Burnet (OCT, 1903) · Fowler (1926)
Fowler (1926)
281a ΣΩ.Ἱππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ σοφός· ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν
κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.
Soc.Hippias, beautiful and wise, what a long time it is since you have put in at the port of Athens!
ΙΠ.Οὐ γὰρ σχολή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἡ γὰρ Ἦλις ὅταν τι
δέηται διαπράξασθαι πρός τινα τῶν πόλεων, ἀεὶ ἐπὶ πρῶτον
ἐμὲ ἔρχεται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱρουμένη πρεσβευτήν, ἡγουμένη
δικαστὴν καὶ ἄγγελον ἱκανώτατον εἶναι τῶν λόγων οἳ ἂν
281b παρὰ τῶν πόλεων ἑκάστων λέγωνται. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν
καὶ εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπρέσβευσα, πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ περὶ
πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα· διὸ δή, ὃ σὺ
ἐρωτᾷς, οὐ θαμίζω εἰς τούσδε τοὺς τόπους.
Hipp.I am too busy, Socrates. For whenever Elis needs to have any business transacted with any of the states, she always comes to me first of her citizens and chooses me as envoy, thinking that I am the ablest judge and messenger of the words that are spoken by the several states. So I have often gone as envoy to other states, but most often and concerning the most numerous and important matters to Lacedaemon. For that reason, then, since you ask me, I do not often come to this neighborhood.
ΣΩ.Τοιοῦτον μέντοι, ὦ Ἱππία, ἔστι τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
σοφόν τε καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα εἶναι. σὺ γὰρ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἱκανὸς
εἶ παρὰ τῶν νέων πολλὰ χρήματα λαμβάνων ἔτι πλείω
281c ὠφελεῖν ὧν λαμβάνεις, καὶ αὖ δημοσίᾳ τὴν σαυτοῦ πόλιν
ἱκανὸς εὐεργετεῖν, ὥσπερ χρὴ τὸν μέλλοντα μὴ καταφρονήσεσθαι
ἀλλ' εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς. ἀτάρ, ὦ Ἱππία,
τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα
λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, Πιττακοῦ τε καὶ Βίαντος καὶ τῶν ἀμφὶ
τὸν Μιλήσιον Θαλῆν καὶ ἔτι τῶν ὕστερον μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου,
ὡς ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν
πολιτικῶν πράξεων;
Soc.That’s what it is, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect man! For you are both in your private capacity able to earn much money from the young and to confer upon them still greater benefits than you receive, and in public affairs you are able to benefit your own state, as a man must who is to be not despised but held in high repute among the many. And yet, Hippias, what in the world is the reason why those men of old whose names are called great in respect to wisdom—Pittacus, and Bias, and the Milesian Thales with his followers and also the later ones, down to Anaxagoras, are all, or most of them, found to refrain from affairs of state?
ΙΠ.Τί δ' οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀδύνατοι ἦσαν
281d καὶ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ἐξικνεῖσθαι φρονήσει ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, τά τε
κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια;
Hipp.What else do you suppose, Socrates, than that they were not able to compass by their wisdom both public and private matters?
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι ἐπιδεδώκασι
καὶ εἰσὶ παρὰ τοὺς νῦν δημιουργοὺς οἱ παλαιοὶ
φαῦλοι, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην
ἐπιδεδωκέναι φῶμεν καὶ εἶναι τῶν ἀρχαίων τοὺς περὶ τὴν
σοφίαν φαύλους πρὸς ὑμᾶς;
Soc.Then for Heaven’s sake, just as the other arts have progressed, and the ancients are of no account in comparison with the artisans of today, shall we say that your art also has progressed and those of the ancients who were concerned with wisdom are of no account in comparison with you?
ΙΠ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Hipp.Yes, you are quite right.
ΣΩ.Εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἱππία, ὁ Βίας ἀναβιοίη, γέλωτ'
282a ἂν ὄφλοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Δαίδαλόν φασιν οἱ
ἀνδριαντοποιοί, νῦν εἰ γενόμενος τοιαῦτ' ἐργάζοιτο οἷα ἦν
ἀφ' ὧν τοὔνομ' ἔσχεν, καταγέλαστον ἂν εἶναι.
Soc.Then, Hippias, if Bias were to come to life again now, he would be a laughing-stock in comparison with you, just as the sculptors say that Daedalus, if he were to be born now and were to create such works as those from which he got his reputation, would be ridiculous.
ΙΠ.Ἔστι μὲν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὡς σὺ λέγεις·
εἴωθα μέντοι ἔγωγε τοὺς παλαιούς τε καὶ προτέρους ἡμῶν
προτέρους τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγκωμιάζειν ἢ τοὺς νῦν, εὐλαβούμενος
μὲν φθόνον τῶν ζώντων, φοβούμενος δὲ μῆνιν τῶν
τετελευτηκότων.
Hipp.That, Socrates, is exactly as you say. I, however, am in the habit of praising the ancients and our predecessors rather than the men of the present day, and more greatly, as a precaution against the envy of the living and through fear of the wrath of those who are dead.
282b ΣΩ.Καλῶς γε σύ, ὦ Ἱππία, ὀνομάζων τε καὶ διανοούμενος,
ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς. συμμαρτυρῆσαι δέ σοι ἔχω ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγεις,
καὶ τῷ ὄντι ὑμῶν ἐπιδέδωκεν ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὰ δημόσια
πράττειν δύνασθαι μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων. Γοργίας τε γὰρ οὗτος
ὁ Λεοντῖνος σοφιστὴς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἴκοθεν πρεσβεύων,
ὡς ἱκανώτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν,
καὶ ἔν τε τῷ δήμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις
ποιούμενος καὶ συνὼν τοῖς νέοις χρήματα πολλὰ ἠργάσατο
282c καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὁ ἡμέτερος
ἑταῖρος Πρόδικος οὗτος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ
ἀφίκετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τελευταῖα ἔναγχος ἀφικόμενος δημοσίᾳ ἐκ
Κέω λέγων τ' ἐν τῇ βουλῇ πάνυ ηὐδοκίμησεν καὶ ἰδίᾳ
ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ τοῖς νέοις συνὼν χρήματα ἔλαβεν
θαυμαστὰ ὅσα. τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε
ἠξίωσεν ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι οὐδ' ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι
282d ἐν παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας· οὕτως
ἦσαν εὐήθεις καὶ ἐλελήθει αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον ὡς πολλοῦ
ἄξιον εἴη. τούτων δ' ἑκάτερος πλέον ἀργύριον ἀπὸ σοφίας
εἴργασται ἢ ἄλλος δημιουργὸς ἀφ' ἧστινος τέχνης· καὶ ἔτι
πρότερος τούτων Πρωταγόρας.
Soc.Yours, Hippias, is a most excellent way, at any rate, of speaking about them and of thinking, it seems to me and I can bear you witness that you speak the truth, and that your art really has progressed in the direction of ability to carry on public together with private affairs. For this man Gorgias, the sophist from Leontini, came here from home in the public capacity of envoy, as being best able of all the citizens of Leontini to attend to the interests of the community, and it was the general opinion that he spoke excellently in the public assembly, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he earned and received a great deal of money from this city; or, if you like, our friend here, Prodicus, often went to other places in a public capacity, and the last time, just lately, when he came here in a public capacity from Ceos, he gained great reputation by his speaking before the Council, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he received a marvellous sum of money; but none of those ancients ever thought fit to exact the money as payment for his wisdom or to give exhibitions among people of various places; so simple-minded were they, and so unconscious of the fact that money is of the greatest value. But either of these two has earned more money from his wisdom than any artisan from his art. And even before these Protagoras did so.
ΙΠ.Οὐδὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶσθα τῶν καλῶν περὶ τοῦτο.
εἰ γὰρ εἰδείης ὅσον ἀργύριον εἴργασμαι ἐγώ, θαυμάσαις ἄν·
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐῶ, ἀφικόμενος δέ ποτε εἰς Σικελίαν, Πρωταγόρου
282e αὐτόθι ἐπιδημοῦντος καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦντος καὶ πρεσβυτέρου
ὄντος πολὺ νεώτερος ὢν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάνυ πλέον ἢ πεντήκοντα
καὶ ἑκατὸν μνᾶς ἠργασάμην, καὶ ἐξ ἑνός γε χωρίου
πάνυ σμικροῦ, Ἰνυκοῦ, πλέον ἢ εἴκοσι μνᾶς· καὶ τοῦτο ἐλθὼν
οἴκαδε φέρων τῷ πατρὶ ἔδωκα, ὥστε ἐκεῖνον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
πολίτας θαυμάζειν τε καὶ ἐκπεπλῆχθαι. καὶ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι
ἐμὲ πλείω χρήματα εἰργάσθαι ἢ ἄλλους σύνδυο οὕστινας
βούλει τῶν σοφιστῶν.
Hipp.Why, Socrates, you know nothing of the beauties of this. For if you were to know how much money I have made, you would be amazed. I won’t mention the rest, but once, when I went to Sicily, although Protagoras was staying there and had a great reputation and was the older, I, who was much younger, made in a very short time more than one hundred and fifty minas, and in one very small place, Inycus, more than twenty minas; and when I came home, I took this and gave it to my father, so that he and the other citizens were overwhelmed with amazement. And I pretty well think I have made more money than any other two sophists together.
ΣΩ.Καλόν γε, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγεις καὶ μέγα τεκμήριον
283a σοφίας τῆς τε σεαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς
τοὺς ἀρχαίους ὅσον διαφέρουσι. τῶν γὰρ προτέρων [περὶ
Ἀναξαγόρου λέγεται] πολλὴ ἀμαθία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.
τοὐναντίον γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ φασὶ συμβῆναι ἢ ὑμῖν· καταλειφθέντων
γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλῶν χρημάτων καταμελῆσαι καὶ
ἀπολέσαι πάντα—οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι—λέγουσι
δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων τῶν παλαιῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. τοῦτο μὲν
οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καλὸν τεκμήριον ἀποφαίνειν περὶ σοφίας τῶν
283b νῦν πρὸς τοὺς προτέρους, καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ ὅτι τὸν σοφὸν
αὐτὸν αὑτῷ μάλιστα δεῖ σοφὸν εἶναι· τούτου δ' ὅρος ἐστὶν
ἄρα, ὃς ἂν πλεῖστον ἀργύριον ἐργάσηται. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν
ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ, σὺ αὐτὸς πόθεν πλεῖστον
ἀργύριον ἠργάσω τῶν πόλεων εἰς ἃς ἀφικνῇ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ
Λακεδαίμονος, οἷπερ καὶ πλειστάκις ἀφῖξαι;
Soc.That’s a fine thing you say, Hippias, and strong testimony to your wisdom and that of the men of today and to their great superiority to the ancients. For the earlier sophists of the school of Anaxagoras must have been very ignorant to judge from what is said, according to your view; for they say that what happened to Anaxagoras was the opposite of what happens to you; for though much money was left him, he neglected it and lost it all so senseless was his wisdom. And they tell similar tales about others among the ancients. So this seems to me fine testimony that you adduce for the wisdom of the men of today as compared with the earlier men, and many people agree with me that the wise man must be wise for himself especially ; and the test of this is, who makes the most money. Well, so much for that. But tell me this: at which of the cities that you go to did you make the most money? Or are we to take it that it was at Lacedaemon, where your visits have been most frequent?
ΙΠ.Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.No, by Zeus, it was not, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Πῶς φῄς; ἀλλ' ἐλάχιστον;
Soc.What’s that you say? But did you make least there?
283c ΙΠ.Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν τὸ παράπαν πώποτε.
Hipp.Why, I never made anything at all.
ΣΩ.Τέρας λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὦ Ἱππία. καί μοι
εἰπέ· πότερον ἡ σοφία ἡ σὴ οὐχ οἵα τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῇ
καὶ μανθάνοντας εἰς ἀρετὴν βελτίους ποιεῖν;
Soc.That is a prodigious marvel that you tell, Hippias; and say now: is not your wisdom such as to make those who are in contact with it and learn it, better men in respect to virtue?
—ΙΠ.Καὶ
πολύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.Yes, much better, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν Ἰνυκίνων
ὑεῖς οἷός τε ἦσθα ἀμείνους ποιῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ Σπαρτιατῶν
ἠδυνάτεις;
Soc.But you were able to make the sons of the Inycenes better, and had no power to improve the sons of the Spartans?
—ΙΠ.Πολλοῦ γε δέω.
Hipp.That is far from true.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ δῆτα Σικελιῶται
μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι, Λακεδαιμόνιοι
283d δ' οὔ;
Soc.Well, then, the Siceliotes desire to become better, and the Lacedaemonians do not?
—ΙΠ.Πάντως γέ που, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι.
Hipp.No certainly, Socrates, the Lacedaemonians also desire it.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν χρημάτων ἐνδείᾳ ἔφευγον τὴν σὴν
ὁμιλίαν;
Soc.Then it was for lack of money that they avoided intercourse with you?
—ΙΠ.Οὐ δῆτα, ἐπεὶ ἱκανὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστιν.
Hipp.Not at all, since they have plenty of money.
ΣΩ.Τί δῆτ' ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ ἔχοντες χρήματα,
καὶ σοῦ δυναμένου τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν, οὐ
πλήρη σε ἀργυρίου ἀπέπεμψαν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, μῶν μὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
σοῦ βέλτιον ἂν παιδεύσειαν τοὺς αὑτῶν παῖδας; ἢ
τοῦτο φῶμεν οὕτω, καὶ σὺ συγχωρεῖς;
Soc.What, then, could be the reason, that when they desired it and had money, and you had power to confer upon them the greatest benefits, they did not send you away loaded with money? But I see; perhaps the Lacedaemonians might educate their own children better than you? Shall we state it so, and do you agree?
283e ΙΠ.Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.
Hipp.Not in the least.
ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν τοὺς νέους οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦσθα πείθειν ἐν
Λακεδαίμονι ὡς σοὶ συνόντες πλέον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδιδοῖεν
ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνων πατέρας ἠδυνάτεις πείθειν ὅτι
σοὶ χρὴ παραδιδόναι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, εἴπερ τι
τῶν ὑέων κήδονται; οὐ γάρ που ἐφθόνουν γε τοῖς ἑαυτῶν
παισὶν ὡς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι.
Soc.Then were you not able to persuade the young men at Lacedaemon that they would make more progress towards virtue by associating with you than with their own people, or were you powerless to persuade their fathers that they ought rather to hand them over to you than to care for them themselves, if they are at all concerned for their sons? For surely they did not begrudge it to their children to become as good as possible.
ΙΠ.Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε φθονεῖν.
Hipp.I do not think they begrudged it.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὔνομός γ' ἡ Λακεδαίμων.
Soc.But certainly Lacedaemon is well governed.
—ΙΠ.Πῶς γὰρ
284a οὔ;
Hipp.Of course it is.
—ΣΩ.Ἐν δέ γε ταῖς εὐνόμοις πόλεσιν τιμιώτατον ἡ
ἀρετή.
Soc.And in well-governed states virtue is most highly honored.
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Σὺ δὲ ταύτην παραδιδόναι
ἄλλῳ κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων ἐπίστασαι.
Soc.And you know best of all men how to transmit that to another.
—ΙΠ.Καὶ πολύ γε,
ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.Much best, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Ὁ οὖν κάλλιστ' ἐπιστάμενος ἱππικὴν
παραδιδόναι ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μάλιστα
τιμῷτο καὶ πλεῖστα χρήματα λαμβάνοι, καὶ ἄλλοθι ὅπου
τοῦτο σπουδάζοιτο;
Soc.Well, he who knows best how to transmit horsemanship would be most honored in Thessaly of all parts of Greece and would receive most money—and anywhere else where horsemanship is a serious interest, would he not?
—ΙΠ.Εἰκός γε.
Hipp.Very likely.
—ΣΩ.Ὁ δὴ δυνάμενος
παραδιδόναι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια μαθήματα εἰς ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἐν
284b Λακεδαίμονι μάλιστα τιμήσεται καὶ πλεῖστα ἐργάσεται χρήματα,
ἂν βούληται, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἥτις τῶν Ἑλληνίδων
εὐνομεῖται; ἀλλ' ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἴει μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν
Ἰνυκῷ; ταῦτα πειθώμεθα, ὦ Ἱππία; ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ κελεύῃς,
πειστέον.
Soc.Then will not he who is able to transmit the doctrines that are of most value for the acquisition of virtue be most highly honored in Lacedaemon and make most money, if he so wishes, and in any other of the Greek states that is well governed? But do you, my friend, think he will fare better in Sicily and at Inycus? Are we to believe that, Hippias? For if you tell us to do so, we must believe it.
ΙΠ.Οὐ γὰρ πάτριον, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λακεδαιμονίοις κινεῖν
τοὺς νόμους, οὐδὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα παιδεύειν τοὺς ὑεῖς.
Hipp.Yes, for it is not the inherited usage of the Lacedaemonians to change their laws or to educate their children differently from what is customary.
ΣΩ.Πῶς λέγεις; Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐ πάτριον ὀρθῶς
284c πράττειν ἀλλ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν;
Soc.What? For the Lacedaemonians is it the hereditary usage not to act rightly, but to commit errors?
ΙΠ.Οὐκ ἂν φαίην ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.I wouldn’t say so, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ἂν πράττοιεν βέλτιον ἀλλὰ μὴ χεῖρον
παιδεύοντες τοὺς νέους;
Soc.Would they, then, not act rightly in educating the young men better, but not in educating them worse?
ΙΠ.Ὀρθῶς· ἀλλὰ ξενικὴν παίδευσιν οὐ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς
παιδεύειν, ἐπεὶ εὖ ἴσθι, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἐκεῖθεν χρήματα
ἔλαβεν πώποτε ἐπὶ παιδεύσει, καὶ ἐμὲ ἂν λαβεῖν πολὺ
μάλιστα—χαίρουσι γοῦν ἀκούοντες ἐμοῦ καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν—
ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, οὐ νόμος.
Hipp.Yes, they would; but it is not lawful for them to give them a foreign education; for you may be sure that if anybody had ever received money there in payment for education, I should have received by far the most; they certainly enjoy hearing me and they applaud me; but, as I say, it is not the law.
284d ΣΩ.Νόμον δὲ λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία, βλάβην πόλεως εἶναι ἢ
ὠφελίαν;
Soc.But, Hippias, do you say that law is an injury to the state, or a benefit?
—ΙΠ.Τίθεται μὲν οἶμαι ὠφελίας ἕνεκα, ἐνίοτε δὲ
καὶ βλάπτει, ἐὰν κακῶς τεθῇ ὁ νόμος.
Hipp.It is made, I think, with benefit in view, but sometimes, if the law is badly made, it is injurious.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ; οὐχ
ὡς ἀγαθὸν μέγιστον πόλει τίθενται τὸν νόμον οἱ τιθέμενοι;
καὶ ἄνευ τούτου μετὰ εὐνομίας ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖν;
Soc.Well, then, is it not true that those who make the law make it as the greatest good to the state, and that without this it is impossible to enjoy good government?
—ΙΠ.Ἀληθῆ
λέγεις.
Hipp.What you say is true.
—ΣΩ.Ὅταν ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ ἁμάρτωσιν οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες
τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι, νομίμου τε καὶ νόμου ἡμαρτήκασιν· ἢ
284e πῶς λέγεις;
Soc.Then, when those who make the laws miss the good, they have missed the lawful and the law; or what do you say?
—ΙΠ.Τῷ μὲν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως
ἔχει· οὐ μέντοι εἰώθασιν ἅνθρωποι ὀνομάζειν οὕτω.
Hipp.Speaking accurately, Socrates, that is true; however, men are not accustomed to think so.
Πότερον, ὦ Ἱππία, οἱ εἰδότες ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες;
Soc.The men who know, Hippias, or those who do not know?
—ΙΠ.Οἱ
πολλοί.
Hipp.The many.
—ΣΩ.Εἰσὶν δ' οὗτοι οἱ εἰδότες τἀληθές, οἱ πολλοί;
Soc.Are these, the many, those who know the truth?
—ΙΠ.Οὐ δῆτα.
Hipp.Certainly not.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μήν που οἵ γ' εἰδότες τὸ
ὠφελιμώτερον τοῦ ἀνωφελεστέρου νομιμώτερον ἡγοῦνται τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς;
Soc.But surely those who know, think that in truth for all men that which is more beneficial is more lawful than that which is less beneficial; or do you not agree?
—ΙΠ.Ναί,
συγχωρῶ, ὅτι γε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.
Hipp.Yes, I agree that they think it is so in truth.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἔστιν τε καὶ
ἔχει οὕτως ὡς οἱ εἰδότες ἡγοῦνται;
Soc.Well, it actually is as those who know think it is, is it not?
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἔστι δέ γε Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὠφελιμώτερον
285a τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ παίδευσιν, ξενικὴν οὖσαν, παιδεύεσθαι
μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἐπιχωρίαν.
Soc.But or the Lacedaemonians, as you say, it is more beneficial to be educated in your education, which is foreign, than in the local education.
—ΙΠ.Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω.
Hipp.Yes, and what I say is true.
Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὰ ὠφελιμώτερα νομιμώτερά ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο
λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία;
Soc.And do you say this also, Hippias, that beneficial things are more lawful?
—ΙΠ.Εἶπον γάρ.
Hipp.Yes, I said so.
—ΣΩ.Κατὰ τὸν σὸν
ἄρα λόγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ὑέσιν ὑπὸ Ἱππίου παιδεύεσθαι
νομιμώτερόν ἐστιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πατέρων ἀνομώτερον, εἴπερ τῷ
ὄντι ὑπὸ σοῦ πλείω ὠφεληθήσονται.
Soc.Then, according to what you say, it is more lawful for the sons of the Lacedaemonians to be educated by Hippias and less lawful for them to be educated by their fathers, if in reality they will be more benefited by you.
—ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠφεληθήσονται,
285b ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.But certainly they will be benefited, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Παρανομοῦσιν ἄρα Λακεδαιμόνιοι
οὐ διδόντες σοι χρυσίον καὶ ἐπιτρέποντες τοὺς αὑτῶν
ὑεῖς.
Soc.Then the Lacedaemonians in not giving you money and entrusting their sons to you , act contrary to law.
—ΙΠ.Συγχωρῶ ταῦτα· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὸν λόγον πρὸς
ἐμοῦ λέγειν, καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦσθαι.
Hipp.I agree to that; for you seem to be making your argument in my favour, and there is no need of my opposing it.
ΣΩ.Παρανόμους μὲν δή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τοὺς Λάκωνας εὑρίσκομεν,
καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς τὰ μέγιστα, τοὺς νομιμωτάτους δοκοῦντας
εἶναι. ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ δή σε πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ χαίρουσιν
ἀκούοντες ποῖα; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἐκεῖνα ἃ σὺ κάλλιστα
285c ἐπίστασαι, τὰ περὶ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη;
Soc.Then my friends, we find that the Lacedaemonians are law-breakers, and that too in the most important affairs—they who are regarded as the most law-abiding of men. But then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, what sort of discourses are those for which they applaud you and which they enjoy hearing? Or are they evidently those which you understand most admirably, those about the stars and the phenomena of the heavens?
— ΙΠ.Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν· ταῦτά γε οὐδ' ἀνέχονται.
Hipp.Not in the least; they won’t even endure those.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ
περὶ γεωμετρίας τι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες;
Soc.But they enjoy hearing about geometry?
—ΙΠ.Οὐδαμῶς,
ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἀριθμεῖν ἐκείνων γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πολλοὶ
ἐπίστανται.
Hipp.Not at all, since one might say that many of them do not even know how to count.
—ΣΩ.Πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν περί γε λογισμῶν
ἀνέχεσθαί σου ἐπιδεικνυμένου.
Soc.Then they are far from enduring a lecture by you on the processes of thought.
—ΙΠ.Πολλοῦ μέντοι νὴ Δία.
Hipp.Far from it indeed, by Zeus.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ δῆτα ἐκεῖνα ἃ σὺ ἀκριβέστατα ἐπίστασαι
285d ἀνθρώπων διαιρεῖν, περί τε γραμμάτων δυνάμεως καὶ συλλαβῶν
καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν;
Soc.Well, then, those matters which you of all men know best how to discuss, concerning the value of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies?
—ΙΠ.Ποίων, ὠγαθέ,
ἁρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων;
Hipp.Harmonies indeed, my good fellow, and letters!
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ τί μήν ἐστιν ἃ ἡδέως
σου ἀκροῶνται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν; αὐτός μοι εἰπέ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγὼ
οὐχ εὑρίσκω.
Soc.But then what are the things about which they like to listen to you and which they applaud? Tell me yourself, for I cannot discover them.
ΙΠ.Περὶ τῶν γενῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τε ἡρώων καὶ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν κατοικίσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκτίσθησαν
αἱ πόλεις, καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἥδιστα
285e ἀκροῶνται, ὥστ' ἔγωγε δι' αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκασμαι ἐκμεμαθηκέναι
τε καὶ ἐκμεμελετηκέναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
Hipp.They are very fond of hearing about the genealogies of heroes and men, Socrates, and the foundations of cities in ancient times and, in short, about antiquity in general, so that for their sake I have been obliged to learn all that sort of thing by heart and practise it thoroughly.
ΣΩ.Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ὦ Ἱππία, ηὐτύχηκάς γε ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι
οὐ χαίρουσιν ἄν τις αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ Σόλωνος τοὺς
ἄρχοντας τοὺς ἡμετέρους καταλέγῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, πράγματ' ἂν
εἶχες ἐκμανθάνων.
Soc.By Zeus, Hippias, it is lucky for you that the Lacedaemonians do not enjoy hearing one recite the list of our archons from Solon’s time; if they did, you would have trouble in learning it by heart.
ΙΠ.Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἅπαξ ἀκούσας πεντήκοντα
ὀνόματα ἀπομνημονεύσω.
Hipp.How so, Socrates? After hearing them once, I can remember fifty names.
ΣΩ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐνενόησα ὅτι τὸ
μνημονικὸν ἔχεις· ὥστ' ἐννοῶ ὅτι εἰκότως σοι χαίρουσιν
286a οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἅτε πολλὰ εἰδότι, καὶ χρῶνται ὥσπερ ταῖς
πρεσβύτισιν οἱ παῖδες πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως μυθολογῆσαι.
Soc.True, but I did not understand that you possess the science of memory; and so I understand that the Lacedaemonians naturally enjoy you as one who knows many things, and they make use of you as children make use of old women, to tell stories agreeably.
ΙΠ.Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε ἐπιτηδευμάτων
καλῶν καὶ ἔναγχος αὐτόθι ηὐδοκίμησα διεξιὼν ἃ χρὴ τὸν
νέον ἐπιτηδεύειν. ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν παγκάλως λόγος
συγκείμενος, καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι·
πρόσχημα δέ μοί ἐστι καὶ ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις τοῦ λόγου.
ἐπειδὴ ἡ Τροία ἥλω, λέγει ὁ λόγος ὅτι Νεοπτόλεμος
286b Νέστορα ἔροιτο ποῖά ἐστι καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ ἄν τις
ἐπιτηδεύσας νέος ὢν εὐδοκιμώτατος γένοιτο· μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ
λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Νέστωρ καὶ ὑποτιθέμενος αὐτῷ πάμπολλα
νόμιμα καὶ πάγκαλα. τοῦτον δὴ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐπεδειξάμην καὶ
ἐνθάδε μέλλω ἐπιδεικνύναι εἰς τρίτην ἡμέραν, ἐν τῷ Φειδοστράτου
διδασκαλείῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια ἀκοῆς·
ἐδεήθη γάρ μου Εὔδικος ὁ Ἀπημάντου. ἀλλ' ὅπως παρέσῃ
286c καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλους ἄξεις, οἵτινες ἱκανοὶ ἀκούσαντες κρῖναι
τὰ λεγόμενα.
Hipp.And by Zeus, Socrates, I have just lately gained reputation there by telling about noble or beautiful pursuits, recounting what those of a young man should be. For I have a very beautiful discourse composed about them, well arranged in its words and also in other respects. And the plan of the discourse, and its beginning, is something like this: After the fall of Troy, the story goes that Neoptolemus asked Nestor what the noble and beautiful pursuits were, by following which a young man would become most famous; so after that we have Nestor speaking and suggesting to him very many lawful and most beautiful pursuits. That discourse, then, I delivered there and intend to deliver here the day after tomorrow in Pheidostratus’s schoolroom, with many other things worth hearing; for Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, asked me to do so. Now be sure to be there yourself and to bring others who are able to judge of discourses that they hear.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, ὦ Ἱππία. νυνὶ
μέντοι βραχύ τί μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπόκριναι· καὶ γάρ με εἰς
καλὸν ὑπέμνησας. ἔναγχος γάρ τις, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰς ἀπορίαν
με κατέβαλεν ἐν λόγοις τισὶ τὰ μὲν ψέγοντα ὡς αἰσχρά,
τὰ δ' ἐπαινοῦντα ὡς καλά, οὕτω πως ἐρόμενος καὶ μάλα
ὑβριστικῶς· "Πόθεν δέ μοι σύ," ἔφη, "ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶσθα
286d ὁποῖα καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά; ἐπεὶ φέρε, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν τί ἐστι
τὸ καλόν;" καὶ ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν φαυλότητα ἠπορούμην τε
καὶ οὐκ εἶχον αὐτῷ κατὰ τρόπον ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἀπιὼν οὖν
ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας ἐμαυτῷ τε ὠργιζόμην καὶ ὠνείδιζον, καὶ
ἠπείλουν, ὁπότε πρῶτον ὑμῶν τῳ τῶν σοφῶν ἐντύχοιμι,
ἀκούσας καὶ μαθὼν καὶ ἐκμελετήσας ἰέναι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν
ἐρωτήσαντα, ἀναμαχούμενος τὸν λόγον. νῦν οὖν, ὃ λέγω,
εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις, καί με δίδαξον ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι
286e ἐστί, καὶ πειρῶ μοι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀκριβῶς εἰπεῖν ἀποκρινόμενος,
μὴ ἐξελεγχθεὶς τὸ δεύτερον αὖθις γέλωτα ὄφλω.
οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου σαφῶς, καὶ σμικρόν που τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη
μάθημα ὧν σὺ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπίστασαι.
Soc.Well, that shall be done, God willing, Hippias. Now, however, give me a brief answer to a question about your discourse, for you reminded me of the beautiful just at the right moment. For recently, my most excellent friend, as I was finding fault with some things in certain speeches as ugly and praising other things as beautiful, a man threw me into confusion by questioning me very insolently somewhat after this fashion: How, if you please, do you know, Socrates, said he, what sort of things are beautiful and ugly? For, come now, could you tell me what the beautiful is? And I, being of no account, was at a loss and could not answer him properly; and so, as I was going away from the company, I was angry with myself and reproached myself, and threatened that the first time I met one of you wise men, I would hear and learn and practise and then go back to the man who questioned me to renew the wordy strife. So now, as I say, you have come at the right moment; just teach me satisfactorily what the absolute beautiful is, and try in replying to speak as accurately as possible, that I may not be confuted a second time and be made ridiculous again. For you doubtless know clearly, and this would doubtless be but a small example of your wide learning.
ΙΠ.Σμικρὸν μέντοι νὴ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδενὸς
ἄξιον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.
Hipp.Yes, surely, by Zeus, a small one, Socrates, and, I may say, of no value.
ΣΩ.Ῥᾳδίως ἄρα μαθήσομαι καὶ οὐδείς με ἐξελέγξει ἔτι.
Soc.Then I shall learn it easily, and nobody will confute me any more.
ΙΠ.Οὐδεὶς μέντοι· φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα
287a καὶ ἰδιωτικόν.
Hipp.Nobody, surely; for in that case my profession would be worthless and ordinary.
ΣΩ.Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία, εἰ χειρωσόμεθα
τὸν ἄνδρα. ἀτὰρ μή τι κωλύω μιμούμενος ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον,
ἐὰν σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι τῶν λόγων, ἵνα ὅτι
μάλιστά με ἐκμελετήσῃς; σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔμπειρός εἰμι τῶν
ἀντιλήψεων. εἰ οὖν μή τί σοι διαφέρει, βούλομαι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι,
ἵν' ἐρρωμενέστερον μάθω.
Soc.That is good, by Hera, Hippias, if we are to worst the fellow. But may I without hindering you imitate him, and when you answer, take exception to what you say, in order that you may give me as much practice as possible? For I am more or less experienced in taking exceptions. So, if it is all the same to you, I wish to take exceptions, that I may learn more vigorously.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλ' ἀντιλαμβάνου. καὶ γάρ, ὃ νυνδὴ εἶπον, οὐ
287b μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου χαλεπώτερα
ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐγώ σε διδάξαιμι, ὥστε μηδένα ἀνθρώπων
δύνασθαί σε ἐξελέγχειν.
Hipp.Oh yes, take exceptions. For, as I said just now, the question is no great matter, but I could teach you to answer much harder ones than this, so that nobody in the world could confute you.
ΣΩ.Φεῦ ὡς εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἄγ', ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ κελεύεις,
φέρε ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκεῖνος γενόμενος πειρῶμαί σε ἐρωτᾶν. εἰ
γὰρ δὴ αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐπιδείξαις ὃν φῄς, τὸν περὶ
τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἀκούσας, ἐπειδὴ παύσαιο λέγων,
ἔροιτ' ἂν οὐ περὶ ἄλλου πρότερον ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ—ἔθος
287c γάρ τι τοῦτ' ἔχει—καὶ εἴποι ἄν· "Ὦ ξένε Ἠλεῖε, ἆρ' οὐ
δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι;" ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Ἱππία,
ὡς ἐκείνου ἐρωτῶντος.
Soc.Oh how good that is! But come, since you tell me to do so, now let me try to play that man’s part, so far as possible, and ask you questions. For if you were to deliver for him this discourse that you mention, the one about beautiful pursuits, when he had heard it, after you had stopped speaking, the very first thing he would ask about would be the beautiful; for he has that sort of habit, and he would say, Stranger from Elis, is it not by justice that the just are just? So answer, Hippias, as though he were asking the question.
—ΙΠ.Ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι δικαιοσύνῃ.
Hipp.I shall answer that it is by justice.
—ΣΩ."Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τι τοῦτο, ἡ δικαιοσύνη;"
Soc.Then this—I mean justice—is something?
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ
γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
—ΣΩ."Οὐκοῦν καὶ σοφίᾳ οἱ σοφοί εἰσι σοφοὶ καὶ τῷ
ἀγαθῷ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἀγαθά;"
Soc.Then, too, by wisdom the wise are wise and by the good all things are good, are they not?
—ΙΠ.Πῶς δ' οὔ;
Hipp.Of course.
—ΣΩ."Οὖσί
γέ τισι τούτοις· οὐ γὰρ δήπου μὴ οὖσί γε."
Soc.And justice, wisdom, and so forth are something; for the just, wise, and so forth would not be such by them, if they were not something.
—ΙΠ.Οὖσι
μέντοι.
Hipp.To be sure, they are something.
—ΣΩ."Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ πάντα τῷ καλῷ
287d ἐστι καλά;"
Soc.Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by the beautiful?
—ΙΠ.Ναί, τῷ καλῷ.
Hipp.Yes, by the beautiful.
—ΣΩ."Ὄντι γέ τινι
τούτῳ;"
Soc.By the beautiful, which is something?
—ΙΠ.Ὄντι· ἀλλὰ τί γὰρ μέλλει;
Hipp.Yes, for what alternative is there?
—ΣΩ."Εἰπὲ
δή, ὦ ξένε," φήσει, "τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν;"
Soc.Tell me, then, stranger, he will say, what is this, the beautiful?
ΙΠ.Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν δεῖται
πυθέσθαι τί ἐστι καλόν;
Hipp.Well, Socrates, does he who asks this question want to find out anything else than what is beautiful?
ΣΩ.Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἱππία.
Soc.I do not think that is what he wants to find out, but what the beautiful is.
ΙΠ.Καὶ τί διαφέρει τοῦτ' ἐκείνου;
Hipp.And what difference is there between the two?
ΣΩ.Οὐδέν σοι δοκεῖ;
Soc.Do you think there is none?
ΙΠ.Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει.
Hipp.Yes, for there is no difference.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δῆλον ὅτι σὺ κάλλιον οἶσθα. ὅμως
δέ, ὠγαθέ, ἄθρει· ἐρωτᾷ γάρ σε οὐ τί ἐστι καλόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι
287e ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.
Soc.Well, surely it is plain that you know best; but still, my good friend, consider; for he asked you, not what is beautiful, but what the beautiful is.
ΙΠ.Μανθάνω, ὠγαθέ, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γε αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐστι
τὸ καλόν, καὶ οὐ μή ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ. ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
εὖ ἴσθι, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, παρθένος καλὴ καλόν.
Hipp.I understand, my good friend, and I will answer and tell him what the beautiful is, and I shall never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if I must speak the truth, a beautiful maiden is beautiful.
ΣΩ.Καλῶς γε, ὦ Ἱππία, νὴ τὸν κύνα καὶ εὐδόξως
ἀπεκρίνω. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, τὸ
288a ἐρωτώμενόν τε ἀποκεκριμένος ἔσομαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, καὶ οὐ μή
ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ;
Soc.Beautifully answered, Hippias, by the dog, and notably! Then if I give this answer, I shall have answered the question that was asked, and shall have answered it correctly, and shall never be confuted?
ΙΠ.Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐλεγχθείης, ὅ γε πᾶσιν
δοκεῖ καὶ πάντες σοι μαρτυρήσουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ὅτι ὀρθῶς
λέγεις;
Hipp.Yes, for how could you, Socrates, be confuted, when you say what everybody thinks, and when all who hear it will bear witness that what you say is correct?
ΣΩ.Εἶεν· πάνυ μὲν οὖν. φέρε δή, ὦ Ἱππία, πρὸς
ἐμαυτὸν ἀναλάβω ὃ λέγεις. ὁ μὲν ἐρήσεταί με οὑτωσί πως·
"Ἴθι μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι· ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φῂς καλὰ
εἶναι, εἰ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλά;" ἐγὼ
δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλόν, ἔστι δι' ὃ ταῦτ' ἂν
εἴη καλά;
Soc.Very well; certainly. Come, then, Hippias, let me rehearse to myself what you say. The man will question me in some such fashion as this: Come Socrates, answer me. All these things which you say are beautiful, if the absolute beautiful is anything, would be beautiful? And I shall say that if a beautiful maiden is beautiful, there is something by reason of which these things would be beautiful.
288b ΙΠ.Οἴει οὖν ἔτι αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρήσειν σε ἐλέγχειν ὡς οὐ
καλόν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις, ἢ ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσῃ, οὐ καταγέλαστον
ἔσεσθαι;
Hipp.Do you think, then, that he will still attempt to refute you and to show that what you say is not beautiful, or, if he does attempt it, that he will not be ridiculous?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσει, ὦ θαυμάσιε, εὖ οἶδα· εἰ δὲ
ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει. ἃ μέντοι ἐρεῖ,
ἐθέλω σοι λέγειν.
Soc.That he will attempt it, my admirable friend, I am sure but whether the attempt will make him ridiculous, the event will show. However, I should like to tell you what he will ask.
ΙΠ.Λέγε δή.
Hipp.Do so.
ΣΩ."Ὡς γλυκὺς εἶ," φήσει, "ὦ Σώκρατες. θήλεια δὲ
ἵππος καλὴ οὐ καλόν, ἣν καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ ἐπῄνεσεν;"
288c τί φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία; ἄλλο τι ἢ φῶμεν καὶ τὴν ἵππον καλὸν
εἶναι, τήν γε καλήν; πῶς γὰρ ἂν τολμῷμεν ἔξαρνοι εἶναι τὸ
καλὸν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;
Soc.How charming you are, Socrates! he will say. But is not a beautiful mare beautiful, which even the god praised in his oracle? What shall we say, Hippias? Shall we not say that the mare is beautiful, I mean the beautiful mare? For how could we dare to deny that the beautiful thing is beautiful?
ΙΠ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεί τοι καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ
ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν· πάγκαλαι γὰρ παρ' ἡμῖν ἵπποι γίγνονται.
Hipp.Quite true, Socrates for what the god said is quite correct, too; for very beautiful mares are bred in our country.
ΣΩ."Εἶεν," φήσει δή· "τί δὲ λύρα καλή; οὐ καλόν;"
φῶμεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Soc.Very well, he will say, and how about a beautiful lyre? Is it not beautiful? Shall we agree, Hippias?
ΙΠ.Ναί.
Hipp.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ἐρεῖ τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος, σχεδόν τι εὖ οἶδα
ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου τεκμαιρόμενος· "Ὦ βέλτιστε σύ, τί δὲ χύτρα
καλή; οὐ καλὸν ἄρα;"
Soc.After this, then, the man will ask, I am sure, judging by his character: You most excellent man, how about a beautiful pot? Is it, then, not beautiful?
288d ΙΠ.Ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; ὡς ἀπαίδευτός
τις ὃς οὕτω φαῦλα ὀνόματα ὀνομάζειν τολμᾷ ἐν
σεμνῷ πράγματι.
Hipp.Socrates, who is the fellow? What an uncultivated person, who has the face to mention such worthless things in a dignified discussion!
ΣΩ.Τοιοῦτός τις, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός,
οὐδὲν ἄλλο φροντίζων ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀποκριτέον
τῷ ἀνδρί, καὶ ἔγωγε προαποφαίνομαι· εἴπερ ἡ χύτρα κεκεραμευμένη
εἴη ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ κεραμέως λεία καὶ στρογγύλη καὶ
καλῶς ὠπτημένη, οἷαι τῶν καλῶν χυτρῶν εἰσί τινες δίωτοι,
τῶν ἓξ χοᾶς χωρουσῶν, πάγκαλαι, εἰ τοιαύτην ἐρωτῴη
288e χύτραν, καλὴν ὁμολογητέον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαῖμεν καλὸν
ὂν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;
Soc.That’s the kind of person he is, Hippias, not elegant, but vulgar, thinking of nothing but the truth. But nevertheless the man must be answered, and I will declare my opinion beforehand: if the pot were made by a good potter, were smooth and round and well fired, as are some of the two-handled pots, those that hold six choes, very beautiful ones— if that were the kind of pot he asked about, we must agree that it is beautiful; for how could we say that being beautiful it is not beautiful?
ΙΠ.Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.We could not at all, Socrates.
ΣΩ."Οὐκοῦν καὶ χύτρα," φήσει, "καλὴ καλόν; ἀποκρίνου."
Soc.Then, he will say, a beautiful pot also is beautiful, is it not? Answer.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλ' οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχει, οἶμαι· καλὸν μὲν καὶ
τοῦτο τὸ σκεῦός ἐστι καλῶς εἰργασμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο
οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξιον κρίνειν ὡς ὂν καλὸν πρὸς ἵππον τε καὶ
παρθένον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ καλά.
Hipp.Well, Socrates, it is like this, I think. This utensil, when well wrought, is beautiful, but absolutely considered it does not deserve to be regarded as beautiful in comparison with a mare and a maiden and all the beautiful things.
289a ΣΩ.Εἶεν· μανθάνω, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς ἄρα χρὴ ἀντιλέγειν
πρὸς τὸν ταῦτα ἐρωτῶντα τάδε· Ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι τὸ
τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἄρα "Πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς
ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν," καὶ χυτρῶν ἡ καλλίστη
αἰσχρὰ παρθένων γένει συμβάλλειν, ὥς φησιν Ἱππίας ὁ
σοφός. οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ Ἱππία;
Soc.Very well I understand, Hippias, that the proper reply to him who asks these questions is this: Sir, you are not aware that the saying of Heracleitus is good, that Ôthe most beautiful of monkeys is ugly compared with the race of man,Õ and the most beautiful of pots is ugly compared with the race of maidens, as Hippias the wise man says. Is it not so, Hippias?
ΙΠ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω.
Hipp.Certainly, Socrates; you replied rightly.
ΣΩ.Ἄκουε δή. μετὰ τοῦτο γὰρ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι φήσει· "Τί
δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸ τῶν παρθένων γένος θεῶν γένει ἄν τις
289b συμβάλλῃ, οὐ ταὐτὸν πείσεται ὅπερ τὸ τῶν χυτρῶν τῷ τῶν
παρθένων συμβαλλόμενον; οὐχ ἡ καλλίστη παρθένος αἰσχρὰ
φανεῖται; ἢ οὐ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγει, ὃν σὺ
ἐπάγῃ, ὅτι "Ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος
φανεῖται καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν;"
ὁμολογήσωμεν, Ἱππία, τὴν καλλίστην παρθένον πρὸς θεῶν
γένος αἰσχρὰν εἶναι;
Soc.Listen then. For I am sure that after this he will say: Yes, but, Socrates, if we compare maidens with gods, will not the same thing happen to them that happened to pots when compared with maidens? Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? Or does not Heracleitus, whom you cite, mean just this, that the wisest of men, if compared with a god, will appear a monkey, both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else? Shall we agree, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly if compared with the gods?
ΙΠ.Τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀντείποι τούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Hipp.Yes, for who would deny that, Socrates?
289c ΣΩ.Ἂν τοίνυν ταῦτα ὁμολογήσωμεν, γελάσεταί τε καὶ
ἐρεῖ· "Ὦ Σώκρατες, μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἠρωτήθης;" Ἔγωγε,
φήσω, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν. "Ἔπειτα," φήσει,
"ἐρωτηθεὶς τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνῃ ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, ὡς αὐτὸς φῄς,
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν;" Ἔοικε, φήσω· ἢ τί μοι
συμβουλεύεις, ὦ φίλε, φάναι;
Soc.If, then, we agree to that, he will laugh and say: Socrates, do you remember the question you were asked? I do, I shall say, the question was what the absolute beautiful is. Then, he will say, when you were asked for the beautiful, do you give as your reply what is, as you yourself say, no more beautiful than ugly? So it seems, I shall say; or what do you, my friend, advise me to say?
ΙΠ.Τοῦτο ἔγωγε· καὶ γὰρ δὴ πρός γε θεοὺς ὅτι οὐ καλὸν
τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος, ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖ.
Hipp.That is what I advise; for, of course, in saying that the human race is not beautiful in comparison with gods, you will be speaking the truth.
ΣΩ."Εἰ δέ σε ἠρόμην," φήσει, "ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ἐστι
289d καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν, εἴ μοι ἅπερ νῦν ἀπεκρίνω, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν
ὀρθῶς ἀπεκέκρισο; ἔτι δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ
καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν
προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, τοῦτ' εἶναι παρθένος ἢ ἵππος
ἢ λύρα;
Soc.But if I had asked you, he will say, in the beginning what is beautiful and ugly, if you had replied as you now do, would you not have replied correctly? But do you still think that the absolute beautiful, by the addition of which all other things are adorned and made to appear beautiful, when its form is added to any of them—do you think that is a maiden or a mare or a lyre?
ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ τοῦτό γε ζητεῖ, πάντων
ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι αὐτῷ τί ἐστι τὸ καλὸν ᾧ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προσγενομένου αὐτοῦ καλὰ φαίνεται.
289e εὐηθέστατος οὖν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπαΐει περὶ
καλῶν κτημάτων. ἐὰν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν
ὃ ἐρωτᾷ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χρυσός, ἀπορήσει καὶ οὐκ
ἐπιχειρήσει σε ἐλέγχειν. ἴσμεν γάρ που πάντες ὅτι ὅπου ἂν
τοῦτο προσγένηται, κἂν πρότερον αἰσχρὸν φαίνηται, καλὸν
φανεῖται χρυσῷ γε κοσμηθέν.
Hipp.Well, certainly, Socrates, if that is what he is looking for, nothing is easier than to answer and tell him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and by the addition of which they are made to appear beautiful. So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him: This that you ask about, the beautiful, is nothing else but gold, he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.
ΣΩ.Ἄπειρος εἶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς σχέτλιός ἐστι
καὶ οὐδὲν ῥᾳδίως ἀποδεχόμενος.
Soc.You don’t know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.
ΙΠ.Τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸ γὰρ ὀρθῶς λεγόμενον
290a ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἢ μὴ ἀποδεχομένῳ καταγελάστῳ
εἶναι.
Hipp.What of that, then, Socrates? For he must perforce accept what is correct, or if he does not accept it, be ridiculous.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὲν δὴ ταύτην γε τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ
μόνον οὐκ ἀποδέξεται, ἀλλὰ πάνυ με καὶ τωθάσεται, καὶ ἐρεῖ·
"Ὦ τετυφωμένε σύ, Φειδίαν οἴει κακὸν εἶναι δημιουργόν;"
καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι ἐρῶ ὅτι Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.
Soc.This reply, my most excellent friend, he not only will certainly not accept, but he will even jeer at me grossly and will say: You lunatic, do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman? And I shall say, Not in the least.
ΙΠ.Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.And you will be right, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς μέντοι. τοιγάρτοι ἐκεῖνος, ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ
ὁμολογῶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δημιουργὸν τὸν Φειδίαν, "Εἶτα,"
290b φήσει, "οἴει τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ὃ σὺ λέγεις ἠγνόει Φειδίας;"
Καὶ ἐγώ· Τί μάλιστα; φήσω. "Ὅτι," ἐρεῖ, "τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς
τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοῦς ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄλλο πρόςωπον
οὐδὲ τοὺς πόδας οὐδὲ τὰς χεῖρας, εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γε
δὴ ὂν κάλλιστον ἔμελλε φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐλεφάντινον· δῆλον
ὅτι τοῦτο ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξήμαρτεν, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι χρυσὸς ἄρ'
ἐστὶν ὁ πάντα καλὰ ποιῶν, ὅπου ἂν προσγένηται." ταῦτα οὖν
λέγοντι τί ἀποκρινώμεθα, ὦ Ἱππία;
Soc.Yes, to be sure. Consequently when I agree that Pheidias is a good craftsman, Well, then, he will say, do you imagine that Pheidias did not know this beautiful that you speak of? Why do you ask that? I shall say. Because, he will say, he did not make the eyes of his Athena of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her hands and feet, if, that is, they were sure to appear most beautiful provided only they were made of gold, but he made them of ivory; evidently he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold which makes everything beautiful to which it is added. When he says that, what reply shall we make to him, Hippias?
290c ΙΠ.Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν· ἐροῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὀρθῶς ἐποίησε. καὶ
γὰρ τὸ ἐλεφάντινον οἶμαι καλόν ἐστιν.
Hipp.That is easy; for we shall say that Pheidias did right; for ivory, I think, is beautiful.
ΣΩ."Τοῦ οὖν ἕνεκα," φήσει, "οὐ καὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν
ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλεφάντινα ἠργάσατο, ἀλλὰ λίθινα, ὡς οἷόν τ' ἦν
ὁμοιότητα τοῦ λίθου τῷ ἐλέφαντι ἐξευρών; ἢ καὶ ὁ λίθος ὁ
καλὸς καλόν ἐστι;" φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Soc.Why, then, he will say, did he not make the middle parts of the eyes also of ivory, but of stone, procuring stone as similar as possible to the ivory? Or is beautiful stone also beautiful? Shall we say that it is, Hippias?
ΙΠ.Φήσομεν μέντοι, ὅταν γε πρέπων ᾖ.
Hipp.Surely we shall say so, that is, where it is appropriate.
ΣΩ."Ὅταν δὲ μὴ πρέπων, αἰσχρόν;" ὁμολογῶ ἢ μή;
Soc.But ugly when not appropriate? Shall I agree, or not?
ΙΠ.Ὁμολόγει, ὅταν γε μὴ πρέπῃ.
Hipp.Agree, that is, when it is not appropriate.
290d ΣΩ."Τί δὲ δή; ὁ ἐλέφας καὶ ὁ χρυσός," φήσει, "ὦ
σοφὲ σύ, οὐχ ὅταν μὲν πρέπῃ, καλὰ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ὅταν
δὲ μή, αἰσχρά;" ἔξαρνοι ἐσόμεθα ἢ ὁμολογήσομεν αὐτῷ
ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐτόν;
Soc.What then? Do not gold and ivory, he will say, when they are appropriate, make things beautiful, and when they are not appropriate, ugly? Shall we deny that, or agree that what he says is correct?
ΙΠ.Ὁμολογήσομεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ὃ ἂν πρέπῃ ἑκάστῳ,
τοῦτο καλὸν ποιεῖ ἕκαστον.
Hipp.We shall agree to this, at any rate, that whatever is appropriate to any particular thing makes that thing beautiful.
ΣΩ."Πότερον οὖν πρέπει," φήσει, "ὅταν τις τὴν
χύτραν ἣν ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὴν καλήν, ἕψῃ ἔτνους καλοῦ
μεστήν, χρυσῆ τορύνη αὐτῇ ἢ συκίνη;"
Soc.Well, then, he will say, when some one has boiled the pot of which we were speaking just now, the beautiful one, full of beautiful soup, is a golden ladle appropriate to it, or one made of fig wood?
ΙΠ.Ἡράκλεις, οἷον λέγεις ἄνθρωπον, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐ
290e βούλει μοι εἰπεῖν τίς ἐστιν;
Hipp.Heracles! What a fellow this is that you speak of! Won’t you tell me who he is?
ΣΩ.Οὐ γὰρ ἂν γνοίης, εἴ σοι εἴποιμι τοὔνομα.
Soc.You would not know him if I should tell you his name.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε γιγνώσκω, ὅτι ἀμαθής τίς ἐστιν.
Hipp.But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.
ΣΩ.Μέρμερος πάνυ ἐστίν, ὦ Ἱππία· ἀλλ' ὅμως τί
φήσομεν; ποτέραν πρέπειν τοῖν τορύναιν τῷ ἔτνει καὶ τῇ
χύτρᾳ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὴν συκίνην; εὐωδέστερον γάρ που
τὸ ἔτνος ποιεῖ, καὶ ἅμα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἂν συντρίψασα ἡμῖν
τὴν χύτραν ἐκχέαι τὸ ἔτνος καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀποσβέσειεν καὶ τοὺς
μέλλοντας ἑστιᾶσθαι ἄνευ ὄψου ἂν πάνυ γενναίου ποιήσειεν·
ἡ δὲ χρυσῆ ἐκείνη πάντα ἂν ταῦτα ποιήσειεν, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε
291a δοκεῖν τὴν συκίνην ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι πρέπειν ἢ τὴν χρυσῆν,
εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.
Soc.He is a great nuisance, Hippias but yet, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things, so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.
ΙΠ.Πρέπει μὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον· οὐ μεντἂν
ἔγωγε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτῶντι διαλεγοίμην.
Hipp.No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ φίλε· σοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν πρέποι
τοιούτων ὀνομάτων ἀναπίμπλασθαι, καλῶς μὲν οὑτωσὶ ἀμπεχομένῳ,
καλῶς δὲ ὑποδεδεμένῳ, εὐδοκιμοῦντι δὲ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ
ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα φύρεσθαι
291b πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἐμὲ οὖν προδίδασκε καὶ ἐμὴν χάριν
ἀποκρίνου. "Εἰ γὰρ δὴ πρέπει γε μᾶλλον ἡ συκίνη τῆς
χρυσῆς," φήσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, "ἄλλο τι καὶ καλλίων ἂν εἴη,
ἐπειδήπερ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον ὡμολόγησας εἶναι
τοῦ μὴ πρέποντος;" ἄλλο τι ὁμολογῶμεν, ὦ Ἱππία, τὴν
συκίνην καλλίω τῆς χρυσῆς εἶναι;
Soc.Quite right, my friend; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks; but for me it doesn’t matter if I do associate with the fellow; so instruct me and for my sake answer him. For if the wooden one is more appropriate than the golden one, the fellow will say, would it not be more beautiful, since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than that which is not appropriate? Shall we not agree, Hippias, that the wooden one is more beautiful than the golden?
ΙΠ.Βούλει σοι εἴπω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ εἰπὼν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν
ἀπαλλάξεις σαυτὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγων;
Hipp.Do you wish me to tell you, Socrates, what definition of the beautiful will enable you to free yourself from long discussion?
291c ΣΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· μὴ μέντοι πρότερόν γε πρὶν ἄν μοι
εἴπῃς ποτέραν ἀποκρίνωμαι οἷν ἄρτι ἔλεγον τοῖν τορύναιν
πρέπουσάν τε καὶ καλλίω εἶναι.
Soc.Certainly; but not until after you have told me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I shall reply is appropriate and more beautiful.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλ', εἰ βούλει, αὐτῷ ἀπόκριναι ὅτι ἡ ἐκ τῆς συκῆς
εἰργασμένη.
Hipp.Well, if you like, reply to him that it is the one made of fig wood.
ΣΩ.Λέγε δὴ νυνὶ ὃ ἄρτι ἔμελλες λέγειν. ταύτῃ μὲν γὰρ
τῇ ἀποκρίσει, [ᾗ] ἂν φῶ τὸ καλὸν χρυσὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ὡς
ἔοικέ μοι ἀναφανήσεται κάλλιον ὂν χρυσὸς ἢ ξύλον σύκινον·
τὸ δὲ νῦν τί αὖ λέγεις τὸ καλὸν εἶναι;
Soc.Now, then, say what you were just now going to say. For by this reply, if I say that the beautiful is gold, it seems to me that gold will be shown to be no more beautiful than fig wood; but what do you now, once more, say that the beautiful is?
291d ΙΠ.Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. ζητεῖν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι
τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὃ μηδέποτε αἰσχρὸν μηδαμοῦ μηδενὶ
φανεῖται.
Hipp.I will tell you; for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody.
ΣΩ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.
Soc.Certainly, Hippias; now you understand beautifully.
ΙΠ.Ἄκουε δή· πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτο ἴσθι, ἐάν τις ἔχῃ ὅτι
ἀντείπῃ, φάναι ἐμὲ μηδ' ὁτιοῦν ἐπαΐειν.
Hipp.Listen, then; for, mind you, if anyone has anything to say against this, you may say I know nothing at all.
ΣΩ.Λέγε δὴ ὡς τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν.
Soc.Then for Heaven’s sake, speak as quickly as you can.
ΙΠ.Λέγω τοίνυν ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ κάλλιστον
εἶναι ἀνδρί, πλουτοῦντι, ὑγιαίνοντι, τιμωμένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων,
ἀφικομένῳ εἰς γῆρας, τοὺς αὑτοῦ γονέας τελευτήσαντας
291e καλῶς περιστείλαντι, ὑπὸ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐκγόνων καλῶς
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ταφῆναι.
Hipp.I say, then, that for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to reach old age, and, after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents, to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring.
ΣΩ.Ἰοὺ ἰού, ὦ Ἱππία, ἦ θαυμασίως τε καὶ μεγαλείως
καὶ ἀξίως σαυτοῦ εἴρηκας· καὶ νὴ τὴν Ἥραν ἄγαμαί σου ὅτι
μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοϊκῶς, καθ' ὅσον οἷός τ' εἶ, βοηθεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ
τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ τυγχάνομεν, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν δὴ νῦν καὶ πλεῖστον
καταγελάσεται, εὖ ἴσθι.
Soc.Bravo, bravo, Hippias! You have spoken in a way that is wonderful and great and worthy of you; and now, by Hera, I thank you, because you are kindly coming to my assistance to the best of your ability. But our shots are not hitting the man; no, he will laugh at us now more than ever, be sure of that.
ΙΠ.Πονηρόν γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, γέλωτα· ὅταν γὰρ πρὸς
ταῦτα ἔχῃ μὲν μηδὲν ὅτι λέγῃ, γελᾷ δέ, αὑτοῦ καταγελάσεται
292a καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων αὐτὸς ἔσται καταγέλαστος.
Hipp.A wretched laugh, Socrates; for when he has nothing to say to this, but laughs, he will be laughing at himself and will himself be laughed at by those present.
ΣΩ.Ἴσως οὕτως ἔχει· ἴσως μέντοι ἐπί γε ταύτῃ τῇ
ἀποκρίσει, ὡς ἐγὼ μαντεύομαι, κινδυνεύσει οὐ μόνον μου
καταγελᾶν.
Soc.Perhaps that is so perhaps, however, after this reply, he will, I foresee, be likely to do more than laugh at me.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ τί μήν;
Hipp.Why do you say that, pray?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι, ἂν τύχῃ βακτηρίαν ἔχων, ἂν μὴ ἐκφύγω φεύγων
αὐτόν, εὖ μάλα μου ἐφικέσθαι πειράσεται.
Soc.Because, if he happens to have a stick, unless I get away in a hurry, he will try to fetch me a good one.
ΙΠ.Πῶς λέγεις; δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, καὶ
τοῦτο ποιήσας οὐκ ἀχθήσεται καὶ δίκας ὀφλήσει; ἢ οὐκ
292b ἔνδικος ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐᾷ ἀδίκως τύπτειν ἀλλήλους
τοὺς πολίτας;
Hipp.What? Is the fellow some sort of master of yours, and if he does that, will he not be arrested and have to pay for it? Or does your city disregard justice and allow the citizens to beat one another unjustly?
ΣΩ.Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἐᾷ.
Soc.Oh no that is not allowed at all.
ΙΠ.Οὐκοῦν δώσει δίκην ἀδίκως γέ σε τύπτων.
Hipp.Then he will have to pay a penalty for beating you unjustly.
ΣΩ.Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἱππία, οὔκ, εἰ ταῦτά γε ἀποκριναίμην,
ἀλλὰ δικαίως, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc.I do not think so, Hippias. No, if I were to make that reply, the beating would be just, I think.
ΙΠ.Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ γε
αὐτὸς ταῦτα οἴει.
Hipp.Then I think so, too, Socrates, since that is your own belief.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπω σοι καὶ ᾗ αὐτὸς οἴομαι δικαίως ἂν
τύπτεσθαι ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος; ἢ καὶ σύ με ἄκριτον
τυπτήσεις; ἢ δέξῃ λόγον;
Soc.Shall I, then, not tell you why it is my own belief that the beating would be just, if I made that reply? Or will you also beat me without trial? Or will you listen to what I have to say?
292c ΙΠ.Δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ δεχοίμην·
ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις;
Hipp.It would be shocking if I would not listen; but what have you to say?
ΣΩ.Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ νυνδή, μιμούμενος
ἐκεῖνον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς σὲ λέγω ῥήματα, οἷα ἐκεῖνος εἰς
ἐμὲ ἐρεῖ, χαλεπά τε καὶ ἀλλόκοτα. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, "Εἰπέ μοι,"
φήσει, "ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴει ἂν ἀδίκως πληγὰς λαβεῖν, ὅστις
διθύραμβον τοσουτονὶ ᾄσας οὕτως ἀμούσως πολὺ ἀπῇσας
ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος;" Πῶς δή; φήσω ἐγώ. "Ὅπως;"
φήσει· "οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ μεμνῆσθαι ὅτι τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ ἠρώτων,
292d ὃ παντὶ ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι, καὶ
λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ καὶ πάσῃ πράξει
καὶ παντὶ μαθήματι; αὐτὸ γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὤνθρωπε, κάλλος
ἐρωτῶ ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδέν σοι μᾶλλον γεγωνεῖν δύναμαι ἢ
εἴ μοι παρεκάθησο λίθος, καὶ οὗτος μυλίας, μήτε ὦτα μήτε
ἐγκέφαλον ἔχων." εἰ οὖν φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμι ἐγὼ ἐπὶ τούτοις
τάδε, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν ἄχθοιο, ὦ Ἱππία; Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τόδε τὸ
292e καλὸν εἶναι Ἱππίας ἔφη· καίτοι ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἠρώτων οὕτως
ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμέ, ὃ πᾶσι καλὸν καὶ ἀεί ἐστι. πῶς οὖν φῄς;
οὐκ ἀχθέσῃ, ἂν εἴπω ταῦτα;
Soc.I will tell you, imitating him in the same way as a while ago, that I may not use to you such harsh and uncouth words as he uses to me. For you may be sure, Tell me, Socrates, he will say, do you think it would be unjust if you got a beating for singing such a long dithyramb so unmusically and so far from the question? How so? I shall say. How so? he will say; are you not able to remember that I asked for the absolute beautiful, by which everything to which it is added has the property of being beautiful, both stone and stick and man and god and every act and every acquisition of knowledge? For what I am asking is this, man: what is absolute beauty? and I cannot make you hear what I say any more than if you were a stone sitting beside me, and a millstone at that, having neither ears nor brain. Would you, then, not be angry, Hippias,if I should be frightened and should reply in this way? Well, but Hippias said that this was the beautiful; and yet I asked him, just as you asked me, what is beautiful to all and always. What do you say? Will you not be angry if I say that?
ΙΠ.Εὖ γ' οὖν οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πᾶσι καλὸν τοῦτ'
ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ εἶπον, καὶ δόξει.
Hipp.I know very well, Socrates, that this which I said was beautiful is beautiful to all and will seem so.
ΣΩ."Ἦ καὶ ἔσται;" φήσει· "ἀεὶ γάρ που τό γε καλὸν
καλόν."
Soc.And will it be so, too he will say for the beautiful is always beautiful, is it not?
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
—ΣΩ."Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἦν;" φήσει.
Soc.Then was it so, too? he will say.
—ΙΠ.Καὶ ἦν.
Hipp.It was so, too.
—ΣΩ."Ἦ καὶ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ," φήσει, "ὁ
ξένος ὁ Ἠλεῖος ἔφη καλὸν εἶναι ὑστέρῳ τῶν προγόνων
ταφῆναι, καὶ τῷ πάππῳ αὐτοῦ Αἰακῷ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι
293a ἐκ θεῶν γεγόνασι, καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς θεοῖς;"
Soc.And, he will say, did the stranger from Elis say also that for Achilles it was beautiful to be buried later than his parents, and for his grandfather Aeacus, and all the others who were born of gods, and for the gods themselves?
ΙΠ.Τί τοῦτο; βάλλ' ἐς μακαρίαν. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐδ'
εὔφημα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτά γε τὰ ἐρωτήματα.
Hipp.What’s that? Confound it! These questions of the fellow’s are not even respectful to religion.
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; τὸ ἐρομένου ἑτέρου φάναι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν
οὐ πάνυ δύσφημον;
Soc.Well, then, when another asks the question, perhaps it is not quite disrespectful to religion to say that these things are so?
ΙΠ.Ἴσως.
Hipp.Perhaps.
ΣΩ."Ἴσως τοίνυν σὺ εἶ οὗτος," φήσει, "ὃς παντὶ φῂς
καὶ ἀεὶ καλὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐκγόνων ταφῆναι, τοὺς δὲ
γονέας θάψαι· ἢ οὐχ εἷς τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ἦν καὶ
οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντες;"
Soc.Perhaps, then, you are the man, he will say, who says that it is beautiful for every one and always to be buried by one’s offspring, and to bury one’s parents; or was not Heracles included in ’every one,’ he and all those whom we just now mentioned?
ΙΠ.Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔγωγε ἔλεγον.
Hipp.But I did not say it was so for the gods.
293b ΣΩ."Οὐδὲ τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὡς ἔοικας."
Soc.Nor for the heroes either, apparently.
ΙΠ.Οὐχ ὅσοι γε θεῶν παῖδες ἦσαν.
Hipp.Not those who were children of gods.
ΣΩ."Ἀλλ' ὅσοι μή;"
Soc.But those who were not?
ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
ΣΩ."Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν αὖ λόγον, ὡς φαίνεται, τῶν
ἡρώων τῷ μὲν Ταντάλῳ καὶ τῷ Δαρδάνῳ καὶ τῷ Ζήθῳ
δεινόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστι, Πέλοπι δὲ καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις τοῖς οὕτω γεγονόσι καλόν."
Soc.Then again, according to your statement, among the heroes it is terrible and impious and disgraceful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus, but beautiful for Pelops and the others who were born as he was?
ΙΠ.Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Hipp.I think so.
ΣΩ."Σοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ," φήσει, "ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα, τὸ
θάψαντι τοὺς προγόνους ταφῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκγόνων ἐνίοτε καὶ
293c ἐνίοις αἰσχρὸν εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀδύνατον
πᾶσι τοῦτο γενέσθαι καὶ εἶναι καλόν, ὥστε τοῦτό γε ὥσπερ
καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ἥ τε παρθένος καὶ ἡ χύτρα, ταὐτὸν
πέπονθε, καὶ ἔτι γελοιοτέρως τοῖς μέν ἐστι καλόν, τοῖς δ' οὐ
καλόν. καὶ οὐδέπω καὶ τήμερον," φήσει, "οἷός τ' εἶ, ὦ
Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι."
ταῦτά μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ὀνειδιεῖ δικαίως, ἐὰν αὐτῷ
οὕτως ἀποκρίνωμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὦ Ἱππία, σχεδόν
293d τί μοι οὕτω διαλέγεται· ἐνίοτε δὲ ὥσπερ ἐλεήσας μου τὴν
ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν αὐτός μοι προβάλλει ἐρωτῶν εἰ
τοιόνδε μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ἢ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὅτου ἂν
τύχῃ πυνθανόμενος καὶ περὶ οὗ ἂν λόγος ᾖ.
Soc.You think, then, what you did not say just now, that to bury one’s parents and be buried by one’s offspring is sometimes and for some persons disgraceful; and it is still more impossible, as it seems, for this to become and to be beautiful for all, so that the same thing has happened to this as to the things we mentioned before, the maiden and the pot, in a still more ridiculous way than to them; it is beautiful for some and not beautiful for others. And you are not able yet, even today, Socrates, he will say, to answer what is asked about the beautiful, namely what it is. With these words and the like he will rebuke me, if I reply to him in this way. For the most part, Hippias, he talks with me in some such way as that but sometimes, as if in pity for my inexperience and lack of training, he himself volunteers a question, and asks whether I think the beautiful is so and so or whatever else it is which happens to be the subject of our questions and our discussion.
ΙΠ.Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Hipp.What do you mean by that, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Ἐγώ σοι φράσω. "Ὦ δαιμόνιε," φησί, "Σώκρατες,
τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ οὕτω παῦσαι—
λίαν γὰρ εὐήθη τε καὶ εὐεξέλεγκτά ἐστιν—ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε
293e σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, οὗ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐπελαβόμεθα
ἐν τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἡνίκ' ἔφαμεν τὸν χρυσὸν οἷς μὲν πρέπει
καλὸν εἶναι, οἷς δὲ μή, οὔ, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οἷς ἂν τοῦτο
προσῇ· αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ
πρέποντος σκόπει εἰ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ καλόν." ἐγὼ μὲν
οὖν εἴωθα συμφάναι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἑκάστοτε—οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ὅτι
λέγω—σοὶ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν εἶναι;
Soc.I will tell you. Oh, my dear Socrates, he says, stop making replies of this sort and in this way—for they are too silly and easy to refute; but see if something like this does not seem to you to be beautiful, which we got hold of just now in our reply, when we said that gold was beautiful for those things for which it was appropriate, but not for those for which it was not, and that all the other things were beautiful to which this quality pertains; so examine this very thing, the appropriate, and see if it is perchance the beautiful. Now I am accustomed to agree to such things every time for I don’t know what to say; but now does it seem to you that the appropriate is the beautiful?
ΙΠ.Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.Yes, certainly, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Σκοπώμεθα, μή πῃ ἄρ' ἐξαπατώμεθα.
Soc.Let us consider, lest we make a mistake somehow.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ χρὴ σκοπεῖν.
Hipp.Yes, we must consider.
ΣΩ.Ὅρα τοίνυν· τὸ πρέπον ἆρα τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὃ παραγενόμενον
294a ποιεῖ ἕκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλὰ τούτων οἷς ἂν παρῇ,
ἢ ὃ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἢ οὐδέτερα τούτων;
Soc.See, then; do we say that the appropriate is that which, when it is added, makes each of those things to which it is added appear beautiful, or which makes them be beautiful, or neither of these?
ΙΠ.Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ [πότερα] ὃ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι καλά·
ὥσπερ γε ἐπειδὰν ἱμάτιά τις λάβῃ ἢ ὑποδήματα ἁρμόττοντα,
κἂν ᾖ γελοῖος, καλλίων φαίνεται.
Hipp.I think so.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλλίω ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστι τὸ
πρέπον, ἀπάτη τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ πρέπον, καὶ οὐκ
ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὦ Ἱππία; ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ που
294b ἐκεῖνο ἐζητοῦμεν, ᾧ πάντα τὰ καλὰ πράγματα καλά ἐστιν—
ὥσπερ ᾧ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι·
τούτῳ γὰρ πάντα μεγάλα ἐστί, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φαίνηται, ὑπερέχῃ
δέ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι—οὕτω δή, φαμέν, καὶ τὸ
καλόν, ᾧ καλὰ πάντα ἐστίν, ἄντ' οὖν φαίνηται ἄντε μή, τί
ἂν εἴη; τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καλλίω γὰρ ποιεῖ
φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, οἷα δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἐᾷ
φαίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν εἶναι καλά, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον,
294c ἐάντε φαίνηται ἐάντε μή, πειρατέον λέγειν τί ἐστι· τοῦτο
γὰρ ζητοῦμεν, εἴπερ τὸ καλὸν ζητοῦμεν.
Soc.Which?
ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι
ποιεῖ καλὰ παρόν.
Hipp.That which makes them appear beautiful; as when a man takes clothes or shoes that fit, even if he be ridiculous, he appears more beautiful.
ΣΩ.Ἀδύνατον ἄρα τῷ ὄντι καλὰ ὄντα μὴ φαίνεσθαι
καλὰ εἶναι, παρόντος γε τοῦ ποιοῦντος φαίνεσθαι;
Soc.Then if the appropriate makes him appear more beautiful than he is, the appropriate would be a sort of deceit in respect to the beautiful, and would not be that which we are looking for, would it, Hippias? For we were rather looking for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—like that by which all great things are great, that is, excess; for it is by this that all great things are great; for even if they do not appear great, but exceed, they are of necessity great; so, then, we say, what would the beautiful be, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear so or not? For it could not be the appropriate, since that, by your statement, makes things appear more beautiful than they are, but does not let them appear such as they are. But we must try to say what that is which makes things be beautiful, as I said just now, whether they appear so or not; for that is what we are looking for, since we are looking for the beautiful.
ΙΠ.Ἀδύνατον.
Hipp.But the appropriate, Socrates, makes things both be and appear beautiful by its presence.
ΣΩ.Ὁμολογήσομεν οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Ἱππία, πάντα τὰ τῷ
ὄντι καλὰ καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ δοξάζεσθαι καλὰ
294d εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ πᾶσιν, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἀγνοεῖσθαι
καὶ πάντων μάλιστα ἔριν καὶ μάχην περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ
ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ ταῖς πόλεσιν;
Soc.Is it impossible, then, for things which are really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful, at any rate when that is present which makes them appear so?
ΙΠ.Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀγνοεῖσθαι.
Hipp.It is impossible.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γέ που τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς προσῆν·
προσῆν δ' ἄν, εἴπερ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν ἦν καὶ μὴ μόνον καλὰ
ἐποίει εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι. ὥστε τὸ πρέπον, εἰ μὲν
τὸ καλὰ ποιοῦν ἐστιν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἡμεῖς
ζητοῦμεν, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ποιοῦν φαίνεσθαι· εἰ δ' αὖ τὸ
294e φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦν ἐστιν τὸ πρέπον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ καλόν, ὃ
ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν. εἶναι γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε ποιεῖ, φαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ
[ποιεῖν] εἶναι οὐ μόνον καλὰ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ'
οὐδὲ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν. ἑλώμεθα δὴ πότερα δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον εἶναι
τὸ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ ποιοῦν, ἢ τὸ εἶναι.
Soc.Shall we, then, agree to this, Hippias, that all things which are really beautiful, both uses and pursuits, are always believed to be beautiful by all, and appear so to them, or, quite the contrary, that people are ignorant about them, and that there is more strife and contention about them than about anything else, both in private between individuals and in public between states?
ΙΠ.Τὸ φαίνεσθαι, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.The latter rather, Socrates; that people are ignorant about them.
ΣΩ.Βαβαῖ, οἴχεται ἄρ' ἡμᾶς διαπεφευγός, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ
καλὸν γνῶναι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν, ἐπειδή γε τὸ πρέπον ἄλλο τι
ἐφάνη ὂν ἢ καλόν.
Soc.They would not be so, if the appearance of beauty were added to them; and it would be added, if the appropriate were beautiful and made things not only to be beautiful, but also to appear so. So that the appropriate, if it is that which makes things be beautiful, would be the beautiful which we are looking for, but would not be that which makes things appear beautiful; but if, on the other hand, the appropriate is that which makes things appear beautiful, it would not be the beautiful for which we are looking. For that makes things be beautiful, but the same element could not make things both appear and be beautiful, nor could it make them both appear and be anything else whatsoever. Let us choose, then, whether we think that the appropriate is that which makes things appear or be beautiful.
ΙΠ.Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε ἀτόπως.
Hipp.That which makes them appear so, in my opinion, Socrates.
295a ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μήπω γε ἀνῶμεν αὐτό· ἔτι
γάρ τινα ἐλπίδα ἔχω ἐκφανήσεσθαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ καλόν.
Soc.Whew! Our perception of what the beautiful is has fled away and gone, Hippias, since the appropriate has been found to be something other than the beautiful.
ΙΠ.Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπόν ἐστιν
εὑρεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, εἰ ὀλίγον χρόνον εἰς ἐρημίαν
ἐλθὼν σκεψαίμην πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ἀκριβέστερον ἂν αὐτό σοι
εἴποιμι τῆς ἁπάσης ἀκριβείας.
Hipp.Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and to me that is very queer.
ΣΩ.Ἆ μὴ μέγα, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγε. ὁρᾷς ὅσα πράγματα
ἡμῖν ἤδη παρέσχηκε· μὴ καὶ ὀργισθὲν ἡμῖν ἔτι μᾶλλον
295b ἀποδρᾷ. καίτοι οὐδὲν λέγω· σὺ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ῥᾳδίως αὐτὸ
εὑρήσεις, ἐπειδὰν μόνος γένῃ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν ἐμοῦ ἐναντίον
αὐτὸ ἔξευρε, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐμοὶ συζήτει· καὶ ἐὰν
μὲν εὕρωμεν, κάλλιστα ἕξει, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρξω οἶμαι ἐγὼ τῇ
ἐμῇ τύχῃ, σὺ δ' ἀπελθὼν ῥᾳδίως εὑρήσεις· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν νῦν
εὕρωμεν, ἀμέλει οὐκ ὀχληρὸς ἔσομαί σοι πυνθανόμενος ὅτι
ἦν ἐκεῖνο ὃ κατὰ σαυτὸν ἐξηῦρες· νῦν δὲ θέασαι αὐτὸ ὅ σοι
295c δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ καλόν. λέγω δὴ αὐτὸ εἶναι—ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπισκόπει
μοι πάνυ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν μὴ παραληρήσω—τοῦτο
γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ἡμῖν καλόν, ὃ ἂν χρήσιμον ᾖ. εἶπον δὲ ἐκ
τῶνδε ἐννοούμενος· καλοί, φαμέν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοί εἰσιν, οὐχ
οἳ ἂν δοκῶσι τοιοῦτοι εἶναι οἷοι μὴ δυνατοὶ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν
δυνατοί τε καὶ χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὸ ἰδεῖν. ἦ γάρ;
Soc.However, my friend, let us not yet give it up, for I still have hopes that what the beautiful is will be made clear.
ΙΠ.Ναί.
Hipp.Certainly, to be sure, Socrates, for it is not hard to find. Now I know that if I should go away into solitude and meditate alone by myself, I could tell it to you with the most perfect accuracy.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον σῶμα οὕτω λέγομεν καλὸν
εἶναι, τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην, καὶ αὖ τὰ
295d ζῷα πάντα, ἵππον καλὸν καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνα καὶ ὄρτυγα, καὶ
τὰ σκεύη πάντα καὶ τὰ ὀχήματα τά τε πεζὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ
θαλάττῃ πλοῖά τε καὶ τριήρεις, καὶ τά γε ὄργανα πάντα
τά τε ὑπὸ τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις,
εἰ δὲ βούλει, τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους, σχεδόν τι
πάντα ταῦτα καλὰ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ· ἀποβλέποντες
πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ᾗ πέφυκεν, ᾗ εἴργασται,
ᾗ κεῖται, τὸ μὲν χρήσιμον καὶ ᾗ χρήσιμον καὶ πρὸς ὃ χρήσιμον
295e καὶ ὁπότε χρήσιμον καλόν φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ
πάντῃ ἄχρηστον αἰσχρόν· ἆρ' οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως, ὦ
Ἱππία;
Soc.Ah, don’t boast, Hippias. You see how much trouble it has caused us already; I’m afraid it may get angry and run away more than ever. And yet that is nonsense; for you, I think, will easily find it when you go away by yourself. But for Heaven’s sake, find it in my presence, or, if you please, join me, as you are now doing, in looking for it. And if we find it, that will be splendid, but if we do not, I shall, I suppose, accept my lot, and you will go away and find it easily. And if we find it now, I shall certainly not be a nuisance to you by asking what that was which you found by yourself; but now once more see if this is in your opinion the beautiful : I say, then, that it is—but consider, paying close attention to me, that I may not talk nonsense—for I say, then, whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful. But I said it with this reason for my thought; beautiful eyes, we say, are not such as seem to be so, which are unable to see, but those which are able and useful for seeing. Is that right?
ΙΠ.Ἔμοιγε.
Hipp.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ὀρθῶς ἄρα νῦν λέγομεν ὅτι τυγχάνει παντὸς ὂν
μᾶλλον καλὸν τὸ χρήσιμον;
Soc.Then, too, in the same way we say that the whole body is beautiful, part of it for running, part for wrestling; and again all the animals, a beautiful horse or cock or quail and all utensils and land vehicles, and on the sea freight-ships and ships of war; and all instruments in music and in the other arts, and, if you like, customs and laws also—pretty well all these we call beautiful in the same way looking at each of them—how it is formed by nature, how it is wrought, how it has been enacted—the useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in the way in which it is useful, and for the purpose for which it is useful, and at the time when it is useful; and that which is in all these aspects useless we say is ugly. Now is not this your opinion also, Hippias?
—ΙΠ.Ὀρθῶς μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἰς
ὅπερ δυνατόν, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ χρήσιμον, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον
ἄχρηστον;
Hipp.It is.Soc, Then are we right in saying that the useful rather than everything else is beautiful?
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
We are right, surely, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλόν,
ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρόν;
Soc.Now that which has power to accomplish anything is useful for that for which it has power, but that which is powerless is useless, is it not?
—ΙΠ.Σφόδρα γε. τά τε γοῦν ἄλλα,
296a ὦ Σώκρατες, μαρτυρεῖ ἡμῖν ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἀτὰρ οὖν
καὶ τὰ πολιτικά· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τε καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ
πόλει τὸ μὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι πάντων κάλλιστον, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον
πάντων αἴσχιστον.
Hipp.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Εὖ λέγεις. ἆρ' οὖν πρὸς
θεῶν, Ἱππία, διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ σοφία πάντων κάλλιστον, ἡ
δὲ ἀμαθία πάντων αἴσχιστον;
Soc.Power, then, is beautiful, and want of power is disgraceful or ugly.
—ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Hipp.Decidedly. Now other things, Socrates, testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one’s own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.
ΣΩ.Ἔχε δὴ ἠρέμα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε· ὡς φοβοῦμαι τί ποτ'
αὖ λέγομεν.
Soc.Good! Then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things?
296b ΙΠ.Τί δ' αὖ φοβῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ νῦν γέ σοι ὁ λόγος
παγκάλως προβέβηκε;
Hipp.Well, what do you suppose, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Βουλοίμην ἄν, ἀλλά μοι τόδε συνεπίσκεψαι· ἆρ' ἄν
τίς τι ποιήσειεν ὃ μήτ' ἐπίσταιτο μήτε τὸ παράπαν δύναιτο;
Soc.Just keep quiet, my dear friend; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.
—ΙΠ.Οὐδαμῶς· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε μὴ δύναιτο;
Hipp.What are you afraid of again, Socrates, since now your discussion has gone ahead most beautifully?
—ΣΩ.Οἱ
οὖν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοί τε καὶ ποιοῦντες
ἄκοντες, ἄλλο τι οὗτοι, εἰ μὴ ἐδύναντο ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἄν
ποτε ἐποίουν;
Soc.I wish that might be the case; but consider this point with me: could a person do what he did not know how and was utterly powerless to do?
—ΙΠ.Δῆλον δή.
Hipp.By no means; for how could he do what he was powerless to do?
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δυνάμει
296c γε δύνανται οἱ δυνάμενοι· οὐ γάρ που ἀδυναμίᾳ γε.
Soc.Then those who commit errors and accomplish and do bad things involuntarily, if they were powerless to do those things, would not do them?
Οὐ δῆτα.
Hipp.Evidently not.
—ΣΩ.Δύνανται δέ γε πάντες ποιεῖν οἱ ποιοῦντες
ἃ ποιοῦσιν;
Soc.But yet it is by power that those are powerful who are powerful for surely it is not by powerlessness.
—ΙΠ.Ναί.
Hipp.Certainly not.
—ΣΩ.Κακὰ δέ γε πολὺ πλείω
ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀρξάμενοι ἐκ παίδων,
καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνουσιν ἄκοντες.
Soc.And all who do, have power to do what they do?
—ΙΠ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Hipp.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τί
οὖν; ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ταῦτα τὰ χρήσιμα, ἃ ἂν ᾖ ἐπὶ
τὸ κακόν τι ἐργάζεσθαι χρήσιμα, ἆρα φήσομεν ταῦτα εἶναι
296d καλά, ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ;
Soc.Men do many more bad things than good, from childhood up, and commit many errors involuntarily.
—ΙΠ.Πολλοῦ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.That is true.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ τὸ
χρήσιμον ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.
Soc.Well, then, this power and these useful things, which are useful for accomplishing something bad—shall we say that they are beautiful, or far from it?
ΙΠ.Ἐάν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀγαθὰ δύνηται καὶ ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα
χρήσιμον ᾖ.
Hipp.Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ἐκεῖνο μὲν τοίνυν οἴχεται, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ χρήσιμον
ἁπλῶς εἶναι καλόν· ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτ' ἦν ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Ἱππία,
ὃ ἐβούλετο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ χρήσιμόν τε
καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ
296e καλόν;
Soc.Then, Hippias, the powerful and the useful are not, as it seems, our beautiful.
—ΙΠ.Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Hipp.They are, Socrates, if they are powerful and useful for good.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε
ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν. ἢ οὔ;
Soc.Then that assertion, that the powerful and useful are beautiful without qualification, is gone; but was this, Hippias, what our soul wished to say, that the useful and the powerful for doing something good is the beautiful?
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Yes, in my opinion.
—ΣΩ.Οὕτω δὴ
καὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ καλὰ νόμιμα καὶ ἡ σοφία καὶ
ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα καλά ἐστιν, ὅτι ὠφέλιμα.
Soc.But surely this is beneficial; or is it not?
Δῆλον ὅτι.
Hipp.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἄρα ἔοικεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ
καλόν, ὦ Ἱππία.
Soc.So by this argument the beautiful persons and beautiful customs and all that we mentioned just now are beautiful because they are beneficial.
—ΙΠ.Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.Evidently.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιοῦν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
Soc.Then the beneficial seems to us to be the beautiful, Hippias.
—ΙΠ.Ἔστι γάρ.
Hipp.Yes, certainly, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Τὸ ποιοῦν δέ γ' ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλο
τι ἢ τὸ αἴτιον· ἦ γάρ;
Soc.But the beneficial is that which creates good.
—ΙΠ.Οὕτως.
Hipp.Yes, it is.
—ΣΩ.Τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα
297a αἴτιόν ἐστιν τὸ καλόν.
Soc.But that which creates is nothing else than the cause; am I right?
—ΙΠ.Ἔστι γάρ.
Hipp.It is so.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε αἴτιον, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ οὗ ἂν αἴτιον
ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον, ἄλλο ἐστίν· οὐ γάρ που τό γε αἴτιον αἰτίου
αἴτιον ἂν εἴη. ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐ τὸ αἴτιον ποιοῦν ἐφάνη;
Soc.Then the beautiful is the cause of the good.
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Yes, it is.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ποιεῖται
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ποιοῦν;
Soc.But surely, Hippias, the cause and that of which the cause is the cause are different; for the cause could not well be the cause of the cause. But look at it in this way was not the cause seen to be creating?
Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Hipp.Yes, certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο τι τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἄλλο
δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν;
Soc.By that which creates, then, only that is created which comes into being, but not that which creates. Is not that true?
—ΙΠ.Ναί.
Hipp.That is true.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα τό γ' αἴτιον αἴτιον
297b αἰτίου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γιγνομένου ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ.
Soc.The cause, then, is not the cause of the cause, but of that which comes into being through it.
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ
γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Εἰ ἄρα τὸ καλόν ἐστιν αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ, γίγνοιτ' ἂν
ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικε, σπουδάζομεν
καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ καλά, ὅτι
τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἔκγονον σπουδαστόν ἐστι, τὸ ἀγαθόν,
καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐξ ὧν εὑρίσκομεν ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέᾳ εἶναι
τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
Soc.If, then, the beautiful is the cause of good, the good would come into being through the beautiful; and this is why we are eager for wisdom and all the other beautiful things, because their offspring, the good, is worthy of eagerness, and, from what we are finding, it looks as if the beautiful were a sort of father of the good.
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καλῶς γὰρ
λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.Certainly for what you say is well said, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καλῶς λέγω, ὅτι οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ ὑός
297c ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ ὑὸς πατήρ;
Soc.Then is this well said, too, that the father is not the son, and the son not father?
—ΙΠ.Καλῶς μέντοι.
Hipp.To be sure it is well said.
—ΣΩ.Οὐδέ
γε τὸ αἴτιον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὖ αἴτιον.
Soc.And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.
—ΙΠ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Hipp.True.
—ΣΩ.Μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐδὲ ἄρα
τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι
οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων;
Soc.By Zeus, my good friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful; or does it seem to you possible, after what has been said?
—ΙΠ.Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία,
οὔ μοι φαίνεται.
Hipp.No, by Zeus, it does not appear so to me.
ΣΩ.Ἀρέσκει οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐθέλοιμεν ἂν λέγειν ὡς τὸ
καλὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν;
Soc.Does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, and the good not beautiful?
ΙΠ.Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ μοι ἀρέσκει.
Hipp.No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all.
ΣΩ.Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Ἱππία· ἐμοὶ δέ γε πάντων
297d ἥκιστα ἀρέσκει ὧν εἰρήκαμεν λόγων.
Soc.Right, by Zeus, Hippias! And it pleases me least of all the things we have said.
ΙΠ.Ἔοικε γὰρ οὕτως.
Hipp.Yes, that is likely.
ΣΩ.Κινδυνεύει ἄρα ἡμῖν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐφαίνετο κάλλιστος
εἶναι τῶν λόγων τὸ ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμόν τε
καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτως
ἔχειν, ἀλλ', εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν, ἐκείνων εἶναι γελοιότερος τῶν
πρώτων, ἐν οἷς τήν τε παρθένον ᾠόμεθα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν καὶ
ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λεχθέντων.
Soc.Then there is a good chance that the statement that the beneficial and the useful and the powerful to create something good are beautiful, is not, as it appeared to be, the most beautiful of of statements, but, if that be possible, is even more ridiculous than those first ones in which we thought the maiden was the beautiful, and each of the various other things we spoke of before.
ΙΠ.Ἔοικεν.
Hipp.That is likely.
ΣΩ.Καὶ ἐγὼ μέν γε οὐκ ἔτι ἔχω, ὦ Ἱππία, ὅποι τράπωμαι,
ἀλλ' ἀπορῶ· σὺ δὲ ἔχεις τι λέγειν;
Soc.And Hippias, I no longer know where to turn; I am at a loss; but have you anything to say?
297e ΙΠ.Οὐκ ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον,
σκεψάμενος εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι εὑρήσω.
Hipp.Not at the moment, but, as I said just now, I am sure I shall find it after meditation.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ εἰδέναι οὐχ
οἷός τε σὲ εἶναι περιμένειν μέλλοντα· καὶ γὰρ οὖν δή τι
καὶ οἶμαι ἄρτι ηὐπορηκέναι. ὅρα γάρ· εἰ ὃ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς
ποιῇ, μήτι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ
τῆς ὄψεως, τοῦτο φαῖμεν εἶναι καλόν, πῶς τι ἄρ' ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα;
298a οἵ τέ γέ που καλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ τὰ
ποικίλματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα καὶ τὰ πλάσματα
τέρπει ἡμᾶς ὁρῶντας, ἃ ἂν καλὰ ᾖ· καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι οἱ καλοὶ
καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ σύμπασα καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ μυθολογίαι
ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐργάζονται, ὥστ' εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα τῷ θρασεῖ
ἐκείνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι Ὦ γενναῖε, τὸ καλόν ἐστι τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς
τε καὶ δι' ὄψεως ἡδύ, οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν τοῦ θράσους ἐπίσχοιμεν;
Soc.But it seems to me that I am so eager to know that I cannot wait for you while you delay; for I believe I have just now found a way out. Just see; how would it help us towards our goal if we were to say that that is beautiful which makes us feel joy; I do not mean all pleasures, but that which makes us feel joy through hearing and sight? For surely beautiful human beings, Hippias, and all decorations and paintings and works of sculpture which are beautiful, delight us when we see them; and beautiful sounds and music in general and speeches and stories do the same thing, so that if we were to reply to that impudent fellow, My excellent man, the beautiful is that which is pleasing through hearing and sight, don’t you think that we should put a stop to his impudence?
ΙΠ.Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ νῦν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ λέγεσθαι
298b τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστιν.
Hipp.To me, at any rate, Socrates, it seems that the nature of the beautiful is now well stated.
ΣΩ.Τί δ'; ἆρα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ καλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόμους,
ὦ Ἱππία, δι' ἀκοῆς ἢ δι' ὄψεως φήσομεν ἡδέα ὄντα
καλὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι εἶδος ἔχειν;
Soc.But what then? Shall we say, Hippias, that beautiful customs and laws are beautiful because they are pleasing through hearing and sight, or that they have some other form of beauty?
ΙΠ.Ταῦτα δ' ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν παραλάθοι τὸν
ἄνθρωπον.
Hipp.Perhaps, Socrates, these things might slip past the man unnoticed.
ΣΩ.Μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐχ ὅν γ' ἂν ἐγὼ μάλιστα
αἰσχυνοίμην ληρῶν καὶ προσποιούμενός τι λέγειν μηδὲν
λέγων.
Soc.No, by dog, Hippias—not past the man before whom I should be most ashamed of talking nonsense and pretending that I was talking sense when I was not.
ΙΠ.Τίνα τοῦτον;
Hipp.What man is that?
ΣΩ.Τὸν Σωφρονίσκου, ὃς ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον ταῦτα
298c ἐπιτρέποι ἀνερεύνητα ὄντα ῥᾳδίως λέγειν ἢ ὡς εἰδότα ἃ μὴ
οἶδα.
Soc.Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who would no more permit me to say these things carelessly without investigation than to say that I know what I do not know.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴ σὺ εἶπες, δοκεῖ
τι ἄλλο εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τοὺς νόμους.
Hipp.But certainly I also, now that you have mentioned it, think that this about the laws is something different.
ΣΩ.Ἔχ' ἡσυχῇ, ὦ Ἱππία· κινδυνεύομεν γάρ τοι, ἐν τῇ
αὐτῇ ἐμπεπτωκότες ἀπορίᾳ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐν ᾗπερ νυνδή,
οἴεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἶναι.
Soc.Not too fast, Hippias; for very likely we have fallen into the same perplexity about the beautiful in which we were a while ago, although we think we have found another way out.
ΙΠ.Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Hipp.What do you mean by that, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Ἐγώ σοι φράσω ὅ γ' ἐμοὶ καταφαίνεται, εἰ ἄρα τὶ
298d λέγω. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα
τάχ' ἂν φανείη οὐκ ἐκτὸς ὄντα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἣ
διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως ἡμῖν οὖσα τυγχάνει· ἀλλ'
ὑπομείνωμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, τὸ διὰ τούτων ἡδὺ καλὸν
εἶναι, μηδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον παράγοντες. ἀλλ' εἰ
ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο εἴτε οὗτος ὃν λέγω, εἴτε ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· "Τί
δή, ὦ Ἱππία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀφωρίσατε τοῦ ἡδέος τὸ
ταύτῃ ἡδὺ ᾗ λέγετε καλὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας
298e αἰσθήσεις σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τἀφροδίσια καὶ
τἆλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔ φατε καλὰ εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ ἡδέα,
οὐδὲ ἡδονὰς τὸ παράπαν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φατὲ εἶναι, οὐδ'
ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀκοῦσαι;" τί φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Soc.I will tell you what presents itself to me, if perhaps there may be some sense in it. For perhaps these matters of laws and customs might be shown to be not outside of the perception which we have through hearing and sight; but let us stick to the statement that that which is pleasing through the senses is beautiful, without interjecting the matter of the laws. But if this man of whom I speak, or anyone else whosoever, should ask us: Hippias and Socrates, did you make the distinction that in the category of the pleasing that which is pleasing in the way you mention is beautiful, whereas you say that that which is pleasing according to the other senses —those concerned with food and drink and sexual love and all such things—is not beautiful? Or do you say that such things are not even pleasing and that there is no pleasure at all in them, nor in anything else except sight and hearing? What shall we say, Hippias?
ΙΠ.Πάντως δήπου φήσομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις μεγάλας πάνυ ἡδονὰς εἶναι.
Hipp.Certainly, by all means, Socrates, we shall say that there are very great pleasures in the other things also.
ΣΩ."Τί οὖν," φήσει, "ἡδονὰς οὔσας οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ
καὶ ἐκείνας ἀφαιρεῖσθε τοῦτο τοὔνομα καὶ ἀποστερεῖτε τοῦ
299a καλὰς εἶναι;" Ὅτι, φήσομεν, καταγελῴη ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς
ὅστις οὔ, εἰ φαῖμεν μὴ ἡδὺ εἶναι φαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ καλόν, καὶ
ὄζειν ἡδὺ μὴ ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καλόν· τὰ δέ που περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια
πάντες ἂν ἡμῖν μάχοιντο ὡς ἥδιστον ὄν, δεῖν δὲ αὐτό, ἐάν
τις καὶ πράττῃ, οὕτω πράττειν ὥστε μηδένα ὁρᾶν, ὡς
αἴσχιστον ὂν ὁρᾶσθαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν λεγόντων, ὦ Ἱππία,
"Μανθάνω," ἂν ἴσως φαίη, "καὶ ἐγὼ ὅτι πάλαι αἰσχύνεσθε
ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς φάναι καλὰς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ τοῖς
299b ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ τοῦτο ἠρώτων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς
καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔστιν." ἐροῦμεν δὴ οἶμαι ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα,
ὅτι "Τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς γέ φαμεν τὸ μέρος τοῦ ἡδέος, τὸ
ἐπὶ τῇ ὄψει τε καὶ ἀκοῇ γιγνόμενον, καλὸν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ
ἔχεις ἔτι τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἤ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Soc.Why, then, he will say, if they are pleasures no less than the others, do you take from them this designation and deprive them of being beautiful? Because, we shall say, everybody would laugh at us if we should say that eating is not pleasant but is beautiful, and that a pleasant odor is not pleasant but is beautiful; and as to the act of sexual love, we should all, no doubt, contend that it is most pleasant, but that one must, if he perform it, do it so that no one else shall see, because it is most repulsive to see. If we say this, Hippias, I too understand, he will perhaps say, that you have all along been ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to people; but that is not what I asked, what seems to most people to be beautiful, but what is so. We shall, then, I fancy, say, as we suggested, We say that that part of the pleasant which comes by sight and hearing is beautiful. Do you think the statement is of any use, Hippias, or shall we say something else?
ΙΠ.Ἀνάγκη πρός γε τὰ εἰρημένα, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ ἄλλ'
ἄττα ἢ ταῦτα λέγειν.
Hipp.Inevitably, in view of what has been said, Socrates, we must say just that.
ΣΩ."Καλῶς δὴ λέγετε," φήσει. "οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ
299c δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ τοῦτο τυγχάνει
ὂν τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη;" ὁμολογήσομεν;
Soc.Excellent! he will say. Then if that which is pleasant through sight and hearing is beautiful, that among pleasant things which does not happen to be of that sort would evidently not be beautiful? Shall we agree?
ΙΠ.Ναί.
Hipp.Yes.
ΣΩ."Ἦ οὖν τὸ δι' ὄψεως ἡδύ," φήσει, "δι' ὄψεως
καὶ ἀκοῆς ἐστιν ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ δι' ἀκοῆς καὶ δι'
ὄψεώς ἐστιν ἡδύ;" Οὐδαμῶς, φήσομεν, τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου
ὂν τοῦτο δι' ἀμφοτέρων εἴη ἄν—τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖς ἡμῖν λέγειν—ἀλλ'
ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι καὶ ἑκάτερον τούτων αὐτὸ
καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν ἡδέων καλὸν εἴη, καὶ ἀμφότερα. οὐχ οὕτως
ἀποκρινούμεθα;
Soc.Is, then, that which is pleasant through sight, he will say, pleasant through sight and hearing, or is that which is pleasant through hearing pleasant through hearing and sight? No, we shall say, that which is pleasant through each of these would not in the least be pleasant through both—for that is what you appear to us to mean—but we said that either of these pleasant things would be beautiful alone by itself, and both together. Is not that the reply we shall make?
299d ΙΠ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Hipp.Certainly.
ΣΩ."Ἆρ' οὖν," φήσει, "ἡδὺ ἡδέος ὁτιοῦν ὁτουοῦν διαφέρει
τούτῳ, τῷ ἡδὺ εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἢ
ἐλάττων ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὐτῷ τούτῳ
διαφέρει, τῷ ἡ μὲν ἡδονὴ εἶναι, ἡ δὲ μὴ ἡδονή, τῶν ἡδονῶν;"
Οὐχ ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖ· οὐ γάρ;
Soc.Does, then, he will say, any pleasant thing whatsoever differ from any pleasant thing whatsoever by this, by being pleasant? I ask not whether any pleasure is greater or smaller or more or less, but whether it differs by just this very thing, by the fact that one of the pleasures is a pleasure and the other is not a pleasure. We do not think so. Do we?
ΙΠ.Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δοκεῖ.
Hipp.No, we do not.
ΣΩ."Οὐκοῦν," φήσει, "δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι ἡδοναί εἰσι
προείλεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, τοιοῦτόν
299e τι ὁρῶντες ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι ἔχουσί τι διάφορον τῶν
ἄλλων, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέποντες καλάς φατε αὐτὰς εἶναι; οὐ
γάρ που διὰ τοῦτο καλή ἐστιν ἡδονὴ ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως,
ὅτι δι' ὄψεώς ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἦν τὸ αἴτιον
καλῇ εἶναι, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ἡ ἑτέρα, ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς,
καλή· οὔκουν ἔστι γε δι' ὄψεως ἡδονή." Ἀληθῆ λέγεις,
φήσομεν;
Soc.Is it not, then, he will say, for some other reason than because they are pleasures that you chose these pleasures out from the other pleasures —it was because you saw some quality in both, since they have something different from the others, in view of which you say that they are beautiful? For the reason why that which is pleasant through sight is beautiful, is not, I imagine, because it is through sight; for if that were the cause of its being beautiful, the other pleasure, that through hearing, would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through sight. Shall we say What you say is true?
ΙΠ.Φήσομεν γάρ.
Hipp.Yes, we shall.
300a ΣΩ."Οὐδέ γ' αὖ ἡ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅτι δι' ἀκοῆς ἐστι,
διὰ ταῦτα τυγχάνει καλή· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὖ ἡ διὰ τῆς
ὄψεως καλὴ ἦν· οὔκουν ἔστι γε δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή." ἀληθῆ
φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγειν τὸν ἄνδρα ταῦτα λέγοντα;
Soc.Nor, again, is the pleasure through hearing beautiful for the reason that it is through hearing; for in that case, again, the pleasure through sight would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through hearing. Shall we say, Hippias, that the man who says that speaks the truth?
ΙΠ.Ἀληθῆ.
Hipp.Yes, he speaks the truth.
ΣΩ."Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότεραί γ' εἰσὶ καλαί, ὡς φατέ."
φαμὲν γάρ;
Soc.But yet both are beautiful, as you say. We do say that, do we not?
ΙΠ.Φαμέν.
Hipp.We do.
ΣΩ."Ἔχουσιν ἄρα τι τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς
εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις αὐταῖς ἔπεστι κοινῇ
300b καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ ἰδίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ἄλλως ἀμφότεραί γε καλαὶ
ἦσαν καὶ ἑκατέρα." ἀποκρίνου ἐμοὶ ὡς ἐκείνῳ.
Soc.They have, then, something identical which makes them to be beautiful, this common quality which pertains to both of them in common and to each individually; for otherwise they would not both collectively and each individually be beautiful. Answer me, as if you were answering him.
ΙΠ.Ἀποκρίνομαι, καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.
Hipp.I answer, and I think it is as you say.
ΣΩ.Εἰ ἄρα τι αὗται αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἀμφότεραι πεπόνθασιν,
ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν τούτῳ γε τῷ παθήματι εἶεν καλαί.
Soc.If, then, these pleasures are both affected in any way collectively, but each individually is not so affected, it is not by this affection that they would be beautiful.
ΙΠ.Καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, μηδετέρας πεπονθυίας
τι τῶν ὄντων ὁτιοῦν, ἔπειτα τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ
μηδετέρα πέπονθεν, ἀμφοτέρας πεπονθέναι;
Hipp.And how could that be, Socrates, when neither of them individually is affected by some affection or other, that then both are affected by that affection by which neither is affected?
300c ΣΩ.Οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
Soc.You think it cannot be?
ΙΠ.Πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν μ' ἔχοι ἀπειρία καὶ τῆς τούτων
φύσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν παρόντων λέξεως λόγων.
Hipp.I should have to be very inexperienced both in the nature of these things and in the language of our present discussion.
ΣΩ.Ἡδέως γε, ὦ Ἱππία. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἴσως κινδυνεύω
δοκεῖν μέν τι ὁρᾶν οὕτως ἔχον ὡς σὺ φῂς ἀδύνατον
εἶναι, ὁρῶ δ' οὐδέν.
Soc.Very pretty, Hippias. But there is a chance that I think I see a case of that kind which you say is impossible, but do not really see it.
ΙΠ.Οὐ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἑτοίμως
παρορᾷς.
Hipp.There’s no chance about it, Socrates, but you quite purposely see wrongly.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν πολλά γέ μοι προφαίνεται τοιαῦτα πρὸ
τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀπιστῶ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι σοὶ μὲν οὐ φαντάζεται,
300d ἀνδρὶ πλεῖστον ἀργύριον εἰργασμένῳ τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ,
ἐμοὶ δέ, ὃς οὐδὲν πώποτε ἠργασάμην. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦμαι, ὦ
ἑταῖρε, μὴ παίζῃς πρός με καὶ ἑκὼν ἐξαπατᾷς· οὕτως μοι
σφόδρα καὶ πολλὰ φαίνεται.
Soc.And certainly many such cases appear before my mind, but I mistrust them because they do not appear to you, a man who has made more money by wisdom than anyone now living, but to me who never made any money at all; and the thought disturbs me that you are playing with me and purposely deceiving me, they appear to me in such numbers and with such force.
ΙΠ.Οὐδεὶς σοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον εἴσεται εἴτε παίζω
εἴτε μή, ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσῃς λέγειν τὰ προφαινόμενά σοι ταῦτα·
φανήσῃ γὰρ οὐδὲν λέγων. οὐ γὰρ μήποτε εὕρῃς, ὃ μήτ'
ἐγὼ πέπονθα μήτε σύ, τοῦτ' ἀμφοτέρους ἡμᾶς πεπονθότας.
Hipp.Nobody, Socrates, will know better than you whether I am playing with you or not, if you proceed to tell these things that appear to you; for it will be apparent to you that you are talking nonsense. For you will never find that you and I are both affected by an affection by which neither of us is affected.
300e ΣΩ.Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία; ἴσως μὲν τὶ λέγεις, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ
μανθάνω· ἀλλά μου σαφέστερον ἄκουσον ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται, ὃ μήτ' ἐγὼ πέπονθα εἶναι μήτ' εἰμὶ μηδ'
αὖ σὺ εἶ, τοῦτο ἀμφοτέρους πεπονθέναι ἡμᾶς οἷόν τ' εἶναι·
ἕτερα δ' αὖ, ἃ ἀμφότεροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα οὐδέτερον
εἶναι ἡμῶν.
Soc.What are you saying, Hippias? Perhaps you are talking sense, and I fail to understand; but let me tell more clearly what I wish to say. For it appears to me that it is possible for us both to be so affected as to be something which I am not so affected as to be, and which I am not and you are not either; and again for neither of us to be so affected as to be other things which we both are.
ΙΠ.Τέρατα αὖ ἀποκρινομένῳ ἔοικας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι
μείζω ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἀπεκρίνω. σκόπει γάρ· πότερον
εἰ ἀμφότεροι δίκαιοί ἐσμεν, οὐ καὶ ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη ἄν,
ἢ εἰ ἄδικος ἑκάτερος, οὐ καὶ ἀμφότεροι, ἢ εἰ ὑγιαίνοντες,
301a οὐ καὶ ἑκάτερος; ἢ εἰ κεκμηκώς τι ἢ τετρωμένος ἢ πεπληγμένος
ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν πεπονθὼς ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη, οὐ καὶ
ἀμφότεροι αὖ ἂν τοῦτο πεπόνθοιμεν; ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ χρυσοῖ ἢ
ἀργυροῖ ἢ ἐλεφάντινοι, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γενναῖοι ἢ σοφοὶ
ἢ τίμιοι ἢ γέροντές γε ἢ νέοι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτι βούλει τῶν
ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμφότεροι τύχοιμεν ὄντες, ἆρ' οὐ μεγάλη
ἀνάγκη καὶ ἑκάτερον ἡμῶν τοῦτο εἶναι;
Hipp.Your reply, Socrates, seems to involve miracles again even greater than those of your previous reply. For consider: if we are both just, would not each of us be just also, and if each is unjust, would not both again also be unjust, or if both are healthy, each of us also? Or if each of us were to be tired or wounded or struck or affected in any other way whatsoever, should we not both of us be affected in the same way? Then, too, if we were to be golden or of silver or of ivory, or, if you please, noble or wise or honored or old or young or whatever else you like of all that flesh is heir to, is it not quite inevitable that each of us be that also?
301b ΣΩ.Πάντως γε δήπου.
Soc.Absolutely.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν
πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι,
κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον
τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες. διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω
μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα.
καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτόν σε λέληθεν, ὥστε οἴει εἶναί τι
ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν, ἣ περὶ μὲν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἔστιν ἅμα,
301c περὶ δὲ ἑκάτερον οὔ, ἢ αὖ περὶ μὲν ἑκάτερον, περὶ δὲ ἀμφότερα
οὔ· οὕτως ἀλογίστως καὶ ἀσκέπτως καὶ εὐήθως καὶ
ἀδιανοήτως διάκεισθε.
Hipp.But you see, Socrates, you do not consider the entirety of things, nor do they with whom you are in the habit of conversing, but you all test the beautiful and each individual entity by taking them separately and cutting them to pieces. For this reason you fail to observe that embodiments of reality are by nature so great and undivided. And now you have failed to observe to such a degree that you think there is some affection or reality which pertains to both of these together, but not to each individually, or again to each, but not to both; so unreasoning and undiscerning and foolish and unreflecting is your state of mind.
ΣΩ.Τοιαῦτα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὰ ἡμέτερά ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷα
βούλεταί τις, φασὶν ἄνθρωποι ἑκάστοτε παροιμιαζόμενοι,
ἀλλ' οἷα δύναται· ἀλλὰ σὺ ἡμᾶς ὀνίνης ἀεὶ νουθετῶν. ἐπεὶ
καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ ταῦτα νουθετηθῆναι, ὡς εὐήθως διεκείμεθα,
ἔτι σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω εἰπὼν ἃ διενοούμεθα
301d περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢ μὴ εἴπω;
Soc.Human affairs, Hippias, are not what a man wishes, but what he can, as the proverb goes which people are constantly citing; but you are always aiding us with admonitions. For now too, until we were admonished by you of our foolish state of mind—shall I continue to speak and make you a still further exhibition of our thoughts on the subject, or shall I not speak?
ΙΠ.Εἰδότι μὲν ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες· οἶδα γὰρ ἑκάστους
τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὡς διάκεινται. ὅμως δ' εἴ τι σοὶ
ἥδιον, λέγε.
Hipp.You will speak to one who knows, Socrates, for I know the state of mind of all who are concerned with discussions; but nevertheless, if you prefer, speak.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥδιόν γε. ἡμεῖς γάρ, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὕτως
ἀβέλτεροι ἦμεν, πρίν σε ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν, ὥστε δόξαν εἴχομεν
περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ ὡς ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἷς ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ
ὃ ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη οὐκ ἄρα εἶμεν ἀμφότεροι—οὐ γὰρ εἷς
ἐσμεν, ἀλλὰ δύο—οὕτως εὐηθικῶς εἴχομεν· νῦν δὲ παρὰ
301e σοῦ ἤδη ἀνεδιδάχθημεν ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο ἀμφότεροί ἐσμεν,
δύο καὶ ἑκάτερον ἡμῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δὲ εἷς ἑκάτερος,
ἕνα καὶ ἀμφοτέρους ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε διανεκεῖ λόγῳ
τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἱππίαν ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν ἀμφότερα
ᾖ, τοῦτο καὶ ἑκάτερον, καὶ ὃ ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα εἶναι.
πεπεισμένος δὴ νῦν ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐνθάδε κάθημαι. πρότερον
μέντοι, ὦ Ἱππία, ὑπόμνησόν με· πότερον εἷς ἐσμεν ἐγώ τε
καὶ σύ, ἢ σύ τε δύο εἶ κἀγὼ δύο;
Soc.Well, I do prefer. For we, my friend, were so stupid, before you spoke, as to have an opinion concerning you and me, that each of us was one, but that we were not both that which each of us was—for we are not one, but two —so foolish were we. But now we have been taught by you that if we are both two, then each of us is inevitably two, and if each is one, then both are inevitably one; for it is impossible, by the continuous doctrine of reality according to Hippias, that it be otherwise, but what we both are, that each is, and what each is, both are. So now I have been convinced by you, and I hold this position. But first, Hippias, refresh my memory: Are you and I one, or are you two and I two?
ΙΠ.Τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Hipp.What do you mean, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Ταῦτα ἅπερ λέγω· φοβοῦμαι γάρ σε σαφῶς λέγειν,
302a ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνεις, ἐπειδὰν τὶ δόξῃς σαυτῷ λέγειν. ὅμως
δ' ἔτι μοι εἰπέ· οὐχ εἷς ἡμῶν ἑκάτερός ἐστι καὶ πέπονθε
τοῦτο, εἷς εἶναι;
Soc.Just what I say; for I am afraid to speak plainly to you, because you are vexed with me, when you think you are talking sensibly; however, tell me further: Is not each of us one and affected in such a way as to be one?
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ εἷς,
καὶ περιττὸς ἂν εἴη ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν· ἢ οὐ τὸ ἓν περιττὸν
ἡγῇ;
Soc.Then each of us, if one, would be an odd number; or do you not consider one an odd number?
—ΙΠ.Ἔγωγε.
Hipp.I do.
—ΣΩ.Ἦ καὶ ἀμφότεροι οὖν περιττοί
ἐσμεν δύο ὄντες;
Soc.Then are we both an odd number, being two?
—ΙΠ.Οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.That could not be, Socrates.
Ἀλλ' ἄρτιοί γε ἀμφότεροι· ἦ γάρ;
Soc.But we are both an even number, are we not?
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
Μῶν οὖν, ὅτι ἀμφότεροι ἄρτιοι, τούτου ἕνεκα καὶ ἑκάτερος
302b ἄρτιος ἡμῶν ἐστιν;
Soc.Then because we are both even, is each of us on that account even?
—ΙΠ.Οὐ δῆτα.
Hipp.No, surely not.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶσα
ἀνάγκη, ὡς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ἃ ἂν ἀμφότεροι καὶ ἑκάτερον, καὶ
ἃ ἂν ἑκάτερος καὶ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι.
Soc.Then it is not absolutely inevitable, as you said just now, that what both are, each is, and what each is, both are.
ΙΠ.Οὐ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷα ἐγὼ πρότερον ἔλεγον.
Hipp.Not things of this sort, but such as I mentioned before.
ΣΩ.Ἐξαρκεῖ, ὦ Ἱππία· ἀγαπητὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ
τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, τὰ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοντα. καὶ γὰρ
ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, εἰ μέμνησαι ὅθεν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐλέχθη, ὅτι
ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονὴ οὐ τούτῳ εἶεν καλαί,
302c ὅτι τυγχάνοιεν ἑκατέρα μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι πεπονθυῖα, ἀμφότεραι
δὲ μή, ἢ ἀμφότεραι μέν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ
ᾧ ἀμφότεραί τε καὶ ἑκατέρα, διότι συνεχώρεις ἀμφοτέρας
τε αὐτὰς εἶναι καλὰς καὶ ἑκατέραν. τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα τῇ
οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐπ' ἀμφότερα ἑπομένῃ ᾤμην, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά ἐστι
καλά, ταύτῃ δεῖν αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα
ἀπολειπομένῃ μή· καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἴομαι. ἀλλά μοι λέγε,
ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἡ δι' ὄψεως ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ δι' ἀκοῆς, εἴπερ
302d ἀμφότεραί τ' εἰσὶ καλαὶ καὶ ἑκατέρα, ἆρα καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς
καλὰς οὐχὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις γε αὐταῖς ἕπεται καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ;
Soc.That suffices, Hippias; for even this is welcome, since it appears that some things are so and some are not so. For I said, if you remember the beginning of this discussion, that pleasure through sight and through hearing were beautiful, not by that by which each of them was so affected as to be beautiful, but not both, nor both but not each, but by that by which both and each were so affected, because you conceded that both and each were beautiful. For this reason I thought that if both are beautiful they must be beautiful by that essence which belongs to both, but not by that which is lacking in each; and I still think so. But tell me, as in the beginning: If pleasure through sight and pleasure through hearing are both and each beautiful, does not that which makes them beautiful belong to both and to each?
—ΙΠ.Πάνυ γε.
Hipp.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἑκατέρα τ' ἐστὶ
καὶ ἀμφότεραι, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἶεν καλαί; ἢ διὰ τοῦτο μὲν
καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἂν οὐδὲν τούτων ἧττον εἶεν καλαί; οὐδὲν
γὰρ ἧττον ἡδοναὶ ἐφάνησαν οὖσαι, εἰ μέμνησαι.
Soc.Is it, then, for this reason, because each is a pleasure and both are pleasures, that they would be beautiful? Or would all other pleasures be for this reason no less beautiful than they? For we saw, if you remember, that they were no less pleasures.
Μέμνημαι.
Hipp.Yes,I remember.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ὅτι γε δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς αὗταί
302e εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐλέγετο καλὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι.
Soc.But for this reason, because these pleasures were through sight and hearing, it was said that they are beautiful.
—ΙΠ.Καὶ ἐρρήθη
οὕτως.
Hipp.Yes, that is what was said.
ΣΩ.Σκόπει δὲ εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγω. ἐλέγετο γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ
μνήμης ἔχω, τοῦτ' εἶναι καλὸν τὸ ἡδύ, οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν
δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ᾖ.
Soc.See if what I say is true. For it was said, if my memory serves me, that this pleasant was beautiful, not all pleasant, but that which is through sight and hearing.
—ΙΠ.Ἀληθῆ.
Hipp.True.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό
γε τὸ πάθος ἀμφοτέραις μὲν ἕπεται, ἑκατέρᾳ δ' οὔ; οὐ γάρ
που ἑκάτερόν γε αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο, δι'
ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀμφότερα μὲν δι' ἀμφοῖν, ἑκάτερον
δ' οὔ· ἔστι ταῦτα;
Soc.Now this quality belongs to both, but not to each, does it not? For surely each of them, as was said before, is not through both senses, but both are through both, and each is not. Is that true?
—ΙΠ.Ἔστιν.
Hipp.It is.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα τούτῳ γε
ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐστι καλόν, ὃ μὴ ἕπεται ἑκατέρῳ (τὸ γὰρ
ἀμφότερον ἑκατέρῳ οὐχ ἕπεται) ὥστε ἀμφότερα μὲν αὐτὰ
φάναι καλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔξεστιν, ἑκάτερον δὲ οὐκ
303a ἔξεστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; οὐκ ἀνάγκη;
Soc.Then it is not by that which does not belong to each that each of them is beautiful; for both does not belong to each; so that it is possible, according to our hypothesis, to say that they both are beautiful, but not to say that each is so; or what shall we say? Is that not inevitable?
—ΙΠ.Φαίνεται.
Hipp.It appears so.
— ΣΩ.Φῶμεν οὖν ἀμφότερα μὲν καλὰ εἶναι, ἑκάτερον δὲ μὴ
φῶμεν;
Soc.Shall we say, then, that both are beautiful, but that each is not?
—ΙΠ.Τί γὰρ κωλύει;
Hipp.What is to prevent?
ΣΩ.Τόδε ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ φίλε, κωλύειν, ὅτι ἦν που
ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν οὕτως ἐπιγιγνόμενα ἑκάστοις, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέροις
ἐπιγίγνοιτο, καὶ ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ εἴπερ ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ ἀμφοτέροις,
ἅπαντα ὅσα σὺ διῆλθες· ἦ γάρ;
Soc.This seems to me, my friend, to prevent, that there were some attributes thus belonging to individual things, which belonged, we thought, to each, if they belonged to both, and to both, if they belonged to each—I mean all those attributes which you specified. Am I right?
ΙΠ.Ναί.
Hipp.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ἃ δέ γε αὖ ἐγὼ διῆλθον, οὔ· ὧν δὴ ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ
τὸ ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἀμφότερον. ἔστιν οὕτως;
Soc.But those again which I specified did not; and among those were precisely each and both. Is that so?
ΙΠ.Ἔστιν.
Hipp.It is.
303b ΣΩ.Ποτέρων οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, δοκεῖ σοι τὸ καλὸν εἶναι;
πότερον ὧν σὺ ἔλεγες· εἴπερ ἐγὼ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι,
καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ δίκαιος καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ
εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἑκάτερος· οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ καλὸς
καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἑκάτερος;
ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἀρτίων ὄντων τινῶν ἀμφοτέρων τάχα
μὲν ἑκάτερα περιττὰ εἶναι, τάχα δ' ἄρτια, καὶ αὖ ἀρρήτων
ἑκατέρων ὄντων τάχα μὲν ῥητὰ τὰ συναμφότερα εἶναι, τάχα
303c δ' ἄρρητα, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἐμοὶ
προφαίνεσθαι; ποτέρων δὴ τιθεῖς τὸ καλόν; ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ
περὶ αὐτοῦ καταφαίνεται, καὶ σοί; πολλὴ γὰρ ἀλογία ἔμοιγε
δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρους μὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι καλούς, ἑκάτερον δὲ
μή, ἢ ἑκάτερον μέν, ἀμφοτέρους δὲ μή, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν
τοιούτων. οὕτως αἱρῇ, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἢ 'κείνως;
Soc.To which group, then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you to belong? To the group of those that you mentioned? If I am strong and you also, are we both collectively strong, and if I am just and you also, are we both collectively just, and if both collectively, then each individually so, too, if I am beautiful and you also, are we both collectively beautiful, and if both collectively, then each individually? Or is there nothing to prevent this, as in the case that when given things are both collectively even, they may perhaps individually be odd, or perhaps even, and again, when things are individually irrational quantities they may perhaps both collectively be rational, or perhaps irrational, and countless other cases which, you know, I said appeared before my mind? To which group do you assign the beautiful? Or have you the same view about it as I? For to me it seems great foolishness that we collectively are beautiful, but each of us is not so, or that each of us is so, but both are not, or anything else of that sort. Do you choose in this way, as I do, or in some other way?
ΙΠ.Οὕτως ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Hipp.In this way, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ Ἱππία, ἵνα καὶ ἀπαλλαγῶμεν
303d πλείονος ζητήσεως· εἰ γὰρ τούτων γ' ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ
ἂν ἔτι εἴη τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν. ἀμφότερα
μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ καλὰ τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς, ἑκάτερον δ' οὔ·
τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἀδύνατον, ὡς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν,
ὦ Ἱππία.
Soc.You choose well, Hippias, that we may be free from the need of further search; for if the beautiful is in this group, that which is pleasing through sight and hearing would no longer be the beautiful. For the expression through sight and hearing makes both collectively beautiful, but not each individually; and this was impossible, as you and I agree.
ΙΠ.Ὁμολογοῦμεν γάρ.
Hipp.Yes, we agree.
ΣΩ.Ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλὸν
εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε καλὸν γιγνόμενον τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι παρέχεται.
Soc.It is, then, impossible that the pleasant through sight and hearing be the beautiful, since in becoming beautiful it offers an impossibility.
ΙΠ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Hipp.That is true.
ΣΩ."Λέγετε δὴ πάλιν," φήσει, "ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐπειδὴ
303e τούτου διημάρτετε· τί φατε εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐπ'
ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, δι' ὅτι ταύτας πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων
τιμήσαντες καλὰς ὠνομάσατε;" ἀνάγκη δή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι,
ὦ Ἱππία, λέγειν ὅτι ἀσινέσταται αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν εἰσι
καὶ βέλτισται, καὶ ἀμφότεραι καὶ ἑκατέρα· ἢ σύ τι ἔχεις
λέγειν ἄλλο ᾧ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων;
Soc.Then tell us again, he will say, from the beginning, since you failed this time; what do you say that this ’beautiful,’ belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honored them before the rest and called them beautiful? It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest?
ΙΠ.Οὐδαμῶς· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ βέλτισταί εἰσιν.
Hipp.Not at all; for really they are the best.
ΣΩ."Τοῦτ' ἄρα," φήσει, "λέγετε δὴ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι,
ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον;" Ἐοίκαμεν, φήσω ἔγωγε· σὺ δέ;
Soc.This, then, he will say, you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure? It seems that we do, I shall say; and you?
ΙΠ.Καὶ ἐγώ.
Hipp.I also.
ΣΩ."Οὐκοῦν ὠφέλιμον," φήσει, "τὸ ποιοῦν τἀγαθόν,
τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ ποιούμενον ἕτερον νυνδὴ ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰς
τὸν πρότερον λόγον ἥκει ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν
304a εἴη καλὸν οὔτε τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἑκάτερόν
ἐστι." Παντός γε μᾶλλον, φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία, ἂν σωφρονῶμεν·
οὐ γάρ που θέμις τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι μὴ συγχωρεῖν.
Soc.Well, then, he will say, beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good, if each of them is different from the other. Absolutely true, we shall say, if we are reasonable; for it is inadmissible to disagree with him who says what is right.
ΙΠ.Ἀλλὰ δή γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, τί οἴει ταῦτα εἶναι συνάπαντα;
κνήσματά τοί ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων,
ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ διῃρημένα· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ
καλὸν καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, οἷόν τ' εἶναι εὖ καὶ καλῶς λόγον
καταστησάμενον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ ἢ ἐπὶ ἄλλῃ
304b τινὶ ἀρχῇ, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, πείσαντα οἴχεσθαι φέροντα
οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἄθλων, σωτηρίαν
αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ χρημάτων καὶ φίλων. τούτων οὖν
χρὴ ἀντέχεσθαι, χαίρειν ἐάσαντα τὰς σμικρολογίας ταύτας,
ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ λίαν ἀνόητος εἶναι λήρους καὶ φλυαρίας ὥσπερ
νῦν μεταχειριζόμενος.
Hipp.But now, Socrates, what do you think all this amounts to? It is mere scrapings and shavings of discourse, as I said a while ago, divided into bits; but that other ability is beautiful and of great worth, the ability to produce a discourse well and beautifully in a court of law or a council-house or before any other public body before which the discourse may be delivered, to convince the audience and to carry off, not the smallest, but the greatest of prizes, the salvation of oneself, one’s property, and one’s friends. For these things, therefore, one must strive, renouncing these petty arguments, that one may not, by busying oneself, as at present, with mere talk and nonsense, appear to be a fool.
ΣΩ.Ὦ Ἱππία φίλε, σὺ μὲν μακάριος εἶ, ὅτι τε οἶσθα
ἃ χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἐπιτετήδευκας ἱκανῶς, ὡς
304c φῄς· ἐμὲ δὲ δαιμονία τις τύχη, ὡς ἔοικε, κατέχει, ὅστις
πλανῶμαι μὲν καὶ ἀπορῶ ἀεί, ἐπιδεικνὺς δὲ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ
ἀπορίαν ὑμῖν τοῖς σοφοῖς λόγῳ αὖ ὑπὸ ὑμῶν προπηλακίζομαι,
ἐπειδὰν ἐπιδείξω. λέγετε γάρ με, ἅπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν
λέγεις, ὡς ἠλίθιά τε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πραγματεύομαι·
ἐπειδὰν δὲ αὖ ἀναπεισθεὶς ὑπὸ ὑμῶν λέγω ἅπερ
ὑμεῖς, ὡς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστιν οἷόν τ' εἶναι λόγον εὖ καὶ
καλῶς καταστησάμενον περαίνειν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ
304d τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὑπό τε ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ ὑπὸ
τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἀεί με ἐλέγχοντος πάντα κακὰ
ἀκούω. καὶ γάρ μοι τυγχάνει ἐγγύτατα γένους ὢν καὶ ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκῶν· ἐπειδὰν οὖν εἰσέλθω οἴκαδε εἰς ἐμαυτοῦ
καί μου ἀκούσῃ ταῦτα λέγοντος, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι
τολμῶν περὶ καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω φανερῶς
ἐξελεγχόμενος περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὅτι οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι
ποτέ ἐστιν οἶδα. "Καίτοι πῶς σὺ εἴσῃ," φησίν, "ἢ λόγον
304e ὅστις καλῶς κατεστήσατο ἢ μή, ἢ ἄλλην πρᾶξιν ἡντινοῦν,
τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοῶν; καὶ ὁπότε οὕτω διάκεισαι, οἴει σοι κρεῖττον
εἶναι ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι;" συμβέβηκε δή μοι, ὅπερ
λέγω, κακῶς μὲν ὑπὸ ὑμῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὀνειδίζεσθαι, κακῶς
δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν ταῦτα
πάντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ ὠφελοίμην. ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ,
ὦ Ἱππία, ὠφελῆσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν ὁμιλίας· τὴν
γὰρ παροιμίαν ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, τὸ "Χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά," δοκῶ
μοι εἰδέναι.
Soc.My dear Hippias, you are blessed because you know the things a man ought to practise, and have, as you say, practised them satisfactorily. But I, as it seems, am possessed by some accursed fortune, so that I am always wandering and perplexed, and, exhibiting my perplexity to you wise men, am in turn reviled by you in speech whenever I exhibit it. For you say of me, what you are now saying, that I busy myself with silly little matters of no account; but when in turn I am convinced by you and say what you say, that it is by far the best thing to be able to produce a discourse well and beautifully and gain one’s end in a court of law or in any other assemblage, I am called everything that is bad by some other men here and especially by that man who is continually refuting me; for he is a very near relative of mine and lives in the same house. So whenever I go home to my own house, and he hears me saying these things, he asks me if I am not ashamed that I have the face to talk about beautiful practices, when it is so plainly shown, to my confusion, that I do not even know what the beautiful itself is. And yet how are you to know, he will say, either who produced a discourse, or anything else whatsoever, beautifully, or not, when you are ignorant of the beautiful? And when you are in such a condition, do you think it is better for you to be alive than dead? So it has come about, as I say, that I am abused and reviled by you and by him. But perhaps it is necessary to endure all this, for it is quite reasonable that I might be benefited by it. So I think, Hippias, that I have been benefited by conversation with both of you; for I think I know the meaning of the proverb beautiful things are difficult.