Ross (OCT, 1955) · Beare (1908)
Beare (1908)
Chapter 1 (458a33–459a22)
458a
Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἐνυπνίου ἐπιζητητέον, καὶ πρῶτον
33We must, in the next place, investigate the subject of the dream, and first inquire to which of the faculties of the soul it presents itself, i.e.
458b
1 τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φαίνεται, καὶ πότερον τοῦ νοητικοῦ τὸ
πάθος ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις τῶν ἐν
ἡμῖν γνωρίζομέν τι. εἰ δ' ἡ χρῆσις ὄψεως ὅρασις, καὶ ἀκοῆς
τὸ ἀκούειν, καὶ ὅλως αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, κοινὰ δ' ἐστὶ
5 τῶν αἰσθήσεων οἷον σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κίνησις καὶ
τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἴδια δ' οἷον χρῶμα ψόφος χυμός,
ἀδυνατεῖ δὲ πάντα μύοντα καὶ καθεύδοντα ὁρᾶν, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς
ὕπνοις· οὐκ ἄρα γε τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ ἐνύπνιον αἰσθανόμεθα.
10 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῇ δόξῃ· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ προσιόν φαμεν
ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἵππον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ λευκὸν ἢ καλόν· ὧν ἡ
δόξα ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ἂν φήσειεν, οὔτ' ἀληθῶς οὔτε ψευδῶς.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὕπνοις συμβαίνει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
ὁμοίως γὰρ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι λευκὸς ὁ προσιὼν δοκοῦμεν
15 ὁρᾶν. ἔτι παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐννοοῦμεν ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ
ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι αἰσθανόμενοί τι. περὶ οὗ γὰρ αἰσθανόμεθα,
πολλάκις καὶ διανοούμεθά τι· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις
παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐνίοτε ἄλλα ἐννοοῦμεν. φανείη δ' ἄν
τῳ τοῦτο, εἴ τις προσέχοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ πειρῷτο μνημονεύειν
20 ἀναστάς. ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ ἑωράκασιν ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα, οἷον
οἱ δοκοῦντες κατὰ τὸ μνημονικὸν παράγγελμα τίθεσθαι τὰ
προβαλλόμενα· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς πολλάκις ἄλλο τι
παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων εἰς τὸν τόπον φάντασμα·
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐνύπνιον πᾶν τὸ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα,
25 καὶ ὅτι ὃ ἐννοοῦμεν τῇ δόξῃ δοξάζομεν. δῆλον δὲ
περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων τό γε τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ᾧ καὶ
ἐγρηγορότες ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἀπατώμεθα, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ
ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ ποιεῖ τὸ πάθος. καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι δὲ καὶ εἰδόσιν
ὅμως ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' εἴτε δὴ ταὐτὸν εἴθ'
30 ἕτερον τὸ φανταστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδὲν
ἧττον οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι· τὸ γὰρ
παρορᾶν καὶ παρακούειν ὁρῶντος ἀληθές τι καὶ ἀκούοντος, οὐ
μέντοι τοῦτο ὃ οἴεται. ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕπνῳ ὑπόκειται μηδὲν ὁρᾶν
1whether the affection is one which pertains to the faculty of intelligence or to that of sense-perception; for these are the only faculties within us by which we acquire knowledge.
If, then, the exercise of the faculty of sight is actual seeing, that of the auditory faculty, hearing, and, in general that of the faculty of sense-perception, perceiving; and if there are some perceptions 5common to the senses, such as figure, magnitude, motion, &c., while there are others, as colour, sound, taste, peculiar [each to its own sense]; and further, if all creatures, when the eyes are closed in sleep, are unable to see, and the analogous statement is true of the other senses, so that manifestly we perceive nothing when asleep; we may conclude that it is not by sense-perception we perceive a dream.
10But neither is it by opinion that we do so. For [in dreams] we not only assert, e.g. that some object approaching is a man or a horse which would be an exercise of opinion , but that the object iswhite or beautiful, points on which opinion without sense-perception asserts nothing either truly or falsely. It is, however, a fact that the soul makes such assertions in sleep. We seem to see equally well that the approaching figure is a man, and that it is white. [In dreams], too, 15we think something else, over and above the dream presentation, just as we do in waking moments when we perceive something; for we often also reason about that which we perceive. So, too, in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than the mere phantasms immediately before our minds. This would be manifest to any one who should attend and try, immediately on arising from sleep, to remember [his dreaming experience]. 20There are cases of persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according to the mnemonic rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which they envisage into its mnemonic position. Hence it is plain that not every 'phantasm' in sleep is a mere dream-image, 25and that the further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the faculty of opinion.
So much at least is plain on all these points, viz. that the faculty by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected by disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in sleep. So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the facts of the case perfectly well, the sun, nevertheless, appears to them to be only a foot wide. Now, whether the presentative faculty of the soul be identical with, 30or different from, the faculty of sense-perception, in either case the illusion does not occur without our actually seeing or [otherwise] perceiving something. Even to see wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one who sees or hears something real, though not exactly what he supposes.
If, then, the exercise of the faculty of sight is actual seeing, that of the auditory faculty, hearing, and, in general that of the faculty of sense-perception, perceiving; and if there are some perceptions 5common to the senses, such as figure, magnitude, motion, &c., while there are others, as colour, sound, taste, peculiar [each to its own sense]; and further, if all creatures, when the eyes are closed in sleep, are unable to see, and the analogous statement is true of the other senses, so that manifestly we perceive nothing when asleep; we may conclude that it is not by sense-perception we perceive a dream.
10But neither is it by opinion that we do so. For [in dreams] we not only assert, e.g. that some object approaching is a man or a horse which would be an exercise of opinion , but that the object iswhite or beautiful, points on which opinion without sense-perception asserts nothing either truly or falsely. It is, however, a fact that the soul makes such assertions in sleep. We seem to see equally well that the approaching figure is a man, and that it is white. [In dreams], too, 15we think something else, over and above the dream presentation, just as we do in waking moments when we perceive something; for we often also reason about that which we perceive. So, too, in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than the mere phantasms immediately before our minds. This would be manifest to any one who should attend and try, immediately on arising from sleep, to remember [his dreaming experience]. 20There are cases of persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according to the mnemonic rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which they envisage into its mnemonic position. Hence it is plain that not every 'phantasm' in sleep is a mere dream-image, 25and that the further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the faculty of opinion.
So much at least is plain on all these points, viz. that the faculty by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected by disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in sleep. So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the facts of the case perfectly well, the sun, nevertheless, appears to them to be only a foot wide. Now, whether the presentative faculty of the soul be identical with, 30or different from, the faculty of sense-perception, in either case the illusion does not occur without our actually seeing or [otherwise] perceiving something. Even to see wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one who sees or hears something real, though not exactly what he supposes.
459a
1 μηδ' ἀκούειν μηδ' ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μὲν μὴ ὁρᾶν
μηδὲν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν πάσχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀληθές,
ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὴν ὄψιν πάσχειν τι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
αἰσθήσεις, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορότος προςβάλλει
5 μέν πως τῇ αἰσθήσει, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορότος·
καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν ἡ δόξα λέγει ὅτι ψεῦδος, ὥσπερ
ἐγρηγορόσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ κατέχεται καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ φαντάσματι;
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ δοξάζοντος οὐδὲ τοῦ διανοουμένου
τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦμεν ἐνυπνιάζειν, φανερόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦ
10 αἰσθανομένου ἁπλῶς· ὁρᾶν γὰρ ἂν ἦν καὶ ἀκούειν ἁπλῶς.
ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ἐπισκεπτέον. ὑποκείσθω μὲν
οὖν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ φανερόν, ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τὸ πάθος, εἴπερ
καὶ ὁ ὕπνος· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλῳ μέν τινι τῶν ζῴων ὑπάρχει ὁ
ὕπνος, ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ. ἐπεὶ δὲ
15 περὶ φαντασίας ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς εἴρηται, καὶ ἔστι μὲν
τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι φανταστικῷ
καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἕτερον, ἔστι δὲ φαντασία ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς
κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινομένη κίνησις, τὸ δ' ἐνύπνιον
φάντασμά τι φαίνεται εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα
20 ἐνύπνιον λέγομεν, εἴθ' ἁπλῶς εἴτε τρόπον τινὰ γινόμενον),
φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέν ἐστι τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, τούτου δ' ᾗ
φανταστικόν.
1But we have assumed that in sleep one neither sees, nor hears, nor exercises any sense whatever. Perhaps we may regard it as true that the dreamer sees nothing, yet as false that his faculty of sense-perception is unaffected, the fact being that the sense of seeing and the other senses may possibly be then in a certain way affected, while each of these affections, as duly as when he is awake, gives its impulse in a certain manner to his [primary] faculty of sense, 5though not in precisely the same manner as when he is awake. Sometimes, too, opinion says [to dreamers] just as to those who are awake, that the object seen is an illusion; at other times it is inhibited, and becomes a mere follower of the phantasm.
It is plain therefore that this affection, which we name 'dreaming', is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence, but yet is not an affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense. If it were the latter 10it would be possible [when asleep] to hear and see in the simple sense.
How then, and in what manner, it takes place, is what we have to examine. Let us assume, what is indeed clear enough, that the affection [of dreaming] pertains to sense-perception as surely as sleep itself does. For sleep does not pertain to one organ in animals and dreaming to another; both pertain to the same organ.
But since we have, 15in our work On the Soul, treated of presentation, and the faculty of presentation is identical with that of sense-perception, though the essential notion of a faculty of presentation is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since presentation is the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in sleep-whether simply or in some particular way-20is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception, but belongs to this faculty qua presentative.
It is plain therefore that this affection, which we name 'dreaming', is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence, but yet is not an affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense. If it were the latter 10it would be possible [when asleep] to hear and see in the simple sense.
How then, and in what manner, it takes place, is what we have to examine. Let us assume, what is indeed clear enough, that the affection [of dreaming] pertains to sense-perception as surely as sleep itself does. For sleep does not pertain to one organ in animals and dreaming to another; both pertain to the same organ.
But since we have, 15in our work On the Soul, treated of presentation, and the faculty of presentation is identical with that of sense-perception, though the essential notion of a faculty of presentation is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since presentation is the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in sleep-whether simply or in some particular way-20is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception, but belongs to this faculty qua presentative.
Chapter 2 (459a23–460b27)
Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον, καὶ πῶς γίνεται, ἐκ τῶν περὶ
τὸν ὕπνον συμβαινόντων μάλιστ' ἂν θεωρήσαιμεν. τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ
25 καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον ἡμῖν ἐμποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν,
καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν πάθος οὐ μόνον ἐνυπάρχει ἐν
τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθουσῶν.
παραπλήσιον γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐπί τε τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν φερομένων ἔοικεν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων τοῦ
30 κινήσαντος οὐκέτι θιγγάνοντος κινεῖται· τὸ γὰρ κινῆσαν ἐκίνησεν
ἀέρα τινά, καὶ πάλιν οὗτος κινούμενος ἕτερον· καὶ τοῦτον
δὴ τὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἂν στῇ, ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν καὶ ἐν
23We can best obtain a scientific view of the nature of the dream and the manner in which it originates by regarding it in the light of the circumstances attending sleep. The objects of sense-perception 25corresponding to each sensory organ produce sense-perception in us, and the affection due to their operation is present in the organs of sense not only when the perceptions are actualized, but even when they have departed.
What happens in these cases may be compared with what happens in the case of projectiles moving in space. For in the case of these 30the movement continues even when that which set up the movement is no longer in contact [with the things that are moved]. For that which set them in motion moves a certain portion of air, and this, in turn, being moved excites motion in another portion; and so, accordingly, it is in this way that [the bodies], whether in air or in liquids, continue moving, until they come to a standstill.
What happens in these cases may be compared with what happens in the case of projectiles moving in space. For in the case of these 30the movement continues even when that which set up the movement is no longer in contact [with the things that are moved]. For that which set them in motion moves a certain portion of air, and this, in turn, being moved excites motion in another portion; and so, accordingly, it is in this way that [the bodies], whether in air or in liquids, continue moving, until they come to a standstill.
459b
1 ἀέρι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ ὑπολαβεῖν τοῦτο δεῖ καὶ
ἐπ' ἀλλοιώσεως· τὸ γὰρ θερμανθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ τὸ πλησίον
θερμαίνει, καὶ τοῦτο διαδίδωσιν ἕως τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὥστε
καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἀλλοίωσίς τις ἡ κατ'
5 ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. διὸ τὸ πάθος
ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ἐν αἰσθανομένοις τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἐν πεπαυμένοις, καὶ ἐν βάθει καὶ ἐπιπολῆς. φανερὸν δὲ
ὅταν συνεχῶς αἰσθανώμεθά τι· μεταφερόντων γὰρ τὴν αἴσθησιν
ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ πάθος, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου εἰς τὸ σκότος·
10 συμβαίνει γὰρ μηδὲν ὁρᾶν διὰ τὴν ἔτι ὑποῦσαν κίνησιν ἐν
τοῖς ὄμμασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτός. κἂν πρὸς ἓν χρῶμα πολὺν
χρόνον βλέψωμεν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ χλωρόν, τοιοῦτον φαίνεται
ἐφ' ὅπερ ἂν τὴν ὄψιν μεταβάλωμεν. κἂν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον
βλέψαντες ἢ ἄλλο τι λαμπρὸν μύσωμεν, παρατηρήσασι
15 φαίνεται κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, ᾗ συμβαίνει τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν, πρῶτον
μὲν τοιοῦτον τὴν χρόαν, εἶτα μεταβάλλει εἰς φοινικοῦν
κἄπειτα πορφυροῦν, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὴν μέλαιναν ἔλθῃ χρόαν
καὶ ἀφανισθῇ. καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κινουμένων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν,
οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ποταμῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τάχιστα
20 ῥεόντων, φαίνεται [γὰρ] τὰ ἠρεμοῦντα κινούμενα. γίνονται δὲ
καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων δύσκωφοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν
ὀσμῶν δύσοσμοι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων <ὁμοίως>. ταῦτά γε
δὴ φανερῶς συμβαίνει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ ταχὺ τὰ
αἰσθητήρια καὶ μικρᾶς διαφορᾶς αἰσθάνεται, σημεῖον τὸ
25 ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνόπτρων γινόμενον· περὶ οὗ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήσας
σκέψαιτό τις ἂν καὶ ἀπορήσειεν. ἅμα δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ δῆλον
ὅτι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ὄψις πάσχει, οὕτω καὶ ποιεῖ τι. ἐν γὰρ
τοῖς ἐνόπτροις τοῖς σφόδρα καθαροῖς, ὅταν τῶν καταμηνίων
ταῖς γυναιξὶ γινομένων ἐμβλέψωσιν εἰς τὸ κάτοπτρον,
30 γίνεται τὸ ἐπιπολῆς τοῦ ἐνόπτρου οἷον νεφέλη αἱματώδης·
κἂν μὲν καινὸν ᾖ τὸ κάτοπτρον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐκμάξαι τὴν τοιαύτην
κηλίδα, ἐὰν δὲ παλαιόν, ῥᾷον. αἴτιον δέ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν,
1This we must likewise assume to happen in the case of qualitative change; for that part which [for example] has been heated by something hot, heats [in turn] the part next to it, and this propagates the affection continuously onwards until the process has come round to its oint of origination. 5This must also happen in the organ wherein the exercise of sense-perception takes place, since sense-perception, as realized in actual perceiving, is a mode of qualitative change. This explains why the affection continues in the sensory organs, both in their deeper and in their more superficial parts, not merely while they are actually engaged in perceiving, but even after they have ceased to do so. That they do this, indeed, is obvious in cases where we continue for some time engaged in a particular form of perception, for then, when we shift the scene of our perceptive activity, the previous affection remains; for instance, when we have turned our gaze from sunlight into darkness. 10For the result of this is that one sees nothing, owing to the excited by the light still subsisting in our eyes. Also, when we have looked steadily for a long while at one colour, e.g. at white or green, that to which we next transfer our gaze appears to be of the same colour. Again if, after having looked at the sun or some other brilliant object, we close the eyes, then, if we watch carefully, 15it appears in a right line with the direction of vision (whatever this may be), at first in its own colour; then it changes to crimson, next to purple, until it becomes black and disappears. And also when persons turn away from looking at objects in motion, e.g. rivers, and especially 20those which flow very rapidly, they find that the visual stimulations still present themselves, for the things really at rest are then seen moving: persons become very deaf after hearing loud noises, and after smelling very strong odours their power of smelling is impaired; and similarly in other cases. These phenomena manifestly take place in the way above described.
That the sensory organs are acutely sensitive to even a slight qualitative difference [in their objects] 25is shown by what happens in the case of mirrors; a subject to which, even taking it independently, one might devote close consideration and inquiry. At the same time it becomes plain from them that as the eye [in seeing] is affected [by the object seen], so also it produces a certain effect upon it. If a woman chances during her menstrual period to look into a highly polished mirror, 30the surface of it will grow cloudy with a blood-coloured haze.
That the sensory organs are acutely sensitive to even a slight qualitative difference [in their objects] 25is shown by what happens in the case of mirrors; a subject to which, even taking it independently, one might devote close consideration and inquiry. At the same time it becomes plain from them that as the eye [in seeing] is affected [by the object seen], so also it produces a certain effect upon it. If a woman chances during her menstrual period to look into a highly polished mirror, 30the surface of it will grow cloudy with a blood-coloured haze.
460a
1 ὅτι οὐ μόνον πάσχει ἡ ὄψις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ποιεῖ τι καὶ κινεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ λαμπρά· καὶ γὰρ
ἡ ὄψις τῶν λαμπρῶν καὶ ἐχόντων χρῶμα. τὰ μὲν οὖν
ὄμματα εὐλόγως, ὅταν ᾖ τὰ καταμήνια, διακεῖται ὥσπερ καὶ
5 ἕτερον μέρος ὁτιοῦν· καὶ γὰρ φύσει τυγχάνουσι φλεβώδεις
ὄντες. διὸ γινομένων τῶν καταμηνίων διὰ ταραχὴν καὶ
φλεγμασίαν αἱματικὴν ἡμῖν μὲν ἡ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι διαφορὰ
ἄδηλος, ἔνεστι δέ (ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις σπέρματος καὶ
καταμηνίων), ὁ δ' ἀὴρ κινεῖται ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν
10 κατόπτρων ἀέρα συνεχῆ ὄντα ποιόν τινα ποιεῖ καὶ τοιοῦτον
οἷον αὐτὸς πάσχει· ὁ δὲ τοῦ κατόπτρου τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν.
ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἱματίων, τὰ μάλιστα καθαρὰ τάχιστα κηλιδοῦται·
τὸ γὰρ καθαρὸν ἀκριβῶς δηλοῖ ὅ τι ἂν δέξηται,
καὶ τὸ μάλιστα τὰς ἐλαχίστας κινήσεις. ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς διὰ μὲν
15 τὸ λεῖος εἶναι ὁποιασοῦν ἁφῆς αἰσθάνεται μάλιστα (δεῖ δὲ
νοῆσαι οἷον τρίψιν οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος ἁφὴν καὶ ὥσπερ ἔκμαξιν
καὶ ἀνάπλυσιν), διὰ δὲ τὸ καθαρὸν ἔνδηλος γίνεται
ὁπηλικηοῦν οὖσα. τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀπιέναι ταχέως ἐκ τῶν καινῶν
κατόπτρων αἴτιον τὸ καθαρὸν εἶναι καὶ λεῖον· διαδεύται
20 γὰρ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰς βάθος καὶ πάντῃ, διὰ
μὲν τὸ καθαρὸν εἰς βάθος, διὰ δὲ τὸ λεῖον πάντῃ. ἐν δὲ
τοῖς παλαιοῖς οὐκ ἐμμένει, ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσδύεται ἡ κηλὶς
ἀλλ' ἐπιπολαιότερον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μικρῶν
διαφορῶν γίνεται κίνησις, καὶ ὅτι ταχεῖα ἡ αἴσθησις,
25 καὶ ὅτι οὐ μόνον πάσχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντιποιεῖ τὸ τῶν χρωμάτων
αἰσθητήριον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις
καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς οἴνους καὶ τὴν μυρεψίαν συμβαίνοντα.
τό τε γὰρ παρασκευασθὲν ἔλαιον ταχέως λαμβάνει
τὰς τῶν πλησίον ὀσμάς, καὶ οἱ οἶνοι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάσχουσιν·
30 οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν ἐμβαλλομένων ἢ ὑποκιρναμένων
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίον τοῖς ἀγγείοις τιθεμένων ἢ πεφυκότων
ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὰς ὀσμάς. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
1It is very hard to remove this stain from a new mirror, but easier to remove from an older mirror. As we have said before, the cause of this lies in the fact that in the act of sight there occurs not only a passion in the sense organ acted on by the polished surface, but the organ, as an agent, also produces an action, as is proper to a brilliant object. For sight is the property of an organ possessing brilliance and colour. The eyes, therefore, have their proper action as have other parts of the body. 5Because it is natural to the eye to be filled with blood-vessels, a woman's eyes, during the period of menstrual flux and inflammation, will undergo a change, although her husband will not note this since his seed is of the same nature as that of his wife. The surrounding atmosphere, through which operates the action of sight, 10and which surrounds the mirror also, will undergo a change of the same sort that occurred shortly before in the woman's eyes, and hence the surface of the mirror is likewise affected. And as in the case of a garment, the cleaner it is the more quickly it is soiled, so the same holds true in the case of the mirror. For anything that is clean will show quite clearly a stain that it chances to receive, and the cleanest object shows up even the slightest stain. A bronze mirror, because of its shininess, 15is especially sensitive to any sort of contact (the movement of the surrounding air acts upon it like a rubbing or pressing or wiping); on that account, therefore, what is clean will show up clearly the slightest touch on its surface. It is hard to cleanse smudges off new mirrors because 20the stain penetrates deeply and is suffused to all parts; it penetrates deeply because the mirror is not a dense medium, and is suffused widely because of the smoothness of the object. On the other hand, in the case of old mirrors, stains do not remain because they do not penetrate deeply, but only smudge the surface.
From this therefore it is plain that stimulatory motion is set up even by slight differences, and that sense-perception is quick to respond to it; and further that 25the organ which perceives colour is not only affected by its object, but also reacts upon it. Further evidence to the same point is afforded by what takes place in wines, and in the manufacture of unguents. For both oil, when prepared, and wine become rapidly infected by the odours of the things near them; 30they not only acquire the odours of the things thrown into or mixed with them, but also those of the things which are placed, or which grow, near the vessels containing them.
In order to answer our original question, let us now, therefore, assume one proposition, which is clear from what precedes, viz.
From this therefore it is plain that stimulatory motion is set up even by slight differences, and that sense-perception is quick to respond to it; and further that 25the organ which perceives colour is not only affected by its object, but also reacts upon it. Further evidence to the same point is afforded by what takes place in wines, and in the manufacture of unguents. For both oil, when prepared, and wine become rapidly infected by the odours of the things near them; 30they not only acquire the odours of the things thrown into or mixed with them, but also those of the things which are placed, or which grow, near the vessels containing them.
In order to answer our original question, let us now, therefore, assume one proposition, which is clear from what precedes, viz.
460b
1 σκέψιν ὑποκείσθω ἓν μέν, ὅπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν,
ὅτι καὶ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ ἐμμένει τὰ αἰσθήματα
αἰσθητὰ ὄντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἀπατώμεθα
περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ
5 ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς ἐν φόβῳ, ὁ δ' ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἔρωτι,
ὥστε δοκεῖν ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τὸν μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους
ὁρᾶν, τὸν δὲ τὸν ἐρώμενον· καὶ ταῦτα ὅσῳ ἂν ἐμπαθέστερος
ᾖ, τοσούτῳ ἀπ' ἐλάσσονος ὁμοιότητος φαίνεται. τὸν αὐτὸν
δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν ὀργαῖς καὶ ἐν πάσαις ἐπιθυμίαις εὐαπάτητοι
10 γίνονται πάντες, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐν
τοῖς πάθεσιν ὦσιν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς πυρέττουσιν ἐνίοτε φαίνεται
ζῷα ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τῶν γραμμῶν
συντιθεμένων. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐνίοτε συνεπιτείνει τοῖς πάθεσιν οὕτως,
ὥστε, ἂν μὲν μὴ σφόδρα κάμνωσι, μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι
15 ψεῦδος, ἐὰν δὲ μεῖζον ᾖ τὸ πάθος, καὶ κινεῖσθαι πρὸς
αὐτά. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνειν ταῦτα τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν
δύναμιν κρίνειν τό τε κύριον καὶ ᾧ τὰ φαντάσματα
γίνεται. τούτου δὲ σημεῖον ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος,
ἀντίφησι δὲ πολλάκις ἕτερόν τι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν.
20 καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἓν δύο φαίνεται,
ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔ φαμεν δύο· κυριωτέρα γὰρ τῆς ἁφῆς
ἡ ὅψις. εἰ δ' ἦν ἡ ἁφὴ μόνη, κἂν ἐκρίνομεν τὸ ἓν δύο. τοῦ
δὲ διεψεῦσθαι αἴτιον ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κινοῦντος
φαίνεται ἁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κινουμένης αὐτῆς,
25 ἐὰν ὡσαύτως κινῆται ὥσπερ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ·
λέγω δ' οἷον ἡ γῆ δοκεῖ τοῖς πλέουσι κινεῖσθαι κινουμένης
τῆς ὄψεως ὑπ' ἄλλου.
1that even when the external object of perception has departed, the impressions it has made persist, and are themselves objects of perception: and [let us assume], besides, that we are easily deceived respecting the operations of sense-perception when we are excited by emotions, and different persons according to their different emotions; for example, 5the coward when excited by fear, the amorous person by amorous desire; so that, with but little resemblance to go upon, the former thinks he sees his foes approaching, the latter, that he sees the object of his desire; and the more deeply one is under the influence of the emotion, the less similarity is required to give rise to these illusory impressions. Thus too, both in fits of anger, and also in all states of appetite, 10all men become easily deceived, and more so the more their emotions are excited. This is the reason too why persons in the delirium of fever sometimes think they see animals on their chamber walls, an illusion arising from the faint resemblance to animals of the markings thereon when put together in patterns; and this sometimes corresponds with the emotional states of the sufferers, in such a way that, if the latter be not very ill, 15they know well enough that it is an illusion; but if the illness is more severe they actually move according to the appearances. The cause of these occurrences is that the faculty in virtue of which the controlling sense judges is not identical with that in virtue of which presentations come before the mind. A proof of this is, that the sun presents itself as only a foot in diameter, though often something else gainsays the presentation. 20Again, when the fingers are crossed, the one object placed between them is felt [by the touch] as two; but yet we denythat it is two; for sight is more authoritative than touch. Yet, if touch stood alone, we should actually have pronounced the one object to be two. The ground of such false judgements is that any appearances whatever present themselves, not only when its object stimulates a sense, but also when the sense by itself alone is stimulated, 25provided only it be stimulated in the same manner as it is by the object. For example, to persons sailing past the land seems to move, when it is really the eye that is being moved by something else [the moving ship.]
Chapter 3 (460b28–462b11)
Ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐγρηγορότων αἱ κινήσεις
αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων γινόμεναι τῶν τε θύραθεν
30 καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐνυπάρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν γένηται
τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὃ καλεῖται ὕπνος, καὶ μᾶλλον τότε
φαίνονται. μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκρούονται ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν
28From this it is manifest that the stimulatory movements based upon sensory impressions, whether the latter are derived from external objects 30or from causes within the body, present themselves not only when persons are awake, but also then, when this affection which is called sleep has come upon them, with even greater impressiveness. For by day, while the senses and the intellect are working together, they (i.e.
461a
1 αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ἀφανίζονται ὥσπερ παρὰ
πολὺ πῦρ ἔλαττον καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἡδοναὶ μικραὶ παρὰ
μεγάλας, παυσαμένων δὲ ἐπιπολάζει καὶ τὰ μικρά· νύκτωρ
δὲ δι' ἀργίαν τῶν κατὰ μόριον αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἀδυναμίαν
5 τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἔξω εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς γίνεσθαι
τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ παλίρροιαν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως
καταφέρονται καὶ γίνονται φανεραὶ καθισταμένης τῆς
ταραχῆς. δεῖ δὲ ὑπολαβεῖν ὥσπερ τὰς μικρὰς δίνας τὰς
ἐν τοῖς ποταμοῖς γινομένας, οὕτω τὴν κίνησιν ἑκάστην γίνεσθαι
10 συνεχῶς, πολλάκις μὲν ὁμοίως, πολλάκις δὲ διαλυομένας
εἰς ἄλλα σχήματα διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. διὸ καὶ
μετὰ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ πάμπαν νέοις οὖσιν, οἷον τοῖς παιδίοις,
οὐ γίνεται ἐνύπνια· πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ
τῆς τροφῆς θερμότητα. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐν ὑγρῷ, ἐὰν σφόδρα
15 κινῇ τις, ὁτὲ μὲν οὐθὲν φαίνεται εἴδωλον, ὁτὲ δὲ φαίνεται
μέν, διεστραμμένον δὲ πάμπαν, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι ἀλλοῖον
ἢ οἷόν ἐστιν, ἠρεμήσαντος δὲ καθαρὰ καὶ φανερά, οὕτω καὶ
ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ αἱ ὑπόλοιποι κινήσεις
αἱ συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων ὁτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ
20 μείζονος οὔσης τῆς εἰρημένης κινήσεως ἀφανίζονται πάμπαν,
ὁτὲ δὲ τεταραγμέναι φαίνονται αἱ ὄψεις καὶ τερατώδεις,
καὶ οὐκ εἰρόμενα τὰ ἐνύπνια, οἷον τοῖς μελαγχολικοῖς
καὶ πυρέττουσι καὶ οἰνωμένοις· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα
πάθη πνευματώδη ὄντα πολλὴν ποιεῖ κίνησιν καὶ ταραχήν.
25 καθισταμένου δὲ καὶ διακρινομένου τοῦ αἵματος ἐν τοῖς
ἐναίμοις, σῳζομένη τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἡ κίνησις ἀφ' ἑκάστου
τῶν αἰσθητηρίων εἰρόμενά τε ποιεῖ τὰ ἐνύπνια, καὶ φαίνεσθαί
τι καὶ δοκεῖν διὰ μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καταφερόμενα
ὁρᾶν, διὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκούειν, ὁμοιοτρόπως
30 δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν
ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐγρηγορὼς δοκεῖ
1such movements) are extruded from consciousness or obscured, just as a smaller is beside a larger fire, or as small beside great pains or pleasures, though, as soon as the latter have ceased, even those which are trifling emerge into notice. But by night i.e. in sleep owing to the inaction of the particular senses, andtheir powerlessness to realize themselves, 5which arises from the reflux of the hot from the exterior parts to the interior, they i.e. the above 'movements' are borne in to the head quarters ofsense-perception, and there display themselves as the disturbance (of waking life) subsides. We must suppose that, like the little eddies which are being ever formed in rivers, so the sensory movements 10are each a continuous process, often remaining like what they were when first started, but often, too, broken into other forms by collisions with obstacles. This [last mentioned point], moreover, gives the reason why no dreams occur in sleep immediately after meals, or to sleepers who are extremely young, e.g. to infants. The internal movement in such cases is excessive, owing to the heat generated from the food. Hence, just as in a liquid, 15if one vehemently disturbs it, sometimes no reflected image appears, while at other times one appears, indeed, but utterly distorted, so as to seem quite unlike its original; while, when once the motion has ceased, the reflected images are clear and plain; in the same manner during sleep the phantasms, or residuary movements, which are based upon the sensory impressions, 20become sometimes quite obliterated by the above described motion when too violent; while at other times the sights are indeed seen, but confused and weird, and the dreams which then appear are unhealthy, like those of persons who areatrabilious, or feverish, or intoxicated with wine. For all such affections, being spirituous, cause much commotion and disturbance. 25In sanguineous animals, in proportion as the blood becomes calm, and as its purer are separated from its less pure elements, the fact that the movement, based on impressions derived from each of the organs of sense, is preserved in its integrity, renders the dreams healthy, causes a [clear] image to present itself, and makes the dreamer think, owing to the effects borne in from the organ of sight, that he actually sees, and owing to those which come from the organ of hearing, that he really hears; 30and so on with those also which proceed from the other sensory organs. For it is owing to the fact that the movement which reaches the primary organ of sense comes from them, that one even when awake believes himself to see, or hear, or otherwise perceive; just as it is from a belief that the organ of sight is being stimulated, though in reality not so stimulated, that we sometimes erroneously declare ourselves to see, or that, from the fact that touch announces two movements, we think that the one object is two.
461b
1 ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ὄψιν
ἐνίοτε κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖν, οὐ κινουμένην, ὁρᾶν φαμεν, καὶ τῷ τὴν
ἁφὴν δύο κινήσεις εἰσαγγέλλειν τὸ ἓν δύο δοκεῖ. ὅλως
γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεώς φησιν ἡ ἀρχή, ἐὰν μὴ ἑτέρα
5 κυριωτέρα ἀντιφῇ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ
πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἂν τὸ ἐπικρῖνον κατέχηται ἢ
μὴ κινῆται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν. ὥσπερ δ' εἴπομεν ὅτι ἄλλοι
δι' ἄλλο πάθος εὐαπάτητοι, οὕτως ὁ καθεύδων διὰ τὸν ὕπνον
καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ τἆλλα τὰ συμβαίνοντα
10 περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥστε τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον ὁμοιότητα φαίνεται
ἐκεῖνο. ὅταν γὰρ καθεύδῃ, κατιόντος τοῦ πλείστου αἵματος
ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν συγκατέρχονται αἱ ἐνοῦσαι κινήσεις, αἱ μὲν
δυνάμει αἱ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστε ἐν τῇ κινήσει
τῃδὶ ἥδε ἐπιπολάσει ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἡ κίνησις, ἂν δ' αὕτη φθαρῇ,
15 ἥδε. καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας δὴ ἔχουσιν ὥσπερ οἱ πεπλασμένοι
βάτραχοι οἱ ἀνιόντες ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τηκομένου τοῦ ἁλός—οὕτως
ἔνεισι δυνάμει, ἀνειμένου δὲ τοῦ κωλύοντος ἐνεργοῦσιν, καὶ
λυόμεναι ἐν ὀλίγῳ τῷ λοιπῷ αἵματι τῷ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις
κινοῦνται, ἔχουσαι ὁμοιότητα ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν, ἃ
20 παρεικάζουσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ κενταύροις ταχέως μεταβάλλοντα.
τούτων δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὑπόλειμμα
τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος· καὶ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ
ἀληθοῦς ἔνεστι, καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι τοιοῦτον οἷον Κορίσκος,
ἀλλ' οὐ Κορίσκος. ὅτε δὲ ᾐσθάνετο, οὐκ ἔλεγε Κορίσκον
25 τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ἐπικρῖνον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον Κορίσκον
τὸν ἀληθινόν. ὃ δὴ καὶ αἰσθανόμενον λέγει τοῦτο, ἐὰν
μὴ παντελῶς κατέχηται ὑπὸ τοῦ αἵματος, ὥσπερ αἰσθανόμενον
τοῦτο κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις,
καὶ δοκεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές· καὶ τοςαύτη
30 τοῦ ὕπνου ἡ δύναμις ὥστε ποιεῖν τοῦτο λανθάνειν. ὥσπερ
οὖν εἴ τινα λανθάνοι ὑποβαλλόμενος ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ,
1For, as a rule, the governing sense affirms the report of each particular sense, unless another particular sense, 5more authoritative, makes a contradictory report. In every case an appearance presents itself, but what appears does not in every case seem real, unless when the deciding faculty is inhibited, or does not move with its proper motion. Moreover, as we said that different men are subject to illusions, each according to the different emotion present in him, so it is that the sleeper, owing to sleep, and to the movements then going on in his sensory organs, as well as to the other facts of the sensory process, [is liable to illusion], 10so that the dream presentation, though but little like it, appears as some actual given thing. For when one is asleep, in proportion as most of the blood sinks inwards to its fountain [the heart], the internal sensory movements, some potential, others actual accompany itinwards. They are so related [in general] that, if anything move the blood, some one sensory movement will emerge from it, while if this perishes another will take its place; 15while to one another also they are related in the same way as the artificial frogs in water which severally rise [in fixed succesion] to the surface in the order in which the salt [which keeps them down] becomes dissolved. The residuary movements are like these: they are within the soul potentially, but actualize themselves only when the impediment to their doing so has been relaxed; and according as they are thus set free, they begin to move in the blood which remains in the sensory organs, and which is now but scanty, while they possess verisimilitude after the manner of cloud-shapes, which in their rapid metamorphoses one 20compares now to human beings and a moment afterwards to centaurs. Each of them is however, as has been said, the remnant of a sensory impression taken when sense was actualizing itself; and when this, the true impression, has departed, its remnant is still immanent, and it is correct to say of it, that though not actually Koriskos, it is like Koriskos. For when the person was actually perceiving, 25his controlling and judging sensory faculty did not call it Koriskos, but, prompted by this [impression], called the genuine person yonder Koriskos. Accordingly, this sensory impulse, which, when actually perceiving, it [the controlling faculty] describes (unless completely inhibited by the blood), it now [in dreams] when quasi-perceiving, receives from the movements persisting in the sense-organs, and mistakes it-an impulse that is merely like the true [objective] impression-for the true impression itself, while 30the effect of sleep is so great that it causes this mistake to pass unnoticed.
462a
1 οὐ μόνον φανεῖται ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξει εἶναι δύο τὸ ἕν, ἂν
δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανεῖται μὲν οὐ δόξει δέ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ὕπνοις, ἐὰν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει, καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἐν ᾧ
ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ, φαίνεται μέν, λέγει δέ τι ἐν αὐτῷ
5 ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν Κορίσκος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὁ Κορίσκος (πολλάκις
γὰρ καθεύδοντος λέγει τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτι ἐνύπνιον τὸ
φαινόμενον)· ἐὰν δὲ λανθάνῃ ὅτι καθεύδει, οὐδὲν ἀντιφήσει τῇ
φαντασίᾳ. ὅτι δὲ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν καὶ εἰσὶ κινήσεις φανταστικαὶ
ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, δῆλον, ἐάν τις προσέχων πειρᾶται
10 μνημονεύειν ἃ πάσχομεν καταφερόμενοί τε καὶ ἐγειρόμενοι·
ἐνίοτε γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα εἴδωλα καθεύδοντι φωράσει
ἐγειρόμενος κινήσεις οὔσας ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις· καὶ ἐνίοις γε
τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ πάμπαν διαβλέπουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ σκότος, φαίνεται
εἴδωλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, ὥστ' ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι πολλάκις
15 φοβουμένους. ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἁπάντων δεῖ συλλογίσασθαι
ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον φάντασμα μέν τι καὶ ἐν ὕπνῳ· τὰ γὰρ
ἄρτι λεχθέντα εἴδωλα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνύπνια, οὐδ' εἴ τι ἄλλο λελυμένων
τῶν αἰσθήσεων φαίνεται· οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα
πᾶν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐνίοις συμβαίνει καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί
20 πῃ καὶ ψόφων καὶ φωτὸς καὶ χυμοῦ καὶ ἁφῆς, ἀσθενικῶς
μέντοι καὶ οἷον πόρρωθεν· ἤδη γὰρ ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν
ὑποβλέποντες, ὃ ἠρέμα ἑώρων φῶς τοῦ λύχνου καθεύδοντες,
ὡς ᾤοντο, ἐπεγερθέντες εὐθὺς ἐγνώρισαν τὸ τοῦ λύχνου
ὄν, καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνων καὶ κυνῶν φωνὴν ἠρέμα ἀκούοντες ἐγερθέντες
25 σαφῶς ἐγνώρισαν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ ἀποκρίνονται ἐρωτώμενοι·
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ καθεύδειν ἁπλῶς
θατέρου ὑπάρχοντος θάτερόν πῃ ὑπάρχειν. ὧν οὐθὲν ἐνύπνιον
φατέον, οὐδ' ὅσαι δὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γίνονται ἀληθεῖς ἔννοιαι
παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φάντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς
30 κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν ᾖ, ᾗ καθεύδει,
τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐνύπνιον. ἤδη δέ τισι συμβέβηκεν μηδὲν
1Accordingly, just as if a finger be inserted beneath the eyeball without being observed, one object will not only present two visual images, but will create an opinion of its being two objects; while if it [the finger] be observed, the presentation will be the same, but the same opinion will not be formed of it; exactly so it is in states of sleep: if the sleeper perceives that he is asleep, and is conscious of the sleeping state during which the perception comes before his mind, it presents itself still, but something within him speaks to this effect: '5the image of Koriskos presents itself, but the real Koriskos is not present'; for often, when one is asleep, there is something in consciousness which declares that what then presents itself is but a dream. If, however, he is not aware of being asleep, there is nothing which will contradict the testimony of the bare presentation.
That what we here urge is true, i.e. that there are such presentative movements in the sensory organs, any one may convince himself, if he attends to and tries 10to remember the affections we experience when sinking into slumber or when being awakened. He will sometimes, in the moment of awakening, surprise the images which present themselves to him in sleep, and find that they are really but movements lurking in the organs of sense. And indeed some very young persons, if it is dark, though looking with wide open eyes, see multitudes of phantom figures moving before them, so that they often cover up their heads in terror.
15From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is, that the dream is a sort of presentation, and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when the sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream. For in the first place, some persons [when asleep] actually, in a certain way, 20perceive sounds, light, savour, and contact; feebly, however, and, as it were, remotely. For there have been cases in which persons while asleep, but with the eyes partly open, saw faintly in their sleep (as they supposed) the light of a lamp, and afterwards, on being awakened, straightway recognized it as the actual light of a real lamp; while, in other cases, persons who faintly heard the crowing of cocks or the barking of dogs identified these clearly with the real sounds as soon as they awoke. 25Some persons, too, return answers to questions put to them in sleep. For it is quite possible that, of waking or sleeping, while the one is present in the ordinary sense, the other also should be present in a certain way. But none of these occurrences should be called a dream. Nor should the true thoughts, as distinct from the mere presentations, which occur in sleep [be called dreams]. The dream proper is a presentation 30based on the movement of sense impressions, when such presentation occurs during sleep, taking sleep in the strict sense of the term.
That what we here urge is true, i.e. that there are such presentative movements in the sensory organs, any one may convince himself, if he attends to and tries 10to remember the affections we experience when sinking into slumber or when being awakened. He will sometimes, in the moment of awakening, surprise the images which present themselves to him in sleep, and find that they are really but movements lurking in the organs of sense. And indeed some very young persons, if it is dark, though looking with wide open eyes, see multitudes of phantom figures moving before them, so that they often cover up their heads in terror.
15From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is, that the dream is a sort of presentation, and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when the sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream. For in the first place, some persons [when asleep] actually, in a certain way, 20perceive sounds, light, savour, and contact; feebly, however, and, as it were, remotely. For there have been cases in which persons while asleep, but with the eyes partly open, saw faintly in their sleep (as they supposed) the light of a lamp, and afterwards, on being awakened, straightway recognized it as the actual light of a real lamp; while, in other cases, persons who faintly heard the crowing of cocks or the barking of dogs identified these clearly with the real sounds as soon as they awoke. 25Some persons, too, return answers to questions put to them in sleep. For it is quite possible that, of waking or sleeping, while the one is present in the ordinary sense, the other also should be present in a certain way. But none of these occurrences should be called a dream. Nor should the true thoughts, as distinct from the mere presentations, which occur in sleep [be called dreams]. The dream proper is a presentation 30based on the movement of sense impressions, when such presentation occurs during sleep, taking sleep in the strict sense of the term.
462b
1 ἐνύπνιον ἑωρακέναι κατὰ τὸν βίον, τοῖς δὲ πόρρω
που προελθούσης τῆς ἡλικίας ἰδεῖν πρότερον μὴ ἑωρακόσιν.
τὸ δ' αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι παραπλήσιον φαίνεται
5 τῷ ἐπὶ τῶν παιδίων καὶ μετὰ τὴν τροφήν. ὅσοις
γὰρ συνέστηκεν ἡ φύσις ὥστε πολλὴν ἀναθυμίασιν πρὸς
τὸν ἄνω τόπον ἀναφέρεσθαι, ἣ πάλιν καταφερομένη ποιεῖ
πλῆθος κινήσεως, εὐλόγως τούτοις οὐδὲν φαίνεται φάντασμα.
προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας οὐδὲν ἄτοπον φανῆναι ἐνύπνιον·
10 μεταβολῆς γάρ τινος γενομένης ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν ἢ κατὰ πάθος
ἀναγκαῖον συμβῆναι τὴν ἐναντίωσιν ταύτην.
1There are cases of persons who in their whole lives have never had a dream, while others dream when considerably advanced in years, having never dreamed before. The cause of their not having dreams appears somewhat 5like that which operates in the case of infants, and that which operates immediately after meals. It is intelligibleenough that no dream-presentation should occur to persons whose natural constitution is such that in them copious evaporation is borne upwards, which, when borne back downwards, causes a large quantity of motion. But it is not surprising that, as age advances, a dream should at length appear to them. 10Indeed, it is inevitable that, as a change is wrought in them in proportion to age or emotional experience, this reversal [from non-dreaming to dreaming] should occur also.
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