Burnet (OCT, 1901) · Fowler (1925)
11a ΣΩ.Ὅρα δή, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου
δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖν,
11b ἐὰν μή σοι κατὰ νοῦν ᾖ λεγόμενος. βούλει συγκεφαλαιωσώμεθα
ἑκάτερον;
Soc.Observe, then, Protarchus, what the doctrine is which you are now to accept from Philebus, and what our doctrine is, against which you are to argue, if you do not agree with it. Shall we make a brief statement of each of them?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.By all means.
ΣΩ.Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν
πᾶσι ζῴοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους
ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι
μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ
τὰ τούτων αὖ συγγενῆ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς,
τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῴω γίγνεσθαι σύμπασιν ὅσαπερ
11c αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν· δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν ὠφελιμώτατον
ἁπάντων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. μῶν
οὐχ οὕτω πως λέγομεν, ὦ Φίληβε, ἑκάτεροι;
Soc.Very well: Philebus says that to all living beings enjoyment and pleasure and gaiety and whatever accords with that sort of thing are a good; whereas our contention is that not these, but wisdom and thought and memory and their kindred, right opinion and true reasonings, are better and more excellent than pleasure for all who are capable of taking part in them, and that for all those now existing or to come who can partake of them they are the most advantageous of all things. Those are pretty nearly the two doctrines we maintain, are they not, Philebus?
ΦΙ.Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Phi.Yes, Socrates, exactly.
ΣΩ.Δέχῃ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
λόγον;
Soc.And do you, Protarchus, accept this doctrine which is now committed to you?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς
ἀπείρηκεν.
Pro.I must accept it; for our handsome Philebus has withdrawn.
ΣΩ.Δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τἀληθές πῃ περανθῆναι;
Soc.And must the truth about these doctrines be attained by every possible means?
11d ΠΡΩ.Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.Yes, it must.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δή, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τόδε.
Soc.Then let us further agree to this:
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.To what?
ΣΩ.Ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν
ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι
τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως;
Soc.That each of us will next try to prove clearly that it is a condition and disposition of the soul which can make life happy for all human beings. Is not that what we are going to do?
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Pro.It is.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ τὴν
τοῦ φρονεῖν;
Soc.Then you will show that it is the condition of pleasure, and I that it is that of wisdom?
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Pro.True.
ΣΩ.Τί δ' ἂν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῇ; μῶν οὐκ,
11e ἂν μὲν ἡδονῇ μᾶλλον φαίνηται συγγενής, ἡττώμεθα μὲν
ἀμφότεροι τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως βίου, κρατεῖ δὲ ὁ τῆς
12a ἡδονῆς τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;
Soc.What if some other life be found superior to these two? Then if that life is found to be more akin to pleasure, both of us are defeated, are we not, by the life which has firm possession of this superiority, but the life of pleasure is victor over the life of wisdom.
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ἂν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν,
ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται; ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογούμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς;
Soc.But if it is more akin to wisdom, then wisdom is victorious and pleasure is vanquished? Do you agree to that? Or what do you say?
ΠΡΩ.Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.
Pro.Yes, I at least am satisfied with that.
ΣΩ.Τί δὲ Φιλήβῳ; τί φῄς;
Soc.But how about you, Philebus? What do you say?
ΦΙ.Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ,
Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.
Phi.I think and always shall think that pleasure is the victor. But you, Protarchus, will make your own decision.
ΠΡΩ.Παραδούς, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν
ἔτι κύριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον.
Pro.Since you entrusted the argument to me, Philebus, you can no longer dictate whether to make the agreement with Socrates or not.
12b ΦΙ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιοῦμαι καὶ μαρτύρομαι
νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν.
Phi.True; and for that reason I wash my hands of it and now call upon the goddess herself to witness that I do so.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γε αὐτῶν συμμάρτυρες ἂν
εἶμεν, ὡς ταῦτα ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα
ἑξῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἑκόντος ἢ ὅπως
ἂν ἐθέλῃ πειρώμεθα περαίνειν.
Pro.And we also will bear witness to these words of yours. But all the same, Socrates, Philebus may agree or do as he likes, let us try to finish our argument in due order.
ΣΩ.Πειρατέον, ἀπ' αὐτῆς δὴ τῆς θεοῦ, ἣν ὅδε Ἀφροδίτην
μὲν λέγεσθαί φησι, τὸ δ' ἀληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομα Ἡδονὴν
εἶναι.
Soc.We must try, and let us begin with the very goddess who Philebus says is spoken of as Aphrodite but is most truly named Pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα.
Pro.Quite right.
12c ΣΩ.Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν
ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου
φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον,
ταύτῃ προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον,
καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ
καὶ σκοπεῖν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως
ἁπλῶς, ἕν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληφε καί τινα
τρόπον ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις. ἰδὲ γάρ· ἥδεσθαι μέν φαμεν
12d τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἥδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα
αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν· ἥδεσθαι δ' αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα
καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἥδεσθαι δ' αὖ
τὸν φρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν
ἑκατέρας πῶς ἄν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος
φαίνοιτο ἐνδίκως;
Soc.My awe, Protarchus, in respect to the names of the gods is always beyond the greatest human fear. And now I call Aphrodite by that name which is agreeable to her; but pleasure I know has various aspects, and since, as I said, we are to begin with her, we must consider and examine what her nature is. For, when you just simply hear her name, she is only one thing, but surely she takes on all sorts of shapes which are even, in a way, unlike each other. For instance, we say that the man who lives without restraint has pleasure, and that the self-restrained man takes pleasure in his very self-restraint; and again that the fool who is full of foolish opinions and hopes is pleased, and also that the wise man takes pleasure in his very wisdom. And would not any person who said these two kinds of pleasure were like each other be rightly regarded as a fool?
ΠΡΩ.Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται
πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ
12e ἡδονῇ γε ἡδονὴ [μὴ] οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ,
πάντων χρημάτων;
Pro.No, Socrates, for though they spring from opposite sources, they are not in themselves opposed to one another; for how can pleasure help being of all things most like pleasure, that is, like itself?
ΣΩ.Καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι· κατά γε αὐτὸ
τοῦτο οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χρῶμα εἶναι πᾶν, τό γε μὴν μέλαν
τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι
καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὂν τυγχάνει. καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι
κατὰ ταὐτόν· γένει μέν ἐστι πᾶν ἕν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν
13a αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητ' ἔχοντα
μυρίαν που τυγχάνει, καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα οὕτως ἔχονθ' εὑρήσομεν.
ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰ
ἐναντιώτατα ἓν ποιοῦντι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τινας ἡδονὰς
ἡδοναῖς εὑρήσομεν ἐναντίας.
Soc.Yes, my friend, and color is like color in so far as every one of them is a color they will all be the same, yet we all recognize that black is not only different from white, but is its exact opposite. And so, too, figure is like figure; they are all one in kind but the parts of the kind are in some instances absolutely opposed to each other, and in other cases there is endless variety of difference; and we can find many other examples of such relations. Do not, therefore, rely upon this argument, which makes all the most absolute opposites identical. I am afraid we shall find some pleasures the opposites of other pleasures.
ΠΡΩ.Ἴσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθ' ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;
Pro.Perhaps; but why will that injure my contention?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν,
ὀνόματι· λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντ' εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ
μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχὶ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ·
13b κακὰ δ' ὄντα αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν,
ὅμως πάντα σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμολογῶν ἀνόμοια
εἶναι, τῷ λόγῳ εἴ τίς σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί οὖν δὴ ταὐτὸν
ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;
Soc.Because I shall say that, although they are unlike, you apply to them a different designation. For you say that all pleasant things are good. Now no argument contends that pleasant things are not pleasant; but whereas most of them are bad and only some are good, as we assert, nevertheless you call them all good, though you confess, if forced to it by argument, that they are unlike. Now what is the identical element which exists in the good and bad pleasures alike and makes you call them all a good?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἴει γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι,
θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, εἶτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου
13c λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας
ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς;
Pro.What do you mean, Socrates? Do you suppose anyone who asserts that the good is pleasure will concede, or will endure to hear you say, that some pleasures are good and others bad?
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι
καί τινας ἐναντίας.
Soc.But you will concede that they are unlike and in some instances opposed to each other.
ΠΡΩ.Οὔτι καθ' ὅσον γε ἡδοναί.
Pro.Not in so far as they are pleasures.
ΣΩ.Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
οὐδ' ἄρα ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι
φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα
οὐδὲν τιτρώσκει, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐροῦμεν ἅπερ οἱ πάντων
13d φαυλότατοί τε καὶ περὶ λόγους ἅμα νέοι.
Soc.Here we are again at the same old argument, Protarchus, and we shall presently assert that one pleasure is not different from another, but all pleasures are alike, and the examples just cited do not affect us at all, but we shall behave and talk just like the most worthless and inexperienced reasoners.
ΠΡΩ.Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;
Pro.In what way do you mean?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι σε μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ
λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιότατόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιοτάτῳ πάντων
ὁμοιότατον, ἕξω τὰ αὐτὰ σοὶ λέγειν, καὶ φανούμεθά γε
νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχήσεται.
πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουώμεθα, καὶ τάχ' ἂν ἰόντες εἰς τὰς
ὁμοίας ἴσως ἄν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαιμεν.
Soc.Why, if I have the face to imitate you and to defend myself by saying that the utterly unlike is most completely like that which is most utterly unlike it, I can say the same things you said, and we shall prove ourselves to be excessively inexperienced, and our argument will be shipwrecked and lost. Let us, then, back her out, and perhaps if we start fair again we may come to an agreement.
13e ΠΡΩ.Λέγε πῶς;
Pro.How? Tell me.
ΣΩ.Ἐμὲ θὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε.
Soc.Assume, Protarchus, that I am questioned in turn by you.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον δή;
Pro.What question do I ask?
ΣΩ.Φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα
δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον ἀγαθά, διερωτώμενος ὅτι
ποτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ἆρ' οὐ ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῦτο ὅπερ ὁ σὸς
λόγος;
Soc.Whether wisdom and knowledge and intellect and all the things which I said at first were good, when you asked me what is good, will not have the same fate as this argument of yours.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.How is that?
ΣΩ.Πολλαί τε αἱ συνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι
καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῃ
14a γίγνονταί τινες, ἆρα ἄξιος ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ
φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην
ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι, κἄπειθ' ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ
μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῳζοίμεθα ἐπί τινος
ἀλογίας;
Soc.It will appear that the forms of knowledge collectively are many and some of them are unlike each other; but if some of them turn out to be actually opposites, should I be fit to engage in dialectics now if, through fear of just that, I should say that no form of knowledge is unlike any other, and then, as a consequence, our argument should vanish and be lost, like a tale that is told, and we ourselves should be saved by clinging to some irrational notion?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆναι.
τό γε μήν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει·
πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ
ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ διάφοροι.
Pro.No, that must never be, except the part about our being saved. However, I like the equal treatment of your doctrine and mine. Let us grant that pleasures are many and unlike and that the forms of knowledge are many and different.
14b ΣΩ.Τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ]
τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δὲ
εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμῶμεν, ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσωσι πότερον
ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἤ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι.
νῦν γὰρ οὐ δήπου πρός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονικοῦμεν, ὅπως
ἁγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθ' ἃ σύ, τῷ δ'
ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.
Soc.With no concealment, then, Protarchus, of the difference between my good and yours, but with fair and open acknowledgement of it, let us be bold and see if perchance on examination they will tell us whether we should say that pleasure is the good, or wisdom, or some other third principle. For surely the object of our present controversy is not to gain the victory for my assertions or yours, but both of us must fight for the most perfect truth.
ΠΡΩ.Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.Yes, we must.
14c ΣΩ.Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον δι' ὁμολογίας
βεβαιωσώμεθα.
Soc.Then let us establish this principle still more firmly by means of an agreement.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸν ποῖον δή;
Pro.What principle?
ΣΩ.Τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντα ἀνθρώποις πράγματα ἑκοῦσί τε
καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.
Soc.The principle which gives trouble to all men, to some of them sometimes against their will.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε σαφέστερον.
Pro.Speak more plainly.
ΣΩ.Τὸν νυνδὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα
θαυμαστόν. ἓν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ
θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων
ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ.
Soc.I mean the principle which came in our way just now; its nature is quite marvellous. For the assertions that one is many and many are one are marvellous, and it is easy to dispute with anyone who makes either of them.
ΠΡΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν λέγεις ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἕνα
14d γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους
ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον
τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;
Pro.You mean when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and that there are also many of me which are opposites of each other, asserting that I, the same Protarchus, am great and small and heavy and light and countless other things?
ΣΩ.Σὺ μέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν
θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι,
παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥᾴδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια
ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις
14e ἑκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἅμα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα
ταῦτα τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν
ὅτι τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι, τό τε ἓν ὡς πολλά ἐστι
καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἓν μόνον.
Soc.Those wonders concerning the one and the many which you have mentioned, Protarchus, are common property, and almost everybody is agreed that they ought to be disregarded because they are childish and easy and great hindrances to speculation; and this sort of thing also should be disregarded, when a man in his discussion divides the members and likewise the parts of anything, acknowledges that they all collectively are that one thing, and then mockingly refutes himself because he has been compelled to declare miracles—that the one is many and infinite and the many only one.
ΠΡΩ.Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερα λέγεις, ἃ μήπω
συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον;
Pro.But what other wonders do you mean, Socrates, in relation to this same principle, which are not yet common property and generally acknowledged?
15a ΣΩ.Ὁπόταν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἓν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ
ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται, καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν.
ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἕν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νυνδή,
συγκεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον
ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
ἕν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ
σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.
Soc.I mean, my boy, when a person postulates unity which is not the unity of one of the things which come into being and perish, as in the examples we had just now. For in cases of a unity of that sort, as I just said, it is agreed that refutation is needless. But when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty is one, or the good is one, the intense interest in these and similar unities becomes disagreement and controversy.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.How is that?
15b ΣΩ.Πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας
ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν
ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον
προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην; μετὰ
δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην
καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς
χωρίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτ' ἄν, ταὐτὸν καὶ
ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ
15c περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἓν καὶ πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
ἁπάσης ἀπορίας αἴτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας
[ἂν] αὖ καλῶς.
Soc.The first question is whether we should believe that such unities really exist; the second, how these unities, each of which is one, always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, can nevertheless be permanently this one unity; and the third, how in the infinite number of things which come into being this unity, whether we are to assume that it is dispersed and has become many, or that it is entirely separated from itself—which would seem to be the most impossible notion of all being the same and one, is to be at the same time in one and in many. These are the questions, Protarchus, about this kind of one and many, not those others, which cause the utmost perplexity, if ill solved, and are, if well solved, of the greatest assistance.
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκοῦν χρὴ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ νῦν
πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;
Pro.Then is it now, Socrates, our first duty to thresh this matter out?
ΣΩ.Ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.
Soc.Yes, that is what I should say.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβε συγχωρεῖν σοι
τούσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δ' ἴσως κράτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν
ἐπερωτῶντα μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.
Pro.You may assume, then, that we are all willing to agree with you about that; and perhaps it is best not to ask Philebus any questions; let sleeping dogs lie.
15d ΣΩ.Εἶεν· πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξηται πολλῆς οὔσης
καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης; ἆρ' ἐνθένδε;
Soc.Very well; then where shall we begin this great and vastly complicated battle about the matters at issue? Shall we start at this point?
ΠΡΩ.Πόθεν;
Pro.At what point?
ΣΩ.Φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενα
περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεί,
καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε
ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν
λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν· ὁ δὲ
πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὥς
15e τινα σοφίας ηὑρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ
πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἅσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ
συμφύρων εἰς ἕν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων,
εἰς ἀπορίαν αὑτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων,
δεύτερον δ' ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἄντε νεώτερος ἄντε πρεσβύτερος
ἄντε ἧλιξ ὢν τυγχάνῃ, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς
16a οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ζῴων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενὸς
ἂν φείσαιτο, εἴπερ μόνον ἑρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.
Soc.We say that one and many are identified by reason, and always, both now and in the past, circulate everywhere in every thought that is uttered. This is no new thing and will never cease; it is, in my opinion, a quality within us which will never die or grow old, and which belongs to reason itself as such. And any young man, when he first has an inkling of this, is delighted, thinking he has found a treasure of wisdom; his joy fills him with enthusiasm; he joyously sets every possible argument in motion, sometimes in one direction, rolling things up and kneading them into one, and sometimes again unrolling and dividing them; he gets himself into a muddle first and foremost, then anyone who happens to be near him, whether he be younger or older or of his own age; he spares neither father nor mother nor any other human being who can hear, and hardly even the lower animals, for he would certainly not spare a foreigner, if he could get an interpreter anywhere.
ΠΡΩ.Ἆρ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι
νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν, καὶ οὐ φοβῇ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου
συνεπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῇς; ὅμως δὲ μανθάνομεν γὰρ
ὃ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην
ταραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, ὁδὸν δέ
16b τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν, σύ τε προθυμοῦ
τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ
σμικρὸς ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.Socrates, do you not see how many we are and that we are all young men? Are you not afraid that we shall join with Philebus and attack you, if you revile us? However—for we understand your meaning—if there is any way or means of removing this confusion gently from our discussion and finding some better road than this to bring us towards the goal of our argument, kindly lead on, and we will do our best to follow for our present discussion, Socrates, is no trifling matter.
ΣΩ.Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ παῖδες, ὥς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσαγορεύων
Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο
ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα
ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.
Soc.No, it is not, boys, as Philebus calls you; and there certainly is no better road, nor can there ever be, than that which I have always loved, though it has often deserted me, leaving me lonely and forlorn.
ΠΡΩ.Τίς αὕτη; λεγέσθω μόνον.
Pro.What is the road? Only tell us.
16c ΣΩ.Ἣν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι δὲ
παγχάλεπον· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη
πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἣν λέγω.
Soc.One which is easy to point out, but very difficult to follow for through it all the inventions of art have been brought to light. See this is the road I mean.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε μόνον.
Pro.Go on what is it?
ΣΩ.Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται
ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα
φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν
καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν,
ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι,
πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν
16d οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ
παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν—εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν—
ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν,
εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων
ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ
ὅτι ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ὁπόσα· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προςφέρειν
πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν
16e μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, τότε δ' ἤδη τὸ ἓν
ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν.
οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν
καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
17a σοφοὶ ἓν μέν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον
καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα
εὐθύς, τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει—οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε
διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς
ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.
Soc.A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was tossed down from some divine source through the agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming fire; and the ancients, who were better than we and lived nearer the gods, handed down the tradition that all the things which are ever said to exist are sprung from one and many and have inherent in them the finite and the infinite. This being the way in which these things are arranged, we must always assume that there is in every case one idea of everything and must look for it—for we shall find that it is there—and if we get a grasp of this, we must look next for two, if there be two, and if not, for three or some other number; and again we must treat each of those units in the same way, until we can see not only that the original unit is one and many and infinite, but just how many it is. And we must not apply the idea of infinite to plurality until we have a view of its whole number between infinity and one; then, and not before, we may let each unit of everything pass on unhindered into infinity.
The gods, then, as I said, handed down to us this mode of investigating, learning, and teaching one another; but the wise men of the present day make the one and the many too quickly or too slowly, in haphazard fashion, and they put infinity immediately after unity; they disregard all that lies between them, and this it is which distinguishes between the dialectic and the disputatious methods of discussion.
ΠΡΩ.Τὰ μέν πως, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκῶ σου μανθάνειν,
τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δέομαι ἃ λέγεις ἀκοῦσαι.
Pro.I think I understand you in part, Socrates, but I need a clearer statement of some things.
ΣΩ.Σαφὲς μήν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν
ὃ λέγω, καὶ λάμβαν' αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις οἷσπερ καὶ
17b πεπαίδευσαι.
Soc.Surely my meaning, Protarchus, is made clear in the letters of the alphabet, which you were taught as a child; so learn it from them.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.How?
ΣΩ.Φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἐστί που μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος
ἰοῦσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὖ πλήθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἑκάστου.
Soc.Sound, which passes out through the mouth of each and all of us, is one, and yet again it is infinite in number.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Yes, to be sure.
ΣΩ.Καὶ οὐδὲν ἑτέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, οὔτε
ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἕν· ἀλλ' ὅτι πόσα
τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ γραμματικὸν ἕκαστον
ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.
Soc.And one of us is no wiser than the other merely for knowing that it is infinite or that it is one; but that which makes each of us a grammarian is the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τυγχάνει ποιοῦν, τοῦτ'
ἔστι ταὐτόν.
Soc.And it is this same knowledge which makes the musician.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.How is that?
17c ΣΩ.Φωνὴ μέν που καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ
μία ἐν αὐτῇ.
Soc.Sound is one in the art of music also, so far as that art is concerned.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Δύο δὲ θῶμεν βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότονον.
ἢ πῶς;
Soc.And we may say that there are two sounds, low and high, and a third, which is the intermediate, may we not?
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτως.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὔπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς
ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὥς γ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα
οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἔσῃ.
Soc.But knowledge of these facts would not suffice to make you a musician, although ignorance of them would make you, if I may say so, quite worthless in respect to music.
ΠΡΩ.Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα
ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος,
17d καὶ ὁποῖα, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων
ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν—ἃ κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδοσαν
ἡμῖν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἁρμονίας,
ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα
πάθη γιγνόμενα, ἃ δὴ δι' ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασι
ῥυθμοὺς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω
δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν—ὅταν γὰρ αὐτά
17e τε λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν ἓν
ὁτιοῦν ταύτῃ σκοπούμενος ἕλῃς, οὕτως ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο
γέγονας· τὸ δ' ἄπειρόν σε ἑκάστων καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις πλῆθος
ἄπειρον ἑκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ'
ἐνάριθμον, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτε
ἀπιδόντα.
Soc.But, my friend, when you have grasped the number and quality of the intervals of the voice in respect to high and low pitch, and the limits of the intervals, and all the combinations derived from them, which the men of former times discovered and handed down to us, their successors, with the traditional name of harmonies, and also the corresponding effects in the movements of the body, which they say are measured by numbers and must be called rhythms and measures—and they say that we must also understand that every one and many should be considered in this way— when you have thus grasped the facts, you have become a musician, and when by considering it in this way you have obtained a grasp of any other unity of all those which exist, you have become wise in respect to that unity. But the infinite number of individuals and the infinite number in each of them makes you in every instance indefinite in thought and of no account and not to be considered among the wise, so long as you have never fixed your eye upon any definite number in anything.
ΠΡΩ.Κάλλιστα, ὦ Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα
εἰρηκέναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.
Pro.I think, Philebus, that what Socrates has said is excellent.
18a ΦΙ.Κἀμοὶ ταῦτά γε αὐτά· ἀλλὰ τί δή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ
λόγος οὗτος νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;
Phi.So do I; it is excellent in itself, but why has he said it now to us, and what purpose is there in it?
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς μέντοι τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἠρώτηκε
Φίληβος.
Soc.Protarchus, that is a very proper question which Philebus has asked us.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ.
Pro.Certainly it is, so please answer it.
ΣΩ.Δράσω ταῦτα διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων.
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἓν ὁτιοῦν εἴ τίς ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὥς
φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπί
τινα ἀριθμόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον
18b ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἓν εὐθύς, ἀλλ' [ἐπ']
ἀριθμὸν αὖ τινα πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν, τελευτᾶν
τε ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἕν. πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸ
νῦν λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.
Soc.I will, when I have said a little more on just this subject. For if a person begins with some unity or other, he must, as I was saying, not turn immediately to infinity, but to some definite number; now just so, conversely, when he has to take the infinite first, he must not turn immediately to the one, but must think of some number which possesses in each case some plurality, and must end by passing from all to one. Let us revert to the letters of the alphabet to illustrate this.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.How?
ΣΩ.Ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς
εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος—ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῦθ τινα
τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ
ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν
18c ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν
δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο
τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει
τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα
καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν
λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ σύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε·
καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἄνευ
πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς
18d ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς
ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.
Soc.When some one, whether god or godlike man,—there is an Egyptian story that his name was Theuth—observed that sound was infinite, he was the first to notice that the vowel sounds in that infinity were not one, but many, and again that there were other elements which were not vowels but did have a sonant quality, and that these also had a definite number; and he distinguished a third kind of letters which we now call mutes. Then he divided the mutes until he distinguished each individual one, and he treated the vowels and semivowels in the same way, until he knew the number of them and gave to each and all the name of letters. Perceiving, however, that none of us could learn any one of them alone by itself without learning them all, and considering that this was a common bond which made them in a way all one, he assigned to them all a single science and called it grammar.
ΦΙ.Ταῦτ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα,
ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον· τὸ δ' αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ
σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.
Phi.I understand that more clearly than the earlier statement, Protarchus, so far as the reciprocal relations of the one and the many are concerned, but I still feel the same lack as a little while ago.
ΣΩ.Μῶν, ὦ Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτ' ἐστίν;
Soc.Do you mean, Philebus, that you do not see what this has to do with the question?
ΦΙ.Ναί, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ
Πρώταρχος.
Phi.Yes; that is what Protarchus and I have been trying to discover for a long time.
ΣΩ.Ἦ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γε ἤδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φῄς,
18e πάλαι.
Soc.Really, have you been trying, as you say, for long time to discover it, when it was close to you all the while?
ΦΙ.Πῶς;
Phi.How is that?
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆς ἡμῖν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν αἱρετέον;
Soc.Was not our discussion from the beginning about wisdom and pleasure and which of them is preferable?
ΦΙ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Phi.Yes, of course.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ἕν γε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναί φαμεν.
Soc.And surely we say that each of them is one.
ΦΙ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Phi.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ,
πῶς ἔστιν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα
19a εὐθύς, ἀλλά τινά ποτε ἀριθμὸν ἑκάτερον ἔμπροσθεν κέκτηται
τοῦ ἄπειρα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα γεγονέναι;
Soc.This, then, is precisely the question which the previous discussion puts to us: How is each of them one and many, and how is it that they are not immediately infinite, but each possesses a definite number, before the individual phenomena become infinite?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε ἐρώτημα, ὦ Φίληβε, οὐκ οἶδ'
ὅντινα τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε
Σωκράτης. καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ
νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. ἴσως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμὲ τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον
παντελῶς ὑποστάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν
ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελοιότερον
19b δ' οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι. σκόπει
δὴ τί δράσομεν. εἴδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς
ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα·
τῆς τ' αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως.
Pro.Philebus, somehow or other Socrates has led us round and plunged us into a serious question. Consider which of us shall answer it. Perhaps it is ridiculous that I, after taking your place in entire charge of the argument, should ask you to come back and answer this question because I cannot do so, but I think it would be still more ridiculous if neither of us could answer. Consider, then, what we are to do. For I think Socrates is asking us whether there are or are not kinds of pleasure, how many kinds there are, and what their nature is, and the same of wisdom.
ΣΩ.Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι
τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταὐτοῦ δρᾶν
καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμήνυσεν, οὐδεὶς εἰς
οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος.
Soc.You are quite right, son of Callias; for, as our previous discussion showed, unless we can do this in the case of every unity, every like, every same, and their opposites, none of us can ever be of any use in anything.
19c ΠΡΩ.Σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ
καλὸν μὲν τὸ σύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος
δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὑτόν. τί δή μοι
τοῦτο εἴρηται τὰ νῦν; ἐγώ σοι φράσω. σὺ τήνδε ἡμῖν τὴν
συνουσίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σεαυτὸν πρὸς
τὸ διελέσθαι τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον. Φιλήβου
γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθ'
ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, σὺ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντεῖπες ὡς οὐ ταῦτα
19d ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν ἃ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμιμνῄσκομεν
ἑκόντες, ὀρθῶς δρῶντες, ἵν' ἐν μνήμῃ παρακείμενα ἑκάτερα
βασανίζηται. φῂς δ', ὡς ἔοικε, σὺ τὸ προσρηθησόμενον
ὀρθῶς ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην,
σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ, <ἃ> κτᾶσθαι
δεῖν ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα. τούτων δὴ μετ' ἀμφισβητήσεως
ἑκατέρων λεχθέντων ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἠπειλήσαμεν
19e ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν οἴκαδέ σε πρὶν ἂν τούτων τῶν λόγων
πέρας ἱκανὸν γένηταί τι διορισθέντων, σὺ δὲ συνεχώρησας καὶ
ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθ' ἡμῖν σαυτόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, καθάπερ
οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων ἀφαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι· παῦσαι
δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.
Pro.That, Socrates, seems pretty likely to be true. However, it is splendid for the wise man to know everything, but the next best thing, it seems, is not to be ignorant of himself. I will tell you why I say that at this moment. You, Socrates, have granted to all of us this conversation and your cooperation for the purpose of determining what is the best of human possessions. For when Philebus said it was pleasure and gaiety and enjoyment and all that sort of thing, you objected and said it was not those things, but another sort, and we very properly keep reminding ourselves voluntarily of this, in order that both claims may be present in our memory for examination. You, as it appears, assert that the good which is rightly to be called better than pleasure is mind, knowledge, intelligence, art, and all their kin; you say we ought to acquire these, not that other sort. When those two claims were made and an argument arose, we playfully threatened that we would not let you go home until the discussion was brought to some satisfactory conclusion. You agreed and put yourself at our disposal for that purpose. Now, we say that, as children put it, you cannot take back a gift once fairly given. So cease this way of meeting all that we say.
ΣΩ.Τίνα λέγεις;
Soc.What way do you mean?
20a ΠΡΩ.Εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν μὴ δυναίμεθ'
ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι. μὴ
γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν
ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστέον·
ὑπέσχου γάρ. βουλεύου δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτὸς πότερον ἡδονῆς
εἴδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἐατέον, εἴ πῃ καθ'
ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον οἷός τ' εἶ καὶ βούλει δηλῶσαί πως ἄλλως
τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.
Pro.I mean puzzling us and asking questions to which we cannot at the moment give a satisfactory answer. Let us not imagine that the end of our present discussion is a mere puzzling of us all, but if we cannot answer, you must do so; for you gave us a promise. Consider, therefore, whether you yourself must distinguish the kinds of pleasure and knowledge or will let that go, in case you are able and willing to make clear in some other way the matters now at issue among us.
20b ΣΩ.Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ,
ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως εἶπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ῥηθὲν λύει πάντα
φόβον ἑκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τοῖς μνήμην τινὰ δοκεῖ
τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.
Soc.I need no longer anticipate anything terrible, since you put it in that way; for the words in case you are willing relieve me of all fear. And besides, I think some god has given me a vague recollection.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;
Pro.How is that, and what is the recollection about?
ΣΩ.Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἢ καὶ
ἐγρηγορὼς νῦν ἐννοῶ περί τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὡς
οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον
μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν. καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἂν ἐναργῶς
20c ἡμῖν φανῇ νῦν, ἀπήλλακται μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ νικᾶν· τὸ
γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ταὐτὸν αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἢ πῶς;
Soc.I remember now having heard long ago in a dream, or perhaps when I was awake, some talk about pleasure and wisdom to the effect that neither of the two is the good, but some third thing, different from them and better than both. However, if this be now clearly proved to us, pleasure is deprived of victory for the good would no longer be identical with it. Is not that true?
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτως.
Pro.It is.
ΣΩ.Τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι
προσδεησόμεθα κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν. προϊὸν δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον
δείξει.
Soc.And we shall have, in my opinion, no longer any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasure. But the progress of the discussion will make that still clearer.
ΠΡΩ.Κάλλιστ' εἰπὼν οὕτω καὶ διαπέραινε.
Pro.Excellent! Just go on as you have begun.
ΣΩ.Μίκρ' ἄττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώμεθα.
Soc.First, then, let us agree on some further small points.
ΠΡΩ.Τὰ ποῖα;
Pro.What are they?
20d ΣΩ.Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ
τέλεον εἶναι;
Soc.Is the nature of the good necessarily perfect or imperfect?
ΠΡΩ.Πάντων δήπου τελεώτατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.The most perfect of all things, surely, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τἀγαθόν;
Soc.Well, and is the good sufficient?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν
τῶν ὄντων.
Pro.Of course; so that it surpasses all other things in sufficiency.
ΣΩ.Τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον
εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται
βουλόμενον ἑλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὑτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.
Soc.And nothing, I should say, is more certain about it than that every intelligent being pursues it, desires it, wishes to catch and get possession of it, and has no interest in anything in which the good is not included.
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀντειπεῖν.
Pro.There is no denying that.
20e ΣΩ.Σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τόν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν
φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρίς.
Soc.Let us, then, look at the life of pleasure and the life of wisdom separately and consider and judge them.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς εἶπες;
Pro.How do you mean?
ΣΩ.Μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις μήτ' ἐν
τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν
ἔστ' ἀγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δ'
21a ἂν φανῇ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτ' ἔτι τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν
ἀγαθόν.
Soc.Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure and no pleasure in the life of wisdom. For if either of them is the good, it cannot have need of anything else, and if, either be found to need anything, we can no longer regard it as our true good.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.No, of course not.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα;
Soc.Shall we then undertake to test them through you?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.By all means.
ΣΩ.Ἀποκρίνου δή.
Soc.Then answer.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε.
Pro.Ask.
ΣΩ.Δέξαι' ἄν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα
ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;
Soc.Would you, Protarchus, be willing to live your whole life in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?
ΠΡΩ.Τί δ' οὔ;
Pro.Of course I should.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ τοῦτ'
ἔχεις παντελῶς;
Soc.Would you think you needed anything further, if you were in complete possession of that enjoyment?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐδαμῶς.
Pro.Certainly not.
ΣΩ.Ὅρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι
21b τὰ δέοντα καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μῶν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι;
Soc.But consider whether you would not have some need of wisdom and intelligence and power of calculating your wants and the like.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμ' ἄν που τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων.
Pro.Why should I? If I have enjoyment, I have everything.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου ταῖς μεγίσταις
ἡδοναῖς χαίροις ἄν;
Soc.Then living thus you would enjoy the greatest pleasures all your life?
ΠΡΩ.Τί δ' οὔ;
Pro.Yes; why not?
ΣΩ.Νοῦν δέ γε καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν
μὴ κεκτημένος ἀληθῆ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο αὐτό, εἰ χαίρεις ἢ
μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δήπου σε ἀγνοεῖν, κενόν γε ὄντα πάσης
φρονήσεως;
Soc.But if you did not possess mind or memory or knowledge or true opinion, in the first place, you would not know whether you were enjoying your pleasures or not. That must be true, since you are utterly devoid of intellect, must it not?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pro.Yes, it must.
21c ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη
δήπου μηδ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνῆσθαι, τῆς τ' ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα
ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδ' ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν·
δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον ἀληθῆ μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν
χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μηδ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον
ὡς χαιρήσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δὲ οὐκ
ἀνθρώπου βίον, ἀλλά τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια
μετ' ὀστρεΐνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ παρὰ
21d ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλα διανοηθῆναι;
Soc.And likewise, if you had no memory you could not even remember that you ever did enjoy pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present pleasure could remain with you; if you had no true opinion you could not think you were enjoying pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it, and if you were without power of calculation you would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy it in the future; your life would not be that of a man, but of a mollusc or some other shell-fish like the oyster. Is that true, or can we imagine any other result?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πῶς;
Pro.We certainly cannot.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν αἱρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;
Soc.And can we choose such a life?
ΠΡΩ.Εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ
λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.
Pro.This argument, Socrates, has made me utterly speechless for the present.
ΣΩ.Μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ
μεταλαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.
Soc.Well, let us not give in yet. Let us take up the life of mind and scrutinize that in turn.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸν ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
Pro.What sort of life do you mean?
ΣΩ.Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ
νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων κεκτημένος,
21e ἡδονῆς δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν, μηδ' αὖ λύπης,
ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθὴς πάντων τῶν τοιούτων.
Soc.I ask whether anyone would be willing to live possessing wisdom and mind and knowledge and perfect memory of all things, but having no share, great or small, in pleasure, or in pain, for that matter, but being utterly unaffected by everything of that sort.
ΠΡΩ.Οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων
αἱρετός, οὐδ' ἄλλῳ μή ποτε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, φανῇ.
Pro.Neither of the two lives can ever appear desirable to me, Socrates, or, I think, to anyone else.
22a ΣΩ.Τί δ' ὁ συναμφότερος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν
συμμειχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος;
Soc.How about the combined life, Protarchus, made up by a union of the two?
ΠΡΩ.Ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως;
Pro.You mean a union of pleasure with mind or wisdom?
ΣΩ.Οὕτω καὶ τῶν τοιούτων [λέγω] ἔγωγε.
Soc.Yes, I mean a union of such elements.
ΠΡΩ.Πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται πρότερον ἢ 'κείνων
ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις [γε] οὐχ ὁ μέν, ὁ δ' οὔ.
Pro.Every one will prefer this life to either of the two others—yes, every single person without exception.
ΣΩ.Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον
ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;
Soc.Then do we understand the consequences of what we are now saying?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προυτέθησαν,
22b τοῖν δυοῖν δ' οὐδέτερος ἱκανὸς οὐδὲ αἱρετὸς οὔτε ἀνθρώπων
οὔτε ζῴων οὐδενί.
Pro.Certainly. Three lives have been proposed, and of two of them neither is sufficient or desirable for man or any other living being.
ΣΩ.Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἤδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος
αὐτοῖν εἶχε τἀγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλεος
καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις αἱρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως
ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν· εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν
ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἤ
τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.
Soc.Then is it not already clear that neither of these two contained the good for if it did contain the good, it would be sufficient and perfect, and such as to be chosen by all living creatures which would be able to live thus all their lives; and if any of us chose anything else, he would be choosing contrary to the nature of the truly desirable, not of his own free will, but from ignorance or some unfortunate necessity.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔοικε γοῦν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.
Pro.That seems at any rate to be true.
22c ΣΩ.Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τήν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι
ταὐτὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.
Soc.And so I think we have sufficiently proved that Philebus’s divinity is not to be considered identical with the good.
ΦΙ.Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ'
ἕξει που ταὐτὰ ἐγκλήματα.
Phi.But neither is your mind the good, Socrates; it will be open to the same objections.
ΣΩ.Τάχ' ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὅ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τόν γε
ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως πως ἔχειν.
τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ
πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι
22d τί δράσομεν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιῴμεθ'
ἂν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον, ὁ δ' ἡδονὴν εἶναι, καὶ
οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη, τάχα
δ' ἂν αἴτιόν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι. τούτου δὴ
πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην ἂν ὡς ἐν
τῷ μεικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ λαβὼν ὁ βίος
οὗτος γέγονεν αἱρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς
τούτῳ συγγενέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον
22e τὸν λόγον οὔτ' ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδ' αὖ τῶν δευτερείων
ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο· πορρωτέρω δ' ἐστὶ
τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.
Soc.My mind, perhaps, Philebus; but not so, I believe, the true mind, which is also divine; that is different. I do not as yet claim for mind the victory over the combined life, but we must look and see what is to be done about the second place; for each of us might perhaps put forward a claim, one that mind is the cause of this combined life, the other that pleasure is the cause and thus neither of these two would be the good, but one or the other of them might be regarded as the cause of the good. On this point I might keep up the fight all the more against Philebus and contend that in this mixed life it is mind that is more akin and more similar than pleasure to that, whatever it may be, which makes it both desirable and good; and from this point of view pleasure could advance no true claim to the first or even the second place. It is farther behind than the third place, if my mind is at all to be trusted at present.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν
ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι καθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νυνδὴ
λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων πέρι μαχομένη κεῖται. τὸν δὲ
23a νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὡς ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν
νικητηρίων· τὰ γὰρ αὔτ' ἔπαθεν ἄν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων
στερηθεῖσα ἡδονὴ παντάπασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη
πρὸς τῶν αὑτῆς ἐραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτ' ἂν ὁμοίως
φαίνοιτο καλή.
Pro.Certainly, Socrates, it seems to me that pleasure has fought for the victory and has fallen in this bout, knocked down by your words. And we can only say, as it seems, that mind was wise in not laying claim to the victory; for it would have met with the same fate. Now pleasure, if she were to lose the second prize, would be deeply humiliated in the eyes of her lovers; for she would no longer appear even to them so lovely as before.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἐᾶν ἤδη καὶ μὴ τὴν
ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα
λυπεῖν;
Soc.Well, then, is it not better to leave her now and not to pain her by testing her to the utmost and proving her in the wrong?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.Nonsense, Socrates!
23b ΣΩ.Ἆρ' ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν;
Soc.Nonsense because I spoke of paining pleasure, and that is impossible?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὐδείς πώ
σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπεξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ
λόγῳ.
Pro.Not only that, but because you do not understand that not one of us will let you go yet until you have finished the argument about these matters.
ΣΩ.Βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ
λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου πάνυ τι νῦν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ
φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς, ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ
πορευόμενον οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων·
ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά. οὐκοῦν χρή;
Soc.Whew, Protarchus! Then we have a long discussion before us, and not an easy one, either, this time. For in going ahead to fight mind’s battle for the second place, I think I need a new contrivance—other weapons, as it were, than those of our previous discussion, though perhaps some of the old ones will serve. Must I then go on?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.Of course you must.
23c ΣΩ.Τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα
τιθέμενοι.
Soc.Then let us try to be careful in making our beginning.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;
Pro.What kind of a beginning do you mean?
ΣΩ.Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν,
μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.
Soc.Let us divide all things that now exist in the universe into two, or rather, if you please, three classes.
ΠΡΩ.Καθ' ὅτι, φράζοις ἄν;
Pro.Please tell us on what principle you would divide them.
ΣΩ.Λάβωμεν ἄττα τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων.
Soc.Let us take some of the subjects of our present discussion.
ΠΡΩ.Ποῖα;
Pro.What subjects?
ΣΩ.Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν
ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;
Soc.We said that God revealed in the universe two elements, the infinite and the finite, did we not?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον
23d ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι συμμισγόμενον. εἰμὶ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν,
ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἴδη διιστὰς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.
Soc.Let us, then, assume these as two of our classes, and a third, made by combining these two. But I cut a ridiculous figure, it seems, when I attempt a division into classes and an enumeration.
ΠΡΩ.Τί φῄς, ὠγαθέ;
Pro.What do you mean, my friend?
ΣΩ.Τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν φαίνεται.
Soc.I think we need a fourth class besides.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε τίνος.
Pro.Tell us what it is.
ΣΩ.Τῆς συμμείξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα,
καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.
Soc.Note the cause of the combination of those two and assume that as the fourth in addition to the previous three.
ΠΡΩ.Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδεήσει διάκρισίν
τινος δυναμένου;
Pro.And then will you not need a fifth, which has the power of separation?
ΣΩ.Τάχ' ἄν· οὐ μὴν οἶμαί γε ἐν τῷ νῦν· ἂν δέ τι δέῃ,
23e συγγνώσῃ πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι πέμπτον [βίον].
Soc.Perhaps; but not at present, I think. However, if we do need a fifth, you will pardon me for going after it.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι,
τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ ἑκάτερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ
διεσπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἑκάτερον συναγαγόντες,
νοῆσαι πῇ ποτε ἦν αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάτερον.
Soc.First, then, let us take three of the four and, as we see that two of these are split up and scattered each one into many, let us try, by collecting each of them again into one, to learn how each of them was both one and many.
ΠΡΩ.Εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχ' ἂν
ἑποίμην.
Pro.If you could tell me more clearly about them, I might be able to follow you.
24a ΣΩ.Λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο ἃ προτίθεμαι ταὔτ' εἶναι ἅπερ
νυνδή, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον· ὅτι δὲ τρόπον
τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πόλλ' ἐστί, πειράσομαι φράζειν. τὸ δὲ πέρας
ἔχον ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.
Soc.I mean, then, that the two which I select are the same which I mentioned before, the infinite and the finite. I will try to show that the infinite is, in a certain sense, many; the finite can wait.
ΠΡΩ.Μένει.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Σκέψαι δή. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον
ὃ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ σκόπει. θερμοτέρου καὶ
ψυχροτέρου πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα πέρας εἴ ποτέ τι νοήσαις ἄν, ἢ
τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἐν αὐτοῖςοἰκοῦντε οἰκοῦν<τε> τοῖς γένεσιν,
24b ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι·
γενομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτὼ τετελευτήκατον.
Soc.Consider then. What I ask you to consider is difficult and debatable; but consider it all the same. In the first place, take hotter and colder and see whether you can conceive any limit of them, or whether the more and less which dwell in their very nature do not, so long as they continue to dwell therein, preclude the possibility of any end; for if there were any end of them, the more and less would themselves be ended.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Ἀεὶ δέ γε, φαμέν, ἔν τε τῷ θερμοτέρῳ καὶ ψυχροτέρῳ
τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἔνι.
Soc.But always, we affirm, in the hotter and colder there is the more and less.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει τούτω μὴ τέλος
ἔχειν· ἀτελῆ δ' ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον.
Soc.Always, then, the argument shows that these two have no end; and being endless, they are of course infinite.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.Most emphatically, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' εὖ γε, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὑπέλαβες καὶ
24c ἀνέμνησας ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθέγξω,
καὶ τό γε ἠρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον τῷ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ
ἧττον· ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ ἐᾶτον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον,
ἀλλ' ἀεὶ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τοὐναντίον ἑκάσταις
πράξεσιν ἐμποιοῦντε τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον,
τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νυνδή, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε
τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' ἐάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ
24d τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα ἕδρᾳ ἐγγενέσθαι,
αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὑτῶν χώρας ἐν ᾗ ἐνῆν. οὐ γὰρ
ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἂν λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν·
προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ
ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προϊὸν ἐπαύσατο.
κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ θερμότερον
καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅμα.
Soc.I am glad you responded, my dear Protarchus, and reminded me that the word emphatically which you have just used, and the word gently have the same force as more and less. For wherever they are present, they do not allow any definite quantity to exist; they always introduce in every instance a comparison—more emphatic than that which is quieter, or vice versa—and thus they create the relation of more and less, thereby doing away with fixed quantity. For, as I said just now, if they did not abolish quantity, but allowed it and measure to make their appearance in the abode of the more and less, the emphatically and gently, those latter would be banished from their own proper place. When once they had accepted definite quantity, they would no longer be hotter or colder; for hotter and colder are always progressing and never stationary; but quantity is at rest and does not progress. By this reasoning hotter and its opposite are shown to be infinite.
ΠΡΩ.Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἔστι δ', ὅπερ εἶπες,
οὐ ῥᾴδια ταῦτα συνέπεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰς αὖθίς τε καὶ αὖθις
24e ἴσως λεχθέντα τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανῶς
ἂν συμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήναιεν.
Pro.That appears to be the case, Socrates; but, as you said, these subjects are not easy to follow. Perhaps, however, continued repetition might lead to a satisfactory agreement between the questioner and him who is questioned.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' εὖ μὲν λέγεις καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν.
νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα
σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες μηκύνωμεν.
Soc.That is a good suggestion, and I must try to carry it out. However, to avoid waste of time in discussing all the individual examples, see if we can accept this as a designation of the infinite.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
Pro.Accept what?
ΣΩ.Ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα
καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα
25a τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα
ταῦτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον ὃν ἔφαμεν ὅσα
διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν
μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαί τινα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.
Soc.All things which appear to us to become more or less, or to admit of emphatic and gentle and excessive and the like, are to be put in the class of the infinite as their unity, in accordance with what we said a while ago, if you remember, that we ought to collect all things that are scattered and split up and impress upon them to the best of our ability the seal of some single nature.
ΠΡΩ.Μέμνημαι.
Pro.I remember.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία
πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ
ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς
25b ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα σύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας
ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο. ἢ πῶς σὺ
φῄς;
Soc.And the things which do not admit of more and less and the like, but do admit of all that is opposed to them—first equality and the equal, then the double, and anything which is a definite number or measure in relation to such a number or measure— all these might properly be assigned to the class of the finite. What do you say to that?
ΠΡΩ.Κάλλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.Excellent, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Εἶεν· τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μεικτὸν ἐκ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν
τίνα ἰδέαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;
Soc.Well, what shall we say is the nature of the third class, made by combining these two?
ΠΡΩ.Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.
Pro.You will tell me, I fancy, by answering your own question.
ΣΩ.Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος
γίγνηταί τις θεῶν.
Soc.Nay, a god will do so, if any god will give ear to my prayers.
ΠΡΩ.Εὔχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει.
Pro.Pray, then, and watch.
ΣΩ.Σκοπῶ· καί μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος
ἡμῖν νυνδὴ γεγονέναι.
Soc.I am watching; and I think, Protarchus, one of the gods has this moment been gracious unto me.
25c ΠΡΩ.Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῇ;
Pro.What do you mean, and what evidence have you?
ΣΩ.Φράσω δῆλον ὅτι· σὺ δέ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ
λόγῳ.
Soc.I will tell you, of course. Just follow what I say.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε μόνον.
Pro.Say on.
ΣΩ.Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νυνδή πού τι καὶ ψυχρότερον.
ἦ γάρ;
Soc.We spoke just now of hotter and colder, did we not?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Πρόσθες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ
πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ μεῖζον
καὶ σμικρότερον καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν
τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἓν φύσεως.
Soc.Add to them drier and wetter, more and less, quicker and slower, greater and smaller, and all that we assigned before to the class which unites more and less.
25d ΠΡΩ.Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;
Pro.You mean the class of the infinite?
ΣΩ.Ναί. συμμείγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν
αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.
Soc.Yes. Mix with that the second class, the offspring of the limit.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίαν;
Pro.What class do you mean?
ΣΩ.Ἣν καὶ νυνδή, δέον ἡμᾶς καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου
συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν,
οὐ συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει,
<εἰ> τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κἀκείνη
γενήσεται.
Soc.The class of the finite, which we ought just now to have reduced to unity, as we did that of the infinite. We have not done that, but perhaps we shall even now accomplish the same end, if these two are both unified and then the third class is revealed.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;
Pro.What third class, and what do you mean?
ΣΩ.Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς
25e ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα
ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται.
Soc.The class of the equal and double and everything which puts an end to the differences between opposites and makes them commensurable and harmonious by the introduction of number.
ΠΡΩ.Μανθάνω· φαίνῃ γάρ μοι λέγειν μειγνὺς ταῦτα
γενέσεις τινὰς ἐφ' ἑκάστων αὐτῶν συμβαίνειν.
Pro.I understand. I think you mean that by mixture of these elements certain results are produced in each instance.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.
Soc.Yes, you are right.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε τοίνυν.
Pro.Go on.
ΣΩ.Ἆρα οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν
ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;
Soc.In cases of illness, does not the proper combination of these elements produce health?
26a ΠΡΩ.Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις
οὖσιν, ἆρ' οὐ ταὐτὰ [ἐγγιγνόμενα] ταῦτα· ἅμα πέρας τε
ἀπηργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν σύμπασαν τελεώτατα συνεστήσατο;
Soc.And in the acute and the grave, the quick and the slow, which are unlimited, the addition of these same elements creates a limit and establishes the whole art of music in all its perfection, does it not?
ΠΡΩ.Κάλλιστά γε.
Pro.Excellent.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ἔν γε χειμῶσιν καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενομένη
τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ
ἅμα σύμμετρον ἀπηργάσατο.
Soc.And again in the case of cold and hot weather, the introduction of these elements removes the excess and indefiniteness and creates moderation and harmony.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Assuredly.
26b ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὧραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα
ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων
συμμειχθέντων;
Soc.And thence arise the seasons and all the beauties of our world, by mixture of the infinite with the finite?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Καὶ ἄλλα γε δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθ'
ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα
καὶ πάγκαλα. ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ σύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν
αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, ὦ καλὲ Φίληβε, πέρας οὔτε
ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ
τάξιν πέρας ἔχοντ' ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῂς
26c αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. σοὶ δέ, ὦ
Πρώταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;
Soc.There are countless other things which I pass over, such as health, beauty, and strength of the body and the many glorious beauties of the soul. For this goddess, my fair Philebus, beholding the violence and universal wickedness which prevailed, since there was no limit of pleasures or of indulgence in them, established law and order, which contain a limit. You say she did harm; I say, on the contrary, she brought salvation. What do you think, Protarchus?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν.
Pro.What you say, Socrates, pleases me greatly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτα εἴρηκα, εἰ συννοεῖς.
Soc.I have spoken of these three classes, you observe.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' οἶμαι κατανοεῖν· ἓν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ
ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἓν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσι·
τρίτον δὲ οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.
Pro.Yes, I believe I understand; I think you mean that the infinite is one class and the finite is another class among existing things; but what you wish to designate as the third class, I do not comprehend very well.
ΣΩ.Τὸ γὰρ πλῆθός σε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ
τρίτου γενέσεως· καίτοι πολλά γε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον παρέσχετο
26d γένη, ὅμως δ' ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ
ἐναντίου γένει ἓν ἐφάνη.
Soc.No, because the multitude which springs up in the third class overpowers you and yet the infinite also comprised many classes, nevertheless, since they were sealed with the seal of the more and less, they were seen to be of one class.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθῆ.
Pro.True.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτ'
ἐδυσκολαίνομεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἓν φύσει.
Soc.And the finite, again, did not contain many classes, nor were we disturbed about its natural unity.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.Of course not.
ΣΩ.Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἓν τοῦτο
τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ
τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.
Soc.No, not at all. And as to the third class, understand that I mean every offspring of these two which comes into being as a result of the measures created by the cooperation of the finite.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔμαθον.
Pro.I understand.
26e ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τρισὶ τέταρτόν τι τότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι
γένος σκεπτέον· κοινὴ δ' ἡ σκέψις. ὅρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν
γίγνεσθαι.
Soc.But we said there was, in addition to three classes, a fourth to be investigated. Let us do that together. See whether you think that everything which comes into being must necessarily come into being through a cause.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;
Pro.Yes, I do; for how could it come into being apart from a cause?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος φύσις οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι
τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὀρθῶς ἂν
εἴη λεγόμενον ἕν;
Soc.Does not the nature of that which makes or creates differ only in name from the cause, and may not the creative agent and the cause be properly considered one?
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς.
Pro.Yes.
27a ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὖ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον
οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νυνδή, διαφέρον εὑρήσομεν.
ἢ πῶς;
Soc.And, again, we shall find that, on the same principle, that which is made or created differs in name only from that which comes into being, shall we not?
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτως.
Pro.We shall.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ
δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον ἐκείνῳ;
Soc.And the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is created follows after it as it comes into being?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αἰτία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ
δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ.
Soc.Then the cause and that which is the servant of the cause for the purpose of generation are not the same.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Of course not.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα
τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;
Soc.Did not the things which come into being and the things out of which they come into being furnish us all the three classes?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα.
Pro.Certainly.
27b ΣΩ.Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν τέταρτον,
τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον;
Soc.And that which produces all these, the cause, we call the fourth, as it has been satisfactorily shown to be distinct from the others?
ΠΡΩ.Ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.Yes, it is distinct.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς μὴν ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων, ἑνὸς
ἑκάστου μνήμης ἕνεκα ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ καταριθμήσασθαι.
Soc.It is, then, proper, now that we have distinguished the four, to make sure that we remember them separately by enumerating them in order.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ
πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μεικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην
οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μείξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην
27c λέγων ἆρα μὴ πλημμελοίην ἄν τι;
Soc.The first, then, I call infinite, the second limit or finite, and the third something generated by a mixture of these two. And should I be making any mistake if I called the cause of this mixture and creation the fourth?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πῶς;
Pro.Certainly not.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δή, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος, καὶ τί
ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτα ἀφικόμεθα; ἆρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν;
δευτερεῖα ἐζητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἢ φρονήσεως.
οὐχ οὕτως ἦν;
Soc.Now what is the next step in our argument, and what was our purpose in coming to the point we have reached? Was it not this? We were trying to find out whether the second place belonged to pleasure or to wisdom, were we not?
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Yes, we were.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἴσως νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτω διειλόμεθα,
κάλλιον ἂν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσαίμεθα πρώτου πέρι καὶ
δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν;
Soc.And may we not, perhaps, now that we have finished with these points, be better able to come to a decision about the first and second places, which was the original subject of our discussion?
ΠΡΩ.Ἴσως.
Pro.Perhaps.
27d ΣΩ.Ἴθι δή· νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μεικτὸν βίον
ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως;
Soc.Well then; we decided that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the victor, did we not?
ΠΡΩ.Ἦν.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὁρῶμέν που τίς τέ
ἐστι καὶ ὁποίου γένους;
Soc.And do we not see what kind of life this is, and to what class it belongs?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.Of course we do.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μέρος γ' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου οἶμαι
γένους· οὐ γὰρ [ὁ] δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστι [μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος] ἀλλὰ
συμπάντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ὥστε
ὀρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγνοιτ' ἄν.
Soc.We shall say that it belongs to the third class; for that class is not formed by mixture of any two things, but of all the things which belong to the infinite, bound by the finite; and therefore this victorious life would rightly be considered a part of this class.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Quite rightly.
27e ΣΩ.Εἶεν· τί δὲ ὁ σός, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡδὺς καὶ ἄμεικτος
ὤν; ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε
λέγοιτο; ὧδε δ' ἀπόκριναί μοι πρὶν ἀποφήνασθαι.
Soc.Well then, what of your life, Philebus, of unmixed pleasure? In which of the aforesaid classes may it properly be said to belong? But before you tell me, please answer this question.
ΦΙ.Λέγε μόνον.
Phi.Ask your question.
ΣΩ.Ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν
τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένων ἐστόν;
Soc.Have pleasure and pain a limit, or are they among the things which admit of more and less?
ΦΙ.Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ
πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει
καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.
Phi.Yes, they are among those which admit of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be absolute good if it were not infinite in number and degree.
28a ΣΩ.Οὐδέ γ' ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, λύπη πᾶν κακόν· ὥστ' ἄλλο
τι νῷν σκεπτέον ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν ὡς παρέχεταί τι
μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τούτω δή σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων
γε γένους ἔστων· φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς
τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Πρώταρχέ τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν
θέντες οὐκ ἂν ἀσεβοῖμεν; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν
εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.
Soc.Nor would pain, Philebus, be absolute evil; so it is not the infinite which supplies any element of good in pleasure; we must look for something else. Well, I grant you that pleasure and pain are in the class of the infinite but to which of the aforesaid classes, Protarchus and Philebus, can we now without irreverence assign wisdom, knowledge, and mind? I think we must find the right answer to this question, for our danger is great if we fail.
28b ΦΙ.Σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν.
Phi.Oh Socrates, you exalt your own god.
ΣΩ.Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν σαυτοῦ· τὸ δ' ἐρωτώμενον
ὅμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.
Soc.And you your goddess, my friend. But the question calls for an answer, all the same.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὦ Φίληβε, καὶ αὐτῷ
πειστέον.
Pro.Socrates is right, Philebus; you ought to do as he asks.
ΦΙ.Οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προῄρησαι λέγειν;
Phi.Did you not, Protarchus, elect to reply in my place?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε· νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ δέομαί
γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, ἵνα
μηδὲν ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες παρὰ
μέλος φθεγξώμεθά τι.
Pro.Yes; but now I am somewhat at a loss, and I ask you, Socrates, to be our spokesman yourself, that we may not select the wrong representative and so say something improper.
28c ΣΩ.Πειστέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν
ἐπιτάττεις. ἀλλ' ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος,
σεμνύνων ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην
ἐρόμενος ὁποίου γένους εἶεν;
Soc.I must do as you ask, Protarchus; and it is not difficult. But did I really, as Philebus said, embarrass you by playfully exalting my god, when I asked to what class mind and knowledge should be assigned?
ΠΡΩ.Παντάπασί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.You certainly did, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥᾴδιον· πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ
σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστι βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν
οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέγουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων
δ', εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα.
Soc.Yet the answer is easy; for all philosophers agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that mind is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are right. But let us, if you please, investigate the question of its class more at length.
28d ΠΡΩ.Λέγ' ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπολογιζόμενος,
ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος.
Pro.Speak just as you like, Socrates. Do not consider length, so far as we are concerned you cannot bore us.
ΣΩ.Καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δέ πως ὧδε ἐπανερωτῶντες.
Soc.Good. Then let us begin by asking a question.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.What is the question?
ΣΩ.Πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ
καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ
εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ
πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν
συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν;
Soc.Shall we say, Protarchus, that all things and this which is called the universe are governed by an irrational and fortuitous power and mere chance, or, on the contrary, as our forefathers said, are ordered and directed by mind and a marvellous wisdom?
28e ΠΡΩ.Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὦ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες· ὃ
μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, οὐδὲ ὅσιον εἶναί μοι φαίνεται. τὸ
δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ
κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς
περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν
εἴποιμι οὐδ' ἂν δοξάσαιμι.
Pro.The two points of view have nothing in common, my wonderful Socrates. For what you are now saying seems to me actually impious. But the assertion that mind orders all things is worthy of the aspect of the world, of sun, moon, stars, and the whole revolving universe; I can never say or think anything else about it.
ΣΩ.Βούλει δῆτά τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογούμενον
29a συμφήσωμεν ὡς ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μὴ μόνον
οἰώμεθα δεῖν τἀλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
συγκινδυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς
φῇ ταῦτα μὴ οὕτως ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως ἔχειν;
Soc.Do you, then, think we should assent to this and agree in the doctrine of our predecessors, not merely intending to repeat the words of others, with no risk to ourselves, but ready to share with them in the risk and the blame, if any clever man declares that this world is not thus ordered, but is without order?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην;
Pro.Yes, of course I do.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγον
ἄθρει.
Soc.Then observe the argument that now comes against us.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε μόνον.
Pro.Go on.
ΣΩ.Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἁπάντων τῶν
ζῴων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα καθορῶμέν που καὶ γῆν
καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοι, φασίν, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ συστάσει.
Soc.We see the elements which belong to the natures of all living beings, fire, water, air, and earth—or, as the storm-tossed mariners say, land in sight— in the constitution of the universe.
29b ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπ' ἀπορίας
ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.
Pro.Certainly and we are truly storm-tossed in the puzzling cross-currents of this discussion.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δή, περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λαβὲ τὸ
τοιόνδε.
Soc.Well, here is a point for you to consider in relation to each of these elements as it exists in us.
ΠΡΩ.Ποῖον;
Pro.What is the point?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι μικρόν τε τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν ἔνεστι
καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὂν καὶ τὴν
δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ
πάντων νόει ταὐτόν. οἷον πῦρ ἔστι μέν που παρ' ἡμῖν,
ἔστι δ' ἐν τῷ παντί.
Soc.Each element in us is small and poor and in no way pure at all or endowed with the power which is worthy of its nature. Take one example and apply it to all. Fire, for instance, exists in us and also in the universe.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Of course.
29c ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς
καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ
κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ.
Soc.And that which is in us is small, weak, and poor, but that which is in the universe is marvellous in quantity, beauty, and every power which belongs to fire.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλ' ἀληθὲς ὃ λέγεις.
Pro.What you say is very true.
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ αὔξεται
τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρός, ἢ τοὐναντίον
ὑπ' ἐκείνου τό τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων
ἅπαντ' ἴσχει ταῦτα;
Soc.Well, is the fire of the universe nourished, originated, and ruled by the fire within us, or, on the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of all living beings derive nourishment and all that from the universal fire?
ΠΡΩ.Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.
Pro.That question does not even deserve an answer.
29d ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἐρεῖς οἶμαι περί τε τῆς ἐν τοῖς
ζῴοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ
πάντων ὅσων ἠρώτησα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν. οὕτως ἀποκρινῇ;
Soc.True; and you will, I fancy, say the same of the earth which is in us living creatures and that which is in the universe, and concerning all the other elements about which I asked a moment ago your answer will be the same.
ΠΡΩ.Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἄν ποτε
φανείη;
Pro.Yes. Who could answer otherwise without being called a lunatic?
ΣΩ.Σχεδὸν οὐδ' ὁστισοῦν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑξῆς
ἕπου. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἆρ' οὐκ
εἰς ἓν συγκείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα;
Soc.Nobody, I fancy. Now follow the next step. When we see that all the aforesaid elements are gathered together into a unit, do we not call them a body?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Of course.
29e ΣΩ.Ταὐτὸν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦδε ὃν κόσμον λέγομεν·
[διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, σύνθετον ὂν
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.
Soc.Apply the same line of thought to that which we call the universe. It would likewise be a body, being composed of the same elements.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
Pro.Quite right.
ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρ'
ἡμῖν σῶμα ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο τρέφεταί τε καὶ ὅσα
νυνδὴ περὶ αὐτῶν εἴπομεν εἴληφέν τε καὶ ἔχει;
Soc.Does our body derive, obtain, and possess from that body, or that body from ours, nourishment and everything else that we mentioned just now?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ τοῦθ' ἕτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως.
Pro.That, Socrates, is another question not worth asking.
30a ΣΩ.Τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς;
Soc.Well, is this next one worth asking? What will you say to it?
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε τὸ ποῖον.
Pro.What is it?
ΣΩ.Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;
Soc.Shall we not say that our body has a soul?
ΠΡΩ.Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.
Pro.Clearly we shall.
ΣΩ.Πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε
τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον
τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;
Soc.Where did it get it, Protarchus, unless the body of the universe had a soul, since that body has the same elements as ours, only in every way superior?
ΠΡΩ.Δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.Clearly it could get it from no other source.
ΣΩ.Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα
ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος
30b ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχήν
τε παρέχον καὶ σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος
ἰατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀκούμενον πᾶσαν
καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων
ὄντων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι
καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι
τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.
Soc.No; for we surely do not believe, Protarchus, that of those four elements, the finite, the infinite, the combination, and the element of cause which exists in all things, this last, which gives to our bodies souls and the art of physical exercise and medical treatment when the body is ill, and which is in general a composing and healing power, is called the sum of all wisdom, and yet, while these same elements exist in the entire heaven and in great parts thereof, and area moreover, fair and pure, there is no means of including among them that nature which is the fairest and most precious of all.
30c ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοι.
Pro.Certainly there would be no sense in that.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν
ἑπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν,
ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολύ, καὶ πέρας ἱκανόν, καί τις
ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα
ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη
δικαιότατ' ἄν.
Soc.Then if that is not the case, it would be better to follow the other line of thought and say, as we have often said, that there is in the universe a plentiful infinite and a sufficient limit, and in addition a by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called wisdom and mind.
ΠΡΩ.Δικαιότατα δῆτα.
Pro.Yes, most justly.
ΣΩ.Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε
γενοίσθην.
Soc.Surely reason and mind could never come into being without soul.
ΠΡΩ.Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.No, never.
30d ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν
μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς
αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δ' ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά, καθ' ὅτι φίλον
ἑκάστοις λέγεσθαι.
Soc.Then in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul and a kingly mind were implanted through the power of the cause, and in other deities other noble qualities from which they derive their favorite epithets.
ΠΡΩ.Μάλα γε.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξῃς, ὦ
Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις
ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει σύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.
Soc.Now do not imagine, Protarchus, that this is mere idle talk of mine; it confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind always rules the universe.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Τῇ δέ γε ἐμῇ ζητήσει πεπορικὼς ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι νοῦς
30e ἐστὶ γένους τῆς τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος [τῶν τεττάρων,
[ὧν] ἦν ἡμῖν ἓν τοῦτο]. ἔχεις γὰρ δήπου νῦν ἡμῶν
ἤδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.
Soc.And to my question it has furnished the reply that mind belongs to that one of our four classes which was called the cause of all. Now, you see, you have at last my answer.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔχω καὶ μάλα ἱκανῶς· καίτοι με ἀποκρινάμενος
ἔλαθες.
Pro.Yes, and a very sufficient one and yet you answered without my knowing it.
ΣΩ.Ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται
ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά.
Soc.Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes a joke is a restful change from serious talk.
ΠΡΩ.Καλῶς εἶπες.
Pro.You are right.
31a ΣΩ.Νῦν δήπου, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὗ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα
ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν
δεδήλωται.
Soc.We have now, then, my friend, pretty clearly shown to what class mind belongs and what power it possesses.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ἡδονῆς γε ὡσαύτως πάλαι τὸ γένος ἐφάνη.
Soc.And likewise the class of pleasure was made clear some time ago.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα.
Pro.Yes, it was.
ΣΩ.Μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι νοῦς
μὲν αἰτίας ἦν συγγενὴς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονὴ
δὲ ἄπειρός τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος
ἐν αὑτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἕξοντός ποτε γένους.
Soc.Let us, then, remember concerning both of them that mind was akin to cause and belonged more or less to that class, and that pleasure was itself infinite and belonged to the class which, in and by itself, has not and never will have either beginning or middle or end.
31b ΠΡΩ.Μεμνησόμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.We will remember that, of course.
ΣΩ.Δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν
καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον ὁπόταν γίγνησθον ἰδεῖν
ἡμᾶς. πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον
ἐβασανίσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λύπης δὲ αὖ χωρὶς
τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα ἱκανῶς βασανίσαι.
Soc.Our next task is to see in what and by means of what feeling each of them comes into being whenever they do come into being. We will take pleasure first and discuss these questions in relation to pleasure, as we examined its class first. But we cannot examine pleasure successfully apart from pain.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' εἰ ταύτῃ χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα.
Pro.If that is our proper path, let us follow it.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως
αὐτῶν πέρι;
Soc.Do you agree with us about the origin of pleasure?
31c ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.What do you think it is?
ΣΩ.Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ
ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.
Soc.I think pain and pleasure naturally originate in the combined class.
ΠΡΩ.Κοινὸν δέ γε, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομίμνῃσκε
ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.
Pro.Please, my dear Socrates, remind us which of the aforesaid classes you mean by the combined class.
ΣΩ.Ἔσται ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὦ θαυμάσιε.
Soc.I will do so, as well as I can, my brilliant friend.
ΠΡΩ.Καλῶς εἶπες.
Pro.Thank you.
ΣΩ.Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων
τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.
Soc.By combined class, then, let us understand that which we said was the third of the four.
ΠΡΩ.Ὃ μετὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες, ἐν ᾧ καὶ
ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;
Pro.The one you mentioned after the infinite and the finite, and in which you put health and also, I believe, harmony?
31d ΣΩ.Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστ' ἤδη
πρόσεχε.
Soc.You are quite right. Now please pay very close attention.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε μόνον.
Pro.I will. Say on.
ΣΩ.Λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν
τοῖς ζῴοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν
τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.
Soc.I say, then, that when, in us living beings, harmony is broken up, a disruption of nature and a generation of pain also take place at the same moment.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ λέγεις εἰκός.
Pro.What you say is very likely.
ΣΩ.Πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν
ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ
μεγίστων ὅτι τάχιστα ῥηθῆναι.
Soc.But if harmony is recomposed and returns to its own nature, then I say that pleasure is generated, if I may speak in the fewest and briefest words about matters of the highest import.
31e ΠΡΩ.Οἶμαι μέν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμφανέστερον
δὲ ἔτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.
Pro.I think you are right, Socrates; but let us try to be more explicit.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσιά που καὶ περιφανῆ ῥᾷστον
συννοεῖν;
Soc.It is easiest to understand common and obvious examples, is it not?
ΠΡΩ.Ποῖα;
Pro.What examples?
ΣΩ.Πείνη μέν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;
Soc.Is hunger a kind of breaking up and a pain?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;
Soc.And eating, which is a filling up again, is a pleasure?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Δίψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ
32a ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή· διάκρισις
δέ γ' αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους
πάθη, λύπη, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῦξις
ἡδονή.
Soc.Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the filling with moisture of that which was dried up is a pleasure. Then, too, the unnatural dissolution and disintegration we experience through heat are a pain, but the natural restoration and cooling are a pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Καὶ ῥίγους ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζῴου τῆς ὑγρότητος
πῆξις λύπη· πάλιν δ' εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων
ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή. καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει
εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ
32b πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν
τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν
λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ
αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.
Soc.And the unnatural hardening of the moisture in an animal through cold is pain; but the natural course of the elements returning to their place and separating is a pleasure. See, in short, if you think it is a reasonable statement that whenever in the class of living beings, which, as I said before, arises out of the natural union of the infinite and the finite, that union is destroyed, the destruction is pain, and the passage and return of all things to their own nature is pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.
Pro.Let us accept that; for it seems to me to be true in its general lines.
ΣΩ.Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ
ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέροις;
Soc.Then we may assume this as one kind of pain and pleasure arising severally under the conditions I have described?
ΠΡΩ.Κείσθω.
Pro.Let that be assumed.
ΣΩ.Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν
32c παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ
καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.
Soc.Now assume within the soul itself the anticipation of these conditions, the sweet and cheering hope of pleasant things to come, the fearful and woful expectation of painful things to come.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον
εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας
γιγνόμενον.
Pro.Yes, indeed, this is another kind of pleasure and pain, which belongs to the soul itself, apart from the body, and arises through expectation.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἶμαι, κατά γε
τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέσιν τε ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις, ὡς
δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀμείκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι
32d τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν,
ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν,
ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ, καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
τοιούτοις, τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσπαστέον,
ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅτε φύσιν.
Soc.You are right. I think that in these two kinds, both of which are, in my opinion, pure, and not formed by mixture of pain and pleasure, the truth about pleasure will be made manifest, whether the entire class is to be desired or such desirability is rather to be attributed to some other class among those we have mentioned, whereas pleasure and pain, like heat, cold, and other such things, are sometimes desirable and sometimes undesirable, because they are not good themselves, though some of them sometimes admit on occasion the nature of the good.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὅτι ταύτῃ πῃ δεῖ διαπορηθῆναι
τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.
Pro.You are quite right in saying that we must track our quarry on this trail.
ΣΩ.Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε συνίδωμεν· [ὡς] εἴπερ
32e ὄντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν ἀλγηδών,
ἀνασῳζομένων δὲ ἡδονή, τῶν μήτε διαφθειρομένων
μήτε ἀνασῳζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποτὲ ἕξιν δεῖ
τότε ἐν ἑκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζῴοις, ὅταν οὕτως ἴσχῃ. σφόδρα
δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εἰπέ· ἆρα οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν
τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῷον μήτε τι λυπεῖσθαι μήτε ἥδεσθαι μήτε
μέγα μήτε σμικρόν;
Soc.First, then, let us agree on this point: If it is true, as we said, that destruction is pain and restoration is pleasure, let us consider the case of living beings in which neither destruction nor restoration is going on, and what their state is under such conditions. Fix your mind on my question: Must not every living being under those conditions necessarily be devoid of any feeling of pain or pleasure, great or small?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Yes, necessarily.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις
33a παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπουμένου;
Soc.Have we, then, a third condition, besides those of feeling pleasure and pain?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἄγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνῆσθαι. πρὸς
γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν μεμνῆσθαι ταύτην
ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἢ μή. βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει,
διαπεράνωμεν.
Soc.Well then, do your best to bear it in mind; for remembering or forgetting it will make a great difference in our judgement of pleasure. And I should like, if you do not object, to speak briefly about it.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε ποῖον.
Pro.Pray do so.
ΣΩ.[Τῷ] τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν [ἑλομένῳ] βίον οἶσθ' ὡς
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.
Soc.You know that there is nothing to hinder a man from living the life of wisdom in this manner.
33b ΠΡΩ.Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;
Pro.You mean without feeling pleasure or pain?
ΣΩ.Ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων
μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ
νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἑλομένῳ.
Soc.Yes, for it was said, you know, in our comparison of the lives that he who chose the life of mind and wisdom was to have no feeling of pleasure, great or small.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα οὕτως ἐρρήθη.
Pro.Yes, surely, that was said.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι· καὶ ἴσως
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.
Soc.Such a man, then, would have such a life; and perhaps it is not unreasonable, if that is the most divine of lives.
ΠΡΩ.Οὔκουν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ
ἐναντίον.
Pro.Certainly it is not likely that gods feel either joy or its opposite.
ΣΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν
ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰς
33c αὖθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς
τὰ δευτερεῖα, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνώμεθα προσθεῖναι,
προσθήσομεν.
Soc.No, it is very unlikely; for either is unseemly for them. But let us reserve the discussion of that point for another time, if it is appropriate, and we will give mind credit for it in contending for the second place, if we cannot count it for the first.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
Pro.Quite right.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς
ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστι γεγονός.
Soc.Now the other class of pleasure, which we said was an affair of the soul alone, originates entirely in memory.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.How is that?
ΣΩ.Μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν πρότερον ἀναληπτέον,
καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἴσθησιν μνήμης,
εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πῃ
γενήσεσθαι.
Soc.We must, apparently, first take up memory, and perception even before memory, if these matters are to be made clear to us properly.
33d ΠΡΩ.Πῶς φῄς;
Pro.What do you mean?
ΣΩ.Θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἑκάστοτε παθημάτων
τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
διεξελθεῖν ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα
καί τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν
ἑκατέρῳ.
Soc.Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually.
ΠΡΩ.Κείσθω.
Pro.Let us assume that.
ΣΩ.Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν
ἡμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἆρ'
ὀρθότατα ἐροῦμεν;
Soc.Shall we be right in saying that the soul forgets those which do not permeate both, and does not forget those which do?
33e ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς ὡς λέγω
λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος,
ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὔπω γέγονε. τοῦ δὴ μήτε ὄντος
μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τινὰ ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον.
ἦ γάρ;
Soc.Do not in the least imagine that when I speak of forgetting I mean that forgetfulness arises in this case; for forgetfulness is the departure of memory, and in the case under consideration memory has not yet come into being; now it is absurd to speak of the loss of that which does not exist and has not yet come into being, is it not?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.
Soc.Then just change the terms.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.How?
ΣΩ.Ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἀπαθὴς
αὕτη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἣν νῦν λήθην
34a καλεῖς ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.
Soc.Instead of saying that the soul forgets, when it is unaffected by the vibrations of the body, apply the term want of perception to that which you are now calling forgetfulness.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔμαθον.
Pro.I understand.
ΣΩ.Τὸ δ' ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ
γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν
ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' ἄν.
Soc.And the union of soul and body in one common affection and one common motion you may properly call perception.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἤδη μανθάνομεν ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν
αἴσθησιν;
Soc.Then do we now understand what we mean by perception?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων
ὀρθῶς ἄν τις λέγοι κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.
Soc.I think, then, that memory may rightly be defined as the preservation of perception.
34b ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.Quite rightly.
ΣΩ.Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἆρ' οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν;
Soc.But do we not say that memory differs from recollection?
ΠΡΩ.Ἴσως.
Pro.Perhaps.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τόδε;
Soc.And is this the difference?
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.What?
ΣΩ.Ὅταν ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχέν ποθ' ἡ ψυχή,
ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ,
τότε ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί που λέγομεν. ἦ γάρ;
Soc.When the soul alone by itself, apart from the body, recalls completely any experience it has had in company with the body, we say that it recollects do we not?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτ' αἰσθήσεως
εἴτ' αὖ μαθήματος αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν
34c αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα σύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις [καὶ μνήμας]
που λέγομεν.
Soc.And again when the soul has lost the memory of a perception or of something it has learned and then alone by itself regains this, we call everything of that kind recollection.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Pro.You are right.
ΣΩ.Οὗ δὴ χάριν ἅπαντ' εἴρηται ταῦτ', ἔστι τόδε.
Soc.Now my reason for saying all this is—
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.What?
ΣΩ.Ἵνα πῃ τὴν ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι
μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἅμα ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ
γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἔοικεν δηλοῦσθαι.
Soc.That henceforth we may comprehend as completely and clearly as possible the pleasure of the soul, and likewise its desire, apart from the body; for both of these appear to be made plain by what has been said about memory and recollection.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.
Pro.Let us, then, Socrates, discuss the next point.
ΣΩ.Πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν [τὴν]
34d μορφὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν. καὶ
γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι τί
ποτ' ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.
Soc.We must, it seems, consider many things in relation to the origin and general aspect of pleasure; but now I think our first task is to take up the nature and origin of desire.
ΠΡΩ.Σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.
Pro.Then let us examine that; for we shall not lose anything.
ΣΩ.Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν [καὶ] ταῦτά γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε·
εὑρόντες ὃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, ἀπολοῦμεν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα
ἀπορίαν.
Soc.Oh yes, Protarchus, we shall lose a great deal! When we find what we are seeking we shall lose our perplexity about these very questions.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς ἠμύνω· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώμεθα
λέγειν.
Pro.That is a fair counter; but let us try to take up the next point.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα
34e τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν εἶναί τινας ἐπιθυμίας;
Soc.Did we not say just now that hunger, thirst, and the like were desires?
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα γε.
Pro.They are, decidedly.
ΣΩ.Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα ταὐτὸν βλέψαντες οὕτω πολὺ
διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἑνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι;
Soc.What sort of identity have we in view when we call these, which are so different, by one name?
ΠΡΩ.Μὰ Δί' οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ'
ὅμως λεκτέον.
Pro.By Zeus, Socrates, that question may not be easy to answer, yet it must be answered.
ΣΩ.Ἐκεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.
Soc.Let us, then, begin again at that point with the same examples.
ΠΡΩ.Πόθεν δή;
Pro.At what point?
ΣΩ.Διψῇ γέ που λέγομεν ἑκάστοτέ τι;
Soc.We say of a thing on any particular occasion, it’s thirsty, do we not?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Τοῦτο δέ γ' ἐστὶ κενοῦται;
Soc.And that means being empty?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;
Soc.And is thirst, then, a desire?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί, πώματός γε.
Pro.Yes, of drink.
35a ΣΩ.Πώματος, ἢ πληρώσεως πώματος;
Soc.Of drink, or of being filled with drink?
ΠΡΩ.Οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.
Pro.Of being filled, I suppose.
ΣΩ.Ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν
ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει· κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πληροῦσθαι.
Soc.The man, then, who is empty desires, as it appears, the opposite of what he feels for, being empty, he longs to be filled.
ΠΡΩ.Σαφέστατά γε.
Pro.That is very plain.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁπόθεν εἴτ'
αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτ' ἂν εἴτε μνήμῃ, τούτου ὃ
μήτ' ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτ' ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πώποτε
ἔπαθεν;
Soc.Well then, is there any source from which a man who is empty at first can gain a comprehension, whether by perception or by memory, of fulness, a thing which he does not feel at the time and has never felt before?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πῶς;
Pro.It cannot be done.
35b ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.
Soc.And yet he who desires, desires something, we say.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα ὅ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψῇ γάρ,
τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὁ δ' ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.
Soc.And he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, and that is emptiness, but he desires fulness.
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Πληρώσεώς γ' ἄρα πῄ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν
ἐφάπτοιτο.
Soc.Then somehow some part of him who is thirsty can apprehend fulness.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀναγκαῖον.
Pro.Yes, obviously.
ΣΩ.Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ που.
Soc.But it cannot be the body, for that is empty.
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.True.
ΣΩ.Τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν,
35c τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτ' ἄλλῳ ἐφάψαιτο;
Soc.The only remaining possibility is that the soul apprehends it, which it must do by means of memory; for what other means could it employ?
ΠΡΩ.Σχεδὸν οὐδενί.
Pro.No other, I should say.
ΣΩ.Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηχ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν
λόγων;
Soc.And do we understand the consequences of this argument?
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.What are the consequences?
ΣΩ.Σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὔ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος
γίγνεσθαι.
Soc.This argument declares that we have no bodily desire.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.How so?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς
ζῴου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.
Soc.Because it shows that the endeavor of every living being is always towards the opposite of the actual conditions of the body.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα.
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἡ δ' ὁρμή γε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ
παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν
ἐναντίων.
Soc.And the impulse which leads towards the opposite of those conditions shows that there is a memory of the opposite of the conditions.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε.
Pro.Certainly.
35d ΣΩ.Τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας
μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς σύμπασαν τήν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν
καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.
Soc.And the argument, by showing that memory is that which leads us towards the objects of desire, has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and the ruling principle in every living being are of the soul.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα.
Pro.Quite right.
ΣΩ.Διψῆν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἤ τι τῶν
τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ.
Soc.So the argument denies utterly that the body hungers or thirsts or has any such affection.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν.
βίου γὰρ εἶδός τί μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος
ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.
Soc.Let us consider a further point in connection with those very affections. For I think the purpose of the argument is to point out to us a state of life existing in them.
35e ΠΡΩ.Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου πέρι βίου φράζεις;
Pro.Of what sort of life are you speaking, and in what affections does it exist?
ΣΩ.Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα
περὶ σωτηρίαν τέ ἐστι τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις
τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει
κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.
Soc.In the affections of fulness and emptiness and all which pertain to the preservation and destruction of living beings, and I am thinking that if we fall into one of these we feel pain, which is followed by joy when we change to the other.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Pro.That is true.
ΣΩ.Τί δ' ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται;
Soc.And what if a man is between the two?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;
Pro.How between them?
ΣΩ.Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων <ὧν>
γενομένων παύοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί
36a τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;
Soc.Because of his condition, he is suffering, but he remembers the pleasures the coming of which would bring him an end of his pain; as yet, however, he does not possess them. Well then, shall we say that he is between the affections, or not?
ΠΡΩ.Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Let us say so.
ΣΩ.Πότερον ἀλγοῦνθ' ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;
Soc.Shall we say that he is wholly pained or wholly pleased?
ΠΡΩ.Μὰ Δί', ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ
μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας
τινὶ πόθῳ.
Pro.No, by Zeus, but he is afflicted with a twofold pain; he suffers in body from his sensation, and in soul from expectation and longing.
ΣΩ.Πῶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες; ἆρ'
οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερᾷ τοῦ
36b πληρωθήσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀνελπίστως
ἔχει;
Soc.How could you, Protarchus, speak of twofold pain? Is not an empty man sometimes possessed of a sure hope of being filled, and sometimes, on the contrary, quite hopeless?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα γε.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ
μεμνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις
[τοῖς χρόνοις] ἀλγεῖν;
Soc.And do you not think that when he has a hope of being filled he takes pleasure in his memory, and yet at the same time, since he is at the moment empty, suffers pain?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pro.It cannot be otherwise.
ΣΩ.Τότε ἄρ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα λυπεῖταί τε ἅμα
καὶ χαίρει.
Soc.At such a time, then, a man, or any other animal, has both pain and pleasure at once.
ΠΡΩ.Κινδυνεύει.
Pro.Yes, I suppose so.
ΣΩ.Τί δ' ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι
πληρώσεως; ἆρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτ' ἂν περὶ τὰς
λύπας πάθος, ὃ σὺ νυνδὴ κατιδὼν ᾠήθης ἁπλῶς εἶναι
36c διπλοῦν;
Soc.And when an empty man is without hope of being filled, what then? Is not that the time when the twofold feeling of pain would arise, which you just now observed and thought the pain simply was twofold?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.Very true, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε
χρησώμεθα.
Soc.Let us make use of our examination of those affections for a particular purpose.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.For what purpose?
ΣΩ.Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ
ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν; ἢ τὰς μέν τινας ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ' οὔ;
Soc.Shall we say that those pleasures and pains are true or false, or that some are true and others not so?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἶεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ ἢ
λῦπαι;
Pro.But, Socrates, how can there be false pleasures or pains?
ΣΩ.Πῶς δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς,
ἢ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς;
Soc.But, Protarchus, how can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?
36d ΠΡΩ.Δόξας μὲν ἔγωγ' ἄν που συγχωροίην, τὰ δ' ἕτερα
ταῦτ' οὐκ ἄν.
Pro.Opinions I would grant you, but not the rest.
ΣΩ.Πῶς φῄς; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πάνυ
σμικρὸν ἐπεγείρειν.
Soc.What? I am afraid we are starting a very considerable discussion.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Pro.You are right.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὦ παῖ 'κείνου
τἀνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.
Soc.And yet we must consider, thou son of that man, whether the discussion is relevant to what has gone before.
ΠΡΩ.Ἴσως τοῦτό γε.
Pro.Yes, no doubt.
ΣΩ.Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ
ὁτῳοῦν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον λεγομένων.
Soc.We must dismiss everything else, tedious or otherwise, that is irrelevant.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς.
Pro.Right.
36e ΣΩ.Λέγε δή μοι· θαῦμα γάρ μέ γε ἔχει διὰ τέλους ἀεὶ
περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ νυνδὴ προυθέμεθα ἀπορήματα. πῶς δὴ φῄς;
ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;
Soc.Now tell me; for I am always utterly amazed by the same questions we were just proposing.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.What do you mean?
ΣΩ.Οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὔθ' ὕπαρ, ὡς φῄς, [ἐστιν] οὔτ' ἐν
μανίαις οὔτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθ' ὅστις ποτὲ δοκεῖ
μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ' αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι,
λυπεῖται δ' οὔ.
Soc.Are not some pleasures false and others true?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνθ' οὕτω ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες
ὑπειλήφαμεν.
Pro.How could that be?
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ὀρθῶς; ἢ σκεπτέον εἴτ' ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ
ταῦτα λέγεται;
Soc.Then, as you maintain, nobody, either sleeping or waking or insane or deranged, ever thinks he feels pleasure when he does not feel it, and never, on the other hand, thinks he suffers pain when he does not suffer it?
ΠΡΩ.Σκεπτέον, ὥς γ' ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.
Pro.We have, Socrates, always believed that all this is as you suggest.
37a ΣΩ.Διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον
ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστιν γάρ πού τι δοξάζειν
ἡμῖν;
Soc.But is the belief correct? Shall we consider whether it is so or not?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.I should say we ought to consider that.
ΣΩ.Καὶ ἥδεσθαι;
Soc.Then let us analyze still more clearly what we were just now saying about pleasure and opinion. There is a faculty of having an opinion, is there not?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενόν ἐστί τι;
Soc.And of feeling pleasure?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Καὶ τό γε ᾧ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἥδεται;
Soc.And there is an object of opinion?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πάνυ γε.
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἄντε ὀρθῶς ἄντε μὴ ὀρθῶς
δοξάζῃ, τό γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν.
Soc.And something by which that which feels pleasure is pleased?
37b ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἄντε ὀρθῶς ἄντε μὴ ὀρθῶς
ἥδηται, τό γε ὄντως ἥδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἀπολεῖ.
Soc.And that which has opinion, whether right or wrong, never loses its function of really having opinion?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί, καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει.
Pro.Of course not.
ΣΩ.Ὅτῳ ποτὲ οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθὴς
ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς μόνον ἀληθές,
δοξάζειν δ' ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἴληχεν
<σκεπτέον>.
Soc.And that which feels pleasure, whether rightly or wrongly, will clearly never lose its function of really feeling pleasure?
ΠΡΩ.Σκεπτέον.
Pro.Yes, that is true, too.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' ὅτι δόξῃ μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδός τε καὶ
37c ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά
τις ἑκατέρα, σκεπτέον φῂς τοῦτ' εἶναι;
Soc.Then we must consider how it is that opinion is both true and false and pleasure only true, though the holding of opinion and the feeling of pleasure are equally real.
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Yes, so we must.
ΣΩ.Πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν τὰ μέν
ἐστι ποί' ἄττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ ἐστί, ποιώ τινε
δὲ οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν διομολογητέον.
Soc.You mean that we must consider this question because falsehood and truth are added as attributes to opinion, and thereby it becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality in each instance?
ΠΡΩ.Δῆλον.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ὅτι καὶ ποιώ
τινε· πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ
σφόδρα ἑκάτεραι γίγνονται, λῦπαί τε καὶ ἡδοναί.
Soc.And furthermore, we must reach an agreement on the question whether, even if some things have qualities, pleasure and pain are not merely what they are, without qualities or attributes.
37d ΠΡΩ.Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Evidently we must.
ΣΩ.Ἂν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, προσγίγνηταί
τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν
δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν;
Soc.But it is easy enough to see that they have qualities. For we said a long time ago that both pains and pleasures are great and small and intense.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλὰ τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Τί δ', ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ τοὐναντίον ὀρθότητι τινὶ τούτων
προσγίγνηται; μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὀρθότητα
ἴσχῃ, ταὐτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν;
Soc.And if badness becomes an attribute of any of these, Protarchus, shall we say that the opinion or the pleasure thereby becomes bad?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀναγκαῖον.
Pro.Why certainly, Socrates.
37e ΣΩ.Ἂν δέ γε ἁμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ᾖ, τὴν δόξαν
τότε ἁμαρτάνουσάν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολογητέον οὐδ' ὀρθῶς
δοξάζουσαν;
Soc.And what if rightness or its opposite becomes an attribute of one of them? Shall we not say that the opinion is right, if it has rightness, and the pleasure likewise?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.Obviously.
ΣΩ.Τί δ', ἂν αὖ λύπην ἤ τινα ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ
λυπεῖται ἢ τοὐναντίον ἁμαρτάνουσαν ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρθὴν ἢ
χρηστὴν ἤ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;
Soc.And if that which is opined is mistaken, must we not agree that the opinion, since it is at the moment making a mistake, is not right or rightly opining?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ ἁμαρτήσεταί γε
ἡδονή.
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ἔοικέν γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης
ὀρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.
Soc.And what if we see a pain or a pleasure making a mistake in respect of that by which the pain or pleasure is caused? Shall we give it the attribute of right or good or any of the words which denote excellence?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες,
38a ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν
οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆ.
Pro.That is impossible if the pleasure is mistaken.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.
Soc.And certainly pleasure often seems to come to us in connection with false, not true, opinion.
ΠΡΩ.Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω.
Pro.Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates, we call the opinion false; but nobody would ever call the actual pleasure false.
ΣΩ.Διαφέρει δ' ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἡ μετὰ δόξης τε
ὀρθῆς καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ
ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης;
Soc.You are an eager advocate of the case of pleasure just now, Protarchus.
38b ΠΡΩ.Εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν.
Pro.Oh no, I merely say what I hear.
ΣΩ.Τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.
Soc.Is there no difference, my friend, between the pleasure which is connected with right opinion and knowledge and that which often comes to each of us with falsehood and ignorance?
ΠΡΩ.Ἄγ' ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται.
Pro.There is likely to be a great difference.
ΣΩ.Τῇδε δὴ ἄγω.
Soc.Then let us proceed to the contemplation of the difference between them.
ΠΡΩ.Πῇ;
Pro.Lead on as you think best.
ΣΩ.Δόξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ
ἀληθής;
Soc.Then this is the way I lead.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστιν.
Pro.What way?
ΣΩ.Ἕπεται μὴν ταύταις, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονὴ καὶ
λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.
Soc.Do we agree that there is such a thing as false opinion and also as true opinion?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε.
Pro.There is.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ
τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθ' ἑκάστοτε;
Soc.And, as we were saying just now, pleasure and pain often follow them—I mean true and false opinion.
38c ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς ὧδε περὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθ'
ἴσχειν;
Soc.And do not opinion and the power of forming an opinion always come to us from memory and perception?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς τὰ
καθορώμενα συμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθ'
ἅπερ ὁρᾷ;
Soc.Do we, then, believe that our relation to these faculties is somewhat as follows?
ΠΡΩ.Φαίην ἄν.
Pro.How?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὗτος ἀνέροιτ' ἂν
ὧδε;
Soc.Would you say that often when a man sees things at a distance and not very clearly, he wishes to distinguish between the things which he sees?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.Yes, I should say so.
ΣΩ.Τί ποτ' ἄρ' ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' ἑστάναι
38d φανταζόμενον ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ; ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἄν τις πρὸς
ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα αὑτῷ
ποτε;
Soc.Next, then, would he not ask himself—
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.What?
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος
ἂν πρὸς αὑτὸν εἴποι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς
εἰπών;
Soc.What is that which is visible standing beside the rock under a tree? Do you not think a man might ask himself such a question if he saw such objects presented to his view?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πάνυ γε.
Pro.To be sure.
ΣΩ.Καὶ παρενεχθείς γ' αὖ τάχ' ἂν ὡς ἔστι τινῶν
ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.
Soc.And after that our gazer might reply to himself correctly It is a man?
ΠΡΩ.Μάλα γε.
Pro.Certainly.
38e ΣΩ.Κἂν μέν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥηθέντα
ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἂν πάλιν
φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν
ἐκαλοῦμεν;
Soc.Or, again, perhaps he might be misled into the belief that it was a work of some shepherds, and then he would call the thing which he saw an image.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Yes, indeed.
ΣΩ.Ἂν δ' ἄρα μόνος ᾖ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν πρὸς αὑτὸν διανοούμενος,
ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ πορεύεται.
Soc.And if some one is with him, he might repeat aloud to his companion what he had said to himself, and thus that which we called an opinion now becomes a statement?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; ἆρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τούτων ὅπερ
ἐμοί;
Soc.But if he is alone when he has this thought, he sometimes carries it about in his mind for a long time.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Undoubtedly.
ΣΩ.Δοκεῖ μοι τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεοικέναι.
Soc.Well, is your view about what takes place in such cases the same as mine?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.What is yours?
39a ΣΩ.Ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐτὸν
κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνονταί μοι
σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους· καὶ
ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράφῃ [τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα], δόξα τε ἀληθὴς
καὶ λόγοι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ συμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι·
ψευδῆ δ' ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς
γράψῃ, τἀναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη.
Soc.I think the soul at such a time is like a book.
39b ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ῥηθέντα
οὕτως.
Pro.How is that?
ΣΩ.Ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.
Soc.Memory unites with the senses, and they and the feelings which are connected with them seem to me almost to write words in our souls; and when the feeling in question writes the truth, true opinions and true statements are produced in us; but when the writer within us writes falsehoods, the resulting opinions and statements are the opposite of true.
ΠΡΩ.Τίνα;
Pro.That is my view completely, and I accept it as stated.
ΣΩ.Ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων
εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.
Soc.Then accept also the presence of another workman in our souls at such a time.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;
Pro.What workman?
ΣΩ.Ὅταν ἀπ' ὄψεως ἤ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε
δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγών τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων
39c καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ πως. ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι
γιγνόμενον παρ' ἡμῖν;
Soc.A painter, who paints in our souls pictures to illustrate the words which the writer has written.
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.
Pro.But how do we say he does this, and when?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες
ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;
Soc.When a man receives from sight or some other sense the opinions and utterances of the moment and afterwards beholds in his own mind the images of those opinions and utterances. That happens to us often enough, does it not?
ΠΡΩ.Παντάπασιν.
Pro.It certainly does.
ΣΩ.Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδε ἐπὶ
τούτοις σκεψώμεθα.
Soc.And the images of the true opinions are true, and those of the false are false?
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Assuredly.
ΣΩ.Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦτα
ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὔ;
Soc.Then if we are right about that, let us consider a further question.
ΠΡΩ.Περὶ ἁπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡσαύτως.
Pro.What is it?
39d ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν αἵ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι
ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος
ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνοιντ' ἄν, ὥσθ' ἡμῖν συμβαίνει τὸ
προχαίρειν τε καὶ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον
εἶναι γιγνόμενον;
Soc.Whether this is an inevitable experience in relation to the present and the past, but not in relation to the future.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.It is in the same relation to all kinds of time.
ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἃ
σμικρῷ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν
39e γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστίν, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα
οὐκ ἔστιν;
Soc.Was it not said a while ago that the pleasures and pains which belong to the soul alone might come before the pleasures and pains of the body, so that we have the pleasure and pain of anticipation, which relate to the future?
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα γε.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Ἆρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἐλπίδες
εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὖσαι, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ
βίου ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;
Soc.Do the writings and pictures, then, which we imagined a little while ago to exist within us, relate to the past and present, but not to the future?
ΠΡΩ.Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Pro.To the future especially.
ΣΩ.Ἄγε δή, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι.
Soc.Do you say to the future especially because they are all hopes relating to the future and we are always filled with hopes all our lives?
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Precisely.
ΣΩ.Δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἆρ'
οὐ θεοφιλής ἐστιν;
Soc.Well, here is a further question for you to answer.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.What is it?
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἆρ' οὐ
40a τοὐναντίον ἐκείνῳ;
Soc.A just, pious, and good man is surely a friend of the gods, is he not?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς
ἄνθρωπος γέμει;
Soc.And an unjust and thoroughly bad man is the reverse?
ΠΡΩ.Τί δ' οὔ;
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν, ἃς ἐλπίδας
ὀνομάζομεν;
Soc.But, as we were just now saying, every man is full of many hopes?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Yes, to be sure.
ΣΩ.Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐζωγραφημένα· καί
τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἑαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπ'
αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν
ἐφ' αὑτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορᾷ.
Soc.And there are in all of us written words which we call hopes?
40b ΠΡΩ.Τί δ' οὔ;
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ
πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς
εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ <τὸ> πολὺ τοὐναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;
Soc.And also the images painted there; and often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into his possession, and in its train many pleasures; and he even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself immensely.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα φατέον.
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναί γε οὐδὲν ἧττον
πάρεισιν ἐζωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δὲ αὗταί που.
Soc.Shall we or shall we not say that of these pictures those are for the most part true which are presented to the good, because they are friends of the gods, whereas those presented to the bad are for the most part false?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Surely we must say that.
40c ΣΩ.Ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν,
οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.
Soc.Then the bad also, no less than the good, have pleasures painted in their souls, but they are false pleasures.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.
Pro.Yes, surely.
ΣΩ.Εἰσὶν δὴ κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς
ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα, καὶ λῦπαι δὲ ὡσαύτως.
Soc.Then the bad rejoice for the most part in the false, and the good in true pleasures.
ΠΡΩ.Εἰσίν.
Pro.That is inevitably true.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν
δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μηδ' ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μηδὲ ἐπ'
ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε.
Soc.According to our present view, then, there are false pleasures in the souls of men, imitations or caricatures of the true pleasures; and pains likewise.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε.
Pro.There are.
40d ΣΩ.Καὶ ταῦτά γε ἦν οἶμαι τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν
ψευδῆ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἦ γάρ;
Soc.We saw, you remember, that he who had an opinion at all always really had an opinion, but it was sometimes not based upon realities, whether present, past, or future.
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ
ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἕξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις;
Soc.And this it was, I believe, which created false opinion and the holding of false opinions, was it not?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὁπωςοῦν
καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι μηδ' ἐπὶ
τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίοτε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἴσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ
τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι.
Soc.Very well, must we not also grant that pleasure and pain stand in the same relation to realities?
40e ΠΡΩ.Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.
Pro.What do you mean?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβων τε καὶ
θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνίοτε;
Soc.I mean that he who feels pleasure at all in any way or manner always really feels pleasure, but it is sometimes not based upon realities, whether present or past, and often, perhaps most frequently, upon things which will never even be realities in the future.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.This also, Socrates, must inevitably be the case.
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ἢ
ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;
Soc.And the same may be said of fear and anger and all that sort of thing—that they are all sometimes false?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκ ἄλλως.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐδ' ἡδονάς γ' οἶμαι κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ
τρόπον εἰσὶν πονηραὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι.
Soc.Well, can we say that opinions become bad or good except as they become false?
41a ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας.
σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἄν τις λύπας
τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλῃ δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας
πονηρίᾳ.
Pro.No.
ΣΩ.Τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν
οὔσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ νῷν·
τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις
41b ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνομένας λεκτέον. τούτῳ γὰρ
ἴσως χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.
Soc.And we understand, I believe, that pleasures also are not bad except by being false.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; εἴπερ γε εἰσίν.
Pro.No; you have said quite the reverse of the truth, Socrates; for no one would be at all likely to call pains and pleasures bad because they are false, but because they are involved in another great and manifold evil.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶν κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν.
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἕως ἂν κέηται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον
ἀνέλεγκτον δήπου γίγνεσθαι.
Soc.Then of the evil pleasures which are such because of evil we will speak a little later, if we still care to do so; but of the false pleasures we must prove in another way that they exist and come into existence in us often and in great numbers; for this may help us to reach our decisions.
ΠΡΩ.Καλῶς.
Pro.Yes, of course; that is, if such pleasures exist.
ΣΩ.Περιιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ
τὸν λόγον.
Soc.But they do exist, Protarchus, in my opinion; however, until we have established the truth of this opinion, it cannot be unquestioned.
ΠΡΩ.Ἴωμεν.
Pro.Good.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὀλίγον ἐν
41c τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὦσι,
δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι
διείληπται.
Soc.Then let us, like athletes, approach and grapple with this new argument.
ΠΡΩ.Μεμνήμεθα καὶ προερρήθη ταῦτα.
Pro.Let us do so.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ
σώματος ἐναντίων ἕξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἤ τινα διὰ
πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον;
Soc.We said, you may remember, a little while ago, that when desires, as they are called, exist in us, the soul is apart from the body and separate from it in feelings.
ΠΡΩ.Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.I remember; that was said.
ΣΩ.Συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.
Soc.And was not the soul that which desired the opposites of the conditions of the body and the body that which caused pleasure or pain because of feeling?
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε.
Pro.Yes, that was the case.
41d ΣΩ.Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ὁπόταν ᾖ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρακεῖσθαι
λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἅμα παρ'
ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐφάνη.
Soc.Then draw the conclusion as to what takes place in these circumstances.
ΠΡΩ.Φαίνεται γοῦν.
Pro.Go on.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν
ἔμπροσθε κεῖται;
Soc.What takes place is this: in these circumstances pleasures and pains exist at the same time and the sensations of opposite pleasures and pains are present side by side simultaneously, as was made clear just now.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Yes, that is clear.
ΣΩ.Ὡς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἄμφω τούτω δέχεσθον,
λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην.
Soc.And have we not also said and agreed and settled something further?
ΠΡΩ.Εἴρηται. τί μήν;
Pro.What?
ΣΩ.Τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι;
Soc.That both pleasure and pain admit of the more and less and are of the class of the infinite.
41e ΠΡΩ.Πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς;
Pro.Yes, we have said that, certainly.
ΣΩ.Εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις
τισὶ διαγνῶναι βούλεται ἑκάστοτε τίς τούτων πρὸς
ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς
σφοδροτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ
ἡδονὴ πρὸς ἡδονήν.
Soc.Then what means is there of judging rightly of this?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' ἔστι ταῦτά τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς
κρίσεως αὕτη.
Pro.How and in what way do you mean?
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶν
42a τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῆ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν,
ἐν λύπαις δ' ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο
γιγνόμενον;
Soc.I mean to ask whether the purpose of our judgement of these matters in such circumstances is to recognize in each instance which of these elements is greater or smaller or more intense, comparing pain with pleasure, pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.Certainly there are such differences, and that is the purpose of our judgement.
ΣΩ.Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθε γέγονεν.
Soc.Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things from too near at hand or from too great a distance obscures their real sizes and causes us to have false opinions; and does not this same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures?
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;
Pro.Yes, Socrates, even much more than in the case of sight.
ΣΩ.Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὗται
γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἅμα τοῦ παρ' αὑταῖς
παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν.
Soc.Then our present conclusion is the opposite of what we said a little while ago.
42b ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.To what do you refer?
ΣΩ.Νῦν δέ γε αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν
ἑκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἅμα τιθέμεναι
παρ' ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται
καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἡδονὰς
τοὐναντίον ἐκείναις.
Soc.A while ago these opinions, being false or true, imbued the pains and pleasures with their own condition of truth or falsehood.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἑκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάττους
φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτεμόμενος ἑκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον
42c ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν, οὔτε αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον ἐρεῖς, οὐδ' αὖ
ποτε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον
ὀρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμήσεις λέγειν.
Soc.But now, because they are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they.
ΠΡΩ.Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.That is inevitable for the reasons you have given.
ΣΩ.Τούτων τοίνυν ἑξῆς ὀψόμεθα ἐὰν τῇδε ἀπαντῶμεν
ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας
τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.
Soc.They both, then, appear greater and less than the reality. Now if you abstract from both of them this apparent, but unreal, excess or inferiority, you cannot say that its appearance is true, nor again can you have the face to affirm that the part of pleasure or pain which corresponds to this is true or real.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;
Pro.No, I cannot.
ΣΩ.Εἴρηταί που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἑκάστων
διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι
42d καὶ κενώσεσι καί τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι λῦπαί τε
καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύναι καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματα
ἔχει συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.
Soc.Next, then, we will see whether we may not in another direction come upon pleasures and pains still more false than these appearing and existing in living beings.
ΠΡΩ.Ναί, ταῦτα εἴρηται πολλάκις.
Pro.What pleasures and what method do you mean?
ΣΩ.Εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὑτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται,
ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν
αὐτῶν.
Soc.It has been said many times that pains and woes and aches and everything that is called by names of that sort are caused when nature in any instance is corrupted through combinations and dissolutions, fillings and emptyings, increases and diminutions.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς.
Pro.Yes, that has been said many times.
ΣΩ.Τί δ' ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον
ἡμῶν ᾖ;
Soc.And we agreed that when things are restored to their natural condition, that restoration is pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Pro.Right.
42e ΣΩ.Οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὃ σὺ νῦν
ἤρου τὸ ἐρώτημα.
Soc.But when neither of these changes takes place in the body, what then?
ΠΡΩ.Τί δή;
Pro.When could that be the case, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύεις με διερέσθαι
σε πάλιν.
Soc.That question of yours is not to the point, Protarchus.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίαν;
Pro.Why not?
ΣΩ.Εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φήσω, τὸ
τοιοῦτον, τί ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν;
Soc.Because you do not prevent my asking my own question again.
ΠΡΩ.Μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάτερα φῄς;
Pro.What question?
ΣΩ.Οὕτως.
Soc.Why, Protarchus, I may say, granting that such a condition does not arise, what would be the necessary result if it did?
ΠΡΩ.Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔτε ἡδονὴ
γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτ' ἄν τις λύπη.
Pro.You mean if the body is not changed in either direction?
43a ΣΩ.Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι τόδε λέγεις, ὡς
ἀεί τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοί
φασιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ.
Soc.Yes.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γε οὐ φαύλως
λέγειν.
Pro.It is clear, Socrates, that in that case there would never be either pleasure or pain.
ΣΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκστῆναι
τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῇδ' οὖν
διανοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι σύμφευγε.
Soc.Excellent. But you believe, I fancy, that some such change must always be taking place in us, as the philosophers say; for all things are always flowing and shifting.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε ὅπῃ.
Pro.Yes, that is what they say, and I think their theory is important.
ΣΩ.Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους·
43b σὺ δ' ἀπόκριναι πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα πάσχει τι τῶν
ἐμψύχων, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὔτ' αὐξανόμενοι
λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν
πάσχοντες, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον.
Soc.Of course it is, in view of their own importance. But I should like to avoid this argument which is rushing at us. I am going to run away; come along and escape with me.
ΠΡΩ.Ἅπαν δήπου τοὐναντίον· ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε
τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθ' ἡμᾶς.
Pro.What is your way of escape?
ΣΩ.Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς
αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ
ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται.
Soc.We grant you all this let us say to them. But answer me this, Protarchus, are we and all other living beings always conscious of everything that happens to us of our growth and all that sort of thing—or is the truth quite the reverse of that?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Quite the reverse, surely; for we are almost entirely unconscious of everything of that sort.
43c ΣΩ.Ὧδ' ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον.
Soc.Then we were not right in saying just now that the fluctuations and changes cause pains and pleasures.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.No, certainly not.
ΣΩ.Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς
ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δ' αὖ μέτριαί τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν
οὐδέτερα τούτων.
Soc.A better and more unassailable statement would be this.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότερον οὕτως ἢ 'κείνως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.What?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς βίος
ἂν ἥκοι.
Soc.That the great changes cause pains and pleasures in us, but the moderate and small ones cause no pains or pleasures at all.
ΠΡΩ.Ποῖος;
Pro.That is more correct than the other statement, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ὃν ἄλυπόν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.
Soc.But if that is the case, the life of which we spoke just now would come back again.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Pro.What life?
ΣΩ.Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἕνα
43d μὲν ἡδύν, τὸν δ' αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δ' ἕνα μηδέτερα. ἢ πῶς
ἂν φαίης σὺ περὶ τούτων;
Soc.The life which we said was painless and without joys.
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἢ ταύτῃ, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ
χαίρειν;
Soc.Let us, therefore, assume three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and one neither of the two; or do you disagree?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.No, I agree to this, that there are the three lives.
ΣΩ.Ὁπόταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς ὡς ἥδιστον πάντων ἐστὶν
ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις
λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;
Soc.Then freedom from pain would not be identical with pleasure?
ΠΡΩ.Ἡδὺ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.
Pro.Certainly not.
43e ΣΩ.Τριῶν ὄντων οὖν ἡμῖν, ὧντινων βούλει, τίθει, καλλίοσιν
ἵνα ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δ' ἄργυρον,
τρίτον δὲ τὸ μηδέτερα τούτων.
Soc.When you hear anyone say that the pleasantest of all things is to live all one’s life without pain, what do you understand him to mean?
ΠΡΩ.Κεῖται.
Pro.I think he means that freedom from pain is pleasure.
ΣΩ.Τὸ δὴ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα
γένοιτο ἄν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;
Soc.Now let us assume that we have three things; no matter what they are, but let us use fine names and call one gold, another silver, and the third neither of the two.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πῶς ἄν;
Pro.Agreed.
ΣΩ.Οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγόμενος
ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε οὔτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτ' εἰ λέγοι,
λεχθείη, κατά γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.
Soc.Now can that which is neither become either gold or silver?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.Certainly not.
44a ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ
δοξαζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα.
Soc.Neither can that middle life of which we spoke ever be rightly considered in opinion or called in speech pleasant or painful, at any rate by those who reason correctly.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα.
Pro.No, certainly not.
ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε ὅταν μὴ
λυπῶνται;
Soc.But surely, my friend, we are aware of persons who call it and consider it so.
ΠΡΩ.Φασὶ γοῦν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που.
Soc.Do they, then, think they feel pleasure whenever they are not in pain?
ΠΡΩ.Κινδυνεύει.
Pro.That is what they say.
ΣΩ.Ψευδῆ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ
χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου.
Soc.Then they do think they feel pleasure at such times; for otherwise they would not say so.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μὴν χωρίς γε ἦν.
Pro.Most likely.
ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν αἱρώμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι, καθάπερ
44b ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
τὴν δ' ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἡδὺ
προσαγορεύεσθαι;
Soc.Certainly, then, they have a false opinion about pleasure, if there is an essential difference between feeling pleasure and not feeling pain.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δὴ νῦν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφ'
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.
Pro.And we certainly found that difference.
ΣΩ.Ὄντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
οὐ μανθάνεις;
Soc.Then shall we adopt the view that there are, as we said just now, three states, or that there are only two—pain, which is an evil to mankind, and freedom from pain, which is of itself a good and is called pleasure?
ΠΡΩ.Λέγεις δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας;
Pro.Why do we ask ourselves that question now, Socrates? I do not understand.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἳ τὸ
παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι.
Soc.No, Protarchus, for you certainly do not understand about the enemies of our friend Philebus.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Whom do you mean?
44c ΣΩ.Λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, ἃς νῦν οἱ περὶ
Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.
Soc.Certain men who are said to be master thinkers about nature, and who deny the existence of pleasures altogether.
ΠΡΩ.Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι συμβουλεύεις,
ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Pro.Is it possible?
ΣΩ.Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαί τισι, μαντευομένοις
οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς
λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων
οὐδὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα,
44d οὐχ ἡδονήν, εἶναι. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἂν προσχρήσαιο,
σκεψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ
ταῦτα αἵ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι πεύσῃ, ἵνα
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα
πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.
Soc.They say that what Philebus and his school call pleasures are all merely refuges from pain.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Pro.Do you recommend that we adopt their view, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους, ὥσπερ συμμάχους, κατὰ
τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἴχνος. οἶμαι γὰρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν
αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὁτουοῦν
44e εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ
σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν
ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; δεῖ δή σε, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχερέσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
Soc.No, but that we make use of them as seers who divine the truth, not by acquired skill, but by some innate and not ignoble repugnance which makes them hate the power of pleasure and think it so utterly unsound that its very attractiveness is mere trickery, not pleasure. You may make use of them in this way, considering also their other expressions of dislike; and after that you shall learn of the pleasures which seem to me to be true, in order that we may consider the power of pleasure from both points of view and form our judgement by comparing them.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γε αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ
πρῶτα μεγέθει.
Pro.You are right.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἥντινά
ποτ' ἔχει φύσιν βουληθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς
45a ἀποβλεπτέον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ σφοδροτάτας
λεγομένας.
Soc.Let us, then, consider these men as allies and follow them in the track of their dislike. I fancy their method would be to begin somewhere further back and ask whether, if we wished to discover the nature of any class—take the hard, for instance—we should be more likely to learn it by looking at the hardest things or at the least hard. Now you, Protarchus, must reply to them as you have been replying to me.
ΠΡΩ.Πᾶς ἄν σοι ταύτῃ συγχωροίη τὰ νῦν.
Pro.By all means, and I say to them that we should look at the greatest things.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν, αἱ πρόχειροί γε αἵπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν
ἡδονῶν, ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν αὗται;
Soc.Then if we wished to discover what the nature of pleasure is, we should look, not at the smallest pleasures, but at those which are considered most extreme and intense.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.Every one would agree to that now.
ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν καὶ μείζους εἰσὶ καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τοὺς
κάμνοντας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας; εὐλαβηθῶμεν
δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταίσωμέν πῃ. τάχα γὰρ
45b ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας.
Soc.And the commonest and greatest pleasures are, as we have often said, those connected with the body, are they not?
ΠΡΩ.Εἰκός γε.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τί δ'; οὐχ αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ὧν ἂν
καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγισται προγίγνωνται;
Soc.Are they greater, then, and do they become greater in those who are ill or in those who are in health? Let us take care not to answer hastily and fall into error. Perhaps we might say they are greater in those who are in health.
ΠΡΩ.Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.
Pro.That is reasonable.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν
ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ῥιγοῦσι καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα διὰ
τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλόν τ' ἐνδείᾳ συγγίγνονται
καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μείζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχουσιν; ἢ τοῦτο οὐ
φήσομεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι;
Soc.Yes, but are not those pleasures the greatest which gratify the greatest desires?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν νῦν ῥηθὲν φαίνεται.
Pro.That is true.
45c ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; ὀρθῶς ἂν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες ὡς εἴ τις
τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν ἀλλ' εἰς
νόσον ἰόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν; ὅρα δὲ μή με ἡγῇ διανοούμενον
ἐρωτᾶν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν
ὑγιαινόντων, ἀλλ' οἴου μέγεθός με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ
σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ ποτε γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε.
νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ φαμεν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει καὶ τίνα λέγουσιν
οἱ φάσκοντες μηδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν.
Soc.But do not people who are in a fever, or in similar diseases, feel more intensely thirst and cold and other bodily sufferings which they usually have; and do they not feel greater want, followed by greater pleasure when their want is satisfied? Is this true, or not?
45d ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἕπομαι τῷ λόγῳ σου.
Pro.Now that you have said it, it certainly appears to be true.
ΣΩ.Τάχα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἧττον δείξεις. ἀπόκριναι
γάρ· ἐν ὕβρει μείζους ἡδονάς—οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα
δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας—ὁρᾷς ἢ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ;
λέγε δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.
Soc.Then should we appear to be right in saying that if we wished to discover the greatest pleasures we should have to look, not at health, but at disease? Now do not imagine that I mean to ask you whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well, but assume that I am asking about the greatness of pleasure, and where the greatest intensity of such feeling normally occurs. For we say that it is our task to discover the nature of pleasure and what those who deny its existence altogether say that it is.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον
ὁρῶ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ ὁ παροιμιαζόμενος
45e ἐπίσχει λόγος ἑκάστοτε, ὁ τὸ "μηδὲν ἄγαν" παρακελευόμενος,
ᾧ πείθονται· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν
μέχρι μανίας ἡ σφοδρὰ ἡδονὴ κατέχουσα περιβοήτους
ἀπεργάζεται.
Pro.I think I understand you.
ΣΩ.Καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἔν
τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ
μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι γίγνονται.
Soc.Presently, Protarchus, you will show that more clearly, for I want you to answer a question. Do you see greater pleasures—I do not mean greater in number, but greater in intensity and degree—in riotous living or in a life of self-restraint? Be careful about your reply.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.I understand you, and I see that there is a great difference. For the self-restrained are always held in check by the advice of the proverbial expression nothing too much, which guides their actions; but intense pleasure holds sway over the foolish and dissolute even to the point of madness and makes them notorious.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελόμενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι
τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.
Soc.Good; and if that is true, it is clear that the greatest pleasures and the greatest pains originate in some depravity of soul and body, not in virtue.
46a ΠΡΩ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἡδονάς, τίνα
ποτὲ ἔχουσι τρόπον.
Soc.Then we must select some of these pleasures and see what there is about them which made us say that they are the greatest.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίων;
Pro.Yes, we must.
ΣΩ.Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ἃς οὓς εἴπομεν δυσχερεῖς
μισοῦσι παντελῶς.
Soc.Now see what there is about the pleasures which are related to certain diseases.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίας;
Pro.What diseases?
ΣΩ.Οἷον τὰς τῆς ψώρας ἰάσεις τῷ τρίβειν καὶ ὅσα
τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ
πάθος ἡμῖν, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι;
πότερον ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην;
Soc.Repulsive diseases which the philosophers of dislike whom we mentioned utterly abominate.
ΠΡΩ.Σύμμεικτον τοῦτό γ' ἄρ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικε
γίγνεσθαί τι κακόν.
Pro.What are the pleasures?
46b ΣΩ.Οὐ μὲν δὴ Φιλήβου γε ἕνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον·
ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις
ἑπομένων, ἂν μὴ κατοφθῶσι, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα
διακρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.
Soc.For instance, the relief of the itch and the like by scratching, no other treatment being required. For in Heaven’s name what shall we say the feeling is which we have in this case? Is it pleasure or pain?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἰτέον ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων συγγενεῖς.
Pro.I think, Socrates, it is a mixed evil.
ΣΩ.Τὰς ἐν τῇ μείξει κοινωνούσας λέγεις;
Soc.I did not introduce this question on Philebus’ account; but unless we consider these pleasures and those that follow in their train, Protarchus, we can probably never settle the point at issue.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Then we must attack this family of pleasures.
ΣΩ.Εἰσὶ τοίνυν μείξεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς
46c τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δ' αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· τὰς δ' αὖ
τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρήσομεν λύπας ἡδοναῖς
μειχθείσας τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ συναμφότερα, τοτὲ δὲ λύπας
ἐπικαλουμένας.
Soc.You mean those which are mixed?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ὁπόταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ τἀναντία
ἅμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ ῥιγῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμαινόμενος
ἐνίοτε ψύχηται, ζητῶν οἶμαι τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι,
τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμειγμένον, μετὰ
46d δυσαπαλλακτίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον σύντασιν
ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ.
Soc.Some mixtures are concerned with the body and are in the body only, and some belong only to the soul and are in the soul; and we shall also find some mingled pains and pleasures belonging both to the soul and to the body, and these are sometimes called pleasures, sometimes pains.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.
Pro.How so?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μείξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἴσων εἰσὶ
λυπῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἑτέρων πλειόνων;
Soc.Whenever, in the process of restoration or destruction, anyone has two opposite feelings, as we sometimes are cold, but are growing warm, or are hot, but are growing cold, the desire of having the one and being free from the other, the mixture of bitter and sweet, as they say, joined with the difficulty in getting rid of the bitter, produces impatience and, later, wild excitement.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.What you say is perfectly true.
ΣΩ.Λέγε δὴ τὰς μέν, ὅταν πλείους λῦπαι τῶν ἡδονῶν
γίγνωνται—τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νυνδὴ ταύτας εἶναι
καὶ τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν—ὁπόταν <ἐν τοῖς> ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον
ᾖ καὶ τὸ φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τρίψει δὲ καὶ τῇ κνήσει μὴ ἐφικνῆταί
46e τις, τὸ δ' ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέῃ, τοτὲ φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ
καὶ εἰς τοὐναντίον πυρίαις μεταβάλλοντες ἐνίοτε ἀμηχάνους
ἡδονάς, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἔξω, λύπας
ἡδοναῖς συγκερασθείσας, εἰς ὁπότερ' ἂν ῥέψῃ, παρέσχοντο
τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν
47a —[καὶ] ὁμοῦ λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέναι.
Soc.And such mixtures sometimes consist of equal pains and pleasures and sometimes contain more of one or the other, do they not?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὁπόταν αὖ πλείων ἡδονὴ κατὰ <τὰ> τοιαῦτα
πάντα συμμειχθῇ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμειγμένον τῆς λύπης γαργαλίζει
τε καὶ ἠρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δ' αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς
πολὺ πλέον ἐγκεχυμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ,
καὶ παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, παντοῖα δὲ
πνεύματα ἀπεργαζόμενον πᾶσαν ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετὰ
ἀφροσύνης ἐνεργάζεται;
Soc.In the case of the mixtures in which the pains are more than the pleasures—say the itch, which we mentioned just now, or tickling—when the burning inflammation is within and is not reached by the rubbing and scratching, which separate only such mixtures as are on the surface, sometimes by bringing the affected parts to the fire or to something cold we change from wretchedness to inexpressible pleasures, and sometimes the opposition between the internal and the external produces a mixture of pains and pleasures, whichever happens to preponderate; this is the result of the forcible separation of combined elements, or the combination of those that were separate, and the concomitant juxtaposition of pains and pleasures.
47b ΠΡΩ.Μάλα γε.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Καὶ λέγειν τε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, αὐτόν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ
καὶ ἄλλον ὡς ταύταις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος οἷον ἀποθνῄσκει·
καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ παντάπασιν ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει τοσούτῳ
μᾶλλον ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ὢν
τυγχάνῃ, καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐταῖς
ὅτι μάλιστ' ἀεὶ ζῶντα εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριθμεῖται.
Soc.And when the pleasure is the predominant element in the mixture, the slight tincture of pain tickles a man and makes him mildly impatient, or again an excessive proportion of pleasure excites him and sometimes even makes him leap for joy; it produces in him all sorts of colors, attitudes, and paintings, and even causes great amazement and foolish shouting, does it not?
ΠΡΩ.Πάντα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν
πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανας.
Pro.Certainly.
47c ΣΩ.Περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν τοῖς
κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ
ἐντὸς κερασθέντων· περὶ δέ γ' ὧν ψυχὴ σώματι τἀναντία
συμβάλλεται, λύπην τε ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς
λύπην, ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν ἰέναι, ταῦτα ἔμπροσθε
μὲν διήλθομεν, ὡς, ὁπόταν [αὖ] κενῶται, πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ,
καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δὲ ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ τότε
47d μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὡς ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα
διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλήθει ἀμηχάνοις οὖσι μεῖξις
μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς συμπίπτει γενομένη.
Soc.And it makes him say of himself, and others say of him, that he is pleased to death with these delights, and the more unrestrained and foolish he is, the more he always gives himself up to the pursuit of these pleasures; he calls them the greatest of all things and counts that man the happiest who lives most entirely in the enjoyment of them.
ΠΡΩ.Κινδυνεύεις ὀρθότατα λέγειν.
Pro.Socrates, you have described admirably what happens in the case of most people.
ΣΩ.Ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μείξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς
λοιπὴ μία.
Soc.That may be, Protarchus, so far as concerns purely bodily pleasures in which internal and external sensations unite; but concerning the pleasures in which the soul and the body contribute opposite elements, each adding pain or pleasure to the other’s pleasure or pain, so that both unite in a single mixture—concerning these I said before that when a man is empty he desires to be filled, and rejoices in his expectation, but is pained by his emptiness, and now I add, what I did not say at that time, that in all these cases, which are innumerable, of opposition between soul and body, there is one single mixture of pain and pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Ποία, φῄς;
Pro.I believe you are quite right.
ΣΩ.Ἣν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὑτῇ πολλάκις λαμβάνειν
σύγκρασιν ἔφαμεν.
Soc.One further mixture of pain and pleasure is left.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λέγομεν;
Pro.What is it?
47e ΣΩ.Ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ ἔρωτα
καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἆρ' οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς
ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς;
Soc.That mixture of its own feelings which we said the soul often experiences.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔγωγε.
Pro.And what do we call this?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὑρήσομεν ἀμηχάνων;
ἢ δεόμεθα ὑπομιμνῄσκεσθαι [τὸ <ἐν> τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς
ὀργαῖς,] τὸ
ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι
ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο,
48a καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὔσας
ἀναμεμειγμένας;
Soc.Do you not regard anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like as pains of the soul and the soul only?
ΠΡΩ.Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν
συμβαίνοι γιγνόμενα.
Pro.I do.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα
χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι;
Soc.And shall we not find them full of ineffable pleasures? Or must I remind you of the anger?Which stirs a man, though very wise, to wrath,And sweeter is than honey from the comb,Hom. Il. 18.108-109 and of the pleasures mixed with pains, which we find in mournings and longings?
ΠΡΩ.Τί δ' οὔ;
Pro.No, you need not remind me; those things occur just as you suggest.
ΣΩ.Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς,
ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὡς ἔστι κἀν τούτοις μεῖξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;
Soc.And you remember, too, how people enjoy weeping at tragedies?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐ πάνυ κατανοῶ.
Pro.Yes, certainly.
48b ΣΩ.Παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐν τούτῳ
συννοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε πάθος.
Soc.And are you aware of the condition of the soul at comedies, how there also we have a mixture of pain and pleasure?
ΠΡΩ.Οὔκουν ὥς γ' ἔοικεν ἐμοί.
Pro.I do not quite understand.
ΣΩ.Λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν
ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ῥᾷον καταμαθεῖν τις οἷός τ'
ᾖ μεῖξιν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς.
Soc.Indeed it is by no means easy, Protarchus, to understand such a condition under those circumstances.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγοις ἄν.
Pro.No at least I do not find it so.
ΣΩ.Τό τοι νυνδὴ ῥηθὲν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα λύπην
τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;
Soc.Well, then, let us take this under consideration, all the more because of its obscurity; then we can more readily understand the mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases.
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτως.
Pro.Please go on.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας
ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.
Soc.Would you say that envy, which was mentioned just now, was a pain of the soul, or not?
48c ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα γε.
Pro.I say it is.
ΣΩ.Κακὸν μὴν ἄγνοια καὶ ἣν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν ἕξιν.
Soc.But certainly we see the envious man rejoicing in the misfortunes of his neighbors.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Yes, very much so.
ΣΩ.Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει.
Soc.Surely ignorance is an evil, as is also what we call stupidity.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε μόνον.
Pro.Surely.
ΣΩ.Ἔστιν δὴ πονηρία μέν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἕξεώς
τινος ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δ' αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ
τοὐναντίον πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς
γραμμάτων.
Soc.Next, then, consider the nature of the ridiculous.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ "γνῶθι σαυτὸν" λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Pro.Please proceed.
48d ΣΩ.Ἔγωγε. τοὐναντίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μηδαμῇ
γιγνώσκειν αὑτὸν λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμματος ἂν εἴη.
Soc.The ridiculous is in its main aspect a kind of vice which gives its name to a condition; and it is that part of vice in general which involves the opposite of the condition mentioned in the inscription at Delphi.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.You mean Know thyself, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Ὦ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῇ τέμνειν.
Soc.Yes; and the opposite of that, in the language of the inscription, would evidently be not to know oneself at all.
ΠΡΩ.Πῇ φῄς; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.
Pro.Of course.
ΣΩ.Λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν;
Soc.Protarchus, try to divide this into three.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγω, καὶ δέομαί γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.
Pro.How do you mean? I am afraid I can never do it.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὑτοὺς κατὰ τρία
ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἕκαστον;
Soc.Then you say that I must now make the division?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.Yes, I say so, and I beg you to do so, besides.
48e ΣΩ.Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλουσιώτερον
ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν.
Soc.Must not all those who do not know themselves be affected by their condition in one of three ways?
ΠΡΩ.Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶν τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.
Pro.How is that?
ΣΩ.Πλείους δέ γε οἳ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὑτοὺς δοξάζουσι,
καὶ πάντα ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς
οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.
Soc.First in regard to wealth; such a man thinks he is richer than he is.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε.
Pro.Certainly a good many are affected in that way.
ΣΩ.Πολὺ δὲ πλεῖστοί γε οἶμαι περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ
τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετῇ δοξάζοντες
βελτίους ἑαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντες.
Soc.And there are still more who think they are taller and handsomer than they are and that they possess better physical qualities in general than is the case.
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
49a ΣΩ.Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἆρ' οὐ σοφίας πέρι τὸ πλῆθος πάντως
ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ ψευδοῦς;
Soc.But by far the greatest number, I fancy, err in the third way, about the qualities of, the soul, thinking that they excel in virtue when they do not.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Pro.Yes, most decidedly.
ΣΩ.Κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς
ἂν εἴποι πάθος.
Soc.And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one to which people in general lay claim, thereby filling themselves with strife and false conceit of wisdom?
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα γε.
Pro.Yes, to be sure.
ΣΩ.Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ
μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἡδονῆς καὶ
λύπης ὄψεσθαι μεῖξιν. πῶς οὖν τέμνομεν δίχα, λέγεις;
49b πάντες ὁπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀνοήτως
δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων
ἀναγκαιότατον ἕπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν,
τοῖς δὲ οἶμαι τοὐναντίον.
Soc.And we should surely be right in calling all that an evil condition.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pro.Very much so.
ΣΩ.Ταύτῃ τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσι μετ'
ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι,
γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τἀληθῆ φθέγξῃ· τοὺς δὲ
δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰσχυροὺς φοβεροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς
49c προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τούτων σαυτῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις.
ἄγνοια γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά—
βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες
αὐτῆς εἰσιν—ἡ δ' ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε
τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.
Soc.Then this must further be divided into two parts, if we are to gain insight into childish envy with its absurd mixture of pleasure and pain. How shall we divide it, do you say? All who have this false and foolish conceit of themselves fall, like the rest of mankind, into two classes: some necessarily have strength and power, others, as I believe, the reverse.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ
λυπῶν μεῖξις ἐν τούτοις οὔπω μοι καταφανής.
Pro.Yes, necessarily.
ΣΩ.Τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.
Soc.Make the division, then, on that principle; those of them who have this false conceit and are weak and unable to revenge themselves when they are laughed at you may truly call ridiculous, but those who are strong and able to revenge themselves you will define most correctly to yourself by calling them powerful, terrible, and hateful, for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and infamous—since whether real or feigned it injures their neighbors—but ignorance in the weak appears to us as naturally ridiculous.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε μόνον.
Pro.Quite right. But the mixture of pleasure and pain in all this is not yet clear to me.
49d ΣΩ.Λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ ἡδονή;
Soc.First, then, take up the nature of envy.
ΠΡΩ.Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.
Pro.Go on.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὔτ' ἄδικον
οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;
Soc.Is envy a kind of unrighteous pain and also a pleasure?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Undoubtedly.
ΣΩ.Τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὁρῶντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ
λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δέ, ἆρα οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;
Soc.But it is neither wrong nor envious to rejoice in the misfortunes of our enemies, is it?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Pro.No, of course not.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;
Soc.But when people sometimes see the misfortunes of their friends and rejoice instead of grieving, is not that wrong?
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς.
Pro.Of course it is.
ΣΩ.Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ
49e ὅσα νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶν λέγοντες εἴδεσιν γίγνεσθαι,
γελοῖα μὲν ὁπόσα ἀσθενῆ, μισητὰ δ' ὁπόσα ἐρρωμένα, <φῶμεν>
ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν τῶν φίλων ἕξιν
ταύτην ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοίαν εἶναι;
Soc.And we said that ignorance was an evil to every one, did we not?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε.
Pro.True.
ΣΩ.Κακὸν δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὴν ἄγνοιάν γε οὖσαν
εἶναι;
Soc.Then the false conceits of our friends concerning their wisdom, their beauty, and their other qualities which we mentioned just now, saying that they belong to three classes, are ridiculous when they are weak, but hateful when they are powerful. Shall we, or shall we not, affirm that, as I said just now, this state of mind when possessed in its harmless form by any of our friends, is ridiculous in the eyes of others?
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα γε.
Pro.Certainly it is ridiculous.
ΣΩ.Χαίρομεν δὲ ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;
Soc.And do we not agree that ignorance is in itself a misfortune?
50a ΠΡΩ.Δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.
Pro.Yes, a great one.
ΣΩ.Ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον
ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτ' ἀπεργαζόμενον;
Soc.And do we feel pleasure or pain when we laugh at it?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pro.Pleasure, evidently.
ΣΩ.Γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις
φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν αὖ φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν
ἡδονὴν συγκεραννύναι· τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λύπην
ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ
τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.
Soc.Did we not say that pleasure in the misfortunes of friends was caused by envy?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθῆ.
Pro.There can be no other cause.
50b ΣΩ.Μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν
τραγῳδίαις <καὶ κωμῳδίαις>, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας
ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.
Soc.Then our argument declares that when we laugh at the ridiculous qualities of our friends, we mix pleasure with pain, since we mix it with envy; for we have agreed all along that envy is a pain of the soul, and that laughter is a pleasure, yet these two are present at the same time on such occasions.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ
καί τις φιλονικοῖ πάνυ πρὸς τἀναντία.
Pro.True.
ΣΩ.Ὀργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ φόβον καὶ
50c ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προυθέμεθα καὶ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα,
ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὑρήσειν μειγνύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις
λεγόμενα. ἦ γάρ;
Soc.So now our argument shows that in mournings and tragedies and comedies, not merely on the stage, but in all the tragedy and comedy of life, and in countless other ways, pain is mixed with pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.It is impossible not to agree with that, Socrates, even though one be most eager to maintain the opposite opinion.
ΣΩ.Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόνου καὶ
ὀργῆς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ νυνδὴ διαπερανθέντα;
Soc.Again we mentioned anger, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like, as conditions in which we should find a mixture of the two elements we have now often named, did we not?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;
Soc.And we understand that all the details I have been describing just now are concerned only with sorrow and envy and anger?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πάνυ γε.
Pro.Of course we understand that.
ΣΩ.Διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαί σοι τὴν
ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μεῖξιν; ἆρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν, ὅτι τήν γε ἐν
50d τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥᾴδιον κρᾶσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι·
λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναί με μηκέτι
ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς
λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ
σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά
ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε πότερα
ἀφίης με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί
σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναί με· τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων αὔριον
50e ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι
στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.
Soc.Then there are still many others of those conditions left for us to discuss.
ΠΡΩ.Καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν
διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον.
Pro.Yes, very many.
ΣΩ.Κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μειχθείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ
δή τινος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμείκτους πορευοίμεθ' ἂν ἐν τῷ
μέρει.
Soc.Now why do you particularly suppose I pointed out to you the mixture of pain and pleasure in comedy? Was it not for the sake of convincing you, because it is easy to show the mixture in love and fear and the rest, and because I thought that when you had made this example your own, you would relieve me from the necessity of discussing those other conditions in detail, and would simply accept the fact that in the affections of the body apart from the soul, of the soul apart from the body, and of the two in common, there are plentiful mixtures of pain and pleasure? So tell me; will you let me off, or will you keep on till midnight? But I think I need say only a few words to induce you to let me off. I will agree to give you an account of all these matters tomorrow, but now I wish to steer my bark towards the remaining points that are needful for the judgement which Philebus demands.
51a ΠΡΩ.Κάλλιστ' εἶπες.
Pro.Good, Socrates; just finish what remains in any way you please.
ΣΩ.Ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταβαλὼν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν
αὐτάς. τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς
ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πως πείθομαι, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυσι
καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δ'
οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἑτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας,
εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ
ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περί τε σώματος καὶ
ψυχῆς ἀπορίας.
Soc.Then after the mixed pleasures we should naturally and almost of necessity proceed in turn to the unmixed.
51b ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων
ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ' ἄν;
Pro.Very good.
ΣΩ.Τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ
τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν
φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ
ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας [καθαρὰς
λυπῶν] παραδίδωσιν.
Soc.So I will turn to them and try to explain them; for I do not in the least agree with those who say that all pleasures are merely surcease from pain, but, as I said, I use them as witnesses to prove that some pleasures are apparent, but not in any way real, and that there are others which appear to be both great and numerous, but are really mixed up with pains and with cessations of the greatest pains and distresses of body and soul.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν οὕτω;
Pro.But what pleasures, Socrates, may rightly be considered true?
ΣΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς δῆλά ἐστιν ἃ λέγω, πειρατέον
51c μὴν δηλοῦν. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ὅπερ
ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζῴων ἤ
τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλ' εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος,
καὶ περιφερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις γιγνόμενα
ἐπίπεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις,
εἴ μου μανθάνεις. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρός τι καλὰ λέγω,
καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι καί τινας
51d ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσφερεῖς·
καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς]
ἀλλ' ἆρα μανθάνομεν, ἢ πῶς;
Soc.Those arising from what are called beautiful colors, or from forms, most of those that arise from odors and sounds, in short all those the want of which is unfelt and painless, whereas the satisfaction furnished by them is felt by the senses, pleasant, and unmixed with pain.
ΠΡΩ.Πειρῶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πειράθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ
σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν.
Pro.Once more, Socrates, what do you mean by this?
ΣΩ.Λέγω δὴ ἠχὰς τῶν φθόγγων τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς,
τὰς ἕν τι καθαρὸν ἱείσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς
ἀλλ' αὐτὰς καθ' αὑτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων συμφύτους ἡδονὰς
ἑπομένας.
Soc.My meaning is certainly not clear at the first glance, and I must try to make it so. For when I say beauty of form, I am trying to express, not what most people would understand by the words, such as the beauty of animals or of paintings, but I mean, says the argument, the straight line and the circle and the plane and solid figures formed from these by turning-lathes and rulers and patterns of angles; perhaps you understand. For I assert that the beauty of these is not relative, like that of other things, but they are always absolutely beautiful by nature and have peculiar pleasures in no way subject to comparison with the pleasures of scratching; and there are colors which possess beauty and pleasures of this character. Do you understand?
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.
Pro.I am trying to do so, Socrates; and I hope you also will try to make your meaning still clearer.
51e ΣΩ.Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἧττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος
ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμεῖχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας,
καὶ ὅπῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτ'
ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν. ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς,
ταῦτα εἴδη δύο <ὧν> λέγομεν ἡδονῶν.
Soc.I mean that those sounds which are smooth and clear and send forth a single pure note are beautiful, not relatively, but absolutely, and that there are pleasures which pertain to these by nature and result from them.
ΠΡΩ.Κατανοῶ.
Pro.Yes, that also is true.
ΣΩ.Ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ
52a μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ
ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας
ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένας.
Soc.The pleasures of smell are a less divine class; but they have no necessary pains mixed with them, and wherever and in whatever we find this freedom from pain, I regard it always as a mark of similarity to those other pleasures. These, then, are two classes of the pleasures of which I am speaking. Do you understand me?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' οὕτω συνδοκεῖ.
Pro.I understand.
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ
διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορᾷς τινας ἐν αὐταῖς
ἀλγηδόνας;
Soc.And further let us add to these the pleasures of knowledge, if they appear to us not to have hunger for knowledge or pangs of such hunger as their source.
ΠΡΩ.Οὔ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλ' ἔν τισι λογισμοῖς τοῦ
52b παθήματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεὶς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν.
Pro.I agree to that.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μήν, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γε ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς
φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν.
Soc.Well, if men are full of knowledge and then lose it through forgetfulness, do you see any pains in the losses?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθῆ τοίνυν λέγεις ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης ἡμῖν λήθη
γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.
Pro.Not by their inherent nature, but sometimes there is pain in reflecting on the event, when a man who has lost knowledge is pained by the lack of it.
ΣΩ.Ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμείκτους
τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων
ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.
Soc.True, my dear fellow, but just at present we are recounting natural feelings only, not reflection.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ῥητέον;
Pro.Then you are right in saying that we feel no pain in the loss of knowledge.
52c ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τάς
τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὀρθῶς ἂν
λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς
ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον ἐμμετρίαν· καὶ <τὰς> τὸ
μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ <δεχομένας>, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ
ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου γε ἐκείνου
καὶ ἧττον καὶ μᾶλλον διά τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου
52d προςθῶμεν[προς]θῶμεν αὐτὰς εἶναι γένους, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων.
Soc.Then we may say that these pleasures of knowledge are unmixed with pain and are felt not by the many but only by very few.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε αὐτῶν
διαθεατέον.
Soc.And now that we have fairly well separated the pure pleasures and those which may be pretty correctly called impure, let us add the further statement that the intense pleasures are without measure and those of the opposite sort have measure; those which admit of greatness and intensity and are often or seldom great or intense we shall assign to the class of the infinite, which circulates more or less freely through the body and soul alike, and the others we shall assign to the class of the limited.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Quite right, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι; τὸ καθαρόν
τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα
καὶ τὸ ἰταμόν;
Soc.There is still another question about them to be considered.
ΠΡΩ.Τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾷς βουλόμενος;
Pro.What is it?
ΣΩ.Μηδέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἡδονῆς
52e τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου καθαρόν
ἐστι, τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρόν, ἵνα καθαρὸν ἑκάτερον ἰὸν εἰς τὴν
κρίσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ συνάπασι τοῖσδε ῥᾴω παρέχῃ τὴν
κρίσιν.
Soc.What kind of thing is most closely related to truth? The pure and unadulterated, or the violent, the widespread, the great, and the sufficient?
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα.
Pro.What is your object, Socrates, in asking that question?
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δή, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν,
οὑτωσὶ διανοηθῶμεν· προελόμενοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἕν τι
σκοπῶμεν.
Soc.My object, Protarchus, is to leave no gap in my test of pleasure and knowledge, if some part of each of them is pure and some part impure, in order that each of them may offer itself for judgement in a condition of purity, and thus make the judgement easier for you and me and all our audience.
53a ΠΡΩ.Τί οὖν προελώμεθα;
Pro.Quite right.
ΣΩ.Τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον, εἰ βούλει, θεασώμεθα
γένος.
Soc.Very well, let us adopt that point of view towards all the classes which we call pure. First let us select one of them and examine it.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Which shall we select?
ΣΩ.Πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη;
πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν
ᾧ χρώματος μηδεμία μοῖρα ἄλλη μηδενὸς ἐνείη;
Soc.Let us first, if agreeable to you, consider whiteness.
ΠΡΩ.Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστ' εἰλικρινὲς ὄν.
Pro.By all means.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς. ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθέστατον, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
53b καὶ ἅμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θήσομεν,
ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;
Soc.How can we have purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is it the greatest and most widespread, or the most unmixed, that in which there is no trace of any other color?
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατά γε.
Pro.Clearly it is the most unadulterated.
ΣΩ.Σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμειγμένου πολλοῦ
λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἅμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐὰν
φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν ὀρθῶς.
Soc.Right. Shall we not, then, Protarchus, declare that this, and not the most numerous or the greatest, is both the truest and the most beautiful of all whitenesses?
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Quite right.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; οὐ δήπου πολλῶν δεησόμεθα παραδειγμάτων
τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ
νοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν ὡς ἄρα καὶ σύμπασα ἡδονὴ σμικρὰ
53c μεγάλης καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς, καθαρὰ λύπης, ἡδίων καὶ
ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων γίγνοιτ' ἄν.
Soc.Then we shall be perfectly right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and more beautiful and truer than a great deal of mixed white.
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παράδειγμα ἱκανόν.
Pro.Perfectly right.
ΣΩ.Τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν
ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς;
κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι
μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.
Soc.Well then, we shall have no need of many such examples in our discussion of pleasure; we see well enough from this one that any pleasure, however small or infrequent, if uncontaminated with pain, is pleasanter and more beautiful than a great or often repeated pleasure without purity.
ΠΡΩ.Τί δή;
Pro.Most certainly; and the example is sufficient.
ΣΩ.Διαπερανοῦμαί σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν, ὦ
53d Πρώταρχε φίλε.
Soc.Here is another point. Have we not often heard it said of pleasure that it is always a process or generation and that there is no state or existence of pleasure? There are some clever people who try to prove this theory to us, and we ought to be grateful to them.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.
Pro.Well, what then?
ΣΩ.Ἐστὸν δή τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, τὸ δ'
ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου.
Soc.I will explain this whole matter, Protarchus, by asking questions.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς τούτω καὶ τίνε λέγεις;
Pro.Go on; ask your questions.
ΣΩ.Τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δ' ἐλλιπὲς
ἐκείνου.
Soc.There are two parts of existence, the one self-existent, the other always desiring something else.
ΠΡΩ.Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.
Pro.What do you mean? What are these two?
ΣΩ.Παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήκαμεν ἅμα
καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.
Soc.The one is by nature more imposing, the other inferior.
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα γε.
Pro.Speak still more plainly.
ΣΩ.Τούτοις τοίνυν ἐοικότα δυοῖν οὖσι δύο ἄλλα ζήτει
53e κατὰ πάνθ' ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι.
Soc.We have seen beloved boys who are fair and good, and brave lovers of them.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ; λέγε σαφέστερον, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ὅτι λέγεις.
Pro.Yes, no doubt of it.
ΣΩ.Οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος
ἐρεσχηλεῖ νῷν, λέγει δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων
ἔστ' ἀεί, τὸ δ' οὗ χάριν ἑκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον
ἀεὶ γίγνεται.
Soc.Try to find another pair like these in all the relations we are speaking of.
ΠΡΩ.Μόγις ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι.
Pro.Must I say it a third time? Please tell your meaning more plainly, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Τάχα δ' ἴσως, ὦ παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προελθόντος
54a τοῦ λόγου.
Soc.It is no riddle, Protarchus; the talk is merely jesting with us and means that one part of existences always exists for the sake of something, and the other part is that for the sake of which the former is always coming into being.
ΠΡΩ.Τί γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.I can hardly understand after all your repetition.
ΣΩ.Δύο δὴ τάδε ἕτερα λάβωμεν.
Soc.Perhaps, my boy, you will understand better as the discussion proceeds.
ΠΡΩ.Ποῖα;
Pro.I hope so.
ΣΩ.Ἓν μέν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἕν.
Soc.Let us take another pair.
ΠΡΩ.Δύο ἀποδέχομαί σου ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν.
Pro.What are they?
ΣΩ.Ὀρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέρου, τὴν
γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως
ἕνεκα;
Soc.One is the generation of all things (the process of coming into being), the other is existence or being.
ΠΡΩ.Τοῦτο ὃ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία εἰ γενέσεως ἕνεκα
τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐστί, νῦν πυνθάνῃ;
Pro.I accept your two, generation and being.
ΣΩ.Φαίνομαι.
Soc.Quite right. Now which of these shall we say is for the sake of the other, generation for the sake of being, or being for the sake of generation?
54b ΠΡΩ.Πρὸς θεῶν ἆρ' [ἂν] ἐπανερωτᾷς με τοιόνδε τι;
λέγ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, μοί, πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα
φῂς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας, καὶ πάνθ'
ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ἐστίν;
Pro.You are now asking whether that which is called being is what it is for the sake of generation?
ΣΩ.Λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὦ Πρώταρχε.
Soc.Yes, plainly.
ΠΡΩ.Τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Pro.For Heaven’s sake, is this the kind of question you keep asking me, Tell me, Protarchus, whether you think shipbuilding is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of shipbuilding, and all that sort of thing?
ΣΩ.Οὐδὲν ὅτι οὔ· σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμμέτεχε.
Soc.Yes; that is just what I mean, Protarchus.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Then why did you not answer it yourself, Socrates?
54c ΣΩ.Φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντα
ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἑκάστην δὲ
γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἑκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι,
σύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι συμπάσης.
Soc.There is no reason why I should not; but I want you to take part in the discussion.
ΠΡΩ.Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος
οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν.
Soc.I say that drugs and all sorts of instruments and materials are always employed for the sake of production or generation, but that every instance of generation is for the sake of some being or other, and generation in general is for the sake of being in general.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.That is very clear.
ΣΩ.Τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ
γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ
τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὦ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.
Soc.Then pleasure, if it is a form of generation, would be generated for the sake of some form of being.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀναγκαιότατον.
Pro.Of course.
54d ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην
ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν;
Soc.Now surely that for the sake of which anything is generated is in the class of the good, and that which is generated for the sake of something else, my friend, must be placed in another class.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Most undeniably.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ
μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ'
ἡντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος
τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ.
Soc.Then if pleasure is a form of generation, we shall be right in placing it in a class other than that of the good, shall we not?
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα γε.
Pro.Quite right.
54e ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν αὑτὸς οὗτος ἑκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς
γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται.
Soc.Then, as I said when we began to discuss this point, we ought to be grateful to him who pointed out that there is only a generation, but no existence, of pleasure; for he is clearly making a laughing-stock of those who assert that pleasure is a good.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;
Pro.Yes, most emphatically.
ΣΩ.Τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἤ τι τῶν
τοιούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἐξιᾶται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἅτε
ἡδονῆς οὔσης αὐτῆς, καί φασι ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι μὴ
διψῶντές τε καὶ πεινῶντες καὶ τἆλλα ἅ τις ἂν εἴποι πάντα
τὰ ἑπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι μὴ πάσχοντες.
Soc.And he will also surely make a laughing-stock of all those who find their highest end in forms of generation.
55a ΠΡΩ.Ἐοίκασι γοῦν.
Pro.How is that, and to whom do you refer?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαί γε τοὐναντίον ἅπαντες τὸ
φθείρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἄν.
Soc.To those who, when cured of hunger or thirst or any of the troubles which are cured by generation are pleased because of the generation, as if it were pleasure, and say that they would not wish to live without thirst and hunger and the like, if they could not experience the feelings which follow after them.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀναγκαῖον.
Pro.That seems to be their view.
ΣΩ.Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἱροῖτ' ἄν τις τοῦθ'
αἱρούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ᾧ μήτε
χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δ' ἦν [δυνατὸν] ὡς οἷόν τε
καθαρώτατα.
Soc.We should all agree that the opposite of generation is destruction, should we not?
ΠΡΩ.Πολλή τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλογία συμβαίνει
γίγνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν
τιθῆται.
Pro.Inevitably.
ΣΩ.Πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι λέγωμεν.
Soc.And he who chooses as they do would be choosing destruction and generation, not that third life in which there was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought.
ΠΡΩ.Πῇ;
Pro.It is a great absurdity, as it appears, Socrates, to tell us that pleasure is a good.
55b ΣΩ.Πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ
καλὸν μήτε ἐν σώμασι μήτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν
ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἢ σωφροσύνην
ἢ νοῦν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα ἀγαθὰ εἴληχε ψυχή, μηδὲν
τοιοῦτον εἶναι; πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα
δέ, ἀναγκάζεσθαι φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε ὅταν ἀλγῇ, κἂν ᾖ
ἄριστος πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντα αὖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει,
55c τότε ὅταν χαίρῃ, τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν.
Soc.Yes, a great absurdity, and let us go still further.
ΠΡΩ.Πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατὸν
ἀλογώτατα.
Pro.How?
ΣΩ.Μὴ τοίνυν ἡδονῆς μὲν πάντως ἐξέτασιν πᾶσαν ἐπιχειρῶμεν
ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης οἷον φειδόμενοι
σφόδρα φανῶμεν· γενναίως δέ, εἴ πῄ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν
περικρούωμεν, ὡς ὅτι καθαρώτατόν ἐστ' αὐτῶν φύσει, τοῦτο
κατιδόντες εἰς τὴν κρίσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινὴν τοῖς τε τούτων
καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις.
Soc.Is it not absurd to say that there is nothing good in the body or many other things, but only in the soul, and that in the soul the only good is pleasure, and that courage and self-restraint and understanding and all the other good things of the soul are nothing of the sort; and beyond all this to be obliged to say that he who is not feeling pleasure, and is feeling pain, is bad when he feels pain, though he be the best of men, and that he who feels pleasure is, when he feels pleasure, the more excellent in virtue the greater the pleasure he feels?
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς.
Pro.All that, Socrates, is the height of absurdity.
55d ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν οἶμαι δημιουργικόν ἐστι τῆς
περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ
τροφήν. ἢ πῶς;
Soc.Now let us not undertake to subject pleasure to every possible test and then be found to give mind and knowledge very gentle treatment. Let us rather strike them boldly everywhere to see if their metal rings unsound at any point; so we shall find out what is by nature purest in them, and then we can make use of the truest elements of these and of pleasure to form our judgement of both.
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτως.
Pro.Right.
ΣΩ.Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς διανοηθῶμεν πρῶτα εἰ
τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον, τὸ δ' ἧττον ἔνι,
καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτατα νομίζειν, τὰ δ' ὡς ἀκαθαρτότερα.
Soc.Well, then, one part of knowledge is productive, the other has to do with education and support. Is that true?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκοῦν χρή.
Pro.It is.
ΣΩ.Τὰς τοίνυν ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἑκάστων αὐτῶν
χωρίς;
Soc.Let us first consider whether in the manual arts one part is more allied to knowledge, and the other less, and the one should be regarded as purest, the other as less pure.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίας καὶ πῶς;
Pro.Yes, we ought to consider that.
55e ΣΩ.Οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἄν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ
καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικήν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν φαῦλον τὸ
καταλειπόμενον ἑκάστης ἂν γίγνοιτο.
Soc.And should the ruling elements of each of them be separated and distinguished from the rest?
ΠΡΩ.Φαῦλον μὲν δή.
Pro.What are they, and how can they be separated?
ΣΩ.Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζειν λείποιτ' ἂν καὶ τὰς
αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καί τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς
στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν ἃς πολλοὶ τέχνας
56a ἐπονομάζουσι, μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας.
Soc.For example, if arithmetic and the sciences of measurement and weighing were taken away from all arts, what was left of any of them would be, so to speak, pretty worthless.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.
Pro.Yes, pretty worthless.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν μεστὴ μέν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ σύμφωνον
ἁρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ, καὶ
σύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητική, τὸ μέτρον ἑκάστης χορδῆς τῷ
στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα, ὥστε πολὺ μεμειγμένον
ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.
Soc.All that would be left for us would be to conjecture and to drill the perceptions by practice and experience, with the additional use of the powers of guessing, which are commonly called arts and acquire their efficacy by practice and toil.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.That is undeniable.
56b ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ἰατρικήν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν
καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εὑρήσομεν ἐχούσας.
Soc.Take music first; it is full of this; it attains harmony by guesswork based on practice, not by measurement; and flute music throughout tries to find the pitch of each note as it is produced by guess, so that the amount of uncertainty mixed up in it is great, and the amount of certainty small.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πάνυ γε.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Τεκτονικὴν δέ γε οἶμαι πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ
ὀργάνοις χρωμένην τὰ πολλὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα
τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν παρέχεται.
Soc.And we shall find that medicine and agriculture and piloting and generalship are all in the same case.
ΠΡΩ.Πῇ;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Κατά τε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ' οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐν
πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ξυλουργικῆς. κανόνι γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ
56c τόρνῳ χρῆται καὶ διαβήτῃ καὶ στάθμῃ καί τινι προσαγωγίῳ
κεκομψευμένῳ.
Soc.But the art of building, I believe, employs the greatest number of measures and instruments which give it great accuracy and make it more scientific than most arts.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Pro.In what way?
ΣΩ.Θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν
μουσικῇ συνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάττονος ἀκριβείας
μετισχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος.
Soc.In shipbuilding and house-building, and many other branches of wood-working. For the artisan uses a rule, I imagine, a lathe, compasses, a chalk-line, and an ingenious instrument called a vice.
ΠΡΩ.Κείσθω.
Pro.Certainly, Socrates; you are right.
ΣΩ.Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἃς
νυνδὴ πρώτας εἴπομεν.
Soc.Let us, then, divide the arts, as they are called, into two kinds, those which resemble music, and have less accuracy in their works, and those which, like building, are more exact.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνῃ μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσας μετὰ
ταύτης τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νυνδή.
Pro.Agreed.
56d ΣΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἀλλ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἆρ' οὐ διττὰς
αὖ καὶ ταύτας λεκτέον; ἢ πῶς;
Soc.And of these the most exact are the arts which I just now mentioned first.
ΠΡΩ.Ποίας δὴ λέγεις;
Pro.I think you mean arithmetic and the other arts you mentioned with it just now.
ΣΩ.Ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἆρ' οὐκ ἄλλην μέν τινα
τὴν τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δ' αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;
Soc.Certainly. But, Protarchus, ought not these to be divided into two kinds? What do you say?
ΠΡΩ.Πῇ ποτε διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην
θείη τις ἂν ἀριθμητικήν;
Pro.What kinds?
ΣΩ.Οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος, ὦ Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που
μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον
στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ
56e τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν,
εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν
ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.
Soc.Are there not two kinds of arithmetic, that of the people and that of philosophers?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα εὖ λέγεις οὐ σμικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν
περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δύ' αὐτὰς
εἶναι.
Pro.How can one kind of arithmetic be distinguished from the other?
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ <ἡ> κατὰ τεκτονικὴν
καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ
57a λογισμῶν καταμελετωμένων—πότερον ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκτέον
ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;
Soc.The distinction is no small one, Protarchus. For some arithmeticians reckon unequal units, for instance, two armies and two oxen and two very small or incomparably large units; whereas others refuse to agree with them unless each of countless units is declared to differ not at all from each and every other unit.
ΠΡΩ.Τῇ πρόσθεν ἑπόμενος ἔγωγ' ἂν δύο κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν
ψῆφον τιθείην ἑκατέραν τούτων.
Pro.You are certainly quite right in saying that there is a great difference between the devotees of arithmetic, so it is reasonable to assume that it is of two kinds.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς. οὗ δ' ἕνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα εἰς τὸ
μέσον, ἆρα ἐννοεῖς;
Soc.And how about the arts of reckoning and measuring as they are used in building and in trade when compared with philosophical geometry and elaborate computations—shall we speak of each of these as one or as two?
ΠΡΩ.Ἴσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφήνασθαι τὸ
νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.
Pro.On the analogy of the previous example, I should say that each of them was two.
ΣΩ.Δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγε οὗτος ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ἧττον ἢ
ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἠρχόμεθα, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζητῶν ἀντίστροφον
ἐνταῦθα προβεβληκέναι σκοπῶν ἆρά ἐστί τις ἑτέρας
57b ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς
ἡδονή.
Soc.Right. But do you understand why I introduced this subject?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἕνεκα τούτων
ἐπικεχείρηκεν.
Pro.Perhaps; but I wish you would give the answer to your question.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλοις
ἄλλην τέχνην οὖσαν ἀνηυρήκειν σαφεστέραν καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν
ἄλλην ἄλλης;
Soc.This discussion of ours is now, I think, no less than when we began it, seeking a counterpart of pleasure, and therefore it has introduced the present subject and is considering whether there is one kind of knowledge purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.That is very clear; it was evidently introduced with that object.
ΣΩ.Ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἆρ' οὔ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὁμώνυμον
φθεγξάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μιᾶς, πάλιν ὡς
57c δυοῖν ἐπανερωτᾷ τούτοιν αὐτοῖν τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν
περὶ ταῦτα πότερον ἡ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων
ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;
Soc.Well, had not the discussion already found in what preceded that the various arts had various purposes and various degrees of exactness?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τίν' οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ δίδομεν ἀπόκρισιν;
Soc.And after having given an art a single name in what has preceded, thereby making us think that it was a single art, does not the discussion now assume that the same art is two and ask whether the art of the philosophers or that of the non-philosophers possesses the higher degree of clearness and purity?
ΠΡΩ.Ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγεθος
εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν.
Pro.Yes, I think that is just the question it asks.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινούμεθα ῥᾷον;
Soc.Then what reply shall we make, Protarchus?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γε ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὗται τῶν
ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν
57d τῶν ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων ὁρμὴν ἀμήχανον ἀκριβείᾳ καὶ
ἀληθείᾳ περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.
Pro.Socrates, we have found a marvelously great difference in the clearness of different kinds of knowledge.
ΣΩ.Ἔστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες θαρροῦντες
ἀποκρινόμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλκήν—
Soc.That will make the reply easier, will it not?
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Yes, to be sure; and let our reply be this, that the arithmetical and metrical arts far surpass the others and that of these the arts which are stirred by the impulse of the true philosophers are immeasurably superior in accuracy and truth about measures and numbers.
ΣΩ.Ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ καὶ
ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται συνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητα
ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δὲ ἑνὸς κεκοινωμέναι.
Soc.We accept that as our judgement, and relying upon you we make this confident reply to those who are clever in straining arguments—
57e ΠΡΩ.Διδῶμεν τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τούτοις οὓς φῂς δεινοὺς
εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Pro.What reply?
ΣΩ.Ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστ'
εἶναι;
Soc.That there are two arts of arithmetic and two of measuring, and many other arts which, like these, are twofold in this way, but possess a single name in common.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Let us give this answer, Socrates, to those who you say are clever; I hope we shall have luck with it.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ
διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν.
Soc.These, then, we say, are the most exact arts or sciences?
ΠΡΩ.Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὖ δεῖ λέγειν;
Pro.Certainly.
58a ΣΩ.Δῆλον ὁτιὴ πᾶς ἂν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίη·
τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν
ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι σύμπαντας
ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην
εἶναι γνῶσιν. σὺ δὲ τί; πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνοις
ἄν;
Soc.But the art of dialectic would spurn us, Protarchus, if we should judge that any other art is preferable to her.
ΠΡΩ.Ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἑκάστοτε Γοργίου
πολλάκις ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν
58b —πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἑκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας
ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν—νῦν δ'
οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.
Pro.But what is the art to which this name belongs?
ΣΩ."Τὰ ὅπλα" μοι δοκεῖς βουληθεὶς εἰπεῖν αἰσχυνθεὶς
ἀπολιπεῖν.
Soc.Clearly anybody can recognize the art I mean; for I am confident that all men who have any intellect whatsoever believe that the knowledge which has to do with being, reality, and eternal immutability is the truest kind of knowledge. What do you think, Protarchus?
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτῃ ὅπῃ σοι δοκεῖ.
Pro.I have often heard Gorgias constantly maintain that the art of persuasion surpasses all others for this, he said, makes all things subject to itself, not by force, but by their free will, and is by far the best of all arts; so now I hardly like to oppose either him or you.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;
Soc.It seems to me that you wanted to speak and threw down your arms out of modesty.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Very well; have it as you like.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω,
58c τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη καὶ
ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ
σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν εἰ
σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνινᾶσα, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν.
ἀλλ' ὅρα—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθήσῃ Γοργίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου
ὑπάρχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν,
ᾗ δ' εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματείᾳ, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι
τότε ἔλεγον, κἂν εἰ σμικρόν, καθαρὸν δ' εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ
58d καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέρειν, τούτῳ γ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ,
καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἱκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι,
μήτ' εἴς τινας ὠφελίας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς
εὐδοκιμίας, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις
ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν,
ταύτην εἴπωμεν διεξερευνησάμενοι—τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ
φρονήσεως εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι
φαῖμεν ἂν ἤ τινα ἑτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον.
Soc.Is it my fault that you have misunderstood?
58e ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπὸν οἶμαι συγχωρῆσαί
τινα ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι
μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην.
Pro.Misunderstood what?
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις νῦν,
ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι, καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηνται,
59a πρῶτον μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζητοῦσι
συντεταμένως; εἴ τε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις ζητεῖν,
οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονεν καὶ
ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαῖμεν
ἂν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;
Soc.My question, dear Protarchus, was not as yet what art or science surpasses all others by being the greatest and best and most useful to us: what I am trying to find out at present is which art, however little and of little use, has the greatest regard for clearness, exactness, and truth. See; you will not make Gorgias angry if you grant that his art is superior for the practical needs of men, but say that the study of which I spoke is superior in the matter of the most perfect truth, just as I said in speaking about the white that if it was small and pure it was superior to that which was great but impure. Now, therefore, with careful thought and due consideration, paying attention neither to the usefulness nor to the reputation of any arts or sciences, but to that faculty of our souls, if such there be, which by its nature loves the truth and does all things for the sake of the truth, let us examine this faculty and say whether it is most likely to possess mind and intelligence in the greatest purity, or we must look for some other faculty which has more valid claims.
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτως.
Pro.I am considering, and I think it is difficult to concede that any other science or art cleaves more closely to truth than this.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀεί, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα
καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνῄρηται
τὸν πόνον;
Soc.In saying that, did you bear in mind that the arts in general, and the men who devote themselves to them, make use of opinion and persistently investigate things which have to do with opinion? And even if they think they are studying nature, they are spending their lives in the study of the things of this world, the manner of their production, their action, and the forces to which they are subjected. Is not that true?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.Yes, it is.
ΣΩ.Τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἂν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ
59b ἀληθείᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὧν μήτε ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ
μήθ' ἕξει μήτε εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει;
Soc.Such thinkers, then, toil to discover, not eternal verities, but transient productions of the present, the future, or the past?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πῶς;
Pro.Perfectly true.
ΣΩ.Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μηδ' ἡντινοῦν
πῶς ἄν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν καὶ ὁτιοῦν;
Soc.And can we say that any of these things becomes certain, if tested by the touchstone of strictest truth, since none of them ever was, will be, or is in the same state?
ΠΡΩ.Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς.
Pro.Of course not.
ΣΩ.Οὐδ' ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά ἐστιν
τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα.
Soc.How can we gain anything fixed whatsoever about things which have no fixedness whatsoever?
ΠΡΩ.Οὔκουν εἰκός γε.
Pro.In no way, as it seems to me.
ΣΩ.Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον
χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἐᾶν, τόδε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ.
Soc.Then no mind or science which is occupied with them possesses the most perfect truth.
59c ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.No, it naturally does not.
ΣΩ.Ὡς ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ
καθαρὸν καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ
ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμεικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἢ [δεύτερος]
ἐκείνων ὅτι μάλιστά ἐστι συγγενές· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα
δεύτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.
Soc.Then we must dismiss the thought of you and me and Gorgias and Philebus, and make this solemn declaration on the part of our argument.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Pro.What is the solemn declaration?
ΣΩ.Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα ἆρ'
οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιότατον ἀπονέμειν;
Soc.That fixed and pure and true and what we call unalloyed knowledge has to do with the things which are eternally the same without change or mixture, or with that which is most akin to them; and all other things are to be regarded as secondary and inferior.
ΠΡΩ.Εἰκός γε.
Pro.Very true.
59d ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστι καὶ φρόνησις ἅ γ' ἄν τις τιμήσειε
μάλιστα ὀνόματα;
Soc.And of the names applied to such matters, it would be fairest to give the finest names to the finest things, would it not?
ΠΡΩ.Ναί.
Pro.That is reasonable.
ΣΩ.Ταῦτ' ἄρα ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις ἐστὶν
ἀπηκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.
Soc.Are not mind, then, and wisdom the names which we should honor most?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ἅ γε εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρεσχόμην
οὐκ ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα.
Soc.Then these names are applied most accurately and correctly to cases of contemplation of true being.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Εἶεν. τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι
59e πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μεῖξιν εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημιουργοῖς
ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι παρακεῖσθαι, καλῶς
ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι.
Soc.And these are precisely the names which I brought forward in the first place as parties to our suit.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ μάλα.
Pro.Yes, of course they are, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἆρ' οὐ μειγνύναι ἐπιχειρητέον;
Soc.Very well. As to the mixture of wisdom and pleasure, if anyone were to say that we are like artisans, with the materials before us from which to create our work, the simile would be a good one.
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς
αὐτοὺς ὀρθότερον ἂν ἔχοι;
Soc.And is it, then, our next task to try to make the mixture?
ΠΡΩ.Τὰ ποῖα;
Pro.Surely.
ΣΩ.Ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν· εὖ δ' ἡ παροιμία
60a δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπαναπολεῖν
τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.
Soc.Would it not be better first to repeat certain things and recall them to our minds?
ΠΡΩ.Τί μήν;
Pro.What things?
ΣΩ.Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· οἶμαι γὰρ οὑτωσί πως τὰ τότε
λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι.
Soc.Those which we mentioned before. I think the proverb we ought to repeat twice and even three times that which is good is an excellent one.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς;
Pro.Surely.
ΣΩ.Φίληβός φησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν πᾶσι
ζῴοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι, καὶ
δὴ καὶ τἀγαθὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι σύμπασι, καὶ δύο ὀνόματα,
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ, ἑνί τινι καὶ φύσει μιᾷ τούτω ὀρθῶς
60b τεθέντ' ἔχειν· Σωκράτης δ' ἓν μὲν οὔ φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι, δύο
δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ διάφορον
ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστιν
τε καὶ ἦν τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὦ Πρώταρχε;
Soc.Well then, in God’s name; I think this is the gist of our discussion.
ΠΡΩ.Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.
Pro.What is it?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν συνομολογοῖτο;
Soc.Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good for all, and the two designations good and pleasant are properly and essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one, but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from one another in nature, and that wisdom’s share in the good is greater than pleasure’s. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus?
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων.
Soc.And furthermore, is not and was not this a point of agreement among us?
60c ΠΡΩ.Τίνι;
Pro.What?
ΣΩ.Ὧι παρείη τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζῴων διὰ τέλους πάντως
καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ
ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;
Soc.That the nature of the good differs from all else in this respect.
ΠΡΩ.Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Pro.In what respect?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου
θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἑκάστων, ἄμεικτον μὲν ἡδονὴν
φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον
ἔχουσαν;
Soc.That whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient. We agreed to that?
ΠΡΩ.Ἦν ταῦτα.
Pro.We did.
ΣΩ.Μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἱκανὸν ἔδοξεν
60d εἶναί τῳ;
Soc.And then we tried in thought to separate each from the other and apply them to individual lives, pleasure unmixed with wisdom and likewise wisdom which had not the slightest alloy of pleasure?
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ πῶς;
Pro.Yes.
ΣΩ.Εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν ὁστισοῦν
ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ
ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος
καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἄν οἱ καὶ ὁτιοῦν
εἶναι ἢ καὶ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονὴν εἴθ' ὡς πλείστην
εἴθ' ὡς σφοδροτάτην, ἣν μήτε ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι χαίρειν μήτε
τὸ παράπαν γιγνώσκοι τί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος μήτ' αὖ
60e μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδ' ὁντινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι. ταὐτὰ δὲ
λεγέτω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ
τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετά
τινων ἡδονῶν ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ
μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινος.
Soc.And did we think then that either of them would be sufficient for any one?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτά γε
πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν.
Pro.By no means.
61a ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ
παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη;
Soc.And if we made any mistake at that time, let any one now take up the question again. Assuming that memory, wisdom, knowledge, and true opinion belong to the same class, let him ask whether anyone would wish to have or acquire anything whatsoever without these not to speak of pleasure, be it never so abundant or intense, if he could have no true opinion that he is pleased, no knowledge whatsoever of what he has felt, and not even the slightest memory of the feeling. And let him ask in the same way about wisdom, whether anyone would wish to have wisdom without any, even the slightest, pleasure rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without wisdom rather than with some wisdom.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.That is impossible, Socrates; it is useless to ask the same question over and over again.
ΣΩ.Τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι σαφῶς ἢ καί τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ
ληπτέον, ἵν', ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ δώσομεν ἔχωμεν.
Soc.Then the perfect, that which is to be desired by all and is altogether good, is neither of these?
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
Pro.Certainly not.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μέν τινα ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν;
Soc.We must, then, gain a clear conception of the good, or at least an outline of it, that we may, as we said, know to what the second place is to be assigned.
ΠΡΩ.Τίνα;
Pro.Quite right.
ΣΩ.Καθάπερ εἴ τίς τινα ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν οἴκησιν
61b πρῶτον ὀρθῶς ἵν' οἰκεῖ πύθοιτο αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δήπου πρὸς
τὴν εὕρεσιν ἂν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητουμένου.
Soc.And have we not found a road which leads to the good?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Pro.What road?
ΣΩ.Καὶ νῦν δή τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ
κατ' ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμείκτῳ βίῳ τἀγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἐν
τῷ μεικτῷ.
Soc.If you were looking for a particular man and first found out correctly where he lived, you would have made great progress towards finding him whom you sought.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε.
Pro.Yes, certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μειχθέντι καλῶς τὸ
ζητούμενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μή;
Soc.And just now we received an indication, as we did in the beginning, that we must seek the good, not in the unmixed, but in the mixed life.
ΠΡΩ.Πολύ γε.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραννύωμεν,
61c εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἥφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν
τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως.
Soc.Surely there is greater hope that the object of our search will be clearly present in the well mixed life than in the life which is not well mixed?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Far greater.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι
κρῆναι—μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς,
τὴν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως νηφαντικὴν καὶ ἄοινον αὐστηροῦ
καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινος ὕδατος—ἃς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα
συμμειγνύναι.
Soc.Let us make the mixture, Protarchus, with a prayer to the gods, to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever he be who presides over the mixing.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.By all means.
61d ΣΩ.Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἆρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονήσει
μειγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν;
Soc.We are like wine-pourers, and beside us are fountains—that of pleasure may be likened to a fount of honey, and the sober, wineless fount of wisdom to one of pure, health-giving water—of which we must do our best to mix as well as possible.
ΠΡΩ.Ἴσως.
Pro.Certainly we must.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές. ᾗ δὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν
μειγνύοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινα ἀποφήνασθαι ἄν.
Soc.Before we make the mixture, tell me: should we be most likely to succeed by mixing all pleasure with all wisdom?
ΠΡΩ.Λέγε τίνα.
Pro.Perhaps.
ΣΩ.Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον
ἑτέρας ἄλλη καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα;
Soc.But that is not safe; and I think I can offer a plan by which we can make our mixture with less risk.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.What is it?
ΣΩ.Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ
61e τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ
μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ
ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί. ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπισκοπούμενοι
ἡγησάμεθα ἐκείνης ἀληθεστέραν εἶναι.
Soc.We found, I believe, that one pleasure was greater than another and one art more exact than another?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἰ τἀληθέστατα τμήματα ἑκατέρας ἴδοιμεν
πρῶτον συμμείξαντες, ἆρα ἱκανὰ ταῦτα συγκεκραμένα τὸν
ἀγαπητότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἤ τινος
ἔτι προσδεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων;
Soc.And knowledge was of two kinds, one turning its eyes towards transitory things, the other towards things which neither come into being nor pass away, but are the same and immutable for ever. Considering them with a view to truth, we judged that the latter was truer than the former.
62a ΠΡΩ.Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως.
Pro.That is quite right.
ΣΩ.Ἔστω δή τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς περὶ
δικαιοσύνης ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἑπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν,
καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως
διανοούμενος.
Soc.Then what if we first mix the truest sections of each and see whether, when mixed together, they are capable of giving us the most adorable life, or whether we still need something more and different?
ΠΡΩ.Ἔστω γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.I think that is what we should do.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἕξει, κύκλου μὲν
καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην
ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν,
62b καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι
καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις;
Soc.Let us assume, then, a man who possesses wisdom about the nature of justice itself, and reason in accordance with his wisdom, and has the same kind of knowledge of all other things.
ΠΡΩ.Γελοίαν διάθεσιν ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς
θείαις οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμαις λέγομεν.
Pro.Agreed.
ΣΩ.Πῶς φῄς; ἦ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος ἅμα καὶ τοῦ
κύκλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον
κοινῇ καὶ συγκρατέον;
Soc.Now will this man have sufficient knowledge, if he is master of the theory of the divine circle and sphere, but is ignorant of our human sphere and human circles, even when he uses these and other kinds of rules or patterns in building houses?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν
ἑκάστοτε ἐξευρήσειν οἴκαδε.
Pro.We call that a ridiculous state of intellect in a man, Socrates, which is concerned only with divine knowledge.
62c ΣΩ.Ἦ καὶ μουσικήν, ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν στοχάσεώς
τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν;
Soc.What? Do you mean to say that the uncertain and impure art of the false rule and circle is to be put into our mixture?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ
βίος ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος.
Pro.Yes, that is inevitable, if any man is ever to find his own way home.
ΣΩ.Βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὠθούμενος
καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ
πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μείγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾷ
τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν;
Soc.And must we add music, which we said a little while ago was full of guesswork and imitation and lacked purity?
62d ΠΡΩ.Οὔκουν ἔγωγε οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι τις ἂν
βλάπτοιτο πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς
πρώτας.
Pro.Yes, I think we must, if our life is to be life at all.
ΣΩ.Μεθιῶ δὴ τὰς συμπάσας ῥεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὁμήρου
καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχήν;
Soc.Shall I, then, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and hustled by a mob, give up, open the door, and let all the kinds of knowledge stream in, the impure mingling with the pure?
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.I do not know, Socrates, what harm it can do a man to take in all the other kinds of knowledge if he has the first.
ΣΩ.Μεθεῖνται· καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν
ἰτέον. ὡς γὰρ διενοήθημεν αὐτὰς μειγνύναι, τὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν
μόρια πρῶτον, οὐκ ἐξεγένεθ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν
ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταὐτὸν μεθεῖμεν ἁθρόας καὶ πρόσθεν
62e τῶν ἡδονῶν.
Soc.Shall I, then, let them all flow into what Homer very poetically calls the mingling of the vales?
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ὥρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι νῷν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν,
πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἁθρόας ἀφετέον ἢ καὶ τούτων
πρώτας μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσαι ἀληθεῖς.
Soc.They are let in; and now we must turn again to the spring of pleasure. For our original plan for making the mixture, by taking first the true parts, did not succeed; because of our love of knowledge, we let all kinds of knowledge in together before pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρός γε ἀσφάλειαν πρώτας τὰς
ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Μεθείσθων δή. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἆρ' οὐκ εἰ μέν
τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, συμμεικτέον καὶ ταύτας;
Soc.So now it is time for us to consider about pleasures also, whether these, too, shall be all let loose together, or we shall let only the true ones loose at first.
ΠΡΩ.Τί δ' οὔ; τάς γε ἀναγκαίας δήπουθεν.
Pro.It is much safer to let loose the true first.
63a ΣΩ.Εἰ δέ γε καί, καθάπερ τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἀβλαβές
τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι διὰ βίου, καὶ νῦν δὴ ταὐτὰ
λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, εἴπερ πάσας ἡδονὰς ἥδεσθαι διὰ
βίου συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασι, πάσας
συγκρατέον.
Soc.We will let them loose, then. But what next? If there are any necessary pleasures, as there were kinds of knowledge, must we not mix them with the true?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς
ποιῶμεν;
Pro.Of course; the necessary pleasures must certainly be added.
ΣΩ.Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς
δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις διαπυνθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδε
ἀλλήλων πέρι.
Soc.And as we said it was harmless and useful to know all the arts throughout our life, if we now say the same of pleasures—that is, if it is advantageous and harmless for us to enjoy all pleasures throughout life—they must all form part of the mixture.
63b ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.What shall we say about these pleasures, and what shall we do?
ΣΩ."Ὦ φίλαι, εἴτε ἡδονὰς ὑμᾶς χρὴ προσαγορεύειν
εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ὀνόματι, μῶν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ
φρονήσεως πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν;" οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς
ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν.
Soc.There is no use in asking us, Protarchus; we must ask the pleasures and the arts and sciences themselves about one another.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.What shall we ask them?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, "Τὸ μόνον καὶ
ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς εἶναί τι γένος οὔτε πάνυ τι δυνατὸν οὔτ'
63c ὠφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἓν ἀνθ'
ἑνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν τἆλλά τε πάντα καὶ
[αὖ τὴν] αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἑκάστην."
Soc.Dear ones—whether you should be called pleasures or by any other name—would you choose to dwell with all wisdom, or with none at all? I think only one reply is possible.
ΠΡΩ."Καὶ καλῶς γε εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν," φήσομεν.
Pro.What is it?
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς. πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ
τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον· "Ἆρ' ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθε ἐν τῇ
συγκράσει;" φαῖμεν ἂν αὖ τὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν
ἀνερωτῶντες. "Ποίων," φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως, "ἡδονῶν;"
Soc.What we said before: For any class to be alone, solitary, and unalloyed is neither altogether possible nor is it profitable; but of all classes, comparing them one with another, we think the best to live with is the knowledge of all other things and, so far as is possible, the perfect knowledge of our individual selves.
ΠΡΩ.Εἰκός.
Pro.Your reply is excellent, we shall tell them.
63d ΣΩ.Ὁ δέ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅδε.
"Πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθέσιν ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς," φήσομεν, "ἆρ' ἔτι
προσδεῖσθ' ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς συνοίκους εἶναι καὶ
τὰς σφοδροτάτας;" "Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες," ἴσως φαῖεν
ἄν, "αἵ γ' ἐμποδίσματά τε μυρία ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν
αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι διὰ μανίας [ἡδονάς], καὶ γίγνεσθαί
63e τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἐῶσι, τά τε γιγνόμενα ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς
τὸ πολύ, δι' ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρουσιν;
ἀλλ' ἅς τε ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς [ἃς] εἶπες,
σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας
καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι
καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ συνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ,
ταύτας μείγνυ· τὰς δ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
κακίας ἑπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μειγνύναι τὸν
βουλόμενον ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μεῖξιν
64a καὶ κρᾶσιν, ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι τί ποτε ἔν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ
καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί
ποτε μαντευτέον." ἆρ' οὐκ ἐμφρόνως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως
ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν ὑπέρ τε αὑτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ
δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα;
Soc.Right. And next we must turn to wisdom and mind, and question them. We shall ask them, Do you want any further pleasures in the mixture? And they might reply, What pleasures?
ΠΡΩ.Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Quite likely.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἄν
ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ' ἂν ἕν.
Soc.Then we should go on to say: In addition to those true pleasures, do you want the greatest and most intense pleasures also to dwell with you? How can we want them, Socrates, they might perhaps say, since they contain countless hindrances for us, inasmuch as they disturb with maddening pleasures the souls of men in which we dwell, thereby preventing us from being born at all, and utterly destroying for the most part, through the carelessness and forgetfulness which they engender, those of our children which are born?
But the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, you must consider almost our own by nature, and also those which are united with health and self-restraint, and furthermore all those which are handmaids of virtue in general and follow everywhere in its train as if it were a god,—add these to the mixture; but as for the pleasures which follow after folly and all baseness, it would be very senseless for anyone who desires to discover the most beautiful and most restful mixture or compound, and to try to learn which of its elements is good in man and the universe, and what we should divine its nature to be, to mix these with mind. Shall we not say that this reply which mind has now made for itself and memory and right opinion is wise and reasonable?
64b ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ὧι μὴ μείξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοῦτο
ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἂν γενόμενον εἴη.
Soc.But another addition is surely necessary, without which nothing whatsoever can ever come into being.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Pro.What is it?
ΣΩ.Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει
ταύτῃ, λέγετε σὺ καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεὶ
κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν
λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.
Soc.That in which there is no admixture of truth can never truly come into being or exist.
ΠΡΩ.Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι.
Pro.No, of course not.
64c ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις
[καὶ] τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι [τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου] λέγοντες
ἴσως ὀρθῶς ἄν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν;
Soc.No. But if anything is still wanting in our mixture, you and Philebus must speak of it. For to me it seems that our argument is now completed, as it were an incorporeal order which shall rule nobly a living body.
ΠΡΩ.Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.
Pro.And you may say, Socrates, that I am of the same opinion.
ΣΩ.Τί δῆτα ἐν τῇ συμμείξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστ'
αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσιν γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ
τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπισκεψόμεθα
εἴθ' ἡδονῇ εἴτε τῷ νῷ προσφυέστερον καὶ
οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ συνέστηκεν.
Soc.And if we were to say that we are now in the vestibule of the good and of the dwelling of the good, should we not be speaking the truth after a fashion?
64d ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθῶς· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστι
συμφορώτατον.
Pro.I certainly think so.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν καὶ συμπάσης γε μείξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν
τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν ἢ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἡτισοῦν ἢ τὸ
παράπαν οὐδενός.
Soc.What element, then, of the mixture would appear to us to be the most precious and also the chief cause why such a state is beloved of all? When we have discovered this, we will then consider whether it is more closely attached and more akin to pleasure or to mind in the universe.
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς λέγεις;
Pro.Right; for that is most serviceable to us in forming our judgement.
ΣΩ.Οὐδείς που τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ.
Soc.And it is quite easy to see the cause which makes any mixture whatsoever either of the highest value or of none at all.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ ποῖον;
Pro.What do you mean?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα
ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν σύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὑτήν· οὐδὲ
64e γὰρ κρᾶσις ἀλλά τις ἄκρατος συμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς
ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ὄντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις συμφορά.
Soc.Why, everybody knows that.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.Knows what?
ΣΩ.Νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις
εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν· μετριότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία
κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.
Soc.That any compound, however made, which lacks measure and proportion, must necessarily destroy its components and first of all itself; for it is in truth no compound, but an uncompounded jumble, and is always a misfortune to those who possess it.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Perfectly true.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γε ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει
μεμεῖχθαι.
Soc.So now the power of the good has taken refuge in the nature of the beautiful; for measure and proportion are everywhere identified with beauty and virtue.
ΠΡΩ.Πάνυ γε.
Pro.Certainly.
65a ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι,
σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ,
λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατ' ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθ' ἂν τῶν
ἐν τῇ συμμείξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν
γεγονέναι.
Soc.We said that truth also was mingled with them in the compound.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
Pro.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἤδη τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἂν
ὁστισοῦν κριτὴς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονήσεως, ὁπότερον
65b αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου συγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν
ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς.
Soc.Then if we cannot catch the good with the aid of one idea, let us run it down with three—beauty, proportion, and truth, and let us say that these, considered as one, may more properly than all other components of the mixture be regarded as the cause, and that through the goodness of these the mixture itself has been made good.
ΠΡΩ.Δῆλον μέν, ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν
βέλτιον.
Pro.Quite right.
ΣΩ.Καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν
καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν· δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ <ὡς> μᾶλλον
συγγενὲς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν.
Soc.So now, Protarchus, any one would be able to judge about pleasure and wisdom, and to decide which of them is more akin to the highest good and of greater value among men and gods.
ΠΡΩ.Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι
λέγεις;
Pro.That is clear; but still it is better to carry on the discussion to the end.
ΣΩ.Ναί. πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώταρχε·
65c καὶ λαβόμενος βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ
ἡδονήν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ πότερον
ἡδονὴ συγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ.
Soc.Let us, then, judge each of the three separately in its relation to pleasure and mind; for it is our duty to see to which of the two we shall assign each of them as more akin.
ΠΡΩ.Τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ; πολὺ γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρετον.
ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν
ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τἀφροδίσια, αἳ δὴ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς
65d καθάπερ παίδων τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημένων·
νοῦς δὲ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων
ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.
Pro.You refer to beauty, truth, and measure?
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως
σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω
κέκτηται;
Soc.Yes. Take truth first, Protarchus; take it and look at the three—mind, truth, and pleasure; take plenty of time, and answer to yourself whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.
ΠΡΩ.Εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας·
οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων
πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης
ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδ' ἂν ἕν ποτε.
Pro.Why take time? For the difference, to my mind, is great. For pleasure is the greatest of impostors, and the story goes that in the pleasures of love, which are said to be the greatest, perjury is even pardoned by the gods, as if the pleasures were like children, utterly devoid of all sense. But mind is either identical with truth or of all things most like it and truest.
65e ΣΩ.Καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὅμως δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νοῦς
ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλεῖον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστε
εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τοὐναντίον;
Soc.Next, then, consider measure in the same way, and see whether pleasure possesses more of it than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀλλ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε
ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε
ἐσόμενον.
Pro.That also is an easy thing to consider. For I think nothing in the world could be found more immoderate than pleasure and its transports, and nothing more in harmony with measure than mind and knowledge.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς.
Soc.However, go on and tell about the third. Has mind or pleasure the greater share in beauty?
ΠΡΩ.Ἡδονὰς δέ γέ που, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας,
ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὁντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ
66a πάντων αἴσχιστον ἑπόμενον ὁρῶντες αὐτοί τε αἰσχυνόμεθα
καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ὅτι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὁρᾶν αὐτά.
Pro.But Socrates, no one, either asleep or awake, ever saw or knew wisdom or mind to be or become unseemly at any time or in any way whatsoever.
ΣΩ.Πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων
πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι
πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον
καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα
νομίζειν, τὴν †ἀίδιον ᾑρῆσθαι.
Soc.Right.
ΠΡΩ.Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.
Pro.But pleasures, and the greatest pleasures at that, when we see any one enjoying them and observe the ridiculous or utterly disgraceful element which accompanies them, fill us with a sense of shame; we put them out of sight and hide them, so far as possible; we confine everything of that sort to the night time, as unfit for the sight of day.
66b ΣΩ.Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ
τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖ ταύτης
ἐστίν.
Soc.Then you will proclaim everywhere, Protarchus, by messengers to the absent and by speech to those present, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor even the second, but first the eternal nature has chosen measure, moderation, fitness, and all which is to be considered similar to these.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔοικε γοῦν.
Pro.That appears to result from what has now been said.
ΣΩ.Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ
φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις.
Soc.Second, then, comes proportion, beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all that belongs to that class.
ΠΡΩ.Ἴσως.
Pro.Yes, so it appears.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν,
ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτ'
66c εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γέ ἐστι
μᾶλλον [ἢ] τῆς ἡδονῆς συγγενῆ;
Soc.And if you count mind and wisdom as the third, you will, I prophesy, not wander far from the truth.
ΠΡΩ.Τάχ' ἄν.
Pro.That may be.
ΣΩ.Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὁρισάμενοι,
καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις,
τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπομένας;
Soc.And will you not put those properties fourth which we said belonged especially to the soul—sciences, arts, and true opinions they are called— and say that these come after the first three, and are fourth, since they are more akin than pleasure to the good?
ΠΡΩ.Ἴσως.
Pro.Perhaps.
ΣΩ."Ἕκτῃ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ," φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, "καταπαύσατε
κόσμον ἀοιδῆς·" ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος
λόγος ἐν ἕκτῃ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ
66d ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι
τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
Soc.And fifth, those pleasures which we separated and classed as painless, which we called pure pleasures of the soul itself, those which accompany knowledge and, sometimes, perceptions?
ΠΡΩ.Οὐκοῦν χρή.
Pro.May be.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δή, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι
λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.
Soc.But with the sixth generation, says Orpheus, cease the rhythmic song. It seems that our discussion, too, is likely to cease with the sixth decision. So after this nothing remains for us but to give our discussion a sort of head.
ΠΡΩ.Ποῖον δή;
Pro.Yes, that should be done.
ΣΩ.Φίληβος τἀγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν
καὶ παντελῆ.
Soc.Come then, let us for the third time call the same argument to witness before Zeus the saviour, and proceed.
ΠΡΩ.Τὸ τρίτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως
τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.
Pro.What argument?
66e ΣΩ.Ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ
κατιδὼν ἅπερ νυνδὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου
λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς
ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.
Soc.Philebus declared that pleasure was entirely and in all respects the good.
ΠΡΩ.Ἦν ταῦτα.
Pro.Apparently, Socrates, when you said the third time just now, you meant that we must take up our argument again from the beginning.
ΣΩ.Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ εἶπον ὡς
εἰ φανείη τι τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων
νῷ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συνδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων
στερήσοιτο.
Soc.Yes; but let us hear what follows. For I, perceiving the truths which I have now been detailing, and annoyed by the theory held not only by Philebus but by many thousands of others, said that mind was a far better and more excellent thing for human life than pleasure.
67a ΠΡΩ.Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν.
Pro.True.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἱκανώτατα τούτοιν οὐδέτερον
ἱκανὸν ἐφάνη.
Soc.But suspecting that there were many other things to be considered, I said that if anything should be found better than these two, I should support mind against pleasure in the struggle for the second place, and even the second place would be lost by pleasure.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα.
Pro.Yes, that is what you said.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς
ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μή τοι τἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ μηδ' ἕτερον
αὐτοῖν εἶναι, στερομένοιν αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ
τελέου δυνάμεως;
Soc.And next it was most sufficiently proved that each of these two was insufficient.
ΠΡΩ.Ὀρθότατα.
Pro.Very true.
ΣΩ.Φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος τούτοιν
ἑκατέρου, μυρίῳ γ' αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον
πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ.
Soc.In this argument, then, both mind and pleasure were set aside; neither of them is the absolute good, since they are devoid of self-sufficiency, adequacy, and perfection?
ΠΡΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pro.Quite right.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν νῦν ὁ λόγος
ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.
Soc.And on the appearance of a third competitor, better than either of these, mind is now found to be ten thousand times more akin than pleasure to the victor.
ΠΡΩ.Ἔοικεν.
Pro.Certainly.
67b ΣΩ.Πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι
καὶ τἆλλα σύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν·
οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι
τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς
θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ
τοὺς τῶν ἐν μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε
λόγων.
Soc.Then, according to the judgement which has now been given by our discussion, the power of pleasure would be fifth.
ΠΡΩ.Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαί σοι νῦν ἤδη
φαμὲν ἅπαντες.
Pro.So it seems.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με;
Soc.But not first, even if all the cattle and horses and other beasts in the world, in their pursuit of enjoyment, so assert. Trusting in them, as augurs trust in birds, the many judge that pleasures are the greatest blessings in life, and they imagine that the lusts of beasts are better witnesses than are the aspirations and thoughts inspired by the philosophic muse.
ΠΡΩ.Σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ
δήπου σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν, ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ
λειπόμενα.
Pro.Socrates, we all now declare that what you have said is perfectly true.
Soc.Then you will let me go?
Pro.There is still a little left, Socrates. I am sure you will not give up before we do, and I will remind you of what remains.