Busse (CAG IV.1, 1887) · Owen (1853)
Owen (1853)
Chapter 1: Object of the Writer
Ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, Χρυσαόριε, καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγοριῶν
διδασκαλίαν τοῦ γνῶναι τί γένος καὶ τί διαφορὰ τί τε εἶδος καὶ τί
ἴδιον καὶ τί συμβεβηκός, εἴς τε τὴν τῶν ὁρισμῶν ἀπόδοσιν καὶ ὅλως εἰς
τὰ περὶ διαιρέσεως καὶ ἀποδείξεως χρησίμης οὔσης τῆς τούτων θεωρίας,
σύντομόν σοι παράδοσιν ποιούμενος πειράσομαι διὰ βραχέων ὥσπερ ἐν
εἰσαγωγῆς τρόπῳ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἐπελθεῖν, τῶν μὲν βαθυτέρων
ἀπεχόμενος ζητημάτων, τῶν δ' ἁπλουστέρων συμμέτρως στοχαζόμενος. αὐτίκα
περὶ τῶν γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν τὸ μὲν εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις
ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται εἴτε καὶ ὑφεστηκότα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα καὶ
πότερον χωριστὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ὑφεστῶτα, παραιτήσομαι
λέγειν βαθυτάτης οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας καὶ ἄλλης μείζονος
δεομένης ἐξετάσεως· τὸ δ' ὅπως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν προκειμένων
λογικώτερον οἱ παλαιοὶ διέλαβον καὶ τούτων μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου,
νῦν σοι πειράσομαι δεικνύναι.
Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, both to the doctrine of Aristotle's Categories, to know what genus, difference, species, property, and accident are, 5and also to the assignments of definitions, in short, since the investigation of these is useful for those things which belong to division and demonstration, I will endeavour by a summary briefly to discuss to you, as in the form of introduction, what on this subject has been delivered by the ancients, abstaining, indeed, from more profound questions, yet directing attention in a fitting manner, 10to such as are more simple. For instance, I shall omit to speak about genera and species, as to whether they subsist (in the nature of things) or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in, sensibles, and subsist about these, for such a treatise is most profound, and requires another more extensive 15investigation. Nevertheless, how the ancients, and especially the Peripatetics, discussed these and the other proposed subjects, in a more logical manner, I will now endeavour to point out to you.
Chapter 2: Of the Nature of Genus and Species
Ἔοικεν δὲ μήτε τὸ γένος μήτε τὸ εἶδος ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι. γένος γὰρ
λέγεται καὶ ἡ τινῶν ἐχόντων πως πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἄθροισις,
καθ' ὃ σημαινόμενον τὸ Ἡρακλειδῶν λέγεται γένος ἐκ τῆς ἀφ' ἑνὸς σχέσεως,
λέγω δὴ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, καὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἐχόντων πως πρὸς
ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνου οἰκειότητα. κατὰ ἀποτομὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων
γενῶν κεκλημένου. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πάλιν γένος ἡ ἑκάστου τῆς γενέσεως
Neither genus nor species appear to be simply denominated, for that is called genus which is a collection of certain things, subsisting in a certain respect relatively to one thing, and to each other, 20according to which signification the genus of the Heraclidæ is denominated from the habitude from one, I mean Hercules, and from the multitude of those who have alliance to each other from him, denominated according to separation from other genera.
ἀρχὴ εἴτε ἀπὸ τοῦ τεκόντος εἴτε ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ τις γέγονεν.
οὕτως γὰρ Ὀρέστην μὲν ἀπὸ Ταντάλου φαμὲν ἔχειν τὸ γένος, Ὕλλον δὲ
ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους, καὶ πάλιν Πίνδαρον μὲν Θηβαῖον εἶναι τὸ γένος, Πλάτωνα
δὲ Ἀθηναῖον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ πατρὶς ἀρχή τίς ἐστι τῆς ἑκάστου γενέσεως,
ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ πατήρ. τοῦτο δὲ ἔοικε πρόχειρον εἶναι τὸ σημαινόμενον·
Ἡρακλεῖδαι γὰρ λέγονται οἱ ἐκ γένους κατάγοντες Ἡρακλέους καὶ Κεκροπίδαι
οἱ ἀπὸ Κέκροπος καὶ οἱ τούτων ἀγχιστεῖς. καὶ πρότερόν γε ὠνομάσθη
γένος ἡ ἑκάστου τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχή, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς οἷον Ἡρακλέους, ὃ ἀφορίζοντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίζοντες
ἔφαμεν τὸ ὅλον ἄθροισμα Ἡρακλειδῶν γένος. ἄλλως δὲ πάλιν γένος
λέγεται, ᾧ ὑποτάσσεται τὸ εἶδος, καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἴσως τούτων εἰρημένον·
καὶ γὰρ ἀρχή τίς ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτο γένος τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ
πλῆθος περιέχειν πᾶν τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτό.
Τριχῶς οὖν τοῦ γένους λεγομένου περὶ τοῦ τρίτου παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
ὁ λόγος· ὃ καὶ ὑπογράφοντες ἀποδεδώκασι γένος εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ
κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον
οἷον τὸ ζῷον. τῶν γὰρ κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν καθ' ἑνὸς λέγεται μόνου,
ὡς τὰ ἄτομα οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ τὸ οὗτος καὶ τὸ τοῦτο, τὰ δὲ κατὰ πλειόνων,
ὡς τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα
κοινῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ἰδίως τινί. ἔστι δὲ γένος μὲν οἷον τὸ ζῷον, εἶδος δὲ οἷον
ὁ ἄνθρωπος, διαφορὰ δὲ οἷον τὸ λογικόν, ἴδιον δὲ οἷον τὸ γελαστικόν, συμβεβηκὸς
δὲ οἷον τὸ λευκόν, τὸ μέλαν, τὸ καθέζεσθαι. τῶν μὲν οὖν καθ'
ἑνὸς μόνου κατηγορουμένων διαφέρει τὰ γένη τῷ ταῦτα κατὰ πλειόνων
ἀποδοθέντα κατηγορεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ αὖ κατὰ πλειόνων τῶν μὲν εἰδῶν, ὅτι
τὰ μὲν εἴδη εἰ καὶ κατὰ πλειόνων κατηγορεῖται ἀλλ' οὐ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει
ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εἶδος ὢν Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος
κατηγορεῖται, οἳ οὐ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ δὲ
ζῷον γένος ὂν ἀνθρώπου καὶ βοὸς καὶ ἵππου κατηγορεῖται, οἳ διαφέρουσι
1 Again, after another manner also, the principle of the generation of every one is called genus, whether from the generator or from the place in which a person is generated, for thus we say that Orestes had his genus from Tantalus, Hyllus from Hercules, and again, that Pindar was by genus a Theban, but Plato an Athenian, for country is a certain principle 5of each man's generation, in the same manner as a father. Still, this signification appears to be most ready, for they are called Heraclidæ who derive their origin from the genus of Hercules, and Cecropidæ who are from Cecrops; also their next of kin. The first genus, moreover, is so called, which is the principle of each man's generation, but afterwards the number of those who are from one principle, e. g. from Hercules, which defining and 10separating from others, we call the whole collected multitude the genus of the Heraclidæ.
Again, in another way that is denominated genus to which the species is subject, called perhaps from the similitude of these; for such a genus is a certain principle of things under it, and seems also to comprehend all the multitude under itself. As then, genus is predicated triply, the consideration by philosophers is concerning the third, which also they explain 15by description, when they say that genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in answer to what a thing is, e. g. animal. For of predicables some are predicated of one thing alone, as individuals, for instance, "Socrates," and "this man," and "this thing;" but others are predicated of many, as genera, are predicated species, differences, properties, and accidents, predicated in common, but not peculiarly to any one. 20Now genus is such as "animal," species as "man," difference as "rational," property as "risible," accident as " white," "black," "to sit." From such things then, as are predicated of one thing only, genera differ in that they are predicated of many, but on the other hand, from those which are predicated many and from species, (they differ) because those species are predicated of many things, yet not of those which differ in species, but 25in number only, for man being a species, is predicated of Socrates and Plato, who do not differ from each other in species, but in number, while animal being a genus is predicated of man, and ox, and horse, which differ also in species from each other, and not in number only.
Again, in another way that is denominated genus to which the species is subject, called perhaps from the similitude of these; for such a genus is a certain principle of things under it, and seems also to comprehend all the multitude under itself. As then, genus is predicated triply, the consideration by philosophers is concerning the third, which also they explain 15by description, when they say that genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in answer to what a thing is, e. g. animal. For of predicables some are predicated of one thing alone, as individuals, for instance, "Socrates," and "this man," and "this thing;" but others are predicated of many, as genera, are predicated species, differences, properties, and accidents, predicated in common, but not peculiarly to any one. 20Now genus is such as "animal," species as "man," difference as "rational," property as "risible," accident as " white," "black," "to sit." From such things then, as are predicated of one thing only, genera differ in that they are predicated of many, but on the other hand, from those which are predicated many and from species, (they differ) because those species are predicated of many things, yet not of those which differ in species, but 25in number only, for man being a species, is predicated of Socrates and Plato, who do not differ from each other in species, but in number, while animal being a genus is predicated of man, and ox, and horse, which differ also in species from each other, and not in number only.
καὶ τῷ εἴδει ἀλλήλων ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ μόνον. τοῦ δ' αὖ ἰδίου διαφέρει
τὸ γένος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον καθ' ἑνὸς μόνου εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον.
κατηγορεῖται καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀτόμων, ὡς τὸ γελαστικὸν ἀνθρώπου
μόνου καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων, τὸ δὲ γένος οὐχ ἑνὸς εἴδους κατηγορεῖται
ἀλλὰ πλειόνων τε καὶ διαφερόντων. τῆς δ' αὖ διαφορᾶς καὶ τῶν
κοινῇ συμβεβηκότων διαφέρει τὸ γένος, ὅτι εἰ καὶ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων
τῷ εἴδει κατηγοροῦνται αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ τὰ κοινῶς συμβεβηκότα,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγοροῦνται. ἐρωτησάντων γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνο
καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, φαμέν, κατηγορεῖται,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐρωτᾶν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν
ὁ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ὅτι λογικόν, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι ὁ κόραξ φαμὲν
ὅτι μέλαν· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ μὲν λογικὸν διαφορά, τὸ δὲ μέλαν συμβεβηκός·
ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτηθῶμεν, ζῷον ἀποκρινόμεθα· ἦν δὲ ἀνθρώπου
γένος τὸ ζῷον. ὥστε τὸ μὲν κατὰ πλειόνων λέγεσθαι τὸ γένος
διαστέλλει αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἑνὸς μόνου τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορουμένων,
τὸ δὲ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει διαστέλλει ἀπὸ τῶν ὡς εἰδῶν κατηγορουμένων
ἢ ὡς ἰδίων, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι χωρίζει ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν
καὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμβεβηκότων, ἃ οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί
ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν κατηγορεῖται ἕκαστον ὧν κατηγορεῖται. οὐδὲν ἄρα
περιττὸν οὐδὲ ἐλλεῖπον περιέχει ἡ τοῦ γένους ῥηθεῖσα ὑπογραφὴ τῆς ἐννοίας.
Τὸ δὲ εἶδος λέγεται μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἑκάστου μορφῆς, καθὸ εἴρηται
1 From property, moreover, genus differs because property is predicated of one species alone of which it is the property, and of the individuals under the species, as "risible" of man alone, and of men particularly, for genus is not predicated of one species, but 5of many things, which are also different in species. Besides, genus differs from difference and from accidents in common, because though differences and accidents in common are predicated of many things, different also in species, yet they are not so in reply to what a thing is, but (what kind of a thing) it is. For when 10some persons ask what that is of which these are predicated, we reply, that it is genus; but we do not assign in answer differences and accidents, since they are not predicated of a subject, as to what a thing is, but rather as to what kind of a thing it is. For in reply to the question, what kind of a thing man is, we say, that he is 15rational, and in answer to what kind of a thing a crow is, we say that it is black, yet rational is difference, but black is accident. When however we are asked what man is, we answer, an animal, but animal is the genus of man, so that from genus being predicated of many, it is diverse from individuals which are predicated of one thing only, 20but from being predicated of things different in species, it is distinguished from such as are predicated as species or as properties.
πρῶτον μὲν εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος.
λέγεται δὲ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, καθὸ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τὸν
μὲν ἄνθρωπον εἶδος τοῦ ζῴου γένους ὄντος τοῦ ζῴου, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν τοῦ
χρώματος εἶδος, τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον τοῦ σχήματος εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ γένος
ἀποδιδόντες τοῦ εἴδους ἐμεμνήμεθα εἰπόντες τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων
τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον, καὶ τὸ εἶδός φαμεν τὸ
ὑπὸ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ γένος τινός ἐστιν γένος
καὶ τὸ εἶδος τινός ἐστιν εἶδος ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀμφοτέρων
λόγοις κεχρῆσθαι ἀμφοτέροις. ἀποδιδόασιν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὕτως·
εἶδός ἐστι τὸ ταττόμενον ὑπὸ τὸ γένος καὶ οὗ τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
κατηγορεῖται. ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὕτως· εἶδός ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων
τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀπόδοσις
τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου ἂν εἴη καὶ ὅ ἐστι μόνον εἶδος, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι εἶεν ἂν καὶ
τῶν μὴ εἰδικωτάτων. σαφὲς δ' ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
καθ' ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν ἐστίν τινα γενικώτατα καὶ πάλιν ἄλλα εἰδικώτατα
καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν γενικωτάτων καὶ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἄλλα. ἔστιν δὲ γενικώτατον
μέν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος, εἰδικώτατον δέ,
μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ὑποβεβηκὸς εἶδος, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ γενικωτάτου καὶ
τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ γένη καὶ εἴδη ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτά, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι
καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα.
Γινέσθω δὲ ἐπὶ μιᾶς κατηγορίας σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον. ἡ οὐσία ἔστι
μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ γένος, ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην ἐστὶν σῶμα, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ σῶμα
ἔμψυχον σῶμα, ὑφ' ὃ τὸ ζῷον, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ ζῷον λογικὸν ζῷον, ὑφ' ὃ ὁ
ἄνθρωπος, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος
ἄνθρωποι. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἡ μὲν οὐσία τὸ γενικώτατον καὶ ὃ μόνον γένος,
ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος τὸ εἰδικώτατον καὶ ὃ μόνον εἶδος, τὸ δὲ σῶμα εἶδος μὲν
τῆς οὐσίας, γένος δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα
εἶδος μὲν τοῦ σώματος, γένος δὲ τοῦ ζῴου, πάλιν δὲ τὸ ζῷον εἶδος μὲν
τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος, γένος δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον
εἶδος μὲν τοῦ ζῴου, γένος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἶδος μὲν
τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ γένος τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ
μόνον εἶδος· καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρὸ τῶν ἀτόμων προσεχῶς κατηγορούμενον εἶδος
1Moreover, because it is predicated in reply to what a thing is, it is distinguished from differences and from accidents commonly, which are severally predicated of what they are predicated, not in reply to what a thing is, but what kind of a thing it is, or in what manner it subsists: the description therefore of the conception of genus, which has been enunciated, contains nothing superfluous, 5nothing deficient. Species indeed is predicated of every form, according to which it is said, "form is first worthy of imperial sway;" still that is called species also, which is under the genus stated, according to which we are accustomed to call man a species of animal, animal being genus, but white a species of colour, and triangle of figure. Nevertheless, if when we assign the genus, we make mention of species, saying that which is predicated of many things differing in 10species, in reply to what a thing is, and call species that which is under the assigned genus, we ought to know that, since genus is the genus of something, and species the species of something, each of each, we must necessarily use both in the definitions of both. They assign, therefore, species thus: species is what is arranged under genus, and of which genus is predicated in reply to what a thing is: moreover, thus species is what is predicated of many things differing in number, in 15reply to what a thing is. This explanation, however, belongs to the most special, and which is species only, but no longer genus also, but the other (descriptions) will pertain to such as are not the most special. Now, what we have stated will be evident in this way: in each category there are certain things most generic, and again, others most special, and between the most generic and the most special, others which are alike called both genera and species, but the most generic is that 20above which there cannot be another superior genus, and the most special that below which there cannot be another inferior species. Between the most generic and the most special, there are others which are alike both genera and species, referred, nevertheless, to different things, but what is stated may become clear in one category. Substance indeed, is itself genus, under this is body, under body animated body, under which is animal, under animal rational animal, under which is man, 25under man Socrates, Plato, and men particularly. Still, of these, substance is the most generic, and that which alone is genus; but man is most specific, and that which alone is species; yet body is a species of substance, but a genus of animated body, also animated body is a species of body, but a genus of animal; again, animal is a species of animated body, but a genus of rational animal, and rational animal is a species of animal, but a genus of man, and man is a species of rational 30animal, but is no longer the genus of particular men, but is species only, and every thing prior to individuals being proximately predicated of them, will be species only, and no longer genus also.
ἂν εἴη μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ γένος. ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ οὐσία ἀνωτάτω οὖσα τῷ
μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸ αὐτῆς γένος ἦν τὸ γενικώτατον, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος
εἶδος ὤν, μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος οὐδέ τι τῶν τέμνεσθαι δυναμένων εἰς εἴδη,
ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀτόμων (ἄτομον γὰρ Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκόν)
μόνον ἂν εἴη εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον εἶδος καὶ ὡς ἔφαμεν τὸ εἰδικώτατον·
τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν μὲν πρὸ αὐτῶν εἴη ἂν εἴδη, τῶν δὲ μετ' αὐτὰ γένη.
ὥστε ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει δύο σχέσεις, τήν τε πρὸς τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν, καθ' ἣν
εἴδη αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγεται, τήν τε πρὸς τὰ μετ' αὐτά, καθ' ἣν γένη αὐτῶν
εἶναι λέγεται· τὰ δὲ ἄκρα μίαν ἔχει σχέσιν· τό τε γὰρ γενικώτατον τὴν
μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ ἔχει σχέσιν, γένος ὂν πάντων τὸ ἀνωτάτω,
τὴν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ οὐκέτι ἔχει, ἀνωτάτω ὂν καὶ ὡς πρώτη
ἀρχὴ καί, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος· καὶ
τὸ εἰδικώτατον δὲ μίαν ἔχει σχέσιν τὴν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὧν
ἐστιν εἶδος, τὴν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ οὐκ ἀλλοίαν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
ἀτόμων εἶδος λέγεται ἀλλ' εἶδος μὲν λέγεται τῶν ἀτόμων ὡς περιέχον
αὐτά, εἶδος δὲ πάλιν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὡς περιεχόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν.
Ἀφορίζονται τοίνυν τὸ μὲν γενικώτατον οὕτως, ὃ γένος ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν
εἶδος, καὶ πάλιν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος· τὸ δὲ εἰδικώτατον,
ὃ εἶδος ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν γένος καὶ ὃ εἶδος ὂν οὐκ ἂν διελοίμεθα
ἔτι εἰς εἴδη καὶ ὃ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί
ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν ἄκρων ὑπάλληλά τε καλοῦσι γένη
καὶ εἴδη, καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶδος εἶναι καὶ γένος τίθενται, πρὸς
ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενον. τὰ δὴ πρὸ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἄχρι
1As then, substance being in the highest place, is most generic, from there being no genus prior to it, so also man being a species, after which there is no other species, nor any thing capable of division into species, but individuals, (for Socrates, Plato, Alcibiades, and this white thing, I call individual,) will be species alone, and the last species, and as we 5say the most specific. Yet the media will be the species of such as are before them, but the genera of things after them, so that these have two conditions, one as to things prior to them, according to which they are said to be their species, the other to things after them, according to which they are said to be their genera. The extremes on the other hand, have one condition, for the most generic has indeed a condition as to the things under it, 10since it is the highest genus of all, but has no longer one as to those before it, being supreme, and the first principle, and, as we have said, that above which there cannot be another higher genus. Also, the most specific has one condition, as to the things prior to it, of which it is the species, yet it has not a different one, as to things posterior to it, but is called the species of individuals, so termed as comprehending them, and again, the species 15of things prior to it, as comprehended by them, wherefore the most generic genus is thus defined to be that which being genus is not species, and again, above which there cannot be another higher genus; but the most specific species, that, which being species is not genus, and which being species we can no longer divide into species; moreover, which is predicated of many things differing in number, in reply to what a thing is. Now, 20the media of the extremes they call subaltern species and genera, and admit each of them to be species and genus, when referred indeed to different things, for those which are prior to the most specific, ascending up to the most generic, are called subaltern genera and species.
τοῦ γενικωτάτου ἀνιόντα γένη τε λέγεται καὶ εἴδη καὶ ὑπάλληλα γένη ὡς
ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων Ἀτρείδης καὶ Πελοπίδης καὶ Τανταλίδης καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον
Διός. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενεαλογιῶν εἰς ἕνα ἀνάγουσι, φέρε εἰπεῖν τὸν
Δία, τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν οὐχ
οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ γάρ ἐστι κοινὸν ἓν γένος πάντων τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ πάντα ὁμογενῆ
καθ' ἓν τὸ ἀνωτάτω γένος, ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης. ἀλλὰ κείσθω,
ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις, τὰ πρῶτα δέκα γένη οἷον ἀρχαὶ δέκα πρῶται·
κἂν δὴ πάντα τις ὄντα καλῇ, ὁμωνύμως, φησί, καλέσει, ἀλλ' οὐ συνωνύμως.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἦν κοινὸν πάντων γένος τὸ ὄν, συνωνύμως ἂν πάντα
ὄντα ἐλέγετο· δέκα δὲ ὄντων τῶν πρώτων ἡ κοινωνία κατὰ τοὔνομα μόνον,
οὐκέτι μὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν κατὰ τοὔνομα. δέκα μὲν οὖν τὰ γενικώτατα,
τὰ δὲ εἰδικώτατα ἐν ἀριθμῷ μέν τινι, οὐ μὴν ἀπείρῳ· τὰ δὲ
ἄτομα, ἅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰ εἰδικώτατα, ἄπειρα. διὸ ἄχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων
ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατιόντας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι,
κατιέναι δὲ διὰ τῶν διὰ μέσου διαιροῦντας ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς·
τὰ δὲ ἄπειρά φησιν ἐᾶν, μὴ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην. κατιόντων
μὲν οὖν εἰς τὰ εἰδικώτατα ἀνάγκη διαιροῦντας διὰ πλήθους ἰέναι,
ἀνιόντων δὲ εἰς τὰ γενικώτατα ἀνάγκη συναιρεῖν τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἕν· συναγωγὸν
γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν εἰς μίαν φύσιν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ γένος,
τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέρος καὶ καθ' ἕκαστα τοὐναντίον εἰς πλῆθος ἀεὶ διαιρεῖ τὸ
ἕν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εἴδους μετουσίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι εἷς, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ
μέρος ὁ εἷς καὶ κοινὸς πλείους· διαιρετικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον,
συλληπτικὸν δὲ καὶ ἑνοποιὸν τὸ κοινόν.
Ἀποδεδομένου δὲ τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ εἴδους τί ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν,
1Thus, Agamemnon is Atrides, Pelopides, Tantalides, and lastly, (the son) of Jupiter, yet in genealogies they refer generally to one origin, for instance, to Jupiter; but this is not the case in genera and species, since being 5is not the common genus of all things, nor, as Aristotle says, are all things of the same genus with respect to one summum genus. Still, let the first ten genera be arranged, as in the Categories, as ten first principles, and even if a person should call all things beings, yet he 10will call them, so he says, equivocally, but not synonymously, for if being were the one common genus of all things, all things would be synonymously styled beings, but the first principles being ten, the community is in name only, yet not in the definition also belonging to the 15name: there are then ten most generic genera. On the other hand, the most specific they place in a certain number, yet not in an infinite one, but individuals which are after the most specific are infinite; wherefore, when we have come down to the most specific from the most 20generic, Plato exhorts us to rest, but to descend through those things which are in the middle, dividing by specific differences; he tells us however to leave infinites alone, as there cannot be science of these.
καὶ τοῦ μὲν γένους ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν δὲ εἰδῶν πλειόνων (ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰς πλείω
εἴδη ἡ τομὴ τοῦ γένους) τὸ μὲν γένος ἀεὶ τοῦ εἴδους κατηγορεῖται καὶ
πάντα τὰ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑποκάτω, τὸ δὲ εἶδος οὔτε τοῦ προσεχοῦς αὐτοῦ γένους
οὔτε τῶν ἐπάνω· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει. δεῖ γὰρ ἢ τὰ ἴσα τῶν ἴσων
κατηγορεῖσθαι ὡς τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν τοῦ ἵππου ἢ τὰ μείζω τῶν ἐλαττόνων
ὡς τὸ ζῷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν μειζόνων οὐκέτι· οὐκέτι
γὰρ τὸ ζῷον εἴποις ἂν εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὥσπερ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἴποις ἂν εἶναι
ζῷον. καθ' ὧν δ' ἂν τὸ εἶδος κατηγορῆται, κατ' ἐκείνων ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
τὸ τοῦ εἴδους γένος κατηγορηθήσεται καὶ τὸ τοῦ γένους γένος ἄχρι τοῦ
γενικωτάτου· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὸ τὸν Σωκράτην εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ
ἄνθρωπον ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ζῷον οὐσίαν· ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην ζῷον εἰπεῖν
καὶ οὐσίαν. ἀεὶ οὖν τῶν ἐπάνω κατηγορουμένων τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ μὲν εἶδος
τοῦ ἀτόμου κατηγορηθήσεται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ
τοῦ ἀτόμου, τὸ δὲ γενικώτατον καὶ κατὰ τοῦ γένους ἢ τῶν γενῶν, εἰ πλείω
εἴη τὰ μέσα καὶ ὑπάλληλα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου.
λέγεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν γενικώτατον κατὰ πάντων τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ γενῶν τε
καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ γένος τὸ πρὸ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου κατὰ πάντων
τῶν εἰδικωτάτων καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ μόνον εἶδος κατὰ πάντων τῶν
ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ ἄτομον ἐφ' ἑνὸς μόνου τῶν κατὰ μέρος. ἄτομον δὲ λέγεται
ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ οὑτοσὶ ὁ προσιὼν Σωφρονίσκου
υἱός, εἰ μόνος αὐτῷ εἴη Σωκράτης υἱός. ἄτομα οὖν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα,
ὅτι ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα οὐκ ἂν ἐπ'
ἄλλου ποτὲ τὸ αὐτὸ γένοιτο· αἱ γὰρ Σωκράτους ἰδιότητες οὐκ ἂν ἐπ'
ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γένοιντο ἂν αἱ αὐταί, αἱ μέντοι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,
λέγω δὴ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ἰδιότητες γένοιντ' ἂν αἱ αὐταὶ ἐπὶ πλειόνων,
μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων, καθὸ ἄνθρωποι.
περιέχεται οὖν τὸ μὲν ἄτομον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὑπὸ τοῦ
1 In descending then, to the most specific, it is necessary to proceed by division through multitude, but in ascending to the most generic, we must collect multitude into one, for species is collective of the many into one nature, and genus yet more so; but particulars and singulars, on the contrary, always divide the one into multitude, for by the participation of species, many men become one man; but in 5particulars and singulars, the one, and what is common, becomes many; for the singular is always divisive, but what is common is collective and reductive to one. Genus then, and species, being each of them explained as to what it is, since also genus is one, but species many, (for there is always a division of genus into many species,) genus indeed is always predicated of species, and all superior of inferior, but species is neither predicated of its proximate genus, nor of those superior, since it does 10not reciprocate. For it is necessary that either equals should be predicated of equals, as neighing of a horse, or that the greater should be predicated of the less, as animal of man, but the less no longer of the greater, for you can no longer say that animal is man, as you can say that man is animal. Of those things however whereof species is predicated, that genus of the species will also be necessarily predicated, also that genus of the genus up to the most generic; for if it is true to say that Socrates is a 15man, but man an animal, and animal substance, it is also true to say that Socrates is animal and substance. At least, since the superior are always predicated of the inferior, species indeed will always be predicated of the individual, but the genus both of the species and of the individual, but the most generic both of the genus or the genera, (if the media and subaltern be many,) and of the species, and of the individual. For the most generic is predicated of all the genera, species, and individuals under it, but 20the genus which is prior to the most specific (species), is predicated of all the most specific species and individuals; but what is species alone of all the individuals (of it), but the individual of one particular alone. Now, an individual is called Socrates, this white thing, this man who approaches the son of Sophroniscus, if Socrates alone is his son, and such things are called individuals, because each consists of properties of which the combination can never be the same in any other, for the properties 25of Socrates can never be the same in any other particular person; the properties of man indeed, (I mean of him as common,) may be the same in many, or rather in all particular men, so far as they are men.
γένους· ὅλον γάρ τι τὸ γένος, τὸ δὲ ἄτομον μέρος, τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ ὅλον
καὶ μέρος, ἀλλὰ μέρος μὲν ἄλλου, ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις· ἐν
γὰρ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν γένους καὶ εἴδους καὶ τί τὸ γενικώτατον καὶ τί τὸ εἰδικώτατον
καὶ τίνα καὶ γένη τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ εἴδη τίνα τε τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ποσαχῶς
τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος, εἴρηται.
1 Wherefore the individual is comprehended in the species, but the species by the genus, for genus is a certain whole, but the individual is a part, and species both a whole and a part; part indeed of something else, but a whole not of another, but in other things, for the whole is in its parts. Concerning genus 5then, and species, we have shown what is the most generic, and the most specific, also what the same things are genera and species, what also are individuals, and in how many ways genus and species are taken.
Chapter 3: Of Difference
Διαφορὰ δὲ κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα λεγέσθω. κοινῶς μὲν
γὰρ διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τὸ ἑτερότητι διαλλάττον ὁπωσοῦν ἢ
πρὸς αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο· διαφέρει γὰρ Σωκράτης Πλάτωνος τῇ ἑτερότητι
καὶ αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ παιδός τε ὄντος καὶ ἀνδρωθέντος καὶ ἐνεργοῦντός τι
ἢ παυσαμένου καὶ ἀεί γε ἐν ταῖς τοῦ πῶς ἔχειν ἑτερότησιν. ἰδίως δὲ διαφέρειν
λέγεται ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὅταν ἀχωρίστῳ συμβεβηκότι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ
ἑτέρου διαφέρῃ· ἀχώριστον δὲ συμβεβηκὸς οἷον γλαυκότης ἢ γρυπότης ἢ
καὶ οὐλὴ ἐκ τραύματος ἐνσκιρωθεῖσα. ἰδιαίτατα δὲ διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου
λέγεται, ὅταν εἰδοποιῷ διαφορᾷ διαλλάττῃ, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ἵππου εἰδοποιῷ
διαφορᾷ διενήνοχε τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ποιότητι. καθόλου μὲν οὖν πᾶσα
διαφορὰ ἑτεροῖον ποιεῖ προσγινομένη τινί· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν κοινῶς καὶ ἰδίως
ἀλλοῖον ποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰδιαίτατα ἄλλο. τῶν γὰρ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν ἀλλοῖον
ποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἄλλο. αἱ μὲν οὖν ποιοῦσαι ἄλλο εἰδοποιοὶ κέκληνται, αἱ δὲ
ἀλλοῖον ἁπλῶς διαφοραί. τῷ γὰρ ζῴῳ διαφορὰ προσελθοῦσα ἡ τοῦ λογικοῦ
Difference may be predicated commonly, properly, and most properly: for one thing is said to differ from another in common from its differing in some respect in diversity of nature, either 10from itself, or from something else; for Socrates differs from Plato in diversity of nature, and himself from himself when a boy, and when become a man, also when he does any thing, or ceases to do it, and it is always perceived in the different ways in which a thing is somehow effected. Again, one thing is said to differ properly from another, when one differs from another by an inseparable accident; 15but an inseparable accident is such as blueness, or crookedness, or a scar become scirrhous from a wound. Moreover, one is most properly said to differ from another, when it varies by specific difference, as man differs from horse by specific difference, i. e. by the quality of rational. Universally then every difference acceding to a thing renders it different, but differences common and 20proper render it different in quality, and the most proper render it another thing.
ἄλλο ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλοῖον μόνον παρὰ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν
ἐποίησεν, ὥστε ἡ μὲν ἄλλο, ἡ δὲ ἀλλοῖον μόνον ἐποίησεν. κατὰ μὲν
οὖν τὰς ἄλλο ποιούσας διαφορὰς αἵ τε διαιρέσεις γίνονται τῶν γενῶν εἰς τὰ
εἴδη, οἵ τε ὅροι ἀποδίδονται ἐκ γένους ὄντες καὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαφορῶν,
κατὰ δὲ τὰς μόνον ἀλλοῖον ποιούσας αἱ ἑτερότητες μόνον συνίστανται καὶ
αἱ τοῦ πως ἔχοντος μεταβολαί.
Ἄνωθεν οὖν πάλιν ἀρχομένῳ ῥητέον τῶν διαφορῶν τὰς μὲν χωριστὰς
εἶναι, τὰς δὲ ἀχωρίστους· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ τὸ
ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ὅσα τούτοις παραπλήσια χωριστά ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ
γρυπὸν εἶναι ἢ σιμὸν ἢ λογικὸν ἢ ἄλογον ἀχώριστα. τῶν δὲ ἀχωρίστων
αἱ μὲν ὑπάρχουσι καθ' αὑτάς, αἱ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ λογικὸν
καθ' αὑτὸ ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης
εἶναι δεκτικόν, τὸ δὲ γρυπὸν ἢ σιμὸν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐ καθ'
αὑτό. αἱ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὑτὰς προσοῦσαι ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λαμβάνονται
λόγῳ καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἄλλο, αἱ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὔτε ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας
λόγῳ λαμβάνονται οὔτε ποιοῦσιν ἄλλο ἀλλὰ ἀλλοῖον. καὶ αἱ μὲν καθ'
αὑτὰς οὐκ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, αἱ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
κἂν ἀχώριστοι ὦσιν, ἐπίτασιν λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἄνεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ γένος
μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον κατηγορεῖται οὗ ἂν ᾖ γένος οὔτε αἱ τοῦ γένους διαφοραί,
καθ' ἃς διαιρεῖται· αὗται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τὸν ἑκάστου λόγον συμπληροῦσαι,
τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔτε ἄνεσιν οὔτε ἐπίτασιν ἐπιδεχόμενόν
ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ γρυπὸν ἢ σιμὸν εἶναι ἢ κεχρῶσθαί πως καὶ ἐπιτείνεται καὶ
ἀνίεται.
Τριῶν οὖν εἰδῶν τῆς διαφορᾶς θεωρουμένων καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐσῶν χωριστῶν
τῶν δὲ ἀχωρίστων καὶ πάλιν τῶν ἀχωρίστων τῶν μὲν οὐσῶν καθ'
1Hence, those which render it another thing are called specific, but those, which make it different in quality, are simply(called) differences, for the difference of rational being added to animal, makes it another thing, (and makes a species of animal, ) but difference of being moved makes it different in quality only from what is at rest, so that 5the one renders it another thing, but the other only of another quality. According then, to the differences which produce another thing do the divisions of genera into species arise, and the definitions arising from genus and such differences are assigned. On the other hand, as to those which only make a thing different in quality, diversities alone consist, and the changes of subsistence of a thing; beginning then, again, 10from the first, we must say that of differences some are separable, others inseparable, thus to be moved, and to be at rest, to be ill, and to be well, and such as resemble these, are separable, but to have a crooked, or a flat nose, to be rational, or irrational, are inseparable differences. Again, of the inseparable, some exist per se, others by accident, for rational, mortal, to be susceptible of science, are inherent in man 15per se, but to have a crooked or flat nose, accidentally, and not per se. Wherefore, such as are present per se, are assumed in the definition of substance, and effect a different thing:, but what are accidental are neither taken in the definition of substance, nor render a thing another, but of another quality. Those too, which are per se, do not admit of the more and less, but the accidental, even if they be inseparable, admit 20of intention and remission, for neither is genus more and less predicated of that of which it is the genus, nor the differences of genus according to which it is divided. For these are such as complete the definition of each thing, but the essence of each is one and the same, and neither admits of intention, nor remission; to have however a crooked or a flat nose, or to be in some way coloured, admits both of intension and remission.
αὑτὰς τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, πάλιν τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς διαφορῶν αἱ μέν
εἰσι καθ' ἃς διαιρούμεθα τὰ γένη εἰς τὰ εἴδη, αἱ δὲ καθ' ἃς τὰ διαιρεθέντα
εἰδοποιεῖται. οἷον τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς διαφορῶν πασῶν τῶν τοιούτων
τοῦ ζῴου οὐσῶν ἐμψύχου καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ, λογικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου, θνητοῦ καὶ
ἀθανάτου, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἐμψύχου καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ διαφορὰ συστατική ἐστι τῆς
τοῦ ζῴου οὐσίας, ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ζῷον οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική, ἡ δὲ τοῦ
θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου διαφορὰ καὶ ἡ τοῦ λογικοῦ τε καὶ ἀλόγου διαιρετικαί
εἰσι τοῦ ζῴου διαφοραί· δι' αὐτῶν γὰρ τὰ γένη εἰς τὰ εἴδη διαιρούμεθα.
ἀλλ' αὗταί γε αἱ διαιρετικαὶ διαφοραὶ τῶν γενῶν συμπληρωτικαὶ γίνονται
καὶ συστατικαὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· τέμνεται γὰρ τὸ ζῷον τῇ τε τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ
τῇ τοῦ ἀλόγου διαφορᾷ καὶ πάλιν τῇ τε τοῦ θνητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου
διαφορᾷ. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τοῦ θνητοῦ καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ διαφοραὶ συστατικαὶ γίνονται
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, αἱ δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου τοῦ θεοῦ, αἱ
δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω
οὐσίας διαιρετικῶν οὐσῶν τῆς τε ἐμψύχου καὶ ἀψύχου διαφορᾶς καὶ
τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ ἀναισθήτου ἡ μὲν ἔμψυχος καὶ αἰσθητικὴ συλληφθεῖσαι
τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπετέλεσαν τὸ ζῷον, ἡ δὲ ἔμψυχος καὶ ἀναίσθητος ἀπετέλεσαν τὸ
φυτόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ αὐταὶ πὼς μὲν ληφθεῖσαι γίνονται συστατικαί, πὼς δὲ
διαιρετικαί, εἰδοποιοὶ πᾶσαι κέκληνται. καὶ τούτων γε μάλιστα χρεία εἴς
τε τὰς διαιρέσεις τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ὁρισμούς, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
ἀχωρίστων οὐδ' ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν χωριστῶν.
Ἃς δὴ καὶ ὁριζόμενοί φασιν· διαφορά ἐστιν ᾗ περισσεύει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ
1Since then, there are three species of difference considered, some indeed separable, but others inseparable, again, of the inseparable, some are per se, but others accidental, moreover of differences per se, some are those according to which we divide genera into species, but others according to which the things divided become specific:—thus 5of all such differences per se of animal as these, animated and sensitive, rational and irrational, mortal and immortal, the difference of animated and sensitive is constitutive of the essence of animal, for animal is an animated substance, endued with sense, but the difference of mortal and immortal, and that of rational and irrational, are the divisive differences of animal, for through these we divide genera into species: yet 10these very differences which divide the genera are constitutive and completive of species. For animal is divided by the difference of rational and irrational, and again, by the difference of mortal and immortal; but the differences of rational and mortal are constitutive of man, but those of rational and immortal of God, those again, of mortal and irrational, of irrational animals. Thus also, since the differences of animate 15and inanimate, sensitive and void of sense, divide the highest substance, animate and sensitive added to substance, complete animal, but animate and deprived of sense, form plant; since then, the same differences taken in one way become constitutive, but in another divisive, they are all called specific.
These indeed are especially useful for divisions of genera, and for definitions, yet not with regard to those which 20are inseparable accidentally, nor still more with such as are separable. And indeed defining these, they say that difference is that by which species exceeds genus, e.
These indeed are especially useful for divisions of genera, and for definitions, yet not with regard to those which 20are inseparable accidentally, nor still more with such as are separable. And indeed defining these, they say that difference is that by which species exceeds genus, e.
γένους. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ζῴου πλέον ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητόν·
τὸ γὰρ ζῷον οὔτε οὐδὲν τούτων ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πόθεν ἂν τὰ εἴδη σχοῖεν διαφοράς;
οὔτε δὲ πάσας τὰς ἀντικειμένας ἔχει, ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἕξει τὰ
ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀξιοῦσι, δυνάμει μὲν πάσας ἔχει τὰς τῶν ὑφ' αὑτὸ
διαφοράς, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδεμίαν. καὶ οὕτως οὔτε ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τι γίνεται
οὔτε τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἅμα περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται.
Ὁρίζονται δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ οὕτως· διαφορά ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ
διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν
καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορούμενον ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
λέγεται ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν. τί μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
ἐρωτωμένων ἡμῶν οἰκεῖον εἰπεῖν ζῷον, ποῖον δὲ ζῷον πυνθανομένων λογικὸν
καὶ θνητὸν οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν. τῶν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους
συνεστώτων ἢ ἀνάλογόν γε ὕλῃ καὶ εἴδει τὴν σύστασιν ἐχόντων, ὥσπερ ὁ
ἀνδριὰς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν τοῦ χαλκοῦ, εἴδους δὲ τοῦ σχήματος, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος
ὁ κοινός τε καὶ εἰδικὸς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν ἀναλόγου συνέστηκεν τοῦ γένους,
ἐκ μορφῆς δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς, τὸ δὲ ὅλον τοῦτο, ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν,
ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀνδριάς.
Ὑπογράφουσι δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς καὶ οὕτως· διαφορά ἐστιν τὸ
χωρίζειν πεφυκὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος· τὸ λογικὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον
τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν ἵππον ὄντα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὸ ζῷον χωρίζει.
ἀποδιδόασι δὲ καὶ οὕτως· διαφορά ἐστιν ὅτῳ διαφέρει ἕκαστα. ἄνθρωπος
γὰρ καὶ ἵππος κατὰ μὲν τὸ γένος οὐ διενήνοχεν· θνητὰ γὰρ ζῷα καὶ
ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικὸν προστεθὲν διέστησεν ἡμᾶς ἀπ'
ἐκείνων· καὶ λογικά ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ θεοί, ἀλλὰ τὸ θνητὸν προστεθὲν
1g. man exceeds animal in being rational and mortal, for animal is neither any one of these, (since whence would species have differences?) nor has it all the opposite differences, (since otherwise the same thing would at the same time have opposites,) but (as they allege) it contains all the differences which are under it in 5capacity, but not one of them in energy, and so neither is any thing produced from non-entities, nor will opposites at the same time subsist about the same thing.
Again, they define it (difference) also thus: difference is that which is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question, of what kind a thing is, for rational and mortal being predicated of man, are spoken in 10reply to what kind of thing man is, and not as to the question what is he. For when we are asked what is man, we properly answer, an animal, but when men inquire what kind of animal, we say properly, that he is rational and mortal. For since things consist of matter and form, or have a constitution analogous to matter and form, as a statue is composed of brass, matter, but of figure, form, so also man, both 15common and specific, consists matter analogous to genus, and of form analogous to difference, but the whole of this, animal, rational, mortal, is man, in the same manner as the statue there. They also describe it thus, difference is what is naturally adapted to separate things which are under the same genus, as rational and irrational separate man and horse, which are under the same genus, animal. 20 Again, they give it in this way: difference is that by which each singular thing differs, for man and horse do not differ as to genus, for both we and horses are animals, but the addition of rational separates us from them; again, both we and the gods are rational, but the addition of mortal separates us from them.
Again, they define it (difference) also thus: difference is that which is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question, of what kind a thing is, for rational and mortal being predicated of man, are spoken in 10reply to what kind of thing man is, and not as to the question what is he. For when we are asked what is man, we properly answer, an animal, but when men inquire what kind of animal, we say properly, that he is rational and mortal. For since things consist of matter and form, or have a constitution analogous to matter and form, as a statue is composed of brass, matter, but of figure, form, so also man, both 15common and specific, consists matter analogous to genus, and of form analogous to difference, but the whole of this, animal, rational, mortal, is man, in the same manner as the statue there. They also describe it thus, difference is what is naturally adapted to separate things which are under the same genus, as rational and irrational separate man and horse, which are under the same genus, animal. 20 Again, they give it in this way: difference is that by which each singular thing differs, for man and horse do not differ as to genus, for both we and horses are animals, but the addition of rational separates us from them; again, both we and the gods are rational, but the addition of mortal separates us from them.
διέστησεν ἡμᾶς ἀπ' ἐκείνων. προσεξεργαζόμενοι δὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς
μὴ τὸ τυχόν φασι τῶν χωριζόντων τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος εἶναι τὴν
διαφοράν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἰς τὸ εἶναι συμβάλλεται καὶ ὃ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι
τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι μέρος. οὐ γὰρ τὸ πεφυκέναι πλεῖν διαφορὰ ἀνθρώπου,
εἰ καὶ ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου· εἴποιμεν γὰρ ἂν τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν πλεῖν
πεφυκέναι τὰ δὲ μή χωρίζοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι
πλεῖν οὐκ ἦν συμπληρωτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπιτηδειότης
μόνον αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι οἷαι αἱ ἰδίως εἰδοποιοὶ λεγόμεναι διαφοραί.
εἶεν ἂν οὖν εἰδοποιοὶ διαφοραί, ὅσαι ἕτερον εἶδος ποιοῦσιν, καὶ ὅσαι
ἐν τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι παραλαμβάνονται.
Καὶ περὶ μὲν διαφορᾶς ἀρκεῖ τοσαῦτα.
1 They however who more nicely discuss what pertains to difference, say that it is not any casual thing dividing those under the same genus, but such as contributes to the essence, and to the definition of the essence of a thing, and which is part of the thing. For to be naturally adapted to sail is not the difference, 5though it is the property of man, since we may say that of animals, some are naturally adapted to sail, but others not, separating man from other animals; yet a natural ability to sail does not complete the essence, neither is a part of it, but only an aptitude of it, because it is not such a difference as those which are called specific differences. Wherefore specific differences will be such as produce 10another species, and which are assumed in explaining the very nature of a thing: and concerning difference this is sufficient.
Chapter 4: Of Property
Τὸ δὲ ἴδιον διαιροῦσι τετραχῶς· καὶ γὰρ ὃ μόνῳ τινὶ εἴδει συμβέβηκεν,
εἰ καὶ μὴ παντί, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἰατρεύειν ἢ τὸ γεωμετρεῖν· καὶ ὃ παντὶ
συμβέβηκεν τῷ εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ μόνῳ, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι·
καὶ ὃ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ποτέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ παντὶ τὸ ἐν γήρᾳ πολιοῦσθαι.
τέταρτον δέ, ἐφ' οὗ συνδεδράμηκεν τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, ὡς τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικόν· κἂν γὰρ μὴ γελᾷ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ γελαστικὸν λέγεται
οὐ τῷ ἀεὶ γελᾶν ἀλλὰ τῷ πεφυκέναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀεὶ αὐτῷ σύμφυτον ὑπάρχει,
ὡς καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ χρεμετιστικόν. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ κυρίως ἴδιά φασιν,
ὅτι καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ γὰρ ἵππος, χρεμετιστικόν, καὶ εἰ χρεμετιστικόν,
ἵππος.
Property they divide in four ways: for it is that which happens to some one species alone, though not to every (individual of that species), as to a man to heal, or to geometrize: that also which happens to a whole species, though not to that alone, as to man to be a 15biped: that again, which happens to a species alone, and to every (individual of it), and at a certain time, as to every man to become grey in old age: in the fourth place, it is that in which it concurs (to happen) to one species alone, and to every (individual of it), and always, as risibility to a man; for though he does not always laugh, yet he is said to be risible, not from his always laughing, but 20from being naturally adapted to laugh, and this is always inherent in him, in the same way as neighing in a horse. They say also that these are validly properties, because they reciprocate, since if any thing be a it is capable of neighing, and if any thing be capable of neighing it is a horse.
Chapter 5: Of Accident
Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου
φθορᾶς. διαιρεῖται δὲ εἰς δύο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χωριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ
δὲ ἀχώριστον. τὸ μὲν οὖν καθεύδειν χωριστὸν συμβεβηκός, τὸ δὲ μέλαν
Accident is that which is present and absent without the destruction of its subject. It receives a 25two-fold division, for one kind of it is separable, but the other inseparable, e.
εἶναι ἀχωρίστως τῷ κόρακι καὶ τῷ Αἰθίοπι συμβέβηκεν, δύναται δὲ ἐπινοηθῆναι
καὶ κόραξ λευκὸς καὶ Αἰθίοψ ἀποβαλὼν τὴν χροιὰν χωρὶς φθορᾶς
τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. ὁρίζονται δὲ καὶ οὕτως· συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ὃ ἐνδέχεται
τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ὃ οὔτε γένος ἐστὶν οὔτε διαφορὰ
οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε ἴδιον, ἀεὶ δέ ἐστιν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὑφιστάμενον.
Ἀφορισθέντων δὲ πάντων τῶν προτεθέντων, λέγω δὴ γένους, εἴδους,
διαφορᾶς, ἰδίου, συμβεβηκότος, ῥητέον τίνα τε κοινὰ πρόσεστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ
τίνα ἴδια.
1g. to sleep is a separable accident, but to be black happens inseparably to a crow and an Ethiopian; we may possibly indeed conceive a white crow, and an Ethiopian casting his colour, without destruction of the subject. They also define it thus; accident is that which may be present and not present to the same thing; also that which is neither 5genus, nor difference, nor species, nor property, yet is always inherent in a subject.
Chapter 6: Of Things Common and Peculiar to the Five Predicates
Κοινὸν μὲν δὴ πάντων τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων κατηγορεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν
γένος τῶν εἰδῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων, καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ εἶδος
τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον τοῦ τε εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ τῶν
ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ἀτόμων. τό τε
γὰρ ζῷον ἵππων τε καὶ βοῶν κατηγορεῖται εἰδῶν ὄντων καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ ἵππου
καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ βοὸς ἀτόμων ὄντων, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ἵππων καὶ βοῶν κατηγορεῖται
καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, τὸ μέντοι εἶδος οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν κατὰ
μέρος μόνον, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον οἷον τὸ γελαστικὸν καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν
κατὰ μέρος, τὸ δὲ μέλαν τοῦ τε εἴδους τῶν κοράκων καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος
συμβεβηκὸς ὂν ἀχώριστον, καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ ἵππου χωριστὸν
ὂν συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων, κατὰ δεύτερον
δὲ λόγον καὶ τῶν περιεχόντων τὰ ἄτομα.
Having discussed all that were proposed, I mean, genus, species, difference, property, accident, we must declare what things are common, and what peculiar to them. Now it is common to them all to be predicated, as we have said, of many things, but genus (is predicated) of the species and individuals under it, and difference in like manner; but species, 10of the individuals under it; and property, both of the species, of which it is the property, and of the individuals under that species; again, accident (is predicated) both of species, and individuals. For animal is predicated of horse and ox, being species, also of this particular horse and ox, which are individuals, but irrational is predicated of horse and ox, and of particulars. Species however, as man, is predicated of particulars 15alone, but property both of the species of which it is the property, and of the individuals under that species as risibility both of man, and of particular men, but blackness of the species of crows, and of particulars, being an inseparable accident; and to be moved, of man and horse, being a separable accident. Notwithstanding, it is pre-eminently (predicated) of individuals, but secondarily of those things which comprehend individuals.
Chapter 7: Of the Community and Distinction of Genus and Difference
Κοινὸν δὲ γένους καὶ διαφορᾶς τὸ περιεκτικὸν εἰδῶν· περιέχει γὰρ καὶ
It 20is common to genus and difference to be comprehensive of species, for difference also comprehends species, though not all such as the genera; for rational, though it does not comprehend irrational, as animal does, yet it comprehends man and divinity, which are species.
ἡ διαφορὰ εἴδη, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα ὅσα τὰ γένη. τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν εἰ καὶ
μὴ περιέχει τὰ ἄλογα ὥσπερ τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ περιέχει ἄνθρωπον καὶ θεόν,
ἅπερ ἐστὶν εἴδη. ὅσα τε κατηγορεῖται τοῦ γένους ὡς γένους, καὶ τῶν ὑπ'
αὐτὸ εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὅσα τε τῆς διαφορᾶς ὡς διαφορᾶς, καὶ τοῦ ἐξ
αὐτῆς εἴδους κατηγορηθήσεται. γένους τε γὰρ τοῦ ζῴου ὄντος ὡς γένους
κατηγορεῖται ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ ζῷον εἰδῶν
πάντων κατηγορεῖται ταῦτα ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων· διαφορᾶς τε οὔσης τῆς
τοῦ λογικοῦ κατηγορεῖται ὡς διαφορᾶς τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι, οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦ
λογικοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ λογικὸν εἰδῶν κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ χρῆσθαι
λόγῳ. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀναιρεθέντος ἢ τοῦ γένους ἢ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀναιρεῖσθαι
τὰ ὑπ' αὐτά· ὡς γὰρ μὴ ὄντος ζῴου οὐκ ἔστιν ἵππος οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος,
οὕτως μὴ ὄντος λογικοῦ οὐδὲν ἔσται ζῷον τὸ χρώμενον λόγῳ.
Ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ γένους τὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἤπερ ἡ διαφορὰ
καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῷον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου
καὶ ἵππου καὶ ὀρνέου καὶ ὄφεως, τὸ δὲ τετράπουν ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν
τέσσαρας πόδας ἐχόντων, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ἀτόμων, καὶ τὸ
χρεμετιστικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου μόνον καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς
ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἐλαττόνων. δεῖ δὲ διαφορὰς λαμβάνειν, αἷς τέμνεται τὸ γένος,
οὐ τὰς συμπληρωτικὰς τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ γένους. ἔτι τὸ γένος περιέχει τὴν
διαφορὰν δυνάμει· τοῦ γὰρ ζῴου τὸ μὲν λογικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον. ἔτι τὰ
μὲν γένη πρότερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ διαφορῶν, διὸ συναναιρεῖ μὲν αὐτάς, οὐ
συναναιρεῖται δέ· ἀναιρεθέντος γὰρ τοῦ ζῴου συναναιρεῖται τὸ λογικὸν καὶ
1Whatever things also are predicated of genus as genus, are predicated of the species under it. and whatever are predicated of difference as difference, will be also of the species formed from it. For animal being a genus, substance is predicated of it as of a genus, also animated, and sensible, 5but these are predicated of all the species under animal, as far as to individuals. As moreover, rational is difference, the use of reason is predicated of it, as of difference, yet the use of reason will not be predicated of rational only, but also of the species under rational. This too is common, that when genus or difference is subverted, the things 10under them are also subverted co-subverted, for as when animal is not, horse is not, nor man, thus also, when rational is not, there will be no animal which uses reason. Now, it is the property of genus to be predicated of more things than difference, species, property, and accident are, for animal (is predicated) of man and horse, bird and snake, but quadruped of 15animals alone, which have four feet; again, man of individuals alone, and capacity of neighing of horse alone, and of particulars. Likewise, accident of fewer things: yet we must assume the differences by which the genus is divided, not those which complete, but which divide the essence of genus.
Moreover, genus comprehends difference in capacity, for 20of animal one kind is rational, but another irrational, but differences do not comprehend genera. Besides, genera are prior to the differences under them, wherefore they subvert them, but are not co-subverted with them.
Moreover, genus comprehends difference in capacity, for 20of animal one kind is rational, but another irrational, but differences do not comprehend genera. Besides, genera are prior to the differences under them, wherefore they subvert them, but are not co-subverted with them.
τὸ ἄλογον. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ οὐκέτι συναναιροῦσι τὸ γένος· κἂν γὰρ πᾶσαι
ἀναιρεθῶσιν, οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητικὴ ἐπινοεῖται, ἥτις ἦν τὸ ζῷον. ἔτι τὸ
μὲν γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ὡς εἴρηται,
κατηγορεῖται. ἔτι γένος μὲν ἓν καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος οἷον ἀνθρώπου τὸ
ζῷον, διαφοραὶ δὲ πλείους οἷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν,
αἷς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων διαφέρει. καὶ τὸ μὲν γένος ἔοικεν ὕλῃ, μορφῇ
δὲ ἡ διαφορά. προσόντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων κοινῶν τε καὶ ἰδίων τῷ γένει καὶ
τῇ διαφορᾷ ἀρκείτω ταῦτα.
1For animal being subverted, rational and irrational are co-subverted, but differences no longer co-subvert genus, for even if all of them should be subverted, yet we may form a conception of animated, sensible substance, which is animal. Yet more, genus is predicated in reference to what a thing is, but difference in reference 5to what kind of a thing it is, as was observed before; besides there is one genus according to every species; e. g. of man, animal (is the genus), but there are many differences, as rational, mortal, capable of intellect and science, by which he differs from other animals. Genus also is similar to matter, but difference to form: however since there are other things common and peculiar to genus and 10difference, these will suffice.
Chapter 8: Of Community and Difference of Genus and Species
Γένος δὲ καὶ εἶδος κοινὸν μὲν ἔχουσι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς εἴρηται,
κατηγορεῖσθαι· εἰλήφθω δὲ τὸ εἶδος ὡς εἶδος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ ὡς γένος, ἄνπερ
ᾖ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶδος καὶ γένος. κοινὸν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ προτέροις
εἶναι ὧν κατηγορεῖται καὶ τὸ ὅλον τι εἶναι ἑκάτερον.
Διαφέρει δὲ ᾗ τὸ μὲν γένος περιέχει τὰ εἴδη, τὰ δὲ εἴδη περιέχεται
καὶ οὐ περιέχει τὰ γένη· ἐπὶ πλεῖον γὰρ τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους. ἔτι τὰ γένη
προϋποκεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ διαμορφωθέντα ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς ἀποτελεῖν
τὰ εἴδη, ὅθεν καὶ πρότερα τῇ φύσει τὰ γένη. καὶ συναναιροῦντα, ἀλλ' οὐ
συναναιρούμενα, καὶ εἴδους μὲν ὄντος πάντως ἔστι καὶ γένος, γένους δὲ
ὄντος οὐ πάντως ἔστι καὶ τὸ εἶδος. καὶ τὰ μὲν γένη συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖται
τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὰ εἰδῶν, τὰ δὲ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν οὐκέτι. ἔτι τὰ μὲν
γένη πλεονάζει τῇ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ εἰδῶν περιοχῇ, τὰ δὲ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν
πλεονάζει ταῖς οἰκείαις διαφοραῖς. ἔτι οὔτε τὸ εἶδος γένοιτ' ἂν γενικώτατον
οὔτε τὸ γένος εἰδικώτατον.
Genus and species possess in common, (as we have said,) the being predicated of many things, but species must be taken as species only, and not as genus, if the same thing be both species and genus. Moreover, it is common to them both to be prior to what they are predicated of, and to be each a certain whole; but they differ, because genus indeed comprehends species, but 15species are comprehended by, and do not comprehend genera, for genus is predicated of more than species. Besides, it is necessary that genera should be presupposed, and when formed by specific differences, that they should consummate species, whence also genera are by nature prior. They also co-subvert, but are not co-subverted, for species existing, genus also entirely exists, but genus existing there is 20not altogether species; genera too, are indeed univocally predicated of species under them, but not species of genera. Moreover, genera exceed, from comprehending the species which are under them, but species exceed genera by their proper differences; besides, neither can species become most generic, nor genus most specific.
Chapter 9: Of Community and Difference of Genus and Property
Γένους δὲ καὶ ἰδίου κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς εἴδεσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος,
ζῷον, καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν. καὶ τὸ ἐπίσης κατηγορεῖσθαι
τὸ γένος τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον τῶν αὐτοῦ μετεχόντων ἀτόμων·
ἐπίσης γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς ζῷον καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Μέλητος γελαστικόν.
κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸ γένος τῶν οἰκείων
εἰδῶν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἴδιον.
Διαφέρει δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν γένος πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ ἴδιον· δεῖ γὰρ
εἶναι ζῷον, εἶτα διαιρεῖσθαι διαφοραῖς καὶ ἰδίοις. καὶ τὸ μὲν γένος κατὰ
πλειόνων εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἑνὸς εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον. καὶ
τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἀντικατηγορεῖται οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, τὸ δὲ γένος οὐδενὸς ἀντικατηγορεῖται·
οὔτε γὰρ εἰ ζῷον, ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε εἰ ζῷον, γελαστικόν· εἰ δὲ
ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν, καὶ ἔμπαλιν. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον παντὶ τῷ εἴδει ὑπάρχει,
οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ μόνῳ καὶ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ γένος παντὶ μὲν τῷ εἴδει, οὗ
ἂν ᾖ γένος, καὶ ἀεί, οὐ μέντοι καὶ μόνῳ. ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἴδια ἀναιρούμενα οὐ
συναναιρεῖ τὰ γένη, τὰ δὲ γένη ἀναιρούμενα συναναιρεῖ τὰ εἴδη, ὧν ἐστιν
ἴδια, ὥστε καὶ ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια ἀναιρουμένων καὶ αὐτὰ συναναιρεῖται.
Both to genus and to property it is common to follow species, for if any thing be man, it is animal, and if any thing be man, it is risible. Likewise to genus, to be equally predicated of species, and to property, (to be equally predicated) of the individuals which participate 5it; thus man and ox are equally animal, and Anytus and Melitus risible. It is also common that genus should be univocally predicated of its proper species, and property of the things of which it is the property; still they differ, because genus is prior, but property posterior, for animal must first necessarily exist, afterwards be divided by differences and properties. Also genus indeed is predicated of many species, but property of one certain species of which it is 10the property. Besides property is reciprocally predicated of that of which it is the property, but genus is not reciprocally predicated of any thing, for neither if any thing is an animal, is it a man, nor if a thing be animal is it risible, but if any thing is a man it is risible, and vice versâ. Moreover, property is inherent in the whole species, of which it is the property, in it alone, and always, but genus in the whole species indeed of which it is the genus, 15and always, yet not in it alone; once more, properties being subverted do not co-subvert genera, but genera being subverted, co-subvert species, to which properties belong; wherefore, also those things of which there are properties, being subverted, the properties themselves also, are co-subverted.
Chapter 10: Of Community and Difference of Genus and Accident
Γένους δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότος κοινὸν τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς εἴρηται,
κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἄν τε τῶν χωριστῶν ᾖ ἄν τε τῶν ἀχωρίστων· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
It is common to genus and accident to be predicated, as we have said, of many things, whether they (the accidents) be separable or inseparable, for to be moved is predicated 20of many things, and blackness of crows, and of Ethiopians, and of certain inanimate things.
κινεῖσθαι κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ τὸ μέλαν κατὰ κοράκων καὶ Αἰθιόπων καί
τινων ἀψύχων.
Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ γένος τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν γένος πρὸ τῶν
εἰδῶν, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τῶν εἰδῶν ὕστερα· κἂν γὰρ ἀχώριστον λαμβάνηται
συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' οὖν πρότερόν ἐστι τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τοῦ συμβεβηκότος.
καὶ τοῦ μὲν γένους ἐπίσης τὰ μετέχοντα μετέχει, τοῦ δὲ συμβεβηκότος
οὐκ ἐπίσης· ἐπίτασιν γὰρ καὶ ἄνεσιν ἐπιδέχεται ἡ τῶν συμβεβηκότων
μέθεξις, ἡ δὲ τῶν γενῶν οὐκέτι. καὶ τὰ μὲν συμβεβηκότα
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων προηγουμένως ὑφίσταται, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη φύσει
πρότερα τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσιῶν. καὶ τὰ μὲν γένη ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται
τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι ἢ πῶς ἔχον ἕκαστον·
ποῖος γὰρ Αἰθίοψ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐρεῖς μέλας, καὶ πῶς ἔχει Σωκράτης ἐρεῖς ὅτι
κάθηται ἢ περιπατεῖ.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων τεττάρων διαφέρει εἴρηται, συμβέβηκεν
δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον διαφέρειν τῶν τεττάρων, ὥστε πέντε μὲν
ὄντων, ἑνὸς δὲ ἑκάστου τῶν τεττάρων διαφέροντος, τετράκι τὰ πέντε, εἴκοσι
γίνεσθαι τὰς πάσας διαφοράς. ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς
καταριθμουμένων καὶ τῶν μὲν δύο μιᾷ λειπομένων διαφορᾷ διὰ τὸ ἤδη
εἰλῆφθαι, τῶν δὲ τριῶν δυσίν, τῶν δὲ τεττάρων τρισί, τῶν δὲ πέντε
τέτρασι, δέκα αἱ πᾶσαι γίνονται διαφοραί, τέσσαρες, τρεῖς, δύο, μία. τὸ
μὲν γὰρ γένος διαφέρει τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ
συμβεβηκότος· τέσσαρες οὖν αἱ διαφοραί. ἡ διαφορὰ δὲ πῇ μὲν διενήνοχεν
τοῦ γένους εἴρηται, ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει τὸ γένος αὐτῆς ἐρρέθη· λοιπὸν δὲ
πῇ διαφέρει τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ῥηθήσεται,
καὶ γίνονται τρεῖς. πάλιν τὸ εἶδος πῇ μὲν διαφέρει τῆς διαφορᾶς ἐρρέθη,
ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ εἴδους ἐλέγετο· πῇ δὲ διαφέρει τὸ εἶδος
1Genus however differs from accident, in that genus is prior, but accident posterior 5to species, for though an inseparable accident be assumed, yet that of which it is the accident is 10prior to the accident. Also the participants of genus participate it equally, but those of accident do 15not equally; for the participation of accidents accepts intension and remission, but not that of genera. 20Besides, accidents primarily subsist about individuals, but genera and species are by nature prior to 25individual substances.
τοῦ γένους ἐρρέθη, ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους ἐλέγετο· λοιπὸν
οὖν πῇ διαφέρει τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ῥηθήσεται· δύο οὖν καὶ
αὗται αἱ διαφοραί. τὸ δὲ ἴδιον πῇ διαφέρει τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καταλειφθήσεται·
πῇ γὰρ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ γένους διαφέρει,
προειρημένον ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων πρὸς αὐτὸ διαφορᾷ· τεσσάρων οὖν λαμβανομένων
τοῦ γένους πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα διαφορῶν, τριῶν δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς, δύο
δὲ τοῦ εἴδους, μιᾶς δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκός, δέκα ἔσονται αἱ
πᾶσαι, ὧν τὰς τέσσαρας, αἳ ἦσαν τοῦ γένους πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, φθάσαντες
ἀπεδείξαμεν.
1Moreover, genera are predicated of the things under them, in respect to what a thing is, but accidents in respect to what kind of a thing it is, or how each thing subsists; for being asked, what kind of man an Ethiopian is, you say that he is black; or how Socrates is, you reply that he is sick or well.
Chapter 11: Of Community and Difference of Species and Difference
Κοινὸν τοίνυν διαφορᾶς καὶ εἴδους τὸ ἐπίσης μετέχεσθαι· ἀνθρώπου
τε γὰρ ἐπίσης μετέχουσιν οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι καὶ τῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ
διαφορᾶς. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ παρεῖναι τοῖς μετέχουσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ Σωκράτης
λογικός, καὶ ἀεὶ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος.
We have shown then, wherein genus differs from the other four, but each of the other four happens also to differ from the rest, so that as there are five, and each one of the four differs from the rest, the five being 5four times (taken), all the differences would appear to be twenty. Nevertheless, such is not the case, but always those successive being enumerated, and two being deficient by one difference, from having been already assumed, and the three by two differences, the four by three, the five by four; all the differences are ten, namely, four, three, two, one. For in what genus differs from difference, species, property, and accident, we have shown, wherefore, there are four differences; also we explained in what respect difference differs from genus, when we declared in what genus differs from it. What remains then, viz. in what respect it differs from species, 10property, and accident, shall be told, and three (differences) arise. Again, we declared how species differs from difference, when we showed how difference differs from species; also we showed how species differs from genus, when we explained how genus differs from species; what remains then, viz. in what species differs from property and from accident, shall be told: these, then, are two differences. But in what respect property differs from accident, shall be discovered, for how it differs from species, difference, and genus, was explained before in the difference of those from these. Wherefore, as four differences of genus with respect to the 15rest, are assumed, but three of difference, two of species, and one of property with regard to accident, there will be ten (differences altogether), of which, four we have already demonstrated, viz. those of genus, with respect to the rest.
Chapter 12: The Same Subject Continued
Ἴδιον δὲ διαφορᾶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι, εἴδους
δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν· κἂν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ποιὸν λαμβάνηται, οὐχ
ἁπλῶς ἂν εἴη ποιόν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ τῷ γένει προσελθοῦσαι αἱ διαφοραὶ ὑπέστησαν
αὐτό. ἔτι ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πολλάκις εἰδῶν θεωρεῖται,
ὡς τὸ τετράπουν ἐπὶ πλείστων ζῴων τῷ εἴδει διαφερόντων, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐπὶ
μόνων τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀτόμων ἐστίν. ἔτι ἡ διαφορὰ προτέρα τοῦ κατ'
αὐτὴν εἴδους· συναναιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν ἀναιρεθὲν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ
ἄνθρωπος ἀναιρεθεὶς οὐκ ἀνῄρηκεν τὸ λογικόν, ὄντος θεοῦ. ἔτι διαφορὰ
μὲν συντίθεται μετὰ ἄλλης διαφορᾶς· τὸ λογικὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ θνητὸν συνετέθη
It is common then to difference and species to be equally participated, for particular men partake equally of man, and of the difference of rational. It is also common always to be present to their participants, for Socrates is always rational, and always man, but it is the property of difference indeed to be predicated in respect to what kind a thing is of, but of species in respect to what a thing is, for though 20man should be assumed as a certain kind of thing, yet he will not be simply so, but in as far as differences according to genus constitute him. Besides, difference is often seen in many species, as quadruped in many animals, different in species, but species is in the individuals alone, which are under the species. Moreover, difference is prior to the species which subsists according to it, for rational being subverted, co-subverts man, but man being subverted, does not co-subvert rational, since there is still divinity.
εἰς ὑπόστασιν ἀνθρώπου· εἶδος δὲ εἴδει οὐ συντίθεται, ὥστε ἀπογεννῆσαι
ἄλλο τι εἶδος· τὶς μὲν γὰρ ἵππος τινὶ ὄνῳ σύνεισιν εἰς ἡμιόνου γένεσιν,
ἵππος δὲ ἁπλῶς ὄνῳ οὐκ ἂν συντεθεὶς ἀποτελέσειεν ἡμίονον.
1Further, difference is joined with another difference, (for rational and mortal are joined for the subsistence of man,) but species is not joined with species, so as to produce some other species; for indeed a certain horse is joined with a certain ass, for the production of a mule, but horse 5simply joined with ass will not produce a mule.
Chapter 13: Of Community and Difference of Property and Difference
Διαφορὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδιον κοινὸν μὲν ἔχουσι τὸ ἐπίσης μετέχεσθαι
ὑπὸ τῶν μετεχόντων· ἐπίσης γὰρ τὰ λογικὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὰ γελαστικὰ
γελαστικά. καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ παρεῖναι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν· κἂν γὰρ κολοβωθῇ
ὁ δίπους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πεφυκέναι τὸ ἀεὶ λέγεται, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν
τῷ πεφυκέναι ἔχει τὸ ἀεί, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῷ γελᾶν ἀεί.
Ἴδιον δὲ διαφορᾶς ὅτι αὕτη μὲν ἐπὶ πλειόνων εἰδῶν λέγεται πολλάκις,
οἷον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἐπὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἐφ' ἑνὸς
εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον. καὶ ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἕπεται ἐκείνοις, ὧν ἦν διαφορά,
οὐ μὴν καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀντικατηγορεῖται ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἴδια διὰ
τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν.
Difference also and property have it in common to be equally shared by their participants, for rational are equally rational, and risible (equally) risible (animals). Also it is common to both to be always present, and to every one, for though a biped should be mutilated, yet (the term biped) is always predicated 10with reference to what is naturally adapted, since also risible has the "always" from natural adaptation, but not from always laughing. Now, it is the property of difference, that it is frequently predicated of many species, as rational of divinity and man, but property (is predicated) of one species, of which it is the property. Difference moreover follows those 15things of which it is the difference, yet does not also reciprocate, but properties are reciprocally predicated of those of which they are the properties, in consequence of reciprocating.
Chapter 14: Of Community and Difference of Accident and Difference
Διαφορᾷ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότι κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων λέγεσθαι,
κοινὸν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ προσεῖναι· τό
τε γὰρ δίπουν ἀεὶ πρόσεστι πᾶσι κόραξι τό τε μέλαν ὁμοίως.
Διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ περιέχει, οὐ περιέχεται δέ·
To difference and accident it is common to be predicated of many things, but it is common (to the former) with inseparable accidents to be present always and with every one, 20for biped is always present to man, and likewise blackness to all crows.
περιέχει γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον· τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τρόπον μέν τινα
περιέχει τῷ ἐν πλείοσιν εἶναι, τρόπον δέ τινα περιέχεται τῷ μὴ ἑνὸς συμβεβηκότος
εἶναι δεκτικὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων. καὶ ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ
ἀνεπίτατος καὶ ἀνάνετος, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον
ἐπιδέχεται. καὶ ἀμιγεῖς μὲν αἱ ἐναντίαι διαφοραί, μιγείη δ' ἂν τὰ ἐναντία
συμβεβηκότα.
Τοιαῦται μὲν οὖν αἱ κοινότητες καὶ αἱ ἰδιότητες τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων. τὸ δὲ εἶδος πῇ μὲν διαφέρει γένους καὶ διαφορᾶς, εἴρηται ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγομεν,
πῇ τὸ γένος διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων καὶ πῇ ἡ διαφορὰ διαφέρει τῶν
ἄλλων.
1Still they differ in that difference indeed comprehends but is not comprehended by species; for rational comprehends divinity and man, but accidents after a certain manner comprehend from their being in many things, yet in a certain manner are comprehended from the 5subjects not being the recipients of one accident, but of many. Besides, difference indeed does not admit of intension and remission, but accidents accept the more and less; moreover contrary differences cannot be mingled, but contrary accidents may sometimes be mingled. So many then are the points common and peculiar to difference 10and the others.
Chapter 15: Of Community and Difference of Species and Property
Εἴδους δὲ καὶ ἰδίου κοινὸν τὸ ἀλλήλων ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι· εἰ γὰρ
ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν, καὶ εἰ γελαστικόν, ἄνθρωπος· τὸ γελαστικὸν δὲ ὅτι
κατὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι γελᾶν ληπτέον, πολλάκις εἴρηται· ἐπίσης τε γάρ ἐστι
τὰ εἴδη τοῖς μετέχουσι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια.
Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἰδίου, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶδος δύναται ἄλλων γένος
εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον εἶναι ἄλλων ἴδιον ἀδύνατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶδος προϋφέστηκεν
τοῦ ἰδίου, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἐπιγίνεται τῷ εἴδει· δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι,
ἵνα καὶ γελαστικὸν ᾖ. ἔτι τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ πάρεστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ,
τὸ δὲ ἴδιόν ποτε καὶ δυνάμει· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὁ
Σωκράτης ἐστίν, γελᾷ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί, καίπερ ἀεὶ πεφυκὼς εἶναι γελαστικός.
ἔτι ὧν οἱ ὅροι διάφοροι, καὶ αὐτὰ διάφορά ἐστιν· ἔστιν δὲ εἴδους μὲν τὸ
In what respect species differs from genus and difference, was explained in our enunciation of the way in which genus, and also difference, differ from the rest; it now remains that we should point out how it (species) differs from property and accident. It is common then to species and property, to be reciprocally 15predicated of each other, since if any thing be man, it is risible, also if it be risible, it is man, still we have frequently declared that risible must be assumed according to natural adaptation to risibility. It is also common (to them) to be equally present, for species are equally present to their participants, and properties 20to the things of which they are properties, but species differs from property, in that species indeed may be the genus of other things, but property cannot possibly be the property of other things.
ὑπὸ τὸ γένος εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν
τῷ τί ἐστιν κατηγορούμενον εἶναι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἰδίου δὲ τὸ μόνῳ καὶ
ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ προσεῖναι.
1Again, species subsists prior to property, but property accedes to species, for man must exist, in order that risible may: besides, species is always present in energy with its subject, but property sometimes also in capacity, for Socrates is a man always in energy, but he does not always laugh, though he is always naturally adapted to be risible. Once 5more, things of which the definitions are different, are themselves also different, but it is (the definition) of species to be under genus, and to be predicated of many things, also differing in number, in respect to what a thing is, and things of this kind, but of property it is to be present to a thing alone, and to every individual and always.
Chapter 16: Of Community and Difference of Species and Accident
Εἴδους δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότος κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πολλῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι,
σπάνιοι δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι κοινότητες διὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστάναι τό τε
συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν.
Ἴδια δὲ ἑκατέρου, τοῦ μὲν εἴδους τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι ὧν
ἐστιν εἶδος, τοῦ δὲ συμβεβηκότος τὸ ἐν τῷ ποῖον ἢ πῶς ἔχον. καὶ τὸ
ἑκάστην οὐσίαν ἑνὸς μὲν εἴδους μετέχειν, συμβεβηκότων δὲ πλειόνων, τῶν
τε χωριστῶν καὶ τῶν ἀχωρίστων. καὶ τὰ μὲν εἴδη προεπινοεῖται τῶν συμβεβηκότων,
κἂν ἀχώριστα ᾖ (δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἵνα ἐκείνῳ
τι συμβῇ)· τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ὑστερογενῆ πέφυκεν καὶ ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν φύσιν
ἔχει. καὶ τοῦ μὲν εἴδους ἡ μετοχὴ ἐπίσης, τοῦ δὲ συμβεβηκότος, κἂν ἀχώριστον
ᾖ, οὐκ ἐπίσης· καὶ γὰρ Αἰθίοψ Αἰθίοπος ἔχοι ἂν τὴν χροιὰν ἢ
ἀνειμένην ἢ ἐπιτεταμένην κατὰ μελανίαν.
Λείπεται δὴ περὶ ἰδίου καὶ συμβεβηκότος εἰπεῖν· πῇ γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ
τε εἴδους καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ γένους διενήνοχεν, εἴρηται.
To species and accident it is common to be predicated of many, but other points of 10community are rare, from the circumstance of accident, and that to which it is accidental, differing very much from each other. Now, the properties of each are these: of species, to be predicated of those of which it is the species, in respect to what a thing is, but of accident, in reference to what kind a thing is of, or how it subsists. Likewise, that each substance partakes of one species, but of many accidents, both separable and inseparable: 15moreover, species are conceived prior to accidents, even if they be inseparable, (for there must be subject, in order that something should happen to it,) but accidents are naturally adapted to be of posterior origin, and possess a nature adjunctive to substance. Again, of species the participation is equal, but of accident, even if it be inseparable, it is not equal; for an Ethiopian may have a colour intense, or remitted, according to blackness, 20with reference to an(other) Ethiopian.
Chapter 17: Of Community and Difference of Property and Accident
Κοινὸν δὴ τῷ ἰδίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀχωρίστῳ συμβεβηκότι τὸ ἄνευ αὐτῶν
μὴ ὑποστῆναι ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' ὧν θεωρεῖται· ὡς γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ γελαστικοῦ οὐχ
It remains to speak of property and accident, for how property differs from species, difference, and genus has been stated.
ὑφίσταται ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἄνευ τοῦ μέλανος ὑποσταίη ἂν Αἰθίοψ.
καὶ ὥσπερ παντὶ καὶ ἀεὶ πάρεστι τὸ ἴδιον, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκός.
Διενήνοχεν δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον μόνῳ ἑνὶ εἴδει πάρεστιν ὡς τὸ γελαστικὸν
ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς οἷον τὸ μέλαν οὐκ Αἰθίοπι
μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κόρακι πρόσεστι καὶ ἄνθρακι καὶ ἐβένῳ καὶ ἄλλοις τισίν.
διὸ τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἀντικατηγορεῖται οὗ ἐστὶν ἴδιον καὶ ἔστιν ἐπίσης, τὸ δὲ
ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἀντικατηγορεῖται. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἐπίσης
ἡ μετοχή, τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκότων ἡ μὲν μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ ἧττον.
Εἰσὶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι κοινότητές τε καὶ ἰδιότητες τῶν εἰρημένων,
ἀλλ' ἐξαρκοῦσι καὶ αὗται εἰς διάκρισίν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας παράστασιν.
1It is common then to property and inseparable accident not to subsist without those things in which they are beheld, for as man does not subsist without risible, so neither can Ethiopian subsist without blackness, and as property is present to every, and always, so also is inseparable accident. Nevertheless, they differ, in that property 5is present to one species alone, as the being risible to man, but inseparable accident, as black, is present not only to an Ethiopian, but also to a crow, to a coal, to ebony, and to certain other things. Moreover, property is reciprocally predicated of that of which it is the property, and is equally (present), but inseparable accident is not reciprocally predicated, besides, the participation of properties is equal, 10but of accidents one (subject partakes) more, but another less. There are indeed other points of community, and peculiarity of the above-mentioned (predicables), but these are sufficient for their distinction, and the setting forth of their agreement.