Burnet (OCT, 1903) · Lamb (1925)
447a ΚΑΛ.Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, Σώκρατες,
οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.
Call.To join in a fight or a fray, as the saying is, Socrates, you have chosen your time well enough.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' , τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ
ὑστεροῦμεν;
Soc.Do you mean, according to the proverb, we have come too late for a feast?
ΚΑΛ.Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ
Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.
Call.Yes, a most elegant feast; for Gorgias gave us a fine and varied display but a moment ago.
ΣΩ.Τούτων μέντοι, Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε,
ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι.
Soc.But indeed, Callicles, it is Chaerephon here who must take the blame for this; he forced us to spend our time in the market-place.
447b ΧΑΙ.Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι.
φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ,
νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰς αὖθις.
Chaer.No matter, Socrates I will take the curing of it too for Gorgias is a friend of mine, so that he will give us a display now, if you think fit, or if you prefer, on another occasion.
ΚΑΛ.Τί δέ, Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι
Γοργίου;
Call.What, Chaerephon? Has Socrates a desire to hear Gorgias?
ΧΑΙ.Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.
Chaer.Yes, it is for that very purpose we are here.
ΚΑΛ.Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε· παρ'
ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.
Call.Then whenever you have a mind to pay me a call—Gorgias is staying with me, and he will give you a display.
ΣΩ.Εὖ λέγεις, Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν
447c ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τίς
δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστιν ἐπαγγέλλεταί
τε καὶ διδάσκει· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰς αὖθις, ὥσπερ σὺ
λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.
Soc.Thank you, Callicles: but would he consent to discuss with us? For I want to find out from the man what is the function of his art, and what it is that he professes and teaches. As for the rest of his performance, he must give it us, as you suggest, on another occasion.
ΚΑΛ.Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ
αὐτῷ ἓν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν
ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη
ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.
Call.The best way is to ask our friend himself, Socrates: for indeed that was one of the features of his performance. Why, only this moment he was pressing for whatever questions anyone in the house might like to ask, and saying he would answer them all.
ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.
Soc.What a good idea! Ask him, Chaerephon.
ΧΑΙ.Τί ἔρωμαι;
Chaer.What am I to ask?
447d ΣΩ.Ὅστις ἐστίν.
Soc.What he is.
ΧΑΙ.Πῶς λέγεις;
Chaer.How do you mean?
ΣΩ.Ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός,
ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς
λέγω;
Soc.Just as, if he chanced to be in the shoe-making business, his answer would have been, I presume, a shoemaker. Now, don’t you see my meaning?
ΧΑΙ.Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. Εἰπέ μοι, Γοργία,
ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλῃ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι
ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;
Chaer.I see, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles here correct in saying that you profess to answer any questions one may ask you?
448a ΓΟΡ.Ἀληθῆ, Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα
ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν
οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.
Gorg.He is, Chaerephon; indeed, I was just now making this very profession, and I may add that nobody has asked me anything new for many years now.
ΧΑΙ. που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρινῇ, Γοργία.
Chaer.So I presume you will easily answer, Gorgias.
ΓΟΡ.Πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.
Gorg.You are free to make trial of that, Chaerephon.
ΠΩΛ.Νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ.
Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι
διελήλυθεν.
Pol.Yes, to be sure; and, if you like, Chaerephon, of me. For I think Gorgias must be quite tired out, after the long discourse he has just delivered.
ΧΑΙ.Τί δέ, Πῶλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου
ἀποκρίνασθαι;
Chaer.Why, Polus, do you suppose you could answer more excellently than Gorgias?
448b ΠΩΛ.Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;
Pol.And what does that matter, if I should satisfy you?
ΧΑΙ.Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.
Chaer.Not at all; since it is your wish, answer.
ΠΩΛ.Ἐρώτα.
Pol.Ask.
ΧΑΙ.Ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν
τῆς τέχνης ἧσπερ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τί ἂν αὐτὸν
ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον;
Chaer.Then I ask you, if Gorgias chanced to be skilled in the same art as his brother Herodicus, what should we be justified in calling him? What we call his brother, should we not?
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
ΧΑΙ.Ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν
ἐλέγομεν.
Chaer.Then we should make a right statement if we described him as a doctor.
ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
ΧΑΙ.Εἰ δέ γε ἧσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν Ἀγλαοφῶντος
ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς
ἐκαλοῦμεν;
Chaer.And if he were expert in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother, what name should we rightly give him?
448c ΠΩΛ.Δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.
Pol.Obviously that of painter.
ΧΑΙ.Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα
ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;
Chaer.But as it is, we would like to know in what art he is skilled, and hence by what name we should rightly call him.
ΠΩΛ. Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν
ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ηὑρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ
ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ
κατὰ τύχην. ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι
ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας
ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.
Pol.Chaerephon, there are many arts amongst mankind that have been discovered experimentally, as the result of experiences: for experience conducts the course of our life according to art, but inexperience according to chance. Of these several arts various men partake in various ways, and the best men of the best. Gorgias here is one of these, and he is a partner in the finest art of all.
448d ΣΩ.Καλῶς γε, Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι
εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ
ποιεῖ.
Soc.Fine, at any rate, Gorgias, is the equipment for discourse that Polus seems to have got: but still he is not performing his promise to Chaerephon.
ΓΟΡ.Τί μάλιστα, Σώκρατες;
Gorg.How exactly, Socrates ?
ΣΩ.Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
Soc.He does not seem to me to be quite answering what he is asked.
ΓΟΡ.Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.
Gorg.Well, will you please ask him?
ΣΩ.Οὔκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν
εἴρηκεν ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν
διαλέγεσθαι.
Soc.No, if you yourself will be so good as to answer, why, I would far rather ask you. For I see plainly, from what he has said, that Polus has had more practice in what is called rhetoric than in discussion.
448e ΠΩΛ.Τί δή, Σώκρατες;
Pol.How so, Socrates ?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι, Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας
ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ
τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.
Soc.Because, Polus, when Chaerephon has asked in what art Gorgias is skilled, you merely eulogize his art as though it were under some censure, instead of replying what it is.
ΠΩΛ.Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἴη καλλίστη;
Pol.Why, did I not reply that it was the finest?
ΣΩ.Καὶ μάλα. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις Γοργίου
τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὅντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ
τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς
449a καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς τέχνη
καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, Γοργία,
αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα
τέχνης.
Soc.You certainly did: but nobody asked what was the quality of his art, only what it was, and by what name we ought to call Gorgias. Just as Chaerephon laid out the lines for you at first, and you answered him properly in brief words, in the same way you must now state what is that art, and what we ought to call Gorgias; or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself in what art it is you are skilled, and hence, what we ought to call you.
ΓΟΡ.Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, Σώκρατες.
Gorg.Rhetoric, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;
Soc.So we are to call you a rhetorician ?
ΓΟΡ.Ἀγαθόν γε, Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι,
ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.
Gorg.Yes, and a good one, if you would call me what—to use Homer’s phrase—I vaunt myself to be.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.
Soc.Well, I shall be pleased to do so.
ΓΟΡ.Κάλει δή.
Gorg.Then call me such.
449b ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;
Soc.And are we to say that you are able to make others like yourself?
ΓΟΡ.Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἄλλοθι.
Gorg.Yes, that is what I profess to do, not only here, but elsewhere also.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα,
διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος,
τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο,
εἰς αὖθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ
ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
Soc.Then would you be willing, Gorgias, to continue this present way of discussion, by alternate question and answer, and defer to some other time that lengthy style of speech in which Polus made a beginning? Come, be true to your promise, and consent to answer each question briefly.
ΓΟΡ.Εἰσὶ μέν, Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων
ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
449c πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο
ἕν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ
εἰπεῖν.
Gorg.There are some answers, Socrates, that necessitate a lengthy expression: however, I will try to be as brief as possible; for indeed it is one of my claims that no one could express the same thing in briefer terms than myself.
ΣΩ.Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ
τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς
αὖθις.
Soc.That is just what I want, Gorgias: give me a display of this very skill—in brevity of speech; your lengthy style will do another time.
ΓΟΡ.Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου
ἀκοῦσαι.
Gorg.Well, I will do that, and you will admit that you never heard anyone speak more briefly.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δή· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῂς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης
449d εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί
τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν
ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· γάρ;
Soc.Come then; since you claim to be skilled in rhetorical art, and to be able to make anyone else a rhetorician, tell me with what particular thing rhetoric is concerned: as, for example, weaving is concerned with the manufacture of clothes, is it not?
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ
μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;
Soc.And music, likewise, with the making of tunes?
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
ΣΩ.Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις,
ὅτι ἀποκρίνῃ ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.
Soc.Upon my word, Gorgias, I do admire your answers! You make them as brief as they well can be.
ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
Gorg.Yes, Socrates, I consider myself a very fair hand at that.
ΣΩ.Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ
τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;
Soc.You are right there. Come now, answer me in the same way about rhetoric: with what particular thing is its skill concerned?
449e — ΓΟΡ.Περὶ λόγους.
Gorg.With speech.
—ΣΩ.Ποίους τούτους, Γοργία; ἆρα
οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν;
Soc.What kind of speech, Gorgias? Do you mean that which shows sick people by what regimen they could get well?
— ΓΟΡ.Οὔ.
Gorg.No.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους
ῥητορική ἐστιν.
Soc.Then rhetoric is not concerned with all kinds of speech.
—ΓΟΡ.Οὐ δῆτα.
Gorg.No, I say.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν
γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.
Soc.Yet it does make men able to speak.
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ
λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;
Soc.And to understand also the things about which they speak.
—ΓΟΡ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Gorg.Of course.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν,
450a ἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ
δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;
Soc.Now, does the medical art, which we mentioned just now, make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
—ΓΟΡ.Ἀνάγκη.
Gorg.It must.
— ΣΩ.Καὶ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.
Soc.Hence the medical art also, it seems, is concerned with speech.
— ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;
Soc.That is, speech about diseases?
—ΓΟΡ.Μάλιστα.
Gorg.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν
τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;
Soc.Now, is gymnastic also concerned with speech about the good and bad condition of our bodies?
—ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ
γε.
Gorg.Quite so.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, Γοργία, οὕτως
450b ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἳ τυγχάνουσιν
ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν τέχνη.
Soc.And moreover it is the same, Gorgias, with all the other arts; each of them is concerned with that kind of speech which deals with the subject matter of that particular art.
—ΓΟΡ.Φαίνεται.
Gorg.Apparently.
—ΣΩ.Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας
οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην
ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἂν περὶ λόγους;
Soc.Then why, pray, do you not give the name rhetorical to those other arts, when they are concerned with speech, if you call that rhetoric which has to do with speech?
ΓΟΡ.Ὅτι, Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ
χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά
ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον
χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα πρᾶξις καὶ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων
450c ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ
λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.
Gorg.Because, Socrates, the skill in those other arts is almost wholly concerned with manual work and similar activities, whereas in rhetoric there is no such manual working, but its whole activity and efficacy is by means of speech. For this reason I claim for the rhetorical art that it is concerned with speech, and it is a correct description, I maintain.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα
δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι.
γάρ;
Soc.Now, do I understand what sort of art you choose to call it? Perhaps, however, I shall get to know this more clearly. But answer me this: we have arts, have we not?
ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
ΣΩ.Πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ
πολύ ἐστιν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενὸς
ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον
γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας
450d μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φῂς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι·
οὔ;
Soc.Then amongst the various arts some, I take it, consist mainly of work, and so require but brief speech; while others require none, for the art’s object may be achieved actually in silence, as with painting, sculpture, and many other arts. It is to such as these that I understand you to refer when you say rhetoric has no concern with them; is not that so?
ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, Σώκρατες.
Gorg.Your supposition is quite correct, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ἕτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν
περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενὸς προσδέονται
βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ
καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν
ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ
δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ
450e κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι
δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν.
Soc.But there is another class of arts which achieve their whole purpose through speech and—to put it roughly—require either no action to aid them, or very little; for example, numeration, calculation, geometry, draught-playing, and many other arts: some of these have the speech in about equal proportion to the action, but most have it as the larger part, or absolutely the whole of their operation and effect is by means of speech. It is one of this class of arts that I think you refer to as rhetoric.
ΓΟΡ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Gorg.You are right.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὔτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι
ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι διὰ
λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις,
εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, "Τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν
ἄρα ῥητορικήν, Γοργία, λέγεις;" ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε
τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.
Soc.But, mind you, I do not think it is any one of these that you mean to call rhetoric; though, so far as your expression went, you did say that the art which has its effect through speech is rhetoric, and one might retort, if one cared to strain at mere words: So, Gorgias, you call numeration rhetoric! But I do not believe it is either numeration or geometry that you call rhetoric.
451a ΓΟΡ.Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.
Gorg.Your belief is correct, Socrates, and your supposition just.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν
τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι
τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος
ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νυνδὴ
ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν· " Σώκρατες, τίς
451b ἐστιν ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη;" εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι,
ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο·
"Τῶν περὶ τί;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε
καὶ περιττὸν [γνῶσις], ὅσα ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνῃ ὄντα. εἰ δ'
αὖ ἔροιτο· "Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην;" εἴποιμ'
ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ
ἐπανέροιτο· " περὶ τί;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ
451c συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἀριθμητικὴ
λογιστικὴ ἔχειπερὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστιν, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ
τὸ περιττόνδιαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ
πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ
τὸ ἄρτιον λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο,
ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα,
"Οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας," εἰ φαίη, "περὶ τί εἰσιν,
Σώκρατες;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν
καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.
Soc.Come now, and do your part in finishing off the answer to my question. Since rhetoric is in fact one of these arts which depend mainly on speech, and there are likewise other arts of the same nature, try if you can tell me with what this rhetoric, which has its effect in speech, is concerned. For instance, suppose some one asked me about one or other of the arts which I was mentioning just now: Socrates, what is the art of numeration? I should tell him, as you did me a moment ago, that it is one of those which have their effect through speech. And suppose he went on to ask: With what is its speech concerned? I should say: With the odd and even numbers, and the question of how many units there are in each. And if he asked again: What art is it that you call calculation? I should say that this also is one of those which achieve their whole effect by speech. And if he proceeded to ask: With what is it concerned? I should say— in the manner of those who draft amendments in the Assembly—that in most respects calculation is in the same case as numeration, for both are concerned with the same thing, the odd and the even; but that they differ to this extent, that calculation considers the numerical values of odd and even numbers not merely in themselves but in relation to each other. And suppose, on my saying that astronomy also achieves its whole effect by speech, he were to ask me: And the speech of astronomy, with what is it concerned? I should say: With the courses of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative speeds.
ΓΟΡ.Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, Σώκρατες.
Gorg.And you would be right, Socrates.
451d ΣΩ.Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ
ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ
κυρουμένων· γάρ;
Soc.Come then and do your part, Gorgias: rhetoric is one of those arts, is it not, which carry out their work and achieve their effect by speech.
ΓΟΡ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Gorg.That is so.
ΣΩ.Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; <τί> ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων,
περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν οἷς ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;
Soc.Then tell me what they deal with: what subject is it, of all in the world, that is dealt with by this speech employed by rhetoric?
ΓΟΡ.Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, Σώκρατες,
καὶ ἄριστα.
Gorg.The greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ', Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις
451e καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἴομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς
συμποσίοις ᾀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν καταριθμοῦνται
ᾄδοντες ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν,
τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν
ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.
Soc.But that also, Gorgias, is ambiguous, and still by no means clear. I expect you have heard people singing over their cups the old catch, in which the singers enumerate the best things in life,—first health, then beauty, and thirdly, as the maker of the catch puts it, wealth got without guile.
ΓΟΡ.Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
Gorg.Yes, I have heard it; but what is the point of your quotation?
452a ΣΩ.Ὅτι εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων
ὧν ἐπῄνεσεν τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ
παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ἰατρὸς
ὅτι " Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν
τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ'
ἐμή" —εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· Σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα
λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; τὸ τῆς
σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; "Πῶς γὰρ οὔ,"
φαίη ἂν ἴσως, " Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ' ἐστὶν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν
452b ἀνθρώποις ὑγιείας;" εἰ δ' αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον παιδοτρίβης εἴποι
ὅτι "Θαυμάζοιμί τἄν, Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς εἴ σοι ἔχοι
Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἐγὼ
τῆς ἐμῆς·" εἴποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον· Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ,
ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; "Παιδοτρίβης," φαίη ἄν,
"τὸ δὲ ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα." μετὰ δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι
ἂν χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων·
452c "Σκόπει δῆτα, Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον
ἀγαθὸν ὂν παρὰ Γοργίᾳ παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν." φαῖμεν ἂν
οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Τί δὲ δή; σὺ τούτου δημιουργός; Φαίη
ἄν. Τίς ὤν; "Χρηματιστής." Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον
ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. "Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ;"
ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὑτῷ
τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν
ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἄν· "Καὶ τί ἐστιν
452d τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας." ἴθι οὖν νομίσας,
Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι
τί ἐστιν τοῦτο φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.
Soc.I mean that, supposing the producers of those blessings which the maker of the catch commends—namely, the doctor, the trainer, and the money-getter—were to stand before you this moment, and the doctor first should say: Gorgias is deceiving you, Socrates for it is not his art, but mine, that deals with man’s greatest good. Then supposing I were to ask him: And who are you, to say so? He would probably reply: A doctor. Well, what do you mean? That the work of your art is the greatest good? What else, Socrates, I expect he would reply, is health? What greater good is there for men than health? And supposing the trainer came next and said: I also should be surprised indeed, Socrates, if Gorgias could show you a greater good in his art than I can in mine. Again I should say to him in his turn: And who are you, sir? What is your work? A trainer, he would reply, and my work is making men’s bodies beautiful and strong. After the trainer would come the money-getter, saying— with, I fancy, a fine contempt for every one: Pray consider, Socrates, if you can find a good that is greater than wealth, either in Gorgias’ view or in that of anyone else at all. Why then, we should say to him, are you a producer of that? Yes, he would say. And who are you? A money-getter. Well then, we shall say to him, do you judge wealth to be the greatest good for men? Of course, he will reply. But look here, we should say; our friend Gorgias contends that his own art is a cause of greater good than yours. Then doubtless his next question would be: And what is that good? Let Gorgias answer. Now come, Gorgias; imagine yourself being questioned by those persons and by me, and tell us what is this thing that you say is the greatest good for men, and that you claim to produce.
ΓΟΡ.Ὅπερ ἐστίν, Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον
ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει
ἑκάστῳ.
Gorg.A thing, Socrates, which in truth is the greatest good, and a cause not merely of freedom to mankind at large, but also of dominion to single persons in their several cities.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;
Soc.Well, and what do you call it?
452e ΓΟΡ.Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ
ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ
ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί,
ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ
τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν
παιδοτρίβην· δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται
χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν
καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.
Gorg.I call it the ability to persuade with speeches either judges in the law courts or statesmen in the council-chamber or the commons in the Assembly or an audience at any other meeting that may be held on public affairs. And I tell you that by virtue of this power you will have the doctor as your slave, and the trainer as your slave; your money-getter will turn out to be making money not for himself, but for another,—in fact for you, who are able to speak and persuade the multitude.
ΣΩ.Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν
453a ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγῇ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι,
λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ῥητορική, καὶ πραγματεία
αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ·
ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι πειθὼ
τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;
Soc.I think now, Gorgias, you have come very near to showing us the art of rhetoric as you conceive it, and if I at all take your meaning, you say that rhetoric is a producer of persuasion, and has therein its whole business and main consummation. Or can you tell us of any other function it can have beyond that of effecting persuasion in the minds of an audience?
ΓΟΡ.Οὐδαμῶς, Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς
ὁρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.
Gorg.None at all, Socrates; your definition seems to me satisfactory; that is the main substance of the art.
ΣΩ.Ἄκουσον δή, Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς
453b ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλόμενος
εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμὲ
εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.
Soc.Then listen, Gorgias: I, let me assure you, for so I persuade myself—if ever there was a man who debated with another from a desire of knowing the truth of the subject discussed, I am such a man; and so, I trust, are you.
ΓΟΡ.Τί οὖν δή, Σώκρατες;
Gorg.Well, what then, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ,
ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων
ἐστὶν πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι
ἧττον ἐρήσομαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς
453c ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἕνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς
ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ
ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν
καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ εἴ σοι
δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε
ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστιν τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι
τὰ ζῷα γράφων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην τὰ ποῖα
τῶν ζῴων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;
Soc.I will now tell you. What the real nature of the persuasion is that you speak of as resulting from rhetoric, and what the matters are with which persuasion deals, I assure you I do not clearly understand; though I may have my suspicions as to what I suppose you to mean by it, and with what things you think it deals. But nevertheless I will ask you what you do mean by the persuasion that results from rhetoric, and with what matters you think it deals. Now why is it that, having a suspicion of my own, I am going to ask you this, instead of stating it myself? It is not on your account, but with a view to the argument, and to such a progress in it as may best reveal to us the point we are discussing. Just see if you do not think it fair of me to press you with my question: suppose I happened to ask you what Zeuxis was among painters, and you said a figure painter, would it not be fair of me to ask you what sort of figures he painted, and where?
ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ γε.
Gorg.Certainly.
453d ΣΩ.Ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες
ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῷα;
Soc.Would this be the reason—that there are also other painters who depict a variety of other figures?
ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
ΣΩ.Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἄν
σοι ἀπεκέκριτο;
Soc.But if no one besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer would have been right?
ΓΟΡ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Gorg.Yes, of course.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι
δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ῥητορικὴ μόνη καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον
διδάσκει πείθει οὔ;
Soc.Come then, tell me now about rhetoric: do you think rhetoric alone effects persuasion, or can other arts do it as well? I mean, for example, when a man teaches anything, does he persuade in his teaching? Or do you think not?
ΓΟΡ.Οὐ δῆτα, Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.
Gorg.No, to be sure, Socrates, I think he most certainly does persuade.
453e ΣΩ.Πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὧνπερ
νυνδή· ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ
ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;
Soc.Then let us repeat our question with reference to the same arts that we spoke of just now: does not numeration, or the person skilled in numeration, teach us all that pertains to number?
—ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ γε.
Gorg.Certainly.
— ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;
Soc.And persuades also?
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Πειθοῦς ἄρα
δημιουργός ἐστιν καὶ ἀριθμητική;
Soc.So that numeration also is a producer of persuasion?
—ΓΟΡ.Φαίνεται.
Gorg.Apparently.
— ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί,
ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ
454a ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν· καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἁπάσας ἕξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πειθοῦς
δημιουργοὺς οὔσας καὶ ἧστινος καὶ περὶ ὅτι· οὔ;
Soc.Then if we are asked what kind of persuasion, and dealing with what, we shall reply, I suppose: The instructive kind, which deals with the amount of an odd or an even number; and we shall be able to demonstrate that all the other arts which we mentioned just now are producers of persuasion, and what kind it is, and what it deals with, shall we not?
— ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστιν
δημιουργός.
Soc.Hence rhetoric is not the only producer of persuasion.
—ΓΟΡ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Gorg.You are right.
ΣΩ.Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ
τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα· Ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ
τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ῥητορική ἐστιν τέχνη; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι
454b δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;
Soc.Since then it is not the only one that achieves this effect, but others can also, we should be justified in putting this further question to the speaker, as we did concerning the painter: Then of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion dealing with what, is rhetoric the art? Or do you not consider that such a further question would be justified?
ΓΟΡ.Ἔμοιγε.
Gorg.Yes, I do.
ΣΩ.Ἀπόκριναι δή, Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ
οὕτως.
Soc.Then answer me, Gorgias, since you agree with me on that.
ΓΟΡ.Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, Σώκρατες, τῆς
ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ
ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.
Gorg.Well then, I mean that kind of persuasion, Socrates, which you find in the law-courts and in any public gatherings, as in fact I said just now; and it deals with what is just and unjust.
ΣΩ.Καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ
καὶ περὶ τούτων, Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς ἐὰν καὶ
ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον
454c εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἑξῆς ἕνεκα
περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ
ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα,
ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ
περαίνῃς.
Soc.I, too, I may tell you, had a suspicion that it was this persuasion that you meant, and as dealing with those things, Gorgias; but you must not be surprised if I ask you by-and-by some such question as may seem to be obvious, though I persist in it; for, as I say, I ask my questions with a view to an orderly completion of our argument—I am not aiming at you, but only anxious that we do not fall into a habit of snatching at each other’s words with a hasty guess, and that you may complete your own statement in your own way, as the premises may allow.
ΓΟΡ.Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, Σώκρατες.
Gorg.And I think you are quite right in doing so, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;
Soc.Come then, let us consider another point. Is there something that you call having learnt.
—ΓΟΡ.Καλῶ.
Gorg.There is.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;
Soc.And again, having believed?
454d Ἔγωγε.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι
καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἄλλο
τι;
Soc.Then do you think that having learnt and having believed, or learning and belief, are the same thing, or different?
—ΓΟΡ.Οἴομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.
Gorg.In my opinion, Socrates, they are different.
Καλῶς γὰρ οἴει· γνώσῃ δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο·
"Ἆρ' ἔστιν τις, Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;"
φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.
Soc.And your opinion is right, as you can prove in this way: if some one asked you—Is there, Gorgias, a false and a true belief?—you would say, Yes, I imagine.
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.I should.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη
ἐστὶν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;
Soc.But now, is there a false and a true knowledge?
—ΓΟΡ.Οὐδαμῶς.
Gorg.Surely not.
—ΣΩ.Δῆλον
ἄρ' αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
Soc.So it is evident again that they are not the same.
—ΓΟΡ.Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Gorg.You are right.
454e Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ
πεπιστευκότες.
Soc.But yet those who have learnt have been persuaded, as well as those who have believed.
—ΓΟΡ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Gorg.That is so.
ΣΩ.Βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν
παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;
Soc.Then would you have us assume two forms of persuasion—one providing belief without knowledge, and the other sure knowledge?
—ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ
γε.
Gorg.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Ποτέραν οὖν ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις
τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ
ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἐξ
ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;
Soc.Now which kind of persuasion is it that rhetoric creates in law courts or any public meeting on matters of right and wrong? The kind from which we get belief without knowledge, or that from which we get knowledge?
—ΓΟΡ.Δῆλον δήπου, Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς
τὸ πιστεύειν.
Gorg.Obviously, I presume, Socrates, that from which we get belief.
—ΣΩ. ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς
455a δημιουργός ἐστιν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ
τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον.
Soc.Thus rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong.
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐδ' ἄρα
διδασκαλικὸς ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς
μόνον· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν
ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.
Soc.And so the rhetorician’s business is not to instruct a law court or a public meeting in matters of right and wrong, but only to make them believe; since, I take it, he could not in a short while instruct such a mass of people in matters so important.
—ΓΟΡ.Οὐ
δῆτα.
Gorg.No, to be sure.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς
455b ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι
ὅτι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως τῇ πόλει
σύλλογος περὶ ναυπηγῶν περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ
ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι τότε ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον
γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι.
οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως λιμένων κατασκευῆς
νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν
αἱρέσεως πέρι τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους χωρίων
455c καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ , ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν,
οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὔ· πῶς λέγεις, Γοργία,
τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φῂς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους
ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ
πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν·
ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητής σου
βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς
αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἄν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ'
455d ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι·
"Τί ἡμῖν, Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ
πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου
μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν;"
πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
Soc.Come then, let us see what actually is our account of rhetoric: for I confess I am not yet able to distinguish what my own account of it is. When the city holds a meeting to appoint doctors or shipbuilders or any other set of craftsmen, there is no question then, is there, of the rhetorician giving advice? And clearly this is because in each appointment we have to elect the most skilful person. Again, in a case of building walls or constructing harbors or arsenals, our only advisers are the master-builders; or in consulting on the appointment of generals, or on a manoeuvre against the enemy, or on a military occupation, it is the general staff who will then advise us, and not the rhetoricians. Or what do you say, Gorgias, to these instances? For as you claim to be an orator yourself and to make orators of others, it is proper to inquire of you concerning your own craft. And here you must regard me as furthering your own interest: for it is quite likely that some one within these walls has a wish to become your pupil—indeed I fancy I perceive more than one, yes, a number of them, who, perhaps, would be ashamed to press you with questions. So, when you are being pressed with mine, consider that you are being questioned by them as well: What shall we get, Gorgias, by coming to hear you? On what matters shall we be enabled to give advice to the state? Will it be only on right and wrong, or on those things besides which Socrates was mentioning just now? So try to give them an answer.
ΓΟΡ.Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, Σώκρατες, σαφῶς
ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ
καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα
455e καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ
ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς
Περικλέους ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.
Gorg.Well, I will try, Socrates, to reveal to you clearly the whole power of rhetoric: and in fact you have correctly shown the way to it yourself. You know, I suppose, that these great arsenals and walls of Athens, and the construction of your harbors, are due to the advice of Themistocles, and in part to that of Pericles, not to your craftsmen.
ΣΩ.Λέγεται ταῦτα, Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους·
Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ
τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.
Soc.So we are told, Gorgias, of Themistocles; and as to Pericles, I heard him myself when he was advising us about the middle wall.
456a ΓΟΡ.Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ὧν νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες,
Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ
οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.
Gorg.So whenever there is an election of such persons as you were referring to, Socrates, you see it is the orators who give the advice and get resolutions carried in these matters.
ΣΩ.Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς
ποτε δύναμίς ἐστιν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις
ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.
Soc.That is just what surprises me, Gorgias, and has made me ask you all this time what in the world the power of rhetoric can be. For, viewed in this light, its greatness comes over me as something supernatural.
ΓΟΡ.Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ἁπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὑτῇ ἔχει.
456b μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ
τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά
τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα φάρμακον πιεῖν
τεμεῖν καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ
ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ τῇ ῥητορικῇ.
φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπῃ βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα
καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐν
ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ
456c ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλ' αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν,
εἰ βούλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὁντιναοῦν
ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὑτὸν ἑλέσθαι ῥητορικὸς
μᾶλλον ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ ὅτου οὐκ ἂν
πιθανώτερον εἴποι ῥητορικὸς ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν
ἐν πλήθει. μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶν
καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης· δεῖ μέντοι, Σώκρατες, τῇ
ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ
456d τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι
ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθεν πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ
ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ
ἐχθρῶν, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ
κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία ἐάν τις εἰς
παλαίστραν φοιτήσας εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος,
ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἄλλον
τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς
456e παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι
μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ
παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους
καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας·
457a οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ
ὀρθῶς. οὔκουν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ τέχνη οὔτε
αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι
οἶμαι ὀρθῶς. αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς.
δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ
παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν
457b ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον
τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαιοὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς,
ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ
ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δὲ οἶμαι ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾆτα ταύτῃ
τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν
τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ
457c δικαίου χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν
οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ
ἀποκτεινύναι ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.
Gorg.Ah yes, if you knew all, Socrates,—how it comprises in itself practically all powers at once! And I will tell you a striking proof of this: many and many a time have I gone with my brother or other doctors to visit one of their patients, and found him unwilling either to take medicine or submit to the surgeon’s knife or cautery; and when the doctor failed to persuade him I succeeded, by no other art than that of rhetoric. And I further declare that, if a rhetorician and a doctor were to enter any city you please, and there had to contend in speech before the Assembly or some other meeting as to which of the two should be appointed physician, you would find the physician was nowhere, while the master of speech would be appointed if he wished. And if he had to contend with a member of any other profession whatsoever, the rhetorician would persuade the meeting to appoint him before anyone else in the place: for there is no subject on which the rhetorician could not speak more persuasively than a member of any other profession whatsoever, before a multitude. So great, so strange, is the power of this art. At the same time, Socrates, our use of rhetoric should be like our use of any other sort of exercise. For other exercises are not to be used against all and sundry, just because one has learnt boxing or wrestling or fighting in armour so well as to vanquish friend and foe alike: this gives one no right to strike one’s friends, or stab them to death. Nor, in all conscience, if a man took lessons at a wrestling-school, and having got himself into good condition and learnt boxing he proceeded to strike his father and mother, or some other of his relations or friends, should that be a reason for hating athletic trainers and teachers of fighting in armour, and expelling them from our cities. For they imparted their skill with a view to its rightful use against enemies and wrongdoers, in self-defence, not provocation; whereas the others have perverted their strength and art to an improper use.

So it is not the teachers who are wicked, nor is the art either guilty or wicked on this account, but rather, to my thinking, those who do not use it properly. Now the same argument applies also to rhetoric: for the orator is able, indeed, to speak against every one and on every question in such a way as to win over the votes of the multitude, practically in any matter he may choose to take up: but he is no whit the more entitled to deprive the doctors of their credit, just because he could do so, or other professionals of theirs; he must use his rhetoric fairly, as in the case of athletic exercise. And, in my opinion, if a man becomes a rhetorician and then uses this power and this art unfairly, we ought not to hate his teacher and cast him out of our cities. For he imparted that skill to be used in all fairness, whilst this man puts it to an opposite use. Thus it is the man who does not use it aright who deserves to be hated and expelled and put to death, and not his teacher.

ΣΩ.Οἶμαι, Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν
λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως
δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι
πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτούς,
457d οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν
καὶ μὴ φῇ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν
μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν
ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἴσχιστα
ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες
περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας
ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν
457e ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς
τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν
σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα
λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ.
458a ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧνπερ καὶ ἐγώ,
ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῴην ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων
εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς
λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι,
οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖζον
γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν
αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι.
οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα
458b ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν λόγος ὤν. εἰ μὲν οὖν
καὶ σὺ φῂς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ
χρῆναι ἐᾶν, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.
Soc.I expect, Gorgias, that you as well as I have had no small practice in arguments, and have observed the following fact about them, that it is not easy for people to define to each other the matters which they take in hand to discuss, and to make such exchange of instruction as will fairly bring their debate to an end: no, if they find that some point is in dispute between them, and one of them says that the other is speaking incorrectly or obscurely, they are annoyed and think the remark comes from jealousy of themselves, and in a spirit of contention rather than of inquiry into the matter proposed for discussion. In some cases, indeed, they end by making a most disgraceful scene, with such abusive expressions on each side that the rest of the company are vexed on their own account that they allowed themselves to listen to such fellows. Well, what is my reason for saying this? It is because your present remarks do not seem to me quite in keeping or accord with what you said at first about rhetoric. Now I am afraid to refute you, lest you imagine I am contentiously neglecting the point and its elucidation, and merely attacking you.

I therefore, if you are a person of the same sort as myself, should be glad to continue questioning you: if not, I can let it drop. Of what sort am I? One of those who would be glad to be refuted if I say anything untrue, and glad to refute anyone else who might speak untruly; but just as glad, mind you, to be refuted as to refute, since I regard the former as the greater benefit, in proportion as it is a greater benefit for oneself to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver some one else. For I consider that a man cannot suffer any evil so great as a false opinion on the subjects of our actual argument. Now if you say that you too are of that sort, let us go on with the conversation; but if you think we had better drop it, let us have done with it at once and make an end of the discussion.

ΓΟΡ.Ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος
εἶναι οἷον σὺ ὑφηγῇ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ
τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ
τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν,
458c ἢν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων,
μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.
Gorg.Nay, I too, Socrates, claim to be of the sort you indicate; though perhaps we should have taken thought also for the wishes of our company. For, let me tell you, some time before you and your friend arrived, I gave the company a performance of some length; and if we now have this conversation I expect we shall seriously protract our sitting. We ought, therefore, to consider their wishes as well, in case we are detaining any of them who may want to do something else.
ΧΑΙ.Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες,
αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἐάν
τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία,
ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν
τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.
Chaer.You hear for yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, the applause by which these gentlemen show their desire to hear anything you may say; for my own part, however, Heaven forbid that I should ever be so busy as to give up a discussion so interesting and so conducted, because I found it more important to attend to something else.
458d ΚΑΛ.Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς
πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην
οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην
ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.
Call.Yes, by all that’s holy, Chaerephon; and let me say, moreover, for myself that among the many discussions which I have attended in my time I doubt if there was one that gave me such delight as this present one. So, for my part, I shall count it a favor even if you choose to continue it all day long.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μήν, Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει,
εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.
Soc.Why, Callicles, I assure you there is no hindrance on my side, if Gorgias is willing.
ΓΟΡ.Αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ
γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλεται.
458e ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι
βούλει.
Gorg.After that, Socrates, it would be shameful indeed if I were unwilling, when it was I who challenged everybody to ask what questions they pleased. But if our friends here are so minded, go on with the conversation and ask me anything you like.
ΣΩ.Ἄκουε δή, Γοργία, θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς
ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῂς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι, ἐάν τις
βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;
Soc.Hark you then, Gorgias, to what surprises me in your statements: to be sure, you may possibly be right, and I may take your meaning wrongly. You say you are able to make a rhetorician of any man who chooses to learn from you?
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ
459a πείθοντα;
Soc.Now, do you mean, to make him carry conviction to the crowd on all subjects, not by teaching them, but by persuading?
—ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Gorg.Certainly I do.
—ΣΩ.Ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ
ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται
ῥήτωρ.
Soc.You were saying just now, you know, that even in the matter of health the orator will be more convincing than the doctor.
—ΓΟΡ.Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.
Gorg.Yes, indeed, I was—meaning, to the crowd.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου
ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.
Soc.And to the crowd means to the ignorant? For surely, to those who know, he will not be more convincing than the doctor.
Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Gorg.You are right.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος
ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;
Soc.And if he is to be more convincing than the doctor, he thus becomes more convincing than he who knows?
—ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ
459b γε.
Gorg.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν· γάρ;
Soc.Though not himself a doctor, you agree?
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.
δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὧν ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.
Soc.But he who is not a doctor is surely without knowledge of that whereof the doctor has knowledge.
—ΓΟΡ.Δῆλον ὅτι.
Gorg.Clearly.
—ΣΩ. οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος
ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ
πιθανώτερος . τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἄλλο τι;
Soc.So he who does not know will be more convincing to those who do not know than he who knows, supposing the orator to be more convincing than the doctor. Is that, or something else, the consequence?
—ΓΟΡ.Τοῦτο
ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.
Gorg.In this case it does follow.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας
ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ῥήτωρ καὶ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ
μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν
459c δέ τινα πειθοῦς ηὑρηκέναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι
μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.
Soc.Then the case is the same in all the other arts for the orator and his rhetoric: there is no need to know the truth of the actual matters, but one merely needs to have discovered some device of persuasion which will make one appear to those who do not know to know better than those who know.
ΓΟΡ.Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, Σώκρατες, γίγνεται,
μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν
ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;
Gorg.Well, and is it not a great convenience, Socrates, to make oneself a match for the professionals by learning just this single art and omitting all the others?
ΣΩ.Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ῥήτωρ τῶν
ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι
ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου · νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα
459d τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ
τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ῥητορικὸς
ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι,
αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν τί κακόν ἐστιν τί καλὸν
τί αἰσχρὸν δίκαιον ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος
ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν
459e μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον
ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι
τὴν ῥητορικήν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων
μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενονοὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον
ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα
οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; τὸ παράπαν
οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσῃ αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ
περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, Γοργία;
460a καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς
εἰπὲ τίς ποθ' δύναμίς ἐστιν.
Soc.Whether the orator is or is not a match for the rest of them by reason of that skill, is a question we shall look into presently, if our argument so requires: for the moment let us consider first whether the rhetorician is in the same relation to what is just and unjust, base and noble, good and bad, as to what is healthful, and to the various objects of all the other arts; he does not know what is really good or bad, noble or base, just or unjust, but he has devised a persuasion to deal with these matters so as to appear to those who, like himself, do not know to know better than he who knows. Or is it necessary to know, and must anyone who intends to learn rhetoric have a previous knowledge of these things when he comes to you? Or if not, are you, as the teacher of rhetoric, to teach the person who comes to you nothing about them—for it is not your business—but only to make him appear in the eyes of the multitude to know things of this sort when he does not know, and to appear to be good when he is not? Or will you be utterly unable to teach him rhetoric unless he previously knows the truth about these matters? Or what is the real state of the case, Gorgias? For Heaven’s sake, as you proposed just now, draw aside the veil and tell us what really is the function of rhetoric.
ΓΟΡ.Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ
εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.
Gorg.Why, I suppose, Socrates, if he happens not to know these things he will learn them too from me.
ΣΩ.Ἔχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν
σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.
Soc.Stop there: I am glad of that statement. If you make a man a rhetorician he must needs know what is just and unjust either previously or by learning afterwards from you.
460b — ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ γε.
Gorg.Quite so.
—ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς
τεκτονικός, οὔ;
Soc.Well now, a man who has learnt building is a builder, is he not?
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ
μουσικός;
Soc.And he who has learnt music, a musician?
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός;
καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα
τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;
Soc.Then he who has learnt medicine is a medical man, and so on with the rest on the same principle; anyone who has learnt a certain art has the qualification acquired by his particular knowledge?
— ΓΟΡ.Πάνυ γε.
Gorg.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ
τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;
Soc.And so, on this principle, he who has learnt what is just is just?
—ΓΟΡ.Πάντως δήπου.
Gorg.Absolutely, I presume.
— ΣΩ. δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.
Soc.And the just man, I suppose, does what is just.
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
460c — ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ
δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;
Soc.Now the just man must wish to do what is just?
—ΓΟΡ.Φαίνεταί γε.
Gorg.Apparently.
— ΣΩ.Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.
Soc.Hence the just man will never wish to act unjustly?
— ΓΟΡ.Ἀνάγκη.
Gorg.That must needs be so.
—ΣΩ.Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου
δίκαιον εἶναι.
Soc.But it follows from our statements that the rhetorician must be just.
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται
ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.
Soc.Hence the rhetorician will never wish to do wrong.
—ΓΟΡ.Οὐ φαίνεταί γε.
Gorg.Apparently not.
ΣΩ.Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς
460d παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν
πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται καὶ ἀδικῇ,
ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως
χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδ' ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ
ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα οὔ;
Soc.Then do you remember saying a little while ago that we ought not to complain against the trainers or expel them from our cities, if a boxer makes not merely use, but an unfair use, of his boxing? So in just the same way, if an orator uses his rhetoric unfairly, we should not complain against his teacher or banish him from our city, but the man who does the wrong and misuses his rhetoric. Was that said or not?
—ΓΟΡ.Ἐρρήθη.
Gorg.It was.
—ΣΩ.Νῦν
460e δέ γε αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε
ἀδικήσας. οὔ;
Soc.But now we find that this very person, the rhetorician, could never be guilty of wrongdoing, do we not?
—ΓΟΡ.Φαίνεται.
Gorg.We do.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις
γε, Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὅτι ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους
εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου
καὶ ἀδίκου· γάρ;
Soc.And in our first statements, Gorgias, we said that rhetoric dealt with speech, not on even and odd, but on the just and unjust, did we not?
—ΓΟΡ.Ναί.
Gorg.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε
ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ῥητορικὴ
ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, γ' ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους
ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ῥήτωρ
461a τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος
οὐ συνᾴδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους,
ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ,
ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαίρειν. ὕστερον δὲ
ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται
τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ
καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν
461b κύνα, Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς
διασκέψασθαι.
Soc.Well then, I supposed at the time when you were saying this that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since the speeches it made were always about justice but when a little later you told us that the orator might make even an unjust use of his rhetoric, that indeed surprised me, and thinking the two statements were not in accord I made those proposals,—that if, like myself, you counted it a gain to be refuted, it was worth while to have the discussion, but if not, we had better have done with it. And now that we have come to examine the matter, you see for yourself that we agree once more that it is impossible for the rhetorician to use his rhetoric unjustly or consent to do wrong. Now, to distinguish properly which way the truth of the matter lies will require, by the Dog, Gorgias, no short sitting.
ΠΩΛ.Τί δέ, Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; οἴειὅτι Γοργίας
ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ
οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ
ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα
ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς
461c λόγοιςτοῦτο <> δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα
ἐρωτήματαἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν
ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; —ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶν τοὺς λόγους.
Pol.How is this, Socrates? Is that really your opinion of rhetoric, as you now express it? Or, think you, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit your point that the rhetorician knows what is just and noble and good, and will himself teach these to anyone who comes to him without knowing them; and then from this admission I daresay there followed some inconsistency in the statements made—the result that you are so fond of—when it was yourself who led him into that set of questions! For who do you think will deny that he has a knowledge of what is just and can also teach it to others? I call it very bad taste to lead the discussion in such a direction.
ΣΩ. κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα
ἑταίρους καὶ ὑεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι
σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε ἡμῶν
τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ
461d Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου
δίκαιος δ' εἶκαὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι
δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ,
ἐάν μοι ἓν μόνον φυλάττῃς.
Soc.Ah, sweet Polus, of course it is for this very purpose we possess ourselves of companions and sons, that when the advance of years begins to make us stumble, you younger ones may be at hand to set our lives upright again in words as well as deeds. So now if Gorgias and I are stumbling in our words, you are to stand by and set us up again—it is only your duty; and for my part I am willing to revoke at your pleasure anything that you think has been wrongly admitted, if you will kindly observe one condition.
ΠΩΛ.Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
Pol.What do you mean by that?
ΣΩ.Τὴν μακρολογίαν, Πῶλε, ἢν καθέρξῃς, τὸ πρῶτον
ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.
Soc.That you keep a check on that lengthy way of speaking, Polus, which you tried to employ at first.
ΠΩΛ.Τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι;
Pol.Why, shall I not be at liberty to say as much as I like?
461e ΣΩ.Δεινὰ μεντἂν πάθοις, βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε
ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ
λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ
ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον
ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται
462a μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἴ τι κήδῃ τοῦ λόγου
τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ
νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν
τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε
καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῂς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ
Γοργίας· οὔ;
Soc.It would indeed be a hard fate for you, my excellent friend, if having come to Athens, where there is more freedom of speech than anywhere in Greece, you should be the one person there who could not enjoy it.

But as a set-off to that, I ask you if it would not be just as hard on me, while you spoke at length and refused to answer my questions, not to be free to go away and avoid listening to you. No, if you have any concern for the argument that we have carried on, and care to set it on its feet again, revoke whatever you please, as I suggested just now; take your turn in questioning and being questioned, like me and Gorgias; and thus either refute or be refuted. For you claim, I understand, that you yourself know all that Gorgias knows, do you not?

ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.I do.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε ὅτι
ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;
Soc.Then are you with him also in bidding us ask at each point any questions we like of you, as one who knows how to answer?
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pol.Certainly I am.
462b ΣΩ.Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα
ἀποκρίνου.
Soc.So now, take whichever course you like: either put questions, or answer them.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, Σώκρατες·
ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς,
σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῂς εἶναι;
Pol.Well, I will do as you say. So answer me this, Socrates: since you think that Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, what is your own account of it?
ΣΩ.Ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;
Soc.Are you asking what art I call it?
ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ
τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι.
Soc.None at all, I consider, Polus, if you would have the honest truth.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;
Pol.But what do you consider rhetoric to be?
ΣΩ.Πρᾶγμα φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι
462c ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων.
Soc.A thing which you say—in the treatise which I read of late—made art.
ΠΩΛ.Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
Pol.What thing do you mean?
ΣΩ.Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.
Soc.I mean a certain habitude.
ΠΩΛ.Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;
Pol.Then do you take rhetoric to be a habitude?
ΣΩ.Ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.
Soc.I do, if you have no other suggestion.
ΠΩΛ.Τίνος ἐμπειρία;
Pol.Habitude of what?
ΣΩ.Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.
Soc.Of producing a kind of gratification and pleasure.
ΠΩΛ.Οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι
οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;
Pol.Then you take rhetoric to be something fine—an ability to gratify people?
ΣΩ.Τί δέ, Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημὶ
462d αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλή μοι
δοκεῖ εἶναι;
Soc.How now, Polus? Have you as yet heard me tell you what I say it is, that you ask what should follow that—whether I do not take it to be fine?
ΠΩΛ.Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῂς
εἶναι;
Pol.Why, did I not hear you call it a certain habitude?
ΣΩ.Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί
μοι χαρίσασθαι;
Soc.Then please—since you value gratification—be so good as gratify me in a small matter.
ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.I will.
ΣΩ.Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.
Soc.Ask me now what art I take cookery to be.
ΠΩΛ.Ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία;
Pol.Then I ask you, what art is cookery ?
—ΣΩ.Οὐδεμία,
Πῶλε.
Soc.None at all, Polus.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.
Pol.Well, what is it ? Tell me.
—ΣΩ.Φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία
τις.
Soc.Then I reply, a certain habitude.
—ΠΩΛ.Τίς; φάθι.
Pol.Of what? Tell me.
—ΣΩ.Φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς
462e ἀπεργασίας, Πῶλε.
Soc.Then I reply, of production of gratification and pleasure, Polus.
ΠΩΛ.Ταὐτὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;
Pol.So cookery and rhetoric are the same thing?
ΣΩ.Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως
μόριον.
Soc.Not at all, only parts of the same practice.
ΠΩΛ.Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;
Pol.What practice do you mean?
ΣΩ.Μὴ ἀγροικότερον τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ
Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας
463a ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδακαὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν
καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ
τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν
καλῶν.
Soc.I fear it may be too rude to tell the truth; for I shrink from saying it on Gorgias’ account, lest he suppose I am making satirical fun of his own profession. Yet indeed I do not know whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias practices, for from our argument just now we got no very clear view as to how he conceives it; but what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain business which has nothing fine about it.
ΓΟΡ.Τίνος, Σώκρατες; εἰπέ· μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθῇς.
Gorg.What is that, Socrates? Tell us, without scruple on my account.
ΣΩ.Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα
τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ
φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ
463b ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως
πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ
ὀψοποιική· δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ
ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ
τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν
σοφιστικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν.
εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ
463c πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι
τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεκριμένος, δὲ
ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ
ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι
εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν.
οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα
ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.
Soc.It seems to me then, Gorgias, to be a pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has a natural bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name flattery. This practice, as I view it, has many branches, and one of them is cookery; which appears indeed to be an art but, by my account of it, is not an art but a habitude or knack. I call rhetoric another branch of it, as also personal adornment and sophistry—four branches of it for four kinds of affairs. So if Polus would inquire, let him inquire: he has not yet been informed to what sort of branch of flattery I assign rhetoric; but without noticing that I have not yet answered that, he proceeds to ask whether I do not consider it a fine thing. But I am not going to reply to the question whether I consider rhetoric a fine or a base thing, until I have first answered what it is; for it would not be fair, Polus: but if you want the information, ask me what sort of branch of flattery I assert rhetoric to be.
ΠΩΛ.Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ὁποῖον μόριον.
Pol.I ask you then; so answer, what sort of branch it is.
463d ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ
ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.
Soc.Now, will you understand when I answer? Rhetoric, by my account, is a semblance of a branch of politics.
ΠΩΛ.Τί οὖν; καλὸν αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;
Pol.Well then, do you call it a fine or a base thing?
ΣΩ.Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγετὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶἐπειδὴ
δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἐγὼ λέγω.
Soc.A base one, I call it—for all that is bad I call base—since I am to answer you as though you had already understood my meaning.
ΓΟΡ.Μὰ τὸν Δία, Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς
συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.
Gorg.Nor do I myself, upon my word, Socrates, grasp your meaning either.
463e ΣΩ.Εἰκότως γε, Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω,
Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.
Soc.And no wonder, Gorgias, for as yet my statement is not at all clear; but Polus here is so young and fresh!
ΓΟΡ.Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις
πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.
Gorg.Ah, do not mind him; but tell me what you mean by rhetoric being a semblance of a branch of politics.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι γέ μοι φαίνεται
εἶναι ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὅδε
464a ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν;
Soc.Well, I will try to express what rhetoric appears to me to be: if it is not in fact what I say, Polus here will refute me. There are things, I suppose, that you call body and soul?
—ΓΟΡ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Gorg.Of course.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;
Soc.And each of these again you believe to have a good condition?
— ΓΟΡ.Ἔγωγε.
Gorg.I do.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν
δ' οὔ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ
σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν,
ἀλλ' ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.
Soc.And again, a good condition that may seem so, but is not? As an example, let me give the following: many people seem to be in good bodily condition when it would not be easy for anyone but a doctor, or one of the athletic trainers, to perceive that they are not so.
—ΓΟΡ.Ἀληθῆ
λέγεις.
Gorg.You are right.
—ΣΩ.Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν
ψυχῇ, ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν,
464b ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.
Soc.Something of this sort I say there is in body and in soul, which makes the body or the soul seem to be in good condition, though it is none the more so in fact.
—ΓΟΡ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Gorg.Quite so.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω
λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν
μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν
μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ
σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν,
τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς
τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην.
464c ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι,
ἑκάτεραι τούτων, τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ δικαιοσύνη
τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσίν τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων
δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν
τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη
οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένητέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα,
ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται
464d εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει,
τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε
δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν
ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία
τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι
ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρόν, ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ
οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ
464e πονηρῶν, ἰατρὸς ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν
ἰατρόν. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι
465a εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, Πῶλετοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγωὅτι
τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν
οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα
προσφέρει προσφέρει ὁποῖ' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε
τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ
καλῶ ἂν ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς,
ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.
465b Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ὀψοποιικὴ κολακεία
ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ
ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν
ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ
οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν' οὖν μὴ
μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραιἤδη γὰρ
465c ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαιςὅτι κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν,
τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς
ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι
λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ
ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι
ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι
465d ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο
καὶ διεκρίνετο τε ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἰατρική, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ
σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὑτό, τὸ τοῦ
Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, φίλε Πῶλεσὺ γὰρ τούτων
ἔμπειροςὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ,
ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν.
μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον
465e ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. ἴσως
μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς λόγους
λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν
ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ
ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἥν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην
οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ
466a ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε
καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ
νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.
Soc.Now let me see if I can explain my meaning to you more clearly. There are two different affairs to which I assign two different arts: the one, which has to do with the soul, I call politics; the other, which concerns the body, though I cannot give you a single name for it offhand, is all one business, the tendance of the body, which I can designate in two branches as gymnastic and medicine. Under politics I set legislation in the place of gymnastic, and justice to match medicine. In each of these pairs, of course—medicine and gymnastic, justice and legislation—there is some intercommunication, as both deal with the same thing; at the same time they have certain differences. Now these four, which always bestow their care for the best advantage respectively of the body and the soul, are noticed by the art of flattery which, I do not say with knowledge, but by speculation, divides herself into four parts, and then, insinuating herself into each of those branches, pretends to be that into which she has crept, and cares nothing for what is the best, but dangles what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly, and deceives it into thinking that she is of the highest value. Thus cookery assumes the form of medicine, and pretends to know what foods are best for the body; so that if a cook and a doctor had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, as to which of the two, the doctor or the cook, understands the question of sound and noxious foods, the doctor would starve to death.

Flattery, however, is what I call it, and I say that this sort of thing is a disgrace, Polus—for here I address you—because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best; and I say it is not an art, but a habitude, since it has no account to give of the real nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. I refuse to give the name of art to anything that is irrational: if you dispute my views, I am ready to give my reasons. However, as I put it, cookery is flattery disguised as medicine; and in just the same manner self-adornment personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colors, polish and dress so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic. Well, to avoid prolixity, I am willing to put it to you like a geometer—for by this time I expect you can follow me: as self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice. But although, as I say, there is this natural distinction between them, they are so nearly related that sophists and orators are jumbled up as having the same field and dealing with the same subjects, and neither can they tell what to make of each other, nor the world at large what to make of them. For indeed, if the soul were not in command of the body, but the latter had charge of itself, and so cookery and medicine were not surveyed and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself were the judge, forming its own estimate of them by the gratifications they gave it, we should have a fine instance of what Anaxagoras described, my dear Polus,—for you are versed in these matters: everything would be jumbled together, without distinction as between medicinal and healthful and tasty concoctions. Well now, you have heard what I state rhetoric to be—the counterpart of cookery in the soul, acting here as that does on the body. It may, indeed, be absurd of me, when I do not allow you to make long speeches, to have extended mine to so considerable a length. However, I can fairly claim indulgence: for when I spoke briefly you did not understand me; you were unable to make any use of the answer I gave you, but required a full exposition.

Now if I on my part cannot tell what use to make of any answers you may give me, you shall extend your speech also; but if I can make some use of them, allow me to do it; that will only be fair. And now, if you can make any use of this answer of mine, do so.

ΠΩΛ.Τί οὖν φῄς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι
ῥητορική;
Pol.Then what is it you say? Do you take rhetoric to be flattery?
ΣΩ.Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ'
οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, Πῶλε; τί τάχα
δράσεις;
Soc.Well, I said rather a branch of flattery. Why, at your age, Polus, have you no memory? What will you do later on?
ΠΩΛ.Ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;
Pol.Then do you think that good orators are considered to be flatterers in their cities, and so worthless?
466b ΣΩ.Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;
Soc.Is that a question you are asking, or are you beginning a speech?
ΠΩΛ.Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.
Pol.I am asking a question.
ΣΩ.Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
Soc.To my mind, they are not considered at all.
ΠΩΛ.Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσιν;
Pol.How not considered? Have they not the chief power in their cities?
ΣΩ.Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ
δυναμένῳ.
Soc.No, if you mean power in the sense of something good for him who has it.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγω γε.
Pol.Why, of course I mean that.
ΣΩ.Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.
Soc.Then, to my thinking, the orators have the smallest power of all who are in their city.
ΠΩΛ.Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε
466c ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν
ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;
Pol.What? Are they not like the despots, in putting to death anyone they please, and depriving anyone of his property and expelling him from their cities as they may think fit?
ΣΩ.Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἑκάστου
ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ
ἀποφαίνῃ, ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.
Soc.By the Dog, I fear I am still in two minds, Polus, at everything you say, as to whether this is a statement on your own part, and a declaration of your own opinion, or a question you are putting to me.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.
Pol.Why, I am asking you.
ΣΩ.Εἶεν, φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;
Soc.Very well, my friend then are you asking me two things at once?
ΠΩΛ.Πῶς δύο;
Pol.How two?
ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· " οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν
466d οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα
ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ
αὐτοῖς;"
Soc.Were you not this moment saying something like this: Is it not the case that the orators put to death anyone they wish, like the despots, and deprive people of property and expel them from their cities as they may think fit?
ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.I was.
ΣΩ.Λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστιν τὰ ἐρωτήματα,
καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ,
Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι
μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν
466e γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι
ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.
Soc.Then I tell you that there are two questions here, and I will give you answers to them both. For I say, Polus, that the orators and the despots alike have the least power in their cities, as I stated just now; since they do nothing that they wish to do, practically speaking, though they do whatever they think to be best.
ΠΩΛ.Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;
Pol.Well, and is not that a great power to have?
ΣΩ.Οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν Πῶλος.
Soc.No, judging at least by what Polus says.
ΠΩΛ.Ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.
Pol.I say no! Pardon me, I say yes.
ΣΩ.Μὰ τὸνοὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.
Soc.No, by the ————, you do not; for you said that great power is a good to him who has it.
ΠΩΛ.Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.
Pol.Yes, and I maintain it.
ΣΩ.Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἂν
δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς
σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι;
Soc.Then do you regard it as a good, when a man does what he thinks to be best, without having intelligence? Is that what you call having a great power?
ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Pol.No, I do not.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ
467a τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ
δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς
πόλεσιν δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο
κεκτήσονται, δὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ
δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι·
οὔ;
Soc.Then will you prove that the orators have intelligence, and that rhetoric is an art, not a flattery, and so refute me ? Else, if you are going to leave me unrefuted, the orators who do what they think fit in their cities, and the despots, will find they have got no good in doing that, if indeed power is, as you say, a good, but doing what one thinks fit without intelligence is—as you yourself admit, do you not?—an evil.
ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.Yes, I do.
ΣΩ.Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο οἱ τύραννοι
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι
ποιοῦσιν βούλονται;
Soc.How then can the orators or the despots have great power in their cities, unless Socrates is refuted by Polus, and admits that they do what they wish?
467b ΠΩΛ.Οὗτος ἀνήρ
Pol.Hark at the man————!
ΣΩ.Οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς βούλονται· ἀλλά μ' ἔλεγχε.
Soc.I deny that they do what they wish: there, refute me.
ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα
εἶναι, [τούτου πρόσθεν
Pol.Did you not admit just now that they do what they think best?
ΣΩ.Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.
Soc.Yes, and I admit it now.
ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν βούλονται;
Pol.Then do they not do what they wish?
ΣΩ.Οὔ φημι.
Soc.I say no.
ΠΩΛ.Ποιοῦντες δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;
Pol.When they do what they think fit?
ΣΩ.Φημί.
Soc.Yes.
ΠΩΛ.Σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, Σώκρατες.
Pol.What shocking, nay, monstrous answers, Socrates!
ΣΩ.Μὴ κακηγόρει, λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε
467c κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι
ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.
Soc.Spare your invective, peerless Polus—if I may address you in your own style: but if you have a question to ask me, expose my error otherwise, make answer yourself.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι
λέγεις.
Pol.Well, I am ready to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.
ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι
ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν
τοῦθ' πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες
παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι
ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἐκεῖνο,
τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;
Soc.Then is it your view that people wish merely that which they do each time, or that which is the object of their doing what they do? For instance, do those who take medicine by doctor’s orders wish, in your opinion, merely what they do,—to take the medicine and suffer the pain of it,—or rather to be healthy, which is the object of their taking it?
—ΠΩΛ.Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ
467d ὑγιαίνειν.
Pol.To be healthy, without a doubt.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον
χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν βούλονται,
ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν
καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν;) ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὗ ἕνεκα
πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν.
Soc.And so with seafarers and such as pursue profit generally in trade; what they wish is not what they are doing at each moment—for who wishes to go on a voyage, and incur all its danger and trouble? It is rather, I conceive, the object of their voyage—to get wealth; since it is for wealth that they go on it.
Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς
τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο
467e οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει;
Soc.And is it not just the same in every case? If a man does something for an object, he does not wish the thing that he does, but the thing for which he does it.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν
ὄντων οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν κακὸν μεταξὺ τούτων,
οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;
Soc.Now is there any existent thing that is not either good or bad or between these—neither good nor bad?
—ΠΩΛ.Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, Σώκρατες.
Pol.Most assuredly nothing, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ
ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία
τούτων;
Soc.Well, do you call wisdom and health and wealth and everything else of that kind good, and their opposites bad?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.I do.
—ΣΩ.Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε
κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
468a ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ
βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα
καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἄλλ' ἄττα καλεῖς
τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά;
Soc.And by things neither good nor bad do you mean such things as sometimes partake of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither—for example, sitting, walking, running, and sailing, or again, stones and sticks and anything else of that sort? These are what you mean, are they not? Or are there other things that you describe as neither good nor bad?
—ΠΩΛ.Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.
Pol.No, these are what I mean.
— ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν
ὅταν πράττωσιν, τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ;
Soc.Then do people do these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the intermediate?
—ΠΩΛ.Τὰ
468b μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
Pol.The intermediate, I presume, for the good.
—ΣΩ.Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες
καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ
τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ· οὔ;
Soc.Thus it is in pursuit of the good that we walk, when we walk, conceiving it to be better; or on the contrary, stand, when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, the good: is it not so?
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν,
εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα
χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν μή;
Soc.And so we put a man to death, if we do put him to death, or expel him or deprive him of his property, because we think it better for us to do this than not?
— ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα
ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.
Soc.So it is for the sake of the good that the doers of all these things do them?
—ΠΩΛ.Φημί.
Pol.I agree.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι,
468c ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;
Soc.And we have admitted that when we do things for an object, we do not wish those things, but the object for which we do them?
—ΠΩΛ.Μάλιστα.
Pol.Quite so.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν
πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν
μὲν ὠφέλιμα ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ
δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς
σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ
κακά. γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, Πῶλε, οὔ; τί
οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;
Soc.Then we do not wish to slaughter people or expel them from our cities or deprive them of their property as an act in itself, but if these things are beneficial we wish to do them, while if they are harmful, we do not wish them. For we wish what is good, as you say; but what is neither good nor bad we do not wish, nor what is bad either, do we? Is what I say true in your opinion, Polus, or not? Why do you not answer?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀληθῆ.
Pol.It is true.
468d ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει
τινὰ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε
τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει
δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· γάρ;
Soc.Then, as we agree on this, if a man puts anyone to death or expels him from a city or deprives him of his property, whether he does it as a despot or an orator, because he thinks it better for himself though it is really worse, that man, I take it, does what he thinks fit, does he not?
— ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει
ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ;
Soc.Now is it also what he wishes, supposing it to be really bad? Why do you not answer?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλ' οὔ μοι
δοκεῖ ποιεῖν βούλεται.
Pol.No, I do not think he does what he wishes.
—ΣΩ.Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως τοιοῦτος
468e μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι
ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;
Soc.Can such a man then be said to have great power in that city, if to have great power is something good, according to your admission?
—ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ
ἔστιν.
Pol.He cannot.
—ΣΩ.Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον
ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι
μηδὲ ποιεῖν βούλεται.
Soc.Then I spoke the truth when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he thinks fit in a city and yet not to have great power nor to do what he wishes.
ΠΩΛ.Ὡς δὴ σύ, Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί
σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον μή, οὐδὲ
ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ
ἀφελόμενον χρήματα δήσαντα.
Pol.As if you, Socrates, would not accept the liberty of doing what you think fit in your city rather than not, and would not envy a man whom you observed to have put some one to death as he thought fit, or deprived him of his property or sent him to prison!
ΣΩ.Δικαίως λέγεις ἀδίκως;
Soc.Justly, do you mean, or unjustly?
469a ΠΩΛ.Ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν;
Pol.Whichever way he does it, is it not enviable in either case?
ΣΩ.Εὐφήμει, Πῶλε.
Soc.Hush, Polus!
ΠΩΛ.Τί δή;
Pol.Why?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς
ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.
Soc.Because we ought not to envy either the unenviable or the wretched, but pity them.
ΠΩΛ.Τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω
τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
Pol.What! Is that the state in which you consider those people, of whom I speak, to be?
ΣΩ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Soc.Yes, for so I must.
ΠΩΛ.Ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως
ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;
Pol.Then do you consider that a man who puts another to death as he thinks fit, and justly puts him to death, is wretched and pitiable?
ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.
Soc.Not I; but not enviable either.
ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;
Pol.Did you not say just now that he was wretched?
469b ΣΩ.Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν
γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.
Soc.Only he who unjustly put some one to death, my friend, and I called him pitiable as well: if he acted justly, then he is unenviable.
ΠΩΛ. που γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ
ἄθλιός ἐστιν.
Pol.I suppose, at any rate, the man who is put to death unjustly is both pitiable and wretched.
ΣΩ.Ἧττον ἀποκτεινύς, Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον
δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκων.
Soc.Less so than he who puts him to death, Polus, and less so than he who is put to death justly.
ΠΩΛ.Πῶς δῆτα, Σώκρατες;
Pol.In what way can that be, Socrates ?
ΣΩ.Οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ
ἀδικεῖν.
Soc.In this, that to do wrong is the greatest of evils.
ΠΩΛ. γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;
Pol.What, is this the greatest? Is not to suffer wrong a greater?
ΣΩ.Ἥκιστά γε.
Soc.By no means.
ΠΩΛ.Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν;
Pol.Then would you wish rather to suffer wrong than to do it?
469c ΣΩ.Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη
ἀδικεῖν ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἀδικεῖν.
Soc.I should wish neither, for my own part; but if it were necessary either to do wrong or to suffer it, I should choose to suffer rather than do it.
ΠΩΛ.Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;
Pol.Then you would not accept a despot’s power?
ΣΩ.Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.
Soc.No, if you mean by a despot’s power the same as I do.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ
πόλει, ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ
ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.
Pol.Why, what I mean is, as I did just now, the liberty of doing anything one thinks fit in one’s city—putting people to death and expelling them and doing everything at one’s own discretion.
ΣΩ. μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ.
469d εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον
λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι " Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ
τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ
δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα
δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι
τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα
μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσταιοὕτω
469e μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει," εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι
δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι " Σώκρατες,
οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη
οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε
Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ
δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια·" ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ μέγα
δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· δοκεῖ σοι;
Soc.My gifted friend, let me speak, and you shall take me to task in your turn. Suppose that in a crowded market I should hide a dagger under my arm and then say to you: Polus, I have just acquired, by a wonderful chance, the power of a despot; for if I should think fit that one of those people whom you see there should die this very instant, a dead man he will be, just as I think fit; or if I think fit that one of them shall have his head broken, broken it will be immediately; or to have his cloak torn in pieces, torn it will be: so great is my power in this city. Then suppose that on your disbelieving this I showed you my dagger; I expect when you saw it you would say: Socrates, at this rate every one would have great power, for any house you thought fit might be set ablaze on these methods, and the Athenian arsenals also, and the men-of-war and all the rest of the shipping, both public and private. But surely this is not what it is to have great power—merely doing what one thinks fit. Or do you think it is?
ΠΩΛ.Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.
Pol.Oh no, not in that way.
470a ΣΩ.Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην
δύναμιν;
Soc.Then can you tell me why you disapprove of this kind of power?
ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.I can.
ΣΩ.Τί δή; λέγε.
Soc.Why, then? Tell me.
ΠΩΛ.Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί
ἐστιν.
Pol.Because it is inevitable that he who acts thus will be punished.
ΣΩ.Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;
Soc.And is it not a bad thing to be punished?
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν, θαυμάσιε, [τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι] πάλιν αὖ
σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως
πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν
τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι.
470b σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν
ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτεινύναι τε
καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε
δὲ οὔ;
Soc.So, my remarkable friend, you have come round again to the view that if doing what one thinks fit is attended by advantage in doing it, this is not merely a good thing but at the same time, it seems, the possession of great power; otherwise it is a bad thing and means little power. And let us consider another point besides; do we not admit that sometimes it is better to do those things that we were mentioning just now—to put people to death and banish them and deprive them of property—while sometimes it is not?
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.To be sure.
ΣΩ.Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ'
ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.
Soc.Then here is a point, it seems, that is admitted both on your side and on mine.
ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
ΣΩ.Πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ
τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζῃ.
Soc.Then when do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me where you draw the line.
ΠΩΛ.Σὺ μὲν οὖν, Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι [ταὐτὸ] τοῦτο.
Pol.Nay, I would rather that you, Socrates, answered that.
470c ΣΩ.Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ
ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ,
ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.
Soc.Well then I say, Polus, if you prefer to hear it from me, that it is better when these things are done justly, and worse when unjustly.
ΠΩΛ.Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ
κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;
Pol.So hard to refute you, Socrates! Nay, a mere child could do it, could he not, and prove your words are untrue?
ΣΩ.Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ
σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ
κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.
Soc.Then I shall be most grateful to the child, and equally to you, if you refute me and rid me of foolery. Come, do not grow weary in well-doing towards your friend, but refute me.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλὰ μήν, Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς
470d πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα
ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες
ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν.
Pol.Well, to be sure, Socrates, there is no need to refute you with ancient instances; for those happenings of but a day or two ago are enough to refute you, and prove that many a wrongdoer is happy.
ΣΩ.Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;
Soc.What sort of thing do you mean?
ΠΩΛ.Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς
ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;
Pol.I suppose you see that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, is ruler of Macedonia?
ΣΩ.Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.
Soc.Well, if I do not, at any rate I hear it.
ΠΩΛ.Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄθλιος;
Pol.Do you consider him happy or wretched?
ΣΩ.Οὐκ οἶδα, Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.
Soc.I do not know, Polus; I have never met the man.
470e ΠΩΛ.Τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν
οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;
Pol.What? Could you find out by meeting him, and cannot otherwise tell, straight off, that he is happy?
ΣΩ.Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα.
Soc.No, indeed, upon my word.
ΠΩΛ.Δῆλον δή, Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα
γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.
Pol.Then doubtless you will say, Socrates, that you do not know that even the Great King is happy.
ΣΩ.Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει
καὶ δικαιοσύνης.
Soc.Yes, and I shall be speaking the truth; for I do not know how he stands in point of education and justice.
ΠΩΛ.Τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;
Pol.Why, does happiness entirely consist in that?
ΣΩ.Ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν καὶ
ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ
ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.
Soc.Yes, by my account, Polus; for a good and honorable man or woman, I say, is happy, and an unjust and wicked one is wretched.
471a ΠΩΛ.Ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν
σὸν λόγον;
Pol.Then this Archelaus, on your statement, is wretched?
ΣΩ.Εἴπερ γε, φίλε, ἄδικος.
Soc.Yes, my friend, supposing he is unjust.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; γε προσῆκε μὲν
τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἣν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἦν δούλη
Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον
δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν
ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.
νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν·
471b ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ
θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας
αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν
ὑὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὑτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην,
ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἅμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ
ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν
ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον
471c ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου ὑόν, παῖδα
ὡς ἑπτέτη, οὗ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη
εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίξας πρὸς
τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν
καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν
ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ'
οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ
471d ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι
μᾶλλον Ἀρχέλαος.
Pol.Well, but how can he be other than unjust? He had no claim to the throne which he now occupies, being the son of a woman who was a slave of Perdiccas’ brother Alcetas, and in mere justice he was Alcetas’ slave; and if he wished to do what is just, he would be serving Alcetas and would be happy, by your account; but, as it is, he has become a prodigy of wretchedness, since he has done the most enormous wrong. First of all he invited this very master and uncle of his to his court, as if he were going to restore to him the kingdom of which Perdiccas had deprived him; and after entertaining him and his son Alexander—his own cousin, about the same age as himself—and making them drunk, he packed them into a carriage, drove them away by night, and murdered and made away with them both. And after all these iniquities he failed to observe that he had become a most wretched person and had no repentance, but a while later he refused to make himself happy by bringing up, as he was justly bound, his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy about seven years old who had a just title to the throne, and restoring the kingdom to him; but he cast him into a well and drowned him, and then told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in and lost his life while chasing a goose. So now, you see, as the greatest wrongdoer in Macedonia, he is the most wretched of all the Macedonians, not the happiest; and I daresay some Athenians could be found who would join you in preferring to change places with any other Macedonian of them all, rather than with Archelaus!
ΣΩ.Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε
ἐπῄνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι,
τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν
λόγος, με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν,
ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα
οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὠγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ
σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῄς.
Soc.At the beginning of our discussion, Polus, I complimented you on having had, as I consider, a good training in rhetoric, while you seem to have neglected disputation; and now, accordingly, this is the argument, is it, with which any child could refute me? By this statement, you think, I now stand refuted at your hands, when I assert that the wrongdoer is not happy? How so, my good friend? Why, I tell you I do not admit a single point in what you say.
471e ΠΩΛ.Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.
Pol.No, because you do not want to; for you really agree with my statement.
ΣΩ. μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν,
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ
ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν
λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ
εὐδοκίμους, δὲ τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται
μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν
472a ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ
πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις
ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταὐτὰ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι,
ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ
λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας Νικηράτου
καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς
ἑστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης
472b Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα,
ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἄλλη συγγένεια
ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἷς
ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας
πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν
με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ
αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν
λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν
472c ἡμῖν λόγος · οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς
ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστιν
μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι
πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες
οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων.
καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ
σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε
κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν
ἐστιν γιγνώσκειν ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ
472d ὅστις μή. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ νῦν λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ
ἡγῇ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον
ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγῇ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ.
ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα;
Soc.My gifted friend, that is because you attempt to refute me in rhetorical fashion, as they understand refuting in the law courts. For there, one party is supposed to refute the other when they bring forward a number of reputable witnesses to any statements they may make, whilst their opponent produces only one, or none. But this sort of refutation is quite worthless for getting at the truth; since occasionally a man may actually be crushed by the number and reputation of the false witnesses brought against him. And so now you will find almost everybody, Athenians and foreigners, in agreement with you on the points you state, if you like to bring forward witnesses against the truth of what I say: if you like, there is Nicias, son of Niceratus, with his brothers, whose tripods are standing in a row in the Dionysium; or else Aristocrates, son of Scellias, whose goodly offering again is well known at Delphi; or if you choose, there is the whole house of Pericles or any other family you may like to select in this place. But I, alone here before you, do not admit it, for you fail to convince me: you only attempt, by producing a number of false witnesses against me, to oust me from my reality, the truth. But if on my part I fail to produce yourself as my one witness to confirm what I say, I consider I have achieved nothing of any account towards the matter of our discussion, whatever it may be; nor have you either, I conceive, unless I act alone as your one witness, and you have nothing to do with all these others. Well now, this is one mode of refutation, as you and many other people understand it; but there is also another which I on my side understand. Let us therefore compare them with each other and consider if there is a difference between them. For indeed the points which we have at issue are by no means of slight importance: rather, one might say, they are matters on which it is most honorable to have knowledge, and most disgraceful to lack it; for in sum they involve our knowing or not knowing who is happy and who is not. To start at once with the point we are now debating, you consider it possible for a man to be happy while doing wrong, and as a wrongdoer, since you regard Archelaus as a wrongdoer, and yet happy. We are to conclude, are we not, that this is your opinion?
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν.
εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἆρ', ἂν τυγχάνῃ
δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;
Soc.And I say it is impossible. There we have one point at issue. Very good but then, will a man be happy in wrongdoing if he comes in for requital and punishment?
ΠΩΛ.Ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.
Pol.Not at all, since in that case he would be most wretched.
472e ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν
σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;
Soc.But if the wrongdoer escapes requital, by your account he will be happy?
ΠΩΛ.Φημί.
Pol.Yes.
ΣΩ.Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, Πῶλε, ἀδικῶν τε
καὶ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ
διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος
ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.
Soc.Whereas in my opinion, Polus, the wrongdoer or the unjust is wretched anyhow; more wretched, however, if he does not pay the penalty and gets no punishment for his wrongdoing, but less wretched if he pays the penalty and meets with requital from gods and men.
473a ΠΩΛ.Ἄτοπά γε, Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.
Pol.What a strange doctrine, Socrates, you are trying to maintain!
ΣΩ.Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ἑταῖρε, ταὐτὰ
ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν διαφερόμεθα
ταῦτ' ἐστιν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν
τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.
Soc.Yes, and I will endeavor to make you too, my friend, maintain it with me: for I count you as a friend. Well now, these are the points on which we differ; just examine them yourself. I think I told you at an earlier stage that wrongdoing was worse than being wronged.
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly you did.
ΣΩ.Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
Soc.And you thought that being wronged was worse.
ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
ΣΩ.Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ
ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.
Soc.And I said that wrongdoers were wretched, and I was refuted by you.
ΠΩΛ.Ναὶ μὰ Δία.
Pol.Upon my word, yes.
473b ΣΩ.Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, Πῶλε.
Soc.At least to your thinking, Polus.
ΠΩΛ.Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος.
Pol.Yes, and true thinking too.
ΣΩ.Ἴσως. σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν
μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.
Soc.Perhaps. But you said, on the other hand, that wrongdoers are happy, if they pay no penalty.
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pol.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἐγὼ δέ γε αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ
διδόντας δίκην ἧττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;
Soc.Whereas I say they are most wretched, and those who pay the penalty, less so. Do you wish to refute that as well?
ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν,
Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.
Pol.Why, that is still harder to refute, Socrates, than the other!
ΣΩ.Οὐ δῆτα, Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς
οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.
Soc.Not merely so, Polus, but impossible; for the truth is never refuted.
ΠΩΛ.Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι
473c ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται
καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας
καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὑτοῦ
ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ
καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἐὰν διαφυγὼν
τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὅτι
ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν
473d πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι
ἐξελέγχειν;
Pol.How do you mean? If a man be caught criminally plotting to make himself a despot, and he be straightway put on the rack and castrated and have his eyes burnt out, and after suffering himself, and seeing inflicted on his wife and children, a number of grievous torments of every kind, he be finally crucified or burnt in a coat of pitch, will he be happier than if he escape and make himself despot, and pass his life as the ruler in his city, doing whatever he likes, and envied and congratulated by the citizens and the foreigners besides? Impossible, do you tell me, to refute that?
ΣΩ.Μορμολύττῃ αὖ, γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις·
ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν. ἐὰν
ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;
Soc.You are trying to make my flesh creep this time, my spirited Polus, instead of refuting me; a moment ago you were for calling witnesses. However, please refresh my memory a little: criminally plotting to make himself a despot, you said?
ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.I did.
ΣΩ.Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος
αὐτῶν, οὔτε κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως
οὔτε διδοὺς δίκηνδυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν
473e οὐκ ἂν εἴηἀθλιώτερος μέντοι διαφεύγων καὶ τυραννεύσας.
τί τοῦτο, Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου
ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή;
Soc.Then neither of them will ever be happier than the other—neither he who has unjustly compassed the despotic power, nor he who pays the penalty; for of two wretched persons neither can be happier; but still more wretched is he who goes scot-free and establishes himself as despot. What is that I see, Polus? You are laughing? Here we have yet another form of refutation—when a statement is made, to laugh it down, instead of disproving it!
ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα
λέγῃς οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί.
Pol.Do you not think yourself utterly refuted, Socrates, when you make such statements as nobody in the world would assent to? You have only to ask anyone of the company here.
ΣΩ. Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν
λαχών, ἐπειδὴ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν,
474a γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.
μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ'
εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,
ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ
οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι
μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἄν μοι λόγος , τοὺς δὲ
πολλοὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ
474b πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει
διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ
οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν
τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ
διδόναι.
Soc.Polus, I am not one of your statesmen: indeed, last year, when I was elected a member of the Council, and, as my tribe held the Presidency, I had to put a question to the vote, I got laughed at for not understanding the procedure. So do not call upon me again to take the votes of the company now; but if, as I said this moment, you have no better disproof than those, hand the work over to me in my turn, and try the sort of refutation that I think the case requires. For I know how to produce one witness in support of my statements, and that is the man himself with whom I find myself arguing; the many I dismiss: there is also one whose vote I know how to take, whilst to the multitude I have not a word to say. See therefore if you will consent to be put to the proof in your turn by answering my questions. For I think, indeed, that you and I and the rest of the world believe that doing wrong is worse than suffering it, and escaping punishment worse than incurring it.
ΠΩΛ.Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα.
ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἀδικεῖν;
Pol.And I, that neither I nor anyone else in the world believes it. You, it seems, would choose rather to suffer wrong than to do it.
ΣΩ.Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.
Soc.Yes, and so would you and everyone else.
ΠΩΛ.Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος
οὐδείς.
Pol.Far from it neither; I nor you nor anybody else.
474c ΣΩ.Οὔκουν ἀποκρινῇ;
Soc.Then will you answer?
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ'
ἐρεῖς.
Pol.To be sure I will, for indeed I am eager to know what on earth you will say.
ΣΩ.Λέγε δή μοι, ἵν' εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε
ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ
ἀδικεῖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
Soc.Well then, so that you may know, tell me, just as though I were asking you all over again, which of the two seems to you, Polus, to be the worse—doing wrong or suffering it?
—ΠΩΛ.Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.
Pol.Suffering it, I say.
— ΣΩ.Τί δὲ δή; αἴσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
ἀποκρίνου.
Soc.Now again, which is fouler—doing wrong or suffering it? Answer.
—ΠΩΛ.Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
Pol.Doing it.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον,
εἴπερ αἴσχιον.
Soc.And also more evil, if fouler.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἥκιστά γε.
Pol.Not at all.
—ΣΩ.Μανθάνω· οὐ
474d ταὐτὸν ἡγῇ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν
καὶ αἰσχρόν.
Soc.I see: you hold, apparently, that fair and good are not the same, nor evil and foul.
—ΠΩΛ.Οὐ δῆτα.
Pol.Just so.
ΣΩ.Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ
χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς
οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ
σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ
εἶναι, πρὸς ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον , πρὸς τοῦτο, κατὰ
ἡδονήν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας;
ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους;
Soc.But what of this? All fair things, like bodies and colors and figures and sounds and observances—is it according to no standard that you call these fair in each case? Thus in the first place, when you say that fair bodies are fair, it must be either in view of their use for some particular purpose that each may serve, or in respect of some pleasure arising when, in the act of beholding them, they cause delight to the beholder. Have you any description to give beyond this of bodily beauty?
474e —ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ ἔχω.
Pol.I have not.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα
οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα διὰ ἡδονήν τινα διὰ
ὠφελίαν δι' ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;
Soc.And so with all the rest in the same way, whether they be figures or colors, is it for some pleasure or benefit or both that you give them the name of fair?
Ἔγωγε.
Pol.It is.
—ΣΩ.Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν
πάντα ὡσαύτως;
Soc.And sounds also, and the effects of music, are not these all in the same case?
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ
τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων
ἐστίν, τὰ καλά, τοῦ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἡδέα ἀμφότερα.
Soc.And further, in all that belongs to laws and observances, surely the fairness of them cannot lie beyond those limits of being either beneficial or pleasant or both.
475a — ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Pol.I think not.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων
κάλλος ὡσαύτως;
Soc.And is it not just the same with the fairness of studies also?
—ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε
νῦν ὁρίζῃ, Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ
καλόν.
Pol.Doubtless; and this time, Socrates, your definition is quite fair, when you define what is fair by pleasure and good.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ
κακῷ;
Soc.And foul by their opposites, pain and evil?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pol.That needs must follow.
—ΣΩ.Ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον
κάλλιον , τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον
κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ὠφελίᾳ ἀμφοτέροις.
Soc.Thus when of two fair things one is fairer, the cause is that it surpasses in either one or both of these effects, either in pleasure, or in benefit, or in both.
—ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ
475b ἕτερον αἴσχιον , ἤτοι λύπῃ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον
ἔσται· οὐκ ἀνάγκη;
Soc.And again, when one of two foul things is fouler, this will be due to an excess either of pain or of evil: must not that be so?
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ
δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;
Soc.Come then, what was it we heard just now about doing and suffering wrong? Were you not saying that suffering wrong is more evil, but doing it fouler?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔλεγον.
Pol.I was.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ
αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν
καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη κακῷ ἀμφοτέροις;
οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;
Soc.Well now, if doing wrong is fouler than suffering it, it is either more painful, and fouler by an excess of pain or evil or both; must not this also be the case?
—ΠΩΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pol.Yes, of course.
—ΣΩ.Πρῶτον
475c μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ
ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;
Soc.Then let us first consider if doing wrong exceeds suffering it in point of pain—if those who do wrong are more pained than those who suffer it.
—ΠΩΛ.Οὐδαμῶς, Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.
Pol.Not so at all, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ
ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει.
Soc.Then it does not surpass in pain.
—ΠΩΛ.Οὐ δῆτα.
Pol.No, indeed.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἰ
μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.
Soc.And so, if not in pain, it can no longer be said to exceed in both.
—ΠΩΛ.Οὐ
φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.
Soc.It remains, then, that it exceeds in the other.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τῷ κακῷ.
Soc.In evil.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔοικεν.
Pol.So it seems.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον
τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
Soc.Then it is by an excess of evil that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it.
Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.
Pol.Yes, obviously.
475d ΣΩ.Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ
ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον
εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
Soc.Now it is surely admitted by the mass of mankind, as it was too by you in our talk a while ago, that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Νῦν
δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.
Soc.And now it has been found to be more evil.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔοικε.
Pol.So it seems.
—ΣΩ.Δέξαιο ἂν οὖν
σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; μὴ
ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ
γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ
475e φάθι μὴ ἐρωτῶ.
Soc.Then would you rather have the evil and foul when it is more than when it is less? Do not shrink from answering, Polus you will get no hurt by it: but submit yourself bravely to the argument, as to a doctor, and reply yes or no to my question.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, Σώκρατες.
Pol.Why, I should not so choose, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;
Soc.And would anybody else in the world?
—ΠΩΛ.Οὔ μοι
δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.
Pol.I think not, by this argument at least.
—ΣΩ.Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ
ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἂν σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων
δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ
τυγχάνει ὄν.
Soc.Then I spoke the truth when I said that neither you nor anyone else in the world would choose to do wrong rather than suffer it, since it really is more evil.
—ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
ΣΩ.Ὁρᾷς οὖν, Πῶλε, ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον
παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι
πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς εἷς ὢν
476a μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων
τοὺς ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως
ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν
σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἆρα μέγιστον τῶν
κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ ᾤου, μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ
ἐγὼ ᾤμην.
Σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι
δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;
Soc.So you see, Polus, that when one proof is contrasted with the other they have no resemblance, but whereas you have the assent of every one else except myself, I am satisfied with your sole and single assent and evidence, and I take but your vote only and disregard the rest. Now let us leave this matter where it stands, and proceed next to examine the second part on which we found ourselves at issue—whether for a wrongdoer to pay the penalty is the greatest of evils, as you supposed, or to escape it is a greater, as I on my side held. Let us look at it this way: do you call paying the just penalty, and being justly punished, for wrongdoing the same thing?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.I do.
476b — ΣΩ.Ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά
ἐστιν, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.
Soc.And can you maintain that all just things are not fair, in so far as they are just? Consider well before you speak.
Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, Σώκρατες.
Pol.No, I think they are, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε·
ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου
τοῦ ποιοῦντος;
Soc.Then take another point: if a man does anything, must there be something which is also acted upon by this doer of the thing?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Pol.I think so.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρα τοῦτο
πάσχον τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;
Soc.And does it suffer what the doer does, and is the effect such as the agent’s action makes it? I mean, for example, when one strikes a blow something must needs be struck?
— ΠΩΛ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pol.It must.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ταχὺ
476c τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;
Soc.And if the striker strikes hard or quick, the thing struck is struck in the same way?
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
— ΣΩ.Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἷον ἂν τὸ
τύπτον ποιῇ;
Soc.Hence the effect in the thing struck is such as the striker makes it?
—ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει
τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;
Soc.And so again, if one burns, something must be burnt?
—ΠΩΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pol.Yes, of course.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ εἰ
σφόδρα γε κάει ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς
ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ;
Soc.And if one burns severely or sorely, the thing burnt is burnt according as the burner burns it?
—ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ
τέμνει τι, αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι.
Soc.And again, if one cuts, the same may be said? For something is cut.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον
476d τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει;
Soc.And if the cut is large or deep or sore, the cut made in the thing cut is such as the cutter cuts it?
— ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
—ΣΩ.Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς,
ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον
τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.
Soc.Then putting it all in a word, see if you agree that what I was just saying applies to all cases—that the patient receives an effect of the same kind as the agent’s action.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.
Pol.I do agree.
ΣΩ.Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον
πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ποιεῖν;
Soc.Then this being admitted, is paying the penalty suffering something, or doing it?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀνάγκη, Σώκρατες,
πάσχειν.
Pol.Suffering it must be, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;
Soc.And at the hands of an agent?
—ΠΩΛ.Πῶς
γὰρ οὔ; ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.
Pol.Yes, of course; at the hands of the punisher.
—ΣΩ. δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων
476e δικαίως κολάζει;
Soc.And he who punishes aright punishes justly?
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Δίκαια ποιῶν οὔ;
Soc.Doing what is just, or not?
—ΠΩΛ.Δίκαια.
Pol.What is just.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς
δίκαια πάσχει;
Soc.And he who pays the penalty by being punished suffers what is just?
—ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
—ΣΩ.Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που
καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;
Soc.And what is just, I think we have agreed, is fair?
—ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Τούτων ἄρα
μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, δὲ πάσχει, κολαζόμενος.
Soc.Then of these two, the one does what is fair and the other, he who is punished, suffers it.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
477a —ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; γὰρ ἡδέα ὠφέλιμα.
Soc.And so, if fair, good? For that is either pleasant or beneficial.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pol.It must be so.
—ΣΩ.Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει δίκην
διδούς;
Soc.So he who pays the penalty suffers what is good?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔοικεν.
Pol.It seems so.
—ΣΩ.Ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;
Soc.Then he is benefited?
Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελτίων
τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;
Soc.Is it the benefit I imagine—that he becomes better in soul if he is justly punished?
Εἰκός γε.
Pol.Quite likely.
—ΣΩ.Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται δίκην
διδούς;
Soc.Then is he who pays the penalty relieved from badness of soul?
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται
477b κακοῦ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ
ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾷς πενίαν;
Soc.And so relieved from the greatest evil? Look at it this way; in a man’s pecuniary resources do you perceive any other badness than poverty?
—ΠΩΛ.Οὔκ,
ἀλλὰ πενίαν.
Pol.No, only poverty.
—ΣΩ.Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν
ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα;
Soc.And what in his bodily resources? You would say that badness there is weakness or disease or ugliness or the like?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Pol.I would.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν
ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι;
Soc.And in soul too you believe there is a certain wickedness?
—ΠΩΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Pol.Of course.
—ΣΩ.Ταύτην
οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα;
Soc.And do you not call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and so forth?
—ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Pol.Certainly I do.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων
477c καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας,
πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;
Soc.So now in property, body, and soul, these three, you have mentioned three vices—poverty, disease, and injustice?
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τίς οὖν
τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην
τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;
Soc.Then which of these vices is the foulest? Is it not injustice—in short, the vice of the soul?
—ΠΩΛ.Πολύ γε.
Pol.Far the foulest.
—ΣΩ.Εἰ δὴ
αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;
Soc.And if foulest, then also most evil?
—ΠΩΛ.Πῶς, Σώκρατες, λέγεις;
Pol.How do you mean, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Ὡδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην
παρέχον βλάβην ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν
ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.
Soc.Just this: the foulest is foulest in each case because it produces the greatest pain or harm or both; this follows from our previous admissions.
—ΠΩΛ.Μάλιστα.
Pol.Quite so.
Αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ
477d ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν;
Soc.And foulest of all, we have just agreed, is injustice and, in general, vice of soul?
—ΠΩΛ.Ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
Pol.Yes, we have.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων
ἐστὶν βλάβῃ ἀμφότερα;
Soc.So then either it is most painful, that is, foulest of these vices by an excess of painfulness, or else of harmfulness, or in both ways?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pol.Necessarily.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ'
οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον
εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;
Soc.Then do you think that being unjust, licentious, cowardly, and ignorant is more painful than being poor and sick?
—ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.
Pol.No, I do not, Socrates, from what we have said.
—ΣΩ.Ὑπερφυεῖ
τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα
477e τἆλλα τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ
οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς σὸς λόγος.
Soc.Portentous then must be the extent of harm, and astonishing the evil, by which the soul’s vice exceeds all the others so as to be foulest of all, since it is not by pain, on your view of the matter.
—ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
— ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον
μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.
Soc.But further, I suppose, whatever has an excess of harm in the greatest measure, must be the greatest evil in the world.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.
ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία
μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;
Soc.So injustice, licentiousness, and in general, vice of soul, are the greatest evils in the world?
—ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
ΣΩ.Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;
Soc.Now what is the art that relieves from poverty? Is it not money-making?
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;
Soc.And what from disease? Is it not medicine?
478a — ΠΩΛ.Ἀνάγκη.
Pol.It must be.
—ΣΩ.Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ
οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας
τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;
Soc.And what from wickedness and injustice? If you are not ready for that offhand, consider it thus: whither and to whom do we take those who are in bodily sickness?
—ΠΩΛ.Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς,
Σώκρατες.
Pol.To the doctor, Socrates.
—ΣΩ.Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;
Soc.And whither the wrongdoers and libertines?
—ΠΩΛ.Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;
Pol.To the law-court, do you mean?
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
δίκην δώσοντας;
Soc.Yes, and to pay the penalty?
—ΠΩΛ.Φημί.
Pol.I agree.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ
δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;
Soc.Then is it not by employing a kind of justice that those punish who punish aright?
ΠΩΛ.Δῆλον δή.
Pol.Clearly so.
—ΣΩ.Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει,
478b ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.
Soc.Then money-making relieves us from poverty, medicine from disease, and justice from licentiousness and injustice.
— ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [ὧν λέγεις
Soc.Which then is the fairest of these things?
— ΠΩΛ.Τίνων λέγεις;
Pol.Of what things, pray?
—ΣΩ.Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.
Soc.Moneymaking, medicine, justice.
—ΠΩΛ.Πολὺ διαφέρει, Σώκρατες, δίκη.
Pol.Justice, Socrates, is far above the others.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ὠφελίαν ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ
κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;
Soc.Now again, if it is fairest, it causes either most pleasure or benefit or both.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι
ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;
Soc.Well then, is it pleasant to be medically treated, and do those who undergo such treatment enjoy it?
—ΠΩΛ.Οὐκ
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Pol.I do not think so.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. γάρ;
Soc.But it is beneficial, is it not?
478c Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ
ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.
Soc.Because one is relieved of a great evil, and hence it is worth while to endure the pain and be well.
—ΠΩΛ.Πῶς
γὰρ οὔ;
Pol.Of course.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος
ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;
Soc.Is this then the happiest state of body for a man to be in—that of being medically treated—or that of never being ill at all?
Δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων.
Pol.Clearly, never being ill.
—ΣΩ.Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία,
ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις.
Soc.Yes, for what we regarded as happiness, it seems, was not this relief from evil, but its non-acquisition at any time.
— ΠΩΛ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Pol.That is so.
478d ΣΩ.Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν
εἴτ' ἐν σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος
τοῦ κακοῦ, μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;
Soc.Well now, which is the more wretched of two persons who have something evil either in body or in soul, he who is medically treated and is relieved of the evil, or he who is not treated and keeps it?
—ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεταί
μοι μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.
Pol.To my thinking, he who is not treated.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι
μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας;
Soc.And we found that paying the penalty is a relief from the greatest evil, wickedness?
—ΠΩΛ.Ἦν γάρ.
Pol.We did.
—ΣΩ.Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ
γίγνεται πονηρίας δίκη.
Soc.Because, I suppose, the justice of the court reforms us and makes us juster, and acts as a medicine for wickedness.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Εὐδαιμονέστατος
μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο
478e μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.
Soc.Happiest therefore is he who has no vice in his soul, since we found this to be the greatest of evils.
—ΠΩΛ.Δῆλον δή.
Pol.Clearly so.
—ΣΩ.Δεύτερος
δέ που ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
Soc.Next after him, I take it, is he who is relieved of it.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔοικεν.
Pol.So it seems.
—ΣΩ.Οὗτος
δ' ἦν νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην
διδούς.
Soc.And that was the man who is reproved, reprimanded, and made to pay the penalty.
—ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ἔχων [ἀδικίαν]
καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
Soc.Hence the worst life is led by him who has the vice and is not relieved of it.
—ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν
καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι
479a μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ
φῂς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους
καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;
Soc.And this is the man who in committing the greatest wrongs and practicing the greatest injustice has contrived to escape reproof and chastisement and penalty alike, as you say Archelaus has succeeded in doing, and the rest of the despots and orators and overlords?
ΠΩΛ.Ἔοικε.
Pol.So it seems.
ΣΩ.Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι
εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασιν
συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ
σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος
ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι
479b ἀλγεινόν. οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω;
Soc.Because, I conceive, my excellent friend, what these persons have contrived for themselves is very much as though a man who was the victim of the worst diseases should contrive not to submit to the doctor’s penalty for his bodily transgressions and take the prescribed treatment, from a childish fear of cautery or incision, as being so painful. Or do you not agree to this view of it?
ΠΩΛ.Ἔμοιγε.
Pol.I do.
ΣΩ.Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ὑγίεια καὶ
ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων
τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες,
Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον
τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς
σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ
479c καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι
μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι
καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι
λέγειν· εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, Πῶλε, ἆρ'
αἰσθάνῃ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; βούλει συλλογισώμεθα
αὐτά;
Soc.Since he was ignorant, it would seem, of the virtue of bodily health and fitness. For it is very probable, from what we have just agreed, that something like this is done also by those who evade their due penalty, Polus; they perceive its painfulness, but are blind to its benefits, and are unaware how much more wretched than lack of health in the body it is to dwell with a soul that is not healthy, but corrupt, unjust, and unholy; and hence it is that they do all they can to avoid paying the penalty and being relieved of the greatest of evils, by providing themselves with money and friends and the ability to excel in persuasive speech. But if what we have agreed is true, Polus, do you observe the consequences of our argument? Or, if you like, shall we reckon them up together?
ΠΩΛ.Εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ.
Pol.Yes, if you do not mind.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἀδικία καὶ τὸ
479d ἀδικεῖν;
Soc.Then does it result that injustice and wrongdoing is the greatest evil?
—ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεταί γε.
Pol.Yes, apparently.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε
ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι;
Soc.And further, it appeared that paying the penalty is a relief from this evil?
—ΠΩΛ.Κινδυνεύει.
Pol.It looks like it.
—ΣΩ.Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;
Soc.Whereas not paying it is a retention of the evil in us?
— ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει
τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν
τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.
Soc.Thus wrongdoing is second of evils in greatness; but to do wrong and not pay the penalty is the greatest and takes the first place among all evils.
—ΠΩΛ.Ἔοικεν.
Pol.It seems so.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν,
σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα
479e δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον οἰόμενος,
εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὁστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι
δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως
τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου
ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ
διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;
Soc.Well now, my friend, was this the point at issue between us, that you counted Archelaus, who did the greatest wrong, happy because he paid no penalty, whilst I on the contrary thought that anyone—whether Archelaus or any other person you please—who pays no penalty for the wrong he has done, is peculiarly and pre-eminently wretched among men, and that it is always the wrongdoer who is more wretched than the wronged, and the unpunished than the punished? Is not this what I stated?
ΠΩΛ.Ναί.
Pol.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;
Soc.Then has it not been proved that this was a true statement?
ΠΩΛ.Φαίνεται.
Pol.Apparently.
480a ΣΩ.Εἶεν· εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, Πῶλε, τίς
μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν
νῦν ὡμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως
μὴ ἀδικήσει, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἕξοντα. οὐ γάρ;
Soc.Very well: so if this is true, Polus, what is the great use of rhetoric? For you see by what we have just agreed that a man must keep a close watch over himself so as to avoid wrongdoing, since it would bring a great deal of evil upon him; must he not?
ΠΩΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Pol.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ αὐτὸς ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν
κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα
δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν,
480b σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας
ὕπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει καὶ ἀνίατον· πῶς λέγομεν,
Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα;
οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως
δὲ μή;
Soc.But if he is guilty of wrongdoing, either himself or anyone else he may care for, he must go of his own freewill where he may soonest pay the penalty, to the judge as if to his doctor, with the earnest intent that the disease of his injustice shall not become chronic and cause a deep incurable ulcer in his soul. Or what are we to say, Polus, if our former conclusions stand? Must not our later ones accord with them in this way, and in this only?
ΠΩΛ.Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, Σώκρατες;
Pol.Yes, what else, indeed, are we to say, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας
τῆς αὑτοῦ γονέων ἑταίρων παίδων πατρίδος ἀδικούσης
οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις
480c ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοὐναντίονκατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν
ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν
ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ἀλλ'
εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς
γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε αὑτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν
ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ὥσπερ τέμνειν
καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον
τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς
480d , τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας,
ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνῄσκοντα,
αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ,
ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται
τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. φῶμεν οὕτως μὴ
φῶμεν, Πῶλε;
Soc.Then for pleading in defence of injustice, whether it is oneself or one’s parents or friends or children or country that has done the wrong, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus; except one were to suppose, perchance, to the contrary, that a man ought to accuse himself first of all, and in the second place his relations or anyone else of his friends who may from time to time be guilty of wrong; and, instead of concealing the iniquity, to bring it to light in order that he may pay the penalty and be made healthy; and, moreover, to compel both himself and his neighbors not to cower away but to submit with closed eyes and good courage, as it were, to the cutting and burning of the surgeon, in pursuit of what is good and fair, and without reckoning in the smart: if his crimes have deserved a flogging, he must submit to the rod; if fetters, to their grip; if a fine, to its payment; if banishment, to be banished; or if death, to die; himself to be the first accuser either of himself or of his relations, and to employ his rhetoric for the purpose of so exposing their iniquities that they may be relieved of that greatest evil, injustice. Shall this be our statement or not, Polus?
480e ΠΩΛ.Ἄτοπα μέν, Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι
ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.
Pol.An extraordinary one, Socrates, it seems to me, though perhaps you do find it agrees with what went before.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν κἀκεῖνα λυτέον τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;
Soc.Well, either that must be upset, or this necessarily follows.
ΠΩΛ.Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.
Pol.Yes, that certainly is so.
ΣΩ.Τοὐναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα
κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς
ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦτοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέονἐὰν
δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον, καὶ
481a πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ
τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ
καὶ μὴ δῷ δίκην ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάντε χρυσίον <> ἡρπακὼς
πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν
καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάντε αὖ θανάτου
ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς , ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε,
ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὤν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς
481b πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὤν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, Πῶλε, ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ
γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ χρεία
αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν τις χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς
πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα.
Soc.And so again conversely, supposing it is our duty to injure somebody, whether an enemy or anyone else—provided only that it is not against oneself that wrong has been done by such enemy, for this we must take care to avoid—but supposing our enemy has wronged some one else, we must make every exertion of act and word to prevent him from being punished or coming to trial, or if he does, we must contrive that our enemy shall escape and not be punished; nay, if he has carried off a great lot of gold, that he shall not refund it but keep and spend it on himself and his, unjustly and godlessly, or if he has committed crimes that deserve death, that he shall not die; if possible, never die, but be deathless in his villainy, or failing that, live as long a time as may be in that condition. Such are the purposes, as it seems to me, Polus, for which rhetoric is useful, since to him who has no intention of doing wrong it is, I consider, of no great use, if indeed there is any use in it at all; for in our previous argument it was nowhere to be found.
ΚΑΛ.Εἰπέ μοι, Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης
παίζει;
Call.Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest over this, or only joking?
ΧΑΙ.Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν·
οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.
Chaer.To my thinking, Callicles, prodigiously in earnest: still, there is nothing like asking him.
ΚΑΛ.Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, Σώκρατες,
481c πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα παίζοντα; εἰ
μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα
λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων
καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, δεῖ;
Call.Upon my word, just what I want to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to take you as serious just now, or joking? For if you are serious and what you say is really true, must not the life of us human beings have been turned upside down, and must we not be doing quite the opposite, it seems, of what we ought to do?
ΣΩ. Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος,
τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι [] τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις
ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾴδιον
481d ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας
ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες,
ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε
τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων
δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου
ἑκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ
καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω
481e καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου· ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ
λέγοντος δῆμος Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος
λέγεις ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους
νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας.
τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύμασίν τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός
τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἑκάστοτε
διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις
ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ μή τις παύσει τὰ
482a σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ παύσῃ ποτὲ ταῦτα
λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα
ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν
φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν.
λέγει γάρ, φίλε ἑταῖρε, νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστιν
τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἧττον ἔμπληκτος· μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος
οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ
482b τῶν αὐτῶν, λέγει δὲ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ
αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι
ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι
ἁπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον,
μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς,
Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ.
καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον
εἶναι ἀνάρμοστόν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν χορηγοίην,
482c καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία
λέγειν μᾶλλον ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι
καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.
Soc.Callicles, if men had not certain feelings, each common to one sort of people, but each of us had a feeling peculiar to himself and apart from the rest, it would not be easy for him to indicate his own impression to his neighbor. I say this because I notice that you and I are at this moment in much the same condition, since the two of us are enamored each of two things—I of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, and philosophy, and you of two, the Athenian Demus, and the son of Pyrilampes. Now I always observe that, for all your cleverness, you are unable to contradict your favorite, however much he may say or whatever may be his account of anything, but are ever changing over from side to side. In the Assembly, if the Athenian Demus disagrees with some statement you are making, you change over and say what it desires and just the same thing happens to you in presence of that fair youth, the son of Pyrilampes;

you are unable to resist the counsels and statements of your darling, so that if anyone showed surprise at the strangeness of the things you are constantly saying under that influence, you would probably tell him, if you chose to speak the truth, that unless somebody makes your favorite stop speaking thus, you, will never stop speaking thus either. Consider yourself therefore obliged to hear the same sort of remark from me now, and do not be surprised at my saying it, but make my darling, philosophy, stop talking thus. For she, my dear friend, speaks what you hear me saying now, and she is far less fickle to me than any other favorite: that son of Cleinias is ever changing his views, but philosophy always holds the same, and it is her speech that now surprises you, and she spoke it in your own presence. So you must either refute her, as I said just now, by proving that wrongdoing and impunity for wrong done is not the uttermost evil; or, if you leave that unproved, by the Dog, god of the Egyptians, there will be no agreement between you, Callicles, and Callicles, but you will be in discord with him all your life. And yet I, my very good sir, should rather choose to have my lyre, or some chorus that I might provide for the public, out of tune and discordant, or to have any number of people disagreeing with me and contradicting me, than that I should have internal discord and contradiction in my own single self.

ΚΑΛ. Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν
παθόντος Πώλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ
παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν
ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια τὴν ῥητορικὴν
482d βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι αὐτὸν Γοργίας,
αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ φαίηδιὰ δὴ ταύτην
τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἰπεῖν,
σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶνκαί σου καταγελᾶν, ὥς γέ μοι
δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς, τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν.
καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι
συνεχώρησεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ
482e ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ
γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ
δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, φύσει μὲν
οὐκ ἔστιν καλά, νόμῳ δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί'
ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, τε φύσις καὶ νόμος· ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται
483a καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία
λέγειν. δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ
φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου.
ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν λόγον
ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν
ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ
483b γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ'
ἀνδραπόδου τινὸς κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τεθνάναι ζῆν, ὅστις
ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς
αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὗ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οἱ
τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν καὶ οἱ
πολλοί. πρὸς αὑτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὑτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε
νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς
483c ψόγους ψέγουσιν· ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν
ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν
πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν,
καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων
ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν
φαυλότεροι ὄντες. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ
αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ
ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· δέ γε οἶμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει
483d αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον
ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ
ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις
καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν,
ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν
καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ
τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας;
483e ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὗτοι
κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ
Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ
τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα· πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ
ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ
λέοντας, κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα
484a λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται
ἔχων ἀνήρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ
διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα
καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας,
ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα
484b ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος
ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν λέγει
ὅτι
νόμος πάντων βασιλεὺς
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων·
οὗτος δὲ δή, φησίν,—
ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον
ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί· τεκμαίρομαι
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶἀπριάτας
λέγει οὕτω πωςτὸ γὰρ ᾆσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαιλέγει δ' ὅτι
οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς βοῦς,
484c ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ τἆλλα κτήματα
εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν
χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσῃ δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ
μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί
ἐστιν, Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται ἐν
τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς καὶ
πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι
484d ἐστὶν ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν
κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων
ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς
δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν
ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι
γίγνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἴς τινα ἰδίαν πολιτικὴν
484e πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτικοί,
ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς
λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου·
λαμπρός τέ ἐστιν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ'
ἐπείγεται,
νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν·
485a ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος , ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο,
τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν
ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν
καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν·
ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ,
καταγέλαστον, Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε
485b ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς
τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον
ἴδω, ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ
παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ
πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ, ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου
παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾷ
μου τὰ ὦτα καί μοι δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ
485c ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζομένου παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον
φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐτὸν
οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ
νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν
μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε
οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου
485d πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα
καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι,
Σώκρατες, οὗτος ἀνήρ. γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει
τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς , ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι
φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη
ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ
τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν
485e τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν
μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. ἐγὼ δέ, Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς
ἔχω φιλικῶς· κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ
Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην.
καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἷάπερ
ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι "Ἀμελεῖς, Σώκρατες, ὧν
δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακιώδει
486a τινὶ διατρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὔτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι
προσθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν
ἂν λάβοις, οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο."
καίτοι, φίλε Σώκρατεςκαί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῇς· εὐνοίᾳ
γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇοὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν
ὡς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ
φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος
ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι,
φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι
486b χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι
εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ
φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου
σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, Σώκρατες,
ἥτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα,
μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν
μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ
486c τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ
ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον
εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην.
ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων
δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις
φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα
χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις
δόμοις· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ
486d ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.
Call.Socrates, you seem to be roistering recklessly in your talk, like the true demagogue that you are; and you are declaiming now in this way because Polus has got into the same plight as he was accusing Gorgias of letting himself be led into by you. For he said, I think, when you asked Gorgias whether, supposing a man came to him with no knowledge of justice but a desire to learn rhetoric, he would instruct the man, Gorgias showed some shame and said he would, because of the habit of mind in people which would make them indignant if refused—and so, because of this admission, he was forced to contradict himself, and that was just what suited you—and Polus was right, to my thinking, in mocking at you as he did then; but this time he has got into the very same plight himself. For my own part, where I am not satisfied with Polus is just that concession he made to you—that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it; for owing to this admission he too in his turn got entangled in your argument and had his mouth stopped, being ashamed to say what he thought. For you, Socrates, really turn the talk into such low, popular clap-trap, while you give out that you are pursuing the truth—into stuff that is fair, not by nature, but by convention.

Yet for the most part these two—nature and convention—are opposed to each other, so that if a man is ashamed and dares not say what he thinks, he is forced to contradict himself. And this, look you, is the clever trick you have devised for our undoing in your discussions: when a man states anything according to convention you slip according to nature into your questions; and again, if he means nature, you imply convention. In the present case, for instance, of doing and suffering wrong, when Polus was speaking of what is conventionally fouler, you followed it up in the sense of what is naturally so. For by nature everything is fouler that is more evil, such as suffering wrong: doing it is fouler only by convention. Indeed this endurance of wrong done is not a man’s part at all, but a poor slave’s, for whom it is better to be dead than alive, as it is for anybody who, when wronged or insulted, is unable to protect himself or anyone else for whom he cares. But I suppose the makers of the laws are the weaker sort of men, and the more numerous. So it is with a view to themselves and their own interest that they make their laws and distribute their praises and censures; and to terrorize the stronger sort of folk who are able to get an advantage, and to prevent them from getting one over them, they tell them, that such aggrandizement is foul and unjust, and that wrongdoing is just this endeavor to get the advantage of one’s neighbors: for I expect they are well content to see themselves on an equality, when they are so inferior. So this is why by convention it is termed unjust and foul to aim at an advantage over the majority, and why they call it wrongdoing: but nature, in my opinion, herself proclaims the fact that it is right for the better to have advantage of the worse, and the abler of the feebler. It is obvious in many cases that this is so, not only in the animal world, but in the states and races, collectively, of men—that right has been decided to consist in the sway and advantage of the stronger over the weaker. For by what manner of right did Xerxes march against Greece, or his father against Scythia? Or take the countless other cases of the sort that one might mention. Why, surely these men follow nature—the nature of right—in acting thus; yes, on my soul, and follow the law of nature—though not that, I dare say, which is made by us;

we mold the best and strongest amongst us, taking them from their infancy like young lions, and utterly enthral them by our spells and witchcraft, telling them the while that they must have but their equal share, and that this is what is fair and just. But, I fancy, when some man arises with a nature of sufficient force, he shakes off all that we have taught him, bursts his bonds, and breaks free; he tramples underfoot our codes and juggleries, our charms and laws, which are all against nature; our slave rises in revolt and shows himself our master, and there dawns the full light of natural justice. And it seems to me that Pindar adds his evidence to what I say, in the ode where he says—Law the sovereign of all,Mortals and immortals,Pind. Fr. 169 (Bergk)which, so he continues,—Carries all with highest hand,Justifying the utmost force: in proof I takeThe deeds of Hercules, for unpurchasedPind. Fr. 169 (Bergk)—the words are something like that—I do not know the poem well—but it tells how he drove off the cows as neither a purchase nor a gift from Geryones; taking it as a natural right that cows ar any other possessions of the inferior and weaker should all belong to the superior and stronger. Well, that is the truth of the matter; and you will grasp it if you will now put philosophy aside and pass to greater things. For philosophy, you know, Socrates, is a charming thing, if a man has to do with it moderately in his younger days; but if he continues to spend his time on it too long, it is ruin to any man. However well endowed one may be, if one philosophizes far on into life, one must needs find oneself ignorant of everything that ought to be familiar to the man who would be a thorough gentleman and make a good figure in the world. For such people are shown to be ignorant of the laws of their city, and of the terms which have to be used in negotiating agreements with their fellows in private or in public affairs, and of human pleasures and desires; and, in short, to be utterly inexperienced in men’s characters. So when they enter upon any private or public business they make themselves ridiculous, just as on the other hand, I suppose, when public men engage in your studies and discussions, they are quite ridiculous.

The fact is, as Euripides has it—Each shines in that, to that end presses on,Allotting there the chiefest part of the day,Wherein he haply can surpass himself—Eur. Antiope Fr. whereas that in which he is weak he shuns and vilifies; but the other he praises, in kindness to himself, thinking in this way to praise himself also. But the most proper course, I consider, is to take a share of both. It is a fine thing to partake of philosophy just for the sake of education, and it is no disgrace for a lad to follow it: but when a man already advancing in years continues in its pursuit, the affair, Socrates, becomes ridiculous; and for my part I have much the same feeling towards students af philosophy as towards those who lisp or play tricks. For when I see a little child, to whom it is still natural to talk in that way, lisping or playing some trick, I enjoy it, and it strikes me as pretty and ingenuous and suitable to the infant’s age; whereas if I hear a small child talk distinctly, I find it a disagreeable thing, and it offends my ears and seems to me more befitting a slave. But when one hears a grown man lisp, or sees him play tricks, it strikes one as something ridiculous and unmanly, that deserves a whipping. Just the same, then, is my feeling towards the followers of philosophy. For when I see philosophy in a young lad I approve of it; I consider it suitable, and I regard him as a person of liberal mind: whereas one who does not follow it I account illiberal and never likely to expect of himself any fine or generous action. But when I see an elderly man still going on with philosophy and not getting rid of it, that is the gentleman, Socrates, whom I think in need of a whipping. For as I said just now, this person, however well endowed he may be, is bound to become unmanly through shunning the centers and marts of the city, in which, as the poet said, men get them note and glory; he must cower down and spend the rest of his days whispering in a corner with three or four lads, and never utter anything free or high or spirited. Now I, Socrates, am quite fairly friendly to you, and so I feel very much at this moment as Zethus did, whom I have mentioned, towards Amphion in Euripides.

Indeed I am prompted to address you in the same sort of words as he did his brother: You neglect, Socrates, what you ought to mind; you distort with a kind of boyish travesty a soul of such noble nature; and neither will you bring to the counsels of justice any rightly spoken word, nor will you accept any as probable or convincing, nor advise any gallant plan for your fellow. And yet, my dear Socrates—now do not be annoyed with me, for I am going to say this from goodwill to you—does it not seem to you disgraceful to be in the state I consider you are in, along with the rest of those who are ever pushing further into philosophy? For as it is, if somebody should seize hold of you or anyone else at all of your sort, and drag you off to prison, asserting that you were guilty of a wrong you had never done, you know you would be at a loss what to do with yourself, and would be all dizzy and agape without a word to say; and when you came up in court, though your accuser might be ever so paltry a rascal, you would have to die if he chose to claim death as your penalty. And yet what wisdom is there, Socrates, in an art that found a man of goodly parts and made him worse, unable either to succor himself, or to deliver himself or anyone else from the greatest dangers, but like to be stripped by his enemies of all his substance, and to live in his city as an absolute outcast? Such a person, if one may use a rather low expression, can be given a box on the ear with impunity. No, take my advice, my good sir, and cease refuting; some practical proficiency induce,—something that will give you credit for sense: to others leave these pretty toys,—call them vaporings or fooleries as you will,— which will bring you to inhabit empty halls; and emulate, not men who probe these trifles, but who have means and repute and other good things in plenty.

ΣΩ.Εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, Καλλίκλεις,
οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἅσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων
βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα ἔμελλον
προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν ἐκείνη καλῶς
τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ
οὐδέν με δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;
Soc.If my soul had happened to be made of gold, Callicles, do you not think I should have been delighted to find one of those stones with which they test gold, and the best one; which, if I applied it, and it confirmed to me that my soul had been properly tended, would give me full assurance that I am in a satisfactory state and have no need of other testing?
486e ΚΑΛ.Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, Σώκρατες;
Call.What is the point of that question, Socrates?
ΣΩ.Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ· νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς
τοιούτῳ ἑρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναι.
Soc.I will tell you. I am just thinking what a lucky stroke I have had in striking up with you.
ΚΑΛ.Τί δή;
Call.How so?
ΣΩ.Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἅν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἐμὴ
ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ
487a ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε
ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην
τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω
οἳ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τέ εἰσιν βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ
εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ
μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ·
τὼ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφὼ μὲν καὶ
487b φίλω ἐστὸν ἐμώ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηροτέρω
μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; γε εἰς τοσοῦτον
αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος
αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν
ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα
πάντα ἔχεις οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ
ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὔνους.
487c τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ,
Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ
τε καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος
καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ
ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον
εἴη, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι
εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι
487d παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι
γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω
ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύοντος ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις,
ἱκανόν μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὔνους εἶ.
καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι,
αὐτός τε φῂς καὶ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ
σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὑτωσὶ δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί·
487e ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον
τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ
δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε
αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδείᾳ οὔτ' αἰσχύνης
περιουσίᾳ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις ἄν· φίλος γάρ
μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῄς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἐμὴ καὶ σὴ
ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἕξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη
ἐστὶν σκέψις, Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ὧν σὺ
δή μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί
488a ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον
ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν
ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ
τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῇς,
ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἔστιν τοῦτο ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι,
καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό, καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν
μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταὐτὰ
πράττοντα ἅπερ ὡμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλᾶκα εἶναι καὶ
488b μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσῃς ὕστερον, ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα.
ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε πῶς φῂς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ
σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ
τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον
ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ
δίκαιον εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;
Soc.I am certain that whenever you agree with me in any view that my soul takes, this must be the very truth. For I conceive that whoever would sufficiently test a soul as to rectitude of life or the reverse should go to work with three things which are all in your possession—knowledge, goodwill, and frankness. I meet with many people who are unable to test me, because they are not wise as you are; while others, though wise, are unwilling to tell me the truth, because they do not care for me as you do; and our two visitors here, Gorgias and Polus, though wise and friendly to me, are more lacking in frankness and inclined to bashfulness than they should be: nay, it must be so, when they have carried modesty to such a point that each of them can bring himself, out of sheer modesty, to contradict himself in face of a large company, and that on questions of the greatest importance. But you have all these qualities which the rest of them lack: you have had a sound education, as many here in Athens will agree; and you are well disposed to me. You ask what proof I have? I will tell you. I know, Callicles, that four of you have formed a partnership in wisdom—you, Tisander of Aphidnae, Andron, son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholarges; and I once overheard you debating how far the cultivation of wisdom should be carried, and I know you were deciding in favor of some such view as this—that one should not be carried away into the minuter points of philosophy, but you exhorted one another to beware of making yourselves overwise, lest you should unwittingly work your own ruin. So when I hear you giving me the same advice as you gave your own most intimate friends, I have proof enough that you really are well disposed to me. And further, as to your ability to speak out frankly and not be bashful, you not only claim this yourself, but you are borne out too by the speech that you made a short while ago. Well, this is clearly the position of our question at present: if you can bear me out in any point arising in our argument, that point can at once be taken as having been amply tested by both you and me, and there will be no more need of referring it to a further test; for no defect of wisdom or access of modesty could ever have been your motive in making this concession, nor again could you make it to deceive me: for you are my friend, as you say yourself. Hence any agreement between you and me must really have attained the perfection of truth.

And on no themes could one make more honorable inquiry, Callicles, than on those which you have reproached me with—what character one should have, and what should be one’s pursuits and up to what point, in later as in earlier years. For I assure you that if there is any fault of conduct to be found in my own life it is not an intentional error, but due to my ignorance: so I ask you not to break off in the middle of your task of admonishing me, but to make fully clear to me what it is that I ought to pursue and by what means I may attain it; and if you find me in agreement with you now, and afterwards failing to do what I agreed to, regard me as a regular dunce and never trouble any more to admonish me again—a mere good-for-nothing. Now, go right back and repeat to me what you and Pindar hold natural justice to consist in: is it that the superior should forcibly despoil the inferior, the better rule the worse, and the nobler have more than the meaner? Have you some other account to give of justice, or do I remember aright?

ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν λέγω.
Call.Why, that is what I said then, and I say it now also.
ΣΩ.Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω;
488c οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἷός τ' μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγοις.
πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι
τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς
καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς
κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶν καὶ
ἰσχυρότεραι, ὡς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον
ταὐτὸν ὄν, ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέστερον,
καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον δέ· αὐτὸς
488d ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτό μοι
αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταὐτὸν ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ
τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;
Soc.Is it the same person that you call better and superior? For I must say I was no more able then to understand what your meaning might be. Is it the stronger folk that you call superior, and are the weaker ones bound to hearken to the stronger one—as for instance I think you were also pointing out then, that the great states attack the little ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, on the ground that the superior and the stronger and the better are all the same thing; or is it possible to be better and yet inferior and weaker, and to be superior and yet more wicked? Or is the definition of the better and the superior the same? This is just what I bid you declare in definite terms—whether the superior and the better and the stronger are the same or different.
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
Call.Well, I tell you plainly, they are all the same.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ
φύσιν; οἳ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνί, ὥσπερ
καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.
Soc.Now, are the many superior by nature to the one? I mean those who make the laws to keep a check on the one, as you were saying yourself just now.
ΚΑΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Call.Of course.
ΣΩ.Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων
ἐστίν.
Soc.Then the ordinances of the many are those of the superior.
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
488e ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους
πολὺ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.
Soc.And so of the better? For the superior are far better, by your account.
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειττόνων
γε ὄντων;
Soc.And so their ordinances are by nature fair, since they are superior who made them?
ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I agree.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ
ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν
489a τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστιν ταῦτα οὔ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἁλώσῃ
ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ
τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον
τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι
τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι
ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.
Soc.Then is it the opinion of the many that—as you also said a moment ago—justice means having an equal share, and it is fouler to wrong than be wronged? Is that so, or not? And mind you are not caught this time in a bashful fit. Is it, or is it not, the opinion of the many that to have one’s equal share, and not more than others, is just, and that it is fouler to wrong than be wronged? Do not grudge me an answer to this, Callicles, so that—if I find you agree with me—I may then have the assurance that comes from the agreement of a man so competent to decide.
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλ' οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.
Call.Well, most people do think so.
ΣΩ.Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ
489b ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει·
ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ
ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν νόμος
καὶ φύσις, δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,
ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ
τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.
Soc.Then it is not only by convention that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it, and having one’s equal share is just, but by nature also: and therefore it looks as though your previous statement was untrue, and your count against me incorrect, when you said that convention and nature are opposites and that I, forsooth, recognizing that, am an unscrupulous debater, turning to convention when the assertion refers to nature, and to nature when it refers to convention.
ΚΑΛ.Οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι,
Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ
489c ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἕρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ
οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι τὸ βελτίους; οὐ
πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ
κρεῖττον; οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων
καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ
σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι
νόμιμα;
Call.What an inveterate driveller the man is! Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be word-catching at your age, and if one makes a verbal slip, to take that as a great stroke of luck? Do you imagine that, when I said being superior, I meant anything else than better? Have I not been telling you ever so long that I regard the better and the superior as the same thing? Or do you suppose I mean that if a pack of slaves and all sorts of fellows who are good for nothing, except perhaps in point of physical strength, gather together and say something, that is a legal ordinance?
ΣΩ.Εἶεν, σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;
Soc.Very well, most sapient Callicles: you mean that, do you?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Call.Certainly I do.
489d ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μέν, δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω
τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος
σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο
βελτίους ἡγῇ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους
σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπὲ
τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους;
καὶ θαυμάσιε πρᾳότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω
παρὰ σοῦ.
Soc.Why, my wonderful friend, I have myself been guessing ever so long that you meant something of this sort by superior, and if I repeat my questions it is because I am so keen to know definitely what your meaning may be. For I presume you do not consider that two are better than one, or that your slaves are better than yourself, just because they are stronger than you are. Come now, tell me again from the beginning what it is you mean by the better, since you do not mean the stronger only, admirable sir, do be more gentle with me over my first lessons, or I shall cease attending your school.
489e ΚΑΛ.Εἰρωνεύῃ, Σώκρατες.
Call.You are sarcastic, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, Καλλίκλεις, σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ
νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς
βελτίους εἶναι;
Soc.No, by Zethus, Callicles, whom you made use of just now for aiming a good deal of sarcasm at me: but come, tell us whom you mean by the better.
ΚΑΛ.Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.
Call.I mean the more excellent.
ΣΩ.Ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ
οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς
φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἄλλους τινάς;
Soc.So you see, you are uttering mere words yourself, and explaining nothing. Will you not tell us whether by the better and superior you mean the wiser, or some other sort?
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.
Call.Why, to be sure, I mean those, and very much so.
490a ΣΩ.Πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων
κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ,
τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων·
τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγεινκαὶ οὐ
ῥήματι θηρεύωεἰ εἷς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.
Soc.Then one wise man is often superior to ten thousand fools, by your account, and he ought to rule and they to be ruled, and the ruler should have more than they whom he rules. That is what you seem to me to intend by your statement—and I am not word-catching here—if the one is superior to the ten thousand.
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ
τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον
καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.
Call.Why, that is my meaning. For this is what I regard as naturally just—that being better and wiser he should have both rule and advantage over the baser people.
490b ΣΩ.Ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἁθρόοι, καὶ ἡμῖν
ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ
μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δ' ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν φρονιμώτερος
περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὤν, δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος,
τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν
ὤν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;
Soc.Stop there now. Once more, what is your meaning this time? Suppose that a number of us are assembled together, as now, in the same place, and we have in common a good supply of food and drink, and we are of all sorts—some strong, some weak; and one of us, a doctor, is wiser than the rest in this matter and, as may well be, is stronger than some and weaker than others; will not he, being wiser than we are, be better and superior in this affair?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
490c ΣΩ. οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἑκτέον αὐτῷ,
ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν,
ἐν τῷ δὲ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν
μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἑκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάντων
ἀσθενέστατος ὤν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, Καλλίκλεις;
οὐχ οὕτως, ὠγαθέ;
Soc.Then is he to have a larger ration than the rest of us because he is better, or ought he as ruler to have the distribution of the whole stock, with no advantage in spending and consuming it upon his own person, if he is to avoid retribution, but merely having more than some and less than others? Or if he chance to be the weakest of all, ought he not to get the smallest share of all though he be the best, Callicles? Is it not so, good sir?
ΚΑΛ.Περὶ σιτία, λέγεις, καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας·
490d ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.
Call.You talk of food and drink and doctors and drivel: I refer to something different.
ΣΩ.Πότερον οὐ τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; φάθι
μή.
Soc.Then tell me, do you call the wiser better? Yes or no?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.Yes, I do.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;
Soc.But do you not think the better should have a larger share?
ΚΑΛ.Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.
Call.Yes, but not of food and drink.
ΣΩ.Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον
μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα
ἀμπεχόμενον περιιέναι;
Soc.I see; of clothes, perhaps; and the ablest weaver should have the largest coat, and go about arrayed in the greatest variety of the finest clothes?
ΚΑΛ.Ποίων ἱματίων;
Call.What have clothes to do with it?
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν
490e φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον
ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον
περιπατεῖν.
Soc.Well, shoes then; clearly he who is wisest in regard to these, and best, should have some advantage. Perhaps the shoemaker should walk about in the biggest shoes and wear the largest number.
ΚΑΛ.Ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.
Call.Shoes—what have they to do with it? You keep on drivelling.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον
γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν,
τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς
πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ γῆν.
Soc.Well, if you do not mean things of that sort, perhaps you mean something like this: a farmer, for instance, who knows all about the land and is highly accomplished in the matter, should perhaps have an advantage in sharing the seed, and have the largest possible amount of it for use on his own land.
ΚΑΛ.Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, Σώκρατες.
Call.How you keep repeating the same thing, Socrates!
ΣΩ.Οὐ μόνον γε, Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν.
Soc.Yes, and not only that, Callicles, but on the same subjects too.
491a ΚΑΛ.Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ
κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύῃ, ὡς
περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.
Call.I believe, on my soul, you absolutely cannot ever stop talking of cobblers and fullers, cooks and doctors, as though our discussion had to do with them.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων κρείττων τε καὶ
φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; οὔτε ἐμοῦ
ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξῃ οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;
Soc.Then will you tell me in what things the superior and wiser man has a right to the advantage of a larger share? Or will you neither put up with a suggestion from me nor make one yourself?
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς
κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ'
491b οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν, ὅντινα ἂν
τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι,
ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι
διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.
Call.Why, I have been making mine for sometime past. First of all, by the superior I mean, not shoemakers or cooks, but those who are wise as regards public affairs and the proper way of conducting them, and not only wise but manly, with ability to carry out their purpose to the full; and who will not falter through softness of soul.
ΣΩ.Ὁρᾷς, βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταὐτὰ σύ τ'
ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῂς ἀεὶ
ταὐτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφῃ μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοὐναντίον, ὅτι
οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τοὺς
491c βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὡρίζου, αὖθις
δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἥκεις ἔχων·
ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ
βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις
τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅτι.
Soc.Do you perceive, my excellent Callicles, that your count against me is not the same as mine against you? For you say I am ever repeating the same things, and reproach me with it, whereas I charge you, on the contrary, with never saying the same thing on the same subject; but at one moment you defined the better and superior as the stronger, and at another as the wiser, and now you turn up again with something else: the manlier is what you now tell us is meant by the superior and better. No, my good friend, you had best say, and get it over, whom you do mean by the better and superior, and in what sphere.
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς
τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ
491d προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ'
ἐστίν, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν
ἀρχομένων.
Call.But I have told you already: men of wisdom and manliness in public affairs. These are the persons who ought to rule our cities, and justice means this—that these should have more than other people, the rulers than the ruled.
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; αὑτῶν, ἑταῖρε, τί; τι ἄρχοντας ἀρχομένους;
Soc.How so? Than themselves, my friend?
ΚΑΛ.Πῶς λέγεις;
Call.What do you mean?
ΣΩ.Ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· τοῦτο
μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;
Soc.I mean that every man is his own ruler; or is there no need of one’s ruling oneself, but only of ruling others?
ΚΑΛ.Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;
Call.What do you mean by one who rules himself?
ΣΩ.Οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα
ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν
491e ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
Soc.Nothing recondite; merely what most people mean—one who is temperate and self-mastering, ruler of the pleasures and desires that are in himself.
ΚΑΛ.Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας.
Call.You will have your pleasantry! You mean the simpletons by the temperate.
ΣΩ.Πῶς γὰρ [οὔοὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο
λέγω.
Soc.How so? Nobody can fail to see that I do not mean that.
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν
εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'
ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος
λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν
ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν,
492a ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι'
ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμία
γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οἶμαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν·
ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι
τὴν αὑτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν,
ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς
βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι
ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην
492b καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεὶ
ὅσοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν βασιλέων ὑέσιν εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῇ
φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα τυραννίδα δυναστείαν,
<τί ἂν> τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφροσύνης
καὶ δικαιοσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οἷς ἐξὸν
ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδὼν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ
ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων
νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες
492c εἶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης,
μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὑτῶν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς,
καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ,
Σώκρατες, ἣν φῂς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει· τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία
καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή
τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα,
τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀνθρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς
ἄξια.
Call.Oh, you most certainly do, Socrates. For how can a man be happy if he is a slave to anybody at all? No, natural fairness and justice, I tell you now quite frankly, is this—that he who would live rightly should let his desires be as strong as possible and not chasten them, and should be able to minister to them when they are at their height by reason of his manliness and intelligence, and satisfy each appetite in turn with what it desires. But this, I suppose, is not possible for the many; whence it comes that they decry such persons out of shame, to disguise their own impotence, and are so good as to tell us that licentiousness is disgraceful, thus enslaving—as I remarked before—the better type of mankind; and being unable themselves to procure achievement of their pleasures they praise temperance and justice by reason of their own unmanliness. For to those who started with the advantage of being either kings’ sons or able by their own parts to procure some authority or monarchy or absolute power, what in truth could be fouler or worse than temperance and justice in such cases? Finding themselves free to enjoy good things, with no obstacle in the way, they would be merely imposing on themselves a master in the shape of the law, the talk and the rebuke of the multitude. Or how could they fail to be sunk in wretchedness by that fairness of justice and temperance, if they had no larger portion to give to their own friends than to their enemies, that too when they were rulers in their own cities? No, in good truth, Socrates—which you claim to be seeking—the fact is this: luxury and licentiousness and liberty, if they have the support of force, are virtue and happiness, and the rest of these embellishments—the unnatural covenants of mankind—are all mere stuff and nonsense.
492d ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχῃ τῷ λόγῳ
παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις οἱ ἄλλοι
διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ
σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται
πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ
κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς
μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἁμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ
492e τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν;
Soc.Far from ignoble, at any rate, Callicles, is the frankness with which you develop your thesis: for you are now stating in clear terms what the rest of the world think indeed, but are loth to say. So I beg you not to give up on any account, that it may be made really evident how one ought to live. Now tell me: do you say the desires are not to be chastened if a man would be such as he ought to be, but he should let them be as great as possible and provide them with satisfaction from some source or other, and this is virtue?
ΚΑΛ.Φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.
Call.Yes, I say that.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες
εἶναι.
Soc.Then it is not correct to say, as people do, that those who want nothing are happy.
ΚΑΛ.Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι
εἶεν.
Call.No, for at that rate stones and corpses would be extremely happy.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς βίος.
οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε
λέγει, λέγων
τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;
493a καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη γάρ του ἔγωγε καὶ
ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν καὶ τὸ μὲν
σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ἐπιθυμίαι
εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν
ἄνω κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως
Σικελός τις Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν
τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους,
493b τῶν δ' ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί,
τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη
πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος
σοί, Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἅιδουτὸ ἀιδὲς
δὴ λέγωνοὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν, οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν
εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ
κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη πρὸς ἐμὲ
493c λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπῄκασεν
τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν
δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό
τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν
πως οἷός τε , πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ
ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν
ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἑλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον
493d πείθω τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσθαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι
τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα πολλὰ
τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσῃ;
Soc.Well, well, as you say, life is strange. For I tell you I should not wonder if Euripides’ words were true, when he says:Who knows if to live is to be dead,And to be dead, to live?Eur. Polydus and we really, it may be, are dead; in fact I once heard sages say that we are now dead, and the body is our tomb, and the part of the soul in which we have desires is liable to be over-persuaded and to vacillate to and fro, and so some smart fellow, a Sicilian, I daresay, or Italian, made a fable in which—by a play of words—he named this part, as being so impressionable and persuadable, a jar, and the thoughtless he called uninitiate: in these uninitiate that part of the soul where the desires are, the licentious and fissured part, he named a leaky jar in his allegory, because it is so insatiate. So you see this person, Callicles, takes the opposite view to yours, showing how of all who are in Hades—meaning of course the invisible—these uninitiate will be most wretched, and will carry water into their leaky jar with a sieve which is no less leaky. And then by the sieve, as my story-teller said, he means the soul: and the soul of the thoughtless he likened to a sieve, as being perforated, since it is unable to hold anything by reason of its unbelief and forgetfulness. All this, indeed, is bordering pretty well on the absurd; but still it sets forth what I wish to impress upon you, if I somehow can, in order to induce you to make a change, and instead of a life of insatiate licentiousness to choose an orderly one that is set up and contented with what it happens to have got. Now, am I at all prevailing upon you to change over to the view that the orderly people are happier than the licentious or will no amount of similar fables that I might tell you have any effect in changing your mind?
ΚΑΛ.Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, Σώκρατες.
Call.The latter is more like the truth, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ
βίου ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον
εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν
493e ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, μὲν οἴνου, δὲ μέλιτος, δὲ
γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ
χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ
χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος
μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τούτων
ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ
ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα
τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ
494a ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας·
ἆρα τοιούτου ἑκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου
εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω
τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ
ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, οὐ πείθω;
Soc.Come now, let me tell you another parable from the same school as that I have just told. Consider if each of the two lives, the temperate and the licentious, might be described by imagining that each of two men had a number of jars, and those of one man were sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and various others of various things, and that the sources of each of these supplies were scanty and difficult and only available through much hard toil:

well, one man, when he has taken his fill, neither draws off any more nor troubles himself a jot, but remains at ease on that score; whilst the other finds, like his fellow, that the sources are possible indeed, though difficult, but his vessels are leaky and decayed, and he is compelled to fill them constantly, all night and day, or else suffer extreme distress. If such is the nature of each of the two lives, do you say that the licentious man has a happier one than the orderly? Do I, with this story of mine, induce you at all to concede that the orderly life is better than the licentious, or do I fail?

ΚΑΛ.Οὐ πείθεις, Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ
ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'
ἔστιν, νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν
494b πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν
τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν.
Call.You fail, Socrates. For that man who has taken his fill can have no pleasure any more; in fact it is what I just now called living like a stone, when one has filled up and no longer feels any joy or pain. But a pleasant life consists rather in the largest possible amount of inflow.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ
ἀπιὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;
Soc.Well then, if the inflow be large, must not that which runs away be of large amount also, and must not the holes for such outflow be of great size?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Call.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ
οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν
καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;
Soc.Then it is a plover’s life you are describing this time, not that of a corpse or a stone. Now tell me, is the life you mean something like feeling hunger and eating when hungry?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.Yes, it is.
494c ΣΩ.Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;
Soc.And feeling thirst and drinking when thirsty?
ΚΑΛ.Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα
καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.
Call.Yes, and having all the other desires, and being able to satisfy them, and so with these enjoyments leading a happy life.
ΣΩ.Εὖγε, βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ
ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνῇ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι.
καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ
κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα
τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.
Soc.Bravo, my fine fellow! Do go on as you have begun, and mind you show no bashfulness about it. I too, it seems, must try not to be too bashful. First of all, tell me whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching.
494d ΚΑΛ.Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.
Call.What an odd person you are, Socrates—a regular stump-orator!
ΣΩ.Τοιγάρτοι, Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν
καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ
ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου
μόνον.
Soc.Why, of course, Callicles, that is how I upset Polus and Gorgias, and struck them with bashfulness; but you, I know, will never be upset or abashed; you are such a manly fellow. Come, just answer that.
ΚΑΛ.Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.
Call.Then I say that the man also who scratches himself will thus spend a pleasant life.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;
Soc.And if a pleasant one, a happy one also?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
494e ΣΩ.Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῷ ἔτι τί
σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινῇ, ἐάν τίς σε
τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ τούτων
τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, τῶν κιναίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ
δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν
εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;
Soc.Is it so if he only wants to scratch his head? Or what more am I to ask you? See, Callicles, what your answer will be, if you are asked everything in succession that links on to that statement; and the culmination of the case, as stated—the life of catamites—is not that awful, shameful, and wretched? Or will you dare to assert that these are happy if they can freely indulge their wants?
ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, Σώκρατες, τοὺς
λόγους;
Call.Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion into such topics?
ΣΩ. γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, γενναῖε, ἐκεῖνος
ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν,
495a εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι
ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε πότερον φῂς εἶναι
τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀγαθόν;
Soc.What, is it I who am leading it there, noble sir, or the person who says outright that those who enjoy themselves, with whatever kind of enjoyment, are happy, and draws no distinction between the good and bad sorts of pleasure? But come, try again now and tell me whether you say that pleasant and good are the same thing, or that there is some pleasure which is not good.
ΚΑΛ.Ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος λόγος, ἐὰν
ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι.
Call.Then, so that my statement may not be inconsistent through my saying they are different, I say they are the same.
ΣΩ.Διαφθείρεις, Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους,
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ
παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.
Soc.You are spoiling your first statements, Callicles, and you can no longer be a fit partner with me in probing the truth, if you are going to speak against your own convictions.
495b ΚΑΛ.Καὶ γὰρ σύ, Σώκρατες.
Call.Why, you do the same, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο,
οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν,
τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα
πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως
ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
Soc.Then I am just as much in the wrong if I do, as you are. But look here, my gifted friend, perhaps the good is not mere unconditional enjoyment: for if it is, we have to face not only that string of shameful consequences I have just shadowed forth, but many more besides.
ΚΑΛ.Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, Σώκρατες.
Call.In your opinion, that is, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζῃ;
Soc.And do you, Callicles, really maintain that it is?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I do.
495c ΣΩ.Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος;
Soc.Then are we to set about discussing it as your serious view?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.
Call.Oh yes, to be sure.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπιστήμην
που καλεῖς τι;
Soc.Come then, since that is your opinion, resolve me this: there is something, I suppose, that you call knowledge?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν
νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;
Soc.And were you not saying just now that knowledge can have a certain courage coupled with it?
Ἔλεγον γάρ.
Call.Yes, I was.
—ΣΩ.Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν
τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;
Soc.And you surely meant that they were two things, courage being distinct from knowledge?
—ΚΑΛ.Σφόδρα γε.
Call.Quite so.
— ΣΩ.Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἕτερον;
Soc.Well now, are pleasure and knowledge the same thing, or different?
495d — ΚΑΛ.Ἕτερον δήπου, σοφώτατε σύ.
Call.Different, I presume, O sage of sages.
—ΣΩ. καὶ ἀνδρείαν
ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;
Soc.And courage too, is that different from pleasure?
—ΚΑΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Call.Of course it is.
—ΣΩ.Φέρε δὴ
ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς
ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν
καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.
Soc.Come now, let us be sure to remember this, that Callicles the Acharnian said pleasant and good were the same, but knowledge and courage were different both from each other and from the good.
ΚΑΛ.Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ
ταῦτα. ὁμολογεῖ;
Call.And Socrates of Alopece refuses to grant us this; or does he grant it?
495e ΣΩ.Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν
αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας
τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγῇ πάθος
πεπονθέναι;
Soc.He does not; nor, I believe, will Callicles either, when he has rightly considered himself. For tell me, do you not regard people who are well off as being in the opposite condition to those who are badly off?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I do.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις,
ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου;
οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ
ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου.
Soc.Then if these conditions are opposite to each other, must not the same hold of them as of health and disease? For, you know, a man is never well and ill at the same time, nor gets rid of health and disease together.
ΚΑΛ.Πῶς λέγεις;
Call.How do you mean?
ΣΩ.Οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν
496a σκόπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;
Soc.Take, for instance, any part of the body you like by itself, and consider it. A man, I suppose, may have a disease of the eyes, called ophthalmia?
—ΚΑΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Call.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε
ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;
Soc.Then I presume he is not sound also at that time in those same eyes?
—ΚΑΛ.Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.
Call.By no conceivable means.
—ΣΩ.Τί δὲ
ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται; ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας
ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων
ἀπήλλακται;
Soc.And what say you, when he gets rid of his ophthalmia? Does he at that time get rid too of the health of his eyes, and so at last is rid of both things together?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἥκιστά γε.
Call.Far from it.
—ΣΩ.Θαυμάσιον γὰρ
496b οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται· γάρ;
Soc.Because, I imagine, this would be an astonishing and irrational result, would it not?
—ΚΑΛ.Σφόδρα γε.
Call.Very much so.
— ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;
Soc.Whereas, I take it, he gets and loses either turn?
—ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I agree.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν
ὡσαύτως;
Soc.And so with strength and weakness in just the same way?
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;
Soc.And speed and slowness?
— ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
—ΣΩ. καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ
τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει
καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;
Soc.And so too with good things and happiness and their opposites—bad things and wretchedness—does one take on each of these in turn, and in turn put it off?
—ΚΑΛ.Πάντως δήπου.
Call.Absolutely, I presume.
496c —ΣΩ.Ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό
τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα
σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.
Soc.Then if we find any things that a man puts off and retains at one and the same moment, clearly these cannot be the good and the bad. Do we admit this? Now consider very carefully before you answer.
—ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.
Call.Oh, I admit it down to the ground.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν
ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.
Soc.So now for our former admissions: did you say that being hungry was pleasant or painful? I mean, hunger itself.
—ΚΑΛ.Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδὺ
496d λέγω.
Call.Painful, I said; though eating when one is hungry I call pleasant.
—ΣΩ.Μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν.
οὐχί;
Soc.I see: but at all events hunger itself is painful, is it not?
—ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I agree.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;
Soc.And so too with thirst?
Σφόδρα γε.
Call.Quite so.
—ΣΩ.Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ὁμολογεῖς
ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;
Soc.Then am I to ask you any further questions, or do you admit that all want and desire is painful?
—ΚΑΛ.Ὁμολογῶ,
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.
Call.I admit it; no, do not question me further.
—ΣΩ.Εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν
ἄλλο τι ἡδὺ φῂς εἶναι;
Soc.Very good: but drinking when one is thirsty you surely say is pleasant?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I do.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;
Soc.Now, in this phrase of yours the words when one is thirsty, I take it, stand for when one is in pain?
496e —ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας
καὶ ἡδονή;
Soc.But drinking is a satisfaction of the want, and a pleasure?
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν
λέγεις;
Soc.So in the act of drinking, you say, one has enjoyment?
—ΚΑΛ.Μάλιστα.
Call.Quite so.
—ΣΩ.Διψῶντά γε.
Soc.When one is thirsty?
Φημί.
Call.I agree.
—ΣΩ.Λυπούμενον;
Soc.That is, in pain?
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Αἰσθάνῃ οὖν
τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν
διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ
τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος
βούλει; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα οὔ;
Soc.Then do you perceive the conclusion,—that you say one enjoys oneself, though in pain at the same moment, when you say one drinks when one is thirsty? Or does this not occur at once, at the same place and time—in either soul or body, as you please? For I fancy it makes no difference. Is this so or not?
— ΚΑΛ.Ἔστιν.
Call.It is.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς
497a πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῂς εἶναι.
Soc.But further, you say it is impossible to be badly off, or to fare ill, at the same time as one is faring well.
—ΚΑΛ.Φημὶ γάρ.
Call.Yes, I do.
Ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὡμολόγηκας.
Soc.But to enjoy oneself when feeling pain you have admitted to be possible.
Φαίνεται.
Call.Apparently.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν
οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ.
Soc.Hence enjoyment is not faring well, nor is feeling pain faring ill, so that the pleasant is found to be different from the good.
ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζῃ, Σώκρατες.
Call.I cannot follow these subtleties of yours, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόιθί γε
ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, [ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς] ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς
497b ὤν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται
καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;
Soc.You can, but you play the innocent, Callicles. Just go on a little further, that you may realize how subtle is your way of reproving me. Does not each of us cease at the same moment from thirst and from the pleasure he gets by drinking?
ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.
Call.I cannot tell what you mean.
ΓΟΡ.Μηδαμῶς, Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν
ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.
Gorg.No, no, Callicles, you must answer him, for our sakes also, that the arguments may be brought to a conclusion.
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, Γοργία·
σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.
Call.But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias he keeps on asking petty, unimportant questions until he refutes one.
ΓΟΡ.Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη τιμή,
Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν
βούληται.
Gorg.Why, what does that matter to you? In any case it is not your credit that is at stake, Callicles; just permit Socrates to refute you in such manner as he chooses.
497c ΚΑΛ.Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα,
ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.
Call.Well then, proceed with those little cramped questions of yours, since Gorgias is so minded.
ΣΩ.Εὐδαίμων εἶ, Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι
πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι.
ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν
ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.
Soc.You are fortunate, Callicles, in having been initiated into the Great Mysteries before the Little: I did not think that was the proper thing. So go on answering where you left off—as to whether each of us does not cease to feel thirst and pleasure at the same time.
—ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I grant it.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα
παύεται;
Soc.And so, with hunger and the rest, does he cease to feel the desires and pleasures at the same time?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Call.That is so.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν
497d καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;
Soc.And also ceases to feel the pains and pleasures at the same time?
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ
μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ
ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;
Soc.But still he does not cease to have the good and bad at the same time, as you agreed; and now, you do not agree?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε· τί
οὖν δή;
Call.I do; and what then?
ΣΩ.Ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς
ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα
παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων· πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν
εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ
βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ
497e ὁμολογεῖσθαι· ἄθρει δέ) τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ
ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος
παρῇ;
Soc.Only that we get the result, my friend, that the good things are not the same as the pleasant, nor the bad as the painful. For with the one pair the cessation is of both at once, but with the other two it is not, since they are distinct. How then can pleasant things be the same as good, or painful things as bad? Or if you like, consider it another way—for I fancy that even after that you do not admit it. Just observe: do you not call good people good owing to the presence of good things, as you call beautiful those in whom beauty is present?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I do.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς
ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους
καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;
Soc.Well now, do you give the name of good men to fools and cowards? It was not they just now but brave and wise men whom you so described. Or is it not these that you call good?
— ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Call.To be sure it is.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα
ἤδη εἶδες;
Soc.And now, have you ever seen a silly child enjoying itself?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I have.
—ΣΩ.Ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες
ἀνόητον χαίροντα;
Soc.And have you never seen a silly man enjoying himself?
—ΚΑΛ.Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;
Call.I should think I have; but what has that to do with it?
498a — ΣΩ.Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.
Soc.Nothing; only answer.
—ΚΑΛ.Εἶδον.
Call.I have seen one.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ;
νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;
Soc.And again, a man of sense in a state of pain or enjoyment?
—ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.Yes.
— ΣΩ.Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι
οἱ ἄφρονες;
Soc.And which sort are more apt to feel enjoyment or pain, the wise or the foolish?
—ΚΑΛ.Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.
Call.I should think there is not much difference.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη
εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;
Soc.Well, that will suffice. In war have you ever seen a coward?
—ΚΑΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Call.Of course I have.
—ΣΩ.Τί οὖν;
ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν,
οἱ δειλοὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;
Soc.Well now, when the enemy withdrew, which seemed to you to enjoy it more, the cowards or the brave?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε
498b [μᾶλλονεἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.
Call.Both did, I thought; or if not that, about equally.
—ΣΩ.Οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;
Soc.No matter. Anyhow, the cowards do enjoy it?
—ΚΑΛ.Σφόδρα γε.
Call.Very much.
Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.
Soc.And the fools, it would seem.
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Προσιόντων
δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;
Soc.And when the foe advances, do the cowards alone feel pain, or the brave as well?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἀμφότεροι.
Call.Both.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρα ὁμοίως;
Soc.Alike?
—ΚΑΛ.Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ
δειλοί.
Call.More, perhaps, the cowards.
—ΣΩ.Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;
Soc.And when the foe withdraws, do they not enjoy it more?
Ἴσως.
Call.Perhaps.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ
ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως,
498c ὡς σὺ φῄς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;
Soc.So the foolish and the wise, and the cowardly and the brave, feel pain and enjoyment about equally, according to you, but the cowardly more than the brave?
—ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I agree.
—ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ
ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;
Soc.But further, are the wise and brave good, and the cowards and fools bad?
Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ
ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;
Soc.Then the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain about equally?
—ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I agree.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ
ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ [οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
καὶ οἱ κακοί] εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;
Soc.Then are the good and the bad about equally good and bad? Or are the bad in some yet greater measure good and bad?
498d ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις.
Call.Why, upon my word, I cannot tell what you mean.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῂς παρουσίᾳ
εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς
ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;
Soc.You are aware, are you not, that you hold that the good are good by the presence of good things, and that the bad are so by the presence of bad things? And that the pleasures are the good things, and the pains bad things?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.Yes, I am.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;
Soc.Hence in those who have enjoyment the good things—the pleasures—are present, so long as they enjoy?
—ΚΑΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Call.Of course.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων
ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;
Soc.Then, good things being present, those who enjoy are good?
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Τί δέ; τοῖς
ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;
Soc.Well now, in those who feel pain are not bad things present, namely pains?
—ΚΑΛ.Πάρεστιν.
Call.They are.
498e —ΣΩ.Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῂς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς
κακούς· οὐκέτι φῄς;
Soc.And it is by the presence of bad things, you say, that the bad are bad? Or do you no longer say so?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I do say so.
—ΣΩ.Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα
οἳ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;
Soc.Then whoever enjoys is good, and whoever is pained, bad?
—ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
— ΣΩ.Οἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἳ δ' ἧττον ἧττον, οἳ δὲ
παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;
Soc.You mean, those more so who feel these things more, and those less who feel less, and those about equally who feel about equally?
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
φῂς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους
καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους,
καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς;
Soc.Now you say that the wise and the foolish, the cowardly and the brave, feel enjoyment and pain about equally, or the cowards even more?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I do.
ΣΩ.Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει
ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν
499a εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν μὲν
εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. γάρ;
Soc.Then just help me to reckon up the results we get from our admissions for you know they say: That which seemeth well, ’tis well twice and also thrice to tell, and to examine too. We say that the wise and brave man is good, do we not?
Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;
Soc.And that the foolish and cowardly is bad?
—ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ
γε.
Call.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;
Soc.And again, that he who enjoys is good?
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
— ΣΩ.Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;
Soc.And that he who feels pain is bad?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἀνάγκη.
Call.Necessarily.
Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως,
ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;
Soc.And that the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain in a like manner, or perhaps the bad rather more?
—ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ μᾶλλον
499b ἀγαθὸς κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα,
ἐάν τις ταὐτὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη,
Καλλίκλεις;
Soc.Then is the bad man made bad or good in a like manner to the good man, or even good in a greater measure? Does not this follow, along with those former statements, from the assumption that pleasant things and good things are the same? Must not this be so, Callicles?
ΚΑΛ.Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν,
ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν,
τούτου ἅσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει
ἐμὲ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν
βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.
Call.Let me tell you, Socrates, all the time that I have been listening to you and yielding you agreement, I have been remarking the puerile delight with which you cling to any concession one may make to you, even in jest. So you suppose that I or anybody else in the world does not regard some pleasures as better, and others worse!
ΣΩ.Ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καί μοι
499c ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν,
τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ'
ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος
φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν
παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ
διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, νῦν λέγεις,
ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· γάρ;
Soc.Oh ho, Callicles, what a rascal you are, treating me thus like a child—now asserting that the same things are one way, now another, to deceive me! And yet I started with the notion that I should not have to fear any intentional deception on your part, you being my friend; but now I find I was mistaken, and it seems I must, as the old saying goes, e’en make the best of what I have got, and accept just anything you offer. Well then, what you now state, it seems, is that there are certain pleasures, some good, and some bad; is not that so?
499d — ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ
δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;
Soc.Then are the beneficial ones good, and the harmful ones bad?
—ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε
αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;
Soc.And are those beneficial which do some good, and those evil which do some evil?
—ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I agree.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς, ἄρα
τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἰσχὺν
ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ
499e τἀναντία τούτων κακαί;
Soc.Now are these the sort you mean—for instance, in the body, the pleasures of eating and drinking that we mentioned a moment ago? Then the pleasures of this sort which produce health in the body, or strength, or any other bodily excellence,—are these good, and those which have the opposite effects, bad?
—ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν
καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;
Soc.And similarly in the case of pains, are some worthy and some base?
— ΚΑΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Call.Of course.
—ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ
ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;
Soc.So it is the worthy pleasures and pains that we ought to choose in all our doings?
Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;
Soc.And the base ones not?
—ΚΑΛ.Δῆλον δή.
Call.Clearly so.
— ΣΩ.Ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν
πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἆρα
καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ
ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι
500a ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ
τρίτων;
Soc.Because, you know, Polus and I, if you recollect, decided. that everything we do should be for the sake of what is good. Do you agree with us in this view—that the good is the end of all our actions, and it is for its sake that all other things should be done, and not it for theirs? Do you add your vote to ours, and make a third?
—ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I do.
—ΣΩ.Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ
καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.
Soc.Then it is for the sake of what is good that we should do everything, including what is pleasant, not the good for the sake of the pleasant.
—ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
—ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν
ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά,
τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;
Soc.Now is it in every man’s power to pick out which sort of pleasant things are good and which bad, or is professional skill required in each case?
—ΚΑΛ.Τεχνικοῦ.
Call.Professional skill.
ΣΩ.Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ
Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μνημονεύεις,
500b ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον
παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ
δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην
τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ
τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ
πρὸς Φιλίου, Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἴου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ
παίζειν μηδ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ'
500c αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι
περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ
τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ
τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ
ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ
ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, [ἐπὶ] τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως
500d οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι,
διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτω
διττὼ τὼ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ
ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.
Soc.Then let us recall those former points I was putting to Polus and Gorgias. I said, if you remember, that there were certain industries, some of which extend only to pleasure, procuring that and no more, and ignorant of better and worse; while others know what is good and what bad. And I placed among those that are concerned with pleasure the habitude, not art, of cookery, and among those concerned with good the art of medicine. Now by the sanctity of friendship, Callicles, do not on your part indulge in jesting with me, or give me random answers against your conviction, or again, take what I say as though I were jesting. For you see that our debate is upon a question which has the highest conceivable claims to the serious interest even of a person who has but little intelligence—namely, what course of life is best; whether it should be that to which you invite me, with all those manly pursuits of speaking in Assembly and practicing rhetoric and going in for politics after the fashion of you modern politicians, or this life of philosophy; and what makes the difference between these two. Well, perhaps it is best to do what I attempted a while ago, and distinguish them; and then, when we have distinguished them and come to an agreement with each other as to these lives being really two, we must consider what is the difference between them and which of them is the one we ought to live. Now I daresay you do not yet grasp my meaning.
ΚΑΛ.Οὐ δῆτα.
Call.No, I do not.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν
ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ,
ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην
τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος
θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦαὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον
500e σύμφαθι μή. σύμφῃς;
Soc.Well, I will put it to you more plainly. Seeing that we have agreed, you and I, that there is such a thing as good, and such a thing as pleasant, and that the pleasant is other than the good, and that for the acquisition of either there is a certain practice or preparation—the quest of the pleasant in the one case, and that of the good in the other—but first you must either assent or object to this statement of mine: do you assent?
ΚΑΛ.Οὕτως φημί.
Call.I am with you entirely.
ΣΩ.Ἴθι δή, καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί
μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που
ὅτι μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία,
501a δ' ἰατρική, λέγων ὅτι μὲν τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν
φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει
τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἰατρική· δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς,
πρὸς ἣν θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστιν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ'
αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε
τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν
διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σῳζομένη
501b τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ'
οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί
τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν
τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν
ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ,
ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ
τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ βελτίων χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν,
οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο χαρίζεσθαι
501c μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, Καλλίκλεις,
δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον
κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ
ἄλλο ὅτου ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ
ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι
ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἀντίφῃς;
Soc.Then try and come to a definite agreement with me on what I was saying to our friends here, and see if you now find that what I then said was true. I was saying, I think, that cookery seems to me not an art but a habitude, unlike medicine, which, I argued, has investigated the nature of the person whom she treats and the cause of her proceedings, and has some account to give of each of these things; so much for medicine: whereas the other, in respect of the pleasure to which her whole ministration is given, goes to work there in an utterly inartistic manner, without having investigated at all either the nature or the cause of pleasure, and altogether irrationally—with no thought, one may say, of differentiation, relying on routine and habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result; and that is how she is enabled to provide her pleasures. Now consider first whether you think that this account is satisfactory, and that there are certain other such occupations likewise, having to do with the soul; some artistic, with forethought for what is to the soul’s best advantage, and others making light of this, but again, as in the former case, considering merely the soul’s pleasure and how it may be contrived for her, neither inquiring which of the pleasures is a better or a worse one, nor caring for aught but mere gratification, whether for better or worse. For I, Callicles, hold that there are such, and for my part I call this sort of thing flattery, whether in relation to the body or to the soul or to anything else, whenever anyone ministers to its pleasure without regard for the better and the worse; and you now, do you support us with the same opinion on this matter, or do you gainsay us?
ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ
λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.
Call.Not I; I agree with you, in order that your argument may reach a conclusion, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.
501d ΣΩ.Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ
δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;
Soc.And is this the case with only one soul, and not with two or many?
ΚΑΛ.Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς.
Call.No, it is also the case with two or many.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἁθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲν
σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;
Soc.Then is it possible also to gratify them all at once, collectively, with no consideration of what is best?
ΚΑΛ.Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
Call.I should think it is.
ΣΩ.Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ
τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος,
μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, δ' ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι.
501e πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη
τις εἶναι, Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν,
ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;
Soc.Then can you say what are the pursuits which effect this? Or rather, if you like, when I ask you, and one of them seems to you to be of this class, say yes, and when one does not, say no. And first let us consider flute-playing. Does it not seem to you one of this sort, Callicles, aiming only at our pleasure, and caring for naught else ?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Call.It does seem so to me.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον κιθαριστικὴ
ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;
Soc.And so too with all similar pursuits, such as harp-playing in the contests?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Τί δὲ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ τῶν διθυράμβων
ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἡγῇ
τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον
ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ὅτι μέλλει
502a χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;
Soc.And what of choral productions and dithyrambic compositions? Are they not manifestly, in your view, of the same kind? Or do you suppose Cinesias, son of Meles, cares a jot about trying to say things of a sort that might be improving to his audience, or only what is likely to gratify the crowd of spectators?
ΚΑΛ.Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε
πέρι.
Call.Clearly the latter is the case, Socrates, with Cinesias.
ΣΩ.Τί δὲ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον
βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ
ἥδιστον; ἠνία γὰρ ᾄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει·
οὐχὶ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ τῶν διθυράμβων
ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ηὑρῆσθαι;
Soc.And what of his father Meles? Did he ever strike you as looking to what was best in his minstrelsy? Or did he, perhaps, not even make the pleasantest his aim? For his singing used to be a pain to the audience. But consider now: do you not think that all minstrelsy and composing of dithyrambs have been invented for the sake of pleasure?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔμοιγε.
Call.I do.
502b ΣΩ.Τί δὲ δὴ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, τῆς
τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφ' ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς
τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ σπουδή, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς
θεαταῖς μόνον, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν
καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ
δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει
καὶ ᾄσεται, ἐάντε χαίρωσιν ἐάντε μή; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ
παρεσκευάσθαι τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις;
Soc.Then what of the purpose that has inspired our stately and wonderful tragic poetry? Are her endeavor and purpose, to your mind, merely for the gratification of the spectators, or does she strive hard, if there be anything pleasant and gratifying, but bad for them, to leave that unsaid, and if there be anything unpleasant, but beneficial, both to speak and sing that, whether they enjoy it or not? To which of these two aims, think you, is tragic poetry devoted ?
ΚΑΛ.Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν
502c ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.
Call.It is quite obvious, in her case, Socrates, that she is bent rather upon pleasure and the gratification of the spectators.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ
κολακείαν εἶναι;
Soc.Well now, that kind of thing, Callicles, did we say just now, is flattery ?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε
μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι λόγοι γίγνονται
τὸ λειπόμενον;
Soc.Pray then, if we strip any kind of poetry of its melody, its rhythm and its meter, we get mere speeches as the residue, do we not?
ΚΑΛ.Ἀνάγκη.
Call.That must be so.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται
οἱ λόγοι;
Soc.And those speeches are spoken to a great crowd of people?
ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ποιητική.
Soc.Hence poetry is a kind of public speaking.
502d ΚΑΛ.Φαίνεται.
Call.Apparently.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· οὐ ῥητορεύειν
δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;
Soc.Then it must be a rhetorical public speaking or do you not think that the poets use rhetoric in the theaters?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔμοιγε.
Call.Yes, I do.
ΣΩ.Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ηὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον
τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ
δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ
αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.
Soc.So now we have found a kind of rhetoric addressed to such a public as is compounded of children and women and men, and slaves as well as free; an art that we do not quite approve of, since we call it a flattering one.
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.To be sure.
ΣΩ.Εἶεν· τί δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ
502e καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δήμους τοὺς τῶν
ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν; πότερόν σοι
δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου
στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς
αὑτῶν λόγους, καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις
ὡρμημένοι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὑτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ
κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι
αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται χείρους
503a διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;
Soc.Very well; but now, the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people, or to the other assemblies of freemen in the various cities—what can we make of that? Do the orators strike you as speaking always with a view to what is best, with the single aim of making the citizens as good as possible by their speeches, or are they, like the poets, set on gratifying the citizens, and do they, sacrificing the common weal to their own personal interest, behave to these assemblies as to children, trying merely to gratify them, nor care a jot whether they will be better or worse in consequence?
ΚΑΛ.Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἳ
κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ
οἵους σὺ λέγεις.
Call.This question of yours is not quite so simple; for there are some who have a regard for the citizens in the words that they utter, while there are also others of the sort that you mention.
ΣΩ.Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν
ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία,
τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται
ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ
βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν.
503b ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν· εἴ τινα
ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν
ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;
Soc.That is enough for me. For if this thing also is twofold, one part of it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory, while the other is noble—the endeavor, that is, to make the citizens’ souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one’s hearers. But this is a rhetoric you never yet saw; or if you have any orator of this kind that you can mention, without more ado let me know who he is!
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε
νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.
Call.No, upon my word, I cannot tell you of anyone, at least among the orators of today.
ΣΩ.Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν δι' ὅντινα
αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος
ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ
μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.
Soc.Well then, can you mention one among those of older times whom the Athenians have to thank for any betterment that started at the time of his first harangues, as a change from the worse state in which he originally found them? For my part, I have no idea who the man is.
503c ΚΑΛ.Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν
γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ
τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;
Call.Why, do you hear no mention of Themistocles and what a good man he was, and Cimon and Miltiades and the great Pericles, who has died recently, and whom you have listened to yourself?
ΣΩ.Εἰ ἔστιν γε, Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες
ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὑτοῦ
καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ
λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖνὅτι αἳ μὲν τῶν
ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
503d ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἳ δὲ χείρω, μή, τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις
εἴητοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ [γεγονέναι] οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε
πῶς εἴπω.
Soc.Yes, Callicles, if that which you spoke of just now is true virtue—the satisfaction of one’s own and other men’s desires; but if that is not so, and the truth is—as we were compelled to admit in the subsequent discussion—that only those desires which make man better by their satisfaction should be fulfilled, but those which make him worse should not, and that this is a special art, then I for one cannot tell you of any man so skilled having appeared among them.
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις.
Call.Ah, but if you search properly you will find one.
ΣΩ.Ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων
τοιοῦτος γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ, ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ
βέλτιστον λέγων, ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ'
503e ἀποβλέπων πρός τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ
[βλέποντες] πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος
προσφέρει [πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν,] ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν
εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς
ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους
πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ
ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ
ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ
504a ἅπαν συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα·
καὶ οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ
περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που
τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν
οὔ;
Soc.Then let us just consider the matter calmly, and see if any of them has appeared with that skill. Come now: the good man, who is intent on the best when he speaks, will surely not speak at random in whatever he says, but with a view to some object? He is just like any other craftsman, who having his own particular work in view selects the things he applies to that work of his, not at random, but with the purpose of giving a certain form to whatever he is working upon.

You have only to look, for example, at the painters, the builders, the shipwrights, or any of the other craftsmen, whichever you like, to see how each of them arranges everything according to a certain order, and forces one part to suit and fit with another, until he has combined the whole into a regular and well-ordered production; and so of course with all the other craftsmen, and the people we mentioned just now, who have to do with the body—trainers and doctors; they too, I suppose, bring order and system into the body. Do we admit this to be the case, or not?

ΚΑΛ.Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.
Call.Let it be as you say.
ΣΩ.Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν
εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;
Soc.Then if regularity and order are found in a house, it will be a good one, and if irregularity, a bad one?
ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I agree.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;
Soc.And it will be just the same with a ship?
504b ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;
Soc.And further, with our bodies also, can we say?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Τί δ' ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή,
τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;
Soc.And what of the soul? If it shows irregularity, will it be good, or if it has a certain regularity and order?
ΚΑΛ.Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.
Call.Our former statements oblige us to agree to this also.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς
τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;
Soc.Then what name do we give to the effect of regularity and order in the body?
ΚΑΛ.Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.
Call.Health and strength, I suppose you mean.
504c ΣΩ.Ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ
τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ
ἐκεῖ τὸ ὄνομα.
Soc.I do. And what, again, to the effect produced in the soul by regularity and order? Try to find the name here, and tell it me as before.
ΚΑΛ.Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, Σώκρατες;
Call.Why not name it yourself, Socrates ?
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μέν
σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ
ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν
ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ
ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν;
Soc.Well, if you prefer it, I will; and do you, if I seem to you to name it rightly, say so; if not, you must refute me and not let me have my way. For it seems to me that any regularity of the body is called healthiness, and this leads to health being produced in it, and general bodily excellence. Is that so or not?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔστιν.
Call.It is.
504d ΣΩ.Ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν
νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι·
ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῂς οὔ;
Soc.And the regular and orderly states of the soul are called lawfulness and law, whereby men are similarly made law-abiding and orderly; and these states are justice and temperance. Do you agree or not?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔστω.
Call.Be it so.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος,
τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς
ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαιρήσεται,
πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις
504e δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται,
καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ
ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίῃ.
συγχωρεῖς οὔ;
Soc.Then it is this that our orator, the man of art and virtue, will have in view, when he applies to our souls the words that he speaks, and also in all his actions, and in giving any gift he will give it, and in taking anything away he will take it, with this thought always before his mind— how justice may be engendered in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and how injustice may be removed; how temperance may be bred in them and licentiousness cut off; and how virtue as a whole may be produced and vice expelled. Do you agree to this or not?
ΚΑΛ.Συγχωρῶ.
Call.I agree.
ΣΩ.Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι
καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα
ποτὰ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτι πλέον
τοὐναντίον κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι
ταῦτα;
Soc.For what advantage is there, Callicles, in giving to a sick and ill-conditioned body a quantity of even the most agreeable things to eat and drink, or anything else whatever, if it is not going to profit thereby any more, let us say, than by the opposite treatment, on any fair reckoning, and may profit less? Is this so?
505a ΚΑΛ.Ἔστω.
Call.Be it so.
ΣΩ.Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος
ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. οὐχ
οὕτως;
Soc.Because, I imagine, it is no gain for a man to live in a depraved state of body, since in this case his life must be a depraved one also. Or is not that the case?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα
φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα
μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς
τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;
Soc.And so the satisfaction of one’s desires—if one is hungry, eating as much as one likes, or if thirsty, drinking—is generally allowed by doctors when one is in health; but they practically never allow one in sickness to take one’s fill of things that one desires: do you agree with me in this?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε.
Call.I do.
505b ΣΩ.Περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ἄριστε, οὐχ αὐτὸς τρόπος;
ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ , ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ
ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ
μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται·
φῂς οὔ;
Soc.And does not the same rule, my excellent friend, apply to the soul? So long as it is in a bad state—thoughtless, licentious, unjust and unholy—we must restrain its desires and not permit it to do anything except what will help it to be better: do you grant this, or not?
ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I do.
ΣΩ.Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;
Soc.For thus, I take it, the soul itself is better off?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.To be sure.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;
Soc.And is restraining a person from what he desires correcting him?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν
ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾤου.
Soc.Then correction is better for the soul than uncorrected licence, as you were thinking just now.
505c ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις, Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον
τινὰ ἐρώτα.
Call.I have no notion what you are referring to, Socrates; do ask some one else.
ΣΩ.Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς
τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.
Soc.Here is a fellow who cannot endure a kindness done him, or the experience in himself of what our talk is about—a correction!
ΚΑΛ.Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά
σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.
Call.Well, and not a jot do I care, either, for anything you say; I only gave you those answers to oblige Gorgias.
ΣΩ.Εἶεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον
καταλύομεν;
Soc.Very good. So now, what shall we do? Break off our argument midway?
ΚΑΛ.Αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.
Call.You must decide that for yourself.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι
505d καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς
περιίῃ. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν λόγος
κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.
Soc.Why, they say one does wrong to leave off even stories in the middle; one should set a head on the thing, that it may not go about headless. So proceed with the rest of your answers, that our argument may pick up a head.
ΚΑΛ.Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ,
ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξῃ.
Call.How overbearing you are, Socrates! Take my advice, and let this argument drop, or find some one else to argue with.
ΣΩ.Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν
λόγον καταλίπωμεν.
Soc.Then who else is willing? Surely we must not leave the argument there, unfinished?
ΚΑΛ.Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον,
λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;
Call.Could you not get through it yourself, either talking on by yourself or answering your own questions?
505e ΣΩ.Ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, "πρὸ τοῦ
δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον," εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει
ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν,
οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ
εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστιν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος·
κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι
506a μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ
ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι
καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω
λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τὶ φαίνηται
λέγων ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι.
λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν
λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.
Soc.So that, in Epicharmus’s phrase, what two men spake erewhile I may prove I can manage single-handed. And indeed it looks as though it must of sheer necessity be so. Still, if we are to do this, for my part I think we ought all to vie with each other in attempting a knowledge of what is true and what false in the matter of our argument; for it is a benefit to all alike that it be revealed.

Now I am going to pursue the argument as my view of it may suggest; but if any of you think the admissions I am making to myself are not the truth, you must seize upon them and refute me. For I assure you I myself do not say what I say as knowing it, but as joining in the search with you; so that if anyone who disputes my statements is found to be on the right track, I shall be the first to agree with him. This, however, I say on the assumption that you think the argument should be carried through to a conclusion; but if you would rather it were not, let us have done with it now and go our ways.

ΓΟΡ.Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω
506b ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς
ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διιόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.
Gorg.Well, my opinion is, Socrates, that we ought not to go away yet, but that you should go through with the argument; and I fancy the rest of them think the same. For I myself, in fact, desire to hear you going through the remainder by yourself.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν
Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος
ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ,
Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ'
οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ
506c καλῶς λέγειν. καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί
σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ
ἀναγεγράψῃ.
Soc.Why, to be sure, Gorgias, I myself should have liked to continue discussing with Callicles here until I had paid him an Amphion’s speech in return for his of Zethus. But since you, Callicles, are unwilling to join me in finishing off the argument, you must at any rate pull me up, as you listen, if it seems to you that my statements are wrong. And if you refute me, I shall not be vexed with you as you were with me; you will only be recorded in my mind as my greatest benefactor.
ΚΑΛ.Λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.
Call.Proceed, good sir, by yourself, and finish it off.
ΣΩ.Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον.
Ἆρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; Οὐ ταὐτόν,
ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ
ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος;
Τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὗ
506d παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί
ἐσμεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς
καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης;
Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, Καλλίκλεις.
Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος
καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται,
ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ
ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἆρα ἔστιν ταῦτα; Ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι.
506e Τάξει ἆρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ
ἑκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. Κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος
ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν
ὄντων; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα
τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου; Ἀνάγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν
γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; δέ
507a γε κοσμία σώφρων; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. ἄρα σώφρων
ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι,
φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.
Soc.Give ear, then; but first I will resume our argument from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same thing? Not the same, as Callicles and I agreed. Is the pleasant thing to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant for the sake of the good. And is that thing pleasant by whose advent we are pleased, and that thing good by whose presence we are good? Certainly. But further, both we and everything else that is good, are good by the advent of some virtue? In my view this must be so, Callicles. But surely the virtue of each thing, whether of an implement or of a body, or again of a soul or any live creature, does not arrive most properly by accident, but by an order or rightness or art that is apportioned to each. Is that so? I certainly agree. Then the virtue of each thing is a matter of regular and orderly arrangement? I at least should say so. Hence it is a certain order proper to each existent thing that by its advent in each makes it good? That is my view. So then a soul which has its own proper order is better than one which is unordered? Necessarily. But further, one that has order is orderly? Of course it will be.

And the orderly one is temperate? Most necessarily. So the temperate soul is good. For my part, I can find nothing to say in objection to this, my dear Callicles; but if you can, do instruct me.

ΚΑΛ.Λέγ', ὠγαθέ.
Call.Proceed, good sir.
ΣΩ.Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ σώφρων ἀγαθή ἐστιν, τοὐναντίον
τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακή ἐστιν· ἦν δὲ αὕτη
ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν γε σώφρων
τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ
ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων;
507b Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους
τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ
θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη
δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ
ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε
διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' δεῖ καὶ πράγματα
καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ
διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ
507c ἀνάγκη, Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν,
δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι
τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἂν
πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα
εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον· οὗτος
δ' ἂν εἴη ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ἀκόλαστος, ὃν
σὺ ἐπῄνεις.
Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καί φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ
εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα
507d εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον,
ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ
παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι,
ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ αὐτὸς ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἰδιώτης
πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων
εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα
δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ αὑτοῦ συντείνοντα
καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη
507e τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ
ἐπιθυμίας ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα
πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, λῃστοῦ βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ
ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ·
κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ
ἂν εἴη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ
508a γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ
φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα,
καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ἑταῖρε,
οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προςέχειν
τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν
σε ὅτι ἰσότης γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις
μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας
γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. εἶεν· ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος λόγος
508b ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαίμονες
οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι, εἰ οὗτος ἀληθής
ἐστιν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα,
Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου εἰ
σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὑτοῦ
καὶ ὑέος καὶ ἑταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ
τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ᾤου συγχωρεῖν,
ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅσῳπερ
508c αἴσχιον τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν
ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων,
αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογῆσαι.
Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν σὺ
ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἆρα καλῶς λέγεται οὔ, ὡς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ
οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ
οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων,
εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος,
508d ἄντε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ τοῦ σοῦ
λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, ἐάντε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάντε ἐκβάλλειν
ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάντε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ
οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς σὸς λόγος.
δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις, πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ
κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· Οὔ φημι, Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι
ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι
508e οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ
τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον
καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ
τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ
ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἴσχιον εἶναι ἐμοὶ τῷ
ἀδικουμένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις
οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ
509a εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις
λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσί, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις
σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ὡς
ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε αὐτὸς λόγος
ἐστιν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι
ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως
λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι
509b ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν
ἐστιν ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστου
ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν
βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος
ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἆρα οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀποτρέψει
τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην
εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε
αὑτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὑτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ
509c τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τἆλλα
οὕτως· ὡς ἑκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος
τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή.
ἆρα ἄλλως οὕτως ἔχει, Καλλίκλεις;
Soc.I say, then, that if the temperate soul is good, one that is in the opposite state to this sensible one is bad; and that was the senseless and dissolute one. Certainly. And further, the sensible man will do what is fitting as regards both gods and men; for he could not be sensible if he did what was unfitting. That must needs be so. And again, when he does what is fitting as regards men, his actions will be just, and as regards the gods, pious; and he who does what is just and pious must needs be a just and pious man. That is so. And surely he must be brave also: for you know a sound or temperate mind is shown, not by pursuing and shunning what one ought not, but by shunning and pursuing what one ought, whether they be things or people or pleasures or pains, and by steadfastly persevering in one’s duty; so that it follows of strict necessity, Callicles, that the temperate man, as shown in our exposition, being just and brave and pious, is the perfection of a good man; and that the good man does well and fairly whatever he does and that he who does well is blessed and happy, while the wicked man or evil-doer is wretched. And this must be the man who is in an opposite case to the temperate,—the licentious man whom you were commending.
So there is my account of the matter, and I say that this is the truth; and that, if this is true, anyone, as it seems, who desires to be happy must ensue and practice temperance, and flee from licentiousness, each of us as fast as his feet will carry him, and must contrive, if possible, to need no correction; but if he have need of it, either himself or anyone belonging to him, either an individual or a city, then right must be applied and they must be corrected, if they are to be happy. This, in my opinion, is the mark on which a man should fix his eyes throughout life; he should concentrate all his own and his city’s efforts on this one business of providing a man who would be blessed with the needful justice and temperance; not letting one’s desires go unrestrained and in one’s attempts to satisfy them—an interminable trouble—leading the life of a robber. For neither to any of his fellow-men can such a one be dear, nor to God; since he cannot commune with any, and where there is no communion, there can be no friendship.

And wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order, not of disorder or dissoluteness. Now you, as it seems to me, do not give proper attention to this, for all your cleverness, but have failed to observe the great power of geometrical equality amongst both gods and men: you hold that self-advantage is what one ought to practice, because you neglect geometry. Very well: either we must refute this statement, that it is by the possession of justice and temperance that the happy are happy and by that of vice the wretched are wretched; or if this is true, we must investigate its consequences. Those former results, Callicles, must all follow, on which you asked me if I was speaking in earnest when I said that a man must accuse himself or his son or his comrade if he do any wrong, and that this is what rhetoric must be used for; and what you supposed Polus to be conceding from shame is after all true— that to do wrong is worse, in the same degree as it is baser, than to suffer it, and that whoever means to be the right sort of rhetorician must really be just and well-informed of the ways of justice, which again Polus said that Gorgias was only shamed into admitting.
This being the case, let us consider what weight, if any, there is in the reproaches you cast upon me: is it fairly alleged or not that I am unable to stand up for myself or any of my friends and relations, or to deliver them from the sorest perils, but am exposed like an outcast to the whim of anyone who chooses to give me— the dashing phrase is yours—a box on the ear; or strip me of my substance or expel me from the city; or, worst of all, put me to death; and that to be in such a case is the lowest depth of shame, as your account has it? But mine—though it has been frequently stated already, there can be no objection to my stating it once again—is this: I deny, Callicles, that to be wrongfully boxed on the ear is the deepest disgrace, or to have either my person cut or my purse; I hold that to strike or cut me or mine wrongfully is yet more of a disgrace and an evil, and likewise stealing and kidnapping and housebreaking, and in short any wrong whatsoever done to me or mine, are both worse and more shameful to the wrongdoer than to me the wronged.

All this, which has been made evident in the form I have stated some way back in our foregoing discussion, is held firm and fastened—if I may put it rather bluntly—with reasons of steel and adamant (so it would seem, at least, on the face of it) which you or somebody more gallant than yourself must undo, or else accept this present statement of mine as the only possible one. For my story is ever the same, that I cannot tell how the matter stands, and yet of all whom I have encountered, before as now, no one has been able to state it otherwise without making himself ridiculous. Well now, once more I assume it to be so; but if it is so, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the wrongdoer, and still greater than this greatest, if such can be, when the wrongdoer pays no penalty, what rescue is it that a man must be able to effect for himself if he is not to be ridiculous in very truth? Is it not one which will avert from us the greatest harm? Nay, rescue must needs be at its shamefullest, if one is unable to rescue either oneself or one’s own friends and relations, and second to it is inability in face of the second sort of evil, and third in face of the third, and so on with the rest; according to the gravity attaching to each evil is either the glory of being able to effect a rescue from each sort, or the shame of being unable. Is it so or otherwise, Callicles?

ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ ἄλλως.
Call.Not otherwise.
ΣΩ.Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὑτῷ,
509d ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ
μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν
βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι,
οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ
μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;
Soc.Then of these two, doing and suffering wrong, we declare doing wrong to be the greater evil, and suffering it the less. Now with what should a man provide himself in order to come to his own rescue, and so have both of the benefits that arise from doing no wrong on the one hand, and suffering none on the other? Is it power or will? What I mean is, will a man avoid being wronged by merely wishing not to be wronged, or will he avoid it by providing himself with power to avert it?
ΚΑΛ.Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.
Call.The answer to that is obvious: by means of power.
ΣΩ.Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται
ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίνοὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει καὶ ἐπὶ
509e τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς,
ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ
μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν
ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις
ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα
βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας
ἀδικεῖν;
Soc.But what about doing wrong? Will the mere not wishing to do it suffice—since, in that case, he will not do it—or does it require that he also provide himself with some power or art, since unless he has got such learning or training he will do wrong? I really must have your answer on this particular point, Callicles—whether you think that Polus and I were correct or not in finding ourselves forced to admit, as we did in the preceding argument, that no one does wrong of his own wish, but that all who do wrong do it against their will.
510a ΚΑΛ.Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπεράνῃς
τὸν λόγον.
Call.Let it be as you would have it, Socrates, in order that you may come to a conclusion of your argument.
ΣΩ.Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον
ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν.
Soc.Then for this purpose also, of not doing wrong, it seems we must provide ourselves with a certain power or art.
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.To be sure.
ΣΩ.Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ
μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ
ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν
τῇ πόλει καὶ τυραννεῖν, τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας
ἑταῖρον εἶναι.
Soc.Now what can be the art of providing so that we suffer no wrong, or as little as possible? Consider if you take the same view of it as I do. For in my view it is this: one must either be a ruler, or even a despot, in one’s city, or else an associate of the existing government.
ΚΑΛ.Ὁρᾷς, Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἕτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν,
510b ἄν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.
Call.Do you note, Socrates, how ready I am to praise, when you say a good thing? This seems to me excellently spoken.
ΣΩ.Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος
μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ
οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ
καὶ σοί;
Soc.Then see if this next statement of mine strikes you as a good one too. It seems to me that the closest possible friendship between man and man is that mentioned by the sages of old time as like to like. Do you not agree?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔμοιγε.
Call.I do.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ
ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη,
φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἅπαντος
510c τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι;
Soc.So where you have a savage, uneducated ruler as despot, if there were some one in the city far better than he, I suppose the despot would be afraid of him and could never become a friend to him with all his heart?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔστι ταῦτα.
Call.That is so.
ΣΩ.Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος·
καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὡς
πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.
Soc.Nor a friend to anyone who was much inferior to him either; for the despot would despise him and never show him the attention due to a friend.
ΚΑΛ.Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.
Call.That is true also.
ΣΩ.Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ
τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὤν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν,
ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα
510d ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει.
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
Soc.Then the only friend of any account that remains for such a person is a man of his own temper, who blames and praises the same things, and is thus willing to be governed by him and to be subject to his rule. He is a man who will have great power in that state; him none will wrong with impunity. Is it not so?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων,
"Τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοῖ;"
αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν
αὑτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ
παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ
οὕτως;
Soc.Hence if one of the young men in that city should reflect: In what way can I have great power, and no one may do me wrong?—this, it would seem, is the path he must take, to accustom himself from his earliest youth to be delighted and annoyed by the same things as his master, and contrive to be as like the other as possible. Is it not so?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα
510e δύνασθαι, ὡς ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράξεται.
Soc.And so this man will have attained to a condition of suffering no wrong and having great power—as your party maintain—in the city.
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ
ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα
δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὑτωσὶ
παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἵῳ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα
ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. γάρ;
Soc.And of doing no wrong likewise? Or is it quite the contrary, if he is to be like his unjust ruler, and have great influence with him? Well, for my part, I think his efforts will be all the opposite way, that is, towards enabling himself to do as much wrong as possible and to pay no penalty for the wrong he does; will they not?
ΚΑΛ.Φαίνεται.
Call.Apparently.
511a ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ
ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου
καὶ δύναμιν.
Soc.And thus he will find himself possessed of the greatest evil, that of having his soul depraved and maimed as a result of his imitation of his master and the power he has got.
ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω
καὶ κάτω, Σώκρατες· οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος μιμούμενος
τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ
ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα.
Call.You have a strange way of twisting your arguments, at each point, this way or that, Socrates! Surely you know that this imitator will put to death anyone who does not imitate his master, if he pleases, and will strip him of his property.
511b ΣΩ.Οἶδα, ὠγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ
σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου
πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι
ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν
ὄντα.
Soc.I know that, my good Callicles, if I am not deaf, as I have heard it so often of late from you and Polus, and from almost every one else in the town; but you in return must hear what I say—that he will put a man to death if he pleases, but it will be a villain slaying a good man and true.
ΚΑΛ.Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;
Call.And is not this the very thing that makes one indignant?
ΣΩ.Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς λόγος σημαίνει. οἴει
δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον
ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας αἳ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν
511c κινδύνων σῴζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν
τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασῴζουσαν;
Soc.Not if one is a man of sense, as our argument indicates. Or do you suppose that the object of a man’s efforts should be to live as long a time as possible, and to cultivate those arts which preserve us from every danger; such as that which you bid me cultivate—rhetoric, the art that preserves us in the law courts?
ΚΑΛ.Ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.
Call.Yes, on my word I do, and sound advice it is that I give you.
ΣΩ.Τί δέ, βέλτιστε; καὶ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη
σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;
Soc.But now, my excellent friend, do you think there is anything grand in the accomplishment of swimming?
ΚΑΛ.Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
Call.No, in truth, not I.
ΣΩ.Καὶ μὴν σῴζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους,
ὅταν εἴς τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς
ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγώ σοι
511d μείζω ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικήν, οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς
σῴζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων
κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ῥητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη
ἐστὶν καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς
ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ διαπραξαμένη
τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δύ'
ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου,
511e ἐὰν πάμπολυ, ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα
νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας,
ἀποβιβάσασ' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο,
καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος
ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ
σχήματι· λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ἐπίσταται ὅτι ἄδηλόν
ἐστιν οὕστινάς τε ὠφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας
καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστινας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν
512a αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν οἷοι ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα
οὔτε τὰς ψυχάς. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις
μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος
μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν,
καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ
τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει
καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει,
ἄντε ἐκ θαλάττης ἄντε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἐάντε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν
512b σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ
μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν.
Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην,
καίπερ σῴζοντα ἡμᾶς, οὐδέ γε, θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν,
ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου
οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σῴζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἔστιν
ὅτε ὅλας σῴζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι;
καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων
512c τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων
καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὡς
οὐδὲν τἆλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ
οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου,
καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ
τῷ ὑεῖ αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ' ἂν
αὐτὸς λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς,
τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ
512d τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ' ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων
εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἐγὼ
λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ σῴζειν αὑτὸν καὶ
τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι
ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἰατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
τεχνῶν ὅσαι τοῦ σῴζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ',
μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ
σῴζειν τε καὶ σῴζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ
512e χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶν καὶ
οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ
καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι τὴν εἱμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν
εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον
ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιοίη, ἆρα ἐξομοιῶν
513a αὑτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ ἐν ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ
σὲ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ
μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ
πόλει· τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή,
δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας,
τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις αἵρεσις ἡμῖν
ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἴει
ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις
513b σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα
τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύῃ, Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν
δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον
ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ
μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις
ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς
πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὑτῶν γὰρ
513c ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ
ἄχθονται, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, φίλη κεφαλή.
λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, Καλλίκλεις;
Soc.Yet, you know, that too saves men from death, when they have got into a plight of the kind in which that accomplishment is needed. But if this seems to you too small a thing, I will tell you of a more important one, the art of piloting, which saves not only our lives but also our bodies and our goods from extreme perils, as rhetoric does. And at the same time it is plain-fashioned and orderly, not giving itself grand airs in a pretence of performing some transcendent feat; but in return for performing the same as the forensic art—bringing one safely over, it may be, from Aegina—it charges a fee, I believe, of two obols; or if it be from Egypt or the Pontus, at the very most—for this great service of bringing safe home, as I said just now, oneself and children and goods and womenfolk—on landing charges a couple of drachmae; the actual possessor of the art, after performing all this, goes ashore and strolls on the quay by his vessel’s side, with an unobtrusive demeanor. For he knows, I expect, how to estimate the uncertainty as to which of his passengers he has benefited by not letting them be lost at sea, and which he has injured, being aware that he has put them ashore not a whit better than when they came aboard, either in body or in soul.

And so he reckons out how wrong it is that, whereas a victim of severe and incurable diseases of the body who has escaped drowning is miserable in not having died, and has got no benefit at his hands, yet, if a man has many incurable diseases in that part of him so much more precious than the body, his soul, that such a person is to live, and that he will be doing him the service of saving him either from the sea or from a law court or from any other peril whatsoever: no, he knows it cannot be better for a man who is vicious to live, since he must needs live ill.
This is why it is not the custom for the pilot to give himself grand airs, though he does save our lives; nor for the engineer either, my admirable friend, who sometimes has the power of saving lives in no less degree than a general—to say nothing of a pilot—or anyone else: for at times he saves whole cities. Can you regard him as comparable with the lawyer? And yet, if he chose to speak as you people do, Callicles, magnifying his business, he would bury you in a heap of words, pleading and urging the duty of becoming engineers, as the only thing; for he would find reasons in plenty. But you none the less despise him and his special art, and you would call him engineer in a taunting sense, and would refuse either to bestow your daughter on his son or let your own son marry his daughter. And yet after the praises you sing of your own pursuits what fair ground have you for despising the engineer and the others whom I was mentioning just now? I know you would claim to be a better man and of better birth. But if better has not the meaning I give it, but virtue means just saving oneself and one’s belongings, whatever one’s character may be, you are merely ridiculous in cavilling at the engineer and the doctor and every other art that has been produced for our safety. No, my gifted friend, just see if the noble and the good are not something different from saving and being saved. For as to living any particular length of time, this is surely a thing that any true man should ignore, and not set his heart on mere life; but having resigned all this to Heaven and believing what the women say—that not one of us can escape his destiny—he should then proceed to consider in what way he will best live out his allotted span of life;

whether in assimilating himself to the constitution of the state in which he may be dwelling— and so therefore now, whether it is your duty to make yourself as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you intend to win its affection and have great influence in the city: see if this is to your advantage and mine, so that we may not suffer, my distinguished friend, the fate that they say befalls the creatures who would draw down the moon—the hags of Thessaly; that our choice of this power in the city may not cost us all that we hold most dear. But if you suppose that anyone in the world can transmit to you such an art as will cause you to have great power in this state without conforming to its government either for better or for worse, in my opinion you are ill-advised, Callicles; for you must be no mere imitator, but essentially like them, if you mean to achieve any genuine sort of friendship with Demus the Athenian people, ay, and I dare swear, with Demus son of Pyrilampes as well. So whoever can render you most like them is the person to make you a statesman in the way that you desire to be a statesman, and a rhetorician; for everybody is delighted with words that are designed for his special temper, but is annoyed by what is spoken to suit aliens—unless you have some other view, dear creature. Have we any objection to this, Callicles?

ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν,
Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι
πείθομαι.
Call.It seems to me, I cannot tell how, that your statement is right, Socrates, but I share the common feeling; I do not quite believe you.
ΣΩ. δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις [ἴσως καὶ] βέλτιον
513d ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσῃ. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν
ὅτι δύ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν,
καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν,
τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ
διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν τότε ὡριζόμεθα;
Soc.Because the love of Demus, Callicles, is there in your soul to resist me: but if haply we come to examine these same questions more than once, and better, you will believe. Remember, however, that we said there were two treatments that might be used in the tendance of any particular thing, whether body or soul: one, making pleasure the aim in our dealings with it; the other, working for what is best, not indulging it but striving with it as hard as we can. Was not this the distinction we were making at that point?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν μὲν ἑτέρα, πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ
οὐδὲν ἄλλο κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα· γάρ;
Soc.Then the one, aiming at pleasure, is ignoble and really nothing but flattery, is it not?
513e ΚΑΛ.Ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως.
Call.Be it so, if you like.
ΣΩ. δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο,
εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὂν εἴτε ψυχή, θεραπεύομεν;
Soc.And the aim of the other is to make that which we are tending, whether it be body or soul, as good as may be.
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.To be sure.
ΣΩ.Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστιν τῇ πόλει
καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς
πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
ηὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδεμίαν
514a προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ κἀγαθὴ διάνοια τῶν
μελλόντων χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἀρχήν τινων
ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. φῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;
Soc.Then ought we not to make it our endeavor, in tending our city and its citizens, to make those citizens as good as possible? For without this, you see, as we found in our former argument, there is no use in offering any other service, unless the intentions of those who are going to acquire either great wealth or special authority or any other sort of power be fair and honorable. Are we to grant that?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.
Call.Certainly, if you so prefer.
ΣΩ.Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ
πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά,
τειχῶν νεωρίων ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα,
πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ
514b ἐξετάσαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην οὐκ
ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει
ἂν οὔ;
Soc.Then if you and I, Callicles, in setting about some piece of public business for the state, were to invite one another to see to the building part of it, say the most important erections either of walls or arsenals or temples, would it be our duty to consider and examine ourselves, first as to whether we understood the art of building or not, and from whom we had learnt it? Would we have to do this, or not?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα
ᾠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ
τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν· καὶ εἰ μὲν
ηὑρίσκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ
514c ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ
μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ᾠκοδομημένα ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια
ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων,
νοῦν ἐχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα·
εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἴχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματά
τε μηδὲν πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω
δὴ ἀνόητον ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ
παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι
514d οὔ;
Soc.And so again, in the second place, whether we had ever erected any building privately for one of our friends or for ourselves, and whether such building was handsome or ugly? And if we found on consideration that we had been under good and reputable masters, and that there were many handsome buildings that had been erected by us with our masters’ guidance, and many also by ourselves alone, after we had dispensed with our masters, it might, in those circumstances, be open to men of sense to enter upon public works: but if we had neither a master of ourselves to point to, nor any buildings at all, or only a number of worthless ones, in that case surely it would be senseless to attempt public works or invite one another to take them in hand. Shall we agree to the correctness of this statement or not?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Yes, to be sure.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες
δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ
ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, Φέρε
πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς
ὑγίειαν; ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου,
δοῦλος ἐλεύθερος; κἂν ἐγὼ οἶμαι περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα
τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὑρίσκομεν δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα
514e βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν
ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, Καλλίκλεις,
οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας
ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως
ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι
ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν
κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν
ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν
σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;
Soc.And so too with all the rest: suppose, for instance, we had undertaken the duties of state-physicians, and were to invite one another to the work as qualified doctors, we should, I presume, have first inquired of each other, I of you and you of me: Let us see now, in Heaven’s name; how does Socrates himself stand as regards his body’s health? Or has anyone else, slave or free, ever had Socrates to thank for ridding him of a disease? And I also, I fancy, should make the same sort of inquiry about you; and then, if we found we had never been the cause of an improvement in the bodily condition of anyone, stranger or citizen, man or woman,—by Heaven, Callicles, would it not in truth be ridiculous that men should descend to such folly that, before having plenty of private practice, sometimes with indifferent results, sometimes with success, and so getting adequate training in the art, they should, as the saying is, try to learn pottery by starting on a wine-jar, and start public practice themselves and invite others of their like to do so? Do you not think it would be mere folly to act thus?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔμοιγε.
Call.I do.
515a ΣΩ.Νῦν δέ, βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς
ἄρτι ἄρχῃ πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς
καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα
ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκεν
τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὤν, ἄδικός τε
καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλός τε κἀγαθὸς
γέγονεν, ξένος ἀστός, δοῦλος ἐλεύθερος; λέγε μοι,
515b ἐάν τίς σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, Καλλίκλεις, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα
φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ;
ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος,
πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;
Soc.And now, most excellent sir, since you are yourself just entering upon a public career, and are inviting me to do the same, and reproaching me for not doing it, shall we not inquire of one another: Let us see, has Callicles ever made any of the citizens better? Is there one who was previously wicked, unjust, licentious, and senseless, and has to thank Callicles for making him an upright, honorable man, whether stranger or citizen, bond or free? Tell me, if anyone examines you in these terms, Callicles, what will you say? What human being will you claim to have made better by your intercourse? Do you shrink from answering, if there really is some work of yours in private life that can serve as a step to your public practice?
ΚΑΛ.Φιλόνικος εἶ, Σώκρατες.
Call.You are contentious, Socrates!
ΣΩ.Ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονικίᾳ γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος
εἰδέναι ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον οἴει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι
ἐν ἡμῖν. ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσῃ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ
515c τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν;
οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν
πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὡμολογήκαμεν οὔ; ἀποκρίνου. ὡμολογήκαμεν·
ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο
δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν
μοι ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ
πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι,
515d Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς.
Soc.No, it is not from contentiousness that I ask you this, but from a real wish to know in what manner you can imagine you ought to conduct yourself as one of our public men. Or can it be, then, that you will let us see you concerning yourself with anything else in your management of the city’s affairs than making us, the citizens, as good as possible? Have we not more than once already admitted that this is what the statesman ought to do? Have we admitted it or not? Answer. We have: I will answer for you. Then if this is what the good man ought to accomplish for his country, recall now those men whom you mentioned a little while ago, and tell me if you still consider that they showed themselves good citizens— Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles.
ΚΑΛ.Ἔμοιγε.
Call.Yes, I do.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν
βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει οὔ;
Soc.Then if they were good, clearly each of them was changing the citizens from worse to better. Was this so, or not?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;
Soc.So when Pericles began to speak before the people, the Athenians were worse than when he made his last speeches?
ΚΑΛ.Ἴσως.
Call.Perhaps.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἴσως δή, βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν
ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης.
Soc.Not perhaps, as you say, excellent sir; it follows of necessity from what we have admitted, on the assumption that he was a good citizen.
515e ΚΑΛ.Τί οὖν δή;
Call.Well, what then?
ΣΩ.Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται
Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, πᾶν τοὐναντίον
διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω,
Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ
λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.
Soc.Nothing: but tell me one thing in addition,—whether the Athenians are said to have become better because of Pericles, or quite the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. What I, for my part, hear is that Pericles has made the Athenians idle, cowardly, talkative, and avaricious, by starting the system of public fees.
ΚΑΛ.Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, Σώκρατες.
Call.You hear that from the folk with battered ears, Socrates.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ
ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὐδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ
οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι,
ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν
516a ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν
αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν,
δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.
Soc.Ah, but what is no longer a matter of hearsay, but rather of certain knowledge, for you as well as for me, is that Pericles was popular at first, and the Athenians passed no degrading sentence upon him so long as they were worse; but as soon as they had been made upright and honorable by him, at the end of our Pericles’ life they convicted him of embezzlement, and all but condemned him to death, clearly because they thought him a rogue.
ΚΑΛ.Τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;
Call.What then? Was Pericles a bad man on that account?
ΣΩ.Ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν
τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας
ἑαυτὸν μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε
ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι
516b κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὁστισοῦν ὁτουοῦν ζῴου, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν
ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα παρέλαβε; δοκεῖ
οὔ;
Soc.Well, at any rate a herdsman in charge of asses or horses or oxen would be considered a bad one for being like that—if he took over animals that did not kick him or butt or bite, and in the result they were found to be doing all these things out of sheer wildness. Or do you not consider any keeper of any animal whatever a bad one, if he turns out the creature he received tame so much wilder than he found it? Do you, or do you not?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.
Call.Certainly I do, to oblige you.
ΣΩ.Καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότερον
καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἓν τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶν οὔ;
Soc.Then oblige me still further by answering this: is man also one of the animals, or not?
ΚΑΛ.Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Call.Of course he is.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;
Soc.And Pericles had charge of men?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν,
δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ
516c ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά;
Soc.Well now, ought they not, as we admitted this moment, to have been made by him more just instead of more unjust, if he was a good statesman while he had charge of them?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος· σὺ
δὲ τί φῄς; οὐχ οὕτως;
Soc.And the just are gentle, as Homer said. But what say you? Is it not so?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν οἵους
παρέλαβεν, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὑτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.
Soc.But, however, he turned them out wilder than when he took them in hand, and that against himself, the last person he would have wished them to attack.
ΚΑΛ.Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;
Call.You wish me to agree with you?
ΣΩ.Εἰ δοκῶ γε σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
Soc.Yes, if you consider I am speaking the truth.
ΚΑΛ.Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.
Call.Then be it so.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ
χείρους;
Soc.And if wilder, more unjust and worse?
516d ΚΑΛ.Ἔστω.
Call.Be it so.
ΣΩ.Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου
τοῦ λόγου.
Soc.Then Pericles was not a good statesman, by this argument.
ΚΑΛ.Οὐ σύ γε φῄς.
Call.You at least say not.
ΣΩ.Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὡμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ
λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οὓς
ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς;
καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν;
Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον
516e ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν
ἄν; καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φῄς, οὐκ
ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ'
ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ
θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται
ἡνίοχοι, τότ' ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ
οὔτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· δοκεῖ σοι;
Soc.And you too, I declare, by what you admitted. And now about Cimon once more, tell me, did not the people whom he tended ostracize him in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And Themistocles, did they not treat him in just the same way, and add the punishment of exile? And Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, they sentenced to be flung into the pit, and had it not been for the president, in he would have gone. And yet these men, had they been good in the way that you describe them, would never have met with such a fate. Good drivers, at any rate, do not keep their seat in the chariot at their first race to be thrown out later on, when they have trained their teams and acquired more skill in driving! This never occurs either in charioteering or in any other business; or do you think it does?
ΚΑΛ.Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
Call.No, I do not.
ΣΩ.Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν,
517a ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ
ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὡμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα,
τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας·
οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι
ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντοοὐ γὰρ
ἂν ἐξέπεσονοὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.
Soc.So what we said before, it seems, was true, that we know of nobody who has shown himself a good statesman in this city of ours. You admitted there was nobody among those of the present day, but thought there were some amongst those of former times, and you gave these men the preference. But these we have found to be on a par with ours of the present day and so, if they were orators, they employed neither the genuine art of rhetoric—else they would not have been thrown out—nor the flattering form of it.
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, Σώκρατες, μή
ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται οἷα τούτων ὅστις
517b βούλει εἴργασται.
Call.But still there can be no suggestion, Socrates, that any of the present-day men has ever achieved anything like the deeds of anyone you may choose amongst those others.
ΣΩ. δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε διακόνους
εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι
γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν
ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ
ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελλον
ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν
517c τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ
πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ
τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους
τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε
καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγόμεθα
οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ
ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις
οἶμαι ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι ὡς ἄρα διττὴ αὕτη τις
517d πραγματεία ἔστιν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν,
καὶ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονική ἐστιν, δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν,
ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά,
ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῷ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται
σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾷον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν
εἶναι κάπηλον ὄντα ἔμπορον δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν
517e τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ὀψοποιὸν ὑφάντην σκυτοτόμον
σκυτοδεψόν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ
αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ
μὴ εἰδότι ὅτι ἔστιν τις παρὰ ταύτας ἁπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική
τε καὶ ἰατρική, δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε ἐστὶν σώματος
θεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν
τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι
χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ποτῶν ἐστιν εἰς ἀρετὴν
518a σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ
ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους
εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ
γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι
τούτων. ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, τοτὲ
μέν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς
ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων ὅτι ἄνθρωποι
518b καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν
ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι
ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ
ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν εἰσὶν
σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων
ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς
τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι
γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς
518c παρασκευάζων, δὲ ὄψον, δὲ οἶνον. ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις,
εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι Ἄνθρωπε, ἐπαΐεις οὐδὲν
περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν
παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν
οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἵ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ
παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ'
αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας· οἱ
518d δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἑστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων
αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ'
οἳ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι,
ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῷ
ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους
αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσιν καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἷοί
τ' ὦσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν
518e ἐγκωμιάσουσιν. καὶ σὺ νῦν, Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον
τούτῳ ἐργάζῃ· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τούτους εἱστιάκασιν
εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν. καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν
πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν
519a δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ
σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ
τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν
πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς
τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ
καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους
τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ
τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προςαπολλύωσι
519b πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν
ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ
νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι.
αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν
μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων
ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν
πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς τούτων
λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστιν· προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως
519c οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς
προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ
προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί,
τἆλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα·
φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσιν
τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς [αὑτούς], τούς τε
μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες,
519d εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον
εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους,
ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου,
σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ
δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ἑταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν
με ἠνάγκασας, Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
Soc.My admirable friend, neither do I blame the latter, at least as servants of the state; indeed, I consider they have shown themselves more serviceable than those of our time, and more able to procure for the city the things she desired. But in diverting her desires another way instead of complying with them—in persuading or compelling her people to what would help them to be better— they were scarcely, if at all, superior to their successors; and that is the only business of a good citizen. But in providing ships and walls and arsenals, and various other things of the sort, I do grant you that they were cleverer than our leaders. Thus you and I are doing an absurd thing in this discussion: for during all the time that we have been debating we have never ceased circling round to the same point and misunderstanding each other. I at all events believe you have more than once admitted and decided that this management of either body or soul is a twofold affair, and that on one side it is a menial service, whereby it is possible to provide meat for our bodies when they are hungry, drink when thirsty, and when they are cold, clothing, bedding, shoes, or anything else that bodies are apt to desire: I purposely give you the same illustrations, in order that you may the more easily comprehend. For as to being able to supply these things, either as a tradesman or a merchant or a manufacturer of any such actual things—baker or cook or weaver or shoemaker or tanner—it is no wonder that a man in such capacity should appear to himself and his neighbors to be a minister of the body; to every one, in fact, who is not aware that there is besides all these an art of gymnastics and medicine which really is, of course, ministration to the body, and which actually has a proper claim to rule over all those arts and to make use of their works, because it knows what is wholesome or harmful in meat and drink to bodily excellence, whereas all those others know it not;

and hence it is that, while those other arts are slavish and menial and illiberal in dealing with the body, gymnastics and medicine can fairly claim to be their mistresses. Now, that the very same is the case as regards the soul you appear to me at one time to understand to be my meaning, and you admit it as though you knew what I meant; but a little later you come and tell me that men have shown themselves upright and honorable citizens in our city, and when I ask you who, you seem to me to be putting forward men of exactly the same sort in public affairs; as if, on my asking you who in gymnastics have ever been or now are good trainers of the body, you were to tell me, in all seriousness, Thearion, the baker, Mithaecus, the author of the book on Sicilian cookery, Sarambus, the vintner—these have shown themselves wonderful ministers of the body; the first providing admirable loaves, the second tasty dishes, and the third wine. Now perhaps you would be indignant should I then say to you: Sir, you know nothing about gymnastics; servants you tell me of, and caterers to appetites, fellows who have no proper and respectable knowledge of them, and who peradventure will first stuff and fatten men’s bodies to the tune of their praises, and then cause them to lose even the flesh they had to start with; and these in their turn will be too ignorant to cast the blame of their maladies and of their loss of original weight upon their regalers, but any people who chance to be by at the time and offer them some advice—just when the previous stuffing has brought, after the lapse of some time, its train of disease, since it was done without regard to what is wholesome—these are the people they will accuse and chide and harm as far as they can, while they will sing the praises of that former crew who caused the mischief. And you now, Callicles, are doing something very similar to this: you belaud men who have regaled the citizens with all the good cheer they desired.

People do say they have made the city great; but that it is with the swelling of an imposthume, due to those men of the former time, this they do not perceive. For with no regard for temperance and justice they have stuffed the city with harbors and arsenals and walls and tribute and suchlike trash; and so whenever that access of debility comes they will lay the blame on the advisers who are with them at the time, and belaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who caused all the trouble; and belike they will lay hold of you, if you are not on your guard, and my good friend Alcibiades, when they are losing what they had originally as well as what they have acquired, though you are not the authors, except perhaps part-authors, of the mischief. And yet there is a senseless thing which I see happening now, and hear of, in connection with the men of former times. For I observe that whenever the state proceeds against one of her statesmen as a wrongdoer, they are indignant and protest loudly against such monstrous treatment: after all their long and valuable services to the state they are unjustly ruined at her hands, so they protest. But the whole thing is a lie; since there is not a single case in which a ruler of a city could ever be unjustly ruined by the very city that he rules. For it is very much the same with pretenders to statesmanship as with professors of sophistry. The sophists, in fact, with all their other accomplishments, act absurdly in one point: claiming to be teachers of virtue, they often accuse their pupils of doing them an injury by cheating them of their fees and otherwise showing no recognition of the good they have done them. Now what can be more unreasonable than this plea? That men, after they have been made good and just, after all their injustice has been rooted out by their teacher and replaced by justice, should be unjust through something that they have not! Does not this seem to you absurd, my dear friend? In truth you have forced me to make quite a harangue, Callicles, by refusing to answer.

ΚΑΛ.Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι
ἀποκρίνοιτο;
Call.And you are the man who could not speak unless somebody answered you?
519e ΣΩ.Ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων,
ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὲ
πρὸς Φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα
πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς
γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;
Soc.Apparently I can. Just now, at any rate, I am rather extending my speeches, since you will not answer me. But in the name of friendship, my good fellow, tell me if you do not think it unreasonable for a man, while professing to have made another good, to blame him for being wicked in spite of having been made good by him and still being so?
ΚΑΛ.Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Call.Yes, I do.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων
παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;
Soc.Well, and you hear such things said by those who profess to give men education in virtue?
520a ΚΑΛ.Ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς
ἀξίων;
Call.I do; but what is one to say of such worthless people?
ΣΩ.Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι
τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη
ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης;
οἴει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταὐτόν,
μακάρι', ἐστὶν σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον,
ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν
520b τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς.
τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστιν σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς
ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς·
μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς
οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν,
ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ
τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν
οὕς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
Soc.And what is one to say of those who, professing to govern the state and take every care that she be as good as possible, turn upon her and accuse her, any time it suits them, of being utterly wicked? Do you see any difference between these men and the others? Sophist and orator, my estimable friend, are the same thing, or very much of a piece, as I was telling Polus; but you in your ignorance think the one thing, rhetoric, a very fine affair, and despise the other. Yet in reality sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric by so much as legislation is finer than judicature, and gymnastic than medicine: in fact, for my own part, I always regarded public speakers and sophists as the only people who have no call to complain of the thing that they themselves educate, for its wickedness towards them; as otherwise they must in the same words be also charging themselves with having been of no use to those whom they say they benefit. Is it not so?
520c ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Certainly.
ΣΩ.Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ,
ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον.
ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς
γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν
χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος
αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι
520d τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ βραδυτῆτι οἶμαι ἀδικοῦσιν
οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικίᾳ· γάρ;
Soc.And they alone, I presume, could most likely afford to give away their services without fee, if their words were true. For when a man has received any other service, for example, if he has acquired a fast pace from a trainer’s lessons, he might possibly cheat him of his due if the trainer freely offered himself and did not stipulate for a fee to be paid down by the other as nearly as possible at the moment when he imparted to him the fast pace he required; for it is not through a slow pace, I conceive, that men act unjustly, but through injustice; is it not?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν,
οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς
ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις
ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;
Soc.And so whoever removes this particular thing, injustice, need never have a fear of being unjustly treated; this benefit alone may be freely bestowed without risk, granted that one really had the power of making people good. Is it not so?
ΚΑΛ.Φημί.
Call.I agree.
ΣΩ.Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς
συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι
τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.
Soc.Then this, it seems, is the reason why there is no disgrace in taking money for giving every other kind of advice, as about building or the rest of the arts.
520e ΚΑΛ.Ἔοικέ γε.
Call.It does seem so.
ΣΩ.Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν' ἄν τις τρόπον
ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ
πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν
μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. γάρ;
Soc.But about this business of finding the way to be as good as possible, and of managing one’s own household or city for the best, it is recognized to be a disgrace for one to decline to give advice except for a payment in cash, is it not?
ΚΑΛ.Ναί.
Call.Yes.
ΣΩ.Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη
τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ
ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας
ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ.
ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;
Soc.The reason evidently being that this is the only sort of service that makes the person so served desire to do one in return and hence it is felt to be a good sign when this service that one has done is repaid to one in kind; but when this is not so, the contrary is felt. Is the case as I say?
521a ΚΑΛ.Ἔστιν.
Call.It is.
ΣΩ.Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν
τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις
ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ὡς διακονήσοντα
καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; τἀληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, Καλλίκλεις·
δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ,
διατελεῖν νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.
Soc.Then please specify to which of these two ministrations to the state you are inviting me—that of struggling hard, like a doctor, with the Athenians to make them as good as possible, or that of seeking to serve their wants and humor them at every turn? Tell me the truth, Callicles; for it is only right that, as you began by speaking to me frankly, you should continue to tell me what you think. So now speak out like a good, generous man.
ΚΑΛ.Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.
Call.I say then, the way of seeking to serve them.
521b ΣΩ.Κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.
Soc.So it is to a flatterer’s work, most noble sir, that you invite me?
ΚΑΛ.Εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, Σώκρατες· ὡς
εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις
Call.Work for a mean Mysian, if you prefer the name, Socrates; for unless you do as I say—
ΣΩ.Μὴ εἴπῃς πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με
βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός γε
ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα
μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι Ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅτι χρήσεται
αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ
521c λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς, εἰ δὲ
αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.
Soc.Do not tell me, what you have so often repeated, that anyone who pleases will put me to death, lest I on my side should have to tell you that it will be a villain killing a good man; nor that anyone may strip me of whatever I have, lest I should have to say in my turn: Well, but when he has stripped me, he will not know what use to make of his spoil, but as he stripped me unjustly so will he use his spoil unjustly, and if unjustly, foully, and if foully, ill.
ΚΑΛ.Ὥς μοι δοκεῖς, Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν
ἓν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς
εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ
φαύλου.
Call.It quite strikes me, Socrates, that you believe not one of these troubles could befall you, as though you dwelt out of the way, and could never be dragged into a law court by some perhaps utterly paltry rascal.
ΣΩ.Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ
οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὁντινοῦν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν.
τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ
521d τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων, σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς μ' ἔσται
εἰσάγωνοὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἄνθρωπον
εἰσαγάγοικαὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι
εἴπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;
Soc.Then I am a fool, Callicles, in truth, if I do not suppose that in this city anyone, whoever he was, might find himself, as luck should have it, in any sort of plight. Of one thing, however, I am sure—that if ever I am brought before the court and stand in any such danger as you mention, it will be some villain who brings me there, for no honest man would prosecute a person who had done no wrong; and it would be no marvel if I were put to death. Would you like me to tell you my reason for expecting this?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Do, by all means.
ΣΩ.Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος,
ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ
πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς
λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς
521e τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ
ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. αὐτὸς δέ
μοι ἥκει λόγος ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ
ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ.
σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις
ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι " παῖδες,
πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ
τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ
522a ἰσχναίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα
διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ
πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ηὐώχουν ὑμᾶς·" τί ἂν οἴει
ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; εἰ
εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι "Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν,
παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς," πόσον τι οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους
δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;
Soc.I think I am one of few, not to say the only one, in Athens who attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of the present time who manages affairs of state: hence, as the speeches that I make from time to time are not aimed at gratification, but at what is best instead of what is most pleasant, and as I do not care to deal in these pretty toys that you recommend, I shall have not a word to say at the bar. The same case that I made out to Polus will apply to me; for I shall be like a doctor tried by a bench of children on a charge brought by a cook.

Just consider what defence a person like that would make at such a pass, if the prosecutor should speak against him thus: Children, this fellow has done you all a great deal of personal mischief, and he destroys even the youngest of you by cutting and burning, and starves and chokes you to distraction, giving you nasty bitter draughts and forcing you to fast and thirst; not like me, who used to gorge you with abundance of nice things of every sort. What do you suppose a doctor brought to this sad pass could say for himself? Or if he spoke the truth—All this I did, my boys, for your health—how great, think you, would be the outcry from such a bench as that? A loud one, would it not?

ΚΑΛ.Ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.
Call.I daresay: one must suppose so.
ΣΩ.Οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅτι
522b χρὴ εἰπεῖν;
Soc.Then you suppose he would be utterly at a loss what to say?
ΚΑΛ.Πάνυ γε.
Call.Quite so.
ΣΩ.Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν
εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα
ἕξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελίας νομίζουσιν,
ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται·
ἐάν τέ τίς με νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα,
τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους
ἰδίᾳ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἕξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαίως
522c πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο,
ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν
τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.
Soc.Such, however, I am sure would be my own fate if I were brought before the court. For not only shall I have no pleasures to plead as having been provided by me—which they regard as services and benefits, whereas I envy neither those who provide them nor those for whom they are provided—but if anyone alleges that I either corrupt the younger men by reducing them to perplexity, or revile the older with bitter expressions whether in private or in public, I shall be unable either to tell the truth and say—It is on just ground that I say all this, and it is your interest that I serve thereby, gentlemen of the jury—or to say anything else; and so I daresay any sort of thing, as luck may have it, will befall me.
ΚΑΛ.Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος
ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ
βοηθεῖν;
Call.Then do you think, Socrates, that a man in such a case and with no power of standing up for himself makes a fine figure in a city?
ΣΩ.Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἓν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, Καλλίκλεις, σὺ
πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὑτῷ, μήτε περὶ
522d ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς μήτε
εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γὰρ τῆς βοηθείας ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν
ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι
ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν,
αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος
καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνῄσκοιμι,
ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ
τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα
522e τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται,
ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ
δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν
ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν.
εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον
λέξαι.
Soc.Yes, if he had that one resource, Callicles, which you have repeatedly admitted; if he had stood up for himself by avoiding any unjust word or deed in regard either to men or to gods. For this has been repeatedly admitted by us to be the most valuable kind of self-protection. Now if I were convicted of inability to extend this sort of protection to either myself or another, I should be ashamed, whether my conviction took place before many or few, or as between man and man; and if that inability should bring about my death, I should be sorely vexed: but if I came to my end through a lack of flattering rhetoric, I am quite sure you would see me take my death easily. For no man fears the mere act of dying, except he be utterly irrational and unmanly; doing wrong is what one fears: for to arrive in the nether world having one’s soul full fraught with a heap of misdeeds is the uttermost of all evils. And now, if you do not mind, I would like to tell you a tale to show you that the case is so.
ΚΑΛ.Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο
πέρανον.
Call.Well, as you have completed the rest of the business, go on and complete this also.
523a ΣΩ.Ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν
ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ
ὄντα σοι λέξω μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει,
διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν Ζεὺς καὶ Ποσειδῶν καὶ Πλούτων,
ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ
ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς,
τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ
523b ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν
ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως
εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, δὴ Τάρταρον
καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι
νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων,
ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν· κακῶς οὖν
αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. τε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ
ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία ὅτι φοιτῷέν
523c σφιν ἄνθρωποι ἑκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν Ζεύς· "Ἀλλ'
ἐγώ," ἔφη, "παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς
αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ κρινόμενοι
κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν," δ' ὅς,
"ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ
καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν κρίσις , ἔρχονται
αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν·
523d οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ
ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς
αὑτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι.
ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ
αὑτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν
οὖν," ἔφη, "παυστέον ἐστὶν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον·
νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ
523e ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον
ἁπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν
κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν
ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον
πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα
ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία κρίσις . ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν
ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς ὑεῖς
ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν,
524a ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι,
δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς
φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, δ' εἰς Τάρταρον.
καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς
δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνῳ δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω ἐπιδιακρίνειν,
ἐὰν ἀπορῆτόν τι τὼ ἑτέρω, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη κρίσις
περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις."
Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, Καλλίκλεις, ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω
524b ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι
συμβαίνειν. θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν
ἄλλο δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ
σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἄρα ἀπ'
ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἧττον ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν
αὑτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν
τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἔνδηλα
524c πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει τροφῇ
ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ νεκρὸς
μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχὺς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τἆλλα
οὕτως· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ
νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν
οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἄλλων τραυμάτων
ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον·
κατεαγότα εἴ του ἦν μέλη διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ
524d τεθνεῶτος ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι
παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος
πάντα τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον. ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ
τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα
πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά
τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν
ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄνθρωπος. ἐπειδὰν
οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας
524e παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας
θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ
πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄλλου
ὁτουοῦν βασιλέως δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς
ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ
525a ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἑκάστη πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο
εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας
καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ
ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν
πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν
ψυχὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς
φρουρᾶς, οἷ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη.
525b προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς
τιμωρουμένῳ, βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι παραδείγματι
τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα
ἂν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ
μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ
ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως
δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ὠφελία καὶ
ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
525c οἳ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα
γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται
οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους
ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ
φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα
ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ,
τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα.
525d ὧν ἐγώ φημι ἕνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει
Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος · οἶμαι δὲ
καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ
τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων
πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ
ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις
καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκεν
525e τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ
Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς
ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον
ὡς ἀνίατονοὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος
ἦν οἷς ἐξῆνἀλλὰ γάρ, Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν
526a δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι·
οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι,
καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ,
Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ
τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται
οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ
καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως
526b διαχειρίζειν ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος
γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης Λυσιμάχου·
οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν.
ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκεῖνος
τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν,
οὔθ' ὅστις οὔθ' ὧντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ τοῦτο
κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάντε
ἰάσιμος ἐάντε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος
526c τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως
βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἄλλου τινός,
μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ
αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ,
ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταὐτὰ δὲ
ταῦτα καὶ Αἰακόςἑκάτερος τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει
δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν
526d σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς Ὁμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν
χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, Καλλίκλεις, ὑπό τε τούτων τῶν λόγων
πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην
τὴν ψυχήν· χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν
πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι
ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνῄσκω
526e ἀποθνῄσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους,
καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ
τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ
πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ
οἷός τ' ἔσῃ σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν δίκη σοι καὶ κρίσις
ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν,
527a τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὑόν, ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ,
χασμήσῃ καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ
ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ
πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.
Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς
καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν
τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ
ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ
σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ
527b Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν
τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων. ἀλλ' ἐν
τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος
ἠρεμεῖ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον
τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ
δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ·
ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο
δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ
527c κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν
περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους
καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον
ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει. ἐμοὶ οὖν
πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις
καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς λόγος σημαίνει. καὶ
ἔασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου καὶ προπηλακίσαι,
ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν
527d ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσῃ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι
ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν. κἄπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ
ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς
πολιτικοῖς, ὁποῖον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα,
βελτίους ὄντες βουλεύεσθαι νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς
γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὡς τὶ ὄντας,
οἷς οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ
527e τῶν μεγίστωνεἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευσίαςὥσπερ
οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς
ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν
δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ
τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἑπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν,
μὴ ἐκείνῳ, σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ
οὐδενὸς ἄξιος Καλλίκλεις.
Soc.Give ear then, as they say, to a right fine story, which you will regard as a fable, I fancy, but I as an actual account; for what I am about to tell you I mean to offer as the truth. By Homer’s account, Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto divided the sovereignty amongst them when they took it over from their father. Now in the time of Cronos there was a law concerning mankind, and it holds to this very day amongst the gods, that every man who has passed a just and holy life departs after his decease to the Isles of the Blest, and dwells in all happiness apart from ill; but whoever has lived unjustly and impiously goes to the dungeon of requital and penance which, you know, they call Tartarus. Of these men there were judges in Cronos’ time, and still of late in the reign of Zeus—living men to judge the living upon the day when each was to breathe his last; and thus the cases were being decided amiss. So Pluto and the overseers from the Isles of the Blest came before Zeus with the report that they found men passing over to either abode undeserving. Then spake Zeus: Nay, said he, I will put a stop to these proceedings. The cases are now indeed judged ill and it is because they who are on trial are tried in their clothing, for they are tried alive. Now many, said he, who have wicked souls are clad in fair bodies and ancestry and wealth, and at their judgement appear many witnesses to testify that their lives have been just. Now, the judges are confounded not only by their evidence but at the same time by being clothed themselves while they sit in judgement, having their own soul muffled in the veil of eyes and ears and the whole body. Thus all these are a hindrance to them, their own habiliments no less than those of the judged. Well, first of all, he said, we must put a stop to their foreknowledge of their death; for this they at present foreknow. However, Prometheus has already been given the word to stop this in them. Next they must be stripped bare of all those things before they are tried; for they must stand their trial dead. Their judge also must be naked, dead, beholding with very soul the very soul of each immediately upon his death, bereft of all his kin and having left behind on earth all that fine array, to the end that the judgement may be just.

Now I, knowing all this before you, have appointed sons of my own to be judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. These, when their life is ended, shall give judgement in the meadow at the dividing of the road, whence are the two ways leading, one to the Isles of the Blest, and the other to Tartarus. And those who come from Asia shall Rhadamanthus try, and those from Europe, Aeacus; and to Minos I will give the privilege of the final decision, if the other two be in any doubt; that the judgement upon this journey of mankind may be supremely just.
This, Callicles, is what I have heard and believe to be true; and from these stories, on my reckoning, we must draw some such moral as this: death, as it seems to me, is actually nothing but the disconnection of two things, the soul and the body, from each other. And so when they are disconnected from one another, each of them keeps its own condition very much as it was when the man was alive, the body having its own nature, with its treatments and experiences all manifest upon it. For instance, if anyone’s body was large by nature or by feeding or by both when he was alive, his corpse will be large also when he is dead; and if he was fat, it will be fat too after his death, and so on for the rest; or again, if he used to follow the fashion of long hair, long-haired also will be his corpse. Again, if anyone had been a sturdy rogue, and bore traces of his stripes in scars on his body, either from the whip or from other wounds, while yet alive, then after death too his body has these marks visible upon it; or if anyone’s limbs were broken or distorted in life, these same effects are manifest in death. In a word, whatever sort of bodily appearance a man had acquired in life, that is manifest also after his death either wholly or in the main for some time. And so it seems to me that the same is the case with the soul too, Callicles: when a man’s soul is stripped bare of the body, all its natural gifts, and the experiences added to that soul as the result of his various pursuits, are manifest in it. So when they have arrived in presence of their judge, they of Asia before Rhadamanthus, these Rhadamanthus sets before him and surveys the soul of each, not knowing whose it is; nay, often when he has laid hold of the Great King or some other prince or potentate, he perceives the utter unhealthiness of his soul, striped all over with the scourge, and a mass of wounds, the work of perjuries and injustice;

where every act has left its smirch upon his soul, where all is awry through falsehood and imposture, and nothing straight because of a nurture that knew not truth: or, as the result of an unbridled course of fastidiousness, insolence, and incontinence, he finds the soul full fraught with disproportion and ugliness. Beholding this he sends it away in dishonor straight to the place of custody, where on its arrival it is to endure the sufferings that are fitting. And it is fitting that every one under punishment rightly inflicted on him by another should either be made better and profit thereby, or serve as an example to the rest, that others seeing the sufferings he endures may in fear amend themselves. Those who are benefited by the punishment they get from gods and men are they who have committed remediable offences; but still it is through bitter throes of pain that they receive their benefit both here and in the nether world; for in no other way can there be riddance of iniquity. But of those who have done extreme wrong and, as a result of such crimes, have become incurable, of those are the examples made; no longer are they profited at all themselves, since they are incurable, but others are profited who behold them undergoing for their transgressions the greatest, sharpest, and most fearful sufferings evermore, actually hung up as examples there in the infernal dungeon, a spectacle and a lesson to such of the wrongdoers as arrive from time to time. Among them I say Archelaus also will be found, if what Polus tells us is true, and every other despot of his sort. And I think, moreover, that most of these examples have come from despots and kings and potentates and public administrators; for these, since they have a free hand, commit the greatest and most impious offences. Homer also testifies to this; for he has represented kings and potentates as those who are punished everlastingly in the nether world—Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus; but Thersites, or any other private person who was wicked, has been portrayed by none as incurable and therefore subjected to heavy punishment; no doubt because he had not a free hand, and therefore was in fact happier than those who had.

For in fact, Callicles, it is among the powerful that we find the specially wicked men. Still there is nothing to prevent good men being found even among these, and it deserves our special admiration when they are; for it is hard, Callicles, and deserving of no slight praise, when a man with a perfectly free hand for injustice lives always a just life. The men of this sort are but few; for indeed there have been, and I expect there yet will be, both here and elsewhere, men of honor and excellence in this virtue of administering justly what is committed to their charge. One in fact there has been whose fame stands high among us and throughout the rest of Greece, Aristeides, son of Lysimachus; but most of those in power, my excellent friend, prove to be bad. So, as I was saying, whenever the judge Rhadamanthus has to deal with such a one, he knows nothing else of him at all, neither who he is nor of what descent, but only that he is a wicked person and on perceiving this he sends him away to Tartarus, first setting a mark on him to show whether he deems it a curable or an incurable case; and when the man arrives there he suffers what is fitting. Sometimes, when he discerns another soul that has lived a holy life in company with truth, a private man’s or any others—especially, as I claim, Callicles, a philosopher’s who has minded his own business and not been a busybody in his lifetime—he is struck with admiration and sends it off to the Isles of the Blest. And exactly the same is the procedure of Aeacus: each of these two holds a rod in his hand as he gives judgement; but Minor sits as supervisor, distinguished by the golden scepter that he holds, as Odysseus in Homer tells how he saw him—Holding a golden scepter,speaking dooms to the dead.Hom. Od. 11.569Now for my part, Callicles, I am convinced by these accounts, and I consider how I may be able to show my judge that my soul is in the best of health. So giving the go-by to the honors that most men seek I shall try, by inquiry into the truth, to be really good in as high a degree as I am able, both in my life and, when I come to die, in my death. And I invite all other men likewise, to the best of my power, and you particularly I invite in return, to this life and this contest, which I say is worth all other contests on this earth; and I make it a reproach to you, that you will not be able to deliver yourself when your trial comes and the judgement of which I told you just now;

but when you go before your judge, the son of Aegina, and he grips you and drags you up, you will gape and feel dizzy there no less than I do here, and some one perhaps will give you, yes, a degrading box on the ear, and will treat you with every kind of contumely.
Possibly, however, you regard this as an old wife’s tale, and despise it; and there would be no wonder in our despising it if with all our searching we could somewhere find anything better and truer than this: but as it is, you observe that you three, who are the wisest of the Greeks in our day—you and Polus and Gorgias— are unable to prove that we ought to live any other life than this, which is evidently advantageous also in the other world. But among the many statements we have made, while all the rest are refuted this one alone is unshaken—that doing wrong is to be more carefully shunned than suffering it; that above all things a man should study not to seem but to be good both in private and in public; that if one becomes bad in any respect one must be corrected; that this is good in the second place,— next to being just, to become so and to be corrected by paying the penalty; and that every kind of flattery, with regard either to oneself or to others, to few or to many, must be avoided; and that rhetoric is to be used for this one purpose always, of pointing to what is just, and so in every other activity. Take my advice, therefore, and follow me where, if you once arrive, you will be happy both in life and after life’s end, as this account declares. And allow anyone to contemn you as a fool and foully maltreat you if he chooses; yes, by Heaven, and suffer undaunted the shock of that ignominious cuff; for you will come to no harm if you be really a good and upright man, practicing virtue. And afterwards, having practiced it together, we shall in due course, if we deem it right, embark on politics, or proceed to consult on whatever we may think fit, being then better equipped for such counsel than we are now. For it is disgraceful that men in such a condition as we now appear to be in should put on a swaggering, important air when we never continue to be of the same mind upon the same questions, and those the greatest of all—we are so sadly uneducated. Let us therefore take as our guide the doctrine now disclosed, which indicates to us that this way of life is best—to live and die in the practice alike of justice and of all other virtue. This then let us follow, and to this invite every one else; not that to which you trust yourself and invite me, for it is nothing worth, Callicles.