it can find a limit.
Now if God is supreme over all, Xenophanes declares that it follows that he must be one. For if there were two more gods, he would no longer be supreme and the best of all; for then each of the many gods would likewise 20be supreme. For what God and God’s power means is that he is supreme and never inferior, and that he possesses supremacy over all. So far then as he is not superior, he isnot God. Now if there were several gods, supposing they 3° ‘were superior to one another in some respects and inferior in others, they would not be gods; for it is the nature of the divine not to be inferior. But supposing they were equal, they 25would not possess God’s nature, for God must be supreme; whereas that which is equal is neither better nor worse than that to which it is equal. So that if God be, and be of this nature, God is one and one only. For otherwise he could not even do whatsoever he wished; for if there were more gods than one, he could not do so; therefore he is One only.
Being one he is similar in every part, seeing and hearing and possessing 30the other senses in every part of him, For otherwise the parts of God would be superior and inferior to one another; which is impossible.
Being similar in every part, he is spherical; for he is” not of a certain nature in one part and not in another, but in every part. ἐν Being eternal and one and similar and spherical, he is neither unlimited nor limited. For Not-being is unlimited; for it has neither middle nor 35beginning and end, nor any other parts, and such is the nature of the unlimited. But Being could not be of the same nature as Not-being. On the other hand, if things weré several, mutual limitation would occur. But the One has no likeness either. to Not- * being or to the Many; for that which is one has nothing in which it can find a limit.
977b
1 πάντῃ δ' ὅμοιον ὄντα σφαιροειδῆ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῇ
δ' οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ. ἀΐδιον δ' ὄντα καὶ ἕνα
καὶ σφαιροειδῆ οὔτ' ἄπειρον οὔτε πεπεράσθαι. ἄπειρον ὃ μὴ
ὂν εἶναι· τοῦτο γὰρ οὔτε μέσον οὔτ' ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος οὔτ'
5 ἄλλο μέρος οὐδὲν ἔχειν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον. οἷον
δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι τὸ ὄν, περαίνειν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα,
εἰ πλείω εἶεν. τὸ δὲ ἓν οὔτε τῷ οὐκ ὄντι οὔτε τοῖς πολλοῖς
ὁμοιοῦσθαι· ἓν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει πρὸς ὅ τι περανεῖ. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον
ὂν ἕν, ὃν τὸν θεὸν εἶναι λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι οὔτε κινητὸν
10 εἶναι. ἀκίνητον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν
εἰς αὐτὸ ἕτερον οὔτε ἐκεῖνο εἰς ἄλλο ἐλθεῖν. κινεῖσθαι δὲ
τὰ πλείω ὄντα ἑνός. ἕτερον γὰρ εἰς ἕτερον δεῖν κινεῖσθαι.
εἰς μὲν οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐδὲν ἂν κινηθῆναι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν
οὐδαμῇ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλοι, πλείω αὐτὸν
15 εἶναι ἑνός. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἂν τὰ δύο ἢ πλείω
ἑνός, ἠρεμεῖν δὲ καὶ ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸ οὐδέν. τὸ δὲ ἓν οὔτε
ἀτρεμεῖν οὔτε κινεῖσθαι· οὔτε γὰρ τῷ μὴ ὄντι οὔτε τοῖς πολλοῖς
ὅμοιον εἶναι. κατὰ πάντα δὲ οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν θεόν,
ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἕνα, ὅμοιόν τε καὶ σφαιροειδῆ ὄντα, οὔτε ἄπειρον
20 οὔτε πεπερασμένον, οὔτε ἠρεμεῖν οὔτε ἀκίνητον εἶναι.
1A One, then, of the kind which Xenophanes declares God - to be can, he says, be neither moved nor unmoved; for © inteaGbility belongs to Not-being (for nothing else can go into it, nor can it go into anything else); while movement Ἷ belongs to a plurality, for one body must move into another’s place. Now nothing can ever move into Notbeing; for Not-being is nowhere. 5On the other hand, if it moved in the way of things changing into one another, then the One would be more than one. For these reasons motion belongs to a pair of things, or any number more than one, while rest and immobility belong to that which is nothing. But the One is neither still nor is it moved; for it is similar neither to Not-being nor to the Many; but being in every respect of this nature—eternal and one and _ _ similar and spherical—God is 10neither unlimited nor limited, neither at rest nor in motion.
In the first place, then, Xenophanes also, like Melissus, assumes that what comes into being does so from that which already is. Yet why should not that which comes into being do so not from something either similar dissimilar, but from Not-being? Further, God is no more ungenerated than anything else, even if we suppose that all things have come into being from something similar dissimilar, 15which is impossible; so that either there is nothing except God or everything else is also eternal. Further, he assumes that God is supreme, meaning by this that he is most powerful and best. This does not seem to agree with the customary opinion, which holds that some gods are in many respects superior to others. It was not, therefore, from accepted opinion that he took this hypothesis about God, which he treats as though it were admitted. It is said that 20he understands the supremacy — of God in the sense that his nature is superior, not in relation to anything else, but in his own disposition; since surely in relation to something else there would be nothing to
In the first place, then, Xenophanes also, like Melissus, assumes that what comes into being does so from that which already is. Yet why should not that which comes into being do so not from something either similar dissimilar, but from Not-being? Further, God is no more ungenerated than anything else, even if we suppose that all things have come into being from something similar dissimilar, 15which is impossible; so that either there is nothing except God or everything else is also eternal. Further, he assumes that God is supreme, meaning by this that he is most powerful and best. This does not seem to agree with the customary opinion, which holds that some gods are in many respects superior to others. It was not, therefore, from accepted opinion that he took this hypothesis about God, which he treats as though it were admitted. It is said that 20he understands the supremacy — of God in the sense that his nature is superior, not in relation to anything else, but in his own disposition; since surely in relation to something else there would be nothing to
Chapter 4 (977b21–979a11)
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λαμβάνει καὶ οὗτος τὸ γιγνόμενον
γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ὄντος, ὥσπερ ὁ Μέλισσος. καίτοι τί κωλύει
μήτ' ἐξ ὁμοίου τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος;
ἔτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ θεὸς ἀγέννητος ἢ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα,
25 εἴπερ ἅπαντα ἐξ ὁμοίου ἢ ἀνομοίου γέγονεν· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
ὥστε ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὸν θεόν, ἢ καὶ τἆλλα ἀΐδια πάντα.
ἔτι κράτιστον τὸν θεὸν λαμβάνει, τοῦτο δυνατώτατον καὶ
βέλτιστον λέγων. οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀλλὰ
πολλὰ κρείττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί. οὐκ οὖν ἐκ τοῦ δοκοῦντος
30 εἴληφε ταύτην κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν. τό τε
κράτιστον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οὐχ οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων λέγεται
ὡς πρὸς ἄλλο τι τοιαύτη ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν
αὐτοῦ διάθεσιν, ἐπεί τοί γε πρὸς ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοι μὴ
τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ ῥώμῃ ὑπερέχειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν
35 τῶν ἄλλων ἀσθένειαν. θέλοι δ' ἂν οὐδεὶς οὕτω τὸν θεὸν
φάναι κράτιστον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς ἔχει ὡς οἷόν τε
ἄριστα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκλείπει καὶ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτῷ·
ἅμα γὰρ ἴσως ἔχοντι κἀκεῖνο ἂν συμβαίη. οὕτω δὲ διακεῖσθαι
καὶ πλείους αὐτοὺς ὄντας οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἅπαντας ὡς
prevent his excelling, not by his own goodness and strength, but owing to the weakness of all others. But no one would wish to say that God is supreme in this latter sense, but rather that he is in himself as excellent as possible, and there is 25nothing lacking in him of what is good and noble; if this is so, his supremacy would perhaps follow. But even if there are more gods than one, nothing would prevent their being of this nature, all possessing the greatest possible# excellence and being superior to all else, but not to one another. Now there are, it seems, other things besides God; for he says that God is supreme, and he must necessarily be supreme over something.
But supposing that he is 30one, it does not follow that he sees and hears in every part; for if he does not see in one part, he does not see worse in that part, but does not see at all. But perhaps perceiving in every part means that he would possess the highest excellence if he were PENNS in every part.
Further, if this were his nature, why should he be spherical, and why should he have that shape rather than any other, just because he hears in every part and is supreme in every 35part? For just as when we say of white lead that it is white in all its parts, we merely mean that the colour whiteness is present in every portion of it, why should we not say similarly of God that sight and hearing and supremacy are present in every part, in the sense that whatsoever portion of him one takes will be found to be possessed of these characteristics?
But supposing that he is 30one, it does not follow that he sees and hears in every part; for if he does not see in one part, he does not see worse in that part, but does not see at all. But perhaps perceiving in every part means that he would possess the highest excellence if he were PENNS in every part.
Further, if this were his nature, why should he be spherical, and why should he have that shape rather than any other, just because he hears in every part and is supreme in every 35part? For just as when we say of white lead that it is white in all its parts, we merely mean that the colour whiteness is present in every portion of it, why should we not say similarly of God that sight and hearing and supremacy are present in every part, in the sense that whatsoever portion of him one takes will be found to be possessed of these characteristics?
978a
1 οἷόν τε ἄριστα διακειμένους, καὶ κρατίστους τῶν ἄλλων, οὐχ
αὑτῶν ὄντας. ἔστι δ', ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄλλα. κράτιστον γὰρ
εἶναι τὸν θεόν φησι, τοῦτο δέ τινι εἶναι ἀνάγκη, ἕνα τὰ
πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν οὐδὲν προσήκει· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ καὶ
5 τῇδ' ὁρᾷ, χεῖρον ὁρᾷ ταύτῃ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁρᾷ. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοῦτο
βούλεται τὸ πάντῃ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι οὕτως ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχοι,
ὅμοιος ὢν πάντῃ. ἔτι τοιοῦτος ὢν διὰ τί σφαιροειδὴς ἂν εἴη,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἑτέραν τινὰ μᾶλλον ἔχων ἰδέαν, ὅτι πάντῃ
ἀκούει καὶ πάντῃ κρατεῖ; ὥσπερ γὰρ ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ
10 ψιμμύθιον ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ λευκόν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο τι σημαίνομεν
ἢ ὅτι ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῦ τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐγκέχρωσται ἡ
λευκότης· τί δὴ κωλύει οὕτω κἀκεῖ τὸ πάντῃ ὁρᾶν καὶ
ἀκούειν καὶ κρατεῖν λέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἅπαν ὃ ἄν τις αὐτοῦ
λαμβάνῃ μέρος, τοῦτ' ἔσται πεπονθός; ὥσπερ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ
15 ψιμμύθιον, οὐδὲ τὸν θεὸν ἀνάγκη διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι σφαιροειδῆ.
ἔτι μήτε ἄπειρον μήτε πεπεράνθαι σῶμα γε ὂν καὶ ἔχον
μέγεθος πῶς οἷόν τε, εἴπερ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄπειρον ὃ ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ
πέρας δεκτικὸν ὂν πέρατος. πέρας δ' ἐν μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει
ἐγγίνεται, καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ ποσῷ, ὥστε ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ
20 πέρας μέγεθος ὄν, ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ σφαιροειδῆ ὄντα
ἀνάγκη πέρας ἔχειν. ἔσχατα γὰρ ἔχει, εἴπερ μέσον ἔχει
αὐτοῦ τοῦ πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν. μέσον δ' ἔχει, σφαιροειδὲς ὄν·
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι σφαιροειδὲς ὃ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ
ἔσχατα. σῶμα ἔσχατα ἢ πέρατα ἔχειν, οἷον διαφορεῖ. εἰ
25 γὰρ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἁπλοῦν, οὐκ ἂν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον. τί γὰρ
κωλύει ἔνια ταὐτὰ λεχθῆναι κατὰ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος;
τό τε γὰρ ὂν οὐκ ὂν οὐδεὶς νῦν αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὂν δέ τις οὐκ
ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο νῦν· ἄμφω δὲ λεκτά, ὅπως διανοητά. οὐ λευκὸν
δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν· εἰ οὖν διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ὄντα πάντα λευκά, ὅπως
30 μή τι ταὐτὸ κατὰ τοῦ ὄντος σημαίνωμεν καὶ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ
οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ τῶν ὄντων τι μὴ ὂν εἶναι λευκόν; οὕτω δὲ
καὶ ἄλλην ἂν ἀπόφασιν δέξαιτο τὸ ἄπειρον, εἰ μὴ τὸ πάλαι
λεχθέντι μᾶλλον, παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν ἐστὶν
ἅπαν. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὂν ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πέρας ἔχον ἐστίν. ἴσως δὲ
35 ἄτοπον καὶ τὸ προσάπτειν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἀπειρίαν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν,
εἰ μὴ ἔχει πέρας, ἄπειρον λέγομεν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄνισον οὐκ ἂν
φαῖμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν. ἔτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεὸς πέρας εἷς
ὤν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς θεόν. εἰ δὲ ἓν μόνον ἐστίν, ὁ θεὸς ἂν εἴη
1But God is not necessarily spherical for this reason any more than white lead is.
Further, how is it possible that, being a body and having magnitude, God can be neither unlimited nor limited? For that is unlimited which, being capable of limitation, has no limit, and 5limit occurs in magnitude and multitude and any kind of quantity; and therefore any magnitude which has no limit is unlimited. “Again, if God is spherical, he must have a limit; for he has extremities, if he has_ a centre within himself from which they are at the greatest distance. But anything which is spherical has a centre; for that 10is spherical in which the extremities are equidistant from the centre. Now it is the same thing to say that a body has extremities, and that it has limits...1 For if Not-being is unlimited, why should not Being also be unlimited? For why should not some identical attributes be assigned to Being and to Not-being? For no ‘ one can 15perceive at this moment what does not exist, while something may exist at this moment without any one’s perceiving it;? yet both can be the subject of speech and thought.. 3. And the non-existent is not white; either, then, for this reason ‘existents are all white (this is in order that we may not assign an identical quality to that which 20exists and to the non-existent), or else, I think, there is nothing to prevent anything which exists from being not white. And so Being would still more easily admit a negative predicate, namely, the unlimited, if, was said just now,’ a thing is unlimited owing to its not having a limit;® and so Being too is either unlimited hasalimit. 25But perhaps to attribute unlimitedness to Notbeing is also absurd; for we do not call everything which has not a limit unlimited, just as we should not say that what is not equal is unequal. Again, why should not God, although he be one, yet be limited, though not by any978» thing which is God. But if God is a sole one, then his _ 30¢ parts also must be a sole one.® Further, it is also absurd = that if in fact the Many are limited in relation to one H another, for this reason the One should not havea limit. For many of the same predicates belong to the Many and to the One; Being, for instance, is common to them both. iu at be ΤΩ, It would therefore, perhaps, be 35absurd if we were to declare that God does not exist for the reason that the Many exist, so that he may not be like} them in this respect. Again, though God be One, why should he not be limited and have.
Further, how is it possible that, being a body and having magnitude, God can be neither unlimited nor limited? For that is unlimited which, being capable of limitation, has no limit, and 5limit occurs in magnitude and multitude and any kind of quantity; and therefore any magnitude which has no limit is unlimited. “Again, if God is spherical, he must have a limit; for he has extremities, if he has_ a centre within himself from which they are at the greatest distance. But anything which is spherical has a centre; for that 10is spherical in which the extremities are equidistant from the centre. Now it is the same thing to say that a body has extremities, and that it has limits...1 For if Not-being is unlimited, why should not Being also be unlimited? For why should not some identical attributes be assigned to Being and to Not-being? For no ‘ one can 15perceive at this moment what does not exist, while something may exist at this moment without any one’s perceiving it;? yet both can be the subject of speech and thought.. 3. And the non-existent is not white; either, then, for this reason ‘existents are all white (this is in order that we may not assign an identical quality to that which 20exists and to the non-existent), or else, I think, there is nothing to prevent anything which exists from being not white. And so Being would still more easily admit a negative predicate, namely, the unlimited, if, was said just now,’ a thing is unlimited owing to its not having a limit;® and so Being too is either unlimited hasalimit. 25But perhaps to attribute unlimitedness to Notbeing is also absurd; for we do not call everything which has not a limit unlimited, just as we should not say that what is not equal is unequal. Again, why should not God, although he be one, yet be limited, though not by any978» thing which is God. But if God is a sole one, then his _ 30¢ parts also must be a sole one.® Further, it is also absurd = that if in fact the Many are limited in relation to one H another, for this reason the One should not havea limit. For many of the same predicates belong to the Many and to the One; Being, for instance, is common to them both. iu at be ΤΩ, It would therefore, perhaps, be 35absurd if we were to declare that God does not exist for the reason that the Many exist, so that he may not be like} them in this respect. Again, though God be One, why should he not be limited and have.
978b
1 μόνον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέρη. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄτοπον, εἰ τοῖς
πολλοῖς συμβέβηκε πεπεράνθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα, διὰ τοῦτο
τὸ ἓν μὴ ἔχειν πέρας. πολλὰ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τῷ
ἑνὶ ὑπάρχει ταὐτά, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ εἶναι κοινὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.
5 ἄτοπον οὖν ἴσως ἂν εἴη, εἰ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ φαῖμεν εἶναι τὸν
θεόν, εἰ τὰ πολλά ἐστιν, ὅπως μὴ ὅμοιον ἔσται αὐτοῖς ταύτῃ.
ἔτι τί κωλύει πεπεράνθαι καὶ ἔχειν πέρατα ἓν ὄντα τὸν
θεόν; ὡς καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδης λέγει ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτὸν πάντοθεν
εὐκύκλου σφαίρας ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές.
10 τὸ γὰρ πέρας τινὸς μὲν ἀνάγκη ἴσως εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι
πρός τι γε, οὐδὲ ἀνάγκη τὸ ἔχον πέρας πρός τι ἔχειν πέρας,
ὡς πεπερασμένον πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐφεξῆς ἀπείρου, ἀλλ'
ἐστὶ τὸ πεπεράνθαι ἔσχατα ἔχειν, ἔσχατα δ' ἔχον οὐκ
ἀνάγκη πρός τι ἔχειν. ἐνίοις μὲν οὐ συμβαίνει πᾶν καὶ
15 πεπεράνθαι. πάλιν περὶ τοῦ ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν,
ὅτι καὶ τὸ ὂν κινεῖται, ἴσως ὁμοίως τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἄτοπον.
καὶ ἔτι ἆρά γε οὐ ταὐτὸ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι
καὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀπόφασιν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι,
ὥσπερ τὸ μὴ ἴσον, ὅπερ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, εἴπερ
20 ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ἀκίνητον τῷ ἔχειν πως ἤδη λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ
τὸ ἄνισον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι τῷ ἠρεμεῖν,
ὡς καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ α ἀποφάσεις ἐπὶ ἐναντίοις λέγονται.
τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἀληθὲς ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος,
τὸ δὲ ἠρεμεῖν οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῷ μὴ ὄντι. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ
25 ἀκίνητον εἶναι σημαίνει ταὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὗτος ἐπὶ τῷ ἠρεμεῖν
αὐτῷ χρῆται, καὶ φησὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἠρεμεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει
μετάβασιν. ὅπερ τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω εἴπομεν, ἄτοπον ἴσως,
εἴ τι τῷ μὴ ὄντι προσάπτομεν, τοῦτο μὴ ἀληθὲς εἶναι κατὰ
τοῦ ὄντος εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε κἂν ἀπόφασις ᾖ τὸ λεχθέν, των
30 καὶ τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ μεταλαμβάνειν ἐστίν. πολλὰ
γὰρ ἄν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐλέχθη, ἀφαιροῖτο τῶν ὄντων κατηγορεῖ.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πολλὰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν εἴη μὴ ἕν, εἴπερ
καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐστὶ μὴ ἕν, εἴτε ἐπ' ἐνίων τἀναντία ξυμβαίνειν
δοκεῖ κατὰ τοσαύτας ἀποφάσεις· ὧν ἀνάγκη ἢ ἴσον
35 ἢ ἄνισον, ἄν τι πλῆθος ᾖ, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἢ καὶ ἄρτιον ἢ
περιττόν, ἂν ἀριθμὸς ᾖ. ὁμοίως δὲ ὡς καὶ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν ἢ
κινεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἂν σῶμα ᾖ. ἔτι εἰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ
κινεῖται ὁ θεός τε καὶ τὸ ἕν, ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ κινεῖται τῷ
1limits ὃ even as Parmenides says that, being One, he is Like to the mass of a sphere on all sides carefully rounded Everywhere equally far from the midst.2 For the limit must be a limit of something, but not necessarily in relation to something else: that which has a limit does not necessarily have 5it in relation to something else (as when it is limited in relation to the unlimited which comes next to it), but being limited means the possession of extremities, and when a thing has extremities it need not necessarily have them in relation to something else. Some things, therefore, may happen both to be limited and to adjoin something else, while others may be limited, 10but not in relation to something else.
Again, as regards Being and Not-being being unmoved, we must say that to suppose that Not-being is unmoved because Being is moved, is perhaps just absurd as the cases of opposition given above. And further, surely one cannot suppose that ‘ not-moving’ and ‘unmoved’ are the same thing, but the former is the negation of moving (like ΐ 15not-equal’, which can be correctly used even of the non-existent), while ‘ unmoved’ is used of an actual state (as ‘unequal’ is used), and to express the contrary of ‘moving’ (that is, ‘being at rest’), just as words with the negative prefix® are generally used to express contraries. It is therefore quite right to use the term ‘not-moving’ of the nonexistent, but ‘being at 20rest’ cannot belong to the nonexistent; similarly ‘unmoved’, which means the same thing,® cannot belong to it. Yet Xenophanes uses ‘ not moving’ in the sense of ‘being at rest’, and says that Not-being is at rest because it undergoes no change of position. As we said above, it is perhaps absurd, if we -attach some predicate to Not-being, to assert that it does not apply to 25Being, especially if the predicate used is a negation, such as ‘not moving’ and ‘not changing its position’. For, as has been said, it would preclude a number of predicates from being used of existing things: for it would not be true to say that ‘many’ is ‘ not one’, since the non-existent also is ‘not one’. Furthermore, οἴῃ some cases the contrary predicates seem to follow 30from the mere negations; for example, a thing must be either equal or unequal if it is a multitude or magnitude, and odd even, if it is a number; similarly, perhaps, Being, if it be a body, must be either at rest or in motion. Further, if God and the One do not move, just because 97 the Many move by passing into one another, why should not God also move into something 35else? For he nowhere states that God is one and sole, but what he says is that there is only one God. But even supposing God were one and sole, why should not the parts of God move into one another and God himself thus revolve?
Again, as regards Being and Not-being being unmoved, we must say that to suppose that Not-being is unmoved because Being is moved, is perhaps just absurd as the cases of opposition given above. And further, surely one cannot suppose that ‘ not-moving’ and ‘unmoved’ are the same thing, but the former is the negation of moving (like ΐ 15not-equal’, which can be correctly used even of the non-existent), while ‘ unmoved’ is used of an actual state (as ‘unequal’ is used), and to express the contrary of ‘moving’ (that is, ‘being at rest’), just as words with the negative prefix® are generally used to express contraries. It is therefore quite right to use the term ‘not-moving’ of the nonexistent, but ‘being at 20rest’ cannot belong to the nonexistent; similarly ‘unmoved’, which means the same thing,® cannot belong to it. Yet Xenophanes uses ‘ not moving’ in the sense of ‘being at rest’, and says that Not-being is at rest because it undergoes no change of position. As we said above, it is perhaps absurd, if we -attach some predicate to Not-being, to assert that it does not apply to 25Being, especially if the predicate used is a negation, such as ‘not moving’ and ‘not changing its position’. For, as has been said, it would preclude a number of predicates from being used of existing things: for it would not be true to say that ‘many’ is ‘ not one’, since the non-existent also is ‘not one’. Furthermore, οἴῃ some cases the contrary predicates seem to follow 30from the mere negations; for example, a thing must be either equal or unequal if it is a multitude or magnitude, and odd even, if it is a number; similarly, perhaps, Being, if it be a body, must be either at rest or in motion. Further, if God and the One do not move, just because 97 the Many move by passing into one another, why should not God also move into something 35else? For he nowhere states that God is one and sole, but what he says is that there is only one God. But even supposing God were one and sole, why should not the parts of God move into one another and God himself thus revolve?
979a
1 εἰς ἄλληλα ἰέναι, τί κωλύει καὶ τὸν θεὸν κινεῖσθαι εἰς
ἄλλο; οὐδα τι μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅτι εἷς μόνος θεός. εἰ δὲ καὶ
αὐτός, τί κωλύει εἰς ἄλληλα κινουμένων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ
... κύκλῳ φε... θεόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἕν, ὥσπερ ὁ Ζήνων
5 πολλὰ εἶναι φύσει. αὐτὸς γὰρ σῶμα λέγει εἶναι τὸν
θεόν, εἴτε τόδε τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε ὅ τι δήποτε αὐτὸ λέγων.
ἀσώματος γὰρ ὢν πῶς ἂν σφαιροειδὴς εἴη ἐπιμόνως, ὅταν
οὕτως οὔτ' ἂν κινοῖτο οὔτ' ἂν ἠρεμοῖ μηδαμοῦ γε ὤν; ἐπεὶ δὲ
σῶμά ἐστι, τί ἂν αὐτὸ κωλύοι κινεῖσθαι ὡς ἐλέχθη;
ΠΕΡΙ ΓΟΡΓΙΟΥ.
1For he will not, like Zeno, declare that such a One is many. For he himself asserts that God is a body, whether he calls it the Allor by some other name; for if he were incorporeal, how could he be spherical? Again, it would only be possible for him neither to move-nor to be at rest if he were nowhere; but since he is a body, what would prevent this body from moving, in the way mentioned?
Goreias declares that nothing exists; and if anything exists it is unknowable; and if it exists and is knowable, yet it cannot be indicated to others. To prove that nothing exists he collects the statements of 5others, who in speaking about Being seem to assert contrary opinions (some trying to prove that existence is one and not many,
Goreias declares that nothing exists; and if anything exists it is unknowable; and if it exists and is knowable, yet it cannot be indicated to others. To prove that nothing exists he collects the statements of 5others, who in speaking about Being seem to assert contrary opinions (some trying to prove that existence is one and not many,
Chapter 5 (979a12–33)
Οὐκ εἶναί φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ἄγνωστον εἶναι· εἰ
δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνωστόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις. καὶ ὅτι
μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθεὶς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα, ὅσοι περὶ τῶν
15 ὄντων λέγοντες τἀναντία, ὡς δοκοῦσιν, ἀποφαίνονται αὑτοῖς,
οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἓν καὶ οὐ πολλά, οἱ δὲ αὖ ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ
ἕν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἀγένητα, οἱ δ' ὡς γενόμενα ἐπιδεικνύντες
ταῦτα, συλλογίζεται κατ' ἀμφοτέρων. ἀνάγκη γάρ,
φησίν, εἴ τί ἐστι, μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ εἶναι, μήτε ἀγέννητα
20 μήτε γενόμενα, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴη τι, τούτων
ἂν θάτερα εἴη. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἓν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε
ἀγέννητα οὔτε γενόμενα, τὰ μὲν ὡς Μέλισσος, τὰ δὲ ὡς
Ζήνων ἐπιχειρεῖ δεικνύειν μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἴδιον αὐτοῦ
ἀπόδειξιν, ἐν ᾗ λέγει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι.
25 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον,
τὸ μὴ ὂν τοῦ ὄντος εἴη. τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν ἐστι μὴ ὄν, καὶ
τὸ ὂν ὄν, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι ἢ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα.
εἰ δ' ὅμως τὸ μὴ εἶναί ἐστι, τὸ εἶναι, φησίν, οὐκ
ἔστι τὸ ἀντικείμενον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναί ἐστι, τὸ εἶναι [ἢ] μὴ
30 εἶναι προσήκει. ὥστε οὐκ ἂν οὕτως, φησίν, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὴ
ταὐτόν ἐστιν εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταὐτό, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ
ἂν εἴη οὐδέν· τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπείπερ
ταὐτὸ τῷ μὴ ὄντι. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐκείνου.
others that it is many and not one,'and some that existents are ungenerated, others that they have come to be), and draws a two-edged conclusion. For he argues that if anything exists, it must be either one or many, and either be ungenerated or have come to be. If therefore, it cannot be either one or many, ungenerated or having come to be, it would be nothing at all. For if anything were, it would be one of these alternatives. That Being, then, is neither one nor many, neither ungenerated nor having come to be, he attempts to prove by following partly Melissus and partly Zeno, after first stating his own special proof that 10it is not possible either to be not to be. For, he says, if Not-to-Be is.Not-to-Be, then Not-being would be no less than Being. For Not-being is Not-being and Being zs Being, so that things no more are than are not. But if Not-to-Be zs, then, he argues, To-Be, its opposite, is not; for if Not-to-Be is, it follows that To-Be is not. So that on this showing, he says, nothing could be, unless To-Be and Not-to-Be are the same thing. And if they are the same thing, even so nothing would be; for Not-being is not, nor yet Being, since it is the same Not-being. Such, then, is his first argument.
Nowit does not at all follow from what he has said that nothing is. For the proof which he and others attempt is thus refuted: If Not-being is, it either ‘is’ 15simply, else it is in a similar sense because it is non-existent. — But this is not self-evident, nor a necessary deduction; but if there are, as it were, two things of which one is and the other is not, you can truly say of the former that it ‘is’, but not of the latter, because that which is, is existent, but that which is not is non-existent.1 Why, then, is it” ¥ 35-97. The following appears to be the argument. if διελέγχεται is accepted: If you say μὴ. ὃν ἔστι, you may say ‘it 1s” simply, or you may say it is (in a similar sense) because it is μὴ ov: that is, you may say ‘it is’ existentially from the outset, or you may proceed to the existential sense from the copulative sense in which you say μὴ ὄν ἐστι μὴ ὄν. ὁμοίως then means ‘in a similar 20sense to that in which you say ἔστιν ἁπλῶς. τοῦτο will refer to the last preceding clause, 1.6. it is not self-evident nor a necessary deduction to proceed from ἐστί in the copulative to ἔστι in the existential sense; rather dvoiv not possible either to be or not to be? And why should not both or either be possible? For, he says, Not-to-Be, if Not-to-Be were, as he thinks, something, would be just much as To-Be, while at the same time he denies that Not-to-Be has any kind of existence.t But even if Notbeing is Not-being, yet it does not follow that Not-being ‘is’ in asimilar way to Being; for the former is Not-being, while the latter actually is as well.2, But even if he could say of Not-being that it is simply (yet how strange it would be to 25say that ‘ Not-being is!’), still granted that it were so, does it any more follow that everything is not rather than is? For the exact opposite seems then to become the consequent; since, if Not-being is Being and Being is Being, all things are; for both the things which are, and the things which are not, are. For it does not necessarily follow that if Not-being is, Being is not. Even if one were to concede the point and allow that Not-being is and Being is not, nevertheless, something would be; for the things which are not would be, according to his argument. But if To-Be and Not-to-Be are the same thing, even so it would not follow that nothing is, rather than that something is. For just as he argues that if Not-being and Being are the same 30thing, Being and Not-being alike are not, therefore nothing is; so, reversing the position, it is equally possible to argue that everything is; for Not-being is and Being is, therefore everything is.
After this argument Gorgias declares that if anything is, it must either be ungenerated or else have come to be. If it is ungenerated, he adopts the tenet of Melissus that it is unlimited, and declares that the unlimited cannot exist anywhere. It cannot, he argues, exist in itself, ὄντων, TOU μὲν ὄντος, τοῦ δ᾽ οὐκ ὄντος, you can truly say of the former “ ἔστιν" (ἁπλῶς), but of the latter “ οὐκ ἔστι", because the former (if you insert a copula) ἐστὶν ὄν, but the latter ἐστὶ μὴ ὄν, and, of course, you can proceed from “ ἐστὶν ὄν" to “ éarw” (ἁπλῶς), 35which means the same thing, but not from “ ἐστὶ μὴ dv” to ““ἔστιν᾽᾽ (ἁπλῶς), which means the opposite. What then is his justification for saying οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτ᾽ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι ὃ;
Nowit does not at all follow from what he has said that nothing is. For the proof which he and others attempt is thus refuted: If Not-being is, it either ‘is’ 15simply, else it is in a similar sense because it is non-existent. — But this is not self-evident, nor a necessary deduction; but if there are, as it were, two things of which one is and the other is not, you can truly say of the former that it ‘is’, but not of the latter, because that which is, is existent, but that which is not is non-existent.1 Why, then, is it” ¥ 35-97. The following appears to be the argument. if διελέγχεται is accepted: If you say μὴ. ὃν ἔστι, you may say ‘it 1s” simply, or you may say it is (in a similar sense) because it is μὴ ov: that is, you may say ‘it is’ existentially from the outset, or you may proceed to the existential sense from the copulative sense in which you say μὴ ὄν ἐστι μὴ ὄν. ὁμοίως then means ‘in a similar 20sense to that in which you say ἔστιν ἁπλῶς. τοῦτο will refer to the last preceding clause, 1.6. it is not self-evident nor a necessary deduction to proceed from ἐστί in the copulative to ἔστι in the existential sense; rather dvoiv not possible either to be or not to be? And why should not both or either be possible? For, he says, Not-to-Be, if Not-to-Be were, as he thinks, something, would be just much as To-Be, while at the same time he denies that Not-to-Be has any kind of existence.t But even if Notbeing is Not-being, yet it does not follow that Not-being ‘is’ in asimilar way to Being; for the former is Not-being, while the latter actually is as well.2, But even if he could say of Not-being that it is simply (yet how strange it would be to 25say that ‘ Not-being is!’), still granted that it were so, does it any more follow that everything is not rather than is? For the exact opposite seems then to become the consequent; since, if Not-being is Being and Being is Being, all things are; for both the things which are, and the things which are not, are. For it does not necessarily follow that if Not-being is, Being is not. Even if one were to concede the point and allow that Not-being is and Being is not, nevertheless, something would be; for the things which are not would be, according to his argument. But if To-Be and Not-to-Be are the same thing, even so it would not follow that nothing is, rather than that something is. For just as he argues that if Not-being and Being are the same 30thing, Being and Not-being alike are not, therefore nothing is; so, reversing the position, it is equally possible to argue that everything is; for Not-being is and Being is, therefore everything is.
After this argument Gorgias declares that if anything is, it must either be ungenerated or else have come to be. If it is ungenerated, he adopts the tenet of Melissus that it is unlimited, and declares that the unlimited cannot exist anywhere. It cannot, he argues, exist in itself, ὄντων, TOU μὲν ὄντος, τοῦ δ᾽ οὐκ ὄντος, you can truly say of the former “ ἔστιν" (ἁπλῶς), but of the latter “ οὐκ ἔστι", because the former (if you insert a copula) ἐστὶν ὄν, but the latter ἐστὶ μὴ ὄν, and, of course, you can proceed from “ ἐστὶν ὄν" to “ éarw” (ἁπλῶς), 35which means the same thing, but not from “ ἐστὶ μὴ dv” to ““ἔστιν᾽᾽ (ἁπλῶς), which means the opposite. What then is his justification for saying οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτ᾽ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι ὃ;
Chapter 6 (979a34–980b21)
Οὐδαμόθεν δὲ συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν, μηδὲν εἶναι.
35 ἃ γὰρ καὶ ἀποδείκνυσιν, οὕτως διαλέγεται. εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν
ἐστιν ἢ ἔστιν, ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν εἴη, καὶ ἔστιν ὅμοιον μὴ ὄν.
τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε φαίνεται οὕτως οὔτε ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ' ὡσπερεὶ δυοῖν,
ὄντος, τοῦ δ' οὐκ ὄντος, τὸ μὲν ἔστι, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀληθές, ὅτι ἐστὶ
in anything else (for, on the latter supposition, there would be two unlimiteds, that which is in something else and the something else in which it is); and, being nowhere, it is nothing, according to the argument of Zeno about space. Being is not, therefore, ungenerated.
979b
1 τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν. διότι οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι
τὰ ἄμφω οὔθ' ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐδὲν γάρ, φησίν, εἴη ἂν τὸ
μὴ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι, εἴπερ εἴη τι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι. οὐδείς
φησιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐδαμῶς. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὴ
5 ὂν μὴ ὄν, οὐδ' οὕτως ὁμοίως ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι· τὸ
μὲν γάρ ἐστι μὴ ὄν, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ἔτι. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἁπλῶς
εἰπεῖν ἀληθές, ὡς δὴ θαυμάσιόν τ' ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν. ἀλλ'
εἰ δὴ οὕτω, πότερον μᾶλλον ξυμβαίνει τὰ πάντα εἶναι ἢ
μὴ εἶναι; αὐτὸ γὰρ οὕτω γε τοὐναντίον ἔοικε γίνεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ
10 τό τε μὴ ὄν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὂν ὄν ἐστιν, ἅπαντά ἐστιν. καὶ γὰρ
τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐστίν. οὐκ ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ τὸ μὴ
ὄν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὂν μὴ εἶναι. εἰ δὴ καὶ οὕτω τις ξυγχωρεῖ,
καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὂν εἴη, τὸ δὲ ὂν μὴ εἴη, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον
εἴη ἄν· τὰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα εἴη κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον. εἰ
15 δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' οὕτως
μᾶλλον οὐκ [εἴη] ἄν τι εἴη. ὡς γὰρ κἀκεῖνος λέγει, ὅτι εἰ
ταὐτὸν μὴ ὂν καὶ ὄν, τό τε ὂν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν.
ὥστε οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀντιστρέψαντι ἔστιν ὁμοίως φάναι ὅτι πάντα
ἐστίν. τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὄν, ὥστε πάντα ἐστίν.
20 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φησίν· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἀγέννητον
ἢ γενόμενον εἶναι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγένητον, ἄπειρον αὐτὸ
τοῖς τοῦ Μελίσσου ἀξιώμασι λαμβάνει· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὐκ
ἂν εἶναί ποτε. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν αὑτῷ οὔτ' ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι·
δύο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἢ πλείω εἶναι, τό τε ἐνὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ,
25 μηδαμοῦ δὲ ὂν οὐδὲ εἶναι κατὰ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον περὶ τῆς
χώρας. ἀγέννητον μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτ' οὐκ εἶναι, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ
γενόμενον. γενέσθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτ' ἐξ ὄντος οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ
ὄντος. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν μεταπέσοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' εἶναι τὸ ὄν,
ὥσπερ γ' εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη μὴ ὄν.
30 οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδ' ἐξ ὄντος ἂν γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή ἐστι τὸ
μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκ μηδενὸς ἂν γενέσθαι· εἰ δ' ἔστι τὸ μὴ
ὄν, δι' ἅπερ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος, διὰ ταῦτα οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
ὄντος γενέσθαι. εἰ οὖν ἀνάγκη μέν, εἴπερ ἔστι τι, ἤτοι ἀγέννητον
εἶναι ἢ γενόμενον, ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατόν τι καὶ εἶναι.
35 ἔτι εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἓν ἢ πλείω, φησίν, ἐστίν· εἴτε μήτε ἓν μήτε
πολλά, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη. καὶ ἓν μὲν ... καὶ ὅτι ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη
τὸ ἕν η ἐνσχονμέν γε τῷ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου. ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος
οὐδ' ἂν ... εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ ... μήτε πολλά. εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἓν μήτε
1Nor, again, has it come to be; for, surely, he argues, nothing could come to be out of either Being or Not-being. For if Being were to change, it would no longer be Being,! just as also, if Not-being were to 5come to be, it would no longer be Notbeing. Nor, again, could it come to be, save from Being; for if Not-being is not, nothing could come to be out of nothing; while on the other hand, if Not-being is,? it could not come to be out of Not-being for the same reasons 10for which it could not come to be out of Being. So if anything that is, necessarily either is ungenerated or else has come to be, and these are impossibilities, it is impossible for anything to be.
Further, if anything is, either one or more things must be; 15if neither one nor more, nothing is..
Nor, he says, can anything move. For if it were to move it would no longer be in the same condition, but Being would be Not-being, and Not-being would have come to be. And further, if it moves and is transferred to a different 20position, Being, being no longer continuous, is divided, and, where it is divided, it no longer exists; and so, if it moves in all its parts, it is divided in all its parts, and if Keeping the MS. reading ov.
this is so, it ceases to exist in all its parts. 25For where it is divided, he argues, there it lacks Being; he uses ‘ divided’ to mean a void, as is written in the so-called ‘ Arguments of Leucippus ’.; These are the proofs which he employs to show that nothing exists; he next goes on to prove that if anything 30exists it is unknowable.1_ For otherwise, he argues, all objects of cognition must exist, and Not-being, if it really does not exist, could not be cognized either. But were this so, nothing could be false, not even (he says) though one should say that chariots 35are racing on thesea. For all things would be just the same.” For the objects of sight and hear- ing are® for the reason‘ that they are in each case cognized.
Further, if anything is, either one or more things must be; 15if neither one nor more, nothing is..
Nor, he says, can anything move. For if it were to move it would no longer be in the same condition, but Being would be Not-being, and Not-being would have come to be. And further, if it moves and is transferred to a different 20position, Being, being no longer continuous, is divided, and, where it is divided, it no longer exists; and so, if it moves in all its parts, it is divided in all its parts, and if Keeping the MS. reading ov.
this is so, it ceases to exist in all its parts. 25For where it is divided, he argues, there it lacks Being; he uses ‘ divided’ to mean a void, as is written in the so-called ‘ Arguments of Leucippus ’.; These are the proofs which he employs to show that nothing exists; he next goes on to prove that if anything 30exists it is unknowable.1_ For otherwise, he argues, all objects of cognition must exist, and Not-being, if it really does not exist, could not be cognized either. But were this so, nothing could be false, not even (he says) though one should say that chariots 35are racing on thesea. For all things would be just the same.” For the objects of sight and hear- ing are® for the reason‘ that they are in each case cognized.
980a
1 πολλά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἂν κινηθῆναί φησιν. οὐδενὶ γὰρ κινηθείη,
ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι, ἢ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη,
τὸ δ' οὐκ ὂν γεγονὸς εἴη. ἔτι δὲ ἢ κινεῖ ἢ κινεῖται, καὶ εἰ
μεταφέρεται οὐ συνεχὲς ὄν, διήρηται τὸ ὄν, οὔτε τι ταύτῃ·
5 ὥστε πάντῃ κινεῖται, πάντῃ διῄρηται. εἰ δ' οὕτως, πάντα οὐκ
ἔστιν. ἐκλιπὲς γὰρ ταύτῃ, φησίν, ᾗ διῄρηται, τοῦ ὄντος,
ἀντὶ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι λέγων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Λευκίππου
καλουμένοις λόγοις γέγραπται. εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐδέν, τὰς
ἀποδείξεις λέγειν ἅπαντα. δεῖ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα εἶναι,
10 καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εἴπερ μή ἐστι, μηδὲ φρονεῖσθαι. εἰ δ' οὕτως,
οὐδὲν ἂν εἶναι ψεῦδος οὐδείς φησιν, οὐδ' εἰ ἐν τῷ πελάγει
φαίη ἁμιλλᾶσθαι ἅρματα. πάντα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα εἴη. καὶ
γὰρ τὰ ὁρώμενα καὶ ἀκουόμενα διὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι φρονεῖται
ἕκαστα αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οὐδὲν
15 μᾶλλον ἃ ὁρῶμεν ἐστίν, οὕτω μᾶλλον ἃ ὁρῶμεν ἢ διανοούμεθα.
καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ πολλοὶ ἂν ταῦτα ἴδοιεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα
πολλοὶ ἂν ταῦτα διανοηθείημεν. τὸ οὖν μᾶλλον δὴ τοιάδ'
ἐστί, ποῖα δὲ τἀληθῆ, ἄδηλον. ὥστε καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ἡμῖν γε ἄγνωστα
εἶναι τὰ πράγματα. εἰ δὲ καὶ γνωστά, πῶς ἄν τις, φησί, δηλώσειεν
20 ἄλλῳ; ὃ γὰρ εἶδε, πῶς ἄν τις, φησί, τοῦτο εἴποι
λόγῳ; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ἀκούσαντι γίγνοιτο, μὴ ἰδόντι;
1But if this is not the reason—if just as what we see is not the more because we see it, so also what we think is not the more for that® (and, were it otherwise, just as in the one case our objects of vision would often be just the same,® so in the other our objects of thought 5would often be just the same ®)...; but of which kind the true things are is uncertain. So that even if things are, they would be unknowable by us.
But even if they are knowable by us, how, he asks, could any one indicate them to another? For how, he . 2 56, could any one communicate by word of mouth that which he has seen? And how could that which 10has been seen be indicated to a listener if he has not seen it?
For just as the sight does not recognize sounds, so the hear- ing does not hear colours but sounds; and he who speaks, speaks, but does not speak a colour or a thing. When, therefore, one has not a thing in the mind, how will he get it there from another person by word or any other token 15of the thing except by seeing it, if it is a colour, or hearing it, if it is a noise?. For he who speaks does not speak a noise at all, or a colour, but a word; and so it is not possible to conceive a colour, but only to see it, nor a noise, but only to hear it. But even if it is possible to know things, and to express whatever one knows in words, 20yet how can the hearer have in his mind the same thing as the speaker?
But even if they are knowable by us, how, he asks, could any one indicate them to another? For how, he . 2 56, could any one communicate by word of mouth that which he has seen? And how could that which 10has been seen be indicated to a listener if he has not seen it?
For just as the sight does not recognize sounds, so the hear- ing does not hear colours but sounds; and he who speaks, speaks, but does not speak a colour or a thing. When, therefore, one has not a thing in the mind, how will he get it there from another person by word or any other token 15of the thing except by seeing it, if it is a colour, or hearing it, if it is a noise?. For he who speaks does not speak a noise at all, or a colour, but a word; and so it is not possible to conceive a colour, but only to see it, nor a noise, but only to hear it. But even if it is possible to know things, and to express whatever one knows in words, 20yet how can the hearer have in his mind the same thing as the speaker?
980b
1 ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἡ ὄψις τοὺς φθόγγους γιγνώσκει, οὕτως οὐδὲ
ἡ ἀκοὴ τὰ χρώματα ἀκούει, ἀλλὰ φθόγγους· καὶ λέγει ὁ
λέγων, ἀλλ' οὐ χρῶμα οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα. ὃ οὖν τις μὴ ἐννοεῖ,
πῶς αἰτεῖ παρ' ἄλλου λόγῳ ἢ σημείῳ τινὶ ἑτέρου πράγματος
5 ἐννοήσειεν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐὰν μὲν χρῶμα ἰδών, ἐὰν δὲ μος.
ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐ λέγε γοει δὲ χρῶμα, ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὥστ'
οὐδὲ διανοεῖσθαι χρῶμα ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν, οὐδὲ ψόφον, ἀλλ'
ἀκούειν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται, γινώσκει τε καὶ ἀναγινώσκει
λέγων. ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁ ἀκούων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐννοήσει; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν
10 τε τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἐν πλείοσι καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν εἶναι· δύο γὰρ
ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν. εἰ δὲ καὶ εἴη, φησίν, ἐν πλείοσι καὶ ταὐτόν,
οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ ὅμοιον φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς, μὴ πάντῃ ὁμοίοις
ἐκείνοις οὖσιν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, εἴ τι ἐν τοιούτου εἴησαν, ἀλλ'
οὐ δύο εἶεν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅμοια αἰσθανόμενος
15 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἕτερα τῇ ἀκοῇ καὶ τῇ ὄψει,
καὶ νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι διαφόρως. ὥστε σχολῇ ἄλλῳ πᾶν
ταὐτὸ αἴσθοιτό τις. οὕτως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἕν ἐστι γνωστόν, οὐδεὶς ἂν
αὐτὸ ἑτέρῳ δηλώσειεν, διά τε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα
λεκτά, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ταὐτὸν ἐννοεῖ. ἅπαντες
20 δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρων ἀρχαιοτέρων εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι, ὥστε ἐν τῇ
περὶ ἐκείνων σκέψει καὶ ταῦτα ἐξεταστέον.
1For the same thing cannot be present simultaneously in several separate people; for_in that case the one would to be two. But if, he argues, the same thing could be present in several persons, there is no reason why it 5should not appear dissimilar to them, if they are not themselves entirely similar and are not in the same place; for if they were in the same place they would be one and not two. But it appears that the objects which even one and the same man perceives at the same moment are not 10all similar, but he perceives different things by hearing and by sight, and differently now and on some former occasion; and so a man can scarcely perceive the same thing as someone Thus nothing exists; and if anything could exist, nothing is knowable; and even if anything were 15knowable, no one could indicate it to another, firstly because things are not words, and secondly because no one can have in his mind the same thing as someone else. This and all his other arguments are concerned with difficulties raised by earlier philosophers, so that in 20examining their views these questions have to be discussed.”