Burnet (OCT, 1907) · Lamb (1927)
Lamb (1927)
313a ΣΩ.Ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν;
Soc.Tell me, what is law?
ΕΤ.Ὁποῖον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς τῶν νόμων;
Com.To what kind of law does your question refer?
ΣΩ.Τί δ'; ἔστιν ὅτι διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατ' αὐτὸ
τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι; σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω
ἐρωτῶν σε. ἐρωτῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνηρόμην τί ἐστιν χρυσός,
εἴ με ὡσαύτως ἀνήρου ὁποῖον καὶ λέγω χρυσόν, οἴομαί σε
οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐρέσθαι. οὐδὲν γάρ που διαφέρει οὔτε χρυσὸς
313b χρυσοῦ οὔτε λίθος λίθου κατά γε τὸ λίθος εἶναι καὶ κατὰ
τὸ χρυσός· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ νόμος που νόμου οὐδὲν διαφέρει,
ἀλλὰ πάντες εἰσὶν ταὐτόν. νόμος γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστιν
ὁμοίως, οὐχ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἧττον· τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ ἐρωτῶ,
τὸ πᾶν τί ἐστιν νόμος. εἰ οὖν σοι πρόχειρον, εἰπέ.
Soc.What! Is there any difference between law and law, in this particular point of being law? For just consider what is the actual question I am putting to you. It is as though I had asked, what is gold: if you had asked me in the same manner, to what kind of gold I refer, I think your question would have been incorrect. For I presume there is no difference between gold and gold, or between stone and stone, in point of being gold or stone; and so neither does law differ at all from law, I suppose, but they are all the same thing. For each of them is law alike, not one more so, and another less. That is the particular point of my question—what is law as a whole? So if you are ready, tell me.
ΕΤ.Τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἴη ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἢ τὰ
νομιζόμενα;
Com.Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted?
ΣΩ.Ἦ καὶ λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα, ἢ ὄψις
τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα; ἢ ἄλλο μὲν λόγος, ἄλλο
313c δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ὄψις, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα·
καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἀκοή, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ
νόμος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα; οὕτως ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;
Soc.And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech something distinct from the things spoken, sight something distinct from the things seen, and hearing something distinct from the things heard; and so law is something distinct from things loyally accepted? Is this so, or what is your view?
ΕΤ.Ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη.
Com.I find it now to be something distinct.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα νόμος ἐστὶν τὰ νομιζόμενα.
Soc.Then law is not things loyally accepted.
ΕΤ.Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
Com.I think not.
ΣΩ.Τί δῆτ' ἂν εἴη νόμος; ἐπισκεψώμεθ' αὐτὸ ὧδε. εἴ
τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο, "Ἐπειδὴ ὄψει φατὲ
314a τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾶται;" ἀπεκρινάμεθ'
ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ
τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δ' αὖ ἤρετο ἡμᾶς, "Τί δέ; ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῇ τὰ
ἀκουόμενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἀκοῇ;" ἀπεκρινάμεθ' ἂν
αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς
φωνάς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς, "Ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ
τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται;
314b πότερον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἢ δηλώσει, ὥσπερ τὰ μανθανόμενα
μανθάνεται δηλούσῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἢ εὑρέσει τινί, ὥσπερ τὰ
εὑρισκόμενα εὑρίσκεται, οἷον τὰ μὲν ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη
ἰατρικῇ, ἃ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ διανοοῦνται, ὥς φασιν οἱ μάντεις, μαντικῇ;
ἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων·
ἦ γάρ;"
Soc.Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now: Since you say it is by sight that things seen are seen, what is this sight whereby they are seen? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows objects by means of the eyes. And if he had asked us again: Well then, since it is by hearing that things heard are heard, what is hearing? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows us sounds by means of the ears. In the same way then, suppose he should also ask us: Since it is by law that loyally accepted things are so accepted, what is this law whereby they are so accepted? Is it some sensation or showing, as when things learnt are learnt by knowledge showing them, or some discovery, as when things discovered are discovered—for instance, the causes of health and sickness by medicine, or the designs of the gods, as the prophets say, by prophecy; for art is surely our discovery of things, is it not?
ΕΤ.Πάνυ γε.
Com.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν ἂν τούτων ὑπολάβοιμεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον
εἶναι;
Soc.Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?
ΕΤ.Τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι; ὥστε κινδυνεύει, ὃ
314c σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι.
Com.Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law? So that apparently the whole thing, law, as you put it in your question, is a city’s resolution.
ΣΩ.Δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.
Soc.State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.
ΕΤ.Ἔγωγε.
Com.I do.
ΣΩ.Καὶ ἴσως καλῶς λέγεις· τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα.
λέγεις τινὰς σοφούς;
Soc.And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?
—ΕΤ.Ἔγωγε.
Com.I do.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
οἱ σοφοί εἰσιν σοφίᾳ σοφοί;
Soc.And the wise are wise by wisdom?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ; οἱ
δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι;
Soc.And again, the just are just by justice?
—ΕΤ.Πάνυ γε.
Com.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;
Soc.And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οἱ δὲ
314d ἄνομοι ἀνομίᾳ ἄνομοι;
Soc.And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;
Soc.And the law-abiding are just?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι;
Soc.And the lawless are unjust?
—ΕΤ.Ἄδικοι.
Com.Unjust.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;
Soc.And justice and law are most noble?
— ΕΤ.Οὕτως.
Com.That is so.
—ΣΩ.Αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία;
Soc.And injustice and lawlessness most base?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ τὸ μὲν σῴζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τἆλλα
πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;
Soc.And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ὡς
περὶ καλοῦ ἄρα τινὸς ὄντος δεῖ τοῦ νόμου διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ
ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.
Soc.Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.
—ΕΤ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Com.Undeniably.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν δόγμα ἔφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον;
Soc.And we said that law is a city’s resolution?
314e — ΕΤ.Ἔφαμεν γάρ.
Com.So we did.
—ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ
δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;
Soc.Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil?
—ΕΤ.Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν.
Com.Yes, to be sure.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ
μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.
Soc.And, you know, law was not evil.
—ΕΤ.Οὐ γάρ.
Com.No, indeed.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ
ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ
δόγμα πόλεως.
Soc.So it is not right to reply, in that simple fashion, that law is a city’s resolution.
—ΕΤ.Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Com.I agree that it is not.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα
ἁρμόττοι ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.
Soc.An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.
—ΕΤ.Οὐ δῆτα.
Com.No, to be sure.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται
ὁ νόμος εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἆρα οὐκ ἤδη
τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί;
Soc.But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?
— ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής;
Soc.But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?
315a —ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν
ἐξεύρεσις;
Soc.And true opinion is discovery of reality?
—ΕΤ.Ἔστιν γάρ.
Com.Yes, it is.
—ΣΩ.Ὁ νόμος ἄρα βούλεται
τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις.
Soc.So law tends to be discovery of reality.
ΕΤ.Πῶς οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν τοῦ ὄντος
ἐξεύρεσις, οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα γε ἡμῖν ἐξηύρηται;
Com.Then how is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not use always the same laws on the same matters, if we have thus got realities discovered?
ΣΩ.Βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ νόμος εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος
ἐξεύρεσις· οἱ δ' ἄρα μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμενοι
315b ἄνθρωποι, ὡς δοκοῦμεν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δύνανται ἐξευρίσκειν ὃ
βούλεται ὁ νόμος, τὸ ὄν. ἐπεὶ φέρε ἴδωμεν ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν
ἐνθένδε κατάδηλον γένηται εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμεθα
ἢ ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις, καὶ εἰ ἅπαντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλοι
ἄλλοις.
Soc.Law tends none the less to be discovery of reality: but men, who do not use always the same laws, as we observe, are not always able to discover what the law is intent on—reality. For come now, let us see if from this point onward we can get it clear whether we use always the same laws or different ones at different times, and whether we all use the same, or some of us use some, and others others.
ΕΤ.Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν γνῶναι,
ὅτι οὔτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ἄλλοι τε
ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἡμῖν μὲν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους
θύειν ἀλλ' ἀνόσιον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ θύουσιν ὡς ὅσιον ὂν
315c καὶ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἔνιοι αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὑτῶν
ὑεῖς τῷ Κρόνῳ, ὡς ἴσως καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας. καὶ μὴ ὅτι βάρβαροι
ἄνθρωποι ἡμῶν ἄλλοις νόμοις χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ
ἐν τῇ Λυκαίᾳ οὗτοι καὶ οἱ τοῦ Ἀθάμαντος ἔκγονοι οἵας
θυσίας θύουσιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες. ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς
οἶσθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούων οἵοις νόμοις ἐχρώμεθα πρὸ τοῦ
περὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας, ἱερεῖά τε προσφάττοντες πρὸ τῆς
ἐκφορᾶς τοῦ νεκροῦ καὶ ἐγχυτιστρίας μεταπεμπόμενοι· οἱ
315d δ' αὖ ἐκείνων ἔτι πρότεροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔθαπτον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ
τοὺς ἀποθανόντας· ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιοῦμεν. μυρία
δ' ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν· πολλὴ γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς
ἀποδείξεως ὡς οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομίζομεν
οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἄνθρωποι.
Com.Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy, whereas the Carthaginians perform it as a thing they account holy and legal, and that too when some of them sacrifice even their own sons to Cronos, as I daresay you yourself have heard. And not merely is it foreign peoples who use different laws from ours, but our neighbors in Lycaea and the descendants of Athamas —you know their sacrifices, Greeks though they be. And as to ourselves too, you know, of course, from what you have heard yourself, the kind of laws we formerly used in regard to our dead, when we slaughtered sacred victims before the funeral procession, and engaged urn-women to collect the bones from the ashes. Then again, a yet earlier generation used to bury the dead where they were, in the house: but we do none of these things. One might give thousands of other instances; for there is ample means of proving that neither we copy ourselves nor mankind each other always in laws and customs.
ΣΩ.Οὐδέν τοι θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ σὺ μὲν
ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν. ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν σύ τε
κατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἅ σοι δοκεῖ μακρῷ λόγῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐγώ,
315e οὐδὲν μή ποτε συμβῶμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ
τὸ σκέμμα, τάχ' ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν βούλει,
πυνθανόμενός τι παρ' ἐμοῦ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ σκόπει· εἰ δ' αὖ
βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος.
Soc.And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches, and I speak likewise, we shall never come to any agreement, in my opinion: but if we study the matter jointly, we may perhaps concur. Well now, if you like, hold a joint inquiry with me by asking me questions; or if you prefer, by answering them.
ΕΤ.Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν
βούλῃ.
Com.Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δὴ σύ, πότερα νομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἄδικα εἶναι
καὶ τὰ ἄδικα δίκαια, ἢ τὰ μὲν δίκαια δίκαια, τὰ δὲ ἄδικα
ἄδικα;
Soc.Come then, do you consider just things to be unjust and unjust things just, or just things to be just and unjust things unjust?
—ΕΤ.Ἐγὼ μὲν τά τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα
316a ἄδικα.
Com.I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται;
Soc.And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;
Soc.And among the Persians also?
Καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις>.
Com.Among the Persians also.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ δήπου;
Soc.Always, I presume?
—ΕΤ.Ἀεί.
Com.Always.
— ΣΩ.Πότερον δὲ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται
ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα, ἢ τοὐναντίον;
Soc.Are things that weigh more considered heavier here, and things that weigh less lighter, or the contrary?
—ΕΤ.Οὔκ,
ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα.
Com.No, those that weigh more are considered heavier, and those that weigh less lighter.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ;
Soc.And is it so in Carthage also, and in Lycaea?
— ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἔοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται
316b καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καλὰ οὐδὲ
τὰ καλὰ αἰσχρά.
Soc.Noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble, and base things base; not base things noble or noble things base.
—ΕΤ.Οὕτως.
Com.That is so.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν, ὡς κατὰ πάντων
εἰπεῖν, τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ παρ'
ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.
Soc.And thus, as a universal rule, realities, and not unrealities, are accepted as real, both among us and among all other men.
—ΕΤ.Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Com.I agree.
— ΣΩ.Ὃς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει.
Soc.Then whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.
ΕΤ.Οὕτω μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, καὶ φαίνεται
ταῦτα νόμιμα καὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐννοήσω
316c ὅτι οὐδὲν παυόμεθα ἄνω κάτω μετατιθέμενοι τοὺς
νόμους, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.
Com.In your present way of putting it, Socrates, the same things appear to be accepted as lawful both by us and by the rest of the world, always: but when I reflect that we are continually changing our laws in all sorts of ways, I cannot bring myself to assent.
ΣΩ.Ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ταῦτα μεταπεττευόμενα ὅτι
ταὐτά ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ὧδε μετ' ἐμοῦ αὐτὰ ἄθρει. ἤδη ποτὲ
ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων;
Soc.Perhaps it is because you do not reflect that when we change our pieces at draughts they are the same pieces. But look at it, as I do, in this way. Have you in your time come across a treatise on healing the sick?
Ἔγωγε.
Com.I have.
—ΣΩ.Οἶσθα οὖν τίνος τέχνης τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα;
Soc.Then do you know to what art such a treatise belongs?
—ΕΤ.Οἶδα, ὅτι ἰατρικῆς.
Com.I do: medicine.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἰατροὺς
καλεῖς τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων;
Soc.And you give the name of doctors to those who have knowledge of these matters?
—ΕΤ.Φημί.
Com.Yes.
316d Πότερον οὖν οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν νομίζουσιν
ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλα;
Soc.Then do those who have knowledge accept the same views on the same things, or do they accept different views?
—ΕΤ.Ταὐτὰ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι.
Com.The same, in my opinion.
Πότερον οἱ Ἕλληνες μόνοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι
αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι, ταὐτὰ νομίζουσι;
Soc.Do Greeks only accept the same views as Greeks on what they know, or do foreigners also agree on these matters, both among themselves and with Greeks?
—ΕΤ.Ταὐτὰ δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν τοὺς εἰδότας
αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς συννομίζειν καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους.
Com.It is quite inevitable, I should say, that those who know should agree in accepting the same views, whether Greeks or foreigners.
— ΣΩ.Καλῶς γε ἀπεκρίνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεί;
Soc.Well answered. And do they so always?
—ΕΤ.Ναί,
καὶ ἀεί.
Com.Yes, it is so always.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ συγγράφουσι περὶ ὑγιείας ἅπερ
316e καὶ νομίζουσιν εἶναι;
Soc.And do doctors on their part, in their treatises on health, write what they accept as real?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἰατρικὰ ἄρα καὶ
ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν.
Soc.Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and medical laws.
—ΕΤ.Ἰατρικὰ μέντοι.
Com.Medical, to be sure.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα
γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσίν;
Soc.And are agricultural treatises likewise agricultural laws?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τίνων
οὖν ἐστιν τὰ περὶ κήπων ἐργασίας συγγράμματα καὶ νόμιμα;
Soc.And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about garden-work?
—ΕΤ.Κηπουρῶν.
Com.Gardeners’.
—ΣΩ.Κηπουρικοὶ ἄρα νόμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν
οὗτοι.
Soc.So these are our gardening laws.
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν;
Soc.Of people who know how to control gardens?
—ΕΤ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Com.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Ἐπίστανται δ' οἱ κηπουροί.
Soc.And it is the gardeners who know.
Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τίνων δὲ τὰ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας συγγράμματά
τε καὶ νόμιμα;
Soc.And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?
—ΕΤ.Μαγείρων.
Com.Cooks’.
—ΣΩ.Μαγειρικοὶ ἄρα οὗτοι
νόμοι εἰσί;
Soc.Then there are laws of cookery?
—ΕΤ.Μαγειρικοί.
Com.Of cookery.
—ΣΩ.Τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ὡς
317a ἔοικεν, ὄψου σκευασίας ἄρχειν;
Soc.Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἐπίστανται
δέ, ὥς φασιν, οἱ μάγειροι;
Soc.And it is the cooks, they say, who know?
—ΕΤ.Ἐπίστανται γάρ.
Com.Yes, it is they who know.
—ΣΩ.Εἶεν· τίνων δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως συγγράμματά
τε καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν; ἆρ' οὐ τῶν ἐπισταμένων
πόλεων ἄρχειν;
Soc.Very well; and now, whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the government of a state? Of the people who know how to control states, are they not?
—ΕΤ.Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Com.I agree.
—ΣΩ.Ἐπίστανται δὲ
ἄλλοι τινὲς ἢ οἱ πολιτικοί τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοί;
Soc.And is it anyone else than statesmen and royal persons who know?
—ΕΤ.Οὗτοι
μὲν οὖν.
Com.It is they, to be sure.
—ΣΩ.Πολιτικὰ ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματά ἐστιν,
οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους καλοῦσι, βασιλέων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν
317b ἀγαθῶν συγγράμματα.
Soc.Then what people call laws are treatises of state,— writings of kings and good men.
—ΕΤ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Com.That is true.
ΣΩ.Ἄλλο τι οὖν οἵ γε ἐπιστάμενοι οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα
συγγράψουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν;
Soc.And must it not be that those who know will not write differently at different times on the same matters?
—ΕΤ.Οὔ.
Com.They will not.
—ΣΩ.Οὐδὲ μεταθήσονταί
ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα νόμιμα;
Soc.Nor will they ever change one set of accepted rules for another in respect of the same matters.
— ΕΤ.Οὐ δῆτα.
Com.No, indeed.
—ΣΩ.Ἐὰν οὖν ὁρῶμέν τινας ὁπουοῦν τοῦτο
ποιοῦντας, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας
τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας;
Soc.So if we see some persons anywhere doing this, shall we say that those who do so have knowledge, or have none?
—ΕΤ.Ἀνεπιστήμονας.
Com.That they have no knowledge.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ὀρθὸν ᾖ, νόμιμον αὐτὸ φήσομεν ἑκάστῳ
εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἰατρικὸν ἢ τὸ μαγειρικὸν ἢ τὸ κηπουρικόν;
Soc.And again, whatever is right, we shall say is lawful for each person, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?
317c — ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ ὀρθὸν ᾖ, οὐκέτι φήσομεν τοῦτο
νόμιμον εἶναι;
Soc.And whatever is not right we shall decline to call lawful?
—ΕΤ.Οὐκέτι.
Com.We shall decline.
—ΣΩ.Ἄνομον ἄρα γίγνεται.
Soc.Then it becomes unlawful.
—ΕΤ.Ἀνάγκη.
Com.It must.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι
τοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ὅλως περὶ πόλεως
διακοσμήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς χρὴ πόλιν διοικεῖν, τὸ μὲν
ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὔ, ὃ δοκεῖ
νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄνομον.
Soc.And again, in writings about what is just and unjust, and generally about the government of a state and the proper way of governing it, that which is right is the king’s law, but not so that which is not right, though it seems to be law to those who do not know; for it is unlawful.
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
317d —ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος
εὕρεσιν.
Soc.Then we rightly admitted that law is discovery of reality.
—ΕΤ.Φαίνεται.
Com.So it appears.
ΣΩ.Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε ἐν αὐτῷ διαθεώμεθα. τίς ἐπιστήμων
διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα;
Soc.Now let us observe this further point about it. Who has knowledge of distributing seed over land?
—ΕΤ.Γεωργός.
Com.A farmer.
—ΣΩ.Οὗτος
δὲ τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει;
Soc.And does he distribute the suitable seed to each sort of land?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
— ΣΩ.Ὁ γεωργὸς ἄρα νομεὺς ἀγαθὸς τούτων, καὶ οἱ τούτου
νόμοι καὶ διανομαὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρθαί εἰσιν;
Soc.Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are right in this matter?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
— ΣΩ.Τίς δὲ κρουμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἀγαθὸς νομεύς, καὶ τὰ
ἄξια νεῖμαι; καὶ οἱ τίνος νόμοι ὀρθοί εἰσιν;
Soc.And who is a good apportioner of notes struck for a tune, skilled in distributing suitable notes, and who is it whose laws are right here?
—ΕΤ.Οἱ τοῦ
317e αὐλητοῦ καὶ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ.
Com.The flute-player and the harp-player.
—ΣΩ.Ὁ νομικώτατος ἄρα ἐν
τούτοις, οὗτος αὐλητικώτατος.
Soc.Then he who is the best lawyer in these matters is the best flute-player.
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τίς δὲ τὴν
τροφὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα διανεῖμαι ἄριστος; οὐχ
ὅσπερ τὴν ἀξίαν;
Soc.And who is most skilled in distributing food to human bodies? Is it not he who assigns suitable food?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Αἱ τούτου ἄρα διανομαὶ
καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι, καὶ ὅστις περὶ ταῦτα νομικώτατος,
καὶ νομεὺς ἄριστος.
Soc.Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.
—ΕΤ.Πάνυ γε.
Com.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Τίς οὗτος;
Soc.Who is he?
318a — ΕΤ.Παιδοτρίβης.
Com.A trainer.
—ΣΩ.Οὗτος τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ
σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος;
Soc.He is the best man to pasture the human herd of the body?
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τίς δὲ τὴν τῶν
προβάτων ἀγέλην κράτιστος νέμειν; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;
Soc.And who is the best man to pasture a flock of sheep? What is his name?
Ποιμήν.
Com.A shepherd.
—ΣΩ.Οἱ τοῦ ποιμένος ἄρα νόμοι ἄριστοι τοῖς προβάτοις.
Soc.Then the shepherd’s laws are best for sheep.
—ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οἱ δὲ τοῦ βουκόλου τοῖς βουσί.
Soc.And the herdsman’s for oxen.
— ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οἱ δὲ τοῦ τίνος νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς
τῶν ἀνθρώπων; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι.
Soc.And whose laws are best for the souls of men? The king’s, are they not? Say if you agree.
—ΕΤ.Φημὶ δή.
Com.I do.
318b ΣΩ.Καλῶς τοίνυν λέγεις. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν τίς τῶν
παλαιῶν ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης;
ἴσως οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ βούλει σε ὑπομνήσω;
Soc.Then you are quite right. Now can you tell me who, in former times, has proved himself a good lawgiver in regard to the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you cannot think of him: would you like me to remind you?
— ΕΤ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Com.Do by all means.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ὁ Μαρσύας λέγεται καὶ
τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ Ὄλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ;
Soc.Then is it Marsyas, by tradition, and his beloved Olympus, the Phrygian?
—ΕΤ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Com.That is true.
— ΣΩ.Τούτων δὴ καὶ τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι, καὶ μόνα
κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντας· καὶ ἔτι καὶ
318c νῦν μόνα λοιπά, ὡς θεῖα ὄντα.
Soc.And their flute-tunes also are most divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods; and to this day they only remain, as being divine.
—ΕΤ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Com.That is so.
—ΣΩ.Τίς δὲ
λέγεται τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλέων ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης γεγονέναι,
οὗ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὡς θεῖα ὄντα;
Soc.And who by tradition has shown himself a good lawgiver among the ancient kings, so that to this day his ordinances remain, as being divine?
—ΕΤ.Οὐκ ἐννοῶ.
Com.I cannot think.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ οἶσθα τίνες παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν
Ἑλλήνων;
Soc.Do you not know which of the Greeks use the most ancient laws?
ΕΤ.Ἆρα Λακεδαιμονίους λέγεις καὶ Λυκοῦργον τὸν νομοθέτην;
Com.Do you mean the Spartans, and Lycurgus the lawgiver?
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε οὐδέπω ἴσως ἔτη τριακόσια ἢ ὀλίγῳ
τούτων πλείω. ἀλλὰ τούτων τῶν νομίμων τὰ βέλτιστα πόθεν
318d ἥκει; οἶσθα;
Soc.Why, that is a matter, I daresay, of less than three hundred years ago, or but a little more. But whence is it that the best of those ordinances come? Do you know?
ΕΤ.Φασί γε ἐκ Κρήτης.
Com.From Crete, so they say.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οὗτοι παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν
Ἑλλήνων;
Soc.Then the people there use the most ancient laws in Greece?
ΕΤ.Ναί.
Com.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οἶσθα οὖν τίνες τούτων ἀγαθοὶ βασιλῆς ἦσαν;
Μίνως καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες, ὧν
οἵδε εἰσὶν οἱ νόμοι.
Soc.Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws were theirs.
ΕΤ.Ῥαδάμανθύν γέ φασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαιον ἄνδρα,
τὸν δὲ Μίνων ἄγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄδικον.
Com.Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.
ΣΩ.Ἀττικόν, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγεις μῦθον καὶ τραγικόν.
Soc.Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy.
318e ΕΤ.Τί δέ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω;
Com.What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?
ΣΩ.Οὔκουν ὑπό γε Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου· καίτοι γε
πιθανώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί, ὧν σὺ
ἀκούων ταῦτα λέγεις.
Soc.Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.
ΕΤ.Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν οὗτοι περὶ Μίνω λέγουσιν;
Com.Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?
ΣΩ.Ἐγὼ δή σοι ἐρῶ, ἵνα μὴ καὶ σὺ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ
ἀσεβῇς. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτι τούτου ἀσεβέστερόν ἐστιν οὐδ' ὅτι
χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ
ἐξαμαρτάνειν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς τοὺς θείους ἀνθρώπους· ἀλλὰ
πάνυ πολλὴν χρὴ προμήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἀεί, ὅταν μέλλῃς
319a ἄνδρα ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴπῃς. τούτου καὶ
ἕνεκα χρὴ μανθάνειν διαγιγνώσκειν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς
ἄνδρας. νεμεσᾷ γὰρ ὁ θεός, ὅταν τις ψέγῃ τὸν ἑαυτῷ
ὅμοιον ἢ ἐπαινῇ τὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως ἔχοντα· ἔστι δ' οὗτος
ὁ ἀγαθός. μὴ γάρ τι οἴου λίθους μὲν εἶναι ἱεροὺς καὶ ξύλα
καὶ ὄρνεα καὶ ὄφεις, ἀνθρώπους δὲ μή· ἀλλὰ πάντων
τούτων ἱερώτατόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀγαθός, καὶ μιαρώτατον
ὁ πονηρός.
Ἤδη οὖν καὶ περὶ Μίνω, ὡς αὐτὸν Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος
319b ἐγκωμιάζουσι, τούτου ἕνεκα φράσω, ἵνα μὴ ἄνθρωπος ὢν
ἀνθρώπου εἰς ἥρω Διὸς ὑὸν λόγῳ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς. Ὅμηρος
γὰρ περὶ Κρήτης λέγων ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἐν αὐτῇ εἰσιν
καὶ ἐνενήκοντα πόληες, τῇσι δέ, φησίν—
ἔνι Κνωσὸς μεγάλη πόλις, ἔνθα τε Μίνως
ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής.
319c ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο Ὁμήρου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Μίνων διὰ βραχέων
εἰρημένον, οἷον οὐδ' εἰς ἕνα τῶν ἡρώων ἐποίησεν Ὅμηρος.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς σοφιστής ἐστιν καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὕτη
παγκάλη ἐστί, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι δηλοῖ, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα.
λέγει γὰρ τὸν Μίνων συγγίγνεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔτει τῷ Διὶ ἐν
λόγοις καὶ φοιτᾶν παιδευθησόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ σοφιστοῦ ὄντος
τοῦ Διός. ὅτι οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ἀπένειμεν
Ὅμηρος τῶν ἡρώων, ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ἄλλῳ ἢ Μίνῳ,
319d τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἔπαινος θαυμαστός. καὶ Ὀδυσσείας ἐν Νεκυίᾳ
δικάζοντα χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα πεποίηκε τὸν Μίνων,
οὐ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν· Ῥαδάμανθυν δὲ οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα δικάζοντα
πεποίηκεν οὔτε συγγιγνόμενον τῷ Διὶ οὐδαμοῦ. διὰ
ταῦτά φημ' ἐγὼ Μίνων ἁπάντων μάλιστα ὑπὸ Ὁμήρου
ἐγκεκωμιάσθαι. τὸ γὰρ Διὸς ὄντα παῖδα μόνον ὑπὸ Διὸς
πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ ἔχει ὑπερβολὴν ἐπαίνου—τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει
τὸ ἔπος τὸ—
ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής,
319e συνουσιαστὴν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι τὸν Μίνων. οἱ γὰρ ὄαροι λόγοι
εἰσίν, καὶ ὀαριστὴς συνουσιαστής ἐστιν ἐν λόγοις—ἐφοίτα
οὖν δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον ὁ Μίνως, τὰ μὲν
μαθησόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀποδειξόμενος ἃ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐννεετηρίδι
ἐμεμαθήκει παρὰ τοῦ Διός. εἰσὶν δὲ οἳ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὸν
ὀαριστὴν συμπότην καὶ συμπαιστὴν εἶναι τοῦ Διός, ἀλλὰ
τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμηρίῳ χρῷτο ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγουσιν οἱ οὕτως
320a ὑπολαμβάνοντες· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ Ἑλλήνων
καὶ βαρβάρων, οὐκ ἔστιν οἵτινες ἀπέχονται συμποσίων
καὶ ταύτης τῆς παιδιᾶς, οὗ ἔστιν οἶνος, ἄλλοι ἢ Κρῆτες καὶ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι δεύτεροι, μαθόντες παρὰ Κρητῶν. ἐν Κρήτῃ
δὲ εἷς οὗτός ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων νόμων οὓς Μίνως ἔθηκε, μὴ
συμπίνειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς μέθην. καίτοι δῆλον ὅτι ἃ ἐνόμιζεν
καλὰ εἶναι, ταῦτα νόμιμα ἔθηκεν καὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις.
320b οὐ γάρ που, ὥσπερ γε φαῦλος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ Μίνως ἐνόμιζεν
μὲν ἕτερα, ἐποίει δὲ ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἐνόμιζεν· ἀλλὰ ἦν αὕτη
ἡ συνουσία ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διὰ λόγων ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ εἰς
ἀρετήν. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τούτους ἔθηκε τοῖς αὑτοῦ
πολίταις, δι' οὓς ἥ τε Κρήτη τὸν πάντα χρόνον εὐδαιμονεῖ
καὶ Λακεδαίμων, ἀφ' οὗ ἤρξατο τούτοις χρῆσθαι, ἅτε θείοις
οὖσιν.
Ῥαδάμανθυς δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ἦν ἀνήρ· ἐπεπαίδευτο γὰρ
320c ὑπὸ τοῦ Μίνω. ἐπεπαίδευτο μέντοι οὐχ ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν
τέχνην, ἀλλ' ὑπηρεσίαν τῇ βασιλικῇ, ὅσον ἐπιστατεῖν ἐν
τοῖς δικαστηρίοις· ὅθεν καὶ δικαστὴς ἀγαθὸς ἐλέχθη εἶναι.
νομοφύλακι γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ὁ Μίνως κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ, τὰ δὲ
κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην Κρήτην τῷ Τάλῳ. ὁ γὰρ Τάλως τρὶς
περιῄει τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ κατὰ τὰς κώμας, φυλάττων τοὺς νόμους
ἐν αὐταῖς, ἐν χαλκοῖς γραμματείοις ἔχων γεγραμμένους τοὺς
νόμους, ὅθεν χαλκοῦς ἐκλήθη. εἴρηκε δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος ἀδελφὰ
320d τούτων εἰς τὸν Μίνων. μνησθεὶς γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀνόματος
φησίν—
ὃς βασιλεύτατος γένετο θνητῶν βασιλήων,
καὶ πλείστων ἤνασσε περικτιόνων ἀνθρώπων,
Ζηνὸς ἔχων σκῆπτρον· τῷ καὶ πολέων βασίλευεν.
καὶ οὗτος λέγει τὸ τοῦ Διὸς σκῆπτρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὴν
παιδείαν τὴν τοῦ Διός, ᾗ εὔθυνε τὴν Κρήτην.
Soc.I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to blame or praise a man, so as not to speak incorrectly. For this reason you must learn to distinguish honest and dishonest men: for God feels resentment when one blames a man who is like himself, or praises a man who is the opposite; and the former is the good man. For you must not suppose that while stocks and stones and birds and snakes are sacred, men are not; nay, the good man is the most sacred of all these things, and the wicked man is the most defiled.
So if I now proceed to relate how Minos is eulogized by Homer and Hesiod, my purpose is to prevent you, a man sprung from a man, from making a mistake in regard to a hero who was the son of Zeus. For Homer, in telling of Crete that there were in it many men and ninety cities, says: And amongst them is the mighty city of Cnossos, where Minos was king, having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year. Hom. Od. 19.179 Now here in Homer we have a eulogy of Minos, briefly expressed, such as the poet never composed for a single one of the heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that sophistry is a highly honorable art, he makes plain in many other places, and particularly here. For he says that Minos consorted and discoursed with Zeus in the ninth year, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. And the fact that Homer assigned this privilege of having been educated by Zeus to no one among the heroes but Minos makes this a marvellous piece of praise. And in the Ghost-raising in the Odyssey he has described Minos as judging with a golden scepter in his hand, but not Rhadamanthus: Rhadamanthus he has neither described here as judging nor anywhere as consorting with Zeus; wherefore I say that Minos above all persons has been eulogized by Homer. For to have been the son of Zeus, and to have been the only one who was educated by Zeus, is praise unsurpassable.
For the meaning of the verse— he was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year” — Hom. Od. 19.179 is that Minos was a disciple of Zeus. For colloquies are discourses, and he who has colloquy is a disciple by means of discourse. So every ninth year Minos repaired to the cave of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show his knowledge of others that he had learnt from Zeus in the preceding nine years.

Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus: but one may take the following as a proof that they who suppose so are babblers. For of all the many nations of men, both Greek and foreign, the only people who refrain from drinking-bouts and the jesting that occurs where there is wine, are the Cretans, and after them the Spartans, who learnt it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of their laws which Minos ordained that they are not to drink with each other to intoxication. And yet it is evident that the things he thought honorable were what he ordained as lawful for his people as well. For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, think one thing and do another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education in virtue. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws, which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine.
Rhadamanthus was a good man indeed, for he had been educated by Minos; he had, however, been educated, not in the whole of the kingly art, but in one subsidiary to the kingly, enough for presiding in law courts; so that he was spoken of as a good judge. For Minos used him as guardian of the law in the city, and Talos as the same for the rest of Crete. For Talos thrice a year made a round of the villages, guarding the laws in them, by holding their laws inscribed on brazen tablets, which gave him his name of brazen. And what Hesiod also has said of Minos is akin to this. For after mentioning him by name he remarks— Who was most kingly of mortal kings, and lorded it over more neighboring folk than any, holding the scepter of Zeus: therewith it was that he ruled the cities as king. Hes. Fr. 144And by the scepter of Zeus he means nothing else than the education that he had of Zeus, whereby he directed Crete.

ΕΤ.Διὰ τί οὖν ποτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη ἡ φήμη κατεσκέδασται
320e τοῦ Μίνω ὡς ἀπαιδεύτου τινὸς καὶ χαλεποῦ ὄντος;
Com.Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated and harsh-tempered person?
ΣΩ.Δι' ὃ καὶ σύ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς, εὐλαβήσῃ,
καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ἀνὴρ ὅτῳ μέλει τοῦ εὐδόκιμον εἶναι, μηδέποτε
ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ποιητικῷ μηδενί. οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα
δύνανται εἰς δόξαν, ἐφ' ὁπότερα ἂν ποιῶσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους,
ἢ εὐλογοῦντες ἢ κακηγοροῦντες. ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐξήμαρτεν
ὁ Μίνως, πολεμήσας τῇδε τῇ πόλει, ἐν ᾗ ἄλλη τε πολλὴ
σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ποιηταὶ παντοδαποὶ τῆς τε ἄλλης ποιήσεως
321a καὶ τραγῳδίας. ἡ δὲ τραγῳδία ἐστὶν παλαιὸν ἐνθάδε, οὐχ
ὡς οἴονται ἀπὸ Θέσπιδος ἀρξαμένη οὐδ' ἀπὸ Φρυνίχου, ἀλλ'
εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι, πάνυ παλαιὸν αὐτὸ εὑρήσεις ὂν τῆσδε
τῆς πόλεως εὕρημα. ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως δημοτερπέστατόν
τε καὶ ψυχαγωγικώτατον ἡ τραγῳδία· ἐν ᾗ δὴ καὶ ἐντείνοντες
ἡμεῖς τὸν Μίνων τιμωρούμεθα ἀνθ' ὧν ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασε τοὺς
δασμοὺς τελεῖν ἐκείνους. τοῦτο οὖν ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως,
ἀπεχθόμενος ἡμῖν, ὅθεν δή, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, κακοδοξότερος
321b γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἀγαθὸς ἦν καὶ νόμιμος, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, νομεὺς ἀγαθός, τοῦτο μέγιστον σημεῖον,
ὅτι ἀκίνητοι αὐτοῦ οἱ νόμοι εἰσίν, ἅτε τοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως
οἰκήσεως ἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
Soc.Because of something that will make both you, if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarreling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy. Now tragedy is a thing of ancient standing here; it did not begin, as people suppose, from Thespis or from Phrynicus, but if you will reflect, you will find it is a very ancient invention of our city. Tragedy is the most popularly delightful and soul-enthralling branch of poetry: in it, accordingly, we get Minos on the rack of verse,, and thus avenge ourselves for that tribute which he compelled us to pay This, then, was the mistake that Minos made—his quarrel with us—and hence it is that, as you said in your question, he has fallen more and more into evil repute. For that he was a good and law-abiding person, as we stated in what went before—a good apportioner—is most convincingly shown by the fact the his laws are unshaken, since they were made by one who discovered aright the truth of reality in regard to the management of a state.
ΕΤ.Δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι.
Com.In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσί σοι παλαιοτάτοις
Κρῆτες οἱ Μίνω καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθυος πολῖται νόμοις
χρῆσθαι;
Soc.Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?
ΕΤ.Φαίνονται.
Com.I do.
ΣΩ.Οὗτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγόνασιν,
321c νομῆς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος
ἔφη ποιμένα λαῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν στρατηγόν.
Soc.So these have shown themselves the best lawgivers among men of ancient times— apportioners and shepherds of men; just as Homer called the good general a shepherd of the folk.
ΕΤ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Com.Quite so, indeed.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου· εἴ τις ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο, ὁ τῷ
σώματι ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς τί ἐστιν ταῦτα ἃ
διανέμων ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, εἴποιμεν ἂν καλῶς
τε καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι τροφήν τε καὶ πόνους,
τῇ μὲν αὔξων, τοῖς δὲ γυμνάζων καὶ συνιστὰς τὸ σῶμα αὐτό.
Soc.Come then, in good friendship’s name: if someone should ask us what it is that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to it when he makes it better, we should say, if we were to make a correct and brief answer, that it was food and labor; the former to strengthen, and the latter to exercise and brace it.
ΕΤ.Ὀρθῶς γε.
Com.And we should be right.
321d ΣΩ.Εἰ οὖν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, "Τί δὲ δή ποτε
ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν, <ἃ> ὁ ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης τε καὶ νομεὺς διανέμων
ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βελτίω αὐτὴν ποιεῖ;" τί ἂν ἀποκρινάμενοι
οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθεῖμεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας
αὑτῶν;
Soc.And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better?—what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?
ΕΤ.Οὐκέτι τοῦτ' ἔχω εἰπεῖν.
Com.This time I am unable to say.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν
ἑκατέρου, τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς φαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας, ἐν οἷς
αὐταῖς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φλαῦρον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ
σώματος καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐσκέφθαι.
Soc.But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and rest.